INTRODUCTION

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international organization dealing with the

global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as

smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.

WTO previously known as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) established in 1947

as a forum to reduce trade barriers. WTO replaced GATT in 1995 as legal and institutional

foundation of multilateral trade relations. It is designed to strengthen the trade rules by providing

a stronger set of institutions for resolving disputes and enforcing agreements. The dispute

resolution process aimed at enforcing participants’ adherence to WTO agreements.

FUNCTIONS OF WTO

The WTO is a new international organization set up as a permanent body. It is designed to play

the role of a protection in the spheres of trade in goods, trade in services, foreign investment,

intellectual property rights, and others. Article III has set out the following five functions of WTO:

The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation and further the objec-

tives of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and shall also provide the

frame work for the implementation, administration and operation of the plurilateral Trade

Agreements.

The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its members concerning their

multilateral trade relations.

The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the

Settlement of Disputes.

The WTO shall administer Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Trade Policy Review Mechanism is

to strengthen observance of WTO commitments and promote trade liberalization by providing all

member countries with current and objective information about the trade policies and practices

of each member individually and by establishing a forum within which members can question

one another’s policies and practices in a non- confrontational manner.

WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the international Monetary Fund (IMF) and with the

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its affiliated agencies.

OBJECTIVES OF WTO

The objectives of WTO are to implement the new world trade system as visualized in the

Agreement, to promote World Trade in a manner that benefits every country, and to ensure that

developing countries secure a better balance in the sharing of the advantages resulting from the

expansion of international trade corresponding to their developmental needs. Besides that, it is

also help to enhance competitiveness among all trading partners so as to benefit consumers

and help in global integration and this will increase the level of production and productivity with a

view to ensuring level of employment in the world.

BASIS PRINCIPLE OF WTO

NON-DISCRIMINATION

Non discrimination has two major components which are the most-favored-nation (MFN) rule

and the national treatment principle. The MFN rule requires that a product made in one member

country be treated no less favorably than good that originates in any other country. MFN helps

enforce multilateral rules by raising the costs to a country of defecting from the trade regime to

which it committed itself in an earlier multilateral trade negotiation. If a country desires to raise

trade barriers, it must apply the changed regime to all WTO members. This increase the political

cost of backsliding on trade policy because importers will objects (Bernard, 2004). Lastly, MFN

reduces negotiating costs which once a negotiation has been concluded with a country. National

treatment requires that foreign goods once they have satisfied whatever border measures are

applied, be treated no less favorably, in terms of internal (indirect) taxation than like or directly

competitive domestically produced goods (Art III, GATT ). While, the goods of foreign origin

circulating in the country must be subject to taxes, charges, and regulations that are ‘no less

favorable’ than those that apply to similar goods of domestic origin (Bernard, 2004). National

treatment ensures that liberalization commitment are not offset through the imposition of

domestic taxes and similar measures. The requirement that foreign products be treated no less

favorably than competing domestically produced products gives foreign suppliers greater

certainly regarding the regulatory environment in which they must operate. It is also irrelevant

whether a policy hurts an exporter.

RECIPROCITY

As stated in the Oxford English Dictionary, reciprocity is a mutual or correspondent concession

of advantages or privileges, as forming a basis for the commercial relations between two

countries. Reciprocity is a fundamental element of the negotiating process. It reflects both a

desire to limit the scope for free-riding that may arise because of the MFN rule and desire to

obtain ‘payment’ for trade liberalization in the form of better access to foreign markets. For a

nation to negotiate, it is necessary that the gain from doing so be greater than the gain available

liberalization (Bernard, 2004).

BINDING AND ENFORCEABLE COMMITMENTS

The tariff commitments made by WTO members in a multilateral trade negotiation and on

accession are enumerated in a schedule (list) of concessions. These schedules establish

"ceiling bindings": a country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading

partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade. If satisfaction is not obtained,

the complaining country may invoke the WTO dispute settlement procedures. If a country

perceives that actions taken by another government have the effect of nullifying or impairing

negotiated market access commitments or the disciplines of the WTO, it may bring this situation

to the attention of the government involved and ask that the policy be changed. If satisfaction is

not obtained, the complaining country may invoke WTO dispute settlement procedures, which

involve the establishment of panels of impartial experts charged with determining whether a

contested measure violates the WTO.

TRANSPARENCY

The WTO members are required to publish their trade regulations, to maintain institutions

allowing for the review of administrative decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for

information by other members, and to notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. These

internal transparency requirements are supplemented and facilitated by periodic country-specific

reports through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. The external surveillance also fosters

transparency, both for citizens of the countries concerned and for trading partners. It reduces

the scope for countries to circumvent their obligations, thereby reducing uncertainty regarding

the prevailing policy stance. Transparency has a number of important benefits. It reduces the

pressure on the dispute settlement system, as measures can be discussed in the appropriate

WTO body. Frequently, such discussions can address perceptions by a member that a specific

policy violates the WTO, many potential disputes are defused in informal meetings in Geneva.

Transparency is also vital for ensuring “ownership” of the WTO as an institution if citizens do not

know what the organization does, its legitimacy will be eroded. The trade policy reviews are a

unique source of information that can be used by civil society to assess the implications of the

overall trade policies that are pursued by their governments. From an economic perspective,

transparency can also help reduce uncertainty related to trade policy. Such uncertainty is

associated with lower investment and growth rates and with a shift in resources toward non

tradable, (Francois 1997).

SAFETY VALVES

In specific circumstances, governments are able to restrict trade. The WTO’s agreements permit

members to take measures to protect not only the environment but also public health, animal

health and plant health. There are three types of provisions in this connection: (a) articles

allowing for the use of trade measures to attain noneconomic objectives; (b) articles aimed at

ensuring “fair competition”; and (c) provisions permitting intervention in trade for economic

reasons. Category (a) includes provisions allowing for policies to protect public health or

national security and to protect industries that are seriously injured by competition from imports.

The underlying idea in the latter case is that governments should have the right to step in when

competition becomes so vigorous as to injure domestic competitors. Although it is not explicitly

mentioned in the relevant WTO agreement, the underlying rationale for intervention is that such

competition causes political and social problems associated with the need for the industry to

adjust to changed circumstances. Measures in category (b) include the right to impose

countervailing duties on imports that have been subsidized and antidumping duties on imports

that have been dumped (sold at a price below that charged in the home market). Finally, under

category (c) there are provisions allowing actions to be taken in case of serious balance of

payments difficulties or if a government desires to support an infant industry.

THE STAGE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT OF WTO

J.G Merrills defined dispute as a specific disagreement concerning a matter of fact, law or policy

in which a claim or assertion of one party is met with a refusal, counter claim or denial by

another. The WTO dispute settlement system is regulated by the WTO Understanding on Rules

and Procedures Governing the settlement of Dispute (Dispute Settlement Understanding).

The first stage of formal dispute settlement is consultation and it gives opportunity to the parties

of dispute to resolve the conflict through informal negotiation. The request for the consultation

should be submit to the other party in writing and address all the issues and reasons to the

request. The request should be notified to the other party in conformity with Article 19. The

complaining members also should notify the Dispute Settlement Body about the request for

consultation. In order to facilitate and smooth the consultation process, the parties should

provide sufficient notice and information regarding the matter. The consultations should be

confidential.

The respondent should reply to the request within ten days after the date of its receipt. If the

respondents are fails to responds or fails to find a solution that can satisfy all the parties to

dispute within 60 days, they can request to the Dispute Settlement Body to establish panel. So

that, this problem can be refer to the expert for their recommendation. The parties also may

undertake good offices, conciliation, or mediation procedures. This is the procedure whereas

the third party will involve in the dispute. The mediation process is occurring when the third party

express his opinion by which he plays an evaluative role. While, in conciliation process, the third

party plays a role as a facilitative where he will not advice the party based on his opinion.

According to Rahmat and Azahari (2004), mediation is the process whereby the third party will

involve in the dispute settlement process. Usually this method can be considered more effective

in finding solution as compare a direct negotiation between the dispute parties. Mediator may

conduct a separate and private negotiation with each party to the dispute and attempt to use his

goodwill with both parties to ensure that some form of resolution to the problem will be reach.

(Chuah, March 2009).

Article 1 of the Regulations on the Procedure of International Conciliation adopted by the

Institute of International Law has defined conciliation as:

“a method for the settlement of international disputes of any nature according to which a

commission set up by the Parties, either on a permanent basis or an ad hoc basis to deal with a

dispute, proceeds to the impartial examination of a dispute an attempts to define the terms of a

settlement susceptible of being accepted by them or of affording the Parties with a view to its

settlement, such aid as they may have requested.”

According to Chuah, conciliation should provide the parties with the better understanding of their

opponent’s case and an objective appraisal of the merits of their own case. In this procedure, all

conciliation commissions play a same function that is to investigate the dispute and propose a

solution to settle the dispute. Rahmat and Azahari state that conciliation involves the procedure

of submitting a given dispute to an already established commission or a single conciliator for the

purpose of examining all facets of the dispute and suggesting a solution to the parties

concerned. It should be noted that the recommendation made is not binding on the parties.

The other method that the party can apply is good office. Good office is a procedure whereas

one or more country or international body participate in the dispute with the aim to solve the

dispute peaceful. It will provide assistance in establishing contact or beginning direct negotiation

between the dispute parties. The application of the good offices must be distinguish from the

mediation as it will not binding the dispute parties but it tend to provide advice to the parties.

If the dispute is regarding to the perishable agricultural goods, the members must enter into

consultations within a period of 10 days after receipts the request. If the consultation is fails

within 20 days, the complaining party may request for the establishment of panel.

In case of failure of consultation, the matter is refers to a panel of experts for their

recommendation. This stage requires up to 45 days for a panel to be appointed and plus 6

months for the panel to conclude. Panel’s final report will be given to the parties in dispute within

6 months. This procedure gives the respondents an opportunity to defend themselves because

it may disagree with the complainant on either the facts or correct interpretation of obligation or

benefits under the WTO agreements. The adjudicative stage of dispute settlement is intended to

resolve a legal dispute, and both parties must accept any rulings as binding. A request for the

establishment of a panel must be made in writing and is addressed to the Chairman of the

Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The request for establishment of a panel must be filled at least

11 days in advance.

The responding member can still block the panel’s establishment in the first DSB meeting in

which the request is made. In the second DSB meeting where the request is made, however,

the panel will be established unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish the panel. It

usually takes time around one month later, but the complainant can also request a special

meeting of the DSB within 15 days of the request, which at least 10 days advance notice of the

meeting is given.

Before the first hearing, each side in the dispute presents its case in writing to the panel. In

accordance with the panel’s calendar, the substantive panel process may start with an

exchange of submission between the parties on any preliminary issue raised by the respondent.

If they are no such preliminary issues, the parties start by exchanging a first set of written

submission normally the complainant is the first to file its submission, to which the respondent

replies in it first submission. The parties’ written submission clarifies the facts of the case and

contains legal arguments, which offer relies substantially on prior jurisprudence of panels and

the Appellate Body.

After the exchange of the first written submissions the panel convents a first oral hearing, called

the first substantive meeting. This meeting takes place at WTO headquarters in Geneva and is

similar to an oral hearing before a court but the setting is more informal. This oral hearing is

private and only the parties and third parties to the dispute, the panellists, the secretariat staff,

supporting the panel, and the interpreters are entitled to attend this meeting. This meeting is

record on tape and the parties present their views orally, mostly based on a prepared statement

also distributed in writing to the panel and the other parties.

The parties are invited to respond to question which are usually distributed in written form. It

discussed in the oral hearing. The questions are invited from the panel and from the other

parties to describe all the legal and factual issues. At the end of their first substantive meeting,

usually the parties request to submit written answers to the panel’s and the other parties’

questions although it have already been discussed orally.

After the panel report submitted to the parties and if there are an objection with the panel

conclusion they can appeal the report. The report must be appeal before the Dispute Body

Settlement adopts it and it will be refer to the Appellate Body. Only the parties to disputes are

allowed to appeal and third party may only participate in the appeal which known as “third

participant”

Appeals are limited to legal question and have to be based on points of law. They only can

address the issues that are cover in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the

panel. They cannot re-analyze the existing evidences or try to rise up new issues. It is important

to distinguish legal and fact in order to define the scope of the appellate review. Nevertheless,

most of the complex questions that regularly arise in disputes are the mixed questions of facts

and law. It also can be refer to the question that only can be answered based on both factual

and legal assessment.

In the case of appeal, the three members are selected from a pool of seven members of

Appellate Body to hear appeal and assess the soundness of the panel report’s legal reasoning

and procedure. The selection of the three members is based on the rotation among themselves

and taking into account the principles of random selection but regardless of national origin. The

Members are individuals with the recognized authority and expertise in international trade law

and not associate with any government. Among the selected three Appellate Members, one of

them will be appoint as presiding member of the division that will monitor the overall conduct of

the appellate proceeding, leads the oral hearing and meeting related to the appeal. They also

responsible to coordinates the drafting of the Appellate Body report.

The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the

panel. In many cases, the Appellate Body will partly modify the panel’s legal findings and

conclusions as they may agrees with the panel’s final conclusion but not necessarily with the

panel’ reasoning. If the Appellate Body agrees with both, it will uphold the panel’s findings and

conclusions. If not, it will reverse it.

The appellate review proceedings must be completed within 60 days and not more than 90 days

from the date when the notice of appeal was filed. The Appellate Body must inform to the

Dispute Settlement Body and give reasons of delay if they take more than 60 days to review the

procedure. They also must notice the Dispute Settlement Body the estimate of the time until

circulation of the report.

Dispute Settlement Body must make decision whether to accept or reject the appeal report

within 30 days. If the Dispute Settlement Boy decides to accept the appeal, the parties will apply

the result of appeal ruling. If not, they have to use the original ruling.

The last stage in the dispute settlement process is surveillance or supervision of the

implementation. According to Tatelman and Brougher (Nov 7, 2006), the final report of an

arbitral panel shall bind the parties to dispute and shall not be subjected to appeal. The member

will be given 30 days to inform the Dispute Settlement Body as to how the finding of the report

will be implemented after the adoption of either the final panel or appellate report. The country

will be give a reasonable period of time for implementation as it cannot be achieved quickly. If

the defending party requires more time to comply with the final report of the arbitral panel, or fail

to comply with the WTO decision within the established compliance period, which is between 8

and 15 months, it may inform to the complaining party. So that, they will enter into negotiations

to agrees on the acceptable compensation for this additional period until it comes into

compliance with the final report. If this negotiates fails and agreement is not reached within 20

days after the compliances deadline expires, the prevailing members may request authorization

from Dispute Settlement Body to retaliate.

TUNA-DOLPHIN CASE

The United States banned the importation of tuna from Mexico due to the incidental kill of

dolphins caused by the “perse seine” nets. Mexico appealed the case to the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT stated that United States could not ban tuna

imports from Mexico because it had not explored other less-trade restrictive ways of achieving

the same environmental objective. The panel found that one country could not impose its

standards on another country to protect a renewable resource outside its own territory. The

panel also found that the United States labeling of “dolphin-safe” did not conform to GATT

standards. The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act stated that producers, importers,

exporters, distributors or sellers of tuna products could not include a “dolphin-safe” label if tuna

were harvested in a harmful manner.

Opinion: Based on this case, United States should not label “dolphin-safe” which do not rely on

GATT rules. The panel found that tuna fishers trapped dolphins in their netting which may injure

or killing many. As stated by the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, the producers,

importers, exporters, distributors or sellers of tuna products could not include “dolphin-safe”

label if the fishers use harmful manner to caught tuna. Many people found this manner is

unethical since the dolphins are considered among the most highly intelligent species on Earth.

This impractical manner will harm the dolphin species.

SHRIMP-TURTLE CASE

Five species of sea turtles are protected under the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA) and

the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES): the hawksbill, green,

leatherback, Kemp's rid ley and loggerhead (see HAWKSBIL and GREEN cases). Large

numbers of dead turtles washing ashore on beaches because great concern among

environmental groups. After studying the problem of shrimping methods affecting sea turtles for

ten years, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) concluded that "drowning in shrimp

trawls is considered the greatest threat [to the turtles' survival. NMFS estimates that over

11,000 turtles drown in [U.S.] trawl nets each year.

To combat this problem, the NMFS developed the turtle excluder device, commonly known as

the TED. TEDs are simply a cage-like structure that fits in the neck of a trawl net, preventing

turtles and large fish from being caught. Since the turtle cannot pass through the cage, it is

forced upward through an escape hatch. Studies by the NMFS on shrimp boats found the

device to be 97 percent effective, only reducing shrimp catch by 2 percent. In order to promote

conservation of the turtles, Congress passed a Federal law in 1987 which was later amended

on December 1, 1992. The NMFS intensified the regulations by requiring "that most shrimpers

operating in offshore waters, use the devices immediately, and those using smaller boats in

offshore and in-shore will have to use them within two years."

To complement these measures to protect sea turtles, Congress passed Public Law 101-162 on

November 21, 1989. Section 609 requires the ban of shrimp from nations that do not take

precautionary measures to protect the sea turtles. The Secretary of State must inform the

countries of U.S. law (and international law, the CITES treaty) protecting the turtles and

negotiate treaties encouraging similar shrimping practices.

The law provides that the country must "receive certification that it has met specific conservation

requirements" if it is to continue exporting shrimp to the United States. On May 1, 1991 it

became illegal to import shrimp from a country without certification.

Certification requires proof that a country has adopted "a regulatory program comparable to the

US program or...that the fishing environment in its waters does not pose a threat to sea turtles."

Implementation of TEDs is encouraged by May, 1994 "the nations affected by this law must

require the use of TEDs on all shrimp vessels, or their exports of shrimp to the US will be

embargoed."

The Earth Island Institute filed a suit on February 24, 1992 against the Secretaries of State and

Commerce. They argued that "the defendants failed to certify that all shrimp harvesting nations

have regulatory programs and incidental taking rates of endangered sea turtles comparable to

those in the US." In specific, Earth Island claims that India, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, Mexico,

Malaysia, South Korea and Brazil, who are the largest shrimp exporters to the United States,

are among the dozens of countries "whose fishing fleets...kill more than 150,000 turtles a year."

Earth Island also argues that the State Department is required by law to negotiate treaties with

those countries and encourage the use of TEDs for conservation. The effectiveness of the law

is undermined when only Caribbean and Atlantic countries must abide by the regulation.

Due to the nature of the dispute and the impact of the US law on developing countries, the case

is characterized by a three-way tension between trade, environment and development. Most

writings on the topic have been published from the environmental perspective, as the Shrimp-

Turtle dispute represents a focal point for calls from non-governmental organizations to reform

the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. The issue is still topical; the Appellate Body Report

is due in late September/early October 1998 and tensions are running high. Little analytical

commentary has been published thus far, although much more is to be expected in the coming

year. As a result, only eight articles are provided here; even so, some may lack objectivity. This

list should be read in conjunction with that of the GATT Tuna-Dolphin Dispute

As in the tuna-dolphin conflict, in the end while the U.S lost the legal case, the developing

country complainants may be prompted to upgrade their environment regulation. In the end,

foreign shrimpers wishing to export shrimp to the U.S market will likely be forced to use TEDs.

Opinion: Regarding to this case, the dispute came to the conclusion to be not totally effective

when there are certain unfairness occurs between members of WTO. It is not surprisingly when

the experts all confirmed that the sea turtle were endangered and they did also did not conquer

on the most appropriate conversation method for complainants to utilize and in particular,

whether the means mandated by the United State’s regulation was necessary or appropriate.

There are also discrimination on the use of TEDs where the U.S discriminated among WTO

members by applying different “phase-in” periods during which they must require shrimp

trawlers to use TEDs. Whereas countries in the Carribean/western Antlantic region permitted a

three phase-in period, the rest of the world was granted “only four months.” Clearly, the United

States negotiated seriously with some, but not with other Members (including the appellees),

that export shrimp to the United States. The effect is plainly discriminatory and, in our view,

unjustifiable.

BANANA CASE

In 1993, the European Union (EU) introduced a single import policy that imposed quotas, duties

and import licensing on banana imports into EU countries. This new policy prompted

Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Ecuador and US to complaint to the WTO because the system

was unfair discriminated against them. The US companies had lost 50% of their banana

distributing business and reduced the companies’ access to EU market and violated WTO

agreements. The panel found the policy favored domestic producers in France, Spain and

producers in Carribbean countries. The EU do not comply with the WTO rulling, so in April 1999,

the WTO approved imposition of 100% tariffs of EU imports into the US.

Opinion: The functions of WTO are to implement administer and carry out the WTO

Agreement, to provide a forum for ongoing multilateral trade negotiations, to administer dispute

settlement and serve as a tribunal for resolving disputes, and to review member countries’

performance on trade liberalization, trade policies and practices of member states. As in the

Banana case, the EU cannot imply imposed a policy without get the permission from the WTO

first and without following the WTO agreement. The countries in the EU can make the complaint

to the WTO for their rights.

CURRENT ISSUES

US FAILS TO MEET ITS OBLIGATION IN THE WTO BOEING CASE

Regarding to the issue, United States (US) has not rely on obligations to comply with a World

Trade Organization (WTO) by ruling on illegal subsidies which is “Boeing case” called by

European Union (EU). The European Commission decided to challenge the US non-compliance

at the WTO. US gave the compliance notice to EU in the WTO Dispute Settlement Case 353

(“Boeing Case”) on 24 September 2012. The EU reviewed the measures presented by the US

to assess if these were sufficient to comply with WTO rules as the US claimed.

EU gave quick review which suggested that US has neither withdrawn the illegal subsidies

granted to Boeing nor removed their adverse effects although EU has lack of information. EU

shows evidence that US could have actually granted more illegal subsidies to Boeing in the

meantime. EU challenged US non-compliance in the WTO Boeing ruling. EU requested US to

enter into consultation regarding on the notification made on 24 September 2012.

“We had expected that the US would have finally complied in good faith with its international

commitments and would have abided by the WTO rulings that clearly condemned US subsidies

to Boeing” said EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht. “We are disappointed that this does

not seem to be the case. So, the US leaves us with no other choice but to insist on proper

compliance before the World Trade Organization. We are confident that this process will finally

lead to a level playing field in the aircraft sector.”

It was concluded that both parties between EU and US have 15 days to enter into consultations

to resolve any disagreement under a procedural “sequencing agreement”. Thereafter, the EU

has the right to establish a panel to review the issue of US compliance.

WTO EFFECTIVENESS IN RESOLVING THE EUROPIAN UNION-UNITED STATES (EU-US)

TRADE CONFLICT

The rationale behind the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO is to provide

Members with a clear legal framework for solving disputes which may arise in the course of

implementing WTO agreements. Clearly, agreed solutions between Members are the most

desirable way of solving disputes. However, if this is not possible, Members can ask for panels

and (possibly) appeal procedures where the WTO, by interpreting the rules, solves the dispute.

If a Member does not comply with WTO recommendations on bringing its practice in line with

WTO rules, then trade compensation or sanctions, for example in the form of duty increases or

suspension of WTO obligations may follow.

One of the major strategic challenges facing the transatlantic trade relationship is the ability to

regulate such risk areas as the environment whilst maintaining important trade flows. Much

scholarship has emphasized formal US-EU trade disputes when considering the treatment of

risk.

Two cases involving the US and EU are Bananas and Hormone. While arguably now resolved,

at least as to Bananas, took many years to solve after expiration of the reasonable period of

time and did result in retaliatory sanctions. The US and the EU have been frequent users of the

WTO dispute settlement system, especially against each other. Of the 281, 11 consultations

requests to date, 52 have involved US-EU disputes with 26 complaints brought by the US and

26 brought by the EU. Interestingly, the US and EU were more active in requesting

consultations in the early days of the WTO of the 52 cases, 37 cases were initiated in the 1996-

1999 period which about nine per year, with only 11 cases being initiated in the year of 2000 to

2002.

The WTO system has worked adequately in the US-EU context. The overall number of disputes

seems to have declined and the recent focus is largely on US trade remedies for steel. Those

cases will probably eventually be resolved if only through expiration of the challenged

measures.