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Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga - Part 1

1. Introduction

Originally known as “Object Angara”, the Plesetsk rocketbase was built in the late 1950s as the first operationalSoviet launch site of intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs). The site was on permanent stand-by to firenuclear-tipped R-7 missiles to the US in case of anuclear conflict between the two superpowers. Re-cently released documents have revealed that Angarawas supposed to be only the first of several R-7 launchbases across the Soviet Union, but the emergence ofmore effective ICBMs like the R-16 and R-9 soon turnedthe R-7 into an obsolete missile. In 1963 the decisionwas made to turn Angara into a launch site for satel-lites in high-inclination orbits as well as a test range fornewly developed solid-fuel ICBMs, although initiallypreference had been given to another location about250 km southeast of Angara. The first satellite launchfrom the base took place on 17 March 1966. In theensuing years it became the busiest space port in theworld, performing a record amount of 69 space launchesin 1977. Although US intelligence was aware of Angara’sexistence by 1960 and amateur satellite observers soonpinpointed its location after the first space launch, theSoviet Union did not officially acknowledge its exist-ence until 1983.

2. The Origins of the R-7 missile

By the early 1950s the Soviet Union had tested severalrelatively short-range missiles: the R-1 (essentially a So-viet version of the V-2), the R-2 and the R-5. All test flightsof these missiles had taken place from a launch siteofficially known as the 4th State Central Firing Range(Russian acronym GTsP-4), located near Kapustin Yar inthe Volgograd region.

As the Cold War shifted into higher gear in the late1940s, the Soviet Union began looking at the possibilityof using missiles to carry warheads over intercontinentaldistances. Unlike the US, the USSR did not have theluxury of having bases along the enemy’s borderline,making rockets a more convenient way of transportingweapons than strategic bombers. The leading rocket re-search institute at the time was NII-88 (established in1946), with one of its departments headed by SergeiKorolyov. By the end of the decade NII-88 began investi-gating both intercontinental ballistic and cruise missiles.A Soviet government decree issued on 4 December 1950approved a new rocket research programme, one part ofwhich (“theme N-3”) focused on intercontinental ballisticand cruise missiles. Another decree on 13 February 1953(N° 443-213) approved further experimental work on bothtypes of missiles (themes T-1 and T-2), both of whichneeded to have a range of 8,000 km and carry a 3-tonpayload. Test flights of experimental versions of the ICBMwere to begin in 1955 and test flights of simplified ver-sions of the cruise missiles in 1954 [1].

Initially, missiles were primarily seen as an alternativeway of carrying conventional warheads, but the relativelylow accuracy of missiles combined with the limited yieldof such warheads made them ineffective weapons. Stra-tegic bombers were viewed as the primary means ofdelivering nuclear warheads to US territory, with missilesenjoying relatively little interest from the upper echelonsof power. This changed in the wake of Iosif Stalin’s deathin March 1953, as it became clear that the strategicbombers under development at the time fell short of therange requirements issued earlier by the Air Force andalso became increasingly vulnerable to improving US

Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga:The Early Years of the Plesetsk Launch Site

(1955-1969) – Part 1

BART HENDRICKXMinervastraat 39, 2640 Mortsel, Belgium.

This paper looks at the early years of the Plesetsk launch site in the northwest of the Soviet Union, which wasestablished as an ICBM base in the late 1950s and evolved into a space launch facility in the 1960s. It alsodiscusses early US reconnaissance of the top secret launch base.

Keywords: Soviet Union, cosmodrome, Plesetsk, R-7

Space Chronicle: JBIS, Vol. 65, Suppl. 2, pp.??-??, 2012

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radar and anti-aircraft defence systems. With a payloadcapacity of three tons, the intercontinental missiles wouldbe barely capable of carrying even a small atomic bomb,but by the end of 1953 confidence grew in the develop-ment of a hydrogen bomb that could be delivered bymissiles. Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov cameup with a design for a deliverable hydrogen bomb with amass of about 5 tons, making it necessary to increase thepayload capacity of the rockets.

The final go-ahead for the development of interconti-nental ballistic and cruise missiles came in two separatedecrees on 20 May 1954 (N°956-408 for the ICBMs andN°957-409 for the cruise missiles). Although the com-plete texts of these decrees have so far not been re-leased, they probably ordered designers to adapt thedesigns for carrying Sakharov’s hydrogen bomb, a speci-fication that had not been mentioned in the 13 February1953 decree.

The final configuration of the ICBM, called R-7, wasapproved on 20 November 1954 [2]. It consisted of a corestage and four strap-on rockets, which together formedthe first stage. Both the core stage and strap-ons wouldignite on the ground, eliminating the problems associ-ated with igniting rocket engines at high altitudes. Bothstages used engines burning liquid oxygen (LOX) andkerosene (Fig. 1). The R-7 is the same rocket that wouldeventually launch the first Sputnik on 4 October 1957, butthe orbiting of satellites was only seen as a secondaryobjective for the rocket. Official government approval forthe satellite project had not come until 30 January 1956[3].

At the same time development got underway of twocruise missiles, one called Burya (“Storm”), the otherBuran (“Blizzard”). Both missiles had a winged core stagewith air-breathing ramjet engines flanked by rocket-pow-ered “strap-on” boosters, two for Burya and four for Buran.Burya, to be developed by the OKB-301 design bureau ofSemyon Lavochkin, was designed to carry atomic bombsand Buran, assigned to the OKB-23 design bureau ofVladimir Myasishchev, was supposed to deliver hydrogenbombs.

3. Selecting a Test Rangefor R-7 Test Flights

Even before the release of the May 1954 decrees, an-other Council of Ministers decree of 17 March 1954 hadtasked a special commission with selecting a launch sitefor test flights of the R-7, Burya and Buran missiles by 1January 1955 and report the conclusions by 1 March1955. The decree envisaged that the initial test flights ofall three missiles would be conducted from Kapustin Yar[4].

Fig. 1 The R-7 missile. (RKK Energiya)

Several factors had to be taken into account inmaking a final choice. One of these was that the impactareas of the R-7, Burya and Buran first-stage strap-onboosters as well as those of the simulated nuclearwarheads had to be sparsely populated. Another wasthat the R-7 relied on radio guidance, making it neces-sary to build two control posts (a primary post and a“mirror” post) situated 250 km on either side of thelaunch pad. A straight line connecting the two postswas supposed to be perpendicular to the direction offlight. By measuring the difference between the dis-tances from the missile to the primary and mirror con-trol posts it was possible to correct lateral deviationsfrom the flight trajectory. For accurate range control itwas originally planned to build a third station some 300

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Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga - Part 1

to 500 km “behind” the launch pad but before thebeginning of the R-7 test flights it was decided toentrust this task to a special computer at the primarycontrol post, which also issued the command to shutdown the core stage rocket engine [5].

On 4 February 1955 the Central Committee of theCommunist Party received a report summing up the re-sults of the commission’s work. Between April and De-cember 1954 the commission had studied a number ofoptions:

• Kapustin Yar (the same site used for the early rocketlaunches)

• a location in the Stavropol region (more specificallynear Stepnoye and Divnoye, in between the Blackand Caspian Seas)

• a location near Krasnovodsk (renamed Türkmenbasyin 1993) on the east coast of the Caspian Sea inTurkmenistan)

• a location near Vologda (about 400 km northeast ofMoscow on the Moscow-Arkhangelsk railway)

• a location near Kazalinsk (in Kazakhstan, east of theAral Sea on the shores of the Syr-Darya river)

It is known from other sources that several other loca-tions had been considered as well [6].

Impact areas that had been studied for the warheadswere Chukotka, the Kamchatka peninsula, the coastlineof the Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin island and the Kurilislands.

The commission came to the conclusion that it wasimpossible to find a launch site from where the missilescould fly their maximum range of 8,000 km and stillimpact on Soviet territory without jeopardizing the safetyof the population and violating secrecy rules. Therefore itwas agreed with the missiles’ chief designers that for theinitial test flights the range would be limited to 6,200 kmand that test flights over the full distance of 8,000 kmwould splash down in the Pacific Ocean.

The site considered best suited for the flights was theone near the Syr-Darya river in Kazakhstan, near therailway station of Tyura-Tam on the Chkalov-Tashkentrailway. Korolyov and Mikhail Ryazanskiy, chief designerof radio guidance systems, were opposed to flying theearly R-7 test flights from Kapustin Yar in the direction ofLake Balkhash (a distance of 1,800 km), as had beenrecommended in the 17 March 1954 decree. They pre-ferred instead to begin test flights from the new launchsite towards Kamchatka over a distance of 6,200 km. Thechief designers of the Burya and Buran cruise missiles(Lavochkin and Myasishchev), did consider it expedientto fly initial test flights from Kapustin Yar (to be moreexact from a nearby Air Force test range called

Vladimirovka), enabling them to do some basic testingwhich would determine the further development of themissiles [7].

The recommendations were accepted in a govern-ment decree issued on 12 February 1955 (N° 292-181)[8]. Construction of the new launch site got underwayimmediately. It was officially called the Scientific Re-search and Testing Range No. 5 (NIIP-5) and would laterbecome known as the Baikonur cosmodrome.

4. The Angara and Volga Sites

The NIIP-5 site was selected only for test flights of the R-7, Burya and Buran cruise missiles. With their maximumrange of 8,000 km, they could not reach any significantportions of US territory from the site in Kazakhstan. Foroperational deployment of these missiles, new sites wouldhave to be selected not far from the northern borderlineof the Soviet Union, from where missiles could be launchedover the North Pole to the North American continent. Anadded bonus of these locations was that they were situ-ated far from US bomber bases along the country’s south-ern borderline. If the need arose, they would also providethe opportunity to carry out test flights towards theKamchatka peninsula. The factors to be considered inthe selection of the operational sites were largely thesame as those for the experimental site (proximity ofrailways, sparsely populated areas in the first-stage dropzones, location of radio control posts). Also, they wouldhave to be built in strict secrecy and be camouflaged tothe maximum extent possible, with some of the structuresto be built underground [9].

On 11 June 1955 Defence Minister Georgiy Zhukovsent a letter to the Central Committee recommending twolocations for operational R-7 launch sites, which wereofficially referred to as “combat launch stations” [10]:

• 100-120 km northeast or south of Vorkuta, some 40-50 km from the Moscow-Vorkuta and Vorkuta-Khalmeryu railway lines in the Polar Urals. Thenumerous valleys and gorges crisscrossing this areamade it ideal for both ground-based pads and silos.

• 100-180 km south or southwest of Arkhangelsk, some20-30 km from the Moscow-Arkhangelsk andObozyorskaya-Onega railway lines. The hilly regionwould make it possible to build ground-based pads or“semi-underground” pads.

The Ministry of Defence had already conducted pre-liminary reconnoitring of both areas in October 1954,several months even before the official selection of NIIP-5 as the experimental launch site. Zhukov recommendedboth areas for further surveying and finish that work in thefirst half of 1956, with construction of two to three launchfacilities to begin in the second half of 1956. It made littlesense to begin construction work earlier because the

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choice of the exact location would have to wait until theinitial R-7 test flights from NIIP-5 near Tyura-Tam, thenslated to begin in the first half of 1956. These would haveto show exactly where the radio control posts would haveto be built.

In his letter Zhukov noted that the most ideal locationfrom a strategic standpoint would be the area of Kolymain the far east of the country. From there, the R-7 couldreach virtually any point on US territory, except for thesouthernmost tip of Florida. The problem was that Kolymawas located far from major industrial centres and waseconomically underdeveloped. Furthermore, there wasno railway network in the area. Despite the high coststhat would be associated with building a launch basethere, Zhukov asked the Central Committee to furtherexplore the possibility [11].

On 19 July 1955 the Council of Ministers issued an-other decree (N° 1313-749), approving both the Vorkutaand Arkhangelsk areas for operational deployment of R-7missiles. Several ministries were ordered to examineboth areas in detail by 1 July 1956 and present proposalsfor the construction and protection of the sites as well asroads leading to them by 1 August 1956. They were alsoexplicitly ordered to carry out that work in utmost secrecy.The Ministry of Defence was tasked with further exploringthe use of the Kolyma region in 1955-1956 [12].

Meanwhile, on 9 April 1955 the Council of Ministershad ordered to draw up preliminary plans by August 1955for three types of launch facilities (irrespective of wherethey would eventually be located): silos, ground-basedpads and pads located in mountainous regions [13].

The reconnoitring work seems to have taken longerthan originally planned, possibly because of consider-able delays in the first test launch of the R-7 from NIIP-5in Kazakhstan, which by the end of 1956 had slipped tothe spring of 1957. It was not until 29 December 1956that Defence Minister Zhukov reported to the CentralCommittee the conclusions of the surveys done in ac-cordance with the 19 July 1955 decree and also of stud-ies of the type of launch pad.

The best way to protect the missiles from enemyattacks and nuclear blasts would be to place them in silossome 150 to 200 m under the surface. However, at thattime the Soviet Union did not have any experience what-soever with building such silos and engineers were stillstruggling to find out how to divert the exhaust gases andprevent them from damaging the rocket during lift-off. Itwas also not clear how to prevent explosions in case ofpropellant leaks and how to repair the silos in case ofaccidents. Moreover, the large base diameter of the R-7and possible slight deviations from the flight path after lift-

off made it necessary to build a large silo with a diameterof 25 to 30 metres and it was not easy to place a coverover such a silo that could withstand the force of anuclear explosion. With the knowledge available at thetime, it was felt that silos for the R-7 could not be built forthe time being. However, work was underway at the timeto launch R-11M missiles from submarines and it wasbelieved that the experience gained with that work couldbe used in the longer term to build silos for the R-7.

The easiest and quickest way of building an opera-tional site was to rely on ground-based pads similar to theone at NIIP-5 (Fig. 2). This work could be finished in 2 to2.5 years, by which time the test flights of the R-7 fromNIIP-5 would have been completed and a considerableinventory of operational R-7 missiles would be availableto place on stand-by at the site. The region south ofArkhangelsk was considered the best area for buildingsuch conventional pads. Zhukov proposed to build twosuch pads in 1957-1959 and another two later on. Whilethe pads would be in open air, the surrounding taigaforests provided at least some camouflage. Also, theywould be located at a distance of 6 to 10 km from oneanother to make it more difficult for the enemy to wipethem out in single air attack. S-75 surface-to-air missileswould be deployed in the vicinity of the pads to protectthem from enemy bomber attacks. The missiles, theirnuclear payloads and propellant would be stored in con-crete facilities, built half underground. A large stockpile ofspare parts would have to be available to quickly repairthe facilities if needed.

Zhukov also proposed to build four R-7 pads in themountainous region of the Polar Urals southeast of Vorkuta(rather than northeast or south as proposed in June 1955) inthe 1957-1960 timeframe. The pads would be built on the

Fig. 2 The R-7 missile on the pad. (Kosmodrom Plesetsk)

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steep slopes of mountains with a maximum height of 800 mand be situated about 5 to 10 km from one another, makingit unlikely that a single blast would damage or destroy morethan one of them. Storage facilities for missiles, nuclearweapons and propellants would be built inside the moun-tains, protected by 100 to 150 m of soil.

When fully completed, the two sites could ensure thesimultaneous launch of eight R-7 IBCMs in case of anuclear conflict and destroy important political and mili-tary-industrial centres of the “likely opponent”, as the USwas often called in official documents of those days.

The estimated cost of the Arkhangelsk site was 250million rubles, with an additional cost of 100 million rublesfor unidentified “special equipment”. The site near Vorkutawas expected to cost 500 million rubles with an additional150 million rubles for special equipment. Priority wasclearly given to the Arkhangelsk site, with 37 millionallocated for initial construction in 1957 as compared tojust 3 million for the Polar Urals site.

Zhukov no longer mentioned the possibility of flyingthe R-7 from the Kolyma region, indicating the idea hadbeen definitively abandoned by the end of 1956. HadKolyma been chosen as an operational base for the R-7,that would have been an ironic twist of fate for the rock-et’s chief designer Sergei Korolyov, who did not haveparticularly fond memories of the area. After having beenarrested on trumped-up charges in 1938, he spent sev-eral months digging for gold in a forced labour campthere in 1940. Fortunately, he was summoned back toMoscow to work in a prison design bureau, having nearlysuccumbed to the harsh conditions at the camp [14].

Zhukov’s latest proposals were accepted in a govern-ment and Communist Party decree (N° 61-39) issued on11 January 1957, which officially sanctioned the con-struction of both operational sites. They were namedafter Russian rivers, the site near Arkhangelsk getting thename “Angara”, and the one near Vorkuta “Volga”. Asrecommended by Zhukov, two R-7 pads would be built atthe Angara site in 1957-1959, with two more to followlater [15].

5. Construction of Angara gets Underway

Two locations had been considered for the constructionof Angara in the Arkhangelsk province, both bordering onthe Moscow-Arkhangelsk railway. One was near the townof Plesetsk (railway station Plesetskaya) and the otherslightly north of that near Sheleksa (with an identicallynamed railway station), the next stop on the railway. Thefinal choice in favour of Plesetsk was made by a team ofofficers of the Ministry of Defence led by Ivan F. Debrovas well as specialists of Korolyov’s OKB-1 design bureau

[16]. It should be noted though that while the town sup-porting the launch site was built very close to Plesetsk,the actual R-7 launch facilities were closer to Sheleksa.

Several factors had contributed to the choice of thePlesetsk area apart from its northern location and theproximity of a major railway. The steep, rocky banks ofthe nearby Yemtsa river minimized the amount of excava-tion work needed for the construction of the pads, whichwould be a virtual carbon copy of the R-7 pads at NIIP-5.Moreover, the dense taiga, the numerous lakes andmarshes and the often cloudy weather would make itdifficult to spot the sites from the air. The area needed forthe construction of the pads and supporting facilities (atotal of 74200 hectares) was not suitable for agricultureor other economic activity and very sparsely populated.The few people inhabiting the taiga were forced to moveto the town of Plesetsk or other locations and a forcedlabour camp in the area was evacuated.

Construction work was assigned to the Ministry ofDefence’s 57th Directorate of Engineering Works headedby Serafim Byleyev (replaced in January 1958 by NikolaiStepanchenko). Byleyev left for the site in early February1957 to prepare for the arrival of the first team of con-struction workers the following month. Construction workgot underway in extremely difficult conditions, with tem-peratures dropping to -45°C. It was also hampered by thefact that there was virtually no infrastructure in the areaapart from a dirt road and an old 36 km long railway trackbranching off the main Moscow-Arkhangelsk railway linewhich had once been used to transport wood. Making lifeeven tougher, there was barely any accommodation forthe construction workers. Most of the soldiers were forcedto live in tents and primitive barracks, some of themreportedly left over from the former prison camp.

US space analyst James Oberg poignantly describedthe harsh conditions in a 2009 article:

“The amount of dirt to be moved (a million cubicmeters) and the volume of concrete (30,000 cubicmetres) were equivalent to that needed for a medium-sized hydroelectric power dam. And this had to takeplace either while the ground was frozen or while itwas soaking wet, with pumps constantly fightinggroundwater seepage. The roads crossed peat bogsfive meters thick; a hundred new bridges had to bethrown up and kept up against natural and usagestresses.

The first builders later told tales of hardship. In winter,your moustache would freeze to the pillow at night, ifyou were lucky enough to have a pillow. Withtemperatures hovering below minus 35-40° C andonly a few hours of dim daylight, mechanical equipmentcrumbled and died and couldn’t be repaired. Snows— especially during the first winter — were dry andpowdery, and even snowshoes and skis had difficulty.

In springtime, the rivers flooded, washing away

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foundations and redepositing dirt removed solaborously in previous months. Giant bubbles of naturalgas oozed to the thawing surface, and machines andpeople often sank out of sight. During the cool, briefsummer, clouds of midges devoured all exposed flesh,especially eyes” [17].

Construction of the first R-7 pad began in mid-1957and that of the second pad (some 8 km to the east of it) inearly 1958. Both pads were built out of the escarpmentalong the Yemtsa river. Initially, 4,500 men were em-ployed to build the first pad, many of them having earliertaken part in building the R-7 facilities at NIIP-5. By theend of 1958 the workforce had increased to 11,500.

As construction got underway, efforts were also beingundertaken to create a permanent staff for the new firingrange. On 4 July 1957 a new Military Unit (nr. 13991) wasset up and six days later its commander was namedColonel Mikhail G. Grigoryev, a World World Two veteranwho had already served at Kapustin Yar from 1950 to1956 (Fig. 3). He officially took up the post on 15 July1957, which is still marked every year as the official birthdate of the Plesetsk cosmodrome.

With virtually no infrastructure in place yet at Angara,Grigoryev’s team was initially stationed near the railwaystation of Bolshevo in the Moscow region and didn’t moveto Plesetsk until September 1957, where they initiallylived in five railway cars. In late August 1957 the teamwas split up into two groups. One, headed by Grigoryevhimself, stayed at Plesetsk to look for suitable locationsfor future launch pads, assembly buildings (only the sitefor the first R-7 pad had been selected when constructionbegan) and housing facilities for personnel. Another group,led by Ber-Mordukh Khanin (Grigoryev’s deputy for “spe-cial armaments”), left for NIIP-5 in Kazakhstan to familiar-ize itself with the R-7 missile, the launch preparationprocess and ground-based radio guidance systems andpass on that experience to the launch teams that wouldeventually be stationed at Plesetsk.

In the summer of 1958 construction began of a townwhere most of the launch site personnel would eventuallylive. This was situated on the banks of Lake Plestsy, alittle over 5 km northeast of the town of Plesetsk, whereearlier there had been nothing more than two small vil-lages (Plestsy and Kanifolnyy). The town was not anyofficial Soviet maps and correspondence sent there hadthe address “Moscow-400” and later “Leningrad-300”. Itwas first named Lesnoi and eventually became known asMirnyy (“Peaceful”) [18].

6. The R-7A and Plans forNew Deployment Sites

Meanwhile, test flights of the R-7 had begun at NIIP-5 on

15 May 1957, but it wasn’t until the third flight on 21August 1957 that all flight objectives were met. Afteranother successful ballistic test flight on 7 September1957, the R-7 ushered in the Space Age by launching thefirst Sputnik on 4 October 1957 and Sputnik-2 with thedog Laika on 3 November 1957. It should be stressedthough that the satellite launches were part of and not theultimate goal of the R-7 test flight programme.

As the test flight programme picked up speed,Korolyov’s engineers were looking at ways of increasingthe range of the rocket. Even from the northern sites, theR-7 could not reach all strategically important targets inthe United States. The most obvious way to increase therange was to reduce the mass of the nuclear warhead.Vasiliy Ryabikov, head of the Special Committee thatoversaw the ICBM programme, had already called fordoing this in a letter to the Central Committee in July1955, referring to similar efforts by the US in the Atlasprogramme [19]. In late 1957 Korolyov had a meetingwith nuclear physicists Andrei Sakharov and Yuliy Khariton,who promised him to reduce the mass of the R-7’s war-head by half. Not long afterwards they came up with anew thermonuclear weapon (designated 46A) based onthe RDS-37 atomic bomb that was more than twice lighterthan its predecessor but had about the same yield. Thismeant that without making any basic modifications to therocket itself, its range could be increased from 8,000 to atleast 12,000 km [20].

Fig. 3 Mikhail Grigoryev, first commander of Plesetsk.(Kosmodrom Plesetsk)

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This had important implications for the location of the opera-tional launch sites. With the R-7’s range increased by 4,000km, there no longer was a need to situate all of them in theextreme north of the country for the missiles to reach theirtargets in the US. This, along with the fact that the northernsites were more vulnerable to US air attacks, made it expe-dient to build new sites deeper inside the country. Even theexisting pad at NIIP-5 could now be used for R-7 launcheswith live nuclear warheads in the event of an armed conflictbetween the superpowers.

On 20 June 1958 the USSR Defence Council, estab-lished in February 1955 to make decisions on key na-tional security issues and chaired by Nikita Khrushchov,approved the development of a modified R-7 with a rangeof 12,000 km (the R-7A) and made important decisionson the location of the operational sites. This resulted inthree new Central Committee and Council of Ministerdecrees, all passed on 2 July 1958 [21].

The first decree (Nr. 718-342) ordered to terminateconstruction of the Volga site in the Polar Urals, linkingthe decision directly to the R-7A’s increased range. Con-sideration was still given to flying cruise missiles from thesite, an option which would have to be evaluated over atwo-month period, but it was eventually turned down. It isnot clear what kind of work had already been done at theVolga site, although it was apparently significant enoughto be detected by US intelligence (see section 15). Amissile unit seems to have been formed in October 1957to eventually man the Volga site but it was later reas-signed [22].

There are some indications that Angara itself mayhave been on the chopping block in 1958. In a meetingdiscussing the fate of Angara, Nikita Khrushchov report-edly decided to halt construction of the launch site. How-ever, as Khrushchov was about to close the meeting,launch pad chief designer Vladimir Barmin unexpectedlytook the floor, calling the decision “rash and wrong”. Aftersumming up several convincing arguments and figures,including the fact that the site was 70 % complete, Barminallegedly persuaded Khrushchov to change his mind,thereby saving Angara from closure [23]. There is noevidence that the construction of Angara was seriouslyrunning behind schedule. Presumably, Khrushchov’s ini-tial decision to close down Angara was also related to theR-7A’s increased range. Khrushchov is later said to haveplanned a visit to Plesetsk, which was cancelled at thelast moment [24].

Instead of building a second northern base, decree nr.718-342 tasked the Ministry of Defence with looking forother locations on an imaginary line linking the cities ofLeningrad, Vologda, Kirov, Perm, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirskand Krasnoyarsk (roughly between 55° and 60° northern

latitude). The region of Tyura-Tam was also put forwardas an option. Two to three new locations for building R-7Alaunch pads were to be recommended to the DefenceCouncil in December 1958. In addition, the existing R-7pad at NIIP-5 was to be adapted for operational R-7Alaunches in the first half of 1960 and a second pad for R-7A combat missions would be built in 1960 as well.

The second decree (Nr. 724-346) sanctioned the de-velopment of the R-7A and called for test flights to beginas early as the first quarter of 1959. The third decree (Nr.725-347) set new timelines for the construction of Angara,with the two first pads to be finished in the third and fourthquarters of 1959 respectively.

On 20 February 1959 Dmitriy Ustinov (Chairman ofthe Military Industrial Commission), Rodion Malinovskiy(Minister of Defence) and Mitrofan Nedelin (Minister ofDefence Deputy for Special Armaments and ReactiveTechnology) sent a letter to Nikita Khrushchov in hiscapacity as chairman of the Defence Council, apparentlyin response to concern expressed by Khrushchov overthe maximum launch rate of R-7 missiles in the event of anuclear conflict and the detectability of the pads by en-emy reconnaissance assets.

The three men reported that measures had been takento increase the daily launch rate of R-7 missiles fromAngara from one to two per pad. In order to mask thefacilities, the pads had been covered with “horizontal andvertical camouflage nets” and much of the support infra-structure (missile, propellant and warhead storage facili-ties) had been built half underground, making it hard todetect amid the taiga forests. However, the best way tohide the missiles was still to build silos. These wouldhave to be 50 m deep and have a diameter of up to 30 m.As many as six to eight fully assembled rockets would beon permanent stand-by in vertical position in a nearbyconcealed facility, making it possible to launch four or fivemissiles from a single silo in one day. The first silo couldbe built at NIIP-5 in 1960 for experimental launches andbe made operational later on. For the construction of R-7silos to begin in 1961, surveying of potential sites wouldhave to begin in 1959.

Meanwhile, in order to ensure the possibility of usingthe stockpile of operational R-7 and R-7A missiles ex-pected to be manufactured in 1959-1961, it was consid-ered necessary to build during that timeframe severalmore pads similar to the ones under construction atAngara:

• two more pads at Angara (bringing the total to four)(as had already been envisaged by the January 1957decree)

• two pads north of Kirov (about 800 km northeast ofMoscow) (Object “Neva”)

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• two pads north of Nizhniy Tagil in the Sverdlovskprovince in the Urals (Object “Dnepr”)

• one pad north of Taishet in the Irkutsk province inSiberia (Object “Don”) (Fig. 4)

Together with the two existing pads at Angara and thetwo pads at NIIP-5, this would bring the total amount of R-7(A) launch pads to eleven by the end of 1961. Althoughthe rockets would stand exposed, spreading the variouslaunch sites over such a large area would decrease thearsenal’s vulnerability to enemy attacks. In addition tothat, measures would be taken to better camouflagethem and increase the launch rate, among other thingsby developing techniques to minimize boil-off of liquidoxygen in storage tanks and increase the time duringwhich the rocket could be kept in a fuelled configuration[25].

The proposals outlined by Ustinov, Malinovskiy andNedelin were approved in two separate decrees, oneissued by the Council of Ministers on 20 February(Nr. 163-73) (the very same day the letter was sent toKhrushchov) and another passed jointly by the CentralCommittee and the Council of Ministers (Nr. 276-124) on14 March 1959.

The first decree approved the construction of threenew operational R-7A sites in the 1959-1964 period andalso specified their exact locations:

Neva: 60 km north of Kirov

Dnepr: 35 km northeast of Nizhniy Tagil

Don: 80 km north of Taishet

The second decree repeated the decision to go aheadwith the construction of the three sites plus two additional

pads at Angara, but gave the timeline as 1959-1961. Italso approved the proposal to build silos for the R-7 andR-7A (with a launch rate of 4-5 per day per silo), with thefirst one to be constructed at NIIP-5 in 1960 and survey-ing of other sites to be conducted in 1959, not only for theR-7A, but also for new-generation missiles then underdevelopment [26].

Meanwhile, specialists of the NII-885 institute hadmanaged to simplify the radio guidance system of the R-7A rocket, which in turn made it possible to significantlyreduce the cost of the related ground infrastructure. Thechanges were approved by a government decree (Nr.997-434) on 22 August 1959 [27]. Lateral control of thetrajectory would be completely entrusted to the on-boardinertial guidance system, obviating the need for two radiocontrol posts each situated about 250 km from the pad.Range control would still be conducted from a groundstation, but this could now be located in the immediatevicinity of the launch pad. As pointed out earlier, theselection of R-7 launch sites had partly been determinedby the need to build these guidance stations and had theimprovements been made earlier, other locations mightwell have been chosen.

Nevertheless, the construction of radio control postsfor Angara did not stop since it would be some timebefore the R-7A would enter operational service. Eachpad needed its own radio control posts, probably be-cause of the need to fire a salvo of R-7 missiles in anuclear conflict. While Tyura-Tam, being a test range,had only two radio control posts for the R-7 (a primarypost in Tartugai and a mirror post in Togyz), Plesetskneeded three for each pad (one primary, two mirror) tomaximize the number of launch azimuths [28]. For mis-siles launched from pad nr. 1 the primary station was

Fig. 4 Location of missile test sitesand proposed R-7 operational sites.

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Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga - Part 1

near Pudozh in the Republic of Karelia and the mirrorstations near Karpogory and Pinega, both in theArkhangelsk province [29]. For pad nr. 2 the radio controlposts were built at unspecified locations in the Arkhangelskand Vologda provinces [30]. It looks, however, like atleast some of the equipment originally intended for theradio control posts supporting pad nr. 2 was shipped toTyura-Tam for use in the control post near the pad thatwould be needed for the R-7A test flights [31]. Because ofthe changes to the radio guidance systems the first testlaunch of the R-7A from NIIP-5 slipped to late 1959 [32].The first launch took place on 23 December 1959, withthe simulated nuclear warhead impacting on theKamchatka peninsula after having covered a distance of6,318 km.

7. Angara Becomes Operational

In an attempt to cover up its real purpose, Angara wasnamed the “3rd Training Artillery Firing Range” (3 UAP) on7 February 1959 (although the name Angara continued tobe used, even in official documentation). In order to keepup the facade, artillery tests were regularly conducted atthe range, with local residents being warned not to enteroff-limits areas [33].

The construction of the first two R-7 pads went rela-tively smoothly. On 5 November 1959 Rodion Malinovskiy,Mitrofan Nedelin and Aleksandr Shebunin (Minister ofDefence Deputy for Construction) sent a report to theCentral Committee with an update on the constructionwork. They noted that construction of pad 1 and associ-ated facilities was about 2 to 2.5 months behind scheduleand was expected to be finished in November or earlyDecember. The supporting infrastructure included an as-sembly building, a control bunker, nitrogen and liquidoxygen production facilities, propellant and hydrogen per-oxide storage tanks and a housing area for workers(although most of the firing range’s personnel lived inMirnyy, there were also separate living areas closer to thepads). The facilities were much closer to one anotherthan at NIIP-5, which had led to a considerable reductionof cost.

One factor in the delays had been the constant needto make changes to existing hardware based on dataobtained from the R-7 test flights from NIIP-5. The factthat the radio control posts needed to be built in almostinaccessible regions had also contributed to the delays.This was especially the case for pad 2, whose supportingcontrol posts were situated 200 to 400 km from thenearest railway. Because of the harsh winter conditionsthe equipment for the stations could not be delivered tothe construction sites in time, meaning they would not beready by the time pad 2 was finished in late 1959 or early1960. However, R-7 rockets flying from pad 2 could also

use the radio control posts of pad 1 and in case rocketsneeded to be launched simultaneously from both pads(not inconceivable in a nuclear conflict) the missiles fly-ing from pad 2 would rely solely on their inertial guidancesystems, although that would result in a loss of accuracy[34].

Pad 1 was officially declared ready for use on 15December 1959, becoming the Soviet Union’s first op-erational ICBM launch facility (Fig. 5). Probably not coin-cidentally, the country’s Strategic Rocket Forces wereofficially called into life as a separate branch of the armedforces by the Ministry of Defence just two weeks later, on31 December 1959. Pad 2 followed suit on 17 February1960 (Fig. 6). Pads 3 and 4 became available in July1961. They were built about 4 km to the west of pad 1 andwere only 300 metres from each other, sharing the sameassembly building and nitrogen/liquid oxygen plants (Fig.7). Apparently, the cost savings this provided were con-sidered more important than the vulnerability of bothpads to a single attack.

Meanwhile, after completing its test flight programmein October 1959, the R-7 had been declared opera-tional (“accepted into the armaments” in Soviet termi-nology) on 20 January 1960, followed by the R-7A on12 September 1960 [35]. With the availability of the R-7A, the remotely situated radio control stations, whichhad taken so much trouble to build and were alsovulnerable to attack, were gradually closed down in1961/1962. Some of the personnel was transferred tothe only remaining radio control posts located near thelaunch pad itself.

Fig. 5 CIA map of R-7 pad 1 (“Launch Point III”). (CIA)

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Fig. 6 CIA map of R-7 pad 2 (“Launch Point IV”). (CIA)

Fig. 7 CIA map of R-7 pads 3/4 (“Launch Point I and II”).(CIA)

Each of the R-7 pads was operated by separate mili-tary launch teams, which first underwent several monthsof training at NIIP-5 and were permanently stationed atAngara only after performing a test launch from theKazakhstan test range. Occasionally they were sent backto NIIP-5 to conduct more launches in order to maintaintheir proficiency. One veteran recalls that practice roll-outs of missiles to pads 3 and 4 were carried out everymonth [36]. Since Angara was an operational site, no R-7test or practice launches were initially planned from there,probably because this required the construction of anexpensive network of downrange tracking stations togather the necessary flight data.

The team assigned to pad 1 (“Military Unit 13973”,also known as “Combat Launch Station 42”) was officiallycreated in May 1958, but its formation was not finisheduntil December 1958. The first team members arrived at

NIIP-5 in August 1958 and unit 13973 performed a suc-cessful R-7 test launch on 30 July 1959 before moving toAngara the following month. Testifying to the secrecyinvolved, Eduard Buinovskiy, one of the officers who waspart of the team (and a later cosmonaut candidate),recalls they themselves were unaware of their final desti-nation until shortly before departing for the northern base[37]. Unit 13973 was officially placed on combat duty on 1January 1960. The following year the team returned toNIIP-5 to perform two R-7 launches with an interval of just16.5 hours (on 4 and 5 July 1961).

In the late 1950s new Military Units were also set up toman the other R-7 pads, one unit (nr. 14003, headed byNikolai Tarasov) for pad 2 and another one (nr. 14056,headed by Grigoriy Merzlyakov) consisting of two sepa-rate teams to operate pads 3 and 4. They were firststationed near Novosibirsk and Volgograd respectively,moving to NIIP-5 for training after their formation wasfinished. An overview of R-7 launch pads, launch teamsand team commanders is given in Tables 1, 2 and 3.

8. The R-16 and R-9 Enter the Scene

By the time the R-7 and R-7A were declared operational in1960, more efficient ICBMs were just around the corner. Thebiggest shortcoming of the R-7(A) was its low combat readi-ness due to the use of liquid oxygen, which made it impossi-ble to keep the rocket in a fuelled state for very long. Whilethe rocket needed just 170 tons of LOX to fly, about 400 tonshad to be transported to the pad to compensate for the lossof oxidizer due to evaporation. Initially, it took a team of

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Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga - Part 1

TABLE 1: Overview of R-7(A) Launch Sites.

Pad nr.* Area nr./name** ICBM launches First space launch

1 41/Lesobaza 14 Dec 65 17 Mar 66 (Kosmos-112)21 Dec 65

2 16/Gornyy - 19 Feb 81 (Kosmos-1247)

3 43/Skipidarnyy - 18 Feb 71 (Kosmos-396)

4 43/Skipidarnyy 25 Jul 67 3 Dec 69 (Kosmos-313)

*Other names for the four R-7 pads were SK 317/1, SK 317/2, SK 317/3 and SK317/4 and 17P32/1, 17P32/2, 17P32/3, 17P32/4. **Soviet/Russian cosmodromesare subdivided into “areas” (ploshchadki in Russian).

TABLE 2: Overview of Military Teams in Charge of the R-7(A) Launch Pads.

Military Unit nr./ Pad Date of Period of Transfer to Practice Transfer to Placed onCombat Launch foundation formation NIIP-5 launches 3 UAP combat duty

Station nr. (location) (Tyura-Tam) at NIIP-5 (Angara)

13973/42 1 24 May 58 6 Aug - 5 Dec 58 Aug 58 30 Jul 59 Aug 59 1 Jan 60(Tyura-Tam) 4 Jul 61

5 Jul 6127 Jul 64

14003/48 2 17 Jul 58 21 Sep 58 – 10 Mar 59 May/Jun 59 21 Nov 59 Jan 60 15 Apr 60Medved 2 Jul 62

(Novosibirsk)

14056 (team1)/70 3 ? 26 May – 3 Nov 59 Feb 60 4 Jun 60 Sep 60* 15 Jul 61Kamyshin 22 Apr 63

(Volgograd)

14056 (team 2)/70 4 ? 26 May – 3 Nov 59 Feb 60 27 Feb 61 Mar 61 15 Jul 61Kamyshin 18 May 63

(Volgograd)

*only a week after arriving at 3UAP, team 1 returned to NIIP-5. They returned back to Plesetsk in November 1960.

TABLE 3: Commanders of R-7(A) Launch Teams 1959-1969.

13973 G.K. Mikheyev (1958-1962)M.D. Dudin (1962-1965)F.A. Bulychev (1965-1969)N.P. Lisitsyn (1969-1970)

14003 N.I. Tarasov (1958-1960)A.M. Kuleshov (1960-1964)V.V. Subbotin (1964-1967)

14056 G.M. Merzlyakov (1959-1962)I.M. Bugor (1962-1973)

almost 300 people some 12 hours to prepare a single R-7for launch once the command was given. Although this waseventually reduced to about seven hours, the fuelled rocketcould stand on combat alert for just about eight hours beforeits tanks needed to be drained [38]. In short, althoughrockets derived from the R-7 turned out to be very effectivespace boosters, still in use today, the rocket was a veryineffective ICBM. As Korolyov bureau veteran Boris Chertokpoints out in his memoirs: “During the first years designingthe [first] generation of ICBMs, the R-7 and the R-7A in theUSSR and the Atlas and Titan I in the US – no particularimportance was attached to problems of launch site vulner-

ability and the amount of time a missile stood on duty afterbeing fuelled. The main criteria that generated the fiercestdebate were maximum range, warhead yield and firingaccuracy” [39].

Plans to build more R-7(A) operational sites (Neva,Dnepr, Don), as originally envisaged by the February/March 1959 decrees, were abandoned, but the samedecrees had already ordered to look for locations for newgenerations of ICBMs.

Even before the R-7 began its test flights from NIIP-5 in May 1957, the Soviet government had given thepreliminary go-ahead for the development of a moreeffective ICBM called R-16, which would burn storablepropellants (dimethylhydrazine and AK-27I (a mixtureof nitrogen tetroxide and nitric acid)) (Fig. 8). In adecree passed on 17 December 1956 (Nr. 1596-807)the Council of Ministers entrusted the task to the de-sign bureau of Mikhail Yangel in Dnepropetrovsk, whichhad been founded just two years earlier [40]. After thepreliminary design was approved by an interdepart-mental commission headed by Mstislav Keldysh, an-other decree (28 August 1958, Nr. 1003-476) set the

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Another decree passed on 13 May 1959 (Nr. 521-235)also authorized the development of the R-9A, anotherLOX/kerosene missile developed by OKB-1, but muchmore efficient than the R-7 [43] (Fig. 9). The use ofsupercooled liquid oxygen reduced losses due to evapo-ration to a minimum. While having about the same rangeas the R-16, the R-9’s launch mass was about 60 tonsless. Like the R-7A, the R-9 would use a combination ofinertial and radio guidance, which did make it more accu-rate than the R-16.

In the late 1950s information emerged on US plans tobuild underground silos for ICBMs and this was one ofthe main reasons why a decision was made in the firsthalf of 1960 to build silos for all the intermediate rangeand intercontinental ballistic missiles then under devel-opment (R-12, R-14, R-16, R-9), except for the R-7 [44](Fig. 10).

Like the R-7, the R-16 and R-9 would first fly testmissions from NIIP-5 before being declared operational.The missile would not only be deployed at Plesetsk, butalso at many other sites across the USSR.

The first R-16 rocket was poised to fly from a ground-

Fig. 8 The R-16 missile.(KB Yuzhnoye)

first test flight for June 1961 [41]. A decree on 13 May1959 (N°514-232) called for moving forward the firsttest flight to the fourth quarter of 1960, a move linkedby Russian sources to increased Cold War tensionsafter Khrushchov had issued an ultimatum to the West-ern powers to withdraw from Berlin and make it ademilitarized city [42]. By then, the R-16 was expectedto have a range of at least 12,000 km and rely oninertial guidance only, eliminating the need for radiocontrol posts.

Fig. 9 The R-9 missile.(RKK Energiya)

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Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga - Part 1

based NIIP-5 pad on 24 October 1960, but exploded asengineers were fixing a problem, killing 92 people, in-cluding Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin, who had been namedthe first Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Strate-gic Rocket Forces less than a year earlier. The first testflight eventually took place on 2 February 1961. Testflights were completed in February 1962 and the rocketwas declared operational on 20 October 1962. A modifiedversion of the missile (R-16U), adapted to fly both fromground-based pads and silos, was first launched from aground-based pad at NIIP-5 on 10 October 1961. Testflights from a silo at NIIP-5 began on 13 July 1962 andthe rocket was declared operational on 15 July 1963 [45].

Even before the completion of test flights, the Sovietgovernment had acquired enough confidence in the mis-sile’s reliability to order the start of serial production. Thefirst serially produced R-16 missiles were finished inSeptember 1961 and dispatched to operational launchsites. On 1 November 1961 R-16 missile squadrons wereplaced on combat duty in Nizhniy Tagil and Yurya. NizhniyTagil was also the first site where the silo-based R-16Uwas operationally deployed (from February 1963) [46].These are the same areas that had originally been se-

lected for operational deployment of the R-7A (ObjectNeva near Yurya in the Kirov region and Object Dneprnear Nizhniy Tagil).

The construction of R-16 pads at 3 UAP/Angara be-gan in August 1960. Initially, two sites each consisting oftwo ground-based pads (“Sheksna-N”) (nrs. 5, 6, 7, 8)were built on the banks of the Yemtsa river several kilo-metres east of the R-7 pads (Figs. 11 & 12). Each com-plex had four missiles on permanent stand-by, two in theassembly building and two in a special storage facilitymade of reinforced concrete. In early 1961 constructionbegan of a complex with three silos (“Sheksna-V”) (nrs. 9,10, 11), situated in between the two ground-based com-plexes (Fig. 13). The three silos were served by onepropellant storage facility and fuelling was remotely con-trolled. The missiles stood on duty with empty tanksbecause of the high corrosiveness of the propellants.After being fuelled, they could remain in that configura-tion for 30 days. In the event of a nuclear conflict, the silo-based missiles would be fired first (with just 15 minutes

Fig. 10 Silo-based R-16 missile. (Kosmodrom Plesetsk)

Fig. 11 CIA map of R-16 pads 5 and 6. (CIA)

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Fig. 12 CIA map of R-16 pads 7 and 8. (CIA)

needed for fuelling), followed by a salvo of ground-basedmissiles (with about 40 minutes needed for roll-out to thepad, erection on the pad and fuelling) [47]. An overview ofthe R-16 facilities is given in Table 4.

The R-16 pads at 3 UAP were operated by the 593rdMissile Regiment (Military Unit 44141), which had beenfounded in 1960 as part of the 165th Missile Brigade(stationed in Kostroma) and was transferred to Angara in1961 [48]. Led by Dmitriy Gushcha, the 593rd MissileRegiment was subdivided into three battalions for thethree sites. Unlike the R-7 launch teams, the R-16 teamsdid not undergo preliminary training at NIIP-5. On 22October 1963 an R-16U was launched from silo nr. 11 aspart of a military exercise code-named “Groza” (Thun-der). This was an historic event in the history of Plesetskbecause it was the very first launch performed from thebase since construction had begun in early 1957. It was

Fig. 13 CIA map of R-16 silos 9, 10 & 11. (CIA)

also the first silo-based launch of an ICBM from an op-erational site. The launch was attended by the Com-mander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces NikolaiKrylov [49].

By the mid-1960s the R-16 became the most widelydeployed ICBM in the Soviet Union. In 1965 a total of 186launch installations for the R-16 were available acrossthe Soviet Union, one third of which were silos [50]. Amaximum of 202 launch installations was reached in1966, after which the missile gradually began to be phasedout as more capable ICBMs made their appearance.Overall, 307 R-16 and R-16U launches were performedwith a 91% success rate [51]. The total number launchedfrom Plesetsk reportedly was 107 [52]. The ground-basedR-16U complexes at Plesetsk were mothballed in 1969and the launch teams were transferred to an R-16 base inTeikovo (54th Missile Division) and subsequently to a UR-100 base in Pervomaisk (46th Missile Division) in 1971. In

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Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga - Part 1

the 1970s both complexes were adapted for launches ofthe Temp-2S solid-fuel missile. The R-16U silos at Angararemained operational until the mid-1970s [53].

The R-9 began its test flights on 9 April 1961 from anexperimental ground-based pad at Tyura-Tam situatednot far from the famous “Gagarin” launch complex. Lateron test flights were transferred to a pair of ground-basedpads called “Desna-N” (Fig. 14). However, there wereseveral serious accidents, some of which were attributedto the pad itself, which in many ways did not live up toexpectations. The rocket needed a heavy adapter to beplaced on the pad (which comprised about 50 % of therocket’s dry mass) and the launch preparation processtook about two hours because it was not sufficientlyautomated and propellant loading took too long.

In May 1962 it was decided to build a modernized,highly automated ground-based launch complex. Called“Dolina”, it consisted of two pads and storage facilities fora total of eight missiles. These were placed on trolleysand could be automatically rolled out and erected on thepads and launched in quick succession. The launch prepa-ration time was reduced from 2 hours to just 20 minutes.After the final flight from a Desna-N pad on 14 February1963, test flights from the Dolina complex got underway

TABLE 4: R-16 Launch Facilities at Plesetsk.

Pad nr. Type Area nr./name Declared operational Military Unit Placed on combat duty

5 & 6 ground-based 5/Stroidetal 27 Oct 61 1st Battalion of 593rd 27 Oct 61(Sheksna-N) Missile Regiment

7 & 8 ground-based 24/Lisitsyno 14 Jan 62 2nd Battalion of 593rd 15 Jan 62(Sheksna-N) Missile Regiment*

9, 10 & 11 silo 25/Lesorubov 5 Mar 63 3rd Battalion of 593rd 30 Mar 1963(Sheksna-V) Missile Regiment**

*Turned into the 72nd Missile Regiment (Military Unit 12422) in 1964.** Turned into the 220nd Missile Regiment (Military Unit 68543) in 1964.

Fig. 14 R-9A on the pad. (Kosmodrom Plesetsk)

on 22 February 1963, using a version of the missile thatcould fly from both ground-based pads and silos (desig-nated R-9A). That same year a launch complex with threesilos (called Desna-V) was finished, with the first launchtaking place on 27 September 1963. The test flight pro-gramme was completed on 2 February 1964 and therocket officially entered service on 21 July 1965 [54].

The construction of R-9A pads at Plesetsk got underwayin December 1961. There were two Desna-N type com-plexes, consisting of two pads each (nrs. 12/13 and 14/15)(Figs. 15 & 16) . Unlike the R-7 and R-16 complexes, theywere not built on the banks of the Yemtsa, but severalkilometres south of the river. The R-9A pads were run by the329th Missile Regiment (Military Unit 54303), which hadbeen formed in 1960 as part of the 213th Missile Brigade inTatarsk (Novosibirsk region in Siberia), where it first gainedexperience with handling the R-2 missile. The team per-formed a successful combat training launch of an R-2 fromKapustin Yar in September 1961. From December 1961 toMarch 1962 the team was at NIIP-5 to familiarize itself withthe R-9A, although it apparently did not conduct a testlaunch. In early summer 1962 the 329th Missile Regimentarrived at Plesetsk. Commanded by Pyotr Goltsov, it con-sisted of two battalions to man the two complexes [55]. Anoverview of the R-9A pads at Plesetsk is given in Table 5.

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Fig. 15 CIA map of R-9A pads 12 and 13. (CIA)

Fig. 16 CIA map of R-9A pads 14 and 15. (CIA)

The four pads were declared operational in mid-De-cember 1963 but, remarkably enough, another yearelapsed before the launch teams were placed on combatduty on three of the four pads (on 15 December 1964).Operational deployment of the R-9(A) was limited to fivelocations (Plesetsk, Tyura-Tam, Omsk, Tyumen andKozelsk) with a total of about 30 launch installations.With 15 launch installations (both ground-based and si-los), Kozelsk appears to have been the most important R-9 base. Two R-9 missile regiments were placed on com-bat duty on ground-based pads in Kozelsk on 14 Decem-ber 1964 (just one day before their counterparts atPlesetsk), followed by the first silo team on 26 December1964 [56]. Plesetsk, with just four outdated Desna-Npads (which were never officially accepted into the arma-ments), seems to have played only a minor role.

The first R-9A test launch from Plesetsk took place on16 May 1967 from pad nr. 12 [57]. A total of seventeen R-9A rockets were launched from the site before the padswere decommissioned [58]. In 1970 it was decided to

modify pads 14 and 15 for launches of the Tsiklon-3space rocket, which eventually entered service in 1977[59]. By 1972 all R-9 missiles were decommissioned andin 1974-77 all remaining launch installations were de-stroyed in accordance with the SALT-1 agreement [60].The R-9 was the last LOX-based missile to be built by theSoviet Union.

Angara came perilously close to performing its role ofan operational ICBM launch base when the Cuban Mis-

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Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga - Part 1

sile Crisis (called the “Caribbean Crisis” by the Russians)broke out in the autumn of 1962. All units at the launchbase were on full alert from 11 September to 21 Novem-ber 1962. A curfew was imposed in Mirnyy and whendarkness fell people had to close the curtains beforeputting on the lights. There is conflicting information onthe level of readiness of missiles during the crisis. Oneaccount suggests an R-7A with a live nuclear warheadwas placed on pad 4 and would have been ready to fly in2.5 hours had the command been given [61]. Accordingto another source all available R-7A rockets remained intheir assembly buildings without their nuclear warheadsinstalled and the launch preparation process would havetaken 23 hours and 40 minutes [62]. At Tyura-Tam twonuclear-tipped R-7A missiles were in the final stages ofpreparations when the all-clear was given [63].

In reality, with only eight pads operational (four for theR-7 and four for the R-16) at the time, Plesetsk wouldhave played only a relatively minor role if a nuclearconflict had broken out. By that time, about two dozen R-16 launch facilities were operational at other locations inthe USSR. The Cuban Missile Crisis only sped up theconstruction of ICBM bases across the country and re-portedly also led to a decision in 1963 to gradually phaseout the R-7A as an ICBM, further diminishing the signifi-cance of Angara as an operational ICBM site [64]. It wastime for the northern launch base to take on a new role.

9. Looking for a NorthernCosmodrome and Test Range

In the early 1960s two factors motivated the Russians toestablish a major new space launch base and missile testfacility besides GTsP-4 (Kapustin Yar) and NIIP-5 (Tyura-Tam). One was the need to carry out test flights of theSoviet Union’s first solid-fuel ICBMs. In terms of combatreadiness, solid-fuel missiles outperformed all of theirliquid-fuelled counterparts. The US had begun researchon solid-fuel long-range missiles (the Minuteman I land-launched missile and Polaris sea-launched missile) inthe mid-1950s, but the Soviet Union did not officiallyauthorize the development of such missiles until late1959. A government decree on 20 November 1959 (N°319)assigned Korolyov’s OKB-1 to the development of a me-dium-range solid-fuel missile called RT-1 (range: 2,500km) and also gave the go-ahead to start research on a

long-range version called RT-2 (also RS-12) (range:10,000-12,000 km) [65] (Fig. 17). Final approval for theRT-2 came in a government decree on 4 April 1961(N°316-137), perhaps not coincidentally just two monthsafter the first test launch of the Minuteman I.

RT-1 test flights were staged from Kapustin Yar be-tween April 1962 and June 1963, with the simulatedwarheads coming down near Lake Balkhash. Althoughthe initial test flights of the RT-2 would also be flown fromKapustin Yar, another site was needed for full-range test

TABLE 5: R-9A Pads at Plesetsk.

Pad nr. Type Area nr./name Declared operational Military Unit Placed on combat duty

12 & 13 ground-based 31/Maloye Usovo 12 Dec 63 2nd Battalion of 329th 15 Dec 64 (pad 12)(Desna-N) Missile Regiment* 10 Feb 65 (pad 13)

14 & 15 Ground-based 32/Bolshoye Usovo 11 Dec 63 1st Battalion of 329th 15 Dec 64(Desna-N) Missile Regiment

*Turned into the 63rd Missile Regiment (Military Unit 07395) in 1964.

Fig. 17 The RT-2 solid-fuelICBM. (RKK Energiya).

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flights of the missile. Tyura-Tam, the only ICBM test rangeavailable at the time, was not considered an option be-cause it was already overtaxed with ICBM work andspace launches.

A second factor was that Kapustin Yar and Tyura-Tam,both in the south of the country, were not ideally locatedto put satellites into high-inclination orbits. Due to rangesafety restrictions, the highest inclinations reached fromKapustin Yar and Tyura-Tam at the time were 49° and 65°respectively. By contrast, the US had launch sites inCape Canaveral, Vandenberg and Wallops, making itpossible to put satellites into a wide variety of orbits,including polar orbits. By the end of 1961 the US hadlogged 64 successful launches covering virtually the en-tire spectrum of satellites launched today, from scientificsatellites and deep space probes to manned spacecraftand a plethora of civilian and military satellites for com-munications, meteorology, navigation and reconnais-sance. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had orbitedonly 14 objects, which, leaving aside the first three Sput-niks, had been either man-related or targeted for theMoon, Venus and Mars. The limited launch azimuthsprovided by Tyura-Tam may have been one of the rea-sons for the low diversity of satellites launched by then.

In 1961 NII-4, a research institute of the Strategic RocketForces, sent recommendations to the Council of Ministersfor future space projects and these included the construc-tion of a cosmodrome in the north of the country [66]. Nodoubt the need to fly military satellites, especially reconnais-sance satellites, in high-inclination orbits was one of themajor motives behind this recommendation. The Academyof Sciences had also expressed interest in orbits with higherinclinations than those that could be reached from Tyura-Tam [67]. One possible reason for that may have been thewish to avoid the damaging effects of the Earth’s radiationbelts on certain scientific experiments (such as those involv-ing biological specimens). The belts are more intense atlatitudes under 60° [68]. High-inclination orbits also made iteasier to study auroras.

An additional argument for the construction of a northerntest site and cosmodrome was that it would be out of reachof US tracking facilities in Turkey, which routinely monitoredlaunches from both Kapustin Yar and Tyura-Tam [69].

In early 1962 a commission headed by Kapustin Yardeputy commander Galaktion Alpaidze began looking fora suitable location for the new site. At this point, Angarawas not eyed for this role since it was considered anoperational ICBM launch site and not a missile test rangeor space launch site with its associated downrange track-ing infrastructure. Moreover, at this point the idea was tolaunch only lightweight boosters of the Yangel designbureau (OKB-586), not R-7 based rockets. In 1960

Yangel’s bureau had already initiated work on a smallbooster (63S1 or 11K63) based on its R-12 missile andon 30 October 1961 a government decree (N°984-425)had ordered the bureau to build a new light launch vehi-cle (65S3 or 11K65, later modified as 11K65M) based onthe bureau’s R-14 missile, which would be used to orbitthe Strela and Pchela store/dump communications satel-lites and the Meteor weather satellites (Figs. 18 & 19).Particularly the Meteors would benefit from flying in orbitswith inclinations higher than 65°, enabling them to ob-serve weather patterns in the northern regions of theUSSR. Since OKB-586 was preoccupied with work onICBM projects and the big R-56 space booster, all these

Fig. 18 The 11K63 (“Kosmos-(2)”)launch vehicle. (Soglasiye Publishers)

19

Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga - Part 1

difficult meteorological conditions. In December 1962Alpaidze presented the results to the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Sergei Biryuzov.Two locations had been picked in the south of theArkhangelsk province along the Moscow-Vorkuta rail line,which branches off the Moscow-Arkhangelsk rail line atKonosha. Alpaidze recommended a site between Velskand Kotlas some 35 to 40 km north of the Ileza railwaystation near Pervomaiskiy [70] (Fig. 20). This was roughly250 km southeast of Angara. Biryuzov went along withthe recommendation, which in turn was accepted byDefence Minister Rodion Malinovskiy.

Fig. 19 The 11K65M (“Kosmos-3M”) launch vehicle.

(Soglasiye Publishers)

projects were transferred to other organizations in thecourse of 1962 (the 65S3/11K65 booster and the Strelaand Pchela satellites to Mikhail Reshetnyov’s OKB-10 inKrasnoyarsk and Meteor to Andronik Iosifyan’s VNIIEM inMoscow).

Alpaidze’s commission included design bureau repre-sentatives, construction specialists, ballistics experts,geologists and other specialists. The team was given atrain, drilling equipment and helicopters to examine po-tential sites for the new test range, often working in

On 2 January 1963 the Soviet government issued adecree (N° 13-5) on the creation of NIIP-53 (Scientific Re-search and Test Range 53) (also known as Military Unit26176). Formation of the new site officially began on 10 April1963, with Alpaidze taking up the role of commander on 4May 1963. Many veterans of Tyura-Tam and especiallyKapustin Yar (Alpaidze’s former work place) were sent to thenew site to take part in construction work.

Three Test Directorates were set up to run the site.The 2nd Test Directorate (Military Unit 07377) was respon-sible for space-related activities. Apparently subordinateto the 2nd Test Directorate was Military Unit 63551, whichwould be responsible for launching the 11K65 rocket,based on the R-14 missile. This unit (headed by YakovSuslov) had been set up on 12 October 1962 in Smorgon(Republic of Byelorussia) during the Cuban Missile Crisisto launch R-14 missiles and included two launch batter-ies. In early 1963 launch battery nr. 1 was sent to the newsite north of Ileza, while team nr. 2 was sent to KapustinYar, where it took part in an R-14 test launch in July 1963[71]. Although not confirmed, it is likely that Military Unit65331 would also have been responsible for launchingthe R-12 based launch vehicle from the new site.

Fig. 20 Map of Arkhangelsk province showing Plesetsk andthe originally planned location of the northern cosmodromejust north of Ileza.

20

Bart Hendrickx

1. The full text of the decree is published in: V. Ivkin and G.Sukhina, “Zadacha osoboi gosudarstvennoi vazhnosti: izistorii sozdaniya raketno-yadernogo oruzhiya i Raketnykhvoisk strategicheskogo naznacheniya (1945-1959)”,ROSSPEN, Moscow, pp.316-318, 2010.

2. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., p.481.3. For a detailed account of the origins of the R-7 missile,

see: A. Siddiqi, “The Red Rockets’ Glare: Spaceflight andthe Soviet Imagination, 1857-1957”, Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, pp.241-289, 2010.

4. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., p.386.5. “Radio Control Posts of Baikonur” (in Russian), detailed

look at the Baikonur radio control posts (drawn from severalsources), available online at http://kik-sssr.narod.ru/RUP-s.htm. (Last Accessed 29 October 2012)

6. These were locations near Yoshkar-Ola in Mordoviya (inthe Mari autonomous republic), Makhachkala (on the westcoast of the Caspian Sea) and Kharabali (in the Astrakhanregion on the shores of the Volga river). See for instance:B. Chertok, Rakety i lyudi, Mashinostroyeniye, Moscow,p.407, 1995.

7. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, pp.386-388.8. Ibid, op. cit., pp.388-389.9. S. Shevchenko (ed.), “Strategicheskiye raketnye kompleksy

nazemnogo bazirovaniya”, Voennyy Parad, Moscow, p.228,2007; S. Sergeyev, “Plesetsk Cosmodrome: History ofCreation” (in Russian), online at http://www.plesetzk.ru/index.php?p=creation&d=doc/history. (Last Accessed 29October 2012)

10. “Boevye startovye stantsii” (BSS) in Russian. Later theterm was used to refer to the military teams that operatedthe various R-7 pads.

11. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., pp.469-472.12. Ibid, pp.479-480.13. Ibid, p.470.14. Ibid, pp.541-544.15. Yu. Zhuravlyov (ed.), “Poligon osoboi vazhnosti”, Soglasiye,

Moscow, p.8, 1997; A. Bashlakov (ed.), “Severnyykosmodrom Rossii”, vol. 1, Kosmodrom Plesetsk, Mirnyy,p.18, 2007. The actual text of the decree has not yet beenreleased.

16. A. Bashlakov, op. cit., pp.17-18.17. J. Oberg, “Russia’s Other Cosmodrome – Plesetsk”,

www.jamesoberg.com/1967_plesetsk.pdf. (Last Accessed29 October 2012)

18. This section compiled from: Yu. Zhuravlyov, op. cit., pp.8-15; A. Ovchinnikov, “Pervyy kosmodrom Rossii”, Soglasiye,Moscow, pp.17-18, 1996; A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit.,pp.17-23, pp.26-27; A. Bashlakov, “Severnyy kosmodromRossi” vol. 2, Kosmodrom Plesetsk, Mirnyy, pp.382-383,2007; S. Sergeyev, op. cit.; S. Shevchenko, op. cit., p.55.

19. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., p.484.20. B. Chertok, “Rakety i lyudi. Fili, Podlipki, Tyuratam”,

Mashinostroeniye, Moscow, pp.228-231, 1996; S.Shevchenko, op. cit., p.23.

21. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., pp.658-660, 666-678.22. Ibid, p.968. The unit was based in Kirov and commanded

by Yefim Boichuk from 30 October 1957 to 15 October1960. After the decision to terminate work on Object Volgain July 1958, the team may have been reassigned to mananother R-7 base north of Kirov, approved in March 1959(“Object Neva”). In January 1959 the unit was renamed the24th Training Artillery Firing Range (24 UAP). It had two“combat launch stations” (nrs. 21 and 33), set up inNovember 1958 and June 1959. In 1960 24 UAP wasturned into the 25th Missile Brigade, which in turn becamethe 8th Missile Division in 1961. This was stationed at an R-16 operational launch site in Yurya (north of Kirov).

23. “In Memory of Academician V.P. Barmin” (in Russian),

REFERENCES

Novosti kosmonavtiki, 15/1993, p.32 ; A. Bashlakov, vol. 2,op. cit., p.469.

24. K. Ivlev, “Life and Death of a Launch Complex” (in Russian),Novosti kosmonavtiki, 3/1999, p.62; I. Ivanyuk, “The SecondYouth of Plesetsk” (in Russian), Krasnaya Zvezda, 2February 2002; A. Bashlakov, vol. 2, op. cit., pp.12-13.There is conflicting information on the planned visit. Thefirst source claims it was cancelled because of “fear ofspies”. The second source says he was supposed to makea stopover on his way back from a trip to the United States(which would have been either in September 1959 orOctober 1960) , but gives no reason for the cancellation.According to the third source Khrushchov actually went toPlesetsk by train in 1961 but since he was being followedby spies he limited his visit to a brief speech at the Plesetskrailway station, refraining from visiting the base itself.

25. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., pp.757-759.26. Ibid, pp.760-761, 768-770. The other sites considered were

situated north of Kiev, south of Bryansk and north ofKostroma, Kazan and Sverdlovsk and along an imaginaryline connecting Penza, Kuibyshev, Chelyabinsk, Omsk,Novosibirsk, Irkutsk and Chita.

27. Ibid, pp.832-833.28. I. Pruglo, “Regiments of Baikonur” (in Russian),

www.kosmodrom.nm.ru/7files2002/5.htm. (Last Accessed29 October 2012)

29. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit. p.306; A. Bashlakov, vol. 2, op.cit., p.34, 41.

30. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., pp.854-855.31. Ibid, p.824, 833.32. Ibid, p.859.33. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., p.16; Yu. Zhuravlyov, op. cit.,

p.16.34. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., pp.853-857.35. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., p.27; S. Shevchenko, op. cit.,

p.25.36. Ye. Babichev, “Plesetsk: Jubilee of Area 43” (in Russian),

Novosti kosmonavtiki, 9/1999, pp.68-70.37. E. Buinovskiy, “Povsednevnaya zhizn’ pervykh rossiyskikh

raketchikov i kosmonavtov”, Molodaya Gvardiya, Moscow,p.97, 100, 2004.

38. S. Shevchenko, op. cit., p.26.39. B. Chertok, Rakety i lyudi. Goryachiye dni kholodnoi voiny,

Mashinostroyeniye, Moscow, p.125, 1997.40. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., pp.539-541.41. Ibid, pp.701-711.42. Ibid, pp.795-803; A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., p.31; S.

Konyukhov (ed.), “Prizvany vremenem. Ot protivostoyaniyak mezhdunarodnomu sotrudnichestvu”, Art Press,Dnepropetrovsk, p.67, 2004.

43. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., pp.804-811.44. S. Konyukhov, op. cit., p.92.45. Ibid, pp.87-89, 643.46. A. Karpenko, A. Utkin and A. Popov, “Otechestvennye

strategicheskiye raketnye kompleksy”, Nevskiy Bastion,St. Petersburg, p.120, 124.

47. B. Chertok, “Rakety i lyudi. Goryachiye dni kholodnoi voiny”,op. cit., p.61; A. Karpenko et. al., op. cit., p.122, 127;website of Plesetsk R-16 veteran Viktor P. Titarenko athttp://ruzhany.narod.ru/rvsn/plesetsk_pawlow.html. (LastAccessed 29 October 2012)

48. Website of the 10th Guards Red Banner order of SuvorovMissile Division at http://www.ww2.dk/new/rvsn/10gvmd.htm. (Last Accessed 29 October 2012); history of10th Guards Red Banner order of Suvorov Missile Divisionat http://www.ww2.dk/new/rvsn/10gvmd.htm. (LastAccessed 29 October 2012)

49. Yu. Zhuravlyov, op. cit., pp.19-21; A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op.cit., pp.32-35.

21

Building a Rocket Base in the Taiga - Part 1

50. A. Karpenko et. al., op. cit., p.120.51. S. Shevchenko, op. cit., p.52-53.52. Yu. Zhuravlyov, op. cit., p.25.53. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., p.35, 62, 484.54. Yu. Semyonov (ed.), “Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya

Energiya 1946-1996”, RKK Energiya, Moscow, pp.125-128,1996; S. Shevchenko, op. cit., pp.28-30.

55. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, pp.36-39.56. A. Karpenko, op. cit., p.131, 133; website of the Kozelsk

missile division at http://www.kozelsk.ru/diviziya/. (LastAccessed 29 October 2012)

57. C. Lardier and S. Barensky, “Les deux vies de Soyouz”,Editions Edite, Paris, p.203, 2010.

58. Yu. Zhuravlyov, op. cit., p.25.59. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., pp.164-165.60. S. Shevchenko, op. cit., p.31.61. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., p.41, 347.62. Ye. Babichev, “Plesetsk: Jubilee of Area 43” (in Russian),

Novosti kosmonavtiki, 9/1999, p.68.63. B. Chertok, “Rakety i lyudi. Goryachiye dni kholodnoi voiny”,

op. cit., pp.48-52; I. Yevteyev, “Yeshcho podnimalos’plamya”, Inter-Vesy, Moscow, pp.79-80, 1997.

64. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., pp.41-42.65. V. Ivkin and G. Sukhina, op. cit., p.862-866.66. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., p.43.67. Ibid, p.45.68. B. Morozov, “Kosmodrom Plesetsk”, Mezhdunarodnyy

kosmicheskiy tsentr Plesetsk, Mirnyy, p.12, 1992.69. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., p.45.70. The railway station closest to the site was Kostylyovo. See:

A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., pp.204-205.71. A. Bashlakov, vol. 1, op. cit., pp.44-46, 203-205, 248; V.

Favorskiy, I. Meshcheryakov, “Voenno-kosmicheskiye sily(kniga 1)”, Izdatel’stvo Sankt-Peterburgskoi tipografii,Moscow, pp.94-96, 1997.

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