Dorotheo vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999FACTS:Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government.1Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended period granted.2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCTs, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.

ISSUE:May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect?HELD:Remedial Law; Wills; Judgment; Appeals; A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be; A final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.Same; Same; Same; Same; If no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time.It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.Same; Same; Same; Same; Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation.As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litiumthe very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.Same; Same; Probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects: whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament; compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills; the testamentary capacity of the testator; and the due execution of the last will and testament.Same; Same; What includes due execution of a will.Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.Same; Same; Intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated; Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order.

Francisco vs. Francisco-AlfonsoG.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001.*FACTS:Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990,3 Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.4On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.5 She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion reads:ISSUE:May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?HELD:Succession; Legitime; A compulsory heir of the decedent can not be deprived of his or her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.Ramirez vs. Vda. de RamirezNo. L-27952. February 15, 1982.FACTS:The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate.Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widows usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wandas usufruct are invalid because the first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle, and the appellants, violates the testators express will to give this property to them. Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.ISSUE:is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.

HELD:Testate Succession, The testator cannot impose any lien, substitution, or condition on his widows legitime.The appellants do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They adroit that the testators dispositions impaired his widows legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil CodeIf the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate. And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)Same; The proposed creation by the administratrix in favor of the testators widow of a usufruct over 113 of the free portion of the testators estate cannot be made where it will run counter to testators express will.It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate en pleno dominio as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testators intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.Same; A vulgar substitution of heirs is valid even if the heir designated survives the testator inasmuch us vulgar substitution can take place also by refusal or incapacity to inherit of the first heir.They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect is void because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.Same; A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is not related in the 1st degree to the second heir.As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons: The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance. A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.

Guy vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006FACTS:On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez.In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that the certification against forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renun-ciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioners objections on the certification against forum shopping.Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed.ISSUE:1) whether private respondents petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.

HELD;Same; Succession; Waivers; A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.As regards Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Parents and guardians may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latters claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides: ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied) Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.Same; Same; Same; Illegitimate Children; Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can restignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact; One who is yet to prove his status as acknowledged illegitimate child of the deceased cannot possibly waive his successional right.It must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his coheirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioners invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age.We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo, 374 SCRA 180 (2002), that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.Same; Same; Settlement of Estates; Probate Courts; Pleadings and Practice; The court before which a petition for letters of administration is not precluded from receiving evidence on a persons filiationits jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir; Two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint.While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir. That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

Cruz vs. CristobalG.R. No. 140422. August 7, 2006FACTS:Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint2 for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the cancellation of TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No. 165135 issued in the individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the subject property in accordance with the law of succession and the payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa,3 Anselmo,4 and the late Socorro5 were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification6 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.The testimonies of the parties as summarized by the trial court are as follows:Witness [petitioner Elisa] further testified that her mother died when she was only one year and seven months old. She lived with the sister of her father because the latter married his second wife, Donata Enriquez. Her brother Anselmo and sister Socorro lived with their father and the latters family in the subject property at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.She claimed that when their father died on February 12, 1930, his brother Anselmo stayed with her and her auntie while Socorro stayed with their eldest sister, Mercedes, who was then married.Meanwhile, when her stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children from the second marriage lived with them and her aunt Martina Cristobal.Witness testified that she is now residing at No. 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, the property subject of the present litigation. She has been living in the said property since 1948. She claimed that there are other houses in the area particularly those which belong to her half brothers and sisters which were now converted into factories.She claimed that out of the five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters she occupies only thirty-six (36) square meters of the subject lot.She testified that the [private respondents] divided the property among themselves without giving the [petitioners] their share. She said that she was offered by [private respondent] Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the land in question or money because one of the children of defendant Jose Cristobal wanted to construct an apartment on the lot. She said that she will have to ask the opinion of her other brothers and sisters.Thereafter witness testified that she made an inquiry regarding the land and she found out that the property belonging to their father Buenaventura Cristobal had been transferred to the defen-dants as evidenced by transfer certificates of title issued under the names of Florencio Cristobal (Exhibit E), Norberto Cristobal (Exhibit F), Eufrosina Cristobal (Exhibit G) and Jose Cristobal (Exhibit H).She declared that she felt bad when she learned that the title to the property belonging to her father had been transferred to her half brothers and sisters with the exclusion of herself and the other children from the first marriage.She filed a petition in the barangay to settle the issue among themselves, however, no settlement was reached therein. This prompted the [petitioners] to file the present case.On cross-examination, [petitioner] Elisa Cristobal Sikat admitted that she was aware that the subject property was owned by her father Buenaventura Cristobal even before the latter died. She like wise stated that the [private respondents] are the ones paying the real estate tax due on the lot.Ester Santos testified for the [petitioners]. In her Sinumpaang Salaysay she claimed that she was a neighbor of Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro, Elisa, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal in San Juan, Metro Manila. She said that she knows that Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro and Elisa are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latters first marriage and the Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina, and Jose are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latters second marriage.The said witness testified that Buenaventura Cristobal and his first family lived right across where she stayed.Witness corroborated the testimony of Elisa Cristobal Sikat regarding that the fact that Martina Cristobal is the sister of Buenaventura Cristobal. The said sister of Buenaventura Cristobal allegedly took care of Elisa. Anselmo and Socorro were taken care of by Buenaventura Cristobal and the latters second wife, Donata Enriquez, at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.When Buenaventura Cristobal died Anselmo was taken care of by Martina Cristobal together with Elisa. Socorro on the other hand lived with Mercedes who was then married.Witness testified that she and Elisa were classmates from Grade I until they finished high school at the Philippine School of Commerce in Manila.When the second wife of Buenaventura Cristobal died, Martina Cristobal took care of Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal.Witness said that the brothers and sisters from the first and second marriages lived together with their aunt Martina Cristobal for a long time.When Elisa got married, she and her husband built their house on the lot located at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Until at present, Elisa and her family lives in the said vicinity. Witness Ester Santos declared that the children from the second marriage namely Norberto, Eufrosina, Florencio and Jose built their houses and factory at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.She said that the children from the first and second marriages of Buenaventura Cristobal had a harmonious relationship until sometime in 1994 when [petitioners] and Elisa Cristobals grandchildren were called squatters by the [private respondents] and their grandchildren for residing in the subject parcel of land.On cross-examination, witness Ester Santos said she cannot recall the name of the first wife of Buenaventura Cristobal and that she only knew them to be married although she is not aware of the date when they were married.[Petitioners] presented Jose Cristobal to bolster the claim that they are brothers and sisters of the [private respondents].He claimed that the only time when he became aware that [petitioners] are his brothers and sisters was when he lived with their aunt Martina.He said that the reason why they were giving a portion of the lot in question to Elisa Cristobal Sikat was because the [private respondents] want her to have a piece of property of her own and is not an admission that she is their sister.[Private respondents] on the other hand presented Eufrosina Cristobal as their first witness. She testified that her parents, Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez were married on March 24, 1919 at San Felipe Neri, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Out of the said union, Norberto, Florentino, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal were born.The witness professed that on June 18, 1926, her parents were able to buy a certain property containing five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters.Said witness claimed that her brother Norberto died on September 20, 1980 leaving his wife Marcelina and children Buenaflor and Norberto, Jr.The witness presented marked as Exhibit 33 for Norberto, Exhibit 34 for Florencio, Exhibit 35 for Eufrosina and Exhibit 36 for Jose the birth certificates of her brothers and sisters.On February 24, 1948, Eufrosina admitted having executed an Extrajudicial Partition (Exhibit D-4) with her brothers and sisters of the property left by their parents.She declared that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes, and Anselmo never asserted their alleged right over the property subject of the present litigation.She claimed that the [private respondents] have been paying all the taxes due on the parcel of land and that title to the property has been subdivided under their respective names.On cross-examination, she said that when their parents passed away they were taken care of by their aunt Martina who was the sister of her father. She testified that she addressed Elisa Cristobal as Kaka and that since the time they were kids, she had known that the [petitioners] are their brothers and sisters.7After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment8 on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches.Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision9 dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject property because of laches.ISSUE:(1) whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal; (2) whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private respondents; (3) whether or not petitioners right to question the Deed of Partition had prescribed;HELD:Parent and Child; Filiation; Words and Phrases; Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws, may consist of the childs baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the childs name has been entered, common reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal. Article 172 of the Family Code provides: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws, may consist of the childs baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the childs name has been entered, common reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.Same; Same; Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.The baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.Succession; Extrajudicial Partition of Estate; Without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons.As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private respondents among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Italics supplied) Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons. In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobals estate. The partition of the subject property by the private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded therefrom.Extrajudicial Partition of Estate; Prescription; The action for partition is imprescriptible.As the extrajudicial settlement executed by the private respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased father, it was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold that petitioners right to challenge the said settlement had prescribed. Respondents defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. In Budlong v. Bondoc, 79 SCRA 24 (1977), this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.Filiation; Where both parents deaths occurred before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the children of the first marriage and the children of the second marriage shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil Code.It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal property of Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the property was purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage. Upon the deaths of Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in 1936, both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and the four children of the second marriage shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil Code. Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject property shall be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles 921 and 931 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession, each receiving 66.875 square meters thereof.Rivera vs. Heirs of Romualdo VillanuevaG.R. No. 141501. July 21, 2006.*

FACTS:Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the half-sister-in-law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).4 They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.5 The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late Villanueva.From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi who died on April 20, 1963.6 In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties including the properties contested in this case. The disputed properties are:(a) Lot No. 266-B-1, with an area of 1,787 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-21446 [in the names of Villanueva and Gonzales], together with the residential house erected thereon and other improvements;(b) Lot No. 266-B-3 [included in the coverage of transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-21446], with an area of 5,353 square meters, more or less, situated at Poblacion, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;(c) [Lot 801-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-12201 [in the names of Villanueva and Gonzales], with [an] area of 15.400 hectares, more or less, situated at Llanera, Nueva Ecija;(d) [Lot 3-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-51899 [in the names of Villanueva and Gonzales], with an area of 4.0019 hectares, more or less, situated at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;(e) [Lot No. 838 covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-17193 [in the names of Villanueva, Gonzales and one Soledad Alarcon vda. de Rivera], with an area of 3.8718 hectares, more or less, situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;(f) [Lot 884-B covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-26670 [in the name of Gonzales], with an area of 3.5972 hectares, more or less, situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;(g) Subdivision lots situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 106813 to 106931, inclusive, although the land covered by TCT No. NT-106827 was already sold to one Pastor Barlaan;(h) Shares of stocks, tractor, jewelries and other chattels, with an approximate value of at least P100,000; and(i) Savings deposit with the [Philippine] National Bank, in the amount of P118,722.61.7Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will.On August 8, 1980, Villanueva and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale,8 that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales estate comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.Petitioners (Gonzales half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales estate and annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 37. It was docketed as Civil Case No. SD-857 (SD-857). In dismissing the complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners.9Not satisfied with the trial courts decision, petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed it. Hence, this petition.Petitioners contend that the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina was Gonzales illegitimate daughter despite the RTCs ruling in another case, Special Proceedings No. SD-144 (SD-144), entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Pacita C. Gonzales, Epifanio C. Rivera, petitioner, v. Romualdo Villanueva, oppositor, in which the trial court appointed Epifanio Rivera as administrator of Gonzales estate.ISSUE:HELD:Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Evidence; A record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein; It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.Property; Co-ownership; No co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship; In such a relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting married. According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306 (1979), no co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship. In Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340 (1997), we expounded on this doctrine by declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.Benitez-Badua vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 105625. January 24, 1994FACTS:The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.The fight for administration of Vicentes estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicentes sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz:x x x4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez Badua who was raised and cared for by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; x x xOn November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioners heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age,2 categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for letters of administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals.ISSUE:HELD:Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code do contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.Same; Same; Same; Appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.Same; Same; Same; The totality of contrary evidence presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioners Certificate of Live Birth.We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record. The weight of these findings was not negated by the documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3) purportedly showing that her parents were the late Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, the books making up the Civil Registry and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As related above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioners Certificate of Live Birth. Of said rebutting evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. E) executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In this notarized document, they stated that (they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants. In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioners father. The repudiation was made twenty eight years after he signed petitioners Certificate of Live Birth.