Does the promise of a less violent future lie in the cosmopolitan world view?

8/14/2019 Does the promise of a less violent future lie in the cosmopolitan world view?

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Does the promise of a less violent future lie in the cosmopolitan world view?

World peace is a catch cry repeated so often it has become the ultimate clich, but is it

possible? What would world peace look like? How might it be achieved? Many argue that

world peace, or at least a less violent world, can be achieved through a cosmopolitan world

view. Cosmopolitanism is a word which is derived from the Greek word kosmopolits

meaning citizen of the worldand that is still the basis of its meaning (Kleingeld and Brown,

2013)although it is sometimes called liberal internationalism (Ikenberry, 2009). To be

cosmopolitan, to hold a cosmopolitan world view, is to think of oneself first and foremost as

a citizen of the world, not of any one nation. As an ideology it is the very epitome, and the

logical endpoint, of the basic liberal tenet of all people being born equal. It is a belief that

the things which connect us are greater than the things that divide us, that our similarities

are far greater than our differences.

This paper will argue that, in a globalised world, where inherently global issues abound, a

cosmopolitan worldview, and a shift towards cosmopolitan global governance structures, is

the only option available to us if we hope for a less violent future. While cosmopolitanism is

by no means a guaranteed route to world peace, the current neoliberal Westphalian, state-

based system is unable to provide lasting peace and security, and that can be guaranteed.

A Brief History of Cosmopolitanism

The modern conception of cosmopolitanism has its roots in liberal Enlightenment (Jabri,

2012)and in the United Nations and its 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

but its history is in fact far longer than that. Cynic Diogenes (a fourth century BCE

philosopher) is often identified as perhaps the earliest proponent. It is said that when he

was asked where he came from, he replied, I am a citizen of the world (Nussbaum, 1994).

The concept was further developed by the third century stoics, from where it became

influential in early Christianity (Kleingeld and Brown, 2013). Emphasis on cosmopolitanism

then waned for a period of hundreds of years as debates in political philosophy focused on

temporal political authority and the eternal Church(Kleingeld and Brown, 2013).


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In the 17th

Century Grotius envisioned a great society of states and a law of nations

which would bind all states (Kleingeld and Brown, 2013). In the 18th

Century Anacharsis

Cloots advocated the abolition of all existing states and the establishment of a single world

state under which all human individuals would be directly subsumed. (Kleingeld andBrown, 2013). In 1795, in his Perpetual Peace Immanuel Kant, perhaps the most famous

proponent of cosmopolitanism, argued for a league of nations, the concept of

cosmopolitan law and the abolition of standing armies(Kant and Smith, 2010). In the 19th

Century Marx and Engels were definitely global in their vision but saw cosmopolitanism

itself as an ideological extension of capitalism due to its inherent liberalism (Kleingeld and

Brown, 2013).

The early twentieth century saw two world wars, the antithesis of cosmopolitanism and

international security, but these tragedies also sparked the earliest attempts to implement

cosmopolitan governance. Between WWI and WWII the League of Nations was formed,

similar in more than name to that proposed by Kant in 1795. WWII was both caused by the

failure of the League of Nations and hurried its destruction. In the wake of WWII the

United Nations was formed and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was born

which raised the principle of egalitarian individualism to a universal reference point: the

requirement that each person be treated with equal concern and respect, irrespective of

the state in which they were born or brought up (Held, 2003, p.474). From this time, the

Cold War and the ideological battle between communism and capitalism halted any real

progress towards a global cosmopolitan community and this period, and the final failure of

communism, only served to cement the US as the dominant force in a unipolar world.

The cosmopolitan world view is an inherently peaceful one due to its valuing of all people as

equal, which ultimate extends the concept of a kinship group to the entire human

population. It sets out the terms of reference for the recognition of peoples equal moral

worth, their active agency and what is essential for their autonomy and development; it

seeks to recognise, affirm and nurture human agency (Held, 2003, p.473). It can be seen, in

fact, as stemming from peace theory as it is an attempt to refine and apply in the current

political landscape some of the insights of institutional pacifism (Archibugi, 2000). A


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compelling idea but why do many believe that it is necessary for, or capable of, creating a

less violent future?

The world we now live in is unalterably changed and it is argued that the current, state-

based system, which served us so well for so long after the Peace of Westphalia, is no longer

the best system. The contemporary world is now, to a hitherto unknown degree, a

globalised one, which requires global governance in order to solve global issues. Individual

nations are incapable of solving global issues alone because unilateral action will always be

insufficient. Globalisation cannot be turned back since it is driven by multiple, largely

uncontrollable forces and is a multi-dimensional process of change that has irreversibly

transformed the very nature of the social world and the place of states within that world

(Beck and Sznaider, 2006, p.2).

In the modern globalised world the Westphalian state-based system has suffered from a

crippling failure to ameliorate many threatening global issues and crises including:

environmental degradation (particularly climate change), health issues (particularly the AIDs

pandemic), security problems (particularly transnational terrorism and organised crime), the

power and influence of multi-national corporations (MNCs) and massive, and growing,

global inequality (See for exampleBeck, 2006, Held, 2004,Scholte, 2011, Sachs, 2004,

Singer, 2002). Each one of these issues, whether directly related to security or not, is

dangerous to global peace and security if left unsolved because the risks of modern society

are, as a matter of their internal logic, transnational and all attempts to control them

unleash global conflicts and debates (Beck, 2006, p.61-2). Globalisation has seen the

blurring of distinctions between matters of internal and external security (Adamson, 2005,

p.33). If effective global governance does not arise we can expect that insecurity and

violence will escalate as negative aspects of globalisation go unchecked whilst positive

potentials go unrealized (Scholte, 2011, p.110). As Mann says, in regards to the looming

environmental crisis Either states collectively negotiate and plan, or our great

grandchildren perish (Mann, 2001).

Current governance models are inadequate to the task of ameliorating the numerous

threatening global issues for various, interrelated reasons:


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Institutions and regulations of global governance inherently impinge on nationalsovereignty but our Westphalian system places state sovereignty as paramount. As a

result, global governance rules and actions are frequently decided based, not on

what is likely to produce the utilitarian greatest good for the greatest number, buton what has the least impact on national sovereignty. This dilemma is most starkly

apparent on issues of peace and security where states are strong and IGOs

[intergovernmental organisations] prominent only to a limited degree (Karns and

Mingst, 2010, p.544).

Because states are only able to regulate within their national borders, they arealmost entirely incapable of controlling the actions of multinational corporations

(MNCs) and other transnational organisations, including organised criminal

networks. The global system could not be better designed to give MNCs the ability to

shift between countries based on regulatory competition. This has, and continues

to, result in MNCs holding massive power and influence on the global stage and a

global race to the bottomon regulations as nations compete to attract, or avoid

losing, MNC business (Porter, 1999, Rudra, 1993).

It is often argued that wealthy and powerful nations such as the US have undueinfluence over global governance. How can IGOs act in the global interest when

dominant states (or coalitions) tend to control agendas? (Karns and Mingst, 2010,

p.541). The permanent five members (P5) of the UN Security Council and their

power of veto over all decisions are the ultimate example of this state-based power

imbalance. The P5 are an artefact ofthe period at the end of World War II and, as

such, they have little legitimate claim to authority in modern global governance

(Keohane, 2011, p.104).

There exists in global governance institutions a democratic deficit, both actual andperceived. These institutions are, on the whole, undemocratic and lack sufficient

transparency and accountability (Nye Jr, 2001).

Ultimately, according to the assessment of many theorists (eg.Harvey, 2005, Brown,2006, Brecher et al., 2009), the supremacy of neoliberal ideology, and its derision of

all government intervention in pursuit of the ideal, pure state of the market, makes

regulation inside national borders difficult and global regulation next to impossible.


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Michael J. Sandel, in his book What Money Cant Buy: The Moral Limits of the

Market,illustrates the impact of this market fundamentalism, arguing that

somewhere along the line we drifted from having a market economy to being a

market society (Sandel, 2012).

In the period following the Cold War there was triumphalism in the air regarding the

Western model of liberal state-based democracy. This attitude, a relatively natural response

to a dramatic shift whereby the only competing model suddenly collapsed, was epitomised

by Fukuyama in his The End of History(Fukuyama, 1989). According to Fukuyama, and

others, liberal state-based democracy was the ultimate governance model and thus, with

the fall of communism, history was ending because there would never again be any great

ideological struggles over how best to govern and organise a society. In the face of

contemporary global governance issues, and the failure of the global community to address

numerous crises, this view looks increasingly nave. Far from the triumphalist view, there is

in fact a general consensus among academics that the capitalist world-economy is in crisis

because it cannot find solutions to key dilemmas (Jorgenson and Kick, 2003, p.196).

The failure of the current governance model to find solutions for these issues is due to both

a lack of sufficient global governance and a democratic deficit in the institutions which do

exist (See for exampleNye Jr, 2001, Moravcsik, 2004). Some institutions may function well

despite their democratic deficit, which includes a lack of inclusiveness, transparency and

accountability but, in modern times democracy has become the touchstone of legitimacy

(Nye Jr, 2001, p.3), meaning that, regardless of efficacy, this deficit becomes a crisis of

legitimacy. Given that rulingrequires the tacit approval of the ruled, a crisis of legitimacy

makes a governance institution untenable. Perhaps the greatest danger is that the lack of

sufficient, legitimate global governance can lead to global governance by stealth and

coercion (Scholte, 2011, p.111).

There are few signs that the Westphalian system, and the nationalism it engenders, will

come to an abrupt halt any time soon, but there are some signs that it may be losing its

supremacy. The European Union (EU) has, some believe, demonstrated a new model of

regional cooperation and transnational governance (Laffan, 1998, Schmidt, 2006)but, is

slow progress towards regional blocs conducive of the required global governance, or does


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it force non-aligned nations to be more aggressively nationalistic in response to the threat,

real or perceived, of powerful coalitions of nations?

Since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia the global system has been one in which the ultimate

unit of power is the sovereign, autonomous state. The influence of particular states, and

animosity between states have waxed and waned dramatically but the system of atomised,

individual sovereign states has continued. The notion of autonomous nation-states was a

revolutionary human concept at its inception and, in the world in which it was created, it

reduced conflicts, expanded peace and encouraged the growth in international trade that

allowed the global economy to explode. The state was, at the time, a means of bringing

order to chaos by providing an agency claiming the legitimate right and the resources to set

up and enforce rules and the norms binding the run of affairs over a certain territory

(Bauman, 1998, p.39). The Westphalian system was so successful and was adopted so

wholeheartedly that its logic became internalised and the human construct of autonomous

nation-states has grown to be seen by many as a natural, unalterable truth. The problem is

that the nationalist perspective fails to grasp that political, economic and cultural action

and their (intended and unintended) consequences know no borders (Beck, 2006, p.18).

It is even claimed that the state-based system not only allows conflict but is itself a sourceof

conflict and that you can trace the overwhelming impression of global chaos to the

principle of territoriality which proved to be a major source of the contemporary world

disorder (Bauman, 1998, p.41). Bauman quotes studies claiming that states, despite their

practical impotence:

remain the only sites and agencies for the articulation and execution of laws; devoid

of all real executive power, no more self sufficient, in fact unsustainable militarily,

economically or culturally, those weak states, quasi states keep nevertheless

claiming territorial sovereignty, capitalizing on identity wars and invoking, or rather

whipping up, dormant tribal instincts

(Bauman, 1998, p.41).

Martha Nussbaum argues that to give support to nationalist sentiments subverts,

ultimately, even the values that hold a nation together (Nussbaum, 1994, p.2)because how


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can one argue for equality of all citizens regardless of class, race, religion or creed if our

system creates false difference by way of the constructed barrier of the nation state? She

claims that, by conceding, even encouraging, the idea that the morally arbitrarydifference

of place of birth, in relation to a human constructed nation-state, has significance in our

decision making process, we also deprive ourselves of a principled way of arguing to

citizens that they should in fact join hands across these other barriers(Nussbaum, 1994,

p.6). As Balibar argues, racism is inherently linked to nationalistic discourse, it emerges from

the same ideas of separateness (Balibar, 1991). Logic tells us that if we truly believe that all

humans are born free and equal then our compassion must extend equally across national

borders. If it does not, then why should it cross any other arbitrary divide? The laudable

goals of the UDHR and human rights discourse cannot be achieved by atomised states

because:

it is the nature of human rights that although they are meant to be enjoyed

separately (they mean, after all, the entitlement to have ones own difference

recognized and so to remain different without fear of reprimand or punishment), they

have to be fought for and won collectively, and only collectively can they be granted

(Bauman, 2001, p.142)

The availability of the liberties outlined in liberal theory and the UDHR paradoxically need

global governance because liberty requires order, and order, at somelevel, must be able to

harness force (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006, p.20).

Another way in which insufficient global governance creates global tension is through global

inequality in wealth and power. This problem is a result of a trifecta of bad, or missing

governance:

Nationalism and the refusal of wealthy nations to share the results of decades ofunprecedented economic growth and prosperity.

The inability of any state to sufficiently control the actions of MNCs and lack of anyglobal authority willing or able to fill the gap.

The supremacy of neoliberal ideology which derides government intervention intothe market and encourages a greed is good mentality.


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The weakness of global governance, and even national governance, under neoliberal

ideology is certainly no accident. It is the explicit imposition of a particular form of market

rationality onto the socio-political sphere (Brown, 2006). As Bauman claims, this system

exists because:

weak states are precisely what the new world order needs to sustain itself. Quasi

states can be easily reduced to the (useful) role of local police precincts, securing a

modicum of order required for the conduct of business, but need not be feared as

effective brakes on the global companies freedom

(Bauman, 1998, p.42).

Neoliberal ideology, with its overriding imperatives of opening markets, privatisation of

public assets and maximisation of global competitiveness, was supposed to create economic

growth, foster stability and strengthen civil society but instead has often increased social

tension both between and within nations by exacerbating wealth inequality and removing

job security (Kinnvall, 2004,Calhoun, 1994, Hoogvelt, 2001, Hurrell and Woods, 1999).

A knowledge of the various impending global crises makes it clear that global governance is

critical if we are to find solutions to them, but some argue that a cosmopolitan world view isnot a prerequisite to achieving this. So why cosmopolitanism? Why must we think of

ourselves as citizens of the world? Beck argues that the world and global politics is already

going through a process of cosmopolitanization in response to the forces of globalisation.

He rejects that cosmopolitanism is a conscious and voluntary choice of elites (Beck, 2006,

p.19)but argues that cosmopolitanization is already occurringand that it is outside of our

control. He argues that cosmopolitanization occurs as the unwanted and unobserved side

effectof actions that are not intended as cosmopolitan in the normative sense (Beck,

2006, p.18). Beck calls this banal cosmopolitanism, latent cosmopolitanism, unconscious

cosmopolitanism or passive cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2006). This distinction is also made by

Bauman in his critique of globalization in which he marks the difference between global

effects, notoriously unintended and unanticipated and global undertakings which seem

increasingly rare (Bauman, 1998, p.39).

This cosmopolitanization, this banal cosmopolitanism, is not sufficient to engender a less

violent future. In order for cosmopolitanism to fulfil its promise of a less violent future, we


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need concerted effort and leadership which embraces and encourages a cosmopolitan

worldview and cosmopolitan global governance structures and institutions: normative

cosmopolitanism. As Fraser argues, globalisation has already, and continues to, change the

way we think about justice away from what is owed towards whom it is owed to(Fraser,2005). All we must do is admit that globalisation and cosmopolitanization have made a

cosmopolitan world view a necessity!

There may be a solid argument that, theoretically at least, cosmopolitanism could provide a

less violent future, but is it utopian? This question depends on onesunderstanding of

cosmopolitanism. There is no single model for cosmopolitanism so, while world peace

through a dramatic cosmopolitan shift in the near future is highly unlikely, unstoppable

globalising forces make continued cosmopolitanization unavoidable. Viewed in this light

normative cosmopolitanism is not utopian, but the only logical response to forces almost

entirely outside our control. A more peaceful world through increasingly cosmopolitan

policies and structures is achievable, but requires a shift in thinking. According to Beck:

During the national phase of modernity cosmopolitanism could only be grasped

intellectually, in the head, but could not be felt as a living experience. Nationalism, by

contrast, took possession of the peoples hearts. This head-heart dualism is turned

upside down in the second modernity. Everyday life has become cosmopolitan in

banal ways; yet the insidious concepts of nationalism continue to hauntpeoples

minds almost unabated

(Beck, 2006, p.19).

The contention that a less violent future lies in the cosmopolitan world view is far from

unanimous though and arguments against it come from diverse sources. The common

thread behind most oppositional discourses comes down to a sociological, psychological and

biological argument which posits the notions that human beings are inherently incapable of

true liberal cosmopolitanism. These arguments claim that, for psychological and/or

biological reasons, human beings have in-group versus out-group thinking hardwired into

them and, as such, conflict between groups will exist regardless of governance structures.

The sociology of this theory stems primarily from the work of Tajfel (1970, 2010)whose

work seems to show that individuals have an innate tendency to prefer members of their


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in-group over out-group individuals, regardless of any meaningful differences between

groups. This tendency is said to stem from a self-esteem boost engendered by group

membership which motivates members to give assistance to other group members in the

interests of improving the status of the group as a whole (Billig and Tajfel, 1973, Hogg, 1992,

Abrams and Hogg, 2012,Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

These theories are interested in ascertaining how previously harmless others may suddenly

become reconstructed into the stranger-enemy (Kinnvall, 2004, p.751)but are often

criticised as being overly essentialist, seeing identity as something more ascribed than

acquired (Kinnvall, 2004, p.750). Huddy argues that these theories dont allow for identity

choice, thus discounting human agency in developing ones own identity (Huddy, 2001). It is

also argued that there is a distinction between being categorized as belonging to a group

because of characteristics (real or imagined), and the sort of meaningful group membership

used for identity formation (Huddy, 2001). This argument comes down to one of the most

basic sociological debates: that of structure versus agency. Are the members of our in-

group and the identity that we form with the help of group membership enforced on us by

our situation, or does agency play a role in choosing which groups we are members of and

which (of perhaps numerous) groups we allow to shape our identity?

So how does this tie into a globalized world? Will we continue to create stranger-enemies

unconsciously, regardless of worldview and governance structures? Do we need a national

identity to help in the creation of out groupsfor our own psychological well-being?

According to Kinvall, a globalized world is for many a world devoid of certainty and when

individuals feel vulnerable and experience existential anxiety, it is not uncommon for them

to wish to return to a threatened self-identity (Kinnvall, 2004, p.742). Kinnvall argues thatin response to public anxiety engendered by an increasingly complex globalised world

leaders are seeking to rally people around simple rather than complex causes, even

consciously capitalising on the anxiety, and nationalism seems to have a particularly

powerful appeal (ibid, p.742). Similarly Giddens argues that the complex contemporary

world leaves the individual feeling bereft and alone crying outfor the sense of security

provided by more traditional settings(Giddens, 1991, p.33). We almost certainly need a


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stable sense of identity and self to feel secure and thrive but is nationalism really a

prerequisite for that security, or is it just grasped upon because it is readily available?

According to Calhoun (2003, 2004, 2007), differences between people and nations are real

and the sense of belonging engendered by the construct of the nation state is all the more

important in a complex globalised world. People need the strong and secure base of a

nation state in order to bear the challenges inherent in a globalised world. For Calhoun,

nationalism is an integral and unavoidable building block of identity. Calhoun sees

cosmopolitanism as not only a utopian fantasy but a dangerous one because it ignores the

importance of nations and nationalism. He argues that, in a globalised world, nations

necessary to provide solidarity, stability and a sense of identity because nationalismhelps

locate an experience of belonging in a world of global flows and fears (Calhoun, 2007, p.1).

Aaacording to Calhoun, without the solidarity provided by the nation state, democracy will

fail because membership in a society is an issue of social solidarity and cultural identity as

well as legally constructed state citizenship (Calhoun, 2007, p.104-5).

Nussbaum admits that cosmopolitanism does not offer quite the same comfort as

nationalism, that it offers no such refuge; it offers only reason and love of humanity, which

may seem at times less colourful than other sources of belonging (Nussbaum, 1994, p.6).

What Calhoun fails to take into account is that solidarity and identity groups already cross

national boundaries. The world is not made up of small groups which overlap and grow but

ultimately end at the borders of a nation state. Identity groups exist across the world, be

they religious or political or simply interest/activity-based. In a world of overlapping, global

identity groups, why must the construct of the nation state provide an otherwise

unachievable solidarity? Tilly elucidates how cultural globalisation can allow for

transnational identity and solidarity groups (Tilly, 2005)and, as Beck argues, the national

outlook is becoming false (2006, p.18). This fact is often ignored because, even when

looking at inherently international issues, we tend to examine them through a frame of

what Beck calls methodological nationalism. The internal logic of the nationalist view is

flawed and, without internal logic, a concept cannot long continue to provide any benefit

even if it does so now. A fiction can be comforting, but only so long as that fiction is stable.

The fiction of the nation-state is created just like any other. In order to influence identity


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formation, act as a source of stability, and create in-group solidarity, leaders must

demonstrate that the nation it wishes to create has always existed (Kinnvall, 2004, p.756).

It must be based upon an idealised past, a golden ageand a history of chosen glories and

chosen traumas:the exact same methods that form the basis of radical Islam (Baxter andAkbarzadeh, 2008).

Another response to arguments for the necessity of nations states in providing stability in a

complex, globalised world is Becks claimthat common threats and shared risks can and do

create solidarity, meaning, perhaps, that what we require to become a united world is

merely to shift our thinking on existing global risks and threats in order to find global

solidarity (Beck, 2006, Beck, 2001). According to Beck perhaps we dont need an attack

from Mars to unite us because in a sense that is what occurred on September 11: an

attack from our internal mars (ibid, p.35). Beck claims that we live in a world risk society

and that risks explode self-referential systems and national and international political

agendas, overturning their priorities and producing practical interconnections among

mutually indifferent or hostile parties and camps (ibid, p.p.35-6). In order to realize the

potential of risks to unite us we must shift our focus, stop analysing issues through a frame

of methodological nationalism, and recognise that the things that might bind us togetheralready exist.

The realist arguments against cosmopolitanismclaim that the international sphere is

inherently anarchic, that nations will always do whatever is in their own best interest

regardless of costs to others and no global governance can change that (See for example

Grieco, 1988). This argument is inherently flawed because it presupposes the nation state as

a natural, unalterable institution and, perhaps more tellingly, this same argument could be

used against any form of governance (ie. People are inherently selfish and self-interested

therefore all social relationships will always be anarchic and aggressive) (See for example a

critique of realism by Turner, 1998). A system of democratic governance and laws shows

this not to be true at the national level so why should it be true at the global?

If we believe that cosmopolitanism holds the promise of a less violent future, how are we to

achieve the shift from cosmopolitanism as an amorphous, academic concept into a

structural governance model? There is no one route to this, and argument, even between


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proponents of cosmopolitanism, is fierce. David Held is perhaps the most well-known

proponent to have elucidated a realistic roadmap to a cosmopolitan world. He argues that

having a seat at the negotiating table in a major IGO or at a major conference does not

ensure effective representation and that many people are stakeholders in global politicalproblems that affect them, but remain excluded from the political institutions and strategies

needed to address these problems(Held, 2004, p.370). According to Held there are three

distinct regulatory and political gaps: a jurisdictional gap, an incentive gap and a

participation gap (Held, 2003, p.467). Held (2003, 2004)argues that we need to shift

towards more broad, inclusive and accountable global governance and that all stakeholders

should have a voice in one form or another. His roadmap for a cosmopolitan future starts

with a first step of an enlightened multilateralism (2004, p.377)including reform of

existing global governance structures. He also highlights the importance of creating

governance structures around specific issues by creating what he calls Global Issue

Networks (GINs) which would function similarly to the multistakeholder epistemic

communities that already surround issues like climate change but would have a more

inclusive, open membership. Held (2003)also calls for multilevel governance and multiple

sites of democracy, including small local and regional parliaments able to ensure that the

voices of at least the vast majority of people are heard in some way. He claims that

governance is becoming increasinglya multilevel, intricately institutionalised and spatially

dispersed activity, while representation, loyalty and identity remain stubbornly rooted in

traditional ethnic, regional and national communities (2003, p.469). As such we must make

governance more inclusive and only an international or, better still, a cosmopolitan outlook

can, ultimately, accommodate itself to the political challenges of a more global era (ibid,

p.469).

So perhaps arriving at a cosmopolitan world could create a less violent future, and perhaps

that can be achieved through a slow and difficult process. It will only happen slowly, through

incremental change and only with leadership from powerful states willing to cede some of

their own sovereignty. How realistic is that proposal though? Bauman claims that things

today are moving sideways, aslant or across rather than forward, often backward (Bauman,

2001), meaning that progress, towards any goal, is by no means assured. Radical thinkers

such as philosopher Slavoj Zizek argue that incremental change may be impossible and that


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Does the promise of a less violent future lie in the cosmopolitan world view?

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