Dow v. UBC, 1st Cir. (1993)

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    USCA1 Opinion

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    _________________________

    No. 93-1127

    JOSEPH DOW, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, ET

    Defendants, Appellees.

    _________________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    _________________________

    Before

    Torruella, Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________

    _________________________

    Paul Alan Levy, with whom Mark D. Stern and Public Cit ______________ _____________ _________ Litigation Group were on brief, for appellants. ________________ Christopher N. Souris, with whom Feinberg, Charnas

    _______________________ _________________ Schwartz was on brief, for appellees.

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    ________

    _________________________

    July 28, 1993

    _________________________

    SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal pivots onSELYA, Circuit Judge.

    ______________

    meaning and applicability of two documents concerning

    internal governance of a labor union, Local No. 218 (

    Local"): the constitution of its umbrella union, the Un

    Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners ("the International

    "UBCJA") and the by-laws of Local 218 itself. Much to the di

    of two dissident members of the Local, the district c

    deferred to the International's construction of the texts

    entered judgment accordingly. We affirm.

    I I _

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    Background Background __________

    Local No. 218 is affiliated with, and subject to

    direction of, the International. The latter's constitution

    the Local's by-laws both speak to the manner in which mid-

    vacancies in leadership positions on the local level are t

    filled. The constitution states that:

    [w]hen vacancies occur in any elective office or in the position of Business Representative, the President may appoint a

    qualified member to fill the vacancy pro-tem, until such time as appropriate notices are sent to the membership for the holding of an election to fill the vacancy.

    UBCJA Const., 32(B). Yet, with regard to the position

    Business Manager/Financial Secretary ("Manager"), the Local's

    laws provide that, if a vacancy occurs:

    the Business Representative shall assume the duties of the Business Manager/Financial Secretary and shall appoint a Business Representative.

    By-Laws of Local No. 218, art. II, 1(A).

    2

    In 1992, the latent tension between these

    provisions surfaced. The incumbent Manager resigned.

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    Local's President, Joseph Dow, appointed himself to fill

    vacancy on a temporary basis and called for an election purs

    to section 32(B) of UBCJA's constitution. Dow viewed

    provisions we have quoted as conflicting and reasoned that

    constitution trumped the by-law provision for auto

    succession.

    The International resisted Dow's attempt to grab

    reins of power.1 Its president, Sigurd Lucassen, directed

    to give effect to the by-law provision by allowing the Busi

    Representative, Robert Cataldo, to succeed to the Manager's p

    Lucassen found no conflict between the two instruments

    governance; the by-law provision simply mandates auto

    succession to fill a particular vacancy while section 32(B

    the constitution specifies a procedure for filling vacancies

    no other mechanism has been provided. Because the by

    provision operated ex proprio vigore to fill the Mana __ _______ ______

    position simultaneously with the incumbent's resignation,

    prevented a vacancy from occurring and eliminated any nee

    resort to the constitutional provision. It was on

    understanding, Lucassen intimated, that the Internati

    approved the inclusion of article II, section 1(A) in Local 2

    ____________________

    1Inasmuch as the Manager's position is the brightest

    most coveted star in a local union's administrative firma the struggle over succession takes on added significance.

    3

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    by-laws.2

    Little placated, Dow and a fellow union member, Ro

    Renda, sued in federal district court, premising their actio

    section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.

    185 (1988), and section 101(a)(1) of the Labor-Manage

    Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. 412 (19

    The plaintiffs named the International, the District Counci

    Carpenters, and Local 218 as defendants.3 They sought to co

    recognition of Dow's status as Manager pro tem and to precipi ___ ___

    an election to fill the balance of the unexpired term. On c

    motions for summary judgment, the district court gave control

    weight to the International's interpretation of the gover

    documents and entered judgment for the defendants. This ap

    ensued.

    II II __

    Analysis Analysis ________

    A. A. __

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    Summary judgment is appropriate when the re

    documents that possess evidentiary force "show that there i

    genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

    The mechanics of Rule 56 are familiar: once the moving p

    avers "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving par

    ____________________

    2Section 32(B) of the constitution was in effect whenInternational approved the Local's by-laws. Absentapproval, the by-laws could not have taken effect.

    3For ease in reference, we discuss the issues as if Do

    the International were the sole parties in interest.

    4

    case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986),_____________ _______

    burden of production shifts to the nonmovant. To defea

    properly focused motion, the nonmovant must tender "signifi

    probative evidence," First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co.,_________________ ________________

    U.S. 253, 290 (1968), which, when viewed in the light

    flattering to the nonmovant, illumines a genuine and mate

    factual dispute. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477___ ________ ___________________

    242, 247-48 (1986); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco____________ ______________________

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    896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,_______ ________________

    F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990). While the required proof nee

    necessarily rise to the level of admissible trial evidence,

    Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, it must consist of something more_______

    "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsuppo

    speculation." Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8; accord Fragos____________ ______ _____

    Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 886 (1st Cir. 1993); Kelly v. United Sta

    _____ _____ _________

    924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st Cir. 1991). Brash conjecture, cou

    with earnest hope that something concrete will eventu

    materialize, is insufficient to block summary judgment.

    This appeal implicates a specialized applicatio

    Rule 56. It is common ground that a labor union's inte

    affairs comprise an enclave best kept free from judi

    intrusion. See Local No. 48 v. United Bhd. of Carpente___ _____________ ________________________

    Joiners, 920 F.2d 1047, 1051 (1st Cir. 1990); Howard v. Un _______ ______ _

    Ass'n of Journeyman & Apprentices, Local # 131, 560 F.2d 17

    ________________________________________________

    (1st Cir. 1977). Thus, the scope of judicial inquiry is narr

    circumscribed in such cases. And, moreover, the resul

    5

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    circumscription is particularly stringent when, as now, a l

    organization's interpretation of its own constitution

    singularly at issue. See Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at 1052. ___ ____________

    B. B. __

    In Local No. 48, a case construing the very u ______________

    constitution that is at issue here, this court concluded t

    general union's interpretation of its own governance docu

    will ordinarily be upheld "unless that interpretation is pate

    unreasonable." Id. On that basis, we refused to second- ___

    the International when it advanced a "plausible" reading of

    constitution. Id. At bottom, then, Local No. 48 stands for___ ____________

    proposition that, in the absence of bad faith,4 a l

    organization's interpretation of internal union documents put

    end to judicial scrutiny so long as the interpretation

    "facially sufficient" or grounded in "'arguable authority.'"

    (citation omitted); accord Newell v. International Bhd. of E ______ ______ ______________________

    Workers, 789 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir. 1986); Local 334, Un _______ _____________

    Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. United Ass'n of Journey_________________________________ _______________________

    Apprentices, 669 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1982); Stellin

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    ___________ _______

    International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 1547,____________________________________________________________

    F.2d 1379, 1389 n.10 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S._____ ______

    (1979).

    This black letter law simplifies our task. We af

    plenary review to the entry of summary judgment below.

    ____________________

    4Here, Dow adduced no evidence that the Internati

    formulated its interpretation in bad faith. What is more, henot asserted a claim of bad faith on appeal.

    6

    Garside, 895 F.2d at 48. To do so here, we need only deter _______

    whether the International's synthesis of the juxtap

    documents, i.e., its view that section 32(B) of the constitu ____

    leaves room for, and can comfortably operate side by side wit

    by-law provision mandating automatic succession to a partic

    post, is "so implausible or patently unreasonable as t

    undeserving of deference." Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at 1052. ____________

    C.

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    C. __

    We turn now to the record, first examining the rele

    texts. On one hand, the constitution, quoted supra p. 2, st _____

    that when "vacancies occur in any elective office," the presi

    of the local "may" appoint a replacement to serve until

    election is held. On the other hand, the by-laws, see supr___ ___

    2, state that "the Business Representative shall assume

    duties of the [Manager]" if a "vacancy [in that posit

    occurs." While these provisions can assuredly be rea

    conflict and if they clash, the constitutional provi

    prevails, see UBCJA Const., 6(C), 25(A) a harmonious rea ___

    of them is hardly implausible. We think it is significant

    the constitution uses precatory rather than mandatory langu

    The permissive "may" contained in the constitution, as oppose

    the directory "shall" contained in the by-law, signals tha

    temporary, presidential appointment and subsequent electio

    but one available method for filling vacancies, impli

    suggesting that other, equally satisfactory methods can

    employed. Accord La Joie v. Bay Counties Dist. Council,______ _______ ____________________________

    7

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    L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2547, 2549 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (refusing, for

    reason, to find a conflict between the identical constituti

    provision and the by-laws of a different local). On

    (entirely plausible) reading, automatic succession i

    permissible method of selection.5 Hence, there is ample tex

    support for the International's conclusion that

    constitution's words are inapplicable here because a new Man

    has already been designated that is, the vacancy has alr

    been filled through an authorized alternative process.

    Dow contends that in determining whether

    International proffered an interpretation worthy of deferenc

    reviewing court must not examine the letter of the text

    majestic isolation, but must read them in conjunction

    available extrinsic evidence of past union interpretations

    practices. We agree that "track record" evidence may ofte

    illuminating and should be considered. After all, evidence

    a union decision follows established custom might serve

    strengthen the decision's inherent reasonableness and, by

    token, evidence that a union decision constitutes a radical b

    from uniform past practice might undermine its see

    plausibility. Cf. Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at 1052 (citin___ _____________

    context "of an ongoing consolidation process" as one indiciu

    the reasonableness of the union's authorization of a mer

    ____________________

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    5We believe it is noteworthy that the United St Department of Labor's regulations implementing the L expressly authorize "automatic succession" to fill mid- vacancies. 29 C.F.R. 452.25 (1992).

    8

    Here, however, the summary judgment record is barren of

    evidence sufficient to support an inference that

    International's present reading of the constitution is n

    contrived or inconsistent with past practice.

    To be sure, appellant tried to plug this hole.

    failed efforts center around three sworn statements signe

    John S. Rogers, once a high-ranking officer of the Internatio

    Appellant tells us that these affidavits evidence a traditio

    requiring elections to fill mid-term vacancies in the fac

    conflicting local by-laws. He is wrong. To the extent that

    affidavits touch upon matters germane to this appeal, they

    much too vague to forestall summary judgment.

    Appellant places greatest emphasis on Rogers's repe

    statements that it has "always" been UBCJA's practice to con

    elections to fill mid-term vacancies. In context, however,

    assertion constitutes no more than an empty generality. A pu

    conclusory statement of this sort is manifestly insufficien

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    support an inference of inconsistent past practice withou

    accompanying suggestion nowhere to be found that su

    vacancy has ever before occurred in a local that had adopte

    automatic succession rule. See Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at

    ___ _____________

    (explaining that unsubstantiated conclusions are inadequat

    block summary judgment); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846______ ____________________

    103, 109 (1st Cir. 1988) (refusing to allow "unsubstanti

    allegations" to defeat summary judgment). In the same

    Rogers's general statement that "the Brotherhood and its l

    9

    unions" have deemed a resignation to create "a vacancy .

    regardless of whether or not the applicable Constitution or

    Laws contained a successorship provision" is devoi

    significance absent an indication nowhere to be found t

    particular incident actually occurred and that Rogers posse

    some knowledge about it. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 24 ___ ________

    (stating that, in the summary judgment context, sugge

    inferences must be supported by "specific facts"); Medina-Mu ________

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    896 F.2d at 9 (terming plaintiff's attempted application

    conclusion to a different factual predicate "too large a lea

    In light of these gaps, the Rogers affidavits, carefully rea

    not contradict UBCJA's sworn averment that, at least within

    past five years, the International has never ordered a l

    operating under an approved automatic succession procedur

    hold an election to fill a vacancy.6 Indeed, since the re

    demonstrates that the International has approved a number

    local union by-law provisions incorporating automatic succes

    regimes, including the provision at issue here, the re

    virtually compels the inference that UBCJA's present construc

    of the juxtaposed instruments of governance is consistent

    its past practice.

    ____________________

    6The shortcomings in the Rogers's affidavits are allmore striking because appellant extracted not one, but t

    successive affidavits from Rogers, over a period spanning t and one-half months. The latest of these was executed a

    three days before the hearing on summary judgment. Sincethrice went to the well in an effort to secure suppleme

    information, we think it fair to assume that everythingcould be said was in fact said.

    10

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    In short, appellant's "past practice" pro

    represents yet another situation where a court considerin

    motion for summary judgment "cannot accept, in lieu of docume

    facts, conclusory assertions." Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927_________ _____

    1259, 1262 (1st Cir. 1991). Consequently, we hold

    appellant failed to raise a genuine question regarding

    practice that would bear on the reasonableness of

    International's textual construction.

    We have said enough.7 While the International's

    on the written provisions may not be the only possible one

    even the most natural one, it is well within the universe

    acceptable interpretations. Because plausibility is all tha

    required in a situation of this kind, the lower c

    appropriately granted summary judgment on the existing recor

    III III ___

    Curtailment of Discovery Curtailment of Discovery ________________________

    ____________________

    7We reject out of hand appellant's claim that two o factual disputes sufficient to defeat UBCJA's motion for su judgment lurk in the record. First, pointing to the absence

    of September 9, 1992, of documentary proof anent Catal appointment as Business Representative, appellant speculates

    Cataldo was not duly appointed and, therefore, could not suc to the Manager's position pursuant to the by-laws.

    speculation does not hold water: a nonmovant cannot defeamotion for summary judgment solely by asserting that the mo

    has not adduced, or explained its failure to adduce, thepossible proof of a material point. See Celotex, 477 U.S

    ___ _______ 323; Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 182

    ____ ___________________________

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    Cir. 1989). The second dispute concerns whether Cataldo,violation of the constitution, assumed the Manager's posi

    before resigning as Local 218's Recording Secretary. Becausis uncontradicted that Cataldo no longer held the latter posi

    by October 7, 1992, at the latest, we, like the district co deem the exact date of his resignation to be immaterial.

    11

    Appellant's fall-back position is that the jud

    below must be vacated because the district court unduly curta

    discovery prior to deciding the summary judgment motions.

    generally Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (recognizing the require _________ _______

    of "adequate time for discovery"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 5

    (authorizing continuances so that a nonmovant, upon a pr

    showing, may gather "facts essential to justify [an] opposit

    to summary judgment). The argument is cast in disingenuous t

    and distorts the nature of the district court's discovery rul

    Early in the proceeding, the district court hea

    cacophony of sounds on the issue of discovery: on one flank,

    International urged a stay of discovery; on the opposite fl

    Dow sought to expedite discovery and widen its scope. Confro

    with cross motions for summary judgment that might be suscept

    to resolution on the submitted papers, and anticipating that

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    argument on the cross motions would take place on January

    1993, the district court, in a ruling from the bench, ha

    discovery on December 18, 1992. The court, however, droppe

    anchor to windward: since the full panoply of papers regar

    the motions had not yet been filed, the judge invited Do

    request a continuance for the purpose of conducting discover

    the hearing on summary judgment if, by then, Dow still beli

    that he could not adequately argue the cross motions without

    discovery.8 Hence, notwithstanding appellant's cur

    ____________________

    8Various exchanges at the December 18 hearing tell the t We offer a few representative vignettes. The judge ad appellant's counsel that if the UBCJA "file[s] something o

    12

    caterwauling about a categorical ban on discovery, the cou

    ore tenus order was plainly an interim measure, li ___ _____

    extinguishable for the asking.

    Although Dow held the key to discovery, he neglecte

    unlock the door. The January 12 hearing came and went wit

    any semblance of a renewed request to conduct discovery. No

    did appellant ask, even as a form of alternative relief, t

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    decision on summary judgment be postponed until further disco

    could be obtained. Rather, he chose to shelve the quest

    discovery and dive head-first into the summary jud

    maelstrom.9

    The rule in this circuit is clear that, when a c

    ____________________

    factual nature, and you need something to rebut, then Imove [on January 12] for discovery." The judge later reiter

    the point, stating that once the paperwork is complete,[appellant's attorney] can see whether you need any disco

    If, for some reason, on the 12th you come in here and sa

    can't argue the motion because there is a particular documena factual allegation that has been made and I need to look atparticular thing, maybe I would do it."

    9Appellant's suggestion that he revived his disco request at the January 12 hearing is, at best, wishful thin His counsel's oral argument contained only a fleeting refer to appellant's past inability to conduct discovery as he

    have preferred. His suggestion that he renewed the requestsupplemental memorandum filed in connection with the hearinequally jejune. The memorandum, directed primarily towarentirely different matter, contained a solitary sentenceobfuscatory than illuminative, concerning "legitimatenecessary outstanding requests for discovery." These consti

    no more than veiled references which, without more, cannotthe place of an affirmative request to conduct further disco

    Cf. Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale E ___ ___________________ _______________________________ Co., 840 F.2d 985, 989 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that oral

    ___ written statements "complaining about [a] stay of discove

    coupled with "cryptic allusions," are "entirely inadequate"support a Rule 56(f) motion).

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    temporizes or otherwise defers a ruling on a discovery requ

    and the proponent thereafter fails to resurrect the issue

    timely fashion, he is deemed to have abandoned the point

    cannot later complain on appeal concerning a denial of

    discovery in question. See DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15,___ __________ _____

    23 (1st Cir. 1991). As we have said, "a party who seeks a ru

    must persist in his quest to some reasonable extent." Id. at___

    Having flouted this rule, Dow finds himself mired

    pit similar to that which the government dug for itself in Re _

    v. United States, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988). There,______________

    government moved for additional discovery at a pre-trial hea

    before a magistrate judge. In denying the motion, the magist

    told the government that it might mull the matter for a few

    and renew the request in a more specific form. A follo

    request never came. On appeal, the government attempted to p

    an objection to the denial of discovery. We overruled

    objection, holding that the government had an obligation

    specify, face-up and squarely, what information it continue

    seek." Id. at 168. By not resurfacing the point, despite___

    express invitation to do so, it "waived the right to protest

    denial of" discovery. Id.

    ___

    The same result must obtain here. The district c

    voiced a clear invitation to seek discovery anew. Dow esc

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    it. He cannot now "legitimately complain of lack of access

    [discovery which he] never seasonably requested." Id. at___

    This is as it should be; any other outcome would squa

    14

    judicial resources and give parties who, like Dow, pl

    headlong into the merits of a case without pausing to ex

    discovery options a second bite at the cherry. In the

    analysis, "[c]ourts, like the Deity, are most frequently move

    help those who help themselves." Paterson-Leitch Co.___________________

    Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 989_______________________________________

    Cir. 1988); see also Hebert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218, 222

    ___ ____ ______ ________

    Cir. 1984) (refusing to "employ [Rule 56(f)] to spare liti

    from their own lack of diligence").

    IV IV __

    Conclusion Conclusion __________

    We need go no further. By failing to renew his re

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    for discovery at the appropriate time, Dow waived any objec

    to the district court's decision to resolve the summary jud

    motions on the existing record. And, because the Internation

    reconciliation of the arguable conflict between its constitu

    and the Local's by-laws is plausible in terms of that record,

    entry of summary judgment in defendants' favor must stand.

    Affirmed. Affirmed. ________

    15