Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR2071

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H2450)

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-H2450)

ON AN

IDA DEVELOPMENT GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 3.5 MILLION (US$ 5 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

FOR A

PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PROJECT

March 13, 2012

Public Sector and Institutional Reform Group Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Europe and Central Asia Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective as of February 16, 2012)

Currency Unit = US$

Tajikistan Somoni (TJS) 1.00 = US$ .21 US$ 1.00 = TJS 4.77

FISCAL YEAR = Calendar Year

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACU ADB CAS CIS

Aid Coordination Unit Asian Development Bank Country Assistance Strategy Commonwealth of Independent States

CSD CSN DERI DFID EOP EU FPI GDP HR IBRD IBTA ICT IDA IFC IHQCS IMF MDG MoF MoJ MLSP MTBF NDS PAD PARS PDO

Civil Service Department Civil Service Network Department of Economic Reform and Investment Department for International Development (UK) Executive Office of President European Union Fire Prevention Inspectorate Gross Domestic Product Human Resource International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Institutional Building Technical Assistance Information and Communication Technology International Development Association International Finance Corporation Institute of Higher Qualification of Civil Servants International Monetary Fund Millennium Development Goals Ministry of Finance Ministry of Justice Ministry of Labor and Social Protection Medium Term Budget Framework National development Strategy Project Appraisal Document Public Sector Reform Strategy Project Development Objective

PFM Public Finance Management

iii

PFMMP Public Finance Management Modernization Project PCT PIU PRSP PSRP SES

Project Coordination Team Project Coordination Unit Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper Public Sector Reform Project Sanitary-Epidemiology Service

Vice President: Philippe H. Le Houerou

Country Director: Saroj Kumar Jha

Sector Manager: William Dorotinsky

Project Team Leader: Hassan Aliev

ICR Team Leader: Hassan Aliev

iv

TAJIKISTAN Public Sector Reform Project

(IDA-H2450)

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 83. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 124. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 205. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 206. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 237. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 24Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 25Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 26Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 48Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 49Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 51Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 53Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 54Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 55Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 56

MAP

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A. Basic Information

Country: Tajikistan Project Name: Public Sector Reform

TA

Project ID: P096861 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H2450

ICR Date: 03/23/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: TAL Borrower: MINISTRY OF

FINANCE

Original Total

Commitment: XDR 3.50M Disbursed Amount: XDR 3.49M

Revised Amount: XDR 3.50M

Environmental Category: C

Implementing Agencies:

Executive Office of President

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 12/05/2005 Effectiveness: 09/08/2006 09/08/2006

Appraisal: 02/13/2006 Restructuring(s):

01/21/2010

02/19/2010

05/31/2011

Approval: 07/06/2006 Mid-term Review: 03/27/2009

Closing: 06/01/2011 10/01/2011

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing

Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project

at any time (Yes/No): No

Quality at Entry

(QEA): None

Problem Project at any

time (Yes/No): Yes

Quality of

Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 98 98

Sub-national government administration 2 2

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Administrative and civil service reform 33 30

Health system performance 16 3

Legal institutions for a market economy 17 50

Public expenditure, financial management and

procurement 17 9

Social safety nets 17 8

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Philippe H. Le Houerou Shigeo Katsu

Country Director: Saroj Kumar Jha Annette Dixon

Sector Manager: William Leslie Dorotinsky Deborah L. Wetzel

Project Team Leader: Hassan Aliev Antonius Verheijen

ICR Team Leader: Hassan Aliev

ICR Primary Author: Ronald E. Myers

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The project development objective is to assist the Recipient in the implementation of the

Public Administration Reform Strategy, through strengthening policy making and service

iii

delivery systems and enhancing transparency of public management in selected core

public sector entities

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

Establish legal and organizational prerequisites for improved public sector management,

improve public access to legislation, and strengthen regulatory framework in selected

areas.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Competitive recruitment for administrative civil service positions implemented

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

Merit-based recruitment

and promotion system not

established. No legal

requirement for

competitive merit based

recruitment is in place

80 percent of all

central

government

institutions

correctly apply

new recruitment

procedures, as

identified in data

submitted by the

Civil Service

Agency, and cross-

referenced with

survey data as

conducted under

the project.

Competitive

merit-based

recruitment of

civil servants

for positions

below grades

1-2 is

institutionalize

d. At least 80

percent of

vacant

positions are

filled either by

competitive

recruitment or

promotion.

The Regulation on

Competitive-Based

Selection is applied

throughout the

country

Date achieved 09/08/2006 09/08/2006 01/21/2009 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

By the time of the beginning of the project, there was no any competitive based

recruitment system. In May, 2009 the Regulation on Competitive Selection was

signed by the President. Currently up to 92 % of civil servants are selected on

competition.

Indicator 2 : Legal and organizational system for the central public administration improved

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

The government structure

is fragmented and

ineffective. Horizontal

functional review (HFR)

under preparation.

Reallocation of

functions between

institutions at

central

government level

completed

A law on

Organization

of Public

Administration

and a reform

plan for

streamlining

the overall

central

government

structure

approved; and

The Law on Public

Administration has

been submitted to

the Parliament on

August 2011. The

plan for

restructuring of 10

minisatries is

approved in April

2011.

iv

organizational

structures and

management

systems in

selected core

public sector

entities

improved.

Date achieved 09/08/2006 09/08/2006 01/21/2009 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The draft Law on Organization of Public Administration was approved by the

Government and submitted to the Parliament. This together with the restructuring

plans would help optimize public administration institutions

Indicator 3 : A Strategy and Action Plan for Modernizing public financial management

approved and under implementation

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

Public financial

management initiatives

fragmented. Absence of a

vision of the future PFM

system.

Increasingly

reliable,

comprehensive

and available

public financial

management

information

A Strategy and

Action Plan

for

modernizing

public

financial

management

approved and

under

implementatio

n

A PFM Strategy for

2009-2018 and an

Action Plan for

2009-2011

approved and being

implemented.

Date achieved 09/08/2006 09/08/2006 01/21/2010 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The Strategy is currently implemented by PFMMP Project

Indicator 4 : Enhanced transparency and accessibility to legislation and streamlined legislation

in selected areas

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

Legal norms and acts

difficult to access for govt

officials and generally

unavailable for private

sector and public

Legal database

Adliya complete

and made available

through web-based

access

Date achieved 06/09/2006 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The legal Dataabase Adliya, which includes all the government legislation, is put

on the Civil Srvice Network, and is accesseble through the Ministry of Justice

website on subscription basis.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Operating Civil Service Register enhances CSD monitoring of the civil service

Value Manually collected Civil Service The Civil CS Register

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(quantitative

or Qualitative)

information does not

support effective

horizontal civil service

management

register, as a key

tool for horizontal

Civil Service

management,

operational

Service

Register is

automated and

accessible

through a

network by 47

government

bodies. The

CSD monitors

civil service

development

and issues

quarterly

reports on the

status of

implementatio

n of the civil

service policy

operational and

accessible by HR

officials in 47

central agencies.

Timely and

accurate civil

service information

collected for CS

management.

Date achieved 06/08/2006 08/08/2006 01/21/2009 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The network infrastructure is completed and the network is put into operation.

CS Register is connected to the Netw

Indicator 2 : Consistency in competitive recruitment and promotion practices achieved in

central government entities

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

Competitive selection is

not institutionalized:

neither legally nor in

practice

The number of

vivil servants (new

entrants) recruited

through merit-

based competition

increases by 50%

from the baseline

level of November

2006

Competitive

merit-based

recruitment of

civil servants

for positions

below grades

1-2 is

institutionalize

d. At least

80% of vacant

positions are

filled either by

competitive

recruitment or

promotion

92% of vacant

positions in the

Civil Service are

filled through

competitive

recruitment

Date achieved 09/06/2006 09/06/2006 01/21/2010 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Open, competitive recruitment procedures are institutionalized, but their impact

is constrained by the low attractiveness of civil service employment, which

reduces the number of applicants per vacant post below the level needed for

competitive selection.

Indicator 3 : New civil service pay system is approved and introduced on a pilot basis

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

Low and unattractive pay

with low decompression

rates

New Wage Grid is

approved and

implemented

throughout the Civil

Service

vi

Date achieved 06/08/2006 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

First, 5 ministries were piloted on new Wage Grid. From September 1, 2011 the

system was applied throughout the Civil Swrvice.

Indicator 4 : Streamlining functions and institutions, strengthening accountability

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

Institutional structure

fragmented and the legal

underpinnings for

effective organization of

public administration a

Reform plans are

implemeted for 8

line ministries or

central agencies by

the end of the

project and reports

on their

implementation

are published on

the government

website

Reform plans

for

streamlining

of instituions

structures in 8

ministries and

central

agencies

approved. The

Law on

Organization

of Public

Administratio

n, is submitted

for adoption

Restructuring plans

and legislation on

organizational

structures for 10

ministries

approved. The Law

on Organization of

Public

Administration is

submitted to the

Parliament

Date achieved 09/08/2006 09/08/2006 01/21/2010 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Currently 10 ministries are implemeting their reorganization plans. The Law on

Organization of Public Administration is expected to be adopted by the

Parliament by the end 2011.

Indicator 5 : A new remuneration system in the health sector implemented

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

Lack of transparency &

uniformity in job

classification and pay

systems in the health

A new Public

Health Care pay

and job

classification

system designed

and implemented

Date achieved 09/08/2006 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The new pay system is effective as of July 1, 2009

Indicator 6 :

A Public Financial Management Strategy, establishing framework for

improvement in management, efficiency and transparency of the use of public

resources, is approved

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

Public financial

management initiatives

fragmented. Absence of a

vision of the future PFM

system.

The level of

deviation between

the approved and

executed central

budget decreases

by 30% over the

project period,

from the baseline

level established

on the basis of the

Budget Execution

PFM Strategy

and Action

Plan are

approved.

The PFM Strategy

and Action Plan

were approved.

vii

report for 2005

Date achieved 09/08/2006 09/08/2006 01/21/2010 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Currently PFM Strategy 2009-2018 is being implemeted under PFMMP project

Indicator 7 : Access to information on laws and regulations for the legal entities is improved

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

Poor access of legal

entities and population to

the legislation. No web-

based access.

Access to

information and

regulation norms

and procedures by

business increased

by 40-50 percent

from the baseline

establsihed by a

survey to be

conducted in early

2007

Web-based

access to the

database

Adliya for

legal entities

and population

is effective

Legal database

Adliya is accessible

thorugh the

Ministry of Justice

website

Date achieved 09/08/2006 09/08/2006 01/21/2010 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Legal database Adliya is connected to the Civil Service Network. Population at

large can access the database through the website on subscription basis.

Indicator 8 : Improved regulatory regime in pilot inspection agencies

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

Outdated regulations

create administrative

burden for businesses and

public entities alike

Revised regulations

are adopted and

published for both

pilot inspections:

SES and Fire

Date achieved 09/08/2006 09/30/2011

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Four normative acts of fire safety have been cancelled and three new legal acts

have been adopted. Three new legal acts have been adopted in the area of

sanitary-epidemiology regulation.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 10/16/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.31

2 10/25/2007 Moderately

Unsatisfactory

Moderately

Unsatisfactory 0.49

3 11/19/2007 Moderately

Unsatisfactory

Moderately

Unsatisfactory 0.49

4 06/23/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.04

5 06/24/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.36

6 10/27/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.59

7 03/01/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.82

8 12/11/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.26

9 09/06/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.22

viii

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring

Date(s)

Board

Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at

Restructuring

Amount

Disbursed at

Restructuring

in USD

millions

Reason for Restructuring &

Key Changes Made DO IP

01/21/2010 Y MS S 2.82

02/19/2010 N MS S 2.82

05/31/2011 S S 5.07

The project orginal closing date

was extended for additional four

month until October 1, 2011 to

complete some uncomplete

activities, namely, extension of

the Civil Service Network and

completing the interface of the

legal database Adliya.

Disbursement rate by the time

of restructuring was 93% and

the project rating was

"satisfactory"

If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving

body) enter ratings below:

Outcome Ratings

Against Original PDO/Targets Moderately Unsatisfactory

Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Satisfactory

Overall (weighted) rating Moderately Satisfactory

ix

I. Disbursement Profile

1

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal Despite significant achievements in poverty reduction, growth, reduction in external debt, and greater political and macroeconomic stability following the end of the civil war in 1997, by 2004 Tajikistan remained the poorest among Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries with a per capita GDP of about US$310. The economy depended heavily on exports of cotton and aluminum, as well as remittances of migrants. Poverty was high at 64% in 2003 and low social indicators reflected poor public service delivery and weaknesses in the governance system. While tight monetary policy and strong fiscal discipline had improved inflation and external performance and contributed to economic growth averaging 9% during the first half of the decade, the exigencies of political consolidation complicated key elements of any institutional transition agenda. A complex political economy environment led the government to focus on managing a balance of power among different political factions, preventing the transformation of the public sector from a central planning and state production apparatus into an instrument for encouraging private investment and growth. Efforts at public sector reform, including those supported by an Institution Building Technical Assistance (IBTA) operation over 2000-2005 faltered—laws were enacted, regulations amended and new institutions established, but done in a fragmented and inconsistent manner. Reforms were also stymied by collapsing public sector real wages and weak capacity, which also led to opportunities for corruption and state capture. Consequently the Government was not very effective in translating better economic performance into better fundamentals for long term growth and improved social welfare. By 2005, however, the gradual stabilization of the political system permitted increased focus on the establishment of a more stable institutional system, opening new opportunities to address some of the deep-seated governance problems. The Government approached its development partners to help support a new National Development Strategy (NDS) for 2006-15 which would focus on public sector management reform, private sector development, and human capital formation. A key pillar of the NDS was a Public Administrative Reform Strategy (PARS) which embodied a broad approach to institutional reform, addressing institutional reorganization, budgeting, the regulatory framework, human resource management, as well as measures to strengthen accountability and transparency in the public sector. The subject project explicitly aimed to assist implementation of the PARS (whose design was supported by the IBTA) by making available advisory and capacity building support in the following key areas:

Civil service wage decompression and consolidation; Implementation of the amended Civil Service Law; Creation of a merit-based recruitment and career management system in the

civil service;

2

Design and implementation of restructuring plans for the Ministry of Economy and Trade, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection MLSP), the Ministry of State Revenues and Duties and the Civil Service Department, in 2005-2006, as well as for additional selected ministries in 2007-2008;

Wage and job classification reform in the Primary Health Care; and Reforming licensing and inspection systems in pilot agencies, in particular

the Sanitary Epidemiological Service (SES) and the Fire Safety Inspectorate. . In addition to the PARS, the proposed project conformed to the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2002), which highlighted the need to strengthen public sector governance, as well as the World Bank Group’s Country Assistance Strategy for FY06-09, which also listed these as priority cross-cutting issues. Finally, the project was linked to a Programmatic Development Policy Financing operation, expected to disburse during FY06-09, which promoted several policy reforms.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) The project development objective is to assist the Recipient in the implementation of the Public Administration Reform Strategy, through strengthening policy making and service delivery systems and enhancing transparency of public management in selected core public sector entities. The PAD presented four outcomes (in its Annex 3 Results Framework table) and four corresponding key indicators in the PAD text (section B.2):

1. Outcome: A transparently managed and increasingly merit based Civil Service Indicator: The number of civil servants (new entrants) recruited through merit-based competitions increases by 50 percent from the baseline level to be established in November 2006

2. Outcome: A rationalized overall central government structure and improved organization and management systems in selected core public sector entities Indicator: Reform Plans are implemented for 8 line ministries or central agencies by the end of the project and reports on their implementation are published on the Government web site

3. Outcome: Increasingly reliable, comprehensive and available public financial management information Indicator: The level of deviation between approved and executed central government budget decreases by 30% over the project period, from the baseline level which will be established on the basis of the Budget Execution Report for 2005; and

4. Outcome: Enhanced transparency and accessibility of the legal and regulatory framework Indicator: Access to information and regulation, norms and procedures by businesses increases 40-50 percent from the baseline level to be established by a survey to be conducted in early 2007.

3

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification In January 2010 the project development objective was revised to “Establish legal and organizational prerequisites for improved public sector management, improve public access to legislation, and strengthen regulatory framework in selected areas.” Outcomes and Target Values for Outcome Indicators were revised as follows:

1. Outcome: A transparently managed and increasingly merit-based civil service: At least 80 percent of vacant positions are filled either by competitive recruitment or promotion [unchanged]

Target Value: Competitive merit-based recruitment of civil servants for positions below grades 1-2 is institutionalized. At least 80 percent of vacant positions are filled either by competitive recruitment or promotion

2. Outcome: A law on Organization of Public Administration and a reform plan for streamlining the overall central government structure approved; and organizational structures and management systems in selected core public sector entities improved

Target Value 1: Reform Plans for streamlining of institutions structures in 8 ministries and central agencies approved and short-term restructuring measures implemented Target Value 2: The law on Organization of Public Administration, defining principles of organization and accountability of public administration bodies, is submitted for adoption

3. Outcome: A Strategy and Action Plan for modernizing public financial management approved and under implementation

Target Value 1: A Public Financial Management Strategy establishing framework for improvements in management, efficiency and transparency of the use of public resources, is approved Target Value 2: A new remuneration system in the health system is designed and implemented

4. Outcome: Enhanced public accessibility to legislation and streamlined legislation in selected areas

Target Value 1: Access to information on laws and regulations for the legal entities is improved Target Value 2: Regulations in the area of fire safety, sanitary-epidemiological standard and subsoil use area streamlined (Intermediate outcome indicators were also revised and their results, along with those of the above outcomes and target values, are presented in Annex 2 of this ICR.) The PDO was adjusted to better reflect the reduction in scope of expected project achievements for institutional restructuring, policy making capacity, and service delivery systems. The change was required, according to the document presented to Executive Directors, due to: (i) overambitious and inadequately funded original objectives; (ii) delayed initiation of the vertical functional reviews for government restructuring; (iii) the absence of a central government unit to implement policy coordination reforms; and (iv) insufficient time and resources required for achievement of measurable improvements in service delivery across the public sector. The restructured PDO and indicators essentially

4

stepped down from some unduly ambitious end goals beyond the current capacity of the country and focused on more incremental building block prerequisites for public sector reforms. Additionally, due to the growing importance of exploration of natural minerals for economy of Tajikistan, the project expanded the scope of improvements of regulatory regime by including the mining sector.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries, Beneficiaries were not explicitly identified. By implication, besides the Government of Tajikistan as a whole, the main beneficiaries were the Civil Service Department, the Institute for Higher Qualification of Civil Servants, the Ministry of Finance, the Executive Office of the President, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, the Ministry of Justice, the Sanitary Epidemiological Services, and the Fire and Safety Inspectorate. Ultimately citizens could be presumed to benefit from more efficient and effective government operations.

1.5 Original Components (as approved) The Project had five main components, providing support to key priorities in the National Development Strategy and directly related to the objectives of the PARS. Component 1: Civil Service Management (US$0.81million) The objective was to develop and implement the legal basis and institutional capacity to apply merit principles in civil service recruitment and promotion. Accompanying measures on civil service wage reform would make civil service positions more attractive and provide improved incentives for performance. Grant resources would fund the following activities:

training and advisory support to establish and implement merit-based recruitment and promotion under the amended Civil Service Law;

capacity building for the new regional branches of the Civil Service Department; preparation of a concept for the medium-term development of the Civil Service

Systems; developing key management tools for the CSD, such as the Civil Service Registry

system and assessment centers for civil service recruitment; modernizing civil service incentives, including continued wage decompression

and the monetization of benefits; and providing networking equipment and software.

This component also financed the implementation of the new in-service training system at the Institute for Higher Qualification of Civil Servants (IHQCS). Component 2: Supporting Implementation of Key Reforms under the Public Administration Reform Strategy (US$2.31million) The relatively large component aimed to support organizational and management system reforms in the core public administration, including the elimination of duplication in government functions, implementation of clear accountability and reporting systems between executive entities, and the gradual introduction of modern public management

5

processes to enhance transparency and accountability (such as institutionalized consultation mechanisms, impact assessment and strategic planning). A two phase approach was contemplated with the first laying the legal, informational, and administrative basis for expanded implementation in the next period. First phase priority activities would include:

a. A horizontal functional review of central state administration bodies to identify duplication of functions, redundant and excessive functions as well as inefficiencies due to fragmentation in the allocation of functions;

b. Support to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection as a pilot for service delivery system reform, focusing both on creating clear accountability and reporting systems among different entities under the Ministry and introduction of citizen feedback to pinpoint problems in service delivery;1

c. Technical assistance and capacity building for the structures in charge of public administration reform management in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to strengthen the ability of the Office to introduce key governance reforms and track their implementation and impact over time.

Second phase activities would aim at:

a. Improving administrative efficiency and effectiveness of selected government bodies, including: (i) post-government restructuring support to those that need to execute new/changed functions; (ii) designing new administrative procedures and practices; (iii) conducting pilot vertical functional reviews to streamline structures; (iv) improving interdepartmental interaction processes: and (v) specific reforms in priority agencies.

b. Improving policy making and policy impact assessment practices at the sectoral level, with priority attention to participatory monitoring of government programs by non-governmental organizations;

c. Improving service delivery systems, including: (i) pilot activities related to developing minimal service standards; (ii) introducing basic public service delivery monitoring; and (iii) improving selected administrative procedures related to provision of public services for a limited number of ministries/executive bodies in charge of service provision.

Component 3: Capacity-building in Budget Management (US$0.57million)

1 The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection was selected both because of its expressed interest in undertaking institutional reform of the service delivery system, and because of its pivotal role in social service delivery as the entity responsible for employment policy, social protection policy, pensions, and labor migration issues

6

This component would fund technical support to introduce a Medium Term Budget Framework (MTBF) in Tajikistan and preparatory work for budget modernization. Implementation support would come from a Public Financial Management Modernization Project (PFMMP), then under preparation. The component had two subcomponents:

Subcomponent 1 would finance training and advisory activities for the development of a PFM Reform Strategy and Action Plan to modernize the Public Financial Management (PFM) system.

Subcomponent 2 would fund advisory support and training to the Ministries of Finance and Health to plan and implement health financing reform, in particular in the wage system and Ministry staff planning.

Component 4: Capacity Building in Regulatory Management (US$0.66million) The component sought to enhance transparency and accessibility in regulatory management through capacity-building and advisory support to the Ministry of Justice and pilot inspection agencies. The component had two subcomponents:

Subcomponent 1 would provide consultancy services to the two agencies (Sanitary and Epidemiological Services and Fire Safety Inspectorate) to review existing normative acts and bring them up to date with internationally accepted technical regulations, support the review of internal regulations, and train inspectors to follow the new norms and standards in cooperation with the IFC. a. Subcomponent 2 would fund: (i) capacity building for the Justice Ministry

department responsible for legal documentation to assist with the creation of a recording procedure to ensure maintenance of a comprehensive record of regulatory documents, and a review of existing regulations and norms to identify those which were outdated; and (ii) assistance in establishing an electronic network to link line ministries, agencies, and other institutions with the power of legislative initiative to the MoJ.2 Other governmental bodies would be able to efficiently transfer their regulatory instruments to the MoJ, better ensure that regulatory drafts would be in line with the Law on Normative and Legal Acts (LNA), and provide the capability to make the drafts, as well as existing legislative acts, available for access to other government entities and businesses.

Component 5: Effective Management of Governance Reforms (US$0.65million) This component was to orchestrate the distinct reforms undertaken in the other components, to mitigate the risks of corruption, collusion, fraud and mismanagement associated with weak institutions and opaque state functioning, and fund a robust results

2 This was expected to be done by using the existing Civil Service Network, that covered 20 central ministries, and adding additional institutions through a secure modem-based connection to the network

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framework to monitor the implementation of the PAR Strategy to keep the reforms on track and establish transparent project governance arrangements with appropriate checks and balances. The component had two subcomponents:

Subcomponent 1 would fund project management arrangements, building project management capacity in the Department of Economic Reform and Investment and the Project Implementation Unit, including how to address risks of corruption, collusion and fraud.

Subcomponent 2 was expected to enhance government capacity to effectively manage and monitor governance reforms. It would be supported by conducting surveys on the impact of governance reforms and other outreach activities. In addition, a monitoring system for managing reform implementation was expected to be designed to effectively track reform impact.

1.6 Revised Components The project components remained largely unchanged (other than the indicators, as mentioned above). One activity each was added to components 2 and 4. In 2006 the Government reorganized the public administration by introducing a three-tier management system, which separated policy formulation, policy implementation and supervision functions. To legalize the new organizational structure and explicitly embed the roles and functions of institutions in the legal framework, a Law on Organization of Public Administration was to be developed with support from Component 2. Since the mining sector is a priority for economic growth, the inventorying of mining sector legislation was added as an activity under component 4.

1.7 Other significant changes During implementation there was a downsizing in the extent of capacity building and reform execution contemplated at Grant approval, as well as changes in project implementation arrangements. As indicated above, the PDO and related outcomes and indicators were restructured to better reflect country circumstances and more realistic goals. Implementation arrangements also changed. The PAD anticipated that an Administrative Reform Working Group, established under the National Development Council would oversee the PARS effort and Grant funded project. The Executive Office of the President (EOP) through its Department for Economic Reforms (DERI) would be the Project Implementation Agency and a Project Coordination Team (PCT) staffed by consultants would be created to support the implementation of components by four Technical Committees composed of government officials in beneficiary organizations. Unfortunately during a government reshuffling in December 2006, the Aid Coordination Unit, responsible for fiduciary function of all Bank projects, was abolished by Presidential decree. The DERI director of the PSRP (a staunch PAR champion) was also moved to another post. As a result, the PCT lost guidance from the EOP and could not maintain project implementation. Despite PARS provisions, no dedicated permanent government structure was established to oversee the PARS. Having no permanent staff to support PARS, the new Director of DERI, appointed in March 2007, hired new consultants to form a Project Coordination Team (PCT) to support Technical Committees

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as well as incorporate project fiduciary responsibilities within the PCT. A new and energetic PCT Coordinator was hired. Although a revised procurement plan was initiated, a lack of experience with international procurement caused delays in mobilizing external consulting services . The project’s implementation status was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory in 2007. However with improving project implementation and support of the authorities to the majority of recommendations developed through consulting services to inform new legislation and government decisions on implementing selected PARS objectives, project ratings were upgraded to Moderately Satisfactory in 2008, and ultimately to Satisfactory in 2010. There was some small reallocation of funds from component 4 to component 1 to complete the extension of the Civil Service Network (CSN). The project’s closing date was extended for an additional four months to complete some remaining activities, namely, the extension of the CSN and upgrade of the interface of Adliya legal database.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry The quality at entry was moderately unsatisfactory. On the one hand, the alignment with the Government’s public administration reform program and coordination of the project with adjustment lending and ESW work was quite conducive. On the other hand, overambitious objectives, inadequate funding, and weak management structure negatively affected the project. The PAD rightly rated overall risks as High, took steps to minimize the misuse of grant resource, and listed many lessons that had informed project design, but the design underestimated government’s ability (and perhaps extent of commitment) to undertake the far reaching reforms contemplated in the project. Strengths of the program at entry Leading up to the project and supporting its design was extensive economic and sector work, including a Governance Assessment prepared by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), a Public Expenditure and Investment Review, a Country Financial Accountability Assessment, and a variety of Policy Notes. Two Institution Building Technical Assistance operations had preceded the grant. In addition several of the components of the operation were complemented by policy reforms to be encouraged through the Bank’s development policy lending. There was dialogue with donor partners, who were providing support in a wide variety of related areas. Capacity building and advisory support was provided by several donors, but focused mainly on selected aspects of public sector reform agenda, such as public expenditure management (Department for International Development-DFID and the European Union-EU), social sector reforms (Staff Development Center, ADB, World Bank), and enhancing the investment and business climate (IFC/FIAS/MIGA, United States Agency for International Development-USAID). However, as there were no donors that were active in supporting core public administration capacity building, the World Bank decided to support reforms in that area where it had a strong and long standing track record in analytical work and advisory support.

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The PAD noted the complicated political economy of Tajikistan including regional/ethnic rivalries, a protracted civil war following independence, a government focus on consolidating the regime and balancing political factions, multiple opportunities for corruption, etc. Nevertheless it concluded that the political and institutional environment was favorable for project implementation. By 2006 the Government had stabilized the post-conflict macroeconomic performance and was looking to diversify the sources of economic growth. The Government, the PAD reported, realized that the inherited Soviet-style institutional and legal framework of public administration and its management structure did not meet the requirements of the market economy and slowed down the country’s further economic development. The Government’s commitment to the public administration reform was judged as high. An extensive list of lessons learned were presented in the PAD. They included:

a) Country context: Supporting the Government’s own reform Strategy. b) Ownership and flexibility: Empowering the executive to manage its own reform

program and build flexibility into project design to accommodate changes in reform priorities over the medium term.

c) Programmatic approach: Supporting ‘small steps in the right direction’ in governance reforms focusing on implementation practicalities with related policy issues dealt within the framework of policy-based operations.

d) Implementation arrangements: Seeking: (i) an approved set of practical actions; (ii) adequate implementation arrangements; (iii) built-in mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation; and (iv) incentives to implement the reforms. .

e) Practicality and sustainability of TA: Consulting services should focus on practical implementation issues rather than general reform design and should be well scheduled and managed by the client with intensive Bank supervision. The components were defined to include activities to support implementation and ensure sustainability of outcomes.

f) Partnership: Strong institutional counterpart in the Government, TA operations cannot achieve their objective.

Seven major risks to the project were identified, including political, technical, corruption, implementation and coordination, quality control, and donor coordination risks. All were rated as High. Some mitigating measures, especially in fiduciary and procurement areas were extensive, including use of a separate unit (Aid Coordination Unit-ACU) which was assessed as qualified to handle these responsibilities. Procurement plans and terms of reference were to be prepared in advance and transparency in contracting, through the use of publicly accessible project web-site, was proposed. Regarding those risks largely outside the control of Bank or counterpart project teams, the PAD asserted that the new Civil Service Law would likely enhance stability in the administration, the close linkage with the Bank’s development policy operations would reduce ownership and commitment risk, and capacity building measures would strengthen implementation and coordination capacity. Weaknesses of the project at entry

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Despite the extensive risks identified in the PAD, a list of lessons learned emphasizing a careful targeted incremental approach to capacity building, plus a record of two “Unsatisfactory” prior public sector operations, the project plunged ahead with a large array of components. Some were responding to client demands and needs, others to fill gaps left by the donor community, and one component to enhance a holistic approach to state modernization. The scope of the reforms would tax the management capacity of any government as they covered creating a merit based civil service (where salaries were low and clientelism was not unknown), horizontal restructuring of government plus design and implementation of vertical restructurings in line agencies to improve efficiency, policy making, and service delivery systems, strengthening of budget management, capacity building in regulatory management, and effective management of all governance reforms tossed in for good measure. The extent of contemplated reforms in several components exceeded the institutional, absorptive, and/or political capacity of a poor post-conflict IDA country. There is no disagreement (at least among government champions and the donor community) on the desirability or direction of the reforms, but their ambitiousness seems to contradict the experience of most societies where profound public sector strengthening takes many years if not decades. The fact that the PDO, outcome indicators, and intermediate indicators were nearly all reformulated and reduced attests to the overly ambitious nature of operational design. The fact that the proposed counterpart governance structure was never created, problems immediately emerged in project management, and overall oversight of public sector reform never materialized casts considerable doubt on the PAD’s assertions of government understanding or willingness to pursue the more fundamental reforms posed by the operation. Finally, grand state reform is hard enough without a shoestring budget. At $2.3 million for component 2 for example, the funding seems rather limited to finance functional reviews of government as a whole, 10 agencies, the implementation of recommendations, plus all the training, baseline surveys, and monitoring in other components. The project’s funding, relative to other public sector reform projects in the region looks modest, despite the undoubted difficulties to be expected in attracting high quality international consultants, capacity constraints, training needs, etc. 2.2 Implementation Project implementation was challenged from the beginning. As indicated in Section 1.7 above the governance structure for the project was not created, undermining timely decision making, adherence to project objectives and implementation schedules, plus credibility within the public sector. Unified oversight of all governance reforms was never achieved. Daily project operations were largely delegated to consultants, with implementation progress was due to their efforts plus those of dedicated line agency champions with support from some overstretched senior level officials who recognized the potential of the project.

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That said, the fundamental problems of weak institutional capacity, overly ambitious project goals, and limited funding remained. The ad hoc reform management structure sometimes slowed decision making on the implementation of selected reform measures impacting the achievement of project targets as well as disbursements. Following a mid-term review in 2009 the teams requested Board approval of project restructuring to adjust the PDO and targets to more realistic levels. With the exception of the civil service component where progress was deemed satisfactory, the essential change was to focus on the creation of prerequisites for reforms rather than expect their broad initiation or implementation. Following the restructuring implementation continued apace and targets were largely achieved. The Country Director also approved the project request to extend the project closing date for an additional four months until October 1, 2011 to complete the extension of the Civil Service Network and the upgrade of the Adliya legal database. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization The project monitoring and evaluation arrangements provided for the following activities:

Tracking progress in public administration reforms overall. This would include the design of a monitoring system which would track implementation of key activities included in the Public Administration Reform Strategy based on objective data;

Developing mechanisms for efficient communication of key objectives and achieved results of the reforms. A clear communication strategy supporting the implementation of public administration reform as well as providing publicity and on project activities would be developed and implemented.

Conducting surveys to track project implementation. This would support the monitoring and evaluation function of the project and would include the design and implementation of service delivery, public officials, and other surveys/studies that would allow monitoring and evaluating the progress in project implementation.

Originally the project intended the monitoring of the whole PARS implementation. However, due to lack of proper capacity and funds only PSRP implementation was followed up. The project did not provide resources sufficient for hiring an international consultant to help with capacity building, which affected the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation in general. During implementation, local staff, enhanced their monitoring capacity, but, generally, project monitoring and evaluation was rather weak and required substantial ongoing support from the Bank Task Team. The project regularly published articles in local newspapers on the project progress. Series of workshops on PSRP implementation were conducted throughout the country. A survey conducted by a consulting company at the end of the project showed relatively high awareness of the PARS among political and business opinion leaders though not average citizens. Thirty percent of respondents were aware of PARS implementation, 45% were partially aware and 21% were not aware. The highest awareness level was among deputies: 38% were aware, while 38% were aware partially. Also 35% of civil servants were aware of the PARS, while another 48% were partially aware.

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2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance No safeguard policy was applied to the project. There were no substantial issues with regard to procurement and financial management. A few minor discrepancies revealed during annual audit reviews or supervision missions were effectively resolved in a timely manner. Audit reports were usually provided on time and were unqualified. However, the audit report for FY2010 was significantly delayed. The selection of an auditor was responsibility of the State Committee on Investment and State Property Management. Unfortunately, the whole process of selection was delayed and this fact unfavorably affected all Bank’s projects in Tajikistan that were included into the block audit arrangement. The final project audit will be conducted in February 2012 with the aim of providing the final audit report by the end of March 2012. No procurement post review reports were prepared due to a small number of contracts which did not warrant a separate review.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase The project has supported some important steps forward in institutional capacity building and steps have been taken to sustain those reforms. These include:

a) Assigning the function of coordination and management of public administration reform to the DERI by amending its regulation;

b) Issuing a Government resolution requiring all public organizations connected to the Civil Service Network to allocate funds in their budgets for maintaining the network. The resolution also put the Center for Information Technology in the Executive Office of the President in charge of administering the network, while the Civil Service Department is responsible for managing the Civil Service Registry;

c) The maintenance and management of the Adliya legal database was transferred to ‘Kafolat’, an autonomous state-owned enterprise subordinated to the Ministry of Justice. Information for public at large is accessible on a subscription basis that generates sufficient revenues to maintain the database.

d) A separate IDA credit is supporting public financial management reform (P099840) based on the PFM strategy developed by this project

Beyond the PFM operation, there are no current plans for additional Bank support given the strict limits on IDA resources. To date no other donor has expressed interest in providing additional funding for the initiatives.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation This project’s restructured objectives are relevant to country priorities. The Government highlighted its long term vision for achieving the MDGs – the National Development

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Strategy (NDS) for 2006-15. In collaboration with its development partners, the Government identified the following medium- and long-term development priorities achieving the MDGs: (a) reform of public sector management; (b) development of private sector and attracting investments; and (c) development of human potential. The project is also consistent with the Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy for FY10-13 which highlights the strengthening both governance systems and incentives for better performance of civil servants as top priorities. However, as the original design of the project was unduly ambitious and underfunded, and did not properly mitigate for risks in government capacity and ownership, its PDOs were at best partially achieved. The restructured operation did largely meet its downsized objectives, but in the absence of sustained follow-up requiring a level of government capacity (problematic) and external financing (unidentified thus far) the ultimate relevance of this investment of scarce grant resources remains to be seen.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives As the project was formally revised in terms of PDOs and key associated outcome targets, its achievements must be assessed against both original and restructured objectives. Details on outputs and outcomes as well as a table presenting ratings weighted in proportion to the share of grant disbursements before and after revision are presented in Annex 2. As explained below, results achieved against the original PDOs are at best Moderately Unsatisfactory while the results against the restructured (and reduced) PDOs and outcome targets appear Satisfactory. Achievement of Original Project Development Objectives The original project development objective was to “assist the Recipient in the implementation of the PARS by strengthening policy making and service delivery systems and enhancing transparency of public management in selected core public sector entities.” However, the Project Mid-Term Review Mission concluded that these benchmarks were too ambitious, some outcomes could not be achieved, and some activities envisaged in the PAD did not address the areas of proposed measurements. Of four outcome indicators (and associated four main indicators included in the PAD), only two can be judged, generously, as having been met. The others two are partially achieved. Outcome 1: A transparently managed and increasingly merit based Civil Service Indicator: The number of civil servants (new entrants) recruited through merit-based competitions increases by 50 percent from the baseline level to be established in November 2006. Results: Significant progress has been made in complementing the civil service legislation approved just prior to project effectiveness. The competitive recruitment of civil servants has become the norm. Whereas in 2006 there was not competitive recruitment process in place the majority of civil servants are hired through competition (including the posting of positions in public offices and newspapers, panel interview of candidates if more than one, etc.) In 2010, 2514 vacancies in the civil service were filled

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through a competitive recruitment process, representing 82% out of 3065 vacancies filled. With project support a civil service registry has been designed, installed and is expected to be fully functional by April 1, 2012 once some minor information technology issues are resolved, according to government. A performance appraisal system has been developed and is being introduced. At present, salary progression is based on length of service and performance appraisal depends on the Soviet-style attestation procedure; however, when the performance appraisal system is fully functioning promotion to a new salary grade (or step) is expected to become contingent on annual performance appraisals. With the adjustment in salaries the Civil Service Department is reporting that the Government has been able to fill all vacant positions, many of which had been open for extended periods. Evidence that the Civil Service is transparently managed is difficult to determine in the absence of objective indicators or baseline data, but the thrust of the reforms in recruitment, pay, and performance appraisals has probably increased the level of transparency of management. Outcome 2: A rationalized overall central government structure and improved organization and management systems in selected core public sector entities. Indicator: Reform Plans are implemented for 8 line ministries or central agencies by the end of the project and reports on their implementation are published on the Government web site. Results: Based in part on recommendations of a rapid horizontal functional review conducted under the project, the central government was reorganized in late 2006. A three-tier management system in sectors was established, in which ministries are responsible for policy formulation, agencies are in charge of policy implementation, and inspections – for oversight of policy implementation. As a result the number of ministries and state committees was reduced from 28 to 17. Vertical functional reviews were conducted in 10 central ministries and agencies. Based on the recommendations from the reviews and directed by Presidential Resolution #1574 of April 5, 2011, all ministries have developed and approved organizational restructuring plans. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (including its subordinated Agency on Social Protection, Employment and Migration, and Agency on Social Security and Pension) presented its plan at a government round-table conference with participation of NGOs and mass media, and subsequently implemented the plan. Some advanced ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy and Trade, plan to start reorganization in 2012. Other ministries, with lower capacities, will likely require technical assistance to initiate and implement reforms. Outcome 3: Increasingly reliable, comprehensive and available public financial management information Indicator: The level of deviation between approved and executed central government budget decreases by 30% over the project period, from the baseline level which will be established on the basis of the Budget Execution Report for 2005.

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Results: The original target was not logically linked with the planned and implemented activities under this component. Activities did not provide for strengthening budget planning and execution mechanisms. PSRP resources under component 3 were only partially utilized in part because advances were being anticipated and achieved through preparation of a parallel Bank PFM project which began in 2010. A PFM modernization plan was adopted by the Government in 2009 and the new operation will facilitate increasingly reliable, comprehensive and available public financial management information. Since the end of 2009 the Ministry of Finance has published budget execution information on its website on a quarterly basis. Information from these Central Treasury reports is judged reasonably reliable and relatively comprehensive. Moreover the EU was providing separate resources for the development of a Medium Term Budget Framework and encouraged the Government and Bank to defer specific reforms in budgeting until that MTBF effort was completed. There was a reduction in deviations between the approved and executed budget to less than 10% over the recent years, although the reduction is due to more realistic revenue estimations and expenditure planning and is unrelated to project activities. Outcome 4: Enhanced transparency and accessibility of the legal and regulatory framework Indicator: Access to information and regulation, norms and procedures by businesses increases 40-50 percent from the baseline level to be established by a survey to be conducted in early 2007. Results: With project support the Ministry of Justice improved the technical characteristics of its legal database (covering all laws, norms, regulations, and processes of all government agencies, regulatory agencies, etc. and its interface, designed the ministry’s website, and put the database on that website. “Database Adliya” (www.minjust.tj/adliya) is regularly updated, and available free of charge to public sector agencies and on a subscription basis to enterprises and the general public. A 2007 IFC survey was not conducted as anticipated in the PAD so no baseline for comparison exists. Nevertheless, according to a survey conducted at the end of project implementation, 37.9% of respondents (including public sector employees, deputies, mass media employees, businessmen, and representatives of civil society) had accessed legal information through the Database Adliya. Achievement of Revised Project Development Objectives The revised project development objective was to “Establish legal and organizational prerequisites for improved public sector management, improve public access to legislation, and strengthen regulatory framework in selected areas.” More realistic and narrower in its conception, it focused on prerequisites for improvements rather than positing full implementation of new (if undefined) management systems eschewed grand goals in transparency for improvements in public access to information. While the number of outcomes was maintained at four, more specific target values (main indicators) were increased to 7 and made more specific. Of the outcomes three were achieved and one partially achieved. Six of seven target values were achieved.

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Outcome 1: A transparently managed and increasingly merit-based civil service Target Value: Competitive merit-based recruitment of civil servants for positions below grades 1-2 is institutionalized. At least 80 percent of vacant positions are filled either by competitive recruitment or promotion. Results: As this outcome is unchanged from the original, its results are described above. The revised target value which raised the goal for competitive recruitment from 50% of vacant positions filled to 80% (excepted political level appointments) was overachieved with 82% of entrants hired using competitive processes. It should be noted that 60 positions had only one applicant, reflecting in the view of government the then uncompetitive level of civil service salaries. Outcome 2: A law on Organization of Public Administration and a reform plan for streamlining the overall central government structure approved; and organizational structures and management systems in selected core public sector entities improved Target Value 1: Reform Plans for streamlining of institutions structures in 8 ministries and central agencies approved and short-term restructuring measures implemented Target Value 2: The law on Organization of Public Administration, defining principles of organization and accountability of public administration bodies, is submitted for adoption. Results: A new Law on Organization of Public Administration has been approved by Parliament and awaiting signature by the President. The law defines the types of public institutions, their form of subordination, coordination and accountability arrangements consistent with the reorganization of the central public administration conducted in 2006. It embeds a three-tier management system in public administration sectors, in which ministries are responsible for policy-formulation, agencies are in charge of policy implementation, and inspections provide oversight. As noted above vertical functional reviews were undertaken with project support in 10 central ministries and agencies. The reviews examined the relationship between a ministry’s central apparatus and related sector and regional agencies and services, institutes, enterprises, etc.; helped define cross-cutting issues, hierarchical institutional structures, the role of the center in coordinating and managing policy and service delivery, as well as accountability provisions; proposed revised organizational structures and procedures that would allow more effective and less costly achievement of strategic sector policy objectives including delegation of responsibilities where appropriate. All recommendations were summarized in the Government Plan for Implementation of Recommendations of Vertical Functional Reviews, which was issued on April 5, 2011 (Presidential Resolution #1574). All ministries have developed and approved their organizational restructuring plans and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has implemented its restructuring plan. Some advanced ministries such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy and Trade will start reorganization in 2012. Other ministries, with low capacities, may need technical assistance to initiate reforms.

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Outcome 3: A Strategy and Action Plan for modernizing public financial management approved and under implementation Target Value 1: A Public Financial Management Strategy establishing framework for improvements in management, efficiency and transparency of the use of public resources, is approved Target Value 2: A new remuneration system in the health system is designed and implemented Results: As indicated above a PFM modernization strategy and action plan establishing a framework for improvements in management, efficiency and transparency of the use of public resources, was adopted by the Government in 2009. An IDA operation (Public Financial Modernization –P099840) which became effective on May 14, 2009 is supporting strategy implementation. A new wage grid in the public health sector, introduced on June 29, 2009, is transparent and performance-based, and consistent with new job classifications. The system rationalizes additional pay, allowances, and supplement for doctors and health personnel and establishes a more transparent mechanism in setting up salaries. The new wage grid reflects qualifications and skills, the complexity of work and responsibility, and distinguishes the wage grid in two broad streams - one for "doctors working in primary health care" and one for "doctors working in hospitals and non-primary health care services" Outcome 4: Enhanced public accessibility to legislation and streamlined legislation in selected areas Target Value 1: Access to information on laws and regulations for the legal entities is improved Target Value 2: Regulations in the area of fire safety, sanitary-epidemiological standard and subsoil use area streamlined Results: As indicated above the project helped the Ministry of Justice to improve the technical characteristics of its legal database and its interface, to design the ministry’s website, and to put the database on the ministry’s website (www.minjust.tj/adliya). All existing legislation on fire prevention and sanitary-epidemiology safety was reviewed, and more than 40 technical rules and norms were developed or updated as well as a list of outdated legislation prepared. A preliminary list of laws and regulations was developed, which also included issues on regulation of the mining sector. In coordination with the Ministry of Justice and stakeholders, a methodology was developed to review the legislation on subsoil management. The legislative review was conducted, including laws adopted by the former Soviet Union, in order to identify inconsistencies, reveal gaps in legislation, determine the mechanisms for implementation of laws and regulations, and classify the laws. Particular attention was paid to procedures on business registration in subsurface management, and issuance of licenses and permits (land use, permits for constructions and conducting the works). The entire inventory was approved by the Ministry of Justice in December 2010. A survey was conducted at the end project asks entrepreneurs of their knowledge of the inventory of legislation in the areas of fire prevention and sanitary-epidemiology safety in order to help inform government’s communication effort. According to the survey conducted in the spring 2011, 56% of

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respondents-entrepreneurs believed that the regulatory burden improved in the fire inspection and sanitary-epidemiology areas.

3.3 Efficiency As an institutional capacity building project, quantitative projections of rates of return are not applicable and were not developed during project preparation. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Justification for the above rating reflects careful assessment of advances against original and revised PDO and outcome indicators as weighted by the relative disbursement ratio under both phases (see Annex 2.a Restructuring). Essentially the first half of the project (in terms of disbursements if not time) is judged moderately unsatisfactory whereas the revision of PDO and outcome indicators during the restructuring to more realistic and feasible levels permitted a Satisfactory rating for that phase. Of course the process is not a facile arithmetic exercise as the determination of progress is to some extent subjective especially when the earlier objectives were broad and vaguely worded. (While the final ISRs rated the project as Satisfactory, those ratings refer to the restructured PDOs and not the project as a whole.) Clearly the relevance of public sector capacity building in core systems of civil service, public finance, organizational structure, and service delivery to Tajikistan is high, especially given the challenges from legacy systems and capacity constraints. The full or partial achievement of PDOs is detailed in the previous section and in Annex 2. If sustained there are real advances—building block prerequisites—for the next phases of state modernization and contributing to a more effective public sector. Notable advances include: regulations on competitive recruitment and performance appraisal; new wage grids for the Civil Service and health workers; a law on the organization of the public administration; action plan on for implementing recommendations from vertical functional reviews; and a public finance management reform strategy already in implementation. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has been reorganized with positive impact on citizens through better service delivery, which has been confirmed by several online surveys through the ministry’s website as well as the potential as a model for restructurings in other ministries and agencies. Citizens can now access legal information from government and benefit from updated fire and sanitation codes. All these advances, if sustained, would seem to represent an efficient use of a small grant.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development There is no direct poverty, gender or social impact on the population. Indirectly, however, the project can be judged as helping lay the basis for a strengthening of the government’s human assets, more efficient management of service delivery and public

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administration organization, and improved access to information by the public—all of which should benefit citizens. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Institutional strengthening is the core focus of the project. As indicated above and in Annex 2 below, it has supported improvements in civil service procedures and information management, restructuring or regulatory updates in selected agencies, design of organization reforms in several ministries/agencies, and targeted training. Particular attention was paid to introducing new regulations and capacity building in the Civil Service Department given the potential for positive cross-cutting effects in the whole public sector. Project-financed activities related to strengthening civil service management and coordination capacity, introducing modern HR management processes, improving incentives (pay) systems in the civil service, and strengthening the training system in the IHQCS. Additionally the project funded investments in data access and data collection, communications and computer equipment for connecting ministries/territorial executive bodies to the network, and training for using the civil service register. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) Although the public awareness campaign was conducted properly, the large part of population did not show interest to the government activities. Public interest to reform is one of the key success factors in countries with centralized decision making process.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops A survey, conducted by a private consulting company funded by the project, with 614 respondents drawn from civil servants, deputies, journalists, entrepreneurs and civil society was completed in May 2011. The results were largely positive in terms of the project’s impact. Key findings included the following: -30% of respondents were familiar with the Public Administration Reform Strategy, 45% were aware partially; and 21% were not aware of it. -27% of respondents believed that the quality of civil service competitive selection had improved, 48% agreed with this statement partially, while 16% had not noticed any positive changes in the recruitment process. -32% of respondents thought that training programs offered by the IHQCS had improved, 33% believed they improved partially, while 11% reported no improvements. -31% considered the new civil service wage grid as being more transparent than the previous pay system. Another 31% believed that the given wage grid was somewhat more transparent. Only 9% of respondents replied that the new wage grid was not transparent.

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-23% of respondents agreed with that statement that the new civil service wage grid improved incentives, 38% agreed with the statement partially, while 18% did not agree. -14% of respondents believed that the recent government reorganization was successful, 45% believed that it was partially successful, while 10% of respondents considered the reorganization as a failure. -38% of respondents had access to legal information through the Adliya legal database, and 28% via the mass media. -8% of respondents replied that compliance costs of new procedures in FPI and SES had declined, while 27% believed that costs had declined only modestly, and 11% responded that their costs did not change. Further interpretation of the survey suggests that without adequate public awareness, the reform would have less positive effect. The survey showed that awareness was raised among elites, but not sufficiently among the general public. Each agency publicizes its own activities but without linking the changes to the broader public administration reform. At present, there is no single framework and systemic approach in place to provide information on the reform. The survey underlined that successful implementation of the PARS depends, on one side, on understanding and support of reform objectives by certain parts of the business community and society as well as interest by citizens in reform outcomes, and, on other side, the availability of information on reform implementation,. Appropriate actions should thus be taken aimed at: • stimulating interaction with the public on the reform implementation issues; • raising public awareness of goals, objectives and progress of the reform; and • providing motivation for engagement in reform implementation to different segments of society. In the future, survey findings suggested, reform efforts need to address the secretive mentality of civil servants, which would contribute to their enhanced image. Increasing salaries of civil servants should be linked to their performance. Citizens should be involved in discussions on what must be the outcomes of the public administration’s performance. Public feedback mechanisms should be established. Further work will also be required to clarify the status and authority of the public administration, with a focus on the social control over its actions.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Significant Section 2.5 above details steps taken by Government to consolidate project achievements and institutionalize and sustain the advances. Nevertheless risks remain, particularly with regard to follow up on the vertical organizational reforms. The functional reviews of 10 agencies have been completed, but additional funding and technical assistance will be

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required to support implementation of their recommendations. Similarly the introduction of update regulations in mining, sanitation and epidemiological services and fire prevention does not ensure their implementation. There are no current plans for new Bank financing given the strict limits on IDA resources and no other donor has expressed interest in providing additional funding for these initiatives. Moreover, the issuance of new regulations and assignment of new responsibilities will not ensure implementation in the absence of strong oversight from DERI. Unfortunately that unit did not have the capacity to provide much support to the project during implementation and no new qualified staff have been added or overall policy level oversight function established at the senior level of government. The use of merit in the selection of incoming staff is an important step forward, however if career progression is not linked quickly to performance appraisal its benefits could be dissipated, undermining the role of merit within the civil service.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory As previewed in Section on the quality of entry of the project, the design of the operation was unduly ambitious given country circumstances, funding and project activities were inconsistent with several objectives, the high risks and sobering lessons mentioned in the PAD did not appear to have been learned or utilized in project design. The project appears to have been a quickly prepared (taking only six months from PCN Review to Board). The scope was too broad, in some instances filling gaps, with a less than holistic integrity of approach. Most importantly the design looks like a copy of earlier operations undertaken in other former Soviet Union republics but without adequate adaptation to the fractured political economy and especially weak institutional capacity of Tajikistan. The fact that project implementation arrangements faltered early and a major restructuring and downsizing of objectives was required underlines the assessment. Had the project’s original targets and activities been designed in a way more appropriate to the weak institutional capacity of the country plus high risks identified in the PAD or stark lessons from earlier operations implementation may have been smoother and real advances achieved would not be viewed as downsized or somehow less than expected, but rather as in line with country circumstances and opportunities. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory Supervision of the project was intense from the beginning. A new team leader was tasked with overseeing implementation and, given the design flaws which became quickly apparent, needed to devote constant attention to the operation. Bank supervision missions visited the country 3-4 times a year. The project was supported from the early

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stages by a full-time field based Public Sector Specialist and a strong headquarters based team including specialists in public sector, public financial management, and procurement specialists. Detailed Aides Memoire, which were regularly disseminated to the client and partners, Bank missions focused on key issues and their solutions, and recommendations for further project implementation. The mid-term review in March 2009 reached agreement on a revised project results framework and decision to restructure the project. Between missions, the team supported the daily work of the project by providing considerable advice and recommendations. There was a notably open and productive dialogue between the team and the Project Director and senior government officials once the initial problems in project management were overcome. Significant efforts were made by the team to encourage the creation of the high level body to oversee the public administration reform effort, but these ultimate foundered on the perceived (and probably real) political economy constraints on government to delegate core issues of public sector operations or undertake massive reorganizations given the continuing weight of legacy systems and attitudes, capacity weaknesses, and funding constraints. Sector and country management was engaged early and ISR ratings appear to have been realistic, signaling from the beginning the challenges to the project. The decision to seek a deep restructuring is entirely appropriate, although earlier restructuring could have been pursued even if the substantive results would not have been different. Additionally it appears that the inclusion of an Information and Communications Technology expert on the team could have sped some ICT procurement and strengthen the technical assistance provided to the project. However the need for frequent missions and daily oversight put real constraints on the supervision budget. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The supervision team demonstrated the strengths of the Bank-- technical and country expertise, commitment to project goals and the partner, and willingness to go extra lengths to ensure a successful project. But its satisfactory performance and highly satisfactory dedication cannot outweigh the design flaws and miscues which impacted the project and consumed so much of counterpart and supervision effort in seeking to make the design work and ultimately significantly restructure it. The overall performance must take into account the overall outcome of the operation as well as less than appropriate initial design.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Government performance improved over the course of the project. Once properly constituted the project implementation team under the DERI was highly effective and dedicated. There was a generally high level of Government commitment and ownership during the later phases of project implementation, although some considered the

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Government’s earlier approach as essentially neutral (i.e. not opposed to strengthened public administration but perhaps skeptical about the reach of some components and dubious about the political feasibility of decentralizing powers relating to career advancement, agency organization, etc.) Nevertheless technical groups were established for the main four project components and they provided active assistance in project implementation by discussing terms of reference and participating in procurement processes. The failure to establish the planned project board (Administrative Reform Working Group) or pursue a holistic integration of the PARS undoubtedly reduced the leverage of the project though. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory Thanks to active support of project implementation by all the main beneficiaries (the Executive Office of the President, the Civil Service Department, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Justice, the Sanitary-Epidemiological Service, the Fire Prevention Inspectorate, and ‘Tajikgeologiya’) all project activities in those agencies were completed on time. Capacity-related problems in those agencies were compensated by beneficiary agencies’ high commitment to reform. Other agencies cooperated with their own vertical functional reviews and the preparation of reorganization plans, although it is too early to judge their broader performance as the more difficult phase of implementation has not yet begun. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Judged against the original and restructured PDOs overall borrower performance is judged as moderately satisfactory. Like the project, the inadequacies of the original project design, missteps during the early period of implementation and continuing absence of an effective high level oversight body are factors which cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, given the serious capacity constraints the borrower did permit the high quality and dedicated project team to act, took key decisions (if slowly) when required, and ensured the necessary extent of legal and procedural changes. 6. Lessons Learned

1) For any project attempting important reforms and restructuring in core government operations, especially in a country with a highly centralized decision-making process, the project must involve high level government leadership during both project preparation and implementation. Lack of such leadership can divert project design into suboptimal or infeasible directions, signal a lack of ownership to change resistors, retard and complicate decision-making, and lead to wastage of time, money, and opportunities;

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2) There should be a single project coordination unit, reporting to senior government leadership (and not any one ministry), to oversee such a broad cross government operation. In the absence of such unit, in this case, functions were divided among the state advisor on economic issues, the project director and the PIU, which often affected the timeliness of decision-making process. Establishing the unit should have been a prior condition for this operation;

3) To enhance effectiveness of public administration reform, such technical assistance operations should be supplemented by development policy operations;

4) To be achievable, the project development objectives should correspond to the available funding and implementation timeframe. In this case the activity on reorganization of line ministries and agencies under component 2 provided for conducting vertical functional reviews and implementing recommendations but the funds allocated for that activity were sufficient only to conduct the reviews and make recommendations. Also the project had intended to establish capacity for monitoring and evaluation of PARS. However, funds allocated were not sufficient for building an effective monitoring system covering whole PARS implementation. Only PSRP implementation was monitored and evaluated.

5) Bank management should better ensure that political economy assessments and lessons of earlier applicable operations be incorporated into project design and not solely in PAD text.

6) Avoid project activities tangential to the core project concept. The project supported reform in Sanitary-Epidemiology Service and Fire Prevention Inspectorate. The survey conducted at project close suggested that the reforms had reduced the administrative burden on business. However, the reform might have had a larger and more systemic impact by targeting the development of regulatory capacity at the center of government. For example, establishing capacity for legislative impact assessments and cost-benefit analysis would have been more relevant to the objectives of core public administration reforms. Alternatively the reforms in SES and FPI might have been pilots for reform concepts to be applied more generally rather than stand alone efforts.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies The Executive Office of the President (EOP) prepared a 39 page Final Report on the project. The report lists in detail the advances achieved and reports that the government is positive on the results of the PSRP. The report raises no problematic issues related to preparation, design, or implementation of the grant requiring further Bank comment. (b) Cofinanciers N/A (c) Other partners and stakeholders N/A

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Total Baseline Cost

Component 1. 0.81 1.05 129.62 Component 2. 2.31 2.41 104.32 Component 3. 0.57 0.48 84.21 Component 4. 0.66 0.52 78.78 Component 5. 0.65 0.88 135.38

Total Project Costs 5.00 5.34 106.80 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 0.00 0.00

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 0.00 0.00 .00 IDA Grant 5.00 5.34 106.80 Due to positive changes in the exchange rates between SDR and USD, the sum of funding of the PSRP in USD increased. Additional some was allocated to different activities. Some savings from components 3 and 4 were reallocated to other components. The operations expenses under Component 5 were higher than estimated originally.

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component Original PDO, Outcome Indicators and Related Main Indicators, Intermediate Results Indicators, and Results3 PDO To assist the Recipient in the implementation of PARS through strengthening policy making and service delivery systems and enhancing transparency of public management in selected core public sector entities PDO Outcome Indicators and Related Main IndicatorsOutcome Indicator- A transparently managed and increasingly merit-based Civil Service. Main Indicator - The number of civil servants (new entrants) recruited through merit-based competition increases by 50 percent from the baseline level to be established in November 2006

Achieved The majority of civil servants are hired through competition, a performance appraisal system has been developed and is being introduced; the civil service registry has been designed, installed and is expected to be fully functional by April 1, 2012; and a new transparent civil service salary has been introduced and salary levels raised to become more competitive. Achieved In 2010, 2514 vacancies in the civil service were filled through a competitive recruitment process, representing 82% out of 3065 vacancies filled. In 2006 there was no competitive based recruitment system in place.

Outcome Indicator- A rationalized overall central government structure and improved organization and management systems in selected core public sector entities.

Partially Achieved Based on recommendations of the horizontal functional review conducted under the project, the central government was reorganized in November 2006. The three-tier management system in sectors was established, in which ministries are responsible for policy formulation, agencies are in charge of policy implementation, and inspections – for oversight of policy

3 This annex is arranged to show the PDO, PDO indicators and their related Main Indicators, intermediate results indicators for each component, and results. The first section covers the original Results Framework and the second section - the restructured Results Framework. Given similarities/duplication of some indicators, information on some results achieved will be repeated.

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Main Indicator - Reform Plans are implemented for 8 line ministries or central agencies by the end of the project and reports on their implementation are published on the Government Website

implementation. Funds allocated and timeframe established for vertical functional reviews provided only for developing restructuring recommendations and preparing implementation plans. Implementation plans are being implemented by the Government after the project closure. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, selected as a pilot institution, began its reorganization during project implementation. It has successfully completed reorganization within the life of the project. Partially Achieved Vertical functional reviews were conducted in 10 central ministries and agencies. Based on the recommendations from the reviews and directed by Presidential Resolution #1574 of April 5, 2011, all ministries have developed and approved organizational restructuring plans. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (including its subordinated Agency on Social Protection, Employment and Migration, and Agency on Social Security and Pension) presented its plan at a government round-table conference with participation of NGOs and mass media, and subsequently implemented the plan. Some advanced ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy and Trade, will start reorganization in 2012. Other ministries, with low capacities, may need TA to initiate and implement reforms.

Outcome Indicator- - Increasingly reliable, comprehensive and available public financial management information.

Partially Achieved A PFM modernization plan was adopted by the Government in 2009 and implementation under a parallel World Bank operation started in 2010. Since the end of 2009 the Ministry of Finance has published budget execution information on its website on a quarterly basis. Information from the Central Treasury reports is judged reasonably reliable and relatively comprehensive.

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Main Indicator - The level of deviation between the approved and executed central government budget decreases by 30 % over the project period, from the baseline level established on the basis of the Budget Execution Report for 2005.

Partially Achieved The original target was not logically linked with the planned and implemented activities under this component. Activities did not provide for strengthening budget planning and execution mechanisms. Therefore, it was impossible to attribute the changes in reducing budget deviations to project activities. Nevertheless deviation between approved and executed budget has been less than 10% over the recent years, a reduction due to more realistic revenue estimations and expenditure planning.

Outcome Indicator-Enhanced transparency and accessibility of the legal and regulatory framework. Main Indicator - Access to information and regulation norms and procedures by business increased by 40-50 percent from the baseline level established by a survey to be conducted in early 2007

Practically Achieved The component focused on improving access to information not only for business, but also public sector employees and citizens. Notable achievements include the fact that the Government now has an updated official legal database which is accessible to civil servants free of charge and to individuals and businesses on a subscription basis. Achieved The expected 2007 IFC survey was not conducted so no baseline for comparison exists. Nevertheless, prior to the project there were no official sources of legal information. Now all businesses have access to critical information on norms and procedures through the online legal database.

Component 1 Intermediate Results Indicators and ResultsIndicator- Civil Service register, as a key tool for horizontal Civil Service management, operational

Partially achieved On April 5, 2008 the President approved a regulation on “Order of Awarding Civil Servants Qualification Ranks”. Based on that regulation, the Civil Service Registry has been updated and on September 26, 2011, the extension and rehabilitation of the Civil Service Network was completed. The Network connects all 47 government ministries and agencies in the city of

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Dushanbe and outside to the Civil Service Registry database, providing key information on individual employees, their qualifications, and employment history. Although the registry software has been installed in all agencies, the registry is not yet operating on an on-line basis. There are small bugs in the software, which are currently being fixed. According to the government’s plan, the Civil Service Registry will operate on-line by April 1, 2012.

Indicator- Consistency in recruitment and promotion practices achieved in central government

Partially achieved Recruitment of civil servants takes place according to the government regulation on competitive merit-based recruitment. Promotion is related to the still effective attestation and staff reserve procedures. On February 18, 2011 the President approved the Regulation “Performance Appraisal of Civil Servants”. The new system, which provides a linkage between performance and promotion, is expected to replace the attestation system in the medium-term period.

Indicator-Recruitment by open competition, based on public vacancy announcements, is institutionalized

Achieved On May 20, 2009, the President approved a new regulation on “Competitive Based Selection” procedures, which institutionalized competitive recruitment throughout the Civil Service. The new procedures provide for transparency of the selection process, creation of evaluation commissions with central agency participation, different methods of selection based on types of position within a framework of competition, etc. The Civil Service Department monitors the implementation of this regulation. As indicated above, 82% of vacancies were filled through competitive processes in 2010.

Indicator- New civil service pay system fully operational.

Achieved On October 1, 2010, the new Civil Service Wage Grid was introduced in five central agencies on a pilot basis. On September 1,

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2011 the new Civil Service Wage Grid was extended to the entire Civil Service, including local governments. The reform removed all non-transparent bonuses, better linked pay to outside market compensation, regularized pay for similar jobs across government and made the system more consistent. On average, the salaries of civil servants increased by 40%, with non-political staff receiving the highest adjustments.

Component 2 Intermediate Results Indicators and Results Indicator- Effective reform monitoring and tracking system put in place.

Not achieved While the Government did not establish a central unit to monitor public administration reform, the project unit monitored PSRP activities and reported on advances through local mass media and round-tables workshops.

Indicator- Reallocation of functions between institutions at central government level completed.

Partially achieved A Horizontal Functional Review of the Central Government was conducted under the project in 2006. It recommended reorganization of the central government including the reallocation of functions among institutions at the central government level. On November 30, 2006, the President issued a decree on “Improving the Structure of Central Executive Bodies”, which provided for the establishment of a three-tier administrative system in each policy sectors. It provides that ministries are in charge of developing policies, agencies are responsible for policy implementation, and inspections are in charge of supervision. As a result there is a clearer demarcation of authority, autonomy, and accountability; the number of ministries was cut while the number of agencies and services was increased; and greater specialization has helped reduce duplication of responsibilities.

Indicator- Management and accountability systems for service delivery in the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection streamlined.

Achieved Based on recommendations of a vertical functional review, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MOLSP) developed

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an Action Plan that was successfully implemented. The review helped identify inefficiencies and duplications existing in the social services delivery system. Changes to the Regulation on MOLSP and its subordinated agencies eliminated those inefficiencies and strengthened accountability in the sector. In particular, the adoption of Law on “Minimal Living Standards “(May 19, 2009), Law on “Social Standards” (May19, 2009), and Law on “Insurance and State Pensions” (January 12, 2010) have laid down a solid ground for improving service delivery. Good implementation of approved Standards for Provision of Social Services in Day-Care Centers, Model Regulation of Day-Stay Institution, and Model of Regulation of Division of Social Welfare at Home also contributed to further improvements. For the future, clear division of responsibilities and authorities between MOLSP and local governments in the issue of delivery of social services is necessary. This may be achieved through introducing proper changes to the Law on Local Governments and other sectoral legislation. Second, MOLSP needs to develop and implement an effective capacity building and staff retention plan. The functional review pointed out that there was a lack of proper capacity in some areas of social service delivery as well as high staff turnover at the local level. These issues will be addressed by the ongoing EC Technical Assistance to Sector Policy Support Program in the Social Protection Sector and Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project.

Component 3 Intermediate Results Indicators and ResultsIndicator- Public Financial Management Reform Action Plan adopted and capacity of budget units to use strategic budget

Partially achieved A Public Finance Management Reform Strategy for 2009-2018 and Action Plan

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planning tools enhanced.

were approved by the Government on March 20, 2009. The overall objective of the PFM reform is to improve aggregate fiscal discipline, allocative effectiveness, and operational efficiency. In particular, the reform aims to ensure the budget is comprehensive and stable, a full Medium-Term Expenditure Framework is in place, organizations will be responsible for the proper execution of their budgets and the results achieved, the Government will have an operational financial management information system covering Treasury functions across the whole of the country, the accounting framework approaches compliance with IPSAS Accrual accounting standards, and the preparation of the Annual Financial Statement will be timely and allow for audit by an independent External Audit Office which will report its audit findings to Parliament. The “capacity of budget units to use strategic budget planning tools enhanced” will be implemented and monitored under the Public Finance Management Modernization Project (PFMMP). The capacity of ministries to use budget as a strategic policy planning tool has been addressed through other operations, notably, technical assistance supporting the series of Policy Development Operation (PDPG) and EU Project for implementation of FMIS in the social sector ministries. To avoid duplication and optimize the use of resources under PSRP, the TA to improve budget management was not delivered under the project in question.

Indicator- New wage and staff planning systems for primary health care operational.

Achieved The Ministry of Health approved a new Job Classification of Health Sector Employees on September 29, 2008. The new job classification addressed the role and expected skills of family doctors and nurses, medical nurses working in the health/medical homes, and provided clear separation between existing positions in

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primary and secondary health care with some revision of staffing norms. It formed a basis for the new wage structure in the health sector, correcting the previous 1993 wage grid in the health sector which did not reflect the level of complexity and responsibility of assigned tasks. The new grid is transparent and performance-based, consistent with new job classifications, and rationalizes additional pay, allowances, and supplements for doctors and health personnel.

Component 4 Intermediate Results Indicators and ResultsIndicator- Improved access to legal norms and acts to both government and public.

Achieved The project helped the Ministry of Justice to improve the technical characteristics of the database and its interface, design the ministry’s website, and put the database on the ministry’s website. Database Adliya (www.minjust.tj/adliya) is regularly updated, and available free of charge to public sector agencies and on a subscription basis to enterprises and the general public. According to a survey conducted at the end of the project implementation, 37.9% of respondents (including public sector employees, deputies, mass media employees, businessmen, and representatives of civil society) had accessed legal information through the legal “Database Adliya”.

Indicator- Internal and technical regulations of pilot inspections agencies developed and published, with increased understanding of firm level obligations during public sector inspections, as well as increased comprehension by inspectors of their new roles

Achieved In line with sub-component objectives all existing legislation on the fire prevention and sanitary-epidemiology safety was reviewed, a list of outdated legislation was prepared, and more than 40 technical rules and norms were developed and updated. Key new regulations approved (and introduced into the legal database Adliya) include: Fire Prevention Rules of State Oversight over Fire Safety (May 3, 2010); The Charter of the Fire Prevention

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Inspectorate (June 8, 2009); Program of Training of Staff of Fire Prevention Inspectorate (May 17, 2010); Instruction on Gas and Smoke Protection (May 25, 2020). Sanitary-Epidemiology Safety Rules on Organization of Control over Compliance with Sanitary and Anti-Epidemic Requirements (January 25, 2011); On Sanitary-Epidemiology Requirements to Trade Enterprises (January 25, 2011); On Hygienic Requirements to Expiration Date and Storage of Food (January 25, 2011). The following regulations were cancelled: Fire Prevention Fire Prevention Rules for Industrial and Agricultural Sites (May3, 2010); Fire Prevention Rules on Residential Buildings (May 3, 2010); Fire Prevention Rules on Transport (May 3, 2010). IFC provided assistance to increase understanding of firm level obligations during public sector inspections as well as increased comprehension by inspectors of their new roles. In particular, IFC developed an Inspection Rules Manual, which was presented for SES and disseminated among inspectors. Also a series of broadcast through the national TV to increase entrepreneurs understanding of their obligations were conducted. IFC also developed fire inspection checklists and fire safety posters, which were presented to the Fire Prevention Department and entrepreneurs. The above measures have contributed in increased understanding of inspectors of their new roles and increased understanding of entrepreneurs of their obligations.

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Revised PDO, Outcome Indicators and Related Main Indicators, Intermediate Results Indicators, and Results PDO Establish legal and organizational prerequisites for improved public sector management, improve public access to legislation, and strengthen regulatory framework in selected areas PDO Outcome Indicators and Related Main Indicators Outcome Indicator- A transparently managed and increasingly merit based Civil Service. Main Indicator - Competitive merit-based recruitment of civil servants for positions below grades 1-2 is institutionalized. At least 80 percent of vacant positions are filled either by competitive recruitment or promotion.

Achieved The majority of civil servants are hired through competition, a performance appraisal system has been introduced; the civil service registry has been designed, installed and will be fully functional by April 1, 2012; and civil service salaries have been raised through introduction of a new salary grid to be more transparent and competitive. Achieved In 2010, 2514 vacancies in the civil service below levels 1-2 (political level positions) were filled through a competitive based recruitment process, representing 82% out of 3065 vacancies filled. In 2006 there was no competitive based recruitment system in place.

Outcome Indicator- A law on Organization of Public Administration and a reform plan for streamlining the overall central government structure approved; and organizational structures and management systems in selected core public sector entities improved. Main Indicator - Reform Plans for streamlining of institutions structures in 8 ministries and central agencies approved and short-term restructuring measures implemented.

Achieved A new Law on Organization of Public Administration was approved by the Government and submitted to the Parliament in August 2011. The law has been passed by Parliament and signed by the President. Partially Achieved Vertical functional reviews undertaken with project support covered 10 central ministries and agencies. Based on the recommendations of reviews and the

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Main Indicator - The Law on Organization of Public Administration, defining principles of organization and accountability of public administration bodies, is submitted for adoption.

President Resolution #1574 from April 5, 2011, all ministries have developed and approved their organizational restructuring plans. Only the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has implemented its restructuring plan. Some advanced ministries such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy and Trade are expected to start reorganization in 2012. Other ministries, with low capacities, may need TA to initiate reforms. Achieved The Law on Organization of Public Administration was approved by Parliament and is awaiting Presidential signature. The law defines the types of public institutions, their form of subordination, coordination and accountability arrangements. The law also embeds a three-tier management system in public administration sectors, in which ministries are responsible for policy-formulation, agencies are in charge of policy implementation, and inspections provide oversight. The law is consistent with the reorganization of the central public administration conducted in 2006.

Outcome Indicator- A Strategy and Action Plan for modernizing public financial management approved and under implementation. Main Indicator - A Public Financial Management Strategy, establishing framework for improvements in management, efficiency and transparency of the use of public resources, is approved.

Achieved Achieved A Public Finance Management Reform Strategy for 2009-2018 and Action Plan were approved by the Government on March 20, 2009. The overall objective of the PFM reform is to improve aggregate fiscal discipline, allocative effectiveness, and operational efficiency. In particular, the reform aims to ensure the budget is comprehensive and stable, a full Medium Term Expenditure Framework is in place, organizations will be responsible for the proper execution of their budgets and the results achieved, the Government will have

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Main Indicator – A new remuneration system in the health system is design and implemented

an operational financial management information system covering Treasury functions across the whole of the country, the accounting framework approaches full compliance with IPSAS Accrual accounting standards, and the preparation of the Annual Financial Statement will be timely and allow for audit by an independent External Audit Office which will report its audit findings to Parliament. Achieved The new wage grid in the public health sector, introduced on June 29, 2009, is transparent and performance-based, and consistent with new job classifications. The system rationalizes additional pay, allowances, and supplement for doctors and health personnel and establishes a more transparent mechanism in setting up salaries. The new wage grid reflects qualifications and skills, the complexity of work and responsibility, and distinguishes the wage grid in two broad streams - one for "doctors working in primary health care" and one for "doctors working in hospitals and non-primary health care services"

Outcome Indicator- Enhanced public accessibility to legislation and streamlined legislation in selected areas. Main Indicator - Access to information on laws and regulations for the legal entities is improved

Achieved Achieved The project helped the Ministry of Justice to improve the technical characteristics of the database and its interface, design the ministry’s website, and put the database on the ministry’s website. Database Adliya (www.minjust.tj/adliya) is regularly updated, and available free of charge to public sector agencies and on a subscription basis to enterprises and the general public. According to a survey conducted at the end of the project implementation, 37.9% of respondents (including public sector employees, deputies, mass media employees, businessmen, and

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Main Indicator - Regulations in the area or fire safety, sanitary-epidemiological standards and subsoil use area streamlined

representatives of civil society) had accessed legal information through the legal “Database Adliya” before May 2011. Achieved All existing legislation on fire prevention and sanitary-epidemiology safety was reviewed, and more than 40 technical rules and norms were developed or updated as well as a list of outdated legislation prepared.

Component 1 Intermediate Results Indicators and ResultsIndicator- The Civil Service Register is automated and accessible through a network by 47 government bodies. The CSD monitors civil service development and issues quarterly reports on the status of implementation of the civil service policy

Partially achieved On April 5, 2008 the President approved a regulation on “Order of Awarding Civil Servants Qualification Ranks”. Based on the regulation, the Civil Service Registry has been updated and on September 26, 2011, the extension and rehabilitation of the Civil Service Network was completed. It connects all 47 government ministries and agencies in the city of Dushanbe and outside to the Civil Service Registry database, providing key information on individual employees, their qualifications, and employment history. Although the registry software has been installed in all agencies, the registry is not yet operating on an on-line basis. There are small bugs in the software, which are currently being fixed. According to the government’s plan, the Civil Service Registry will be put in on-line operation by April 1, 2012.

Indicator- Consistency in promotion practices achieved in central government entities, as reflected in annual reports on civil service development issued by the CSD and confirmed through Public Officials Surveys.

Partially achieved On February 18, 2011 the President approved the Regulation “Performance Appraisal of Civil Servants”. The new system, which provides a linkage between performance and promotion, is expected to replace the attestation system in the medium-term period. The survey conducted at the end of the project in May 2011, found that the majority of respondents, representing civil service, Parliament, mass media and civil society, believed that the current performance

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appraisal system had a positive impact to the development of public sector. Their responses to the below statements were as follows: Performance appraisal system is effective: Yes – 47%; partially yes – 34%; no – 10%; could not reply – 8%. Performance appraisal procedures are fair and transparent: Yes – 21%; partially yes – 48%; no – 21%; could not reply – 9%. The Civil Service Department annually submits to the Government a Report on Attestation of Civil Servants. The Report provides information on the number of civil servants by organizations, how many of them were attested, and other relevant data. In 2010, 50% out of more than 7,000 civil servants were attested.

Indicator- Recruitment by open competition, based on public announcements of vacancies, is institutionalized, as reflected in annual reports on civil service development issued by the CSD and confirmed through Public Officials Surveys at the start and the end of the Project.

Achieved On May 20, 2009, the President approved a new regulation on “Competitive Based Selection” procedures, which institutionalized competitive recruitment throughout the Civil Service. The new procedures provide for transparency of the selection process, creation of evaluation commissions with central agency participation, different methods of selection based on types of position within a framework of competition, etc. The survey conducted at the end of the project found that the majority of respondents, representing civil service, Parliament, mass media and civil society believed that introducing a new competition-based recruitment procedures had a positive impact on the development of the public sector. Their responses to the statements below were as follows: The quality of selection has improved after introducing new competition based recruitment procedures: Yes – 27%; partially yes – 48%; no – 17%; could not reply – 9%. The procedures of competition based

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recruitment are fair: Yes – 27%; partially yes – 47%; no – 16%; could not reply – 10%. The data on recruitment by open competition is summarized in an Annual Report on Filling Civil Service Vacancies, which is submitted to the government. The Report includes information on vacancies announced, number of candidates who applied, violation in the selection processes, and other relevant information. In 2010, 2,514 vacancies were announced, to which 2,838 candidates applied. The low ratio of applicants per vacancy reflects still insufficient attraction of the civil service as an employer of choice.

Indicator- New civil service pay system is approved and introduced on a pilot basis, consistent with the public expenditure framework, as reflected in annual reports on civil service development issued by the CSD and confirmed through Public Officials Surveys conducted at the start and the end of the Project.

Achieved On October 1, 2010, the new Civil Service Wage Grid was introduced in five central agencies on a pilot basis. On September 1, 2011 the new Civil Service Wage Grid was extended to the entire Civil Service, including local governments. The reform removed all non-transparent bonuses, decompressed the wage grid, better linked pay to outside market compensation, regularized pay for similar jobs across government and made the system more consistent. On average, the salaries of civil servants increased by 40 %, with non-political staff receiving the highest adjustments. The survey conducted at the end of the project found that the majority of respondents, representing civil service, Parliament, mass media and civil society believed that introducing a new wage grid had a positive impact to the development of public sector. Their responses to the statements below were as follows: New wage grid improved the pay system: Yes – 33%; partially yes – 29%; no – 10%; could not reply – 28%.

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New wage grid is more transparent: Yes – 31%; partially yes – 31%; no – 9%; could not reply – 20%. New wage grid provides for higher motivation for civil servants: Yes – 23%; partially yes – 38%; no – 18%; could not reply – 20%. The report on wage bill is included into the Annual Budget Execution Report, which is prepared by the Ministry of Finance. Budget Execution Report for 9 months of 2011 includes information on wage bill, which is based on new wage grid implemented in the civil service throughout the country.

Component 2 Intermediate Results Indicators and Results Indicator- Functions of different institutions at central government level clarified based on recommendations of functional reviews and the new law on Organization of Public Administration, as reflected in Government Resolutions on the structure of the central state administration.

Partially achieved The Law on Organization of Public Administration was approved by Parliament and is awaiting Presidential signature. The law defines the types of public institutions, their form of subordination, coordination and accountability arrangements. The law also provides for a three-tier management system in public administration sectors, in which ministries are responsible for policy-formulation, agencies are in charge of policy implementation, and inspections provide oversight. The law is aligned with the reorganization of the central public administration conducted in 2006. Vertical functional reviews covered 10 central ministries and agencies. Based on recommendations of the reviews and the President Resolution #1574 from April 5, 2011, all ministries developed and approved their organizational restructuring plans. The reform is expected to include reorganization of the current organization structure of each sector under the respective leading ministry in order to effectively implement government policies and core responsibilities for each sector; eliminate cross-cutting, overlapping or duplicative

42

functions; establishing organizational structures and procedures that would allow more effective and less costly strategic sector policy objectives and achievements; eliminating functions that are not in the sphere of state responsibility; delegation of powers where appropriate and creating mechanisms that strengthen accountability between different levels of government; and, defining institutional optimization levels and the budget implications (final consequences to the state budget) for new staffing levels. Only the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has implemented its restructuring plan. It is expected that ministries will begin implementing their restructuring plans in 2012.

Indicator- Management and accountability systems for service delivery in the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection streamlined.

Achieved Based on recommendations of a vertical functional review, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MOLSP) developed an Action Plan that was successfully implemented. The review conducted helped identify inefficiencies and duplications existing in the social services delivery system. Changes to the Regulation on MOLSP and its subordinated agencies eliminated those inefficiencies and strengthened accountability in the sector. In particular, the adoption of Law on “Minimal Living Standards “(May 19, 2009), Law on “Social Standards” (May 19, 2009), and Law on “Insurance and State Pensions” (January 12, 2010) have laid down a solid ground for improving service delivery. Good implementation of approved Standards for Provision of Social Services in Day-Care Centers, Model Regulation of Day-Stay Institution, and Model of Regulation of Division of Social Welfare at Home also contributed to further improvements. For the future, clear division of

43

responsibilities and authorities between MOLSP and local governments in the issue of delivery of social services is necessary. This may be achieved through introducing proper changes to the Law on Local Governments and other sectoral legislation. Second, MOLSP needs to develop and implement an effective capacity building and staff retention plan. The functional review pointed out that there was a lack of proper capacity in some areas of social service delivery as well as high staff turnover at local level. These issues will be addressed by the ongoing EC Technical Assistance to Sector Policy Support Program in the Social Protection Sector and Bank Social Safety Net Strengthening Project.

Component 3 Intermediate Results Indicators and ResultsIndicator- A Public Financial Management Strategy and an Action Plan for improving management, efficiency and transparency of the public resource have been approved and are under implementation.

Achieved A Public Finance Management Reform Strategy for 2009-2018 and Action Plan were approved by the Government on March 20, 2009. The overall objective of the PFM reform is to improve aggregate fiscal discipline, allocative effectiveness, and operational efficiencies. In particular, the reform aims to ensure the budget is comprehensive and stable, a full Medium-Term Expenditure Framework is in place, organizations will be responsible for the proper execution of their budgets and the results achieved, the Government will have an operational financial management information system covering Treasury functions across the whole of the country, the accounting framework approaches full compliance with IPSAS accrual accounting standards, and the preparation of the Annual Financial Statement will be timely and allow for audit by an independent External Audit Office which will report its audit findings to Parliament. Strategy implementation is underway and

44

coordinated by the PFM Secretariat is led by the Ministry of Finance. On August 29, 2011 the PFM Council approved an updated PFM Strategy Implementation Plan for 2012-2014. The ongoing PFM reform, supported by the PFMMP project and other donor technical assistance projects, covers budget preparation and execution, accounting reform, treasury modernization, developing IT infrastructure and technologies, introducing internal and external audit function.

Indicator- A new wage and staff planning system for primary healthcare operational, as reflected in relevant Presidential Decrees and in annual reports of the Ministry of Health.

Achieved The Ministry of Health approved a new Job Classification of Health Sector Employees on September 29, 2008. The new job classification addressed the role and expected skills of family doctors and nurses, medical nurses working in the health/medical homes, and provided clear separation between existing positions in primary and secondary health care with some revision of staffing norms. It formed a basis for the new wage structure introduced on June 29, 2009 in the health sector, correcting the previous 1993 wage grid in the health sector which did not reflect the level of complexity and responsibility of assigned tasks. The new grid is transparent and performance-based, consistent with new job classifications, and rationalizes additional pay, allowances, and supplements for doctors and health personnel. The Job Classification and Wage Grid, according to legislation, are approved by the Minister of Health Resolution and no President Decree is required. The new Job Description and Wage Grid are reflected in annual reports of the ministry.

Component 4 Intermediate Results Indicators and ResultsIndicator - Improved public access to legal norms and acts through the official government legal database Adliya, which

Achieved The project helped the Ministry of Justice to improve the technical characteristics of the

45

includes all effective legislation in the Republic of Tajikistan and is available to public bodies, the private sector, and the general public (on a subscription basis)

database and its interface, design the ministry’s website, and put the database on the ministry’s website. The database Adliya is regularly updated. It is available free of charge to public sector agencies and on a subscription basis to enterprises and the general public. According to a survey conducted at the end of the project implementation, 37.9% of respondents (including public sector employees, deputies, mass media employees, businessmen, and representatives of civil society) had accessed legal information through the legal database Adliya (www.minjust.tj/adliya).

Indicator - Technical regulations of pilot inspection agencies updated, streamlined (up to 30% reduction or substantial amendments in the number of regulations) and made publicly available, resulting in firms’ increased understanding of their obligations with regard to fire safety and sanitary-epidemiological standards, as reflected in survey results

Achieved All existing legislation on the pilot agencies dealing with fire prevention and sanitary-epidemiology safety was reviewed, a list of outdated legislation prepared, and more than 40 technical rules and norms developed. The following new regulations were approved and introduced into the legal database Adliya: Fire Prevention Rules of State Oversight over Fire Safety (May 3, 2010); The Charter of the Fire Prevention Inspectorate (June 8, 2009); Program of Training of Staff of Fire Prevention Inspectorate (May 17, 2010); Instruction on Gas and Smoke Protection (May 25, 2020). Sanitary-Epidemiology Safety Rules on Organization of Control over Compliance with Sanitary and Anti-Epidemic Requirements (January 25, 2011); On Sanitary-Epidemiology Requirements to Trade Enterprises (January 25, 2011); On Hygienic Requirements to Expiration Date and Storage of Food (January 25, 2011). The below regulation were cancelled:

46

Fire Prevention Fire Prevention Rules for Industrial and Agricultural Sites (May3, 2010); Fire Prevention Rules on Residential Buildings (May 3, 2010); Fire Prevention Rules on Transport (May 3, 2010). A survey conducted at the end project asks entrepreneurs if they are aware of ongoing inventory of legislation in the areas of fire prevention and sanitary-epidemiology safety. Their responses were as follows: Fire prevention Yes – 10%; partially yes – 36%; no – 46; could not respond – 7%. Sanitary-epidemiology safety Yes – 5%; partially yes – 32; no – 53%; could not respond – 10%.

Indicator - Legislation in the subsoil sector streamlined resulting in improved business environment for mining of natural minerals

Partially Achieved A preliminary list of laws and regulations was developed, which also included issues on regulation of the mining sector. In coordination with the Ministry of Justice and stakeholders, a methodology was developed to review the legislation on subsoil management. The legislative review was conducted, including laws adopted by the former Soviet Union, in order to identify inconsistencies, reveal gaps in legislation, determine the mechanisms for implementation of laws and regulations, and classify the laws (effective; effective but need to be amended / updated; to be cancelled). Particular attention was paid to procedures on business registration in subsurface management, and issuance of licenses and permits (land use, permits for constructions and conducting the works). The entire inventory was approved by the Ministry of Justice in December 2010. The forthcoming World Bank TA on improving management in the mining sector of Tajikistan is expected to implement the recommendation developed under this sub-component.

47

Annex 2. A Restructuring Weighted Attainment of Outcomes against Original and Restructured PDO

Against Original

PDOs

Against Revised PDOs

Overall Comments

1 Rating Moderately Unsatisfactory

Satisfactory Significant improvement against more

realistic targets 2 Rating

Value 3 5

3 Weight (% disbursed

before/after

PDO change)

52% 48% 100%

4 Weighted value

(2 x 3)

1.5 2.5 4

5 Final rating

(rounded)

1.5 2.5 Moderately Satisfactory

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) N/A

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending Norpulat Daniyarov Financial Management Specialis ECSO3 Yelena Dobrolyubova Consultant ECSPE Mehmet Gokay Consultant ECCTJ Jariya Hoffman Senior Economist AFTP4 Aziz Khaidarov Country Officer ECCU8 Kathy Lalazarian Senior Public Sector Specialis LCSPS Khursheda Nazirova Temporary ECCTJ Fasliddin Rakhimov Procurement Specialist ECSO2 Utkirdjan Umarov Senior Economist ECSP1 Antonius Verheijen Lead Public Sector Specialist AFTPR

Supervision/ICR Hassan Aliev Public Sector Specialist ECSP4 James Anderson Senior Governance Specialist EASPR Norpulat Daniyarov Financial Management Specialis ECSO3 Cem Dener Sr Public Sector Spec. PRMPS Yelena Dobrolyubova Consultant ECSPE Jariya Hoffman Senior Economist AFTP4 Dilshod Karimova Procurement Analyst ECSO2 Shodi Nazarov Financial Management Analyst ECSO3 Khursheda Nazirova Temporary ECCTJ Craig R. Neal Consultant TWICT John Otieno Ogallo Sr Financial Management Specia ECSO3 Svetlana I. Proskurovska Senior Public Sector Specialis LCSPP Fasliddin Rakhimov Procurement Specialist ECSO2 Clelia Kalliopi Helena Rontoyanni

Public Sector Specialist ECSP4

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY06 211.06 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00

Total: 211.06 Supervision/ICR

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FY06 0.00 FY07 119.15 FY08 105.42

Total: 224.57

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results During March-May, 2011 the government conducted a survey to measure public awareness of the implementation of the Public Administration Reform Strategy. Survey participants were not direct project beneficiaries, but representatives of target groups of the reform. Key findings included the following: -30% of respondents were familiar with the Public Administration Reform Strategy, 45% were aware partially; and 21% were not aware of it. -27% of respondents believed that the quality of civil service competitive selection had improved, 48% agreed with this statement partially, while 16% had not noticed any positive changes in the recruitment process. -32% of respondents thought that training programs offered by the IHQCS had improved, 33% believed they improved partially, while 11% reported no improvements. -31% considered the new civil service wage grid as being more transparent than the previous pay system. Another 31% believed that the given wage grid was somewhat more transparent. Only 9% of respondents replied that the new wage grid was not transparent. -23% of respondents agreed with that statement that the new civil service wage grid improved incentives, 38% agreed with the statement partially, while 18% did not agree. -14% of respondents believed that the recent government reorganization was successful, 45% believed that it was partially successful, while 10% of respondents considered the reorganization as a failure. -38% of respondents had access to legal information through the Adliya legal database, and 28% via the mass media. -8% of respondents replied that compliance costs of new procedures in FPI and SES had declined, while 27% believed that costs had declined only modestly, and 11% responded that their costs did not change. Interpretation of the survey suggests that without adequate public awareness, the reform would have less positive effect. It concluded that “one of the conditions for efficient transformation is the availability of public support to decisions to be made. Government “PR” is essential condition for advancement and implementation of the decisions to be made. The success of the reform also depends on the character of communication established between the government and population with a purpose of achieving of public interest and support for the given reform. Information support for the implementation of the public administration reform must also be directed to enhancement of interest of the public servants themselves who must fully realize the goals and objectives of the reform”i.

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The survey also showed that awareness was raised among elites, but not sufficiently among the general public. As a result, wide segments of the population did not have a clear picture of the objectives and principles of the reform and its potential benefits. Each ministry and department in the economic sectors plus each regional government authority was aware of their own goals and objectives. While they publicize their own activities, however, they did not link ongoing changes in their agencies with the broader public administration reform. At present, there is no single framework and systemic approach in place to provide information on the reform. As a result, there has been insufficient interaction between the public authorities and society in this area. The survey underlined that successful implementation of the PARS depends, on one side, on understanding and support of reform objectives by certain parts of the business community and society as well as interest by citizens in reform outcomes, and, on other side, the availability of information on reform implementation,. Appropriate actions should thus be taken aimed at: • stimulating interaction with the public on the reform implementation issues; • raising public awareness of goals, objectives and progress of the administrative reform; • providing motivation for engagement in reform implementation to different segments of society. In the future, survey findings suggested, reform efforts need to address the secretive mentality of civil servants, which would contribute to their enhanced image. Increasing salaries of civil servants should be linked to their performance. Citizens should be involved in discussions on what must be the outcomes of the public administration’s performance. For that purpose, public feedback mechanisms should be established. Further work will also be required to clarify the status and authority of the public administration, with a focus on the social control over its actions. 1 Survey on Public Awareness of Public Administration Reform Strategy Implementation, May 2011

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) N/A

54

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR The Executive Office of the President (EOP) prepared a 39 page Final Report on the project. The government is positive on the results achieved with the support of the PSRP. The borrower believes that capacities in the Civil Service Department and IHQCS were strengthened and the new regulations that were developed and implemented have contributed to enhanced civil service management. The automated Civil Service Registry and rehabilitated network are a basis for further introducing modern Information and Communications Technology in the public administration. The vertical functional reviews in 10 ministries were successful and the implementation of recommendations is in train. A reorganization of the EOP has been partially implemented. The Concept Paper on the Reorganization of the Public Administration has been adopted supporting subsequent adoption of the Law on Organization of Public Administration. By adopting the Public Finance Management (PFM) Reform Strategy a solid basis for comprehensive PFM reform has been established. New job descriptions and wage grid for healthcare workers have contributed to better management in the sector. Public access to legal information has been improved thanks to web-based access to the Adliya legal database. The regulatory regime in the sanitary-epidemiology and fire prevention areas has also improved as a result of updated legislation and streamlined regulations. The report raises no problematic issues related to preparation, design, or implementation of the project.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A

56

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Project Appraisal Document, No 34924-TJ, May 25, 2006; Project Operational Manual, April 12, 2006; Mid-Term Review Report, June 17, 2009; Project Restructuring Paper, 52877, January 15, 2010; Project Restructuring Paper, 62216, May 26, 2011; Implementation and Status of Results Reports (ISRs) for entire project period Interviews with current and former Task Team Leader and team members

Tr a n s A l a i - R a n g e

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ShahrtuzShahrtuz

KomsomolabadKomsomolabad

KalaikhumKalaikhum

ChkolovskChkolovsk

TabosharTaboshar

KonibodomKonibodom

AyniAyniPendzhikentPendzhikent

VanjVanjRukhchRukhch

IshkashimIshkashim

VrangVrang

AlichurAlichur

AndarobAndarob

Ura-Ura-TyubeTyube

Jirgatal'Jirgatal'

ObigarmObigarm

RashtRasht

KulyabKulyab

Khorog Khorog

KhodjandKhodjand

Kurgan-Kurgan-TyubeTyube

DUSHANBEDUSHANBE

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G H O R N O -B A D A K H S H A N

A . O .

Region underdirect Republicsubordination

Murgab

Rangkul'

Nurek

Pyanj

MoskovskiyGaravuti

Shahrtuz

Komsomolabad

Kalaikhum

Chkolovsk

Taboshar

Konibodom

AyniPendzhikent

VanjRukhch

Ishkashim

Vrang

Alichur

Andarob

Ura-Tyube

Jirgatal'

Obigarm

Rasht

Kulyab

Khorog

Khodjand

Kurgan-Tyube

DUSHANBE

AFGHANISTANPAKISTAN

CHINAUZBEKISTAN

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To Osh

To Sary-Tash

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To Andijon

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T r a n s A l a i - R a n g e

FerganaValley

P a mi r s

Pik ImeniIsmail Samani

(7495 m )

Pik Lenin(7134 m )

Pik Revolution(6,974 m)

Pik Karl Marx (6723 m )

68°E 70°E

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RayonsTursunzodaShahrinavRudakiHissorVarzobFayzobodVahdatRoghunNurobodRashtTojikobodTavildaraJirgatolDarvozVanjIshkoshimRoshtqalaRushonShughnon

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MurghobNosir KhusravShahrituzQabodiyonJilikulKhurosonQumsangirBokhtarKolkhozobodJomiVakshsYovonSarbandPanjDangharaFarkhorNorakVoseSovet

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KulobBaljuvonMoskvaShurobodKhovalingMuminobodPandjakentAyniShahristonZafarobodIstaravshanGhonchiSpitamenMatchinJabor RasulobKuhistoni MastchohGhafurovKonibodomAshtIsfara

3940414243444546474849505152535455565758

0 20 40 60

0 20 40 60 Miles

80 Kilometers

IBRD 33493R

MAY 2007

TAJ IKISTANSELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS

AUTONOMOUS OBLAST CENTER*

OBLAST CENTERS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

MAIN ROADS

RAILROADS

JAMOAT (SUB-DISTRICT) BOUNDARIES

RAYON (DISTRICT) BOUNDARIES

AUTONOMOUS OBLAST BOUNDARY*

OBLAST BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

* Area with no oblast-level administrative divisions, where rayons are under direct republic jurisdiction.

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.