Published only in 1989, on the centenary of its author's birth, Heidegger's Beitra« gezur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) [Contributions to philosophy (of propriation)] is acomplicated and multifaceted book. It is a collection of manuscripts written between1936 and 1938, which has been promoted by some as his second major work after Beingand Time (Emad, 1991; Kovacs, 1996; see Heidegger, 1962; 1967), and claimed byPo« ggeler to surpass even that, being Heidegger's ` true magnum opus'' (1982, page 481,cited in Schmidt, 2001, page 32). Although it has been translated into English by Emadand Maly as Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning (Heidegger, 1999), (1) and,despite its obvious importance to Heidegger's project, it has not received nearly theattention that might be expected (though see Greisch, 1989; Krell, 1992; Scott et al,2001; Vallega-Neu, 2003). Perhaps most notable is that almost all of the attentionhas been in the field of philosophy, with very little in the other disciplines inwhich Heidegger's writings have had an impact.(2) Shortly after its initial publicationSchu« rmannöhimself a professor of philosophyösuggested that this contribution tophilosophy was actually a ` monstrous Contribution to Politics'' (1992, page 313). In thewake of the revival of interest in Heidegger's political past, perhaps this delayed abalanced assessment. The political context is undoubtedly important: this was a projectwritten in the last few years of peace beforeWorldWar 2, in Nazi Germany, by the resignedrector of Freiburg University, still a member of the party (see also de Beistegui, 1998;Elden, 2003a; Janicaud, 1996, pages 96 ^ 97). However, although I will discuss the politicalaspects, I want to suggest that the work also functions as a contribution to geography.

The important implications of the Beitra« ge to work on Heidegger's understandingof time and space are a challenge that has been ducked before (Casey, 1997, page 453;Elden 2001a, pages 56 ^ 57; Villela-Petit, 1992, pages 121, 128, 137),(3) despite de Beistegui's

Contributions to geography? The spaces of Heidegger's Beitra« ge

Stuart EldenDepartment of Geography, University of Durham, Durham DH1 3LE, England;e-mail: stuart.elden@durham.ac.ukReceived 26 January 2004; in revised form 18 June 2004

Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2005, volume 23, pages 811 ^ 827

Abstract. In this paper I provide a reading of Heidegger's Beitra« ge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) [thecontributions to philosophy (of propriation)] as a contribution to geography. This collection of manu-scripts, written between 1936 and 1938, is extremely important in terms of the development of Heidegger'swork, his political career, and his rethinking of the relation between space and time. This rethinking is oneof the key themes discussed, along with the political and geographical implications of Heidegger's notionof calculation. In order to situate these insights, I first provide a discussion of the context withinwhich Heidegger wrote the work. After outlining this biographical, intellectual, and political situation,I move to the geographical contributions, suggesting ways in which Heidegger's thought can impacton our thinking of environment, nature, globalisation, and measurement.

DOI:10.1068/d369t

(1) Page references are given only for the German edition, as the German of this and other textspagination is usually found in the margins of the English translation. I have regularly revisedexisting translations.(2) All the contributors to Scott et al (2001) are philosophers, for example.(3) On space in Heidegger's work generally see also Franck (1986), which was published before theBeitra« ge. A useful recent discussion is also found in Vallega (2004).

claim that here we find ` possibly Heidegger's most sustained and convincing effort''on thistopic (2003, page 199). Although Heidegger's one reference to geography as a disci-pline, in an extended critique of the modern academy, is dismissive and throwaway(1989, page 153, see also pages 145 ^ 159), the Beitra« ge has much to offer the continuedrethinking of the theoretical basis of contemporary geography. Its contribution can, Ithink, be seen in two main areas: the notion of calculation and the issue of the relationbetween time and space, and the understandings of these terms. Thinking throughnotions about calculation is useful in debates about the difference between place andspace, and in his remarks Heidegger himself touches upon issues of globalisation andthe environment. The issue of time and space is important in terms of the relationbetween these two key terms, between history and geography, and between the issue ofcalculation and representations of these terms. However, in order to introduce thesekey themes, I look first not at what the Beitra« ge offers geography but to its ownsituation, the geographies of the Beitra« ge.

The geographies of the Beitra« geGermany in 1936 was a country of contrasts. This was three years after Hitler hadtaken power, and quickly withdrawn from the League of Nations, one year after theNuremberg laws on racial purity, and the Four Year Plan for economic growth beganin September. The year 1936 also saw the reoccupation and militarisation of theRhineland, an alliance with Mussolini, and the beginning of the Spanish civil war;Guernica was destroyed the following year. Germany's gearing up for a war economywas well underway and it was the incremental marginalisation of the Jews which madepossible their later extermination. But, for much of Germany, increased employmentand prosperity meant that things were better than they had been since 1914. The BerlinOlympics of 1936, in particular, were a showcase to a new Germany and a greatlyexploited piece of political propaganda.

For Heidegger, there was a similarly contrasting set of circumstances. Tucked awayin the Black Forest, in the university city of Freiburg, his childhood hometown ofMeÞkirch, or in his mountain Hu« tte in Todtnauberg, he continued to think, write,and teach. Although his twice-yearly courses continued after the resignation andthroughout the war, Heidegger found it increasingly difficult to publish, and so manyof his writings from this period first appeared in postwar collections, notably Holzwegefirst published in 1950 (see Heidegger, 1977). The restrictions on publications werebecause of political reasons, and, beneath the surface of Heidegger's rural idyl,political tensions seethed and festered. His own political involvement, as the rectorof Freiburg University, had come to a crushing end two years previously. Initiallyharbouring na|« ve ambitions that the regime could be changed from within, withhimself cast as the philosopher to Hitler as king, Heidegger had hoped for a reawaken-ing of the German Volk to their spiritual destiny and a return to the West's heritagein Greek thought. Disappointed and embittered, Heidegger resigned the post, andreturned to his role as professor of philosophy, the chair previously occupied byHusserl.(4) Heidegger remained in the Nazi party until the end of the war, and forsome time after his resignation seemed to feel that the movement and Hitler couldtranscend the party. Nonetheless, his critical commentsöoften equivocal, regularlyambiguous, and usually guardedödo begin to surface from 1934 onwards. Retrospec-tively, he would suggest that these were his declarations of `spiritual resistance'. If thisis far too strong, what he does say is worth attention.

(4) The literature on this is vast, but for some useful perspectives see Bambach (2003); de Beistegui(1998); Janicaud (1996); Ott (1993); Thomson (2003).

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It is notable that Heidegger had, in his own words, remained in the provinces.Refusing two calls to a chair in Berlin, first in 1931 and then in late 1933, Heideggerhad chosen to stay in the land he had been born into.

`On a steep slope of a wide mountain valley in the southern Black Forest, atan elevation of 1150 metres, there stands a small ski hut [Skihu« tte]. The floor planmeasures six metres by seven. The low-hanging roof covers three rooms: the kitchenwhich is also the living room, a bedroom and a study. Scattered at wide intervalsthroughout the narrow base of the valley and on the equally steep slope opposite,lie the farmhouses with their large over-hanging roofs. Higher up the slope themeadows and pasture lands lead to the woods with its dark fir-trees, old andtowering. Over everything there stands a clear summer sky, and in its radiant spacetwo hawks glide around in wide circles'' (1981, page 27; 1983a, page 9).Heidegger's description of his `work world' continues, as he talks about how this

landscape is conducive to his writingöthe solitude rather than lonelinessöand tohis integration into the peasant environment. ``The inner relationship of my ownwork to the Black Forest and its people comes from a centuries-long and irreplaceablerootedness [Bodensta« ndigkeit] in the Alemannian-Swabian soil'' (1981, page 27; 1983a,pages 10 ^ 11). This rootedness in the soil is important in terms of both Heidegger'spolitics and his philosophy. Although this would be developed in his later works as thenotion of dwelling, which has occasioned much interest in geography (for example,Cloke and Jones, 2001; Harrison, forthcoming; Seamon and Mugerauer, 1985), `dwell-ing' is not yet a term that has been worked through in Heidegger's thought.(5) Instead,Heidegger is contrasting his rural existence with the asphalt alienation of the big city.Romantic and reactionary, rootedness is politically, as Bambach (2003) has shown,a tragic ^ comic repetition of Greek myths of autochthony. But it is important to notehere, because it is also Heidegger's opposed term to the domination which he would latercall `technology' and what, at this time, he called Machenschaft (machination).

Todtnauberg was therefore for Heidegger a retreat from Freiburg, but, after hisresignation as rector, it was the place where, like Plato, he returned from Syracuse(Gadamer, 1989). It was here that he wrote Being and Time, and where the Beitra« ge waslargely composed. The Beitra« ge is a work whose potentials can be hard to discern; it iswritten in a stuttering, disjointed style, conceptually opaque, and filled with referencesto other parts of Heidegger's work, to the tradition, and, in extremely muted form, tocontemporary events. Its vast resources are akin to a working draft, bringing togetherthemes either published or discussed in publicöthat is, in Heidegger's lectures andseminarsöwith those which appeared only in published work many years later or indeednever saw the light of day in his own lifetime. It requires quite extensive knowledge ofHeidegger's other writings before it begins to make sense, and, indeed, Heidegger himselfordained that the Beitra« ge should be published only in his Gesamtausgabe (collectededition) after all of his lecture courses (volumes 17 ^ 63 of this edition) had appeared.He believed that only then would readers be ready for it (see von Herrmann, 1989,page 513). In fact, in 1989, eighteen of these volumes had not yet been published.

Heidegger's lecture courses from 1936 to 1938 included three on Nietzsche (1985;1986a; 2003), the first two of which appear in revised form in the 1961 book Nietzsche(1991; 1996 [1961]), one each on Schelling (1988a) and Kant (1984b), and a course thatis often thought to be the best single introduction to the Beitra« ge, Grundfragen derPhilosophie (Basic questions of philosophy) (1984c; 1994a; see von Herrmann 1989,page 513). In terms of the themes I will argue are of relevance to geography, this last

(5) It was developed through Heidegger's engagement with Ho« lderlin, in lecture courses in 1934 ^ 35,and, most explicitly, in 1942 (1980; 1984a; see Elden, 2001a, pages 33 ^ 43, 82 ^ 84).

The spaces of Heidegger's Beitra« ge 813

course offers relatively little, except for a remarkable inventory of how the course wasoriginally to have been delivered. I reproduce it here in full: we should note that thecourse as actually delivered was largely confined to the first point, and the draft foundas an appendix to the lecture course (1984c, pages 195 ^ 223; 1994b, pages 168 ^ 186)breaks off halfway through the third point.

` I. Foundational issues in the question of truth.II. Leaping ahead into the essency [Wesung] of truth.III. Recollection of the first shining forth of the essence of truth, aletheia (uncon-cealedness), as the basic character of beings. (The history of its shining forthand expiring from Anaximander to Aristotle).IV. The question of truth as the unfolding of the essency of beyng, which appropriates[er-eignet ] as the clearing of the `in the midst' [Inmitten] of beings.V. The question of truth as the grounding of Da-sein.VI. The essency of truth as the truth of beyng in the abyss [Abgrund ].VII. The a-byss as the space of the play of time [Zeit ^ Spiel ^ Raum]. (Space and timein the previous interpretation, one determined by metaphysics and its guiding ques-tion).VIII. The abyss and the strife (Da-sein: earth and world).IX. Truth and its shelter in beings as the recasting of beings in beyng.X. The full essency of truth and the inclusion of correctness'' (1984c, page 193;1994a, page 167).There is a lot that could be said of this, much of which is well known in terms

of scholarship on Heidegger and perhaps of marginal relevance to his contributionto geography. But it is worth noting briefly two points because of their importance toHeidegger's work. One is Heidegger's archaic spelling of being, as Seyn instead of Sein,which along with many commentators [but in contrast to Rojcewicz and Schuwer(Heidegger, 1994a), and indeed to Emad and Maly in 1999] I have rendered as theEnglish word `beyng', which is similarly old. The point is that Heidegger wants toretrieve a sense of being that is not tainted with metaphysics. A similar intent is foundin Heidegger's well-known translation of the Greek aletheia, commonly rendered as`truth', as `unconcealedness', preserving the alpha privative of the Greek: truth is a bringingof something into the open, and the notion of truth as correctness (see point X) or veracityis a later invention (see 1988b).

More important to the overall argument is the term Da-sein, a common word forexistence' but which here is hyphenated by Heidegger to draw out the root meaningsof `being' Sein, and `there', Da. Although this term is usually untranslated in English,it has sometimes been rendered as `being-there'. Straightforward appropriations of thisin a purely spatial sense largely miss Heidegger's point, because the term is betterunderstood as `being-the-there', the openness to being of human existence (see 1989,page 17).

Reading this as a straightforward spatial term is misleading, but there is aprofound thinking through of issues around space to be found in Heidegger'swork which is merely hinted at here. In particular, the notions of the `abyss' andthe Zeit ^ Spiel ^ Raum and the suggestion that common understandings of spaceand time are ones determined by metaphysics promise much. And point VIII, withits juxtaposition of the abyss and the strife, and with it the juxtaposition of earth andworld, recalls vocabulary found in Heidegger's 1935 ^ 36 lecture ``On the origin of thework of art'' (1977, see especially pages 35 ^ 36, 42; see also 1989, pages 30, 398 ^ 399,408, 510). All of these themes are important in terms of the Beitra« ge, but I wouldcontend that here they are merely promissory notes, and that, rather than being usefulin terms of understanding the Beitra« ge, they are really understood only in the context

814 S Elden

of that work. In some respects this is also true for the confrontation with NietzscheöwhatHeidegger would call an Auseinandersetzung, a `setting-apart-from-another'. Whereas theBeitra« ge's comments on the notion of Augenblicköthe famous word used by MartinLuther concerning `the twinkling of an eye' in his translation of Paul's First Letter tothe Corinthians, and later utilised by Nietzsche as the `moment' of the eternal recur-renceötrade upon work in the Nietzsche courses,(6) on other issues it is other way round.For example, in a discussion of the notion of Zeit ^ Raum Heidegger explicitly makesreference to the unpublished manuscript (1985, page 286).

As with so much of Heidegger's later work, it is in the 1935 lecture course Anintroduction to metaphysics' that more useful clues can be gleaned. The openings areparticularly found in the famous comments on geopolitics:

`This Europe, in its unholy blindness always on the point of cutting its own throat,lies today in the great pincers between Russia on the one side and America on theother. Russia and America, seen metaphysically, are both the same: the samehopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless [bodenlosen] organiza-tion of the average man. When the farthest corner of the globe [Erdballs] has beenconquered technologically and can be exploited economically... when time isnothing but rapidity, instantaneity and simultaneity [Schnelligkeit, Augenblicklichkeitund Gleichzeitigkeit ] ... when the tallies of millions at mass meetings are a triumph[Millionenzahlen von Massenversammlungen ein Triumph], yes then, there still loomslike a spectre over all this uproar the question: what for?öwhere to?öand whatthen?'' (1953, pages 28 ^ 29).Although the Germanic thrust of this is deeply problematicöit is the German Volk

that lies `in the pincers', that is, the `metaphysical Volk'öthere is something that goesbeyond this here. Perhaps, most obviously, there is the sarcastic reference to the`triumph' that can be tallied through numbers at mass meetings. Is it necessary tonote that Leni Riefenstahl's contemporary film of the Nuremberg rallies The Triumphof the Will had been released the year of Heidegger's lectures? Then there is the adventof a mechanised and technological `globalisation', a process where the earth is but aball, conceived as a whole, conquered and exploited. Again the notion of machinationis anticipated, but without a full development. Heidegger's point about rapidity, instan-taneity, and simultaneity is more nuanced than a simple translation can capture.Schnell is the word for speed, and so this captures something of the transitory, accel-erated nature of time; Augenblick is the `moment' discussed above; and Gleichzeitigkeitimplies each moment of time (Zeit) being made the same (Gleich). The mournfulreferences to the ` destruction of the earth'' and the ` reduction of human beings to amass [die Vermassung des Menschen]'' which follow (1953, page 29) equally hint atthe political opportunities beyond the straightforward ones we might associate withHeidegger.

`The prevailing dimension became that of extension and number [Ausdehnung undder Zahl ] ... . In America and Russia, then, this all intensified until it turned into themeasureless [maÞlose] so-on-and-so-forth of the ever-identical and the indifferent[Immergleichen und Gleichgu« ltigen], until finally this quantitative temper became aquality of its own'' (1953, page 35).Slightly further down that page, Heidegger offers a discussion of how that highly

charged Hegelian word Geistöusually translated as `spirit' or `mindöwhen renderedas mere Intelligenz, is examining and calculating (Berechnung und Betrachtung).

(6) See, for example, ` the thinking question of the truth of beyng is the moment [Augenblick] thatcarries the transition. This moment can never be fixed as actualöand even less calculated[errechnen]. It first establishes the time of propriation [Ereignis]'' (1989, page 20; for a reading seeElden, 2001a, pages 44 ^ 49; McNeill, 1999, pages 221 ^ 238).

The spaces of Heidegger's Beitra« ge 815

What is interesting is that this way of thinking is seen in action in three potentialrealms: ``the regulation and domination [die Regelung und Beherrschung] of thematerial conditions of production''; ` the intelligent ordering [Ordnung und Erkla« rung]of everything that is present and already posited at any time''; and as ` applied to theorganisational regulation [der organisatorischen Lenkung] of the vital resources and race ofaVolk [der Lebensmasse und Rasse eines Volkes]'' (page 29). Heidegger notes that the firstis found in Marxism, the second in positivismöby which he surely means its Americanform. He does not name the third, but note this was 1935, and it was delivered in NaziGermany (1953, pages 35 ^ 36). As Kisiel notes, too strongly but on the right track,` thus the practice of German National Socialism is, already in 1935, `metaphysicallythe same' as that of Americanism and Russian Communism'' (2001a, page 240).

If this is the situation in Germany, and of the Beitra« ge in German, how is it totranslate it, to carry it across, into the modernday Anglophone world and into theEnglish language? Aside from the obvious problems of reading a book almost seventyyears after it was first written, with the difficulties of recognising all the allusions andcontexts of Heidegger's time, the English-language reader is faced with a translationwhich has tended to invite severe criticism (for example, Bambach, 2000). Emad andMaly have, to their credit, brought this work into English in some form, and allowedwider discussion of this text to begin. Faced with the text they had to work with, onecan only have sympathy for their task. That said, several contentious decisions havebeen made here, and the book needs to be retranslated as it is read. Essentially, Emadand Maly have overtranslated to an alarming degree. For example, Wesen, essenceor character, has been translated as `essential sway', or sometimes, when it impliesdas Eigenste einer Sache (what is ownmost to something), as `what is ownmost', andthen at times it is rendered as `way of being'. Although a recognition of the importanceHeidegger puts on this word is necessary, to translate continually with different wordsor phrases obscures the point (see de Beistegui, 2003, pages 87 ^ 89; Sallis, 2001, page 196).Similarly, the choice of en-owning' for Ereignis is deeply problematic, the word havinga common meaning of event' and a sense of `appropriation' or `propriation' (see Casey,1997, page 278; Elden, 2003a, pages 37 ^ 38; Krell, 1992, page 231).

This is why I have regularly revised the translation of passages and terms takenfrom the Beitra« ge, which has the additional advantage of allowing some of the word-play around key terms to emerge. It is for this reason that many German terms areincluded in brackets within the text, and that quite a bit of stress is given to wordassociation and etymology. As both Heidegger and Nietzsche have shown, the analysisof words can reveal much about meanings that have become obscured or forgotten.The use of language is a crucial tool in Heidegger's mode of argumentation, and, forthat reason, it is necessary to pay careful attention to what he actually says.

Calculation and politicsThe political background established above is important, as Heidegger's work onmeasure (MaÞ ) and calculation (Rechnung) has to be understood in the context ofits time, and it is perhaps hereömore than any other theme in the Beitra« ge with theexception of raceöthat the political intrudes.(7) The word `measure' is MaÞ, whichderives from messen, to measure or to gauge. Heidegger continually works with wordsthat share this stem. We have already seen Massenversammlungen, the mass meetings;Vermassung, the reduction to a mass or measure; and Lebensmasse, vital resources.More broadly, in those references to Einfu« hrung in die Metaphysic (an introductionto metaphysics) (1953) we saw how Heidegger believed all had been condensed to

(7) For a much more detailed account see Elden (2003a). These themes are developed in Elden (2005a).

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extension and number. One of the most important of these related words in a politicalcontext is Gema« Þheit, a word vital to national socialism, which means conformityor accord, the removal of dangerous elements as things are brought together arounda fixed measure or norm. In this it is directly related to the better known conceptof Gleichschaltung, which implies political coordination, literally `same wiring' orconnection', the bringing into line and elimination of opposition, subordinating thingsto a common measure (see Friedlander, 1980; Klemperer, 2000). The other key themeis the gearing up of the economy, particularly in the Four Year Plan (see Kisiel, 2001a).A running theme of the Beitra« ge concerns the problems of mechanistic, calculativeways of looking at the world. For Heidegger, by this time, it is increasingly obviousthat Nazism is a continuation of this problematic, rather than its potential solution,which he had at one point patently believed.

Indeed, Heidegger's lifelong claim that the tradition has forgotten or is oblivious tobeing is seen, in the Beitra« ge, as dependent on three things, three concealments(Verhu« llungen): calculation (die Berechnung), acceleration or rapidity (die Schnelligkeit ),and massiveness (Massenhaften, that root again) (1989, pages 120 ^ 121). These threethemes are necessarily related, the second and third being particular ways of celebrat-ing quantitative growth, with the obvious dual relations to time and spaceöquickertimes and greater extension. Calculation, a particular way of taking measure thatincreasingly becomes the only way, requires all things to be adjusted in its light: theincalculable is only the not yet calculable. The last of the three, massiveness, is relatedto a term Heidegger calls the gigantic (das Riesenhafte) (1989, pages 135 ^ 138, 441 ^ 443).There are three candidates for giganticism in 1930s Germany: the Leviathan, a state ofunlimited and undivided sovereignty on the Hobbesian model; the Behemoth thatbecame the symbol of the Nazi war machine; and the Hindenberg airship which hadburst into flames in 1937 (see Kisiel, 2001b; Neumann, 1942; de Syon, 2002).

`The gigantic was determined as that through which the `quantitative' is transformedinto its own `quality', a kind of magnitude [Gro« Þe]. The gigantic is thus not some-thing quantitative that begins with a relatively high number (with number andmeasurement)öeven though it can appear superficially as quantitative'. The giganticis grounded upon the decidedness and invariability of calculation' and is rooted in aprolongation of subjective re-presentation unto the whole of beings'' (1989, page 441).(8)

This theme of the quantitative as a quality in itself is important. The quale ofsomething is its whatness, effectively its way of being, or, in the traditional sense, itsessence. That the quantitative has become a quality is an important shift. The gigantic,for Heidegger, is not merely a quantity of dramatic proportions, but is his name forthis shift. In other works, as I have traced elsewhere (2001b; 2003a), Heidegger seesDescartes as the crucial moment of this development. Descartes sees the world as` mechanical nature, that is, extension'' (Heidegger, 1988a, page 103).What is importanthere is how the shift to seeing `what is' as `what can be calculated' plays out politically.Essentially, the current malaise is seen in terms of the twin themes of order (Ordnung)and calculation. These two are related to each other in that dividing something intoelements helps to establish control over it, as these can be organised, rendered, andfurther divided, or grouped and forced into similarity.

Heidegger's critiques of the Nazi concept of `new order' (Neue Ordnung) and theirnotion of Lebensraum are notably not from any moralising position, nor are they evenexplicitly political, but they are seen as examples of the greater problem of nihilism andthe culmination of metaphysics in technology (1986b, pages 139 ^ 141; 1998, page 143).

(8) Almost exactly the same formulation to the first sentence is found in ` The age of the worldpicture'' (in 1977, page 75 ^ 113), first delivered on 9 June 1938.

The spaces of Heidegger's Beitra« ge 817

Calculability is an essential prerequisite for mechanism (1989, page 376), andmore generally the notion of machination is highly dependent on this particular wayof grasping the world. In a particularly striking passage, Heidegger interrogates this.

`The machine, its essence. The service that it demands, the uprooting that itbrings. `Industry' (operations [Betriebe] ); industrial workers, torn from homelandand history [Heimat und Geschichte], exploited for profit. Machine-training,machination and business. What recasting of man gets started here? (World-earth?) Machination and business [Machenschaft und das Gescha« ft ]. The largenumber, the gigantic, pure extension [Ausdehnung] and growing levelling off andemptying. Falling necessarily victim to kitsch and imitation'' (1989, page 392).There are several things that can be said here. In a few places Heidegger notes the

relation between thought of machination and previous understandings of poiesis andtechne. This is a complicated issue which deserves a little more examination. In hisseminal reading of the Nicomachean Ethics Book Six (Aristotle, 1909, 1139b16 ^ 1139b17)crucial for both his own work and a generation of European thinkersöGadamer,Arendt, Strauss, and Klein, to name but a fewöHeidegger (1992) stresses the connec-tions and distinctions between techne, episteme, phronesis, sophia, and nousöthe fiveways the mind arrives at truth (aletheuein). These would usually be translated as art orskill; scientific knowledge; practical wisdom or prudence; philosophic wisdom; andintellectual. For us here, the most important distinction is between techne and phron-esis. These two intellectual virtues are distinct because they relate to poiesis and praxis,which are two entirely separate realms of human activity: production or makingas opposed to action or doing. Phronesis is related to praxis and techne to poiesis. Techneis an intellectual virtue concerned with making as it is logou alethous poietikeöthat is, amode of logos aiming for truth concerned with production (Aristotle, 1909, 1140a10 ^ 11).In stressing this distinction Heidegger indicates the separation of our everyday dealingwith equipment in the world, and insight into our actions explored in Being and Time(1962; 1967). The first division of the published book, concerned with the techne ofpoiesis, examines our relation to beings which do not share our way of being, such asobjects, tools, ` trees, stones, land, sea'', in the Umweltöthe surrounding world orenvironment. The second division looks at the phronesis of praxis, the way we dealwith beings that share our way of being, other humans, in the Mitwelt (the with-worldor shared world) (Heidegger, 1992, page 386; see Elden, 2005a; Kisiel, 1995, page 179).

Machination (Machenschaft) is a mode of making (machen). The former is usuallyassociated with ` a `bad' type of human activity and plotting for such an activity''(Heidegger, 1989, page 126), but Heidegger is interested in retrieving a sense of howit impacts on the issue of being. The latter is, however, unquestionably a humancomportment: Heidegger adds ` poiesis, techne '' (page 126) in parenthesis here tounderline the point. That said, he wants to stress that this comportment is possibleonly on the basis of a particular interpretation of beingsöthat is, of physis, the Greek termthat encompasses nature and the physical more generally. Physis is thought in relation totechne, ` so that what counts now is the preponderance of the makeable and the self-making [Machbare und Sich-machende] ... in a word: machination.'' Physis is not techne, buta reduction of physis into techne is pronounced.

`What does machination mean? That which is let loose into its own shackles?Which shackles? The pattern of generally calculable explainability [berechnenbarenErkla« rbarkeit], by which everything draws nearer to everything else in the samemeasure [gleichma« Þig] and becomes completely alien to itselföyes, totally otherthan just alien [ja ganz anders als noch fremd wird]. The relation of non-relationality[Der Bezug der Unbezu« glichkeit]'' (1989, page 132).

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Heidegger's ongoing critique of Descartes is revealing in the way he shows hownotions of measure have changed over time. This historical investigationörelated tothe one around concepts of space I will discuss in the next sectionöis something thatappears in many forms in his work. A number of important works in the historyof science have made progress in this inquiry, something which is still somewhatunderdeveloped in geography. Examinations of the relation between geography andmathematics have tended to concentrate on the mathematics of geography, the quanti-tative revolution. More recent reassessments have noted the importance of a relatedissue, that of the geographies of mathematics (Barnes and Hannah, 2001a; 2001b;Philo, 1998). Much of the interesting work on this area develops ideas found in thework of Foucault, particularly around notions of governmentality and biopower (forexample, Hannah, 2000).(9) But, although Foucault is extremely interesting in termsof conceptual and historical work, I would suggest that philosophically this is devel-oped much more explicitly in Heidegger's work. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere(2001a), much of Foucault's work in this area is closely related to some of Heidegger'sclaims.

Heidegger pursues this theme across the Beitra« ge and a comprehensive summary isimpossible. Let me confine myself to three points: first, the relation between machina-tion and lived experience. Although we might appeal to a more `authentic', vitalist,experiential way of thinking as a reaction against cold mechanism and calculation,Heidegger suggests that `lived experience', Erlebnis, shares a common foundation withmachination, made most obvious in Descartes (Heidegger, 1984c, page 149; 1989,pages 123 ^ 124, 129, 131 ^ 134; 1994a, page 129). Second, thinking machination backthrough its root in techne may provide a way into the issue of being, albeit from oneof its most oblique angles (1989, page 132). We can see this if we look at the wayHeidegger retrieves so much from his reading of Aristotle (Heidegger, 1992). Third,and in most detail, there is the issue of world ^ earth, raised in an earlier quotation asa question but invoked in other places as a direct problem.

The problem of world ^ earth opens up contemporary concerns with the environ-ment and globalisation, which Heidegger was grappling with. If his credentials as afoundational theorist of certain types of ecological thinking are well known, throughan engagement with his writings on technology and poetic dwelling (Foltz, 1995;Zimmerman, 1993), what is less understood is how such themes emerged in his workof the 1930s, within this particular political context, most notably in the Beitra« ge.Heidegger's argument is complicated, and hinges on the reduction of the Greek physisto the Latin natura, the root for our term `nature'. For Heidegger, even in 1936 ^ 38,in technology (die Technik) nature is destroyed because it is separated from humanbeings, it is seen as a separate realm from human existence. In part, this is theargument against Descartes found in Being and Time, where Descartes's separationof the mind and body is challenged with the idea of being-in-the-world. Heideggerargues that the originary, more rooted sense of physis is lost as nature is seen as abeing itself, ` and, after this demoting [Absetzung], ultimately reduced to the full forceof calculating machination and economy'' (1989, page 277). Nature becomes resextensa, an extended material resource. The natural no longer has any ` immediaterelation to physis, but rather is fully set-up [gestellt ] according to the machinational''(page 133). Recent debates in geography have demonstrated that the problematic

(9) The 2004 Association of American Geographers centenary meeting in Philadelphia, for example,had a panel under the title of ` Place, Space and Calculation'', organised by myself and JeremyCrampton. Papers included assessments of calculative citizenship, urban planning, 17th-centurymaritime navigation, the cartography of the Peace of Paris, public policy, national socialism, andthe American Geographical Society.

The spaces of Heidegger's Beitra« ge 819

division of the social and the natural needs to be rethought, but also that the idea ofthe production of nature is worth investigating (see Castree, 1995; Castree and Braun,1998; Demeritt, 2002; Gregory, 2001). Heidegger's argument here is not merely thatnature is never pure but is always already social, but also that the very idea of `nature'in some supposedly pure state is already a reductive understanding. This perhaps addsanother angle into this ongoing debate.

Heidegger talks of the human reduction and ` transition to a technicised animal, whichbegins to replace the instincts, which have already grown weaker and less refined by thegiganticism of technology [derTechnik]'' (1989, page 98, emphasis in original). In this reduc-tion, nature becomes merely scenery and a place for recreation, and even in this it isarranged for the masses as a form of the gigantic (page 277).Very similar language wouldbe used for the Rhine river in the later ` Question concerning technology'' essay (2000,pages 7 ^ 36), which also makes use of the crucial term Ge-Stell, enframing or the setup,which names the essence of technology. In the earliest form of this lecture, from 1949, thetitle was ` Das Ge-Stell'' (1994b, pages 24 ^ 45). For Heidegger, the prospects are bleak.

`The human might for centuries yet pillage and lay waste to the planet with theirmachinations, the gigantic character of this driving might `develop' into somethingunimaginable and take on the form of a seeming rigour as the massive regulating ofthe desolate as suchöyet the greatness of beyng continues to be closest off (1989,page 408).The key issue is the separation of world and earth. Earth, a more rooted experi-

ence, is lost in the technologised world through the advent of a globalisation thatreduces the earth to a ball, to the world made picture, rationalised, calculated, andcontrolled. Calculation here plays a key role. It is not just the impact of technologythat must be investigated, but the very thing that makes it possible: calculation. ` Mustnature be surrendered and abandoned to machination?'' asks Heidegger. `Are we stillcapable of seeking earth anew?'' (1989, page 278).

Time ^ space and the AbgrundFor geographers, perhaps the most crucial part of the manuscript is the discussionof the notion of time ^ space (Zeit ^Raum) in sections 238 ^ 242 (1999, pages 371 ^ 388).It is potentially through these that we might be able to rethink the notion of earth.These sections are anticipated by an earlier comment, which sums up the key aspectsof the discussion.

`One must first generally attempt to think the essence of time so originally (in its`ecstasis') that it becomes graspable as the possible truth for beyng [Seyn] as such.But already thinking time through in this way brings it, in its relatedness to theDa of Da-sein, into an essential relationship with the spatiality of Da-sein and thuswith space (compare `Grounding' [Part 5 of the Beitra« ge, in which sections238 ^ 242 are found]). But measured against their ordinary representations, timeand space are here more originary; and ultimately, they are time ^ space, which isnot a coupling of time and space but what is more originary in their belongingtogether'' (1989, page 189).

Three points can be made about this: the relation between time and space; the attemptto think time and space without notions of calculation; and the notion of the abyss.

The treatment of time and space together is a correction of the one-sided analysesof Being and Time. Time here is the possible truth for being (and the nonmetaphysicalbeyng at that), but it must be thought in relation to space in this regard, unlike inBeing and Time when temporality was the guiding clue for the question of being (seealso 1989, pages 191 ^ 193). In this alone it is clear that Heidegger is trying to thinktheir relation, which in itself is important in contemporary debates within geography.

820 S Elden

As I have argued elsewhere, the issue of the reassertion of space within social theorycan neither be at the expense of time, nor allow space to be assimilated into anotherwise unproblematised historical method (Elden, 2001a; for a related argumentsee Lefebvre, 2004). Indeed, Heidegger's suggestion is more than time ^ space needingto be thought together, instead of apart. Time ^ space is not simply the coupling of timeand space, but the very notion that allows each to be thought distinctly. Zeit ^Raum isnot the same as Zeitraumöthat is, a span of time, a notion that betrays a measured,mathematical sense. Thinking the idea of time (the Wesen, the essence of time), forcesusöthrough the notion of the Da, the there or the here of being, being-the-thereötocome to terms with space. The reverse is also the case. However, we should note thecaution that neither time nor space here are understandable in terms of ` their ordinaryrepresentations'', a point hinted at above in the passage from the Grundfragen derPhilosophie (Basic questions of philosophy) (Heidegger, 1984c, page 193; 1994b,page 167). Time ^ space takes on a particularly privileged role in the Beitra« ge, as` originally the site for the moment of propriation [Augenblicks-Sta« tte des Ereignisses]''(1989, page 30, see also page 235). Although this is perhaps more important forHeidegger scholarship than for geography, we should note that this is the way tounderstand the notion of Da-sein, as ` the site for the moment of the grounding ofthe truth of beyng'' (page 323, see also pages 374 ^ 375). Da-sein, whichöaccording toBeing and Timeöis the being for whom, in its being, its being is in question (1967,page 11), is here seen as similarly related to this key issue.

Heidegger suggests that time ^ space needs to be thought in a way distinct from themathematical calculative understanding of time and space. Time is not simply a fourthcoordinate or parameter (Parameter), a t, to add to the three coordinates of space, theCartesian x, y, and z (1989, page 377). In such a way of thinking, ` space and time aremerely strung together, after both have been levelled off in advance unto the same of whatis countable [Za« hlbaren] and what makes counting possible [Za« hlung Ermo« glichenden]''(page 377). Problems arise in trying to think space and time in any way other thanquantitatively, ` at most as forms of these quantities'' (page 136). Heidegger's way ofthinking the problem of calculationöwhich is relevant, as I suggested above, to a wholerange of inquiriesöis central to his thinking of the issue of time ^ space more generally(see Elden, 2001a; 2005a). The notion of time ^ space has important affinities to thebreadth of Heidegger's project here, as when he suggests that the ` time ^ space charac-ter of decision to be grasped as the bursting cleft or fissure [aufbrechende Klu« ftung] ofbeyng itself, that is being-historically and not morally-anthropologically'' (1989, page 103,emphasis in original; see Krell, 1992, page 202).

Time ^ space is therefore more originary than both time and space separately andthe idea of four-dimensional space ^ time. Zeit ^Raum should not be separated intospace and time, but they must be thought together, with a lack of a distance betweenthem. The term also seeks to exceed a straightforward understanding of all historicalevents as `somewhen' and `somewhere' (Heidegger, 1989, page 377). This is not to saythat they are entirely invalid ways of thinking, but that they are reductive and limited.For Heidegger, the standard form of knowing ` will be above all relegated tothe naturally limited sphere of its accuracy [or correctness, Richtigkeit]'' (page 378).Heidegger's counterexample is valuable in thinking through concerns with performa-tivity and embodiment, where he attempts to use examples of these ways of being asaccess to the question itself. He suggests that if we take a number of everyday issuesönearness and distance, emptiness and gifting, energy and hesitation (Na« he undFerne, Leere und Schenkung, Schwung und Zo« gerung)öwe should not try to thinkthem in terms of the usual representations of space and time, but try to think spaceand time differently through them, because ``within them lies the hidden essence

The spaces of Heidegger's Beitra« ge 821

[verhu« llte Wesen] of time ^ space'' (page 372). Why might this be hidden? Once again theGerman shows us more easily than English can about Heidegger's intent. The threeconcealments of being, the Verhu« llungen, are at play here, particularly in the way calcula-tion, acceleration, and massiveness relate to and impact on our understanding of time andspace.

It should of course be mentioned that we cannot simply try to return to the origin,a way of thinking before the metaphysical fall. We cannot simply turn back meta-physics. Rather, we need to think historically about the problem, and retrace the` descent out of the history [die Herkunft aus der Geschichte]'' (page 372):

`We need to show how it happens that space and time become framing representation(ordo-concept [row or rank]) (`forms of intuition') for `mathematical' calculation andwhy these concepts of space and time dominate all thinking, even and preciselywhere one speaks of `experienced time [erlebter Zeit]' (Bergson and others)''(page 373).(10)

In such an inquiry into the history of the concepts of space and time, there will bevarious stages. For Heidegger the key events are the following:1. Aristotle's Physicsöparticularly the analysis of topos and khronos in Physics book 4(Aristotle, 1936). But even here, pou and pote (the where and when) are categories,determinations of beingness, ousia.2. The Christian interpretation of beings, which seemingly keeps the `results' ofAristotle. By this Heidegger means scholasticism, in all its many varieties, a topicwhich he does not treat in anything like sufficient detail (see Lang, 1992; 1998).In this period Heidegger contends that we see the replacement of ousia with substantia,a revised reading of the term megethos from a notion of stretch to that of thecontinuum, and the idea of space as sensorium Dei (Sense of God).3. Space and time in Leibniz's work and the notion of mathesis (learning, especiallymathematically). We might add Descartes in this chronology here, just as Heideggerusually does.4. In Kant, time and space are attributed to the human subject, a determination whichis challenged, but not fundamentally, by Nietzsche (Heidegger, 1989, page 373, see alsopages 70 ^ 71, 207 ^ 208, 376).

This is an inquiry which looks at ` why and under what assumptions is the breakingapart of space and time historically necessary?'' (1989, page 373). In this we have twohistorical inquiries, but inquiries of the conditions of possibility for things to be as theyare: what might be called, in Heideggerian ^ Foucauldian manner, historical ontology,in other words a historicisation of the Kantian problematic (Elden, 2003b; Hacking,2002). Although Heidegger does suggest that we need to be careful in this,(11) we cando some interesting things with such thinking: in particular, tracing the relationsbetween mathematical and philosophical conceptions of space and their political andgeographical counterparts. This relation is not straightforwardly causal, in that onemakes the other, but it is revealing to trace their connections. Such an analysis is at theheart of Casey's history of the concept of place (1997) and is something I have tried topursue in relation to the idea of territory.

(10) On the problem of experience (see Elden, 2003a, pages 47 ^ 49; Heidegger, 1989, page 74).(11) ` But all of these historical expositions, frequently attempted since the nineteenth century, are blindand useless and without real philosophical questioning, apart from the fact that they merely pick the`passages' out of each respective context of inquiry and line them up, The history [Geschichte] of these`representations' is the history of the truth of beyng [Geschichte der Wahrheit des Seyns] and can befruitfully brought into a sharper philosophical focus only with the history of the guiding-question[Geschichte der Leitfrage]. Everything else is scholarly pretence, merely misleading even more to thesuperficiality of collecting and comparing passages'' (1989, pages 378 ^ 379).

822 S Elden

The key argument in this ongoing work is that space and place should not bedistinguished on the basis of scale, but that space emerges in Western thought througha particular way of grasping place. This way of grasping is to see place as somethingextensible and calculable, extended in three dimensions, and grounded on the geo-metric point. On this understanding, territory is not merely a political way of conceivingland, but the political corollary of this emergent concept of space. What this means isthat although territory is integrally related to the state, in that both the modern stateand the modern concept of territory emerge at the same historical juncture, it does notnecessarily follow that territory is inherently tied to the state. The historical momentwe call globalisation demonstrates that the calculable understanding of space has beenextended to the globe, which means that even as the state becomes less the focus ofattention territory remains of paramount importance. Territory therefore is a politicalway of conceiving of calculable space (see Elden, 2005b).

Beyond such historical analyses, Heidegger's suggestionöand quite possibly themost complicated one he makes in the Beitra« ge in relation to geographyöis that weshould think time ^ space as Abgrund. What does he mean by this? Abgrund is theGerman word for abyss, so time ^ space is abyssal, unfathomable, without ground. Is thisour impossible, the impassable, the shattering encounter of the immeasurable void?Heidegger declares that `Ab-grund is the originary essency of ground. Ground is theessence of truth [Ab-grund ist die urspru« ngliche Wesung des Grundes. Der Grund ist dasWesen derWahrheit]'' (1989, page 379). This shares an affinity with the notion of fissureor cleft, Klu« ftung, as noted above, which can also mean crevasse or chasm, and relatedwords such as Zerklu« ftung, the fissured or the indented. `The Leap'öpart 4 of theBeitra« geöis concerned with the way the other beginning is the ``leap into the en-cleftmiddle of the turn of propriation'' (1989, page 231; see pages 235 ^ 239, 244; Krell, 1992,pages 202 ^ 203).

There are a range of words that share an etymological kinship with Abgrund,including Grund, Ungrund, Urgrund, gru« nden, Gru« nder, and Gru« ndung (Emad andMaly, 1999, pages xxx ^ xxii). Grund is related to the English `ground', which likeGrund comes from the Old High German word grunt. But there is also the Latinate`found', from fundus, and these two terms help to get a sense of what Heidegger isdriving at. Several of the available translations of Heidegger's lecture courses havetitles such as `The fundamental concepts of metaphysics' or `The basic problems ofphenomenology'. The key word in both is Grund: Grundbegriffe or Grundprobleme.Heidegger was always concerned with the fundamental, the foundational, the ground-ing issues. `Found' and `fundamental' both come from the same root, fundare. However,Grund also means `bottom', `root', `basis', and can also, like in English, mean the reasonor grounds for something.

For Emad and Maly, Abgrund is not abyss, but in regular German it is.(12) It wouldmake German readers think of abyss, chasm, depth, or precipice, and therefore forcethem to think this term more carefully when they see it on the page, to sidestep whatmight be thought by the term in its standard use, and so it should be for Englishreaders. To coin a word such as abground' means that the reader already knows that itis unusual, peculiar, and problematic, rather than letting the sense emerge from thediscussion. Heidegger notes that ` Der Ab-grund ist Ab-grund '' (1989, page 379)öthat is,Abgrund is not wholly negative. We should perhaps compare its structure to the termaletheia, translated above as unconcealment, which is not something that has a negative

(12) Heidegger uses it in its standard form in a few places. See, for example, ` the animal is separatedfrom man by an Abgrund '' (1983b, page 384), and the suggestion that in relation to biologism thereis an ` abgru« ndig that separates Nietzsche from all this'' (1996, volume 1, page 510).

The spaces of Heidegger's Beitra« ge 823

connotation, but one of bringing something into the open, revealing it. Abgrund couldsimply mean something like groundless', or potentially `from ground', `by ground', awayfrom ground'.

In fact, the English `abyss' does a lot of this work. It comes from the late Latinabyssus, itself a simple transliteration of the Greek abyssos, basically the alpha-privative with bathos, depth. From this word we get the English `bathos', meaningdepth, but also meaning the rhetorical device of a move from the elevated to thecommonplace, after Alexander Pope. In a sense Abgrund follows the same paththe other way, so we might think of a notion of `abathos', a move from the common-place to the elevation of being. In other words, it is a move from the everyday nearnessand distance, emptiness and gifting, energy and hesitation (Na« he und Ferne, Leere undSchenkung, Schwung und Zo« gerung) to the question of being. Such things function as amode of access to this question of being.

`The a-byss as the first essence of ground grounds (lets the ground essence asground) in the way of temporalising and spatialising [Der Ab-grund als ersteWesungdes Grundes gru« ndet (la« Þt den Grund als Grund wesen) in derWeise der Zeitigung undRa« umung]'' (1989, page 383).The abyssal then, feet gripping the edge, tottering on the rim of the precipice.

Without ground, without depth, or, rather, from ground, from the depths. An impos-sible encounter that makes possible what follows. From the Ab-grund comes the Grund,from the abyss, the foundation, and this ` in the way of temporalising and spatialising''.Unfortunately, the resemblance to abatos, impassable, is visual rather than etymological,although it is clear that the impasse becomes a way, just as the abyss grounds. If we trytherefore to fathom the unfathomable, it must be through taking our measure from theimmeasurable, rather than the other way round: in other words, we should not seethe incalculable as simply the not-yet-calculable. Just as the abathos move takes usfrom the commonplace to the question of being, so too should our notion of measureemerge from an engagement with the world, through those everyday issues noted above.We should, therefore, not think them in relation to a preexisting sense of space and time,but allow a sense of space and time to emerge from thinking them.

ConclusionI have attempted here to show how Heidegger's Beitra« ge zur Philosophie can offer much byway of a contribution to geography. There are doubtless several potential issues of interestwithin this complex work, a resource I have only touched upon, but I have concentratedon two main concerns, intimately related: the issue of calculation and the understanding oftime ^ space. Heidegger's work on these two issues opens up a whole range of questionsand perspectives. These includeöbut surely cannot be reduced toöthe question ofwhat it means to calculate, and how understandings of measure and number mayhave changed; the interrelation and conceptualisation of time, space, and time ^ space,both theoretically and from a historical perspective; and the connections betweentechnology or machination and the environment and globalisation.

In the final lines of the Beitra« ge, Heidegger rehearses and develops some of thethemes touched upon here:

`Language is grounded in silence. Silence is the most sheltered measure-holding [MaÞ-halten]. It holds the measure, in that it first sets up measures [Es ha« lt das MaÞ, indem esdie MaÞ-sta« be erst setzt]. And so language is measure-setting [MaÞ-setzung] in themost intimate and widest sense, measure-setting as essential essency of the jointureand its joining (propriation) [Erwesung des Fugs und seiner Fu« gung {Ereignis}]. Andinsofar as language ground of Da-sein, the measuring [Ma« Þigung] lies in thisand indeed as the ground of strife of world and earth'' (1989, page 510).

824 S Elden

Perhaps, given Heidegger's later concerns, it is only apposite that the Beitra« geshould end with a reflection on language. Here, Heidegger opens up the possibility ofthinking about measure in a different way, taking measure from language, being, andDa-sein. The strife of world and earth, that theme of the lecture on art but with widergeographical and geopolitical implications, can be traced back to the ground ofDa-seinöhuman openness or potential closedness, oblivionöto being. If geographyis to make progress in addressing the issues of environment and globalisation, of therelation of time and space and the problematic politics that arise from notions of orderand calculation, a rethinking of the notion of measure would be entirely appropriate.

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