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Escape from Syria

Scenario analysis of the apocalyptic disaster of

the new millennium

Edited By Marcello Ciola

December 2015

Dossier No.

03

Copyright© 2015 by Mediterranean Affairs

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Updated at 1st December

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Summary

Introduction .............................................................................. 2

A Road Map for Syria Unresolved Issues and (Legitimate)

Concerns for the Future .............................................................. 4

The Divergent Interests of the Actors Engaged .................5

The Plan of the Lowest Common Denominator ...............13

Unresolved Issues and (Legitimate) Concerns for the

Future ......................................................................................15

Syria: in the Middle of an Energy Game ............................. 19

Energy in Syria.......................................................................19

Assad’s Energy Strategy: too complicated to be possible

..................................................................................................24

An International Gas War ....................................................25

Conclusions ............................................................................27

The three main terrorist organizations in Syria .................. 28

Islamic Front...........................................................................28

Daesh .......................................................................................33

Al-Nusra Front .......................................................................37

Conclusions ............................................................................41

Different Military Strategies, same targets........................... 43

Russia ...................................................................................... 44

References ............................................................................... 58

The paradox of the Syrian conflict and its politics .............. 59

References ............................................................................... 67

Refugee crisis: Beyond the borders ....................................... 69

The evolution of the events ................................................. 70

From Syria to nowhere ......................................................... 72

Syria Situation 2014 .............................................................. 73

Road to Europe: refugees and the business opportunity 75

Conclusion .............................................................................. 78

References ............................................................................... 80

About the Authors .................................................................. 82

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Introduction

“Escape from Syria”, a suggestive title, apparently as a warning or a

description of what millions of people have begun to do as the

revolution became the first civil war, then war by proxy between Saudis

and Iranians, and finally the carnage in which Daesh imposes its law. In

reality the admonition that this work wants to give to a distracted public,

afraid and tired of Syria is exactly the opposite: woe to think that they

can escape the reflection that the Syrian events impose.

A group of young scholars from different backgrounds, but who

share a passion for knowledge and social commitment. Because to

inform people of what is happening in Syria and to try to explain it is

the first necessary step to not abandon Syria and its people to a destiny

made of violence, deprivation, and death. Today more than ever, to

know, understand and disseminate information to those who want to

know is more than the professional duty of a social scientist: it is the

only way we have to stay human in front of the endless carnage we are

witnessing.

The work takes the reader through the various facets of the Syrian

crisis, to show the twists and deep issues that make it so difficult to

solve. Yet if we can draw a lesson from the apocalypse described in the

subtitle, it is that if we let precipitate a crisis in the hope that it will end

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on its own is a dramatic and glaring error. Especially when behind the

scenes many - too many - continue to fuel the war, providing the

contenders of weapons, money and ideological bricks.

We had to wait for the attacks of 13 November in Paris to realize

how what happens beyond the sea cannot create anything else but

dramatic consequences, even in our societies. A little later. Hence, this

work offers a multifaceted reading key to the many that, after 13

November, have begun to question a war that seemed distant only able

to involve “other” without ever touching us.

We also need to thank the young scientists gathered in the group of

Mediterranean Affairs, representatives of Baab Al Shams and Professor

Michela Mercuri from the University of Macerata.

Vittorio Emanuele Parsi

Director ASERI – Postgraduate School of Economics and International

Relations (Catholic University of Milan)

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A Road Map for Syria

Unresolved Issues and (Legitimate) Concerns for the Future

Michela Mercuri

After almost five years of war and more than 250.000 casualties and 7 million

displaced; but above all, after the beginning of French airstrikes against the Islamic

State’s jihadist forces and last September Russian intervention, something is changing

in the tormented Syrian scene, critical area of a crisis that quickly expanded beyond

Syrian borders.

At this current moment, Syria’s future looks to be depending on the

proposal arisen during the two negotiation rounds that took place in

Vienna on October 30th and November 14th1, as well as on a plan for a

state building process. On paper, this plan may look well structured.

Yet, it leaves unanswered many among the fundamental questions

concerning Syria’s future, and is likely to work only by seconding,

through a masterful system of power counterbalancing, the varied

interests of the international, regional, and local stakeholders who got

dragged in this conflict for diverse reasons.

What will happen in the area now? And how could internal and

regional equilibriums shift? In order to shed some light on the future of

this conflict, it is helpful to start with analyzing the actors engaged and

1 EU and UN representatives took part to these meetings, as well as delegates from all countries touched by the conflict. Representatives from the Syrian opposition did not take part.

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on their respective interests inside and outside Syria. From here, then,

we will be able to clearly outline some possible future scenarios, as well

as critical situations that could arise from on-the-ground

implementation of the Vienna road map.

The Divergent Interests of the Actors Engaged

If, at the moment, all of regional and international actors – Moscow

to Washington, Tehran to Riyadh – look cohesive and resolute in

condemning terrorism and agree on the necessity of fighting Daesh, we

should not forget that these same actors, now sitting beside one another

at the negotiating table, were fighting in Syria and Iraq a “very personal”

proxy war just few weeks ago. Thus, if it is true that -also in the wake

of the Paris massacre- everybody’s intentions rapidly converged, it is

plausible to hypothesize that divergences and national interests could

re-emerge as soon as good intentions will have to be turned into

concrete actions to be implemented on the field. Therefore, it is

necessary to analyze first of all the interests of the main competitors

engaged in the Syrian game as to evaluate if and how they could impede

the road map implementation.

Russia launched its unilateral military action with the manifest

objective of re-establishing the status quo, reinforcing Assad’s Alawite

power, ending up attacking not only the Islamic State but also all of the

actors that could have been a threat for Russia. In fact, oftentimes

Russian authorities have been compelled to admit of having bombarded

not only positions of the Daesh, but also some of other rebel groups,

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6

jihadists and non-jihadists, fighting with Assad over the control of areas

still under the government’s authority above all in the Western part of

the country. Among these groups are the varied militias composing the

Free Syrian Army, partly equipped and trained by the United States

itself.

However, it would be reductive believing that Russia’s stakes are

limited to the protection of the government of Damascus. By

undertaking a unilateral military action, Putin aimed at showing to the

world that Russia is still a superpower, all by strengthening Russia’s

strategic position in East Mediterranean. It is not due to chance the fact

that the first Russian bombs hit Latakia harbor areas: the intention was

to defend Russian military port of Tartous, and to expand up to Homs

Source: Institute for the Study on War

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and the surrounding areas in an attempt to reinforcing Damascus’

dictator’s presence in the West part of the country. There, Alawite

power is still well rooted and is where Russian strategic bases are

located. This is the so-called Syrie utile, an area of Syria that comprehends

around 25-30% of the territory – its most relevant parts in terms of

economics and demographics.

In this context, re-opening the dialogue with the United States and

with the anti-IS coalition in general can be interpreted in a perspective

of mere political pragmatism: Putin is perfectly aware of the Russian

system’s economic crisis as well as of the possible internal repercussions

in case certain regional and international partners drifted away.

Therefore, Putin chose to weigh Russia’s power politics according to

the inevitable economic consequences. If, on the one hand, the Russian

leader can count on the alliance with the Shi’ite crescent, on the other

he cannot overlook the interests binding him to the other internationals

and regional powers.

Then again, after the manifest failure of the leading from behind strategy

– or, if preferred, of multilateral retrenchment2 - the United States too

would like to reinvigorate their role as hegemonic power in the Middle

Eastern system, as it was jeopardized first by the failing of the expensive

strategy of training of the rebels, and then the game, evidently lost,

against Putin. Despite the intention of restoring US position, the

2 Such is called Obama’s political strategy aiming at reducing the country’s engagement abroad, restoring its reputation and transferring to partners the burden of protecting international stability. Drezner, D. W. (2011, July-August). Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 90 (4).

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American strategy has not been very convincing so far, unlike Russia’s.

It suffice to bring to mind that, just before summer, the Americans

started training the New Syrian Forces investing $500 million, with the

aim of training around 5,000 recruits. As acknowledged also by Gen.

Lloyd Austin at American Senate Defense Commission, the first 54

units trained downsized to 5 because of desertions, killings, and

kidnappings. Their training cost $41 million. Today, the Obama

Administration seems to be looking forward to getting out of this

impasse as to regain a leading role, keeping talks open with Russia about

Syria’s transition and, at the same time, vigorously using pressure on

Europeans and regional partners for a more coordinated military and

political action.

From this point of view, however, if the Vienna consensus can

represent a partial, first success, we should keep in mind that the

coalition rests on somewhat fleeting alliances, with actors at times

Source: Business Insider

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ambiguous – Saudi Arabia is a clear example of this. Such considerations

take us to a further fundamental piece of the White House strategy: in

fact, the American position in the “war to the Caliphate” has to be

contextualized in the wider frame of the relationship tightly intertwining

Washington to Riyadh since the Seventies. Saudi and other GCC

countries’ enormous investments in the United States are certainly not

a secret, and neither are the massive exports of American (and

European) weapons to the Saud3.

Now, it is evident how any political decision be highly influenced by

economic interests. These, since many years, converge on the Sunni

Gulf countries, which after having accepted (who knows at what

conditions) the rehabilitation of the Iranian historical enemy, continue

asking for Assad’s elimination without mincing words, as well as

something in exchange for their engagement on the Syrian scene.

Inevitably, these are factors that the United States will have to consider.

In the regional context the situation is just as complex and

fragmented.

For Iran, preserving Bashar al Assad’s regime has been a key objective

of its foreign and security policy. Syria in fact represents one of the

3 According to the IHS Jane Global Defence Trade Annual Report (which does not include ammunitions and small caliber weapons) in 2014 Saudi Arabia substituted India as world’s major military equipment importer. Moores, B. et. al. (2015, March). IHS Balance of Trade. IHS balance of trade. A report published by Congressional Research Service, referring to the period between October 2010 and October 2014, estimates that the total worth of commercial proposals in the defense sector between Washington and Riyadh exceeds $90 billion. Blanchard, C. M. (2015, September 8). Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf.

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critical points of the Iranian strategy for the Middle East. First of all,

the axis with Damascus allows Iran to keep supporting Hezbollah in

Lebanon militarily and economically. To do so, Iran takes advantage of

the “Damascus corridor”, linking Tehran to the Shi’ite Lebanese

movement. This area extends from Palmira to al-Qusair.

Second, Syria has considerable importance also from the geostrategic

point of view: through the Syrian territory the Iranian regime has an

indirect control over the Mediterranean, which Iran could reach only

via the Suez Canal. The involvement of the Shi’ite bastion in the Syrian

conflict, beyond the confessional and sectarian aspect4, is therefore

directly linked to national security and the economic objectives of the

Islamic Republic. This explains Iran’s engagement on several fronts.

First of all, militarily, through the provision of weapons, soldiers5, cash6,

and military advisors chosen among the ranks of the Guardians of the

Revolution, élite force of the Islamic Republic of Iran7. Second, Iran,

4 Gilbert, K. (2013, October). The rise of Shi’ite militias and the post-Arab Spring sectarian threat. IDC Herzeliya & International Institute for Counter Terrorism. Retrieved from http://i-hls.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Gilbert-ICT-Rise-of-Shiite-militias-and-post-Arab-Spring-sectarian-threat.pdf. 5 2,000 units only in the last two months, coordinating with Hezbollah militias (around 5,000 units). 6 In May 2013 the newspaper Asr Iran, reporting from the Syrian newspaper Tashin, revealed that Tehran guaranteed a $7 billion to Damascus. Iran grants Syria $7 billion loan. (2013, May 29). Iran Daily Brief. Retrieved from http://www.irandailybrief.com/2013/05/29/iran-grants-syria-7-billion-loan/. 7 In support to the Syrian regime, Teheran deployed some among the most important Pasdaran officials. In addition to Qassem Soleimani, they deployed Hossein Hamadani and Yadollah Javani, both active in the repression of 2009 Iranian protests. Regarding Qassem Soleimani it is worth noting that in September 2013, American newspaper Wall Street Journal revealed that the chief of the Quds Force had created a true “war room”, with the aim to coordinate his units’ activities with those of the Syrian army and Hezbollah.

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after being re-admitted in the

circle of “legitimate” powers

thanks to the thawing on the

nuclear issue, appears more

and more active on the

diplomatic scene, rising to the

role of “indispensable actor”

for the international

negotiations regarding Syria’s

future. In other words, Tehran

invested considerable economic, political, and diplomatic efforts in the

Syrian challenge. Very likely, Iran will not refrain itself from trying to

make himself heard, supporting positions that diverge deeply from

those of the other pivotal regional actor: Saudi Arabia.

Saudi power, the great rival of Ayatollahs’ Shi’ite regime, has never

hidden its will to weaken the Shi’ite axis in Syria, especially in an anti-

Iran prospective, removing Assad in order to expand its own influence

in the country. In this context, the rise of Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

as the head of the Saudi royal family marks a clear step towards a more

assertive and strong policy against the historical Iranian enemy, either

to affirm its primacy in frame of the Syrian-Iraqi rivalry, strengthening

its stakeholders within the fragmented Sunni community, or to prevent

the proliferation of jihadist and/or Al Qaeda violence (often so far

supported) from passing through the weak borders. It is not a

coincidence that after the self-proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate in

Source: WikiCommons

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Raqqa and in some parts of eastern Iraq, the Saudis have deployed more

than 30,000 men from the security forces to protect their borders. In

this context it is easy to see how the control or at least the influence in

Syria represents to Saudi Arabia a vital issue, on which it will hardly be

willing to give up.

At last, Turkey has joined the coalition against Daesh in July this year,

but this has not prevented it to continue adopting the policy of double

talk, bombing more Kurdish people than Islamists, as over and over

reported by the ‘Syrian Observatory for Human Rights’8. Moreover, it

did not closed its border with Syria, so that all the activities, either

political, military but also humanitarian, of many groups operating in

Syria, including IS, were coordinated from the provinces of Antakya and

Gaziantep, entry point, among other things, of smuggled oil from

Damascus. It becomes clear why Erdoğan wants a Syria without Assad,

but more importantly any solution promoting the aspirations for

autonomy of Kurdish people, who today in Syria are about 2 million

and practically govern a strip of land, the so-called Rojava, which

occupies the northern part of the country. On the other hand, Kurdish

militias have been at the center of the struggle against Daesh and they

will hardly refrain from asserting their position, even if they have been

so far excluded from the negotiating table. It is a prospect that Erdoğan

has apparently already taken into account and that has helped to

increase friction with the Kurdish groups. Given these assumptions, it

8 According to a report of the Syrian Observatory for the Human Rights, during his first months within the coalition, Turkey hit 300 times Kurdish positions and three times the ones from the Islamic State.

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is difficult to think that the AKP will opt for a low profile role in the

difficult game for the reconstruction of Syria.

The Plan of the Lowest Common Denominator

From this intricate risiko sprang the first road map for the future of

Syria. A plan created by the two summits in Vienna and marked more

by a political pragmatism than a real desire to solve the Syrian massacre.

The equation is apparently simple: although the objectives pursued

by the powers involved in the Syrian scenario are partially incompatible,

if there is no one who will be able to fully realize them and if everyone

will pay a significant price, then there is a small space for sharing.

In other words, the unruly Western governments and the

irreconcilable States of the Middle East seem to have realized that a

dialogue can be a feasible hypothesis if:

1. No one has the tools and the political will to achieve

simultaneously the three key objectives to make Syria a State and

not just a black hole on the Middle Eastern map: to destroy the

ability of the IS to act on a full scale, to take Assad away from the

scene and, above all, to control the Syrian territory in order to

prevent a risk greater than Assad from taking over much of the

country.

2. To concentrate only on a single objective (first Westerners on

Assad and then on the SI, the Saudis on the containment of Iranian

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influence, the Russians on the rescue of the dictator, and finally the

Turks on the containment of the Kurds) becomes only a way to

carry on a useless and costly proxy war, that does not lead to any

results other than the increasing migration, terrorism and the

stalemate of a crisis that has reached macroscopic dimensions.

To sum up, it is from these assumptions that arose the road map for

the Syrian future, a plan of the lowest common denominator (but still a

plan) with some well-defined points:

1. To reach a truce in the country regardless of the possibility to

keep alive the fight against terrorist groups beside the Islamic State

and the Jabhat al Nusra Front, which will be identified with a

unified list of armed groups operating in Syria,.

2. To start direct negotiations between the Syrian government and

opposition forces before January 1.

3. To form a transitional executive within six months.

4. To summon within eighteen months free elections, both

parliamentary and presidential, to which would also participate in

the diaspora, that gather about half of the Syrian population.

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Unresolved Issues and (Legitimate) Concerns for the

Future

To see through this road map, and especially bearing in mind the very

different interests of the powers in the field, some obvious problems

emerge that could pose serious obstacles to the long-awaited transition.

Keeping fighting against all terrorist groups on the list yet to be drawn

up and at the same time call a truce in the country means in the first

place leaving the various players involved free to determine who is the

enemy to fight. If on the Al Nusra Front and Daesh all seem to agree,

the same thing could hardly happen to the multitude of “organizations”

in the area financed by proxy

by the various external

actors, first and foremost the

Saudi Arabia, whose new

sovereign Salman challenged

Iran for hegemony also

through the support to some

fighting militias in Syria.

Amongst the others there is

the Jaysh al-Fatah9, born with

the aim of coordinating the

strategic and operative lines

of a wide plethora of

9 Van Wilgenburg, W. (2015). The Rise of Jaysh al-Fateh in Northern Syria. Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor. 13 (12).

Source: WikiCommons

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organizations near the Salafi universe, like Ahrar al-Sham, a relevant

organization in some parts of the country and considered a terrorist

group by Iran, along with all the so-called takfiris, identifying all the

Sunni groups depending from Riyad. In addition to this, according to

Assad are to be considered terrorists all armed opposition groups in

Syria. From this point of view it is clear that since the first step of

negotiations could emerge the personal interests of some political actors

in including or excluding from the list of legitimate actors this

organization or the other, despite a possible momentary convergence to

the negotiating table.

Secondly, assuming that we can agree on a joint list and overcome

the possible differences or individual “preferences”, that we manage to

a negotiating table between the Syrian government and opposition

forces and that Assad could represent one of the parties, who will

represent the counterpart in a credible way? The moderate opposition?

Apart from the Kurds, unwearying opponents to the jihadists, who very

unlikely would be accepted by Turkey at the negotiating table, the so-

called moderate party today seems more a sort of utopia than a reality.

Moreover, if the United States seem to have accepted the idea of leaving

Assad in charge of Syria at least until new elections, at this times it is

not yet very clear the position of Saudi Arabia and Turkey on the matter.

In case that this States would consider the hypothesis, we can assume

that they will demand a significant compensation, and for Turkey this

could be read only in an anti-Kurdish perspective.

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Furthermore, assuming that the first two pre-conditions will be

realized and it will be proceeded to the creation of a transitional

government, it should be remembered that in reality both the so-called

rebels and the loyalists are now shattered into hundreds of militias,

often loyal only to their own commanders10. It will be inevitable that

many factions will be excluded and these hardly will lay down their

weapons, agreeing to be integrated into a single national army and under

some central authority, at least not before they will have obtain an

adequate “compensation” in economic or territorial terms. From this

point of view, Afghanistan and Libya taught us that provide local groups

with weapons to achieve a goal in the short term is likely to have as

direct consequence internal chaos, since forming fighters is certainly not

equivalent to building an army.

In the end, in a context like this, to hold free elections could lead to

biased results. Also in this case the Libyan scenario could be of help,

even with due caution. After the establishment of the National

Transitional Council, in Libya the transitional phase has seen the

establishment in November 2011 of an interim executive, made up of

24 ministers and that aimed to reflect in its composition the complexity

and different souls of the political landscape in the country. The free

elections in July 2012, to which participated a large part of the people,

have sanctioned the victory of the moderate National Forces Alliance

(NFA) led by Mahmoud Jibril. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the

policy framework, the intensification of personal and local interests, but

10 According to recent estimates, in Syria there are more than 2,000 armed groups.

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also the persistence of armed groups excluded from any negotiation,

gave us a failed state that is today one of the major unknowns of the

Mediterranean area.

Therefore, despite the good intentions shown in Vienna, they appear

to be multiple the challenges which would lead towards real peace and

reconstruction of the battered Syria and they are not easy to solve. Only

the will to support a political compromise, reflecting the nature of the

distribution of power in the country and to work towards an internal

political transformation - totally disconnected from external interests -

can lead the way to a real transitional process. However, no negotiations

will be really credible, if the multidirectional flow of arms to Syria will

not be stopped and the lucrative war economy will not be contained.

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Syria: in the Middle of an Energy Game

Francesco Angelone

When we come to talk about Syria, military issues related to the civil war and

international tensions, as well as the humanitarian crisis that has led more than four

million refugees11 to leave the country since the beginning of the protests against

Bashar al-Assad’s regime, are definitely the topics of main interest. But Syria is also

an interesting study case for its geographical position, in the middle of an area affected

by the transit and trade of primary energy resources. It is for this reason that we

cannot omit to mention, among other things, that the political situation still involving

Syria, is linked to a large scale energy game, according to some observers12. So, let’s

take a look at how is the energy situation like in Syria.

Energy in Syria

The political situation, still without the prospect of solutions , also

affects the energy sector. Both oil and gas production heavily dropped

since the beginning of the civil war. Suffice it to mention few data: In

11 Data reported by UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) official website. Data and maps are available at the following link: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 12 Ahmed, N. (2013, August 30). Syria intervention plan fueled by oil interests, not chemical weapon concern. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war-intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines. Even more, for Nafeez Ahmed also political unrest in which Syria fell prey to in 2011 is the result of an explosive mix that includes climate, oil, and debt crises within a politically repressive regime. So the conclusion’s future is also linked to the rival interests dominating the energy corridors. See Ahmed, N. (2013, May 13). Peak oil, climate change, and pipeline geopolitics drive the Syrian conflict. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/may/13/1. Please note that the author wrote these articles two years ago.

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2012 Syria produced just 171 thousand barrels a day, compared to 353

000 in 2011. The decline continued in 2013, when the production

collapsed to 59 000 barrels a day, and furthered in 2014, when it

dropped of an additional -44.4%, i.e. 33 000 barrels a day13. Natural gas

production, however, decreased less than oil but dropped at the same

pace (from 8 billion m3 in 2010 to 4.4 billion in 2014)14. Does this mean

that Syria once was an oil and gas exporting country and no longer is?

Of course Syria no longer has the means to export its energy sources to

the extent it used to do in the past. This affects government revenues,

where energy sector revenues accounted for approximately 25%, before

the civil war. The inability to access refineries once Daesh advanced (as

we will see) almost nullified oil production whereas EU and US

sanctions made some fundamental markets unavailable for Syrian oil15.

So, to answer our question, yes - Syria once was an oil exporting country

and no longer is, since it produces almost a tenth of what it used to

produce before the conflict.

But what about natural gas? Since 2008 Syria became a net importer.

Imports were received through the Arab Gas Pipeline, operative since

13 BP, British Petroleum (2015). BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015. London, UK: BP p.l.c. also available at http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2015/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf. 14 Id. 15 EIA, U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015, June). Syria. Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Syria/syria.pdf.

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the same year and able to bring Egyptian gas to Syria and Lebanon via

Jordan16.

As agreed, the pipeline would have to be extended to Turkey with a

connection to the Nabucco pipeline, for what is honestly an unlikely

prospect nowadays. In fact, the short life of the Arab Gas Pipeline has

been strongly marked by the

political events of the region, the

Arab spring and its consequences.

Since early 2011, explosions due to

sabotages led to the pipeline

shutdown at least thirty times until

May 201517. For Syria, Jordan, and

Lebanon these terroristic attacks to

the pipeline only meant gas

shortages. In this context, in 2011

Iran, Iraq, and Syria intensified

contacts to build a pipeline, the so-

called Friendship Pipeline, also known as Islamic Gas Pipeline)

involving them and Lebanon. This pipeline should have brought natural

gas to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. This project, however, arose

after previous proposals faded. One of these was put forth by Qatar:

bring Qatari gas to Turkey via Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq or,

16 Id. Natural gas from Arish also reaches Ashkelon (Israel) throughout an underwater pipeline. 17 The Cairo Post (2015, May 31). Arish gas line explodes for 30th time. Retrieved from http://thecairopost.youm7.com/news/153307/news/arish-gas-line-explodes-for-30th-time.

Source: The Encyclopedia of Earth

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alternatively, build a pipeline that crossing Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria

and a connection with the Arab Gas Pipeline18. It is quite widespread

the idea that Syria rejected this project because it would have damaged

Russian economic interests19 bringing non-Russian gas in a market (the

European Union’s) highly dependent on Moscow energy exports.

Another proposal was made by Iran itself in order to bring gas to

Europe via Persian Gulf, i.e. the so-called Persian pipeline, and would

have been connected with the planned TAP/TANAP pipelines. This

second proposal strongly suffered the sanctions that hit Iran so that the

companies originally involved found an easy way out in abandoning the

project.

So, what about the Friendship pipeline? The pipeline, to be built by

2016 with an estimated cost of $10 billion, would have run from the

Iranian Assalouyeh port, close to the South Pars gas field in the Persian

Gulf, to Damascus in Syria via Iraqi territory. The original route should

have been 1,500 km long and, as mentioned, could have been extended

to Lebanon and then to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. The

preliminary agreement was signed on July 2011 by the Iranian, Iraqi, and

Syrian oil ministers20 and the first approaches to conclude selling

contracts immediately began.

18 Carlisle, T. (2009, August 26). Qatar seeks gas pipeline to Turkey. The National. Retrieved from http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/qatar-seeks-gas-pipeline-to-turkey#full. 19 Ahmed, N. (2013, August 30). Op. cit. 20 Mohammad Aliabadi for Iran, Abdul Kareem Luaiby for Iraq and Sufian Alow for Syria. Hafidh H. and Faucon B. (2011, July 25). Iraq, Iran, Syria Sign $10 Billion Gas-Pipeline Deal. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903591104576467631289250392.

December 2015

23

It has to be clear that South Pars offshore natural gas field has been

assessed as the largest in the world according to the International

Energy Agency21, accounting for almost 40% of Iran’s reserves22. The

field is divided into 29 development phases and covers an area of 9,700

km2, 3,700 of which are in Iran’s territorial waters in the Persian Gulf

and the remaining 6,000 in Qatar’s (North Field)23. The Friendship

pipeline in fact could be

considered a Shi’ite gas

pipeline from Shi’ite Iran

via Shi’ite-majority Iraq

onto Shi’ite-friendly

Alawite Al-Assad’s Syria24,

and it was planned to

replace a project proposed

by Sunni Qatar,

geopolitically positioned

on the opposite side of Iran

21 EIA, U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015, June). Iran. Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN. 22 Facts Global Energy (2014, December 19), Iran’s Oil and Gas Annual Report 2014, 37-38. Iran is the second country in the world for proved natural gas reserves. See: BP, British Petroleum (2015). Op. cit. 23 Iran launches new South Pars platform with initial capacity of 10 mcm per day. (2015, November 18). Natural Gas Europe. Retrieved from http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/iran-production-launch-platform-gas-south-pars-26488. 24 Engdahl, F.W. (2012, October). Syria, Turkey, Israel and a Greater Middle East Energy War. Retrieved from http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/print/Syria%20Turkey%20Israel%20and%20a%20New%20Greater%20Middle%20East%20War.pdf.

Source: Business Insider

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and Syria25. And in both cases Syria is a crossroads. This is something

to take into account for later conclusions.

Assad’s Energy Strategy: too complicated to be possible

Syria is an energy crossroads not for political choices, rather because

of its geographical position. Conscious of this gift given by nature, in

2008 Assad promoted his energy strategy known as the ‘Four Seas

Policy’. Just like Erdoğan’s Turkey decided to act as energy hub useful

for both the European Union and Russia26, Assad decided to become

an essential energy network piece, linking the Mediterranean, the

Caspian27, the Black Sea, and the Gulf28. But the strategy came

immediately to a deadlock because of the outbreak of the civil war.

Thus, just like the Arab Gas Pipeline became a target for fighting

factions, the Friendship pipeline has not seen the light yet. Once the

Syrian government resulted isolated and the country quickly sled in an

ongoing civil war, Assad’s strategy resulted unfeasible, not much more

25 Actually, the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline is called Friendship Pipeline From an Iranian perspective because it represents a first step towards a new energy road. From a Western perspective, this project represents an enlargement in Iran’s sphere of influence so it is known as Islamic Pipeline. 26 Winrow, G. (2014, April). Realization of Turkey’s Energy Aspirations. Pipe Dreams or Real Projects?. Centre on the United States and Europe at Brookings. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/04/realization-turkeys-energy-aspirations-winrow/turkeys-energy-aspirations.pdf. 27 In fact, Syria in some cases results a transit state to Turkey and in other ones the situation is the opposite. In 2010 Syria signed an agreement with Azerbaijan to import Azeri gas via Turkey. See Azerbaijan, Syria: Gas Agreement Signed. (2010, June 30). Stratfor. Retrieved from https://www.stratfor.com/situation-report/azerbaijan-syria-gas-agreement-signed. 28 Escobar, P. (2013, August 6). Syria’s Pipelineinstan war. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/201285133440424621.html.

December 2015

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than a speculation. Financial reasons of course prevented the

implementation of the single pipeline (Assad’s regime was alleged of

human rights violations and punished with economic sanctions by

countries and international organizations), not taking into account that

later on parts of Syria fell into the hands of rebel groups, especially

Daesh. However, the most serious problem was that Syrian

relationships with its neighbors resulted compromised.

Assad tried to play on more than one table trying to find a profitable

balance for its country by tightening links with Turkey (and Iraqi

Kurdistan), but also with Iran, bypassing Turkey. Definitely too

complicated to be doable. Especially if we consider that Turkish energy

strategy and the Syrian collide on a fundamental point. Turkey’s energy

strategy depends on two main energy suppliers: one is Iran, so any

chance to be by-passed by a pipeline bringing Iranian gas to Europe is

not welcome in Ankara; and the other is of course Russia. European

countries desperately need a way to diversify their energy supplies in

order to reduce Russian leverage on their economies. The Friendship

Pipeline was a partial solution to that.

An International Gas War

A question now arises about the cause-effect relationship existing

between the failure of the Friendship Pipeline and the intricate political

situation of the area. Does the realization of this pipeline resulted

impossible because of the civil war, or is the civil war fueled by

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international players with competing energy interests in this area? And,

more daringly: is Syria the scenario of an international clash?

As far as we know, Qatar is the main Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

exporter in the world29 but has no relevant shares in EU energy market

where natural gas mainly comes via Russian infrastructures (Russian gas

is also cheaper than Qatari one). Qatar’s proposal to build a pipeline

crossing states like Syria and Turkey came just to find an outlet to its

exports but it was backed. When Iran’s one was accepted because more

aligned with Russian interests (more than with Syrian ones)30 Qatari

interests and Iranian (and Syrian) came to a clash. It is not a secret that

Qatar is funding rebel groups and Iran and Russia are supporting

Assad’s troops31. Hence, the main game could be considered the one

between Iran (now freed form some of the economic sanctions) and

Qatar for the regional leadership in exporting natural gas while the

Friendship Pipeline alone would not relevantly damage Russia. The

temperature in the area may rise even more if Turkey (and United States,

apparently behind the scenes as of now) decides to push for an energy

alliance with Qatar, renouncing to the Turkish Stream and the bond

29 EIA, U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015, October). Qatar. Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Qatar/qatar.pdf. 30 Orenstein, M.A. and Romer, G. (2015, October 14). Putin’s Gas Attack. Is Russia Just in Syria for the Pipelines?. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-10-14/putins-gas-attack. 31 Engdahl, F.W. (2014, January 13). Syria attraction: Russia moving into Eastern Mediterranean oil bonanza. Russia Today. Retrieved from https://www.rt.com/op-edge/syria-russia-war-oil-528/.

December 2015

27

with Moscow. Will Turkey decide for securing gas supplies from Russia

or for diversifying them by looking for emancipation from Gazprom?

Conclusions

It has quite spread the idea that who controls oil also rules the world.

In this case, we can affirm that natural gas is the fuel that is fostering

the scramble for energy in the region, and a raging battle over where the

pipelines will go is still taking place, especially in Syria. Several nations

seek control over the area. At the moment it seems that the fight against

Daesh has exceeded in importance every other issue on the international

agenda, but it cannot be completely excluded that military interventions

against rebel groups in Syria are related to energy interests. Syrian

national interest (thinking about Syria as an entity like it was before the

civil war) still lies in being a transit State but the issues about the

relationships with its neighbors now will complicate the achievement of

this geopolitical goal.

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The three main terrorist organizations in

Syria

Federica Fanuli

Within the Syrian war, there is another fight going on: a war between the different

souls composing the opposition, a constellation of armed groups with incompatible

political and ideological agendas, which have in common the objective to topple the

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. To understand what is happening in Syria, it is

important to underline that there is not a united anti-Assad front: the factions

fighting the Alawite regime are simultaneously engaged in a domestic war. The

spectrum of the rebel forces ranges from less ideological revolutionary groups – as

Kurds – to the Salafi-jihadist ones, consumed by another war between the Islamic

State and Jabhat al-Nusra Front, the Syrian group affiliated with al-Qaeda.

Islamic Front

Created on November 22, 2013, the Islamic Front is a coalition

opposing to the Assad’s regime and which combines seven armed

groups inspired to Salafism32.

1. The Ansar al-Sham Battalions: a faction based in the northern

Syria, in Latakia and Idlib;

2. The Kurdish Islamic Front: a small faction of Islamist Kurds.

32 Lund, A. (2014, January 14), The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 1: Structure and Support, Carnegie Endowment, retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54183.

December 2015

29

3. Jaysh al-Islam, the Islam Army: a group established in the east

of Damascus;

4. The Tawhid Brigade: a powerful group from Aleppo;

5. The Suqour al-Sham Brigades: a faction that confines with the

province of Idlib, in north-western Syria;

6. The Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement: it is most extremist

than the other groups;

7. The Haq Brigade: a group that exercises great influence in

Homs;

The Syrian conflict has increased radicalization of armed opposition

in Syria, particularly in the northern and eastern Syria, and such groups,

composing the Front, come from two previous coalitions: the Islamic

Front and the Syrian Liberation Front that announced their break-up

on November 25, 2013. The purpose of the new union is to overcome

Source: Pietervanostaeyen

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internal divisions between factions; a force of about 45,000 to 60,000

fighters united under one flag 33.

Their official statute, published four days after the birth of the Front,

is a document containing ideologies indicating the different groups,

although the hard-line opposition of the Salafist group Ahrar al-Sham

prevails over its every part34. The central part of the Charter provides

for the establishment of an Islamic State, led by a Majlis-ash-Shura,

which would apply the Sharia. Unlike other terrorist groups, the Islamic

Front is not interested in re-establishing the Caliphate and it is opposed

to Secularism as well as to the human legislation (the Law should be

promulgated by God and not by the people), to civilian government and

to the an independent Kurdish State35. About this last aspect, it should

be stated that although the Kurdish member-group inside the Front, it

is the nationalist current that prevails and comes into conflict with the

the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK). As

matter of the fact, inspired by left and secular ideologies, the PKK

reaches the goal to establish an independent Kurdish State. Moreover,

another plan of the Islamic Front is the collapse of the Alawite regime.

No party or individual will assume the exclusive political control: there

33 Klapper, B. and Pace, J. (2014, 18 February), Obama struggling to find winning formula in Syria, Talking Post Memo, retrieved from http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/obama-struggling-to-find-winning-formula-in-syria. Zelin, A. (2013, 3 December), Rebels Consolidating Strength in Syria: The Islamic Front, The Washington Institute, retrieved from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rebels-consolidating-strength-in-syria-the-islamic-front. 34 Lund, A. (2014, 15 January), The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 2: An Umbrella Organization, Carnegie Endowment, retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54204. 35 Lund, A. (2014, 17 February), The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 4: The State, Carnegie Endowment, retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54233.

December 2015

31

would be laws and courts that will rule the actions of State and prevent

the concentration of power on one side, in order to “build an Islamic

civil society in Syria, ruled by God’s law”. The Islamic Front also

reserves an important role to education and the social assistance,

because, even if it is an armed organization, the Front pursues not only

a military mission, but also one on the civil side and it emerges from its

Statute: “The military movement, which aims to topple the regime and

extend security, and the civil movements, from which flows the

missionary, educational, humanitarian, media, politics and [public]

services [movements] […]”36.

After the fall of the dictator, Syria will have to be rebuilt and

renovated and the Statute lists the six main targets of Sunni Theocracy:

– toppling the regime and establishing security throughout beloved

Syria;

– working to strengthen the faith of individuals, society and the state

level;

– preserving the Islamic identity of the society and building a

comprehensive Islamic character;

– rebuilding Syria on a solid bases of justice, independence and

solidarity, in accordance with Islamic principles;

– real participation at the development of society;

36 Jamajeem, A. (2013, 29 Jenuary), The Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front, Carnegie Endowment, retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=50831.

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– preparing expert leaders in various areas of life37.

The fight will not end with the resignation or death of Bashar al-

Assad and now it does not seem contemplated the chance of a

compromise with jihadist or Western forces. The United States tried to

induce the leaders of the Islamic Front to participate to the negotiations

to deal the end of the conflict in Syria, but the proposal has always been

rejected, because the Front does not intend to give up their finish line

and, above all, the Article 10 of their Statute, which states that the

Islamic Front has no intention “to participate in any political process

that contravenes religion or identifies sovereignty everywhere, but in

the law of God, glorified and Sublime”. The US wanted to push the

Front to become a member of the Geneva II Peace Conference, but the

meeting to discuss the achievement of a political solution to the Syrian

crisis was condemned by the Front as “an attempt to prolong the

duration of the scheme”38. Therefore, membership would constitute a

violation of their principles with the risk to end up on trial. If not with

the United States, however, the Front entertains relations with Saudi

Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. Arms, financial support and strategies

different by the terrorist attacks identify the Islamic Front not a terrorist

37 Id. 38 Lund, A. (2014, 16 January), The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 3: Negotiations, Carnegie Endowment, retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54213 or Aron Lund, 2013, 13 October, On the Road to Geneva, Carnegie Endowment, retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=53428.

December 2015

33

organization like Daesh and al-Nusra Front39. Suicide bombings are a

favourite tactic of jihadist groups and no factions of the Front is known

for regularly using suicide bombers, on the contrary, most groups seem

to rely on conventional warfare.

Daesh

The definitions used by jihadists to identify themselves with this

terrorist organization are different: the Islamic State (IS), the Islamic

State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),

the Caliphate, the Islamic State

of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

All names by which it can be

draw the boundaries of a

territory controlled by Caliph,

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,

recognized as the successor of

the Prophet of Islam

Muhammad. On the other hand,

Muslims prefer to use the expression Daesh, an acronym “al-Dawla al-

Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham” (literally “The Islamic State of Iraq and

Great Syria which is the Sun”) which in Arabic sounds as “trample and

39 Dark, E. (2013, 11 December), Syrian FSA fades in shadow of Saudi-backed opposition front, AlMonitor, retrieved from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/syria-fsa-islamic-front-geneva-ii-jarba.html#.

Source: Wikicommons

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destroy” in an offensive meaning. For more than two years, Daesh is

fighting in the civil war against the Alawite President Bashar al-Assad.

Daesh is a “state” that uses methods so violent that even al-Qaeda keeps

at a safe distance from it.

Localized between Iraq and Syria, geographically extensive as

Belgium, the Jihadist State is administered independently, obtaining

capital from its activities.

As well as against the West, Daesh theorizes a war within Islam

aiming to establish a Caliphate in good order, but to understand this

terrorist organization it is important to recall three key figures: the first,

known around the world for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,

Osama bin Laden, the Saudi-born man who has long been the leader of

al-Qaeda; the second is an Egyptian doctor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who

succeed to bin Laden after he was killed in a US raid in Abbottabad,

Pakistan, May 2, 2011; the third is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian

who have been one many rivals to bin Laden in the Movement of the

Mujahideen, since the days of the war against the Soviets who occupied

Afghanistan40.

In 2000, Zarqawi decided to found a group with other ambition than

those of al-Qaeda, that is the idea of creating a foreign legion, with

which Sunni would have to defend Muslim territories by Western

occupation. Zarqawi wanted to provoke a civil war by exploiting the

confused religious context in Iraq, a Shiite majority but with a Sunni

40 Laub, Z. and Masters, J. (2015, 16 November). The Islamic State, Council of Foreign Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811.

December 2015

35

minority in power under Saddam Hussein. The goal was to create an

Islamic Caliphate, exclusively Sunni, which today inspired the Daesh’s

strategy. A campaign of attacks on Muslim States intended to create a

network of regions in which the State forces withdrew exhausted and

where the Islamist forces occupants submitted the local population. The

attacks have gone on and in 2004 Zarqawi called his group Al-Qaeda in

Iraq (AQI), a clear reference to the “mother-group”, allowing bin Laden

to have a strong presence in Iraq, then occupied by the American forces.

In 2006, an American bomb killed Zarqawi, and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi

became leader until 2010, the year of his death, when Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi came into power41. At the time, Al Qaeda in Iraq had suffered

a considerable weakening, due to the partial success of the strategy of

41 What is ‘Islamic State’?, BBC News. (2015, November 14). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144.

Source: Institute for the Study on War

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counterinsurgency implemented in 2007 in Iraq by US General

Petraeus, which provided greater closeness and solidarity between

troops and the people, helping to reduce sectarian violence. The

Petraeus strategy was based on cooperation with local Sunni tribes,

which could not tolerate extremism of al-Qaeda42. In 2011, the group

emerges strengthened and, in April of 2013, AQI became the Islamic

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The war in Syria had guaranteed the

group new expansion possibilities and including the eastern region in

its name (the area of the eastern Mediterranean: Syria, Jordan, Palestine,

Lebanon, Israel and Cyprus) was just functional to the growth of violent

ambitions of the Daesh to establish a Caliphate that would lead to the

purification of the Muslim world43. Since the end of 2013, the chief of

al-Qaeda, Zawahiri, asked Daesh to stay out of the war in Syria, because

al-Qaeda was already represented by the extremist group Jabhat al-

Nusra Front. Al-Baghdadi, however, refused, and in February 2014 the

Daesh expelled Zawahiri from al-Qaeda44. The Islamic State of Iraq and

the Levant was too ferocious even for an organization like al-Qaeda,

42 Keane, C. (2015, 23 September). Petraeus recipe for battling ISIS: US-protected rebel enclaves in Syria, surge in Iraq, Russia Today. Retrieved from https://www.rt.com/usa/316238-petraeus-senate-russia-syria/. 43 Bunzel, C. (2015, March). From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper (19). Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state-bunzel/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf. 44 Byman, D. L. and Williams, J. R. (2015, 24 February). ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s global civil war, Brookings. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/02/24-byman-williams-isis-war-with-al-qaeda.

December 2015

37

and social networks and videos have become a mean to the propaga of

fear.

Unlike other Islamist groups fighting in Syria, Daesh does not depend

for its survival on aid from foreign countries, because the territory

under its control is organized as an administrative system providing a

rich capital, fuelled by the payment of taxes, from the sale of electricity

produced from power stations reclaimed from the Syrian government

and oil coming from refinery captured during military offensives, as well

as illegal business as cultural heritage and arms trafficking45. Daesh was

provided with a careful economic strategy, just think about the high

number of foreign and local fighters very well paid, fact that allows the

group to be more cohesive46. In this way the Daesh has so far managed

to maximize all the things the war in Syria offered.

Al-Nusra Front

The Islamic Front and Daesh are not the only threat from Syria.

There is another terrorist organization that has a dangerous freedom:

Jabhat al-Nusra Front (JN), the official affiliate of al-Qaeda in Syria.

45 Fatf Report (2015 February), Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The Financial Action Task Force. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf or Zenko, M. (2015, 6 February). Guest Post: Preventing Cultural Destruction by ISIS, Council of Foreign Relations. Retrieved from http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2015/03/06/guest-post-preventing-cultural-destruction-by-isis/. 46 Where Islamic State gets its money. (2015, 4 January), The Economist. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/01/economist-explains.

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JN sees the war in Syria as a direct extension of a wider jihad against

the West, as idealized by Osama bin Laden, and represented by the

global movement of Al-Qaeda. Rival of Daesh, the two groups share

common goals, including a revived Islamic Caliphate, that would

reverse the declining path undertaken by the Muslim community47. This

Caliphate, however, is a

long-term goal for the

organization. At the

moment, JN is

pursuing the creation

of a regional Islamic

Emirate in Syria, which

would then be a part of

a largest caliphate48.

JN draws much inspiration from al-Qaeda, particularly from

influential theoretical jihadist Abu Musab al-Suri, who laid the

groundwork for a campaign that gives priority to popular support and

successfully is implementing this methodology in Syria. When the

United States has registered JN in the blacklist of terrorist organizations,

there have been protests in favour of JN, because in addition to military

aspect, al Nusra Front had increased its efforts to ensure social welfare

47 Aa. Vv. (2004, January). Compilation of the Bin Laden Statements 1994-January 2004. FBIS Report, 47. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf. See also Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi on July 9, 2005. 48 Cafarella, J. (2014, December). Jabhat Al-Nusra in Syria an Islamic Emirate for Al-Qaeda. Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report (25). Retrieved from http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/JN%20Final.pdf.

Source: Wikipedia

December 2015

39

to the local populations49. This social campaign that responds to three

basic needs: daily sustenance, security, and healthcare50. Obviously JN

exploits the ability to penetrate in the social structure to establish and

strengthen relations with the net of insurgents and the local population,

with the main purpose of applying the Sharia in Syria: proselytise and

social commitments permit JN to establish relations with the local

community and take the first step to try to conver the religious contest

of Syrian society.

In according to this, al-Nusra Front has not a state structure, but

provincial one, with a central committee called “Treasury Muslim”,

which purpose is to distribute the raised money and facilitate dispersion

of forces JN in almost all the Syrian controlled area so that it maximizes

the economy. Moreover, this structure allows JN forces to coordinate

their activities with local rebel groups and extend the influence of the

organization51. JN, however, pursues its objectives through a distinct

methodology.

The organization maintains a very low profile, so as to make it more

dangerous. JN follows the path marked by al-Zawahiri to instigate a

religious and social revolution and the war in Syria has provided an

49 Roggio, B. (2012, December 12). Syrian National Coalition Urges U.S. to Drop al-Nusrah Terrorism Designation. Long War Journal. Retrieved from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/12/syrian_national_coalition_urge.php. 50 Wood, P. (2013, January 17). Syria: Islamist Nusra Front gives BBC exclusive interview. BBC Monitoring Middle East. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21061018. 51 Solomon, E. (2013, November 32). Islamist Rebels Report Capture of Largest Syrian Oil Field. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Nov-23/238693-rebels-seize-major-syria-oil-field-activists.ashx#axzz2lU9JrzNt.

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almost ideal environment within which to implement this strategy. JN

is more subtle and insidious than Daesh, so it could be more difficult

to contain or defeat this organization. The security vacuum in Syria is

an opportunity for JN, engaged in the production of weapons and the

establishment of a form of engineering corps as a specialized unit. This

group appears to be responsible for both the construction of indirect

fire munitions and of Vehicles Borne Improvised Explosive Devices

(VBIED), the nucleus of JN tactic. JN has consolidated its knowledge

in the production of arms that complements the accurate school

recruitment. Military training aims to exploit the maximum capacity of

operation, to ensure an optimal military coverage beside the religious

one. The high level of discipline and the strict code of conduct

promoted by training military facilitate the acquisition of relations with

rebel groups.

December 2015

41

JN has so far propagated its image of a benevolent and responsible

actor, that gives priority to the safety of the civilian population in Syria

and this makes it an attractive partner. JN provides military training

through a series of camps in Syria. In these fields, the recruits are further

indoctrinated in JN’s ideology, they get weapons training and subjected

to what appears to be a rigorous training regimen. JNS recruitment of

children is an element of long-term and multi-generational AQ

propaganda to create a global Islamic caliphate52.

Conclusions

Of the three organizations, Daesh is the one that frightens the most.

Daesh controls about a third of the country in the northeast of the Syria,

it has established its capital in Raqqa and declared war on the West,

52 Cafarella, J., op. cit.

Source: Institute for the Study on War

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shaking it with a series of attacks. Some jihadists from other countries,

as the Boko Haram in Nigeria, have immediately sworn allegiance to

the Caliph Ibrahim and the Islamic State. Others, such as the Al-Nusra

Front, Al Shabaab in Somalia and fringe of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Egypt

and in the Maghreb, have remained loyal to Al-Qaeda and rejected its

appeal.

In the Syrian complex scenario, in which the Islamic Front emerges

as the apparently weaker organization, but could also join in one of the

two strongest groups, there are two hypotheses. The first is that Al-

Qaeda could declare the birth of a Caliphate opposite to that of Daesh,

after the conquest of the province of Idlib by al-Nusra, establishing a

territorial base in Syria. The second possibility is that the two

organizations could become one and pursue the sharing goal of the

Caliphate. Two assumptions that hold high the alarm for the safety of

the West and the Middle East region and in both cases the solution to

eradicate two fluid structures could not be the raid.

December 2015

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Different Military Strategies, same targets

Pilar Buzzetti

More than four years since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the situation is still

characterized by a shifting balance of power. In the last month, the step up of the

military involvement of some foreign actors, in the support to Syrian President Assad,

caused an additional transformation of the scenario.

The military strategy of the regime has been primarily driven by

Assad’s main desire to preserve his role in an ideal post-war scenario,

through the devise of a durable political solution. However, this

apparently simple goal has encountered several major difficulties,

mainly due to the situation on the ground. Among these, the

countrywide extension of the civil war forced the regime to prioritize

among military fronts, paving the way to the advancement of

opposition forces in crucial locations, such as the Idlib and the Der’a

provinces. Assad has managed to find common ground with the

international community, spreading fear on the raise of a new

transnational threat posed by the various terrorist opposition groups. In

order to strengthen its image as the only legitimate government in the

country, Assad ensured to maintain control over the Syrian population.

In the last few months, President Assad repeatedly stated that the

most critical battle he is fighting is the one for the Syrian people, and in

fact, experts estimate that the Syrian regime controls between 55% and

72% of the Syrian population, while the Syrian opposition controls less

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44

than a third of the total population. This disparity offers the regime

several advantages over rebel forces, like restraining civilians from

joining the Syrian opposition. Another advantage the regime can benefit

from is the enduring economic activity in the areas under its control,

while it no longer exists in rebel-held areas. Nevertheless, loyalist forces

have suffered from a progressive deterioration of their military capacity,

due to a number of factors. In the first place, the growing need to deploy

forces on several fronts clashed with the progressive reduction of units

at their disposal. This decline was the result not only of the loss of lives,

but also of the spreading phenomenon of desertion, which became a

real dilemma over the last few months. Despite its origin of paramilitary

force, the National Defense Force has taken on a more popular

character through the massive recruitment of young people. However,

this evolution has had no positive effect on the overall operations of

the loyalist front. The regime encountered great difficulties in combat

operations of the jihadi group the Army of Islam in the Eastern Ghouta

area. This led to the loss of major portions of territory, questioning the

tightness of the regime, which seemed incapable to ensure the defense

of Damascus.

Facing such difficulties, Moscow, Teheran and Hezbollah militias

have strengthened their intervention in support of the regime, with the

aim of preventing its collapse.

Russia

In mid-September, Russia started building up its military presence in

Syria, deploying all kind of expeditionary forces, fighter jets and tanks.

December 2015

45

The decision came as the fight against various opposition groups

exhausted Assad’s army. In particular, the safety of the port of Tartus

constituted a threat that made it compulsory for greater interference in

the dynamics on the field. This port is crucial to the presence of the

Russian navy in the area and consequently for Russia’s projection in the

MENA region. As Russia’s only Mediterranean base, the base of Tartus

is a vital strategic asset. The need to protect these interests led to the

decision of building in Latakia, the coastal city near Tartus, a new

operational and logistics hub from which lead direct support to the

loyalist front’s operations. Once completed the expansion of Latakia’s

base, at the end of September, Moscow has started a strong campaign

of air strikes. Since then, Moscow has tried to oversee coalition

operations and act as a force multiplier on the frontlines providing

planning and logistical assistance, intelligence capabilities and air

support.

On the strategic level, Russia and Syria (and Iran to a certain extent)

have repeatedly coordinated on some military efforts since before

summer. Therefore, Moscow is familiar with Syrian forces, which it

trained and equipped for decades.

So far, Russia has focused most of its involvement in Syria on hitting

rebel targets to shore up territory for the regime of Syrian president

Bashar al-Assad.

Some analysts believe the campaign strategy may also stem from

Russia’s New Generation Warfare, a notion that already shaped the

2014 military doctrine in Ukraine operations. The ultimate goal of this

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46

concept is minimizing the role of large-scale military operations of the

industrial war era, by combining soft and hard power across military,

diplomatic and economic domains.

It is quite certain that in the management of the operations, Moscow,

Teheran and Damascus have been able to count on renewed support of

the Hezbollah militias.

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47

The latter, involved from the beginning in the Syrian crisis, have seen

over the years a progressive intensification of their efforts. If in the

initial phase, between 2011 and 2012, their intervention had been

sporadic and with clandestine actions near the border between Syria and

Lebanon, in 2013 the commitment has seen a fast escalation, as the

Assad regime began losing control over Syrian territory, leading

Lebanese militia to fight in theaters of war far from its traditional range.

Hezbollah has since then supported Assad with a robust, well-trained

force whose involvement in the conflict aligns with Iranian strategic

interests as Secretary General Nasrallah already acknowledged on April

30, in Teheran: “Syria has real friends in the region, and the world will

not let Syria fall into the hands of America, Israel or takfiri [radical

Islamic] groups,53“ he said.

The Alawite regime in Syria also serves the strategic interests of

Teheran, whose priority is to ensure the survival of Bashar al-Assad’s

regime. To that end, even as it struggles under the weight of

international sanctions, Teheran extended loans and a generous line of

credit to the Syrian government. From an operational point of view,

they dispatched military and intelligence advisers to help Syria suppress

the unrest. When Iran saw that the Syrian army was near to collapse, it

sought to strengthen irregular forces made up of volunteers. These

53 Black, I. and Roberts, D. (2013, April 30). Hezbollah is helping Assad fight Syria uprising, says Hassan Nasrallah. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/hezbollah-syria-uprising-nasrallah.

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volunteer forces, which number about 200,000 men, may come to play

an important role in the future of Syria.

The support provided by all external allies mentioned so far has

resulted in a renewed operational capacity of the loyalist front. The most

evident sign of this was the beginning of the offensive in Aleppo on the

15th of October, that was crucial both from a strategic and a symbolic

point of view. Aleppo’s southern countryside includes the supply line

between the areas under regime control and the other regions it

dominates. The regime has focused on Aleppo’s southern countryside

because it is an easy front on which to outduel the opposition. It made

remarkable progress that will allow it to ensure its supply line to Aleppo.

Without new weapons to restore the military balance altered by the

regime’s Russian and Iranian allies, the opposition forces retreated.

While Iran backed regime forces on the ground, Russia handled air

support, having launched military operations. The government forces

would not have been able to make progress without Iranian and Russian

efforts. The regime forces gradually advanced with allied support. Since

the launch of the attack, the regime regained 15 towns, among them

Abtin, Blas, Kfar Abid, some 80 square kilometer between 16th and 26th

of October.

As it stands now, the Russian intervention in Aleppo has been

instrumental in reinvigorating government troops and enabling them to

capture strategic territory on long stalemated fronts. Syrians are, of

course as divided as ever on opinion about Russia’s involvement in the

operations on the ground.

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The vacuum created by the civil war in Syria led to the emergence of

a group made up of very well trained fighters: the Islamic Caliphate. For

approximately two years, Daesh has been heavily involved in the

fighting in neighboring Syria. The group mostly maintained operations

in the eastern provinces of Syria in Aleppo, Idlib, and Al Raqqa, before

expanding northward.

Nevertheless, among, various Syrian opposition groups, Daesh

managed to assume a leading role in a relatively short time. This was

partly because of its guerrilla experience, its knowledge of the most

remote parts of the country and an existing network of local jihadists.

One of its unique features is the control over a huge territory, stretching

from the Turkish border in Syria and approaching the Lebanese border.

In order to establish the physical integrity of the proclaimed Islamic

Caliphate, Daesh is seeking control of the urban centers that fall within

the outer bounds of its current military outposts. Therefore, its military

strategy in Syria incorporates two main objectives: destroying modern

states to expand control of territory and translating military victories

into political ones through what proved to be an effective

communication campaign. It must also be noted that they are able to

increase manpower through prison breaks, foreign fighter flows, and

increasingly through local recruitment. Hundreds of foreign fighters,

with deep military knowledge, have joined the cause and continue to do

so every day. The Islamic state has proven to be a deeply motivated

group, which reportedly includes almost 14,000 fighters, a figure that

could be even more troublesome than weapons. Together with their

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access to high levels of funding and their effective media strategy, these

elements make it necessary to adopt an effective strategy for the

containment of this threat.

Nevertheless, in the West coalition, there are still too many

uncertainties. What still needs to be fully agreed is whether the priority

should be to bring down Assad or to preserve his army in order to fight

the Islamic extremists on the ground. Moreover, doubts persist also on

the future stabilization of the country and on the future role that Russia

and Iran will play.

What appears to be clear so far is that the Daesh represents the

common enemy, so there is a common interest in overthrowing it, as it

threatens the West, as well as Russia and Iran.

Obama himself was accused, both on the domestic and on the

international level, to have adopted the wrong strategy in the fight

against Daesh. In fact, he was accused to have underestimated his

enemy and the threat it was posing to international peace.

In October, Washington hoped to have time to train and arm the

Syrian moderate rebels to fight Daesh. However, with the Free Syrian

Army – the military force that led the rebellion against Damascus –

fighting on two fronts (on the one hand Assad’s forces and on the other

the extremist groups of the Islamic state and of the Al-Nusra Front)

American officials admitted the strategy was no longer sustainable. This

about-turn, represented a tacit admission that the initial strategy

adopted to counter Daesh threat, without focusing also on the

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51

deposition of President Assad, was completely wrong, as the US

administration realized that Daesh could not be defeated without a

political transition in the country and the overthrow of President Assad.

Obama’s strategy in Syria mainly consisted in a diversified strategy: a

violent bombing campaign and the arming of anti-Daesh forces in both

Iraq and Syria. Last September, president Obama ordered a sharp

escalation of the US military campaign, authorizing airstrikes in Syria

along with expanded airstrikes in Iraq. Until that moment, US airstrikes

where limited to specific missions in northern Iraq. Obama explained

this decision as follows: “We will hunt down terrorists who threaten our

country, wherever they are. That means I will not hesitate to take action

against Daesh in Syria, as well as Iraq”54. Soon after this escalation, the

Syrian government and its close allies warned Obama that an offensive

within Syria would violate international law, as in the absence of a UN

Security Council decision; it would represent an act of aggression.

The US was not standing alone in its fight against Daesh. Ten Arab

countries have agreed to help the US in the ongoing fight: Bahrain,

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and

the United Arab Emirates.

The strikes led by the Gulf States represent undoubtedly a growing

trend toward greater out-of-area military operations. For the US, this

alignment represents the culmination of a decades-long investment in

54 Obama approves US airstrikes in Syria, vows to target ISIS ‘wherever they exist’. (2014, September 10). Fox News. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/10/obama-authorizing-us-airstrikes-in-syria.html.

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training Gulf air forces. However, the Gulf military contribution should

not be overstated. All of the Gulf States were heavily reliant on US

intelligence, which has been targeting data while the Emiratis carried

out the most sophisticated of the air strikes.

The Russian military intervention in support of the Assad regime

came as an unwelcome surprise to the GCC states. In response to

Russia’s escalating military support, Gulf Arab countries have boosted

their supply of weapons to Syrian rebel groups55.

The Saudi position indicates a clear willingness to intensify the Gulf

engagement in Syria and its support for the opposition, coming in the

context of the development of a more forceful and proactive regional

security posture by Riyadh and a number of its allies, including UAE

and Qatar. Nevertheless, a complete military engagement in Syria in the

coming months is unlikely, especially from the Saudi point of view. The

Gulf Arab countries appear more determined than ever to find a

political solution for Syria and they will undoubtedly join Western and

other countries in pushing for a strong diplomatic response against the

Russian escalation, like making pressure for the creation of no fly zones

and safe havens for refugees.

Russia’s intervention in Syria is the country’s first direct military

engagement in the Middle East. The intervention has primarily

consisted of air strikes in areas where the Assad regime had recently

been losing ground: north of Latakia, the Ghab plain north of Hama

55 Syria crisis: Nato renews pledge amid Russia ‘escalation’. (2015, October 8). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34471849.

December 2015

53

and Aleppo. Meanwhile, Iran, the Assad regime and Hezbollah fighters

have started a ground campaign to retake areas in the north of the

country lost earlier this year. Collectively, the strikes and the ground

campaign represent a concerted effort to secure three key sites. The first

is the Ghab plain, Syria’s most fertile area and the boundary between

minority populations on the coast and the majority Sunni population

inland.

The second is the M-5 roadway, which links Damascus to Homs,

Hama and the north. The third is the city of Aleppo. What remains to

be seen is how Tehran will react, not so just to Russia’s military

campaign (from which it has already benefited) but to Russia’s attempts

to assemble a broad-based multisectarian transition in Syria.

Up to this point, Tehran’s support in Syria has been narrowly focused

on building up the minority-dominated National Defense Forces and

importing Hezbollah fighters as well as Shiite Iraqi and Afghan militias

to fight rebels. Iranians say their approach is based on the main

assumption that the Assad regime is crucial for the region’s stability.

Russian officials instead seem interested in a transition in which the

regime is preserved but Assad at some point quit the scene. Teheran

has derived a number of benefits from its military and financial

assistance to Syria, and of course, from the Russian intervention.

Even if Iran’s cooperation with Russia is limited, interacting with a

military superpower may enable it to learn key lessons and pick up

advanced tactics and procedures. Yet the long-term effects of Russian

assistance remain to be seen.

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Despite of all that pressure, the Free Syrian Army forces managed to

preserve their key regions and maintain their positions. The key player

in this battle was therefore FSA, and this proved its ability to confront

ground forces backed by Russian cover.

With the need to crush Daesh in Syria - given a fresh urgency

following the terror group’s claims of responsibility for killing at least

132 people in Paris, Cameron and Obama are pressing Putin to see how

they can reach a compromise about Syria that would protect Russian

interests in the region. In pursuing such a compromise, Hollande did

not ask the NATO Alliance to come to France’s defense under Article

5, which obligates members to aid one another in case of attack, given

the US’s resistance to putting American ground forces in Syria. Instead,

France invoked the Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, which states that

if a member is subject to armed aggression on its territory, the other

members have an obligation of aid and assistance. Nevertheless, the

treaty does not commit them to military action.

As far from now, as France expanded its anti-Daesh air campaign in

response to Paris attacks, Russia launched air strikes from long-range

strategic bombers for the first time since its intervention in the Syrian

war.

The issue was discussed during the recent G20 Summit with a clear

change of course following the Paris attacks. Washington seems now

ready to open dialogue with Moscow, and the others must do the same

in order to reach agreement. The unity of the purpose must prevail over

December 2015

55

differences because Paris showed that time is up. The current scenario

focuses therefore on two main areas.

First, Europe will have to strengthen information technology and

harmonize national service’s reports, to pave the way for a European

counterintelligence service. Second, France made clear that it is

necessary to step up the military strikes.

France’s military strategy seemed already defined, pointing at the

siege of Sinjar and Raqqa. In order to proceed with joint actions, the US

should convince Saudi Arabia and Iran to find common positions

against the terrorists. In light of this, Obama started official bilateral

meetings with King Salman of Saudi Arabia.

Source: The Washington Post

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The final aim would be to persuade Russia’s President that Russia

and the West’s greater mutual interest is the destruction of the Islamic

state, and that this requires recalibrating bombing campaigns. Most of

the targets struck by the Gulf were static and fixed, like training

compounds, headquarters and storage facilities. Even though Moscow

claimed its bombing campaign as a counterterrorism effort aimed at

Daesh targets, there were widespread reports that Russia has been

targeting also non-Daesh targets56.

The intended plan would be to reach a cease-fire for January the 1st,

and then start a period of transition of approximately 18 months during

which the role of Assad will still be an object of discussion.

For the moment, France decided that operations from the French

aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, in the Gulf would triple the

number of French aircrafts involved. Also the Americans have been

operating more planes from Turkish bases like Incirlik, much closer to

potential targets in Syria. The US has also been stepping up its air strikes

against the oil exporting infrastructure from which Daesh gains a

considerable portion of its funds. In the last week, the US Central

Command said it hit 116 trucks used to transport smuggled Islamic

State oil in Syria, and various targets in and around Raqqa, the militant’s

capital. The Paris attacks inevitably raised the question of whether to

escalate American operations in both Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless,

56 Russia pounding non-ISIL targets in Syria. (2015 October 8). Press TV. Retrieved from http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2015/10/08/432550/Russia-Syria-Daesh-John-Kirby.

December 2015

57

president Obama made clear in the last week that his strategy will not

change, meaning there will not be any deployment of ground forces.

The coming weeks will be more intense than ever for Putin and for

the EU members. The Russian president will be visiting Teheran and

then attending a key summit with French President Francois Hollande.

Putin’s goal is to put into practice what was announced on September

28 at the UN: to create a grand coalition to defeat Daesh. However,

even if the strategic intensions are closer than ever, there are still

differences over tactics, the situation requires cooperation from all

countries on this theme.

As a first step, the British Prime Minister David Cameron has

announced on Monday 23rd of November that London has made

available the British military base of RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus to French

aircraft engaged in operations to strengthen the fight against Daesh. The

British Royal Air force could also join in the bombing campaign, as

Cameron will seek Parliament’s approval to participate in the raids.

It remains to be seen how the national parliaments of the states

involved in the Syrian crisis will vote in the upcoming days. But it seems

they largely agree that the solution will not be a military one only, but

also a political one. The real battleground will be the decision on Assad’s

role in the future, where Russia and the US intensions differ

considerably.

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References

Cordesman, A. H. (2015, June 19). Iraq and Syria: The problem of strategy.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from

http://csis.org/publication/iraq-and-syria-problem-strategy.

Baker, P. (2015, November 24). Meeting with François Hollande, Obama

urges Europe to escalate ISIS Fight. New York Times. Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/middleeast/hollande

-obama-islamic-state-paris-attacks.html?ref=topics.

Gordon, M. R. (2015, September 18). US Begins military talks with

Russia on Syria. New York Times. Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/world/europe/us-to-begin-

military-talks-with-russia-on-syria.html?_r=0

Kagan, K. and Kagan, F. W. (2015, November). What to do and don’t

in response to the Paris attacks. Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved

from http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/what-do-

and-don%E2%80%99t-response-paris-attacks.

Syria bombing: where UK parties stand. (2015, November 23). BBC News.

Retrievevd from http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-34710658.

December 2015

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The paradox of the Syrian conflict and its

politics

Cristina Casabón

The eruption of the anti-Assad revolution in Syria has had many consequences

and armed rebellion has evolved significantly since 2011. The government forces of

Bashar al-Assad’s reacted aggressively to the 2011 revolution and accelerated the

descent into civil war, generating a constellation of proliferating armed groups,

including Syrian armed forces, so-called moderates, Islamists and Kurds.

This analysis seeks to explain how in 2015 Assad still remains well

situated to fight a protracted civil war against Syria’s opposition, instead

of the spread of its main opponent, the self-proclaimed Islamic State,

and thanks to the military and political support of other international

players. With major powers involved, the conflict has developed in an

international conflict.

Meanwhile, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has managed to remain

in power throughout nearly five years of civil war, killing hundreds of

thousands of civilians in the process. But during the last few years, the

appearance of Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and the self-

proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Daesh) has thrown the

country into further disarray.

Now all involved players are determined to defeat the Islamic State

and recognising the necessity of boots on the ground. On the one hand,

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the Syrian Democratic Forces, dominated by the Kurdish People’s

Protection Units, which oppose President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. On

the other hand, the pro-regime forces backed by Russia, Iran and

Hezbollah.

In the spring of 2015, Assad government suffered a string of defeats

from both groups. Jabhat al-Nusra particularly played a major role in

the seizure of Idlib on March 29th, 2015, the biggest anti-Assad victory

since the seizure of Raqqa by the rebels two years earlier.

At the beginning of May, Assad made a rare public acknowledgement

of the setbacks. In June 2015, according to the Institute for the Study

of War (ISW), the continued and increasing support of rebel brigades

with Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh clearly indicated that “outside support”

would be necessary to stop them. Finally, Assad admitted that his forces

suffered a chronic manpower problem, and that the rebels were getting

increased support.

Source: New Eastern Outlook

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61

Increasingly worried about Assad’s precarious position and the rise

of extremist groups, Russian President Vladimir Putin began an air

campaign against his opponents in September 2015. Moscow said it was

targeting “terrorists”, primarily militants from IS, but civilians areas and

Western-backed rebels were repeatedly bombed in the following raids.

Russia is now one of Syrian President most important international

backers.

Opposition groups have been internally divided - with rival alliances

battling for supremacy and control of territory -, and a substantial

portion of the fighting has been among them. The conflict in the

northeastern region has been particularly fuelled by the fight for

lucrative resources between jihadists groups, Arab tribes, Kurdish

militias and local brigades. In addition to this complications, the Free

Syrian Army and other rebel fighters have left the group due to low

payment, poor living conditions and the intensification of the conflict.

Since September 2014, a US-led coalition has launched a series of air

strikes inside Syria against IS. However, so far the international coalition

has avoided attacks against Mr. Assad’s forces, and has also avoided

battles between the government army and the rebels. According to the

experts, the U.S.-led coalition has launched more than 8,000 airstrikes

on Islamic State targets since mid-2014, but with limited efficacy.

The Syrian opposition has attracted varying degrees of support from

Gulf Arab states, Turkey and Western countries, but the US program

to train and arm 5,000 Syrian rebels to take the fight to Daesh on the

ground has suffered seriously setbacks. Only about 100 trained fighters

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were deployed in Syria. The first batch was promptly attacked by hard-

line rebels upon crossing the border, and others disbanded or were

killed in combat. Then in October, it was reported that one of the U.S.-

trained commanders handed over American arms and vehicles to

fighters from Jabhat Al-Nusra. The Pentagon finally cancelled the train-

and-equip program in October.

During the last few months, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,

and Jordan reallocated their troops to fight against Iranian-backed

Houthi rebels in Yemen, which contributed to the “failures” of the US-

led international coalition. While they forces were relocating in Yemen,

Teheran and Moscow have been deploying their armies in Syria,

providing military advisers, weapons, as well as lines of credit, oil

transfer. Basically, Iran has become the ground army fighting to save its

embattled ally Bashar al-Assad, while Russia has become his air force.

In that light, the decision to expand U.S. aid for the Kurds has been

welcomed by critics of the international coalition, who have long

pointed out that Kurdish militias are the only proven, pro-Western

faction. The Kurds have also largely avoided confrontation with the

regime.

But after the November 13th attacks in Paris, the French seemed to

be rooting for a course that would increase pressure to the international

coalition. Three days after the deadly attacks that shocked Paris and the

world, French President Francois Hollande stated that “France is at

war,” and called for the creation of a broad coalition which could unite

forces with Russia.

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Hollande’s calls for a broader coalition are not the interests of all

parties, and main powers still have different interests: the Russian

attacks are aimed mainly against rebel positions and against the groups

supported by the US and its Sunni allies, as well as Syrian citizens, while

on the other side Pentagon officials are reconsidering how to get more

aggressive in targeting Daesh without empowering Assad. They

reiterated their position with respect to enlarging the coalition, which

is: there would be no discussions with Russia until Moscow changes its

strategy and stops targeting our rebel forces, and Assad can not be part

of the solution.

On November, French President Francois Hollande arrived in

Washington to meet with President Barack Obama, and Obama

maintained that if Russia decides to cooperate with the international

coalition in the battlefield and confine its attacks to Daesh - this is the

main obstacle to a US-Russia military coalition - they could reach some

kind of agreement. The problem is that Russia has has different

objectives: supporting Assad.

David Cameron told Parliament that there are ‘about 70,000 Syrian

opposition fighters on the ground who do not belong to extremist

groups’ who could help fight Islamic State. Many Syrian analysts have

expressed surprise, since most assume the ‘moderate’ military

opposition to Assad is much smaller and largely ineffectual. among the

70,000 are presumably the Kurdish fighters, so Cameron seems more

inclined to alienate with them, although they are also fighting Turkey,

one of West allies in the battle against Daesh.

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But the most crucial point about Cameron’s 36-page memorandum

is made right at the end of the dossier, when it is said that “only

moderate Sunni Arabs can retake traditionally Sunni Arab areas such as

Raqqa” and “without transition [to a post-Assad government] it will

continue to be difficult to generate a Sunni force able to fight Daesh

and hold ground in Eastern Syria […]” (Wallis, 2015).

Cameron seems to understand the costs of a hypothetical alliance

with Russia, they seem very expensive and it is not clear if it will provide

results. Therefore, he insists that, unlike in 2013, British military

involvement in Syria now would be solely aimed at Daesh and not at

the Assad regime. However, France is inviting other European

countries to join a Russian-friendly coalition. Sweden, Hungary,

Albania, Kuwait, Turkey and Denmark have already announced a major

involvement.

In the meantime, Turkey’s

decision to fire on a Russian Su-

24 that violated its airspace near

the Syrian border on November

24 further complicated the

situation. According to the

Institute for the Study of War,

“the incident highlights the

grand strategic implications of

American policy in Syria. The

West, led by France, has been Source: WikiCommons

December 2015

65

drifting in the direction of cooperating if not allying with Putin (…)

while Putin aims to disrupt NATO fundamentally as part of a larger

effort to recoup Russia’s losses following the collapse of the Soviet

Union.” (Rozen, 2015).

Since the earliest months of the Syrian war, Turkey has had direct

involvement against al-Assad. Speaking at the opening ceremony of the

7th Energy and Economic Summit in Istanbul, Turkish President Recep

Tayyip Erdoğan said that “the main culprit for today’s humanitarian

tragedies and acts of terrorism is the Assad regime. Erdoğan aims at

accelerating the fall of the Assad regime - in concert with Saudi Arabia

and Qatar, among others, and it has allowed the Syrian opposition to

set up headquarters in Istanbul, and it is arming and training the Sunni

rebels.

In the middle of all these tensions, the conflict will not wind down

unless there is a credible process for a political transition. While the

focus on terrorism is of paramount importance, it is the political

solution that is crucial to put an end to this conflict.

The main powers have been meeting in Vienna in October and

November and issued a communique calling for Syrian regime and

opposition parties to meet under UN auspices by January 1. They also

pushed for a new Syrian Constitution to be written in six months and

for new Syrian presidential elections to be held within 18 months. The

main obstacle is the fate of Assad.

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Russia and Iran believe that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad should

remain in power, while the West, the Gulf States and their allies believe

his abdication to be the only way to truly end this conflict. If Assad

remains in power, the rebels cannot expect the peace. The President has

assumed a tough stance and that’s what’s kept him in power so far, and

therefore he can’t be expected to “bury the hatchet” once the conflict

is over. “Those in the opposition faction who continues to advocate a

revolution against the Ba’th and its institutions will be sent to prison or

killed, as it used to be before the conflict.

Since 2011, Assad has had the option of making a peaceful transition

and renewing his government, a turning point in his relations with the

West and its neighbors. But he hasn’t, and in its stead he has promoted

war and violence as the only means to achieve total victory. A

perpetuation of the Alawite government or of his dictatorship on these

terms is therefore unacceptable. Equally important are the intelligence

forces, also largely run by Alawites, as well as other Institutions. As I

Source: Trend News Agency

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67

denounced recently in an article for Open Democracy, Baathist/Syrian

state institutions can not remain intact.

The government’s infamous cruelty, both during the conflict and

before, has deprived it of any legitimacy to sit the negotiations table

with the rebels. Arrived at this point, the hope for a peaceful resolution

rests on one keystone: Assad must leave.

References

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: Facing down rebellion. (2015, October

21). BBC News. Retrieve from

http://www.bbc.com/news/10338256.

Casabón, C. (2015, July 30). Syria, still no solutions to the apocalyptic

disaster. Mediterranean Affairs. Retrieved from

http://www.mediterraneanaffairs.com/en/component/k2/syria-

still-no-solutions-for-the-apocalyptic-disaster.html.

Rawnsely, A. (2015, November 13). Inside Iran’s Secret War in Syria.

The Daily Beast. Retrieved from

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/13/inside-iran-s-

secret-war-in-syria.html.

Wallis, T. (2015, November 26). Another ‘Dodgy Dossier’ for war. Open

Democracy. Retrieved from https://opendemocracy.net/can-europe-

make-it/timmon-wallis/another-dodgy-dossier-for-war.

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Hudson, J. (2015, November 23). Paris Attacks Boost Washington’s War

Against Islamic State. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/23/paris-attacks-boost-

washingtons-war-against-the-islamic-state/.

Rozen, L. (2015, November 24). Will downing of Russia warplane thwart

France’s efforts for broader anti-IS coalition?. Al-Monitor. Retrieved from

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/russia-

plane-downing-france-syria-turkey-isis-

hollande.html#ixzz3sXIzz3uU.

Russo-Turkish Tensions Since the Start of the Russian Air Campaign. (2015,

November 24). Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved from

http://iswresearch.blogspot.com.es/2015/11/russo-turkish-

tensions-since-start-of.html.

Casabón, C. (2015, November 16). Baathist/Syrian state institutions must

be reformed. Open Democracy. Retrieved from

https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/cristina-casab-

n/what-about-reforming-baathist-state-institutions.

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Refugee crisis: Beyond the borders

Beatriz Yubero Parro

Globalization is one of the factors that inexorably explains the development of

those activities that far from contribute to social improvements multiplying the risks

and threats of an internationalized society.

We have been witnessing the greatest humanitarian crisis of our

modern era for several months. As Amnesty International has certified

“In 2013, for the first time since World War II, the number of those

forcibly displaced from their homes exceeded 50 million” (Amnesty

International, 2015).

Millions of people have migrated worldwide as a consequence of the

various armed conflicts and consequent economic crises. Syrian

migrants stand out among them. Almost half of the Syrian population

has been displaced from its place of origin under the eyes of the

International Community. Nearly 95% of the whole population

displaced out of the borders resides in neighboring countries like

Turkey or Lebanon, which are not equipped with the necessary

infrastructures to answer to all the demands of such a human avalanche.

Women and children are the weakest sector in this group, being in

serious danger and exposed to the manipulation of different groups that

belong to the organized crime and terrorism. Not only in Europe but

also in Southeast Asia, international crime organizations dedicated to

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the human trafficking have intensified its activities in the last months.

Denunciations, such as the one made by International Amnesty,

indicates that the global refugee crisis cannot be re-cast as a trafficking

and smuggling issue by governments desperate to deflect attention from

their failures.

This analysis will review the situation in which the refugee crisis

currently is and its evolution of the last few months. Moreover, the

incidence of this type of migratory movements in the field of

international politics will be analyzed by paying special attention to the

risks and needs of the victims affected by the various armed conflicts in

their countries of origin. Similarly, there will be a special reference to

the handling of different terrorist organizations, such as the self-styled

Islamic State, (DAESH by their acronym in Arabic) with respect to the

refugees and the threat of infiltration of jihadist movements in this type

of migration flows.

The evolution of the events

Being a refugee is not easy. International law presents many

ambiguities around the concept of “refugee”. The United Nations

Refugee Agency (UNHCR) furnished the International Community

with the most accurate definition by far of “refugee”, which is listed in

the 2010 Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees:

[…] As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing

to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,

nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,

is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such

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fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or

who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his

former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing

to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In the case of a person who has

more than one nationality, the term “the country of his nationality” shall

mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall

not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his

nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he

has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of

which he is a national[…]

The current wave of refugees is the largest one after that of World

War II. As mentioned in the graph above, the Global Peace Index

establishes a correlation of causality between those areas that are in

conflict and massive population movements: “The United Nations

estimates that more than 50 million people are now either refugees or

Source: Global Peace Index

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internally displaced because of conflict and violence—one out of every

133 people on Earth. When that number exceeded the 50 million mark

in 2014, it was the first time that many people had been displaced since

World War II.” (Global Peace Index, 2015)

From Syria to nowhere

Three years after the beginning of the Syrian conflict57, more than

four million people have become refugees outside the borders of the

country, abandoning their homes and looking for a safe place in

neighboring states such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Turkey58

that is currently hosting more than 2 million Syrian refugees within their

borders. Additionally, more than 7.5 million people from the Syria

Ministry of Interior have been considered as displaced inside the

country by the UNHCR in its Global Report 201459.

[…] The worsening humanitarian situation in and around Syria was

compounded by an escalation of violence in Iraq during 2014. In view

of the impact of current developments on the region’s stability, and the

struggle to find a political resolution in Syria, UNHCR continued to

57 According to data from UNHCR: There are 4,180,631 Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. (UNHCR: 2015)’s Available: http://www.acnur.org/t3/que-hace/respuesta-a-emergencias/emergencia-en-siria/ 58 “Beginning of displacement from Kobani and the surrounding area into Turkey, reaching 192,000 and 23,000 travelling further to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq” (UNHCR:2014). 59 These figures could be even higher, since not all Syrians who have fled their country to register with UNHCR at the time was his arrival.

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work with partners to contain the deterioration of the regional

humanitarian and protection situation […]

However, the capacity of the States neighboring Syria has been

limited, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to be fled through the

Mediterranean toward Europe.

Syria Situation 2014

This migratory pressure exploded a few months ago when citizens

started thinking about how to come up to the Old Continent60 with the

hope to achieve a better future, fleeing of the war and the death.

Nevertheless, the obstacles that develop on the way are more complex

than the trip itself: “The European response to the international

obligation of protection and asylum is rerouted to the national sphere

and limited to a single default country” (Terrón Anne, 2015).

In 2012, after the outbreak of the war, the land border between

Greece and Turkey, one of the main routes of refugees into the

European Union, was closed in an operation carried out by the Greek

authorities called Aspida (Shield)61. The objective of this measure was

to block the border to contain the flow of people illegally crossing into

Europe. This action resulted in the creation of alternative and illegal

60 Under the new Commission plan, states are expected to divide more than 120,000 refugees who are already in the EU. 61 More than 1,800 police officers were deployed in the operation, and rose a 10.5-kilometre fence on the northern part of this land border.

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routes (such as in the Greek islands and Aegean sea) along which

organized crime began to smuggle, massively, citizens from Syria.

Currently, thanks to the information at the disposal of the European

Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external

borders of the States members of the European Union (FRONTEX)62,

the international community has been able to locate the main routes of

trafficking of refugees on the borders of Turkey and Bulgaria63 where

controls and procedures of return by the State authorities are more lax,

62 Frontex promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter applying the concept of Integrated Border Management. Retrieved from http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/. 63 “The number of refugees and migrants detained on the border of Bulgaria with Turkey underwent an accused increase in July 2013” (Amnesty International, 2014)

Source: UNHCR: 2014

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even tough both countries have reinforced security measures in their

territories. Despite this and according to Amnesty International, “60

percent of the people who entered irregularly in Bulgaria in 2013 were

Syrians fleeing the conflict and widespread human rights abuses”

(Amnesty International, 2014).

Road to Europe: refugees and the business opportunity

The current humanitarian crisis affecting the continent is the best

opportunity for criminal and terrorist organizations who want to

infiltrate Western society, thus fulfilling two of the priorities of this type

of formations: recruitment activities and the carrying out actions of

terror.

According to FRONTEX, about 3,800 Syrian passports were used

by the Islamic State organization in order to enter Europe. Once inside

the Schengen area, these citizens can move freely, which multiplies the

risk for neighboring countries as to attack infiltrated cells.

According to Spanish police sources, 1.452 original white passports

that were stolen in Syria might be in the hands of the Islamic State.

Police suspect that these documents might have been sold to Jabhat at

the Nusra group, subsidiary of Al Qaida in Syria, so that members of

the jihadist organization could infiltrate without problem in other

countries.

The European Union in particular is experiencing the greatest human

exodus of modern times at the doors of its borders. The new

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international scenario requires new solutions and the possibility of

having to accept the refugees among the infiltration of jihadists is

something completely new for the governments of the European

countries.

Following the atrocious attacks in Paris, the international community

was also threatened by a new wave of terror from Syria. The focus of

this new escalation of violence that keeps Europe on alert has been

located in the avalanches of refugees in the point of looking to the

regarded as suspect because between the rows of victims could be

infiltrated terrorists with the purpose of attacking the heart of the West.

This prompted the European Union in re-establishing secure and

managed routes that cover the paths of entry to Europe as well as from

various international organizations are fair and rigorous selection that

meet the needs of the victims, fleeing a situation of violence and conflict

and seeking the protection of Europe and the Member States.

According to the report, “Miedo y vallas: Los planteamientos de

Europa para contener a las personas refugiadas”: “Closing the land

borders with fences and trying to that neighbors such as Turkey and

Morocco, to act as filter has refused the refugees access to asylum

procedures, has been exposed to refugees and migrants to abuse and

has pushed people to undertake travel by sea that can cost them their

lives” (Amnesty International: 2015).

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This barbed wire that extends for thousands of kilometers 64on the

border with Europe only strengthens refugee rights violation.

According to the Nations United, date of November of 2015

environment 792.883 refugees arrived by sea to European shores facing

the 280.00 people who would have crossed the land border according

to FRONTEX sources during all the year 2014. Attached to the

establishment of these physical barriers other qualified processes as

undemocratic as the so-called “hot returns” have also been intensified,

thus constituting a violation of international law and the cooperation

from the European Union from third countries which act as a filter to

Europe.

However, such is the concern that refugees crossing the border

without having been subjected to a preliminary analysis may have a link

to a jihadist movement that, various governments, such as the Spanish

one, have requested to the competent authorities that the transfer of the

refugees would be carried out “with a common procedure” for all the

countries of the European Union.

The international situation did change, new actors have emerged and

therefore has political geography. Variables such as demography have

been altered as a result of recent international conflicts. It is therefore

necessary to ensure that both the documents that set out the lines of

64 In whole, the Member States of the EU have constructed more than 235 km of fences on the exterior included borders of the EU, which cost more than 175 million euros. 175 km of fences between Hungary and Serbia; 30 km fence on the Bulgarian-Turkey border, which will be extend of 130 km; 18,7 km of fences between Spain and Morocco (enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla), and a 10,5 km of fences in the Evros region, along the border between Greece and Turkey. (Amnesty Internaional, 2015)

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strategic actions and the forms to carry out these, adapt to the new

global reality, facing potential threats arising from it.

Conclusion

During the last year, organizations such as UNHCR, have realized

numerous humanitarian campaigns to cover the needs of those persons,

who by flee horrors have turned into refugees. “In total, some 45,400

Syrian refugees received legal counselling and legal support related to

documentation, SGBV, birth registration, and civil status-related issues,

with a further 13,000 Syrian IDPs receiving equivalent support”

(UNHCR, 2015).

However, the threat of infiltrations of criminal organizations is still

latent. Therefore, the organizations involved in the control of migratory

flows and the receiving Countries must strengthen border controls to

guarantee the safety of States and migrants, which are often

manipulated by criminal organizations based in their origin Country. “In

2014, almost 745,000 people were registered in the Middle East and

North Africa. By early 2015, 69 per cent of refugees and asylum seekers

in the region had been registered using biometric technology – a faster,

more secure, and durable method to protect people and target

assistance. Iris-scan biometric technology was in place in Egypt, Iraq,

Jordan and Lebanon, while other countries, such as Algeria, Mauritania

and Morocco, used fingerprinting biometrics” (UNHCR, 2015).

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In addition, acting as supranational organization, the European

Union must guarantee the protection of migrants and the safety of

member states, exposed to a terrorist threat of global character. The

most important measures that the European Union should implement

are:

- To manage safe routes for making easier the resettlement

and the family unit.

- The admission of visas for humanitarian reasons in a

controlled manner.

- The creation of centres where the processes of security, such

as the verification of biometric data checks, are

implemented.

- The establishment of a common protocol for the European

Union when it comes to detecting jihadists infiltrators

between the ranks of refugees.

- Finish with the “hot returns” because this process

collaborates to increase the hatred and violence at the gates

of Europe.

- Accelerate and expand the relocation programs.

The international community is dealing with an ethical dilemma that

will inevitably cause a political debate, which its necessary in this new

global scenario and at the same time a challenge to ensure the

compliance with the international law and human rights.

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This debate is not only circumscribed to the political arena, but it

must be also included in social field that has great responsibility toward

refugees. The societies that are receiving refugees are forcing to accept

and integrate the victims of armed conflicts; in this case, mass media

must have an essential role. In this sense, its necessary to implement a

narrative discussion to decriminalize the refugee’s sector. Refugees are

disadvantaged by the common and international policies, invasive and

destructive. Only by the intellectual discussion, the International

Community will achieve a relocation of theses migratory streams and to

fight against the terrorist and criminal organizations, that are gaining

economical benefits from this human crisis.

References

Amnesty International. (2015). The Global Refugee Crisis. A conspiracy of

neglect. London. Retrieved from

http://www.amnesty.org.au/resources/activist/POL4017962015E

NGLISH.PDF.

Amnesty International. (2015, November). Peligro y muerte para las

personas refugiadas por el uso de vallas y filtros de entrada por parte de la UE.

Retrieved form

https://www.es.amnesty.org/noticias/noticias/articulo/peligro-y-

muerte-para-las-personasrefugiadas-por-el-uso-de-vallas-y-filtros-

de-entrada-por-parte-de/.

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Amnesty International (2014). El coste humano de la fortaleza Europa.

London. Retrieved from

file:///C:/Users/BEA/Downloads/eur050012014es.pdf.

Global Peace Index. (2015, June). A Global Geography of Peace (and

Violence). Retrieved from

http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/06/a-global-geography-of-

peace-and-violence/396752/.

Hanf, T. (2015). Coexistence in wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State ad Rise

of a Nation. I.B. Tauris. Lebanon.

Smetana, J. G. (2015, November/December). Iraqi, Syrian, and

Palestinian Refugee Adolescents’ Beliefs About Parental Authority Legitimacy

and Its Correlates. Child Development, 86 (6), 2017–2033.

Terrón, A. (2015, September). How Europe can deal with the asylum crisis.

ECFR. Retrieved from

http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_europe_can_deal_w

ith_the_aslum_cisis_4011.

UNCHR. (2010). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees.

Switzerland. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf

UNHCR. (2015, October). Emergencia en Siria. Retrieved form

http://www.acnur.org/t3/quehace/respuesta-a-

emergencias/emergencia-en-siria/.

UNHCR Global Report 2014. (2014) Middle North. Retrieved from

http://www.unhcr.org/5575a7910.html.

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About the Authors

Michela Mercuri is Professor of Contemporary History of

Mediterranean Countries and of International Structures for

Cooperation at University of Macerata. Doctorate in International

Relations at the Catholic University, Milan. Researcher in “International

Relations” at IReR - Regional Research Institute of Lombardy. Main

focuses: Mediterranean and Middle East.

Francesco Angelone, Editorial Board of Mediterranean Affairs,

graduated in International Relations at LUISS Guido Carli with a thesis

focused on Baltic States and energy market. Then he took a Master in

“Parliament and Public Policies” at LUISS Guido Carli. He has been

collaborating with Termometro Politico as part of editorial team and he

is now working for “Cassa Depositi e Prestiti” in Brussels.

Federica Fanuli, Editorial Board Manager of Mediterranean Affairs,

graduated with honors in Political Science and International Relations

from the University of Salento and she has obtained a Master’s Degree

in Political Science, European Studies and International Relations at the

same University. Columnist of the Sunday Sentinel of New Delhi, she

is Editor-at-large of IndraStra Global and Editorial Board Member of

Cosmopolismedia.it.

Pilar Buzzetti, Editorial Board of Mediterranean Affairs, graduated

in International relations and, soon after, started researching on the

Middle East security situation. Now she is a Junior Consultant in WFP.

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Cristina Casabón is a researcher in Middle East and North African

affairs. She is CEO and co-founder of baabalshams.com. She also

works as an Editor at Open Democracy and Mediterranean Affairs. She

holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the

Complutense University of Madrid.

Beatriz Yubero Parro is journalist. Master in International Politics.

Actually She is researcher and PhD candidate associated with the

University of Ankara (Turkey) and Complutense University of Madrid.

Co-Founder of Baab al Shams. She is working as analyst for different

international mass media and think tanks.

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Ed. Mediterranean Affairs©

www.mediterraneanaffairs.com

Cover image source: CIMSS

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