Dr. Charles W. Wessner Director, Technology & Innovation The National Academies of Sciences, USA.
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Transcript of Dr. Charles W. Wessner Director, Technology & Innovation The National Academies of Sciences, USA.
Dr. Charles W. Dr. Charles W.
WessnerWessnerDirector, Technology & InnovationDirector, Technology & Innovation
The National Academies of The National Academies of Sciences, USASciences, USA
2
• Advisor, US Congress & Executive Agencies• Adjunct Professor, George Washington University;
University of Nottingham, England; Max Planck
Institute, Germany • Advisor, OECD Committee on Science and
Technology Policy• Advisor, Mexican National Council on Science and
Technology• Advisor, Finland National Technology Agency
(Tekes)• Advisor, Sweden National Technology Agency
(VINNOVA) • Member, Norwegian Technology Forum
3
Fostering Knowledge & InnovationAn Overview of the United States Innovation System
Innovation & Competitiveness Practitioners Workshop
Istanbul, TurkeyApril 19, 2004
Charles W. Wessner, Ph.D.Director, Technology and Innovation
National Research Council
4
The U.S. National Academies
NRC Mission:• The NRC is the Operating Arm of the National Academies; it includes 1300 Staff and a Budget of $160 Million• The NRC Mission is the Advise the Government on Science, Engineering, and Medicine: 270 Reports Each Year
National Academy of Sciences
National Academy of Engineering
Institute of Medicine
National Research Council
5
What is a National Innovation System?
• A network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, develop, modify, and commercialize new technologies– Increasingly, governments around the world
view the development and transformation of such systems as an important way to promote innovation —thus improving the competitiveness of domestic industries and services
– Can be better understood as an Eco-system
6
Why National Innovation “Eco-Systems”?
• “Eco-Systems” Because Innovation Systems Grow and Evolve– They are not constructed by an engineering
team to reach a fixed point
• The Good News: New policies and institutional change can help ecosystem to grow in new ways for new needs– Ecosystem characterized by dynamic
linkages among multiple sub-systems…
7
National Innovation “Eco-Systems”
• Ecosystem strengthened through linkages among a Nation’s – Human Resource base, – Information Infrastructure – Universities and Research Institutes, – A Positive Business Environment – Enabling Government Policies and
Programs• The Policies drive the System
8
U.S. Innovation Ecosystem
Strengths & Weaknesses• Strong Aggregate
Commitments to R&D • Distributed system with
multiple paths of Inquiry and Trial
• Culture of Inquiry & Entrepreneurship
• Entrepreneurship-friendly Business Environment
• Distribution of research portfolio can cause gaps & shortfalls, and can reduce the impact of R&D investments
• Political myths about the primacy of markets inhibit commercialization mechanisms
• Dominance of Military R&D, Capacity Constraints & Waste lowers return on R&D investments
9
Presentation Topics• Trends and Anomalies in US R&D Funding
– Strong Aggregate Commitments– But Linkages to Commercial Realization are less robust
• Myths and Market Realities about the US Innovation System– Myth of Perfect Markets mean that Promising New Ideas
are often not adequately funded– The Path to Commercialization is Complex
• Sustaining Innovation-Led Growth– Fostering an Enabling Business Environment– Government Awards to Spur Growth: The SBIR Model– Innovation Transfer from Universities
• Concluding Points
10
Trends & Anomalies in U.S. R&D Funding
The Good News and theBad News
11
Strong U.S. Commitment to R&D
Shares of Total World R&D, 2001• Total World R&D =
$746.7 billion• U.S. share = $276
billion• EU share = $187
billion
• Source: OECD Main S&T Indicators, 2004; AAAS, 2004
• Calculated using purchasing power parities, Jan 2004
12
Trends in U.S. R&D FundingThere is Good News, but…
Total R&D is Rising (but Federal R&D Spending is flat)
13
U.S. Industry and Federal R&D: 2000
Industry R&D is More Focused on Development than Basic or Applied Research
Source: AAAS
Expenditures in Billions of U.S. Dollars
14
More Good NewsPublic Research has Surged in Health:
A National Decision to Increase our Bet
Source, AAAS, 2003
15
Trends in U.S. R&D Funding
The Bad News: An Uneven Record
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Com
puter scie
nces
Med
ical scie
nces
Oc
eanogra
phy
Oth
er eng
ineerin
g
Biolo
gical scie
nces
Aero
nautic
al eng
ineerin
g
Civil e
ngine
erin
g
Environ
menta
l bio
logy
Social scie
nces
Astro
nautic
al eng
ineerin
g
Atm
osphe
ric sciences
Math
ematics
Agric
ultu
ral sciences
Psy
cholog
y
Metallu
rgy/m
aterials e
ngine
erin
g
Astron
omy
Chem
istry
Physics
Chem
ical e
ngine
erin
g
Geolo
gical scie
nces
Ele
ctr
ical e
ngine
erin
g
Mech
anic
al eng
ineerin
gP
erce
nt c
han
ge
All performers Universities & Colleges
Changes in Federal Research Obligations for All Performers and University/College Performers FY 1993–1999
16
The Really Bad News
-60%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10% Chemistry Physics
Chemicalengineering
Geologicalsciences
Electricalengineering
Mechanicalengineering
All performers Universities & Colleges
Random Disinvestment: Real Declines for Research in Physics, Chemistry, & Engineering Risk a Lag Effect
FY 1993–1999; constant 1999 dollars
17
Anomalies in R&D Funding
in U.S. Innovation System• R&D Investments in IT-Related Disciplines Dropped in Real Terms in the 1990s– Yet, IT Innovation is the Main Driver of U.S.
Productivity Surge • Investments in Biomedicine are Up
– But complementary IT investments are needed to capitalize on biomedical progress• Super Computers needed for DNA Analysis• Imaging Technologies and Diagnostics rely on
IT advances• Multi-disciplinary Approaches, e.g.,
Bioinformatics are required
18
Criticisms of the U.S. Innovation System
• Overall R&D Spending is Inadequate– Insufficient R&D investment in the future– 2% in the 1960’s—now 0.8% of GDP
• Too Much Concentration on Military R&D – 52%– Low-utility for civilian economy– Slow or No spin-out for most R&D investments
• Too Much Focus on Health Research at NIH and Not Enough on the Necessary Information Technologies– Surge in Bio-terrorism funding faces capacity
constraints• Inadequate Commercialization Mechanisms
– Ideological/political blockages for effective programs– U.S. myths about perfect markets and role of venture
capital prevent effective policy making– U.S. programs are too few and under-funded
19
Policy Myths & Market Realities
The Myth of Linear Innovation
The Myth of Military Spin-Offs
The Myth of Perfect Markets
The Myth of the Venture Capital Solution
20
• Reality: Innovation is a Complex Process– Major overlap between Basic and Applied Research,
as well as between Development and Commercialization
– Principal Investigators and/or Patents and Processes are Mobile, i.e., not firm-dependent
– Many Unexpected Outcomes– Technological breakthroughs may precede, as well
as stem from, basic research
The Myth of the Linear Model of Innovation
Basic ResearchApplied Research
Development Commercialization
•Myth: Innovation is a Linear Process
21
Basic Research
AppliedResearch
Development
Commercial-ization
Quest for Basic Understanding•New Knowledge•Fundamental Ideas Potential Use
•Application of Knowledge to a Specific Subject•“Prototypicalization”
Development of Products•Goods and Services
Feedback: Market Signals/Technical Challenge• Desired Product Alterations or New Characteristics•Cost/design trade-off
Feedback:Applied Researchneeded to designnew product characteristics
Feedback:• Basic Research needed for discovery •Search for new ideas and solutions to solve longer-term issues
NewUnanticipatedApplications
Non-Linear Model of Innovation
22
The Myth of Military Spin-Offs• Euro Myth: “U.S. Defense
Research/Procurement Directly Funds Civilian Technologies”
• Reality: “Very few technologies proceeded effortlessly from defense conception to commercial application.” – Secrecy, military specs, and long lead times slow
diffusion of new defense technologies• Billions for Stealth Technologies: What civilian market?
– Even efforts to use low-cost civilian technologies for defense use, i.e., “spin-ins,” are often blocked by complicated military procurement system
Beyond Spin-off, John Alic, Lewis Branscomb, et al.
23
The Myth of Military Spin-Offs
• Defense Industry Contracted Sharply in Ten Years after End of Cold War– Major American Contractors dropped from 15 to 5– Industry is detached from mainstream U.S. economy– Dedicated programs with limited spin-off now
compounded by long-term, slow moving contracts • Defense R&D Funds Concentrated on Small Number
of Engineers with Strong Applied Focus– Issue of scale: Intel at $100 Billion value vs. top three
defense groups combined is $50 Billion • Spin-Off of Platform Technologies is Diffused
– Semiconductors and Internet applied widely– Engines and Airframe: Spillovers are substantial
24
The Myth of Perfect Markets
• Strong U.S. Myth: “If it is a good idea, the market will fund it.”
• Reality:– Potential Investors have less than perfect
knowledge, especially about innovative new ideas
– “Asymmetric Information” leads to suboptimal investments• This means that it is hard for small firms to
obtain funding for new ideas
25
Federally Funded Basic
Research Creates New
Ideas
Applied Research
&
Innovation
Capital to Develop Ideas
No Capital
Reality: The Valley of Death Early-Stage Funding Gap
To Innovation
26
The Valley of Death
• A Series of Gaps– Gap in Available Cash Necessary
to develop technology to Proof of Principle, Prototype, and/or Product
– Gaps in Information between Entrepreneur and potential Investor and Partner about• Technology—What is it?• Potential of Technology—What can it do?• Business Opportunity—What size market?
27
The Cash Flow Valley of Death
Technology Creation
Technology Development Early Commercialization
Cash Flow
Federal Agencies, Universities,
States
Entrepreneur & Seed/Angel Investors
IPO
Time
Cash Flow Valley of
Death
Successful
Moderately Successful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Typical Primary Investors
Venture Capitalists
SBIR & ATP
Adapted from: L.M. Murphy & P. L. Edwards, Bridging the Valley of Death—Transitioning from Public to Private Sector Financing, Golden CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, May 2003
28
The Myth of U.S.Venture Capital Markets
• Myth: “U.S. VC Markets are broad & deep, thus there is no role for government awards”
• Reality: Venture Capitalists have– Limited information on new firms– Prone to herding tendencies– Focus on later stages of technology
development– Most VC investors seek early exit
• Large U.S. Venture Capital Market is Not Focused on Early-Stage Firms
29
Sustaining Science-Based Growth
Firm Creation & Job Growth
30
Basic Research and Small Companies Drive Science-
Based Growth• Basic Research is Key in Supplying a Steady Stream of “Fresh and New” Ideas – Ideas, if Effectively Transferred to the Private
Sector, can become Innovations
• Basic research is Essential, but not Enough– Innovations can become Commercial Products
driving Growth—with the Right Policy Support
• Developing Incentives to spur Innovative Ideas for New Products is a Central Policy Challenge– Small Companies are Key Players
31
Importance of Small Businesses to the U.S.
Economy• Small Businesses are a Key Driver of the U.S. Knowledge-Based Economy– Generating 60% to 80% of Net New Jobs Annually
• 2.5 million of the 3.4 million Total Jobs—1999-2000• Employs 39% of High-Tech Workers—Scientists,
Engineers, Computer Workers– Producing 14 times more Patents per Employee
than Large Patenting Firms• Patents are of High Quality• Twice as Likely to be Cited
32
Small Businesses…
• Grow Jobs• Generate Taxable Wealth• Create Welfare-Enhancing Technologies• Transform the Composition of the
Economy, Developing Products to Ensure our Well-Being and Productivity in the Future
This is Why we Punish Them!
33
Challenges Facing Small Firms in the United States:
Regulation & Finance• SME’s Face High Regulatory Burdens
– Very small firms (less than 20 employees) spend 60% more per employee than large firms to comply with federal regulations
• New Firms Struggle for Adequate Financing– Start-Up funds from “Friends, Family, and
Fools”– Over 80% of small firms in U.S. rely on
credit but banks hesitate to lend
34
VC Markets More Risk Averse
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers/Venture Economics/National Venture Capital Association Money Tree Survey, 2004
35
Breakdown of U.S. Venture Capital by Stage of Development-2001
1.93%23%18%
57%
Early Stage Expansion
Later Stage Startup/ Seed
Startup/Seed$799 million
Source: PricewaterCoopers, Venture Economics, National Venture Capital Association, 2003
Total= $41.284 billion
36
Breakdown of U.S. Venture Capital by Stage of Development-2003
1.95% 18.27%
54.18%
26.60%
Startup/Seed Early Stage Expansion Later Stage
Startup/Seed$354.3 million
Total = $18.2 billion
37
Why Do Funding Gaps Matter?
• Because Equity-Financed Small Firms are a Leading Source of Growth in Employment in the United States
• Equity-Financed Small Firms are One of the Most Effective Mechanisms for Capitalizing on New Ideas and Bringing Them to the Market– Audretsch and Acs
38
Significance of Pubic Support for
Early-Stage Technology Development
Collapse in Venture Funding Revealed Importance of Other Sources of Early-Stage Finance
39
New Research: U.S. Funding Sources for Early-Stage Technology
Development
Branscomb & Auerswald, Between Invention and Innovation An Analysis of Funding for Early-Stage Technology Development, NIST, 2002
Multiple Actors
*
Multiple Sources of
Finance Focused on
Different Stages
*
Government Role is
Significant
40
Surprising Role of U.S. Government in Early-Stage Technology Development
• Markets for Allocating Risk Capital to Early-Stage Technology Ventures are not Efficient
• Most Early-Stage Funding comes from– Individual “Angel” investors,– Corporations, and– Federal Government – Not Venture Capitalists!
• Federal Technology Development funds Complement Private Funds– More important than we thought
41
U.S. Entrepreneurial EnvironmentA Key to Knowledge-Based Growth
Sources and Limitations
Drive for Ownership: High Rates of Business Formation– High Social Value placed on business success– Low penalties for failure: Gentle Bankruptcy
Laws Low Regulatory barriers for entry
– Ease of company formation– Access to early-stage financing—very important– Pace of activity increases the effective value of
capital
42
U.S. Policy FrameworkStrong but Uneven R&D Commitment
• Spending Helps: Record funding for federal R&D:• FY 2005 R&D=$131.9billion
– DoD R&D up 6.7% to $69.9 Billion• But funding for basic research remains flat
– NIH has doubled over five years to $28.8 Billion– NSF to increase to $5.7 Billion– DOE to increase to $8.9 Billion– DHS rapidly expanding to $1.2 Billion
• Problems with expenditure
• Large increases in R&D funding for weapons development and homeland defense, but flat or declining funding for the rest of the R&D portfolio
• Focus on military development misstates figures and reduces return on R&D portfolio
43
Positive Policy Framework:Microeconomic Incentives
• Positive Incentives for Entrepreneurs– Strong Intellectual Property Regime: Personal
Incentive for Invention– Tax Policy: Potential High Returns are the Best
Incentive for High Risks– Regulatory Policy: Low Regulation for New
Entrants = Lower Cost, Faster to Market– Labor Flexibility: Hire and Fire as Needed
• Firms that Can’t Fire, Will not Hire (or Invest)
• Good Goals do not Guarantee Good Policy
44
Positive Policy Framework:Intermediating Institutions
• Public-Private Partnerships• Innovation Awards —SBIR, ATP• S&T Parks• University-Industry Clusters • Industry Consortia
45
U.S. Policies for Innovation-Led Growth
Government Awards to Spur Innovation-Led Growth:
SBIR
46
Programs to Bridge the Valley of Death
Total AllocatedResources
Uncertainty and Distance to
Market
Prototype
Product development
Commercialisation
Strategic research
Curiosity research
Applied research
Capital Allocation Curve
The Financial “Valley of
Death”The Focus of
SBIR and ATP
Seed: Angel Investors
Expansion
1st Round VC
2nd Round VC
Business development
Investment
Startup: Friends, Families & Fools
Need fo
r Supp
orti v
e
Poli cy
Fram
ew
ork
SBIR Procurement
ATP
Pre 2002
47
U.S. Innovation Curve
Total AllocatedResources
Uncertainty and Distance to
Market
Prototype
Product development
Commercialisation
Curiosity research
Strategic research
Applied research
Capital Allocation Curve
The Financial “Valley of
Death”The Focus of
SBIR and ATP
Seed: Angel Backers
Expansion
1st Round VC
2nd Round VCBusiness
development
Investment
Startup: Friends, Families & Fools
Need fo
r Supp
orti v
e
Poli cy
Fram
ew
ork
SBIR Procurement
and ATP are More Important
Post 2002
48
The SBIR Program• Created in 1982, Renewed in 1992 & 2001• Participation by all federal agencies with an
annual extramural R&D budget of greater than $100 million is mandatory– Agencies must set aside 2.5% of their
extramural R&D budgets for small business awards
• Currently a $2 billion per year program– Largest U.S. Partnership Program
49
SBIR: Critical Source of Predictable Funding for Early-
Stage Finance• SBIR—Main Source of Federal Funding for Early-Stage Technology Development• SBIR over 85% of
Federal Financial Support for Early-Stage Development
• SBIR over 20% of Funding for Early-Stage Development from all sources
*Estimate of Federal Government Funding Flows to Early-Stage Technology Development—Based on total funding for ATP, SBIR & STTR programs by Branscomb and Auerswald 2002
* SBIR
50
SBIR Model
PHASE IFeasibilityResearch
PHASE IIIProduct
Developmentfor Gov’t orCommercial
Market
Private Sector Investment
Tax Revenue
Federal Investment
PHASE IIResearchtowards
Prototype
Socialand
Government Needs
$750K$100K
R&
D
Investm
en
t
51
SBIR: Goals Vary Among Agencies
• Multiple Program Goals– Commercialization and Research
• Multiple Agency Goals– NIH
• Research Tools, Medical Devices, Drug Development, and Audio-Visual Health Materials
– DOD• Special Forces Equipment• Neural Network Processors for remotely piloted
jets• Wireless Communications for Divers• Low-cost, High-performance Drones
52
SBIR Differs Among Agencies
• Multiple Administrative Systems– Each agency typically has its own manner of
choosing awardees and screening applications– Different metrics reflecting unique agency
missions and needs– Different Metrics by industrial sector, e.g.,
software vs. drug development vs. weapon components
• Commendable Flexibility & Diversity• Not Harmonization!
53
SBIR’s Attraction to Policy Makers
• Catalyzes the Development of New Ideas and New Technologies
• Capitalizes on Substantial R&D Investments• No Budget Line —stable program
• Addresses Gaps in Early-Stage Funding for Promising Technologies• Attractive to Small Firms —political support• Certification Effect —government
endorsement of technical quality
54
SBIR’s Attraction to Entrepreneurs
• Features that Make SBIR Grants Attractive include:– No dilution of ownership– No repayment required– Grant recipients retain rights to IP developed
using SBIR funds– No royalties are owed to government– Certification effect for technology/firm
55
Contributions of SBIR to the Nation
• Provides a Bridge between Small Companies and the Agencies, especially for Procurement
• Contributes New Methods and New Technologies to Government Missions
• Provides a Bridge between Universities and the Marketplace
• Encourages Local and Regional Growth, increasingly through the University connection• Creates jobs and justifies R&D investments to the
general public
56
Contributions of SBIR Concept
• Catalyzes the Development of New Ideas and New Technologies
• Capitalizes on Substantial U.S. R&D Investments
• Addresses Gaps in Early-Stage Funding for Promising Technologies
• Certification Effect—Government Endorsement of Technical Quality
57
The Enabling Role of Universities
A Major U.S. Asset
58
University-Industry Cooperation is Key• Cooperative Research
– University research draws ideas from commercial trends more than ever before
– Feedback loops from industry to universities are important
– Major contribution to training for real jobs
• Regional Growth
– Regional economies need their research universities more than ever before
• Firm Formation– University innovation + early government funding have
been key to the growth of many successful technology companies
• Supportive University Culture & Incentives are crucial
59
How Ideas are Commercialized
Transferring University Technology to Firms
RESEARCH $$ INVESTMENT $$
SALES $$
UNIVERSITYCOMMERCIAL
COMPANYNEW PRODUCTS
& PROCESSESINNOVATION
LicenseAgreement or Equity
• Licensing to existing companies – brings royalty $
• New company formation – brings royalties and/or equity
• Other, less direct, contributions to regional economic activity – 5,000 Good New Jobs in Pittsburgh Area
ROYALTIES
or EQUITY PAYOUT
SBIR
Drawn from C. Gabriel, Carnegie Mellon University
60
The Benefits of University-Industry Cooperation: SBIR
Role• SBIR Innovation Awards Directly Cause Researchers to create New Firms– Jobs and Regional Growth– Cooperation creates High-Tech Jobs
• Universities help diversify and grow the job base– Increasingly universities are the largest regional
employer for all types of employment• Cooperation validates Research Funding
– Returns to Society in Health, Wealth, & Taxes– SBIR is a proven mechanism in an uncertain game
61
Changing Role of Universities
Their Role is Important and Changing
• Universities’ Economic Contributions– Idea Creation: Basic & Applied Research
• Effective University Leadership and Supportive Policies Make Universities– Poles for Growth of High-Tech Clusters– Centers for Employment of All Types
62
To Make the University a Nexus of Growth
• Requires Real Changes in– Culture and Values: This requires new
leadership and new incentives– Status of Professors: permissive
environment to encourage innovations, collaboration with industry, and pursuit of innovation awards and wealth
– Institutional Practices: Parallel research institutes with self-select mechanism
63
Incentives and Impacts in the
U.S. University Model• Structure– Multiple sources of funding– Different Types of Institutions
for different needs
– High cost tuition for private schools; State schools $3,500 to $6,000 per year
– Significant Student funding of studies
– Many needs-based scholarships provided
– Licensing obstacles to technology transfer
• Characteristics– Curriculum responsive to
market needs—ie, industry– Adaptable, Differentiated
programs for students– High range of student choice
– High percentage of class attendance & participation
– High percentage of college-age cohort attending
– Globally high returns to R&D investments, but
– Analytically suboptimal returns to public investments in university research
64
Incentives in the European University
Model• Structure– Centrally managed
University budgets
– Faculty are Civil Servants
– Student fees paid by the State
– Centralized State funding
– No University Endowments
• Characteristics– Curriculum not responsive
to market needs nor scientific opportunity
– Faculty job security means little incentive to innovate
– Low levels of Student engagement; don’t seek ‘money’s worth’
– Lack of financial autonomy limits Universities’ flexibility, adaptability & accountability
– Fewer new initiatives
65
Consequences of the U.S. Model
• The US system is more demand driven, and therefore more adaptable– Multiple private participants, not state
controlled• No single model for higher education
– Transfers allows upward mobility across institutions for bright students from different socio-economic backgrounds
• Research is often focused on problem-solving rather than pure theory
• Tax laws encourage cooperation with industry – Donations of building and endowments
66
Characteristics of Successful
University-Industry Partnerships• University-Industry Cooperation involves:
– Complementary Objectives, Mutual Respect– Active, Routine Communication for Cross-pollination
of ideas
• Growing Perception of University as Major Regional Economic Player– SBIR brings Research out to the Market– SBIR links Universities, Small Companies, and Large
Companies
67
Concluding Points
68
Understanding Innovation Ecosystems• National Innovation Systems are Different in
Scale and Flexibility– Flexibility is a differentiator– It is less how much is spent but how well
• All Systems Have Common Challenges– Need to justify R&D expenditures by creating new jobs
& new wealth– Need to reform institutions (or invent new ones)– Need to recognize that project failure does not equal
program failure
• Linkages strengthen Innovation Ecosystems– E.g., SBIR draws together small businesses,
universities, and government agencies
69
Lessons from the US Innovation System
• The US Innovation System is one of the most productive in the world– Its first lesson is its diversity of approaches; there
is no one right answer and no one right model• What we do know is that centrally planned and
funded technology development programs and University systems work less well– Uniformity of approach is not equality of opportunity
• User driven systems are more responsive– Therefore students & industry should be involved
in decisions and share costs in the cooperative efforts of education and innovation
70
Lessons from the US Innovation System
• What does this mean in practice?– Universities should be allowed to
differentiate to meet different market needs in training, education & cooperation with industry
– To do this, universities need financial autonomy, incentives to cooperate with industry, and strong local rewards
– Awards to industry (and universities) should be competitive, limited in size and duration, and be performance based
71
Lessons from the US Innovation System
• Most important, a powerful institutional mechanism, e.g., a Science, Technology, and Innovation Council, is often needed to adjust the innovation system to new needs, and new opportunities, while drawing on best practice and encouraging diversity.
• Mechanisms like SBIR can change behavior in Universities & Labs while addressing the Early Stage Funding Gap
• Close cooperation with strong innovation systems, e.g., the U.S. and European nation states, should be pursued to acquire resources & network advantages
72
THANK YOU
Charles W. Wessner, Ph.D.Board on Science, Technology, & Economic Policy
National Research Council500 Fifth Street NW
Washington, D.C. [email protected]: 202 334 3801
http://www.nationalacademies.org/step