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Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003245

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-48180 IDA-H6130)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR13.2 MILLION

(US$20 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR13.2 MILLION

(US$20 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

FOR THE

KETSANA EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION

AND REHABILITATION PROJECT

January 23, 2015

Global Practice Social, Urban and Rural Resilience

Southeast Asia Country Management Unit

East Asia and Pacific Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange rate effective Jan 22, 2015)

Currency Unit = US$

1.00 = SDR 0.707

SDR 1.00 = 1.414

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AHICPEP Avian and Human Influenza Control and Preparedness Emergency Project

ADB Asian Development Bank

BBB Build Back Better

CAS Country Assistance Strategy

CCDM Commune Committee for Disaster Management

CMU Country Management Unit

DCDM District Committee for Disaster Management

DMIC Disaster Management Information Center

DR Department of Resettlement

DRM (F) Disaster Risk Management (Framework)

DSA Daily Subsistence Allowance

EA Executing Agency

ECOPs Environmental Codes of Practice

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EMF Environmental Management Framework

EMP Environmental Management Plan

ERL Emergency Recovery Loan

ESSAF Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework

EWS Early Warning System

FM Financial Management

FMIS Financial Management Information System

FMM Financial Management Manual

GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

GGFs Good Governance Frameworks

HHs Households

IA Implementing Agency

ICB International Competitive Bidding

IFR Interim Financial Report

IPA Independent Procurement Agent

ISR Implementation Status & Results

KERRP Ketsana Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project

KPI Key Performance Indicator

MC Managing Consultant

MDG Millennium Development Goal

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance

MHEWS Multi-Hazard Early Warning System

MRD Ministry for Rural Development

NCB National Competitive Bidding

NCDM National Committee for Disaster Management

OFD Open Field Defecation

OM Operations Manual

OP/BP Operational Policy/Bank Procedure

PAP Project Affected Person

PCDM Provincial Committee for Disaster Management

PDNA Post Disaster Needs Assessment

PDRD Provincial Department for Rural Development

PIU Project Implementation Unit

QCBS Quality Cost Based Selection

RAP Resettlement Action Plan

RD Rural Development

RP Resettlement Plan

RF Results Framework

RGC Royal Government of Cambodia

RPF Resettlement Policy Framework

SA Social Assessment

SBD Standard Bidding Document

SMU Sector Management Unit

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

SSST Single Seal Surface Treatment

SSS Single Source Selection

TOR Terms of Reference

US$ US Dollar

Watsan Water and Sanitation

WSUG Water and Sanitation User Group

Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg, EAP

Country Director: Ulrich Zachau

Country Manager: Alassane Sow

Practice Manager: Abhas Kumar Jha

Project Team Leader: Lixin Gu

ICR Team Leader: Lixin Gu

KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

Ketsana Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information B. Key Dates

C. Ratings Summary

D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring (if any) I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 5 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 12

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 19

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 19 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 21 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 23

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 24 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 25

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 30 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 33 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 35 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 39 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 41

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...................... 53 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 54

Annex 10. Project Pictures ............................................................................................ 55

MAP No. IBRD 37862R

A. Basic Information

Country: Cambodia Project Name:

Ketsana Emergency

Reconstruction and

Rehabilitation Project

Project ID: P121075 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-48180,IDA-

H6130

ICR Date: 11/15/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: KINGDOM OF

CAMBODIA

Original Total

Commitment: XDR 26.40M Disbursed Amount: XDR 25.93M

Revised Amount: XDR 26.40M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies:

Ministry of Rural Development (MRD)

National Committee Disaster Management (NCDM)

Co-financiers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 01/15/2010 Effectiveness: 12/14/2010 12/14/2010

Appraisal: 08/23/2010 Restructuring(s): 12/24/2013

Approval: 11/02/2010 Mid-term Review: 05/08/2013 06/27/2013

Closing: 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing

Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory

Overall Bank

Performance: Satisfactory

Overall Borrower

Performance: Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem

Project at any time

(Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry

(QEA): None

Problem Project at any

time (Yes/No): No

Quality of

Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Public administration- Water, sanitation and flood

protection 8 8

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 69 69

Sanitation 8 8

Water supply 15 15

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Natural disaster management 66 66

Rural services and infrastructure 34 34

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Regional Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg James W. Adams

Country Director: Ulrich Zachau Annette Dixon

Practice

Manager/Manager: Abhas Kumar Jha Jeeva A. Perumalpillai-Essex

Project Team Leader: Lixin Gu Lixin Gu

ICR Team Leader: Lixin Gu

ICR Primary Author: Heinrich Unger

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The development objective of this project is to restore the service levels of transport and

water and sanitation to the affected people in the project provinces and strengthen RGC's

capacity in disaster preparedness and management.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

N/A

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Percentage of selected roads returned to pre-disaster levels

Value

(quantitative or

qualitative)

0 100 100

Date achieved 11/02/2010 07/31/2014 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Road targets revised in June 2012 to 615 km because some roads were already

rebuilt, some had lower priority & costs were higher than estimated at appraisal

Indicator 2 : Percentage of community households with access to, and utilization of, improved

water supply in the target villages

Value

(quantitative or

qualitative)

25 100 100 75

Date achieved 11/02/2010 07/31/2014 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

25% of HH in target villages already had access. Revised target was 100% of

150 villages but project was expanded to 180 villages with 75% access to water

Indicator 3 : Percentage of community households with access to, and utilization of, family

latrine sanitation in the target villages

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

19.5 100 75 80

Date achieved 11/02/2010 07/31/2014 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

19.5% of HH in the 150 target villages already had latrines. The revised target

was exceeded.

Indicator 4 : The deliverables of three capacity building tasks: (i) risk mapping, (ii) disaster

management information center, and (iii) building & housing codes

Value

(quantitative or

qualitative)

0 3 3 3

Date achieved 11/02/2010 07/31/2014 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

All 3 deliverables were completed but for (iii) guidelines & manuals only were

developed (due to time constraints for legislated codes)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Cumulative percentage of reconstructed and rehabilitated affected rural roads in

six selected project provinces

Value

(quantitative

or qualitative)

0 100 100

Date achieved 11/02/2010 07/31/2014 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Indicator 2 : Cumulative percentage of villages with dust-controlled roads

Value

(quantitative

or Qualitative)

0 100 110

Date achieved 11/02/2010 07/31/2014 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

The number of villages to receive dust control was revised in June 2012 from

275 to 253, avg. L= 930 m; but in the end, 279 villages received dust control

Indicator 3 : Percentage of water wells built for the target communities (with water quality in

compliance with applicable government standards)

Value

(quantitative

or qualitative)

16 100 75 92

Date achieved 11/02/2010 07/31/2014 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

1,413 wells were drilled (drilling target was 1,329) but 193 were not productive

or had poor water quality, i.e. 1,220 good wells were developed for use

Indicator 4 : Percentage of family latrine facilities built to improve community sanitation in

the target villages

Value

(quantitative

or qualitative)

0 100

100

Date achieved 11/02/2010 07/31/2014 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

18,465 HH (revised from 32,000) targeted to receive family latrine base (sub-

structure). All were completed.

Indicator 5 : Risk mapping, disaster information and early warning system, and building and

housing codes are developed and applied

Value

(quantitative Not developed

Fully developed

and applied

Developed and

applied

or qualitative)

Date achieved 11/02/2010 07/31/2014 07/31/2014 07/31/2014

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Building & housing guidelines and handbook were developed & disseminated in

the short time available since codes would have required legislative action

sshould

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(US$ millions)

1 09/17/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.78

2 05/27/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.80




6 03/24/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 20.49

7 08/06/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 32.79

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring

Date(s)

Board

Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at

Restructuring

Amount

Disbursed at

Restructuring

in

US$ millions

Reason for Restructuring &

Key Changes Made DO IP

12/24/2013 S MS 16.79

To finance outstanding civil

works activities and improve

the Project’s implementation

progress toward achieving the

PDO, the Financing proceeds

were re-allocated as follows: (i)

the Credit proceeds of Category

3 (Unallocated) in the amount

of SDR1,930,000 to Category 2;

and (ii) part of the Grant

proceeds of Category 1 in the

amount of SDR460,833 to

Category 2.

I. Disbursement Profile

1

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Typhoon Ketsana and its Impacts

1. Typhoon Ketsana, with a destructive power not seen in decades, hit Cambodia with

torrential rains between September 29 and October 5, 2009. Fourteen out of 24 provinces

were affected by the storm and the subsequent flooding. The typhoon left 43 people dead,

67 people severely injured, and destroyed homes and livelihoods of about 180,000 people,

the equivalent of 1.4 percent of Cambodia’s total population. Most of the affected districts

were among the poorest in the country. The widespread damage to property, livelihoods,

and public infrastructure in these areas was expected to have long-term economic and

social impacts.

2. It was estimated that the typhoon-related damages would lead to a 0.2 percent

reduction in economic growth for 2009. The impact on fiscal revenues was unlikely to be

very significant, but the impact on expenditures for medium- and long-term needs could

have been considerable. Since the financing needed to rebuild physical infrastructure and

recover livelihoods would have created a higher deficit, additional domestic and foreign

financing was needed.

Post Disaster Needs Assessment

3. The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), with support from the World Bank

and other development partners, and with technical and financial support from the Global

Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), had carried out a Post Disaster

Needs Assessment (PDNA) in the affected provinces (Stung Treng, Preah Vihear,

Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, Ratanak Kiri, Mondul Kiri, Kratie, Oddar Meanchey,

Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang, Preah Sihanouk,

and Kampot) during November 2009.

4. The PDNA estimated total damage and losses at US$132 million, of which damage

accounted for US$58 million and losses for US$74 million. Based on the Typhoon Ketsana

recovery framework proposed by the January 2010 draft PDNA report, US$191 million

was needed for recovery in the identified priority sectors: infrastructure (transport,

water/sanitation, water resource/irrigation, and energy); social (housing and shelter, health,

education); productive sectors (agriculture / livestock / fishery, industry and commerce,

and tourism); and cross-cutting sectors (environment and public administration).

5. The final PDNA report was released March 30, 2010, and served as the basis for

donor interventions. Based on the earlier draft version of the PDNA report, the RGC had

already requested that rehabilitation of national and provincial roads should be funded

through a combination of RGC, Asia Development Bank (ADB), and Government of China

resources; and rural roads should be financed by RGC and the Bank. In the water and

sanitation sector, RGC would support rehabilitation in the urban areas and requested Bank

2

support for rural areas. During an early project preparation mission, the Bank met with

concerned multilateral and bilateral donors, and discussed with RGC the donor

community’s possible contributions to reconstruction and recovery. At the same time RGC

confirmed that it did not require Bank support for housing reconstruction – identified as a

high priority need in the PDNA report – as most of this damage had already been repaired.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

6. The development objectives of this project were (a) to restore the service levels of

transport and water and sanitation to the affected people in the project provinces, and (b)

to strengthen RGC's capacity in disaster preparedness and management.

The project outcomes were measured through: (a) restored levels of infrastructure service

to national standards; (b) improved access to rural road, water and sanitation facilities for

the affected communities; and (c) improved capacity for emergency preparedness and

management capacity. Specifically the key indicators were:

(i) Percentage of project roads to be restored at least to pre-disaster levels;

(ii) Percentage of community households with access to and utilization of

improved water supply in the target villages;

(iii)Percentage of households with access to and utilization of family latrine

sanitation in the target villages; and

(iv) The deliverables of three emergency preparedness and management capacity

building tasks.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and

reasons/justification

The PDO was not revised, but there were some changes to underlying outcome indicators

(indicating a level 2 restructuring). Due to an oversight, these changes were made through

an aide-memoire and all subsequent ISRs, rather than through the formal level 2

restructuring required by Bank procedure. However, all changes in the underlying targets

to the outcome indicators and their justification were well documented in the aide-memoire

dated June 29, 2012. This aide-memoire was subsequently agreed and cleared with the

borrower, the SMU and the CMU, and disclosed; and they were confirmed through all

subsequent aide-memoires and Implementation Status Results (ISR) reports which were

also disclosed. At the time of these changes, the disbursement percentage of the project

was about 15%.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

7. The main beneficiaries of the project were the people of the 255 selected villages

in six provinces that benefited from rural road reconstruction and rehabilitation, application

of dust control within the villages, and provision of community water wells and family

latrines. In addition, the local farmers transporting produce to markets and the trucking

industry, benefited from the rebuilt roads. The Cambodian population at risk from natural

disasters benefited from the preparation of national and provincial risk maps, emergency

3

management information and an early warning system, and improved housing and building

codes. Lastly, the agencies tasked with the implementation of the project, i.e. the Ministry

of Rural Development (MRD) and six provincial RD offices, and the National Committee

for Disaster Management (NCDM), benefited from institutional strengthening and capacity

building, support for project management, financial management and reporting.

1.5 Original Components

The project consisted of four components as follows:

8. Component 1: Support for emergency response (US$5 million). This component,

implemented by the Provincial Department of Public Works, provided retroactive

financing for specific eligible expenditures made for disaster relief. Retroactive financing

covered eligible expenditures, determined to be acceptable to the Bank for: (a) any

rehabilitation and reconstruction works the RGC needed to implement after Typhoon

Ketsana had struck and before the KERRP financing agreement was signed; and (b) any

funds needed to mobilize technical expertise to conduct road surveys, and to mobilize a

managing consultant for project preparation and initial implementation.

9. Component 2: Rural road rehabilitation and reconstruction in six selected

provinces and provision of community-level water supply and sanitation facilities

(US$25.1 million). It was implemented by MRD and comprised the following

subcomponents:

2.1 Rural Road Rehabilitation and Improvement: Rehabilitation of gravel-surfaced

roads that were partially damaged (230 km) and those that were totally damaged (80 km),

to at least national gravel road standards. Selective sections were to be surfaced depending

on availability of materials and cost optimization. Reconstruction of three bridges, some

major culverts, and other drainage facilities were included. In addition, three years of

maintenance for some 920 km of unimproved rural roads that were affected by the typhoon

were to be supported. See Annex 10, Fig. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10.

2.2 Dust control: The existing high levels of dust were to be controlled through a

single seal surface treatment (SSST) of about 2 km of roads for each village, up to a total

of 550 km for the 275 selected villages. See Annex 10, Fig. 5, 6, 7 and 8.

2.3 Water and sanitation activities: Initial surveys had identified 274 villages where

an estimated 60% of households would needed water supply and 75% needed sanitation.

The activities under this subcomponent included the following: (i) Community water

supply: to install 1,400 community-based wells with hand pump at the village level

(assuming 15 households per pump); and (ii) Family-based latrine sanitation: to provide

one pour-flush latrine pit and base per household, for a total of 32,000 units. Simple,

prefabricated substructure units were available from local suppliers, and households were

made responsible for providing the necessary superstructures, including materials and

labor.

4

10. Component 3: Project implementation support (US$4 million). This component,

also implemented by MRD, was designed to address the limited implementation and

management capacity of the implementation agency. Accordingly, the proposed approach

provided implementation support through an experienced international consulting firm,

recruited through competitive selection, to act as Managing Consultant (MC). The MC had

overall responsibility for: (a) detailed surveys, engineering designs, and preparation of

contract documents; (b) construction supervision; (c) monitoring and verification of

outputs; (d) capacity building of local contractors; (e) strengthening MRD’s financial

management and reporting capacities; (e) support to the Ministry of Rural Development

(MRD) in project management; and (f) outreach and dissemination related to the water and

sanitation subcomponent. These activities comprised the costs of the MC (US$3 million),

and project incremental operating costs (US$1 million). Any additional funding required

for incremental costs would be borne by RGC through counterpart funding.

11. Component 4: Institutional strengthening and capacity building (US$3 million).

This component supported and was implemented by NCDM through developing: (a)

national and provincial risk maps; (b) emergency management information and an early

warning system; and (c) improved housing and building codes. This arrangement was

based on the agreement with RGC that the KERRP’s support would focus mainly on

technical capacity, while the proposed Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

(GFDRR) supported strategic and management capacity aspects.

12. In addition, US$2.9 million in unallocated funds was available for contingencies

and other unexpected needs during the implementation period, given the emergency nature

of the project.

1.6 Revised Components

13. The components were not revised but the physical quantities of the subcomponents

under Component 2 were adjusted during the June 2012 supervision mission. Following

detailed field surveys and investigations the targets were reduced to reflect existing service

levels, works done by others, priority rankings and detailed cost estimates that were higher

than the appraisal estimates.

1.7 Other significant changes

14. There were no other significant changes during project implementation except that

in December 2013 the unallocated, and some unspent financing proceeds, were re-allocated

to the category for infrastructure construction (see section 2.2 for details).

5

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

Incorporation of Lessons Learned

15. Following a first preliminary Bank mission in December 2009 to review an early draft

of the PDNA report, a full project preparation mission visited Cambodia in March 2010 to

discuss and agree on the project approach and scope with RGC. Various options were

considered for the Bank’s intervention, including a “top-up” of the then current Bank

operations, a stand-alone operation, and a “no action” option. The conclusion was that a

stand-alone post-disaster emergency operation would be most the suitable.

16. The intervention built upon recent Bank post-disaster experience in Jamaica, China,

and Indonesia and the support provided to Laos, which was also affected by the Ketsana

typhoon. Lessons learned from these post-disaster reconstruction projects have been

incorporated in the design of the KERRP, including the following: (a) reallocation of

resources from existing projects affects the ability to attain long-term development goals

and is less effective than special reconstruction lending – therefore it was not applied in

this project; (b) use of some principles of Results-based Financing and Output-based

Disbursement has proven successful in other projects and was used in the contracts of

KERRP; (c) project design should avoid reconstruction delays, by putting in place

streamlined decision-making and procedures for contracting civil works – this was

attempted but did not work out; (d) need for relatively intensive supervision because many

details are left to be defined during project implementation and flexibility would be

required to deal with changing post-disaster conditions, so provision for intensive

supervision was included in the consultants’ contracts; and (e) priority of community and

transport infrastructure to improve rural economy and quality of life. These considerations,

among others, determined the scope of the project investments.

Rationale for Bank intervention and project

17. The rationale for determining project activities was the focus on: (a) supporting the

poorest segments of the population, which are generally in rural areas; (b) improving the

quality of life; and (c) targeting areas where economic production had suffered the most

and where reconstruction activities would have a maximum impact. The PDNA report had

identified fourteen affected provinces, of which six were selected for World Bank support,

namely Siem Reap, Kampong Cham, Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Thom, Battambang,

and Kampong Chhnang. RGC’s selection was focused on the worst affected rural areas in

terms of damage and losses, population, and economic production. In these areas, people’s

livelihoods depended on rural roads for access to production activities and for access to

social infrastructure such as markets and schools. Their quality of life relied on access to

proper water and sanitation. The six provinces chosen for Bank intervention contained

some of the poorest segments of the national population, and were areas where economic

activity had been the most affected and which would benefit greatly from the proposed

interventions.

6

18. RGC specifically requested the Bank to deal with rural roads, and rural water and

sanitation. Furthermore, capacity building and institutional strengthening would be an

integral part of the project. This was to be achieved by providing implementation support

to the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) through an international engineering firm

(the Managing Consultant). The Managing Consultant (MC) would support: (a) the local

contracting industry in the implementation of the works; (b) behavioral changes at village

and household level with regard to water and sanitation practices; and (c) improved

national disaster management because Cambodia was one of the most flood-prone

countries in the region, and RGC had very weak capacity in disaster preparedness, response

and management.

Assessment of project design

19. The project design was kept simple given the emergency nature of the operation

especially as it was to work in a weak capacity situation; the financing plan with 100

percent IDA financing was equally simple, and both worked well. The PDO was to restore

service levels. However, the service levels before the storm were not known and thus could

not be used as targets for the Results Framework (RF). For the road components it may

have been better to focus the PDO on restoring access. For the water and sanitation

(Watsan) component, it was not a matter of restoring service, but rather providing access

to water and sanitation in selected villages in the project provinces although many existing

dug wells had been flooded by the typhoon. The second part of the PDO, i.e. strengthening

RGC’s capacity in disaster management, was an important objective, albeit difficult to

achieve in an emergency project, and hard to measure in terms of its achievement. The RF

had some weaknesses, such as the very first Key Project Indicator (KPI) – km of rural roads

rehabilitated – not a KPI at all, but an intermediate outcome indicator. Indicator 2 – people

with access to water – would have been fine except the PDO was to restore service not

provide access. KPI 3 – percentage of roads returned to pre-disaster levels – should

actually have been the first KPI. For the second part of the PDO there should have been a

specific KPI. Overall, though, the number of indicators was about right. Lastly, in terms of

project design, the components were well aligned to achieve the PDO – if the PDO had

been better stated. There were not too many implementing agencies, the lending

instrument was right, the Bank was the sole financing agency, and safeguards were well

appraised. However, Component 4 should not have included the establishment of housing

and building codes because they require RGC approval, and this was too much to expect

from an ERL focusing on roads and water.

Risks and their mitigation

20. The Emergency Project Paper (EPP) did not provide an overall risk rating but it

would appear to have been Substantial based on the mitigation measures taken, and it

would have been appropriate. Project appraisal had identified six high risks (before

mitigation) related to the speed of project implementation, including effective use of funds,

government and contractors’ capacity, and governance but the main risk was that the

emergency relief activities would not be provided in a timely manner. Most of the identified

risks to components 2 and 3 were mitigated by the early appointment of an experienced,

7

international MC to build capacity within MRD, supervise and coordinate construction

activities, and generally manage the project. The financial management risk was addressed

by sound control procedures, a financial management manual, SOPs, quarterly interim

financial reporting, a financial management consultant assigned to MRD and NCDM, and

independent external audits. The procurement risk was mitigated through the use of the

Independent Procurement Agent (IPA), appropriate packaging of contracts, and close

supervision by the MC. And lastly, the safeguards risks were dealt with by the integration

of remedial actions into the contract documents and supervision of them by the MC.

Although the Emergency Project Paper (EPP) did not assign an overall risk rating, it would

have been rated as Substantial, even after applying the above mitigation actions.

Lending instrument

21. The project was prepared and processed as an Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL)

under OP/BP 8.00. The magnitude of Typhoon Ketsana damages called for rapid response

and action, and a streamlined ERL with simplified procedures was the most appropriate

instrument to respond to this disaster. The Bank guidelines on rapid response to crisis were

used to develop a fast, flexible and simple response. In view of the emergency nature of

the project, and as a requirement for Bank appraisal, the Bank prepared an Environmental

and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) in accordance with Procedural

Guidelines complementing OP/BP 8.00. The ESSAF for this environmental category B

project provided guidance on the approach to be taken during project implementation for

the selection and design of proposed investments, and the planning of mitigation measures,

including consultation and disclosure requirements. The ESSAF also contained principles

and basic guidelines for land acquisition and compensation. After its completion and

approval by Bank and RGC, the ESSAF was translated into Khmer and disclosed by the

Bank and in Cambodia.

Although an ambitious preparation and processing schedule was agreed to in March 2010,

it took about 15 months from the date of the disaster to project effectiveness and start of

implementation. The Decision Meeting by the Regional Operations Committee, chaired by

the Regional Vice President, was held in May 2010, but then delays occurred with the

preparation and internal reviews of project documentation, especially the safeguards

requirements, such as the ESSAF and the Integrated Safeguard Data Sheet (ISDS).

Negotiations were completed in late August 2010 but Board approval only took place in

November 2010. Some of the processing delays were caused by RGC’s slow response, in

part due to weak capacity in processing projects (Bank-RGC relations were rather strained

at that time, and no other projects were being processed). However, while the Bank was

processing the project, RGC agencies, in particular the MRD, worked on the TOR for the

MC and prepared the detailed safeguard frameworks. Therefore, at credit effectiveness,

project preparation was sufficiently advanced to allow an early start of implementation

activities by a small technical team engaged in advance of the lengthy recruitment of the

MC. Due to the accelerated processing schedule, no participatory approaches could be used

during project preparation but this was addressed during implementation (see section 3.5

(a). Quality at Entry is rated Satisfactory.

8

2.2 Implementation

Implementation Arrangements

22. KERRP was implemented by the MEF, MRD and the NCDM, with MEF

responsible for overall leadership and coordination between different line ministries. Line

ministries provided sectoral experience and implementation capacity. A senior level

Steering Committee was established and led by MEF as the umbrella ministry to oversee

the project; this was a condition of Effectiveness. MRD and NCDM, as the two responsible

line agencies established their own respective management arrangements, i.e. a Project

Management Unit (PMU) and six Provincial Project Implementation Units (PPIUs).

23. Component 1 was managed directly by MEF’s Department of Investment and

Cooperation, and implemented by the Siem Reap Provincial Department of Public Works

using force account procedures. Components 2 and 3 were implemented by MRD, led by

the Project Director who reported the Secretary of State as the Project Coordinator. Support

to the MRD was provided by the MC. Component 4 was administered and managed

directly by the NCDM using the existing team and procedures under the then current Bank-

financed Avian and Human Influenza Control and Preparedness Emergency Project

(AHICPEP).

Progress of implementation

24. Progress was initially slow, mainly due to delays with the procurement of the

respective key consultants for MRD and NCDM, caused by lack of capacity on the part of

the project agencies to navigate the complex and lengthy QCBS process. After one year,

the implementation was six months behind schedule, and after two years, NCDM had fallen

nine months behind schedule. However, once the MC for MRD was appointed in

September 2011, implementation of Components 2 and 3 picked up pace considerably, and

by project closing all scheduled works and activities were completed. The technical DRM

consultant for the NDCM component was mobilized in April 2013 only, but NCDM still

managed to substantially complete Component 4. The frequent and intensive Bank

supervision included technical support missions, carried out by Phnom Penh-based staff

once or twice between the regular Bank missions; they focused on progress, quality of

works, and implementation of safeguards and provided clear guidance for actions. This

approach that applied experience from the Indonesia – Infrastructure Reconstruction

Financing Facility Project for post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh and Nias, contributed

to the timely, on-budget completion of the project.

Key Events and Issues During Implementation

25. Management and staff problems at NCDM caused serious delays. In early 2012 the

PMU for the NCDM component was restructured; the project manager was changed and

the roles of some key staff members were adjusted. The PMU management change affected

technical capacity and caused the loss of institutional memory of the PMU which delayed

the recruitment of the key international consultant substantially. Bid evaluations had been

completed in early August 2012, but the contract negotiations had not. In November 2012,

9

a Bank team identified a lack of technical capacity in the PMU management team, causing

delays of key decisions needed to accelerate overall progress of the NCDM component.

26. The Bank and senior management of the NCDM agreed for NCDM to: (i)

strengthen technical capacity of PMU through the appointment of a technical advisor to the

project manager; (ii) complete negotiations and sign the contract of the international

consulting services; (iii) engage an individual international consultant for technical support

and review of the international consulting team’s work and documents; (iv) form a

technical team in NCDM as an advisory panel and assign counterpart staff to work with

the international consulting team; and (v) carry out PMU staff needs review and engage

necessary consultants, e.g. re-engagement of the FM consultant and assigning the

procurement specialist in the PMU. Senior management of the NCDM finally endorsed the

contract negotiations with the international firm.

27. Adjustment of project targets. By June 2012 the detailed field surveys had been

completed, project and priority criteria were developed and agreed upon by the MC in

consultation with MRD staff, and up-to-date cost data was finally available. Serious delay

in completing the survey work was caused by: (a) amount time and staff resources needed

to carry out detailed surveys in more than 250 villages and road sections, and (b) further

severe flooding in late 2011 causing more damage and preventing consultants from starting

the field surveys. And more roads were damaged by this new flooding event. Some roads

had already been repaired by others, some were lower priority (based on the agreed

criteria), and construction costs were 25% higher because (i) damage to roads was more

extensive than first thought, (ii) more drainage structures were needed, and (iii) materials

and labor costs had increased significantly. A long list of village selection criteria –

including availability of groundwater, ease of access, village proximity and clustering, low

water and sanitation coverage – was used to choose villages for the water and sanitation

investments. As a result, the following reductions to the original targets under component

2 were discussed and agreed during the June 2012 supervision mission: (i) length of road

reconstruction from 920 to 615 km; (ii) the number of wells from 1,440 to 1,329; and (iii)

the number of latrines from 32,000 to 18,465. One essential bridge with a 60 m main span

was added to the project scope. A formal restructuring was not deemed necessary to

incorporate these simple changes in output targets (see paragraph 7 on page 2 for details).

28. Project restructuring through re-allocations. The mid-term review (MTR) took

place in June 2013. Further to a detailed review of the project’s financing needs, Bank and

RGC agreed to re-allocate unused financing proceeds as follows: (i) as all eligible

expenditures for road reconstruction in Siem Reap City had been fully paid to RGC, the

Grant balance of SDR 460,833 was shifted from Category 1 (Retroactive Financing) to

Category 2 (Goods, works, services, etc.), and (ii) SDR 1,930,000 from the Credit under

Category 3 (Unallocated), also to Category 2. These re-allocations to Category 2 facilitated

the achievement of the infrastructure construction targets as revised in 2012.

29. Capacity building of local contractors. Due to the known poor performance of

Cambodian contractors, one of the MC’s responsibilities under Component 3 was to build

the capacity of local contractors. This was achieved by a series of relatively simple

10

measures: (i) prequalification contractors based on their actual works; (ii) provision of local

language translations of contract documents, or at least of critical bid information and

contract terms; (iii) making available reliable cost data for road construction; (iv) holding

pre-bid meetings to fully inform potential bidders of contract requirements; (v)

employment of experienced engineers and contract specialists to give on-the-job, hands-

on training to local contractors.

30. Minor changes to the scope of Component 4 (NCDM). After the international

consultant for this component had mobilized, discussions were held with NCDM and

subsequently with the Bank, with regard to the actual feasibility of implementing certain

aspects of the program under Component 4. Under sub-component 1, landslides had been

included in the TOR as part of the risk assessment. However, the risk of the occurrence of

landslides in Cambodia was deemed to be minimal so NCDM decided to omit landslides

from the risk assessment. Under sub-component 3, the TOR required the consultant to

develop building codes. However, establishing building codes would have required

legislative action by RGC; this was not feasible during the relatively short project

implementation period. This was definitely a design problem. NCDM and the Bank agreed

that a comprehensive set of guidelines and a handbook would be prepared that could be

used to develop building codes in the future. The completed guidelines and handbook will

still yield great benefits by providing up-to-date information and instructions for resilient

building practices. However, building codes would allow enforcement action by

government in cases of non-compliance.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

31. By the end of 2011 the MC had designed a Project Performance Management

framework, including a database and reporting formats, in close coordination with MRD

staff. The MC provided M&E training in the form of workshops and on-the-job activities.

The M&E system was implemented jointly by MC and MRD, and in the latter periods of

project implementation, key data for reports could be generated by MRD on their own. The

early availability of a good monitoring system enabled the project entities to track progress

of the key indicators that were directly related to the PDO. At the end of the project, MRD’s

monitoring and evaluation capacities in the use of M&E systems were improved

significantly.

32. Component 4 (NCDM) did not design, implement and use a separate M&E system

but NCDM relied on, and used, the M&E framework that was already developed and

implemented by the MC for the MRD components. NCDM was able to effectively track

the progress in the implementation and to measure intermediate outcomes but the

framework did not include any impact evaluation as part of the M&E activities, since it

was an emergency operation.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

33. Safeguard. This was a Category B project and although the safeguard policies on

Environmental Assessment, Involuntary Resettlement, and Physical Cultural Resources

were triggered, there were no major adverse environmental nor social impacts. All minor

11

impacts were managed very well by the MRD / MC and close supervision by the Bank.

The ESSAF was disclosed in December 2010 in English and Khmer. Using the ESSAF,

the EMF and RPF, and a detailed checklist, the MRD and consultants made sure that each

small sub-project was screened for any environmental or social impacts. Simple

environmental codes of practice (ECOPs) and EMPs were prepared and incorporated into

the contract documents; road alignments were adjusted as needed to avoid or minimize

land acquisition, and a simple RP for one specific road alignment was prepared and

disclosed. Intensive supervision by MC and MRD teams made sure the RP was adhered to.

Bank supervision followed up, even on minor issues, to ensure full safeguard compliance.

MRD project staff’s capacity in environmental and social safeguards management has

improved significantly through training and practice during project implementation. The

OP for Physical Cultural Resources had been triggered, and contractors, consultants and

all project staff were watchful. Only one physical cultural resource was encountered in the

course of project implementation, and good technical design and appropriate construction

methods avoided negative impacts. In summary, safeguard compliance was exemplary.

34. Fiduciary. Fiduciary compliance was generally good and there were no issues to

be resolved, with the exception of the slow progress of financial management (FM) actions

in the early stages of Component 4. Eventually, NCDM did receive support from the FM

consultant attached to the MRD components before NCDM engaged its own FM

consultant, and this solution improved financial reporting of the NCDM component. MRD

and NCDM generated timely interim financial reports (IFRs), and had external audits of

their accounts done for 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 timely; all auditor’s opinions were non-

qualified, and the management letter of the auditor only had suggestions for some

improvements in internal control system. In addition to the prior reviews carried out by the

Bank, the ex-post procurement review was conducted annually for MRD and NCDM

contracts during the project implementation. There were no major issues identified, and

all procurement was carried out following the Bank procurement guidelines and

Government procedures.

35. Bank and RGC had jointly prepared a Good Governance Framework (GGF) and

RGC made good efforts to implement its provisions, starting with timely disclosure of key

project documents on the MRD and NCDM websites. MEF assigned the IPA for all major

procurement to minimize the risk of mis-procurement. The Bank’s fraud and corruption

provisions and sanctions were incorporated in all procurement documents. An effective

complaints handling mechanism was adopted from earlier Bank projects but there were

hardly any complaints; some instances of unfair treatment were identified through the

environmental and social screening. The Bank’s frequent supervision missions did a

thorough review of the consistent implementation of the GGF.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

36. There was no need for a handover of the reconstructed roads because MRD and

their provincial departments will maintain these roads. MRD has included regular

maintenance of the reconstructed roads in their work program, and RGC wants a follow-

on rural infrastructure project which could provide further opportunities for strengthening

12

road maintenance. In addition to traffic safety signs, strong posts have been installed at the

entrance to some critical road sections to prevent heavy trucks from damaging the roads.

Following the community consultation and information sessions, brochures in the local

language were widely distributed to assist the local communities with the operation and

use of the new water and sanitation infrastructure. Spare parts and O&M training were

provided to all WSUGs to make sure they can keep the hand pumps working well into the

future. Not all beneficiaries have built the necessary superstructures on the latrine bases

(substructures) provided by the project, but MRD and the PDRDs have committed to work

with the local communities to ensure that all superstructures are completed by the end of

December 2014. MRD also committed that it will continue to work with communities on

education campaigns so that these assets will remain in good operating condition.

37. The large turnout for the project closing workshop and the many positive comments

received from government and beneficiaries suggest strong ownership of project assets.

And in view of the successful implementation of this emergency operation, RGC has

approached the Bank for a possible “second Ketsana project”, actually meaning a rural

infrastructure project – delivering roads, water and sanitation to rural people – modeled on

the KERRP.

38. For Component 4, NCDM will employ their increased capacity to link the risk maps

and the multi-hazard early warning system (MHEWS) to the DMIC, and follow the

roadmap provided by the specialist DM consultant. They will also continue to widely

disseminate the handbook on more resilient buildings, and work towards legislated

building codes based on the handbook. RGC / NCDM are working with the ADB on a

possible follow-up project to further develop NCDM’s capacities in DRM.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Overall Rating: Substantial

39. RGC considered this project highly relevant for Cambodia as it was consistent with

its “Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency, Phase-III”

which was reaffirmed by RGC in September 2013. This strategy document is a clear

blueprint to guide the activities of all stakeholders to further pursue and strengthen long-

term sustainable development aimed at promoting economic growth, creating jobs,

equitable distribution of the fruits of growth, and ensuring effectiveness of public

institutions and management of resources. The project addressed three of the four

“Rectangles”; in particular: Rectangle II: (Development of Physical Infrastructure),

explicitly calls for transport infrastructure development; Rectangle III (local private sector

strengthening); and Rectangle IV, (improved water supply, sanitation and health). RGC’s

Rectangular Strategy was underpinned by a call for good governance and leveraging of

partnerships for the country’s development, reduction in poverty and achievement of

Cambodia’s Millennium Development Goals (CMDG); all of which the project has

contributed to.

13

40. As stated further above the project was fully consistent with the Bank’s country

assistance strategy (CAS) for 2005 to 20111. In particular, Pillar 1 of the CAS aimed at

improving the delivery of basic services because of their importance for growth and

poverty reduction. Improved roads, as well as provision of water and sanitation, were

critical components in support of these objectives. Project investments were also important

for Pillar 2 of the CAS since the government-led strategy for investment programs was

aimed at improved infrastructure to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. By

“building back better”, such as more and larger drainage crossings, the project was also

relevant for building in resilience to climate change. The PDO was still fully relevant at

project closing, and design and implementation remained relevant until project completion;

this was confirmed by RGC’s request for another project modeled on KERRP. The overall

rating for relevance is therefore assessed as Substantial.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Rating: Satisfactory

41. The development objectives of this project were (a) to restore the service levels of

transport and water and sanitation to the affected people in the project provinces, and (b)

to strengthen RGC's capacity in disaster preparedness and management. More than 90

percent of the project funds were expended on the first part of the PDO achievement of

project outcomes and will be weighted toward part (a).

42. The PDNA report took about six months to be finalized; its lists of damaged roads

were very preliminary and indicative due to the difficulty of accessing remote project sites

on severely flood-damaged roads. The project as designed provided for a detailed survey

of damaged roads once a consultant had been mobilized (using retroactive financing funds).

The project scope was adjusted based on the survey and the targets were revised in June

2012. Less than 15 percent of project funds had been disbursed at that stage, mostly for the

retroactive financing of the Siem Reap urban roads.

Part (a) of the PDO – Restoring service levels (about 90 percent of project expenditures)

Restoration of transport service is rated as Highly Satisfactory

43. (i) Urban roads. Siem Reap urban roads (see Annex 2 for details) were a high

priority for RGC because of Siem Reap’s strategic importance for the country’s tourism

sector as the base for visits to Angkor Wat, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. In 2009, when

more than 2 million tourists arrived in Cambodia, the main roads in Siem Reap were in

good serviceable condition. The flooding caused by Ketsana had largely washed out the

asphalt surface and some of the base of five key road sections in the center of Siem Reap

linking it to the airport and the national road. RGC decided to repair and resurface 15.7 km

of these roads and complete these works urgently using force account procedures by the

Provincial Department of Works and Transport within four months of the typhoon. The

1 Due to relationship issues there is a new CAS since July 2014

14

Bank agreed to retroactive financing of up to $5 million, subject to a satisfactory inspection

of the completed works. In 2011 the roads were inspected by a joint technical team, were

verified for quantity, quality, cost and fiduciary compliance and were found to be fully

acceptable. At project completion they were in very good overall condition. Due to the

early completion and maintenance of these urban roads and their great importance and

importance to Cambodia’s tourist industry this part is rated Highly Satisfactory.

44. (ii) Rural provincial roads. After Ketsana about 30 percent of the affected rural

laterite road sections were totally damaged, i.e. total disruption of service, but even the

partially damaged roads provided very poor service, especially where bridges or culverts

were missing. The project had adopted the “build back better” (BBB) principle, and MRD

designs considered the likely impacts of climate change. After completion to a high

standard of quality – as confirmed by the supervision and inspection reports – the service

level of the roads was fully restored, and in most locations, significantly improved. The

roads were widened to the extent possible within the existing right-of-way, side slopes were

protected against erosion, larger and additional culverts and causeways (414 in total), also

with erosion protection, were added, and six new bridges were built; road and traffic signs

were installed for safety. The roads are better protected from flooding now, and

beneficiaries are very satisfied (see Annex 5). Average travel speed more than tripled to 33

km/h and traffic volumes grew by 28 percent on some sample sections. Other achievements

were MRD’s work with local agencies to (i) build better preparedness for future disasters,

(ii) manage disaster risks in the rural roads sector, and (iii) do good recovery planning.

Together with the BBB designs, these achievements contributed also to part (b) of the PDO,

i.e. “to strengthen RGC’s capacity in disaster preparedness and management. Overall, this

part of the project is rated Satisfactory.

45. (iii) Dust control. Dust control was provided on road sections through densely

populated areas on about 48 percent of the roads. This was also guided by the “build back

better” principle, and just by using the opportunity of reconstruction. The health and

nuisance problems caused by the high dust levels – especially during the dry season – were

evident, and at relatively small additional cost a single seal surface treatment using bitumen

was added through villages and more heavily populated areas (concrete pavement was used

in front of public schools). About 200,000 people living in the more than 250 villages along

the improved roads have benefited from dust control seal on the roads through the villages

(length of about 1 km each). The health benefits of this measure were not quantified but

are considered to be substantial and beneficiaries praised the removal of the dust nuisance.

Restoration of water and sanitation is rated as Satisfactory.

46. Water and sanitation. This was less a restoration of service level but rather a

“work of opportunity”. When carrying out the road damage survey it was noted that

villages along the affected roads had low levels of access to adequate water (about 25

percent) and sanitation (about 20 percent) services. The poor water sources that people may

have had before Ketsana struck were damaged or destroyed, and the majority of the people

used open field defecation (OFD) for sanitation due to little of proper sanitation practices.

The rural road reconstruction project provided a perfect opportunity to improve the lives

of the rural population living along these roads, to help to reduce rural poverty and

15

contribute towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Cambodia.

The project made every effort to make this sub-component sustainable by the following

measures: community participation prior to and during implementation, spare parts and

training on well pump operation and service, formation of WSUGs, user involvement in

latrine superstructure construction, and water and sanitation (Watsan) brochures for all

community members. After completion of the project, the coverage with water and

sanitation in the target villages rose to between 75 and 80 percent. Although undocumented

in this project, it is reasonable to assume that there are considerable health and gender-

related benefits flowing from this part of the project, and close to 100,000 people benefited

from these Watsan improvements. Annex 5 (Beneficiary Survey Results) and Annex 6

(Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results) document the level of beneficiaries’

satisfaction.

Part (b) of the PDO – strengthen capacity in disaster preparedness and management

This part of the project is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

47. Part (b) of project used less than 10 percent of the project’s financing. It was

implemented by a different and less experienced agency. The risk mapping and risk atlas

for Cambodia were completed and are widely available for risk assessments. The DMIC

and guidelines are useful, even without legislative changes, and the agency’s capacity has

been improved as well. In the course of implementing this part of the project, NCDM

engaged with sector ministries and other stakeholders through many workshops and

through their consultant's work with theses ministries and provinces in data collection and

consultation; these interactions contributed significantly to improving NCDM’s DRM

capacity. Although there was insufficient time to pass legislation to fully establish the

DMIC and to codify the housing and building guidelines prepared by the project, the

guidelines together with a handbook are very useful to promote and guide resilient house

construction practices. However, the full PDO was not achieved for part (b).

48. The project’s final outputs are summarized in the following Core Sector Indicator

(CSI):

Core Sector Indicator Unit Achievement

ROADS AND HIGHWAYS

- Rural roads rehabilitated km 615.0

- Non-rural (=urban) roads rehabilitated km 15.6

SANITATION

- People provided with access to improved sanitation

(based on one latrine/HH and 5 people/HH)

Number 92,325

- Improved latrines constructed under the project Number 18,465

WATER SUPPLY

- People provided with access to “improved water

sources” (based on 15 wells/HH & 5 persons/HH)

Number 91,500

- Improved community water points constructed or

rehabilitated under the project

Number 1,220

16

3.3 Efficiency

Rating: Substantial

49. An economic analysis conducted on 19 representative project road sections

indicated an EIRR of 50.1 percent. It compared transport costs for road agency and

transport users for “with-project” and “without-project” options. In the “without-project”

option, roads were assumed in poor condition with a minimum level of maintenance. The

“with-project” option included only marginal widening, but substantial rehabilitation or

reconstruction to partly gravel and partial surface treatment plus regular maintenance.

Traffic before and after completion of the project indicated an average 28 percent growth

over two years (2012 – 2014), suggesting additional, above normal, growth of about 15

percent. The analysis used 2013 constant prices based on the actual construction and

supervision costs but excluded all taxes and duties. Two categories of benefits were

calculated: (i) savings of vehicle operating costs due to improved road conditions, and (ii)

savings of travel time due to increased travel speeds.

50. The time savings and health benefits generated by the water and sanitation

subcomponent were not quantified and analyzed. There are also considerable, but non-

quantifiable health benefits resulting from the dust control on rural roads through densely

populated areas. Regarding efficiency, the unit costs for wells and latrines were established

by MRD and their consultants by comparisons with past works; they were then confirmed

by competitive bidding. For details of the economic analysis see Annex 3. Overall, the

efficiency of the project is rated as Substantial.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating


51. As detailed above, the project was highly relevant to RGC’s strategy for growth

and the Bank’s most recent CAS. The PDO was achieved except for some elements of

Component 4, and the economic analysis for a representative sample of project roads – the

largest share of the project investments – shows a robust EIRR of about 50 percent.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

52. The rural poor were not specifically targeted by this project, but these generally

remote and poor villages with low water and sanitation coverage were prioritized for

assistance by the project. The water and sanitation investments clearly benefited girls and

women in the target villages to a great extent although no data are available. The new

community wells reduced distances to clean water sources considerably, saving the female

members of households much time and effort. Similarly, girls and women benefit from the

family latrines due to reduced open field defecation (OFD) and the associated higher risks

of assaults and violence but this emergency operation has not gathered any data to quantify

the benefits of the water and sanitation investments.

17

53. The project also had positive impacts on social development in the benefiting

communities as shared infrastructure facilities generally promote community cooperation

and cohesion. During the implementation, the MC employed an outreach team led by an

international expert social development consultant who worked with all project villages on

outreach, education, and organizing Water and Sanitation User Groups (WSUG). WSUGs

are nation-wide government-supported mechanisms for O&M of Watsan investments:

households make small financial contributions, administered by the head of the group, and

the funds are used for small repairs as needed. For major repair or parts replacement, the

provincial rural development department (PDRD, MRD’s local branches) will be

responsible. Also, to ensure smooth operation of the wells, community members received

training in how to use, operate and maintain the hand pumps installed on ground water

wells, each shared by 15 households.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

54. Improved capacity of MRD in infrastructure design and construction supervision:

The MC helped to improve the capacity of the MRD-PMU to plan and design roads and

conduct construction supervision to ensure that these works were built to the specified

construction quality and within the agreed budget. The MC achieved this by (i) involving

MRD staff in their day-to-day work, (ii) advising on contractual issues, (iii) conducting

joint field missions during the survey stage, (iv) doing strict construction supervision and

defects inspections, and (v) co-locating their offices at the MRD during the assessment and

design phases of their assignment. Similarly, MRD improved staff capacity in the planning,

assessment, design, and construction supervision of water wells and latrines by shadowing

the MC specialists when carrying out their duties.

55. Management of environmental and social safeguards by MRD: International and

national environmental experts and a national social safeguard expert of the MC team

assisted MRD to prepare and implement the project safeguard instruments. MRD staff,

both at the central and provincial levels, now have a much better understanding and

capacity of safeguards management after they effectively implemented the environmental

and social safeguards required under RGC and Development Partner regulations. MRD

staff acquired the capacity to carry out public consultations and prepare such safeguard

instruments as EMPs and RPs. As a result, there were no serious environmental impacts or

resettlement issues during project implementation.

M&E capacity

56. MRD improved its monitoring and evaluation capacity by adopting a Project

Performance Management framework, a database and reporting formats in close

coordination with provincial MRD staff. MC provided the M&E training in the form of

workshops and on-the-job training. The M&E system was implemented jointly, and after

the initial training phase, all key data for reports were generated by MRD itself.

NCDM capacity improvements

57. Although the NCDM component experienced several implementation difficulties

as already elaborated above, the technical and institutional capacities of NCDM for risk

18

identification have been strengthened significantly. This includes the capacity to work with

the provinces and communes and the use of risk information, such as risk mapping as well

as preparing measures for reducing disaster impacts. NCDM staff also increased their

capacity in handling early warning systems (EWS) and the associated software. Lastly,

they acquired experience and capacity for cooperating with a wide range of agencies to

develop the building construction guidelines and handbooks.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

58. An unintended impact from the Project was the adoption by MRD of rural road

designs that consider impacts of climate change. The MRD adopted high quality

construction supervision for rural roads and learned new ways to design road alignments

within rights-of-way, thereby avoiding the need for land acquisition or resettlement2. The

land located along the improved roads (including effective dust control) is reportedly going

up in value, and people, particularly the poor, may be tempted to sell their land. This aspect

was highlighted during the Minister of Rural Development’s visits to some of the

reconstructed roads in June 2014.

59. Travel speeds have increased on the reconstructed roads and greater numbers of

heavy vehicles are now using them. Although the higher travel speeds are an important

project benefit (see Annex 3 – Economic Analysis), the bigger trucks damage the roads

and, combined with higher speeds, also cause more traffic accidents – an unintended

outcome that required some mitigation. Traffic signs were included as part of the project,

but traffic safety awareness and education campaigns will still be needed to deal with this

impact. On critical road sections poles have been already installed to prevent heavy trucks

from entering.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

60. Using a representative sample of 385 households living along the project roads, the

MC carried out beneficiary surveys in early 2012 (“before project”) and close to the end of

the project in May/June 2014. The results of the later survey were overwhelmingly

positive: 76 percent of those surveyed rated the improved roads as “excellent” or “good”

compared to 80 percent who had rated the roads as “poor” before the project. The dust

control applied through villages significantly increased the positive ratings. Survey

respondents had similar positive views of the impacts of the road improvements on their

daily life (travel to school, hospital, meetings) and their business / occupations. For details

see Annex 5.

61. In July 2014 RGC organized a project closing workshop attended by high-level

representatives of the RGC together with project stakeholders, including beneficiaries from

target communities. All participants expressed a high level of satisfaction with the project

2 The approach was later applied in the ADB-financed Rural Roads Improvement Project Phase II

19

performance, outputs and outcomes. These positive views were confirmed by anecdotal

comments from community members. For details see Annex 6.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

62. The following risk factors and mitigation actions were considered.

Risk Factors Mitigation

Rebuilt roads are neglected MRD capacity and budgets for O&M

were increased

Rebuilt roads deteriorate and break up Roads were built back to high quality

standard

Higher intensity storms cause larger

runoff volumes than before (climate

change effects)

Additional and larger drainage crossings

(culverts and bridges) were designed and

built under “build back better” approach

Wells and latrines are not used/not

working

Communities were involved, have owner-

ship, received training and tools for O&M

Wells run dry

MRD staff are trained to monitor

performance and functioning of wells and

latrines and assist the communities

concerned with periodic maintenance Latrine pits are full

EWS and DMIC are not made functional

NCDM capacity increased and equipped

with tools and roadmap

Building handbook not codified Wide dissemination of guidelines

63. On the basis of the brief analysis above, the risk to development outcome has been

assessed as Moderate because a number of positive mitigation factors that have been

complied with are likely to reduce what would have been a significant risk.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry


64. The Bank’s performance in ensuring quality at entry is assessed as Satisfactory.

The Bank responded promptly to RGC’s request for emergency assistance, led and

coordinated the PDNA and, by November 2009, produced a comprehensive draft PDNA

report. The Bank promised to consider retroactive financing for any urgent works the RGC

undertook. Project processing was accelerated by making adequate staff resources

available, but the rigorous reviews (and required revisions) of the ESSAF, required for

safeguard clearance, delayed project processing. The project targeted the most affected and

poorer provinces of the country, and the proposed water and sanitation improvements

considered the benefits for women. The implementation arrangements were practical and

20

clear. By using staff with recent experience in emergency operations, lessons from similar

post disaster operations were incorporated.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

65. The Bank’s performance in supervision is assessed as Moderately Satisfactory. In

the early stages of implementation, Bank supervision pushed for quick re-surveys of

affected areas to confirm and adjust the prioritization of investments. Later, Bank

supervision focused on the quality and good progress of implementation to ensure quick

restoration of service levels to the affected communities. Despite serious initial

implementation delays and more severe flooding events early during implementation, the

project was completed by the original closing date. Supervision was frequent, close and

intensive by strong and experienced Bank teams that provided support and advice. The

MTR assured that all works and activities would be completed on time and within budget.

Supervision of safeguard and fiduciary compliance was exemplary; this minimized issues

and problems. Bank rating and reporting was detailed and realistic. The Bank’s emphasis

on, and support for, intensive community development activities, such as setting up

WSUGs, contributes to the sustainability of the water and sanitation investments. However,

as noted earlier, the team failed to follow the formal level 2 restructuring process when

changing the Project’s underlying outcome indicators. Nevertheless, all changes were fully

documented in the mission Aide Memoire and all subsequent ISR reports, which were

agreed with the CMU and disclosed.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


66. Based on the above ratings the Bank’s overall performance is rated as Satisfactory.

The bank can take credit for the reasonably fast project preparation and consistent

assistance to RGC for its preparation activities. Re-assurance that retroactive financing will

be available for eligible expenditures gave RGC confidence to proceed with urgent, critical

road reconstruction works in Siem Reap. Bank supervision was intensive and resulted in a

project implemented without problems, without delays, and with high quality outputs.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance


67. Government’s performance is rated as Satisfactory. RGC cooperated with the Bank

and other development partners to produce a good draft PDNA report less than three

months after Ketsana had struck. Government also acted quickly to carry out urgent urban

road repairs in Siem Reap that later were found to be eligible for retroactive financing by

the Bank. During the early project identification stage, RGC coordinated well with the

other development partners to agree on which donors would finance the various post-

disaster interventions. The project that was identified was consistent with the current RGC

strategy document. MEF was ready to implement the project and had appointed competent

project staff in the key agencies; however, at a later stage, staff changes at NCDM caused

21

some problems and delays. RGC complied with all covenants and also made good efforts

to implement monitor the GGF. MEF also appointed the IPA who was responsible for all

ICB. RGC’s insistence, though, on QCBS consultant selection of the two key consultants

caused considerable delays.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance


68. The performance of MRD is rated as Satisfactory. MRD especially showed strong

ownership and commitment, and as soon as the MC was appointed, the project scope was

finalized based on re-surveys and prioritization criteria. Although there were no

consultations during the short preparation stage, intensive participatory activities were

initiated once project implementation started. MRD supported the formation of WSUGs,

and also prepared and distributed brochures for O&M of the new infrastructure.

Environmental and social safeguard compliance was exemplary, and MRD prepared a very

good EMF and RPF, respectively, as a condition of effectiveness. There were only very

minor problems, and hardly any complaints. A good complaints handling mechanism was

set up, albeit somewhat late, and the GGF was implemented and monitored. Fiduciary

compliance was also good since timely and unqualified external audits were produced.

M&E design was adequate, and the MC, together with MRD provincial staff, gathered

baseline data for the beneficiary survey. The latter was completed in May/June 2014 and

showed large positive impacts.

69. NCDM’s performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory because not all planned

activities were fully completed but nonetheless the capacity building goals were largely

achieved, leaving the agency more competent in DRM. Due to the much smaller size of

this component, the overall performance rating is still assessed as Satisfactory.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


70. The overall performance of the Borrower is rated as Satisfactory because both

Government and the implementing agencies, performed well. Despite the emergency

nature of the operation, the delays during the early stages of implementation, procurement

delays, unusually wet monsoon seasons in 2011 and 2012, and some staffing changes at

NCDM, the project was brought back on schedule and completed on time. The quality of

the roads, wells and latrines is good, and the users/beneficiaries reported their satisfaction

in the beneficiary survey and community feedback.

6. Lessons Learned

71. A simple project design based on the best available preliminary damage and

needs assessment facilitated quick processing and start-up of implementation. As soon

as project consultants were mobilized the final physical scope of the project was

determined and adjusted based on detailed field surveys and more accurate cost

information; this was easily done because of the simple project design.

22

72. Use of retroactive financing and force account by government to get large and

almost immediate positive impacts and reinforce collaboration with government,

especially in an emergency operation. The reconstruction by RGC force account works of

15.7 km of urban roads in Siem Reap, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, was completed in

less than six months after the typhoon struck, even before RGC and Bank had agreed on

the scope for this project. US$ 4.2 million of retroactive financing was part of the project.

73. Use the simpler and quicker Single Source Selection (SSS) for appointing key

consultants for emergency operations in countries with weak technical and institutional

capacities. Project implementation was six months behind schedule at the end of the first

year, mainly because the MC was late being selected, contracted and mobilized by using

the rather lengthy Quality and Cost-based Selection (QCBS).

74. During the implementation stage, target local contractors with simple measures

to ensure better quality construction. The initially poor quality work by the local

contractors displayed a lack of capacity, knowledge and experience, especially in

compressed timeframes; contractors also did not always comprehend, and comply with, the

contract’s general and technical requirements. As detailed in para. 30, a series of simple

measures, implemented by the MC, achieved important improvements in construction

quality and progress.

75. If community participation during project preparation is impossible for an

emergency operation, conduct information sessions and outreach campaigns as early as

possible during implementation. Due to the emergency nature of the project and its

accelerated processing pace, community consultation and development activities before

the start of the project were not possible. Only if project beneficiaries fully understand the

project interventions, will they accept new infrastructure facilities, and also the temporary

inconveniences experienced during construction.

76. Include public road safety awareness programs and campaigns, even for rural

road construction projects. Traffic speeds increased dramatically after the road

reconstruction and rehabilitation works were completed, as did the number and severity

of accidents.

77. Consider applying bitumen seals for dust control on laterite or gravel roads

through rural settlements. The dust control measures on about 1 km per village through

some 250 villages, added at relatively low additional cost, greatly reduced the dust

nuisance, can protect the road base from water damage, and are likely to have some, albeit

non-quantified, health benefits.

23

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

N/A

(b) Cofinanciers

N/A

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

N/A

24

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(US$ millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate

(US$ millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Component 1: Support for

Emergency Response 5.00 4.40 88.0

Component 2: Rural Roads,

Water & Sanitation 25.10 27.13 108.1

Component 3: Implementation

Support 4.00 4.73 118.3

Component 4: Institutional

Strengthening&Capacity Building 3.00 3.12 104.0

Unallocated

2.90 0.00 0

Total Baseline Cost 40.00 39.38 98.5

Physical Contingencies

0.00

0.00

0

Price Contingencies

0.00

0.00

0

Total Project Costs 40.00 39.38 98.5

Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 0

Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 0

Total Financing Required 40.00 39.38 98.5

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal

Estimate

(US$ millions

)

Actual/Latest

Estimate

(US$ millions

)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Borrower 0.00 0.00 0

International Development

Association (IDA) 40.00 39.38 98.5

25

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1: Retroactive financing for support for emergency response

The RGC financed the repair and reconstruction – to at least previously existing standards

– of five critical stretches of urban roads in Siem Reap City (15.7 km in total length) using

asphaltic concrete bitumen surface. The work was done by force account for US$ 4.2

million. Due to the importance of these road sections for the tourism sector in Siem Reap,

the works were completed by RGC in early 2010, within five months of the typhoon. The

roads survey carried out by the Individual International Consultant during 2010 verified

the quantity, quality and costs of these works, and based on the October 2011 Road

Construction Completion Inspection report, the Bank accepted the reconstruction and

paving of the Siem Reap urban roads for retroactive financing since this component had

restored the service levels of these critical road sections in one of the project provinces,

and thereby contributed to the achievement of the first part of the PDO.

Below are the details of the reconstructed Siem Reap urban roads:

Name of road Length in m Width in m

Sivuthar Street – 3 sections 540 8

1,820 12

2,050 8

Total length Sivuthar Street 4,410

Po KamBor Street – 3 sections 943 7

285 14

4,744 10

Total length Po KamBor Street 5,972

AcharSva Street – 2 sections 1,100 8

495 7

Total length AcharSva Street 1,595

AcharHemcheav Street – 2 sections 222 6

1,469 9

Total length AcharHemcheav Street 1,691

Hun SenSantepheap Street 2,000 8

Total length Hun SenSantepheap Street 2,000 8

OVERALL LENGTH - ALL ROADS 15,668

Component 2: Rural road rehabilitation and reconstruction in six selected provinces

and provision of community-level water supply and sanitation facilities

Component 2 covers the bulk of the project investments. The PDNA report had identified

priority road sections for reconstruction but the final scope of the rural roads and Watsan

26

investments was determined by a detailed survey by the project consultants in coordination

with MRD; more recent flooding in 2011, updated costs information, changed priorities

and restoration work done by others were taken into account. Six provinces (“the project

provinces”) were selected for the project interventions, based on the identified needs in the

rural roads and Watsan sectors; this more focused approach also avoided the management

of widely dispersed construction activities.

Some road sections were completed destroyed and required complete reconstruction while

others were damaged to varying degrees. All roads were reconstructed to at least their

previous service levels as evidenced by the increased traffic volumes, as observed in the

traffic counts (see Annex 3). There were few, if any, adequate water supply and sanitation

facilities in the affected villages in the project provinces, i.e. the service levels were

minimal. Watsan investments were done as a work of opportunity. The types and physical

quantities of works were determined based on the specific local needs. The detailed specific

works are listed below by sector and province.

Sub-components 2.1 and 2.2: Rural road rehabilitation and improvement,

including dust control for about 1 km through densely populated areas

Province

Road

length

(km)

Length

of SSST

(km)

Con-

crete

road

(km)

No. of

box

culverts

No. of

pipe

culverts

No. of

bridges

No. of

cause-

ways

Kampong

Thom 193.3 93.3 14 43

2

+1x60m

Kampong

Chhnang 42.2 19.2 4 3

Kampong

Cham 53.6 28.4 1.0 7 25

Battambang 35.8 4.7 5 40 1

Banteay

Meanchey 122.0 37.3 1.8 16.0 96.0 1

Siem Reap

168.5 107.3 28 131 2 1

TOTALS 615.3 290.0 2.8 74 338 6 2

In addition to laterite surfaces and dust control bituminous seals for close to half the length

of the road sections, all roads include:

drainage structures, i.e. pipe and box culverts, plus some bridges

grass erosion protection on side slopes;

erosion protection and guide posts on new and existing pipe and box culverts and

bridges; and

traffic signage and project sign boards.

Also, one additional bridge with a 60m long main span was constructed in Kampong Thom

Province as replacement of a previous, much shorter bridge.

27

See Annex 10, Fig. 1, 2, 3 and 4 for examples of road and bridge works, Fig. 5 to 8 for

illustrations of dust control, and Fig. 9 and 10 for culvert drainage structures.

By raising the standard of road construction, including the BBB approach and considering

climate change in the designs, these road and ancillary works all contributed in large

measure towards the achievement of the fist part of the PDO, i.e. restoring the service levels

transport.

Sub-component 2.3: Water and sanitation activities

Table 2.2: Summary of Wells completed under the Project

Province

Contract

Target

No. of

wells

No. of

Wells

drilled

Unacceptable wells No. of acceptable wells with

hand pumps installed

No.

of

dry

wells

No. of wells

with

unacceptable

water

quality

Total No. of

unacceptable

wells

Good

Well

depth >

55m &

<80m

Good

Wells

depth

between

30 &

55m

Total

Good

Wells

Kampong Thom 285 317 78 0 78 4 235 239

Kampong Chhnang 72 72 0 4 4 0 68 68

Kampong Cham 192 201 1 3 4 40 157 197

Battambang 94 99 3 0 3 0 96 96

Battambang 253 269 62 0 62 16 191 207

Siem Reap 433 455 41 1 42 0 413 413

TOTALS 1,329 1,413 185 8 193 60 1,160 1,220

Note: 92 percent of the targeted wells were fully completed.

Table 2.3: Summary of Latrines completed under the Project

Province

No. of

Latrines

completed

Kampong Thom 3,980

Kampong Chhnang 872

Kampong Cham 2,757

Battambang 1,229

Banteay Meanchey 4,039

Siem Reap 5,588

TOTAL 18,465

28

The Watsan investments did not just restore, but raised service levels greatly above what

existed before the project. The interventions were enhanced by information and

consultation sessions with the beneficiaries; water user groups were formed to better

manage the common water supply wells. Brochures on proper use, operation and

maintenance were also provided to the users. The large number of beneficiaries of new

water supply and sanitation facilities contributed in a substantial manner to the first part of

the PDO, i.e. to restore the service levels of water and sanitation to the affected people in

the project provinces. See Annex 10, Fig. 11 and 12 for photos of water supply wells, and

Fig. 13, 14 and 15 for photos of latrines and owner-built superstructures.

Component 3: Project implementation support (MRD)

This component covered the costs of the MC for providing a range of services and

support activities to central and provincial RD staff as follows:

Detailed survey and report to determine physical scope of project

Detailed investigation and design of roads, water supply and sanitation works

using the BBB approach

Preparation of bidding and contract documents for all civil works

Design M&E system for Component 2

Mobilize FM consultants, also working for NCDM

Provide detailed field supervision of construction

Verify and process progress payments for contractors

Conduct safeguards implementation and management

Train central and provincial RD staff with training in contract management

Conduct information and consultation sessions with local beneficiary populations

Prepare brochure for use, operation & maintenance of water & sanitation systems

Conduct completion and acceptance inspections

Organize project closing workshop

Draft project completion report

The outputs / activities listed above helped to assure the timely completion of good quality

physical works and thereby contributed mainly to the first part of the PDO, i.e. to restore

the service levels of transport, and water and sanitation to the affected people in the project

provinces. By using the BBB approach in planning and design, especially of rural roads

and considering climate change, the outputs of Component 3 also contributed to some

extent to the second part of the PDO, i.e. to strengthen RGC’s capacity in disaster

preparedness and management.

Component 4: Institutional strengthening and capacity building (NCDM)

This component covered the engagement of an international consultant, experienced in

disaster preparedness and management. The consultant worked mainly with NCDM staff

and sector ministries and agencies concerned to produce the outputs listed below.

Sub-component 1: Development of national and provincial risk maps

1. Five workshops/training on: (a) multi-hazard risk assessment, (b) validation of

exposure and vulnerability, (c) validation of probabilistic risk evaluation, (d)

29

disaster risk management applications, and (e) final project workshop, in which the

full model was presented and demonstrated to a wider audience.

2. Preparation of a web-based Natural Hazard Risk Atlas for Cambodia with national

and provincial risk maps

3. Setting up of a geospatial database

4. Preparation of a risk Assessment Report that documented the analysis of the

quantified property, economic activity, fiscal impacts and social losses in

Cambodia, due to the natural hazards identified.

Sub-component 2: Emergency management information and early warning system

1. Eight consultation meetings on early warning gap assessment in provinces

2. Workshops on standard operating procedures for early warning system

3. Two workshops on post disaster need assessment

4. National level DMIC consultation meeting with NCDM

5. Simulations & drills in 3 provinces: Prey Veng, Pursat and Kraties provinces

6. Installation of staff gauges on rivers in Prey Veng and Pursat provinces

7. Report on the Review of Technologies Available and Global Good Practices in

Early Warning Systems and Disaster Management Information Centers

8. Report on the roadmap for setting up (i) an End-to-End Multi Hazard Early

Warning System, and (ii) a DMIC in Cambodia

9. Report on the Concept of Operations for a DMIC

10. Report on the Organizational Study to Establish a DMIC

11. Report on the Study to Identify the Most Appropriate Equipment, Information

Technology, Hardware and Software and Human Resource Needs for the DMIC.

12. Report on the Post-disaster Data Collection: Standard Operating Procedures for

DMIC, NCDM

13. Report on the Prevailing Disaster-related Data Collection and Reporting System in

Cambodia.

Sub-Component 3: Development of housing and building codes

1. Consultation with local construction experts.

2. Report on review of technology available and global good practices with regard to

resilient housing construction for rural areas.

3. Preparation of Handbook and Guidelines on flood- and storm-resistant rural

housing construction in Cambodia.

4. Wide dissemination of handbook and guidelines.

The main outputs, i.e. disaster risk maps, the DMIC and the building handbook and

guidelines supported part (b) of the PDO of strengthening RGC’s capacity in disaster

preparedness and management. The associated series of activities, reviews, reports,

training sessions, etc., involving mainly NCDM staff, all contributed to the strengthening

of RGC’s capacity in disaster preparedness and management.

30

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

Economic analysis of sample of road investments

An economic analysis was carried out using the HDM IV model by comparing transport

costs for road agency and transport users for “with-project” and “without-project” options.

In the “without-project” option, roads were in poor condition and a minimum level of

maintenance is assumed. The “with-project” option included only marginal widening, but

substantial rehabilitation or reconstruction to partly gravel and partly surface treatment plus

regular maintenance.

The analysis used 2013 constant prices based on the actual construction and supervision

costs but excluding all taxes and duties. The analysis was carried out for a representative

road section by averaging the data for all 19 road sections. The average traffic observed on

these road sections was 360 vehicles in 2012 (before construction) and 464 vehicles per

12-hour period in 2014 (after construction) indicating a 28% growth in traffic over 2 years

after completion of the project. Considering a 6% normal traffic growth, this indicated

about 15% additional traffic growth after the road construction. An analysis among the

different vehicles indicated that the additional traffic generation was distributed over all

types of vehicles other than two and three wheelers.

For the HDM model, traffic growth rates of 6% per annum were considered until 2022 and

4% beyond 2022 and additional traffic above this normal growth was taken as additional

traffic generated by the project. The HDM model was calibrated to the average speeds

observed before and after construction. The average speed had increased from about 10 km

per hour to about 33 km per hour.

The economic analysis estimated two categories of benefits: (i) saving of vehicle operating

costs due to improved road conditions, and (ii) saving of travel time due to increased travel

speeds. The vehicle operating costs and travel time costs are estimated using the HDM IV

model. The travel time “without project” and “with project” is estimated by the HDM

Model, and the value of time saved was included in the analysis.

The unit value of passenger time used in the HDM model was derived based on per capita

income for Cambodia. The value of work time for bus, two wheeler and car passengers is

taken as two-third, one and two times the per capita income. The value of non-work time

was taken as 25% of work time. The vehicle prices and operating cost inputs were adopted

based on other recent feasibility studies, making a reasonable approximation for Cambodia.

The economic analysis conducted on the representative project road sections indicated an

EIRR of 50.1%.

Travel Time Improvement

The project was expected to improve travel time along the roads after reconstruction.

According to the road speed survey, the driving speeds improved, on average from 9.2

km/h before the road was rehabilitated, to 43.0 km/h afterwards, based on a sample of 19

road sections spanning all six KERRP provinces. Figure 3.1 indicates that the project-

31

constructed roads allow speeds of up to 50 km/h. Therefore, the KERRP road improvement

has clearly led to faster travel times and reduced wear and tear on vehicles.

Additional road and traffic-related data

Traffic volumes 3 had increased dramatically along the project road sections as

demonstrated through traffic surveys conducted on a sample of 19 out of KERRP’s 67 road

sections as presented in Table 3.1. Cargo traffic which is comprised of trucks of 2 or more

axles, has increased very substantially by 164% while motorized passenger traffic which

is comprised of hand tractors, buses, mini-buses, cars and motorcycles, has increased by

25% from 2012 (before project intervention) to mid-2014 (after completion of the road

rehabilitation works). Overall, non-motorized traffic (bicycles and pedestrians) was found

to have decreased by 10% over the same period as these travelers apparently shifted to

motorized means of transportation. The exception was Siem Reap province where cargo,

motorized passenger and non-motorized traffic all saw substantial increases, pointing to a

pent-up traffic demand in this vibrant economic area which KERRP’s road rehabilitation

work was able to unlock.

Table 3.1: Aggregated Traffic Count on Sample Road Lines – Before and After Project

Baseline (2012) End of Project (2014) Percent Change

Province Cargo

Passenger-

motorized

Non-

motorized

traffic Cargo

Passenger-

motorized

Non-

motorized

traffic Cargo

Passenger-

motorized

Non-

motorized

traffic

Kampong Chhnang 18 475 198 8 632 160 -56% 33% -19%

Kampong Cham 56 1,748 667 105 1,964 419 88% 12% -37%

Siem Reap 29 1,409 739 220 2,397 1,121 659% 70% 52%

Banteay Meanchey 39 1,614 570 54 1,745 330 38% 8% -42%

Battambang 5 485 289 7 593 268 40% 22% -7%

Kampong Thom 32 940 446 78 1,007 314 144% 7% -30%

Total – 19 Sample

Road Lines 179 6,671 2,909 472 8,338 2,612 164% 25% -10%

Source: KERRP Household Surveys – Baseline and End of Project

Referring to the traffic count survey results presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the number of

heavy vehicles has more than doubled while light transportation have generally increased

a little. Bicycle transport and pedestrian traffic has decreased as motorized transport was

able to more easily use the road. The increase of traffic may also be caused by more

economic activities and increased size of the population in the target villages.

3 Traffic counts were done over a continuous 12-hour period from 6AM to 6PM during a regular

weekday on each of the 19 road sections spanning all 6 KERRP provinces, both at baseline in

December 2012 and the end of project in May/June 2014.

32

Table 3.2: Large vehicles traveling the 19 sample road lines in one 12-hour period

Type of Vehicle Baseline (2012) End-line (2014)

%

change

Total Average Min Max Total Average Min Max Total

> 4 wheels Truck 53 9 2 25 139 23 1 56 162%

4 Wheels truck 131 22 3 31 336 56 5 182 156%

Hand tractor 236 39 17 101 388 65 24 185 64%

Bus 2 0 0 2 74 12 0 74 3,600%

Mini-bus 59 10 0 21 177 30 0 85 200%

Car 153 26 6 53 430 72 12 136 181% Source: KERRP Household Surveys – Baseline and End of Project

Table 3.3: Light vehicles and pedestrians traveling the 19 road sections in a 12-hour period

Type vehicle/

travelers

Baseline (2012) End-line (2014)

%

change

Total Average Total Max Total Average Min Max Total

3 Wheels 132 22 3 58 162 27 2 48 23%

Motorcycle 6,574 1,096 430 1,630 7,500 1,250 513 1,881 14%

Animal Cart 84 14 0 56 114 19 0 73 36%

Bicycle 2,487 415 174 604 2,177 363 133 851 -12%

Walkers 627 105 21 163 489 82 23 163 -22%

Other 198 33 1 107 219 37 0 155 11% Source: KERRP Household Surveys – Baseline and End of Project

33

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Lending

Lixin Gu Team Leader EASIN TTL

Abhas Jha Project Advisor, Regional

Disaster

EASIN Disaster

Management

Veasna Bun Co-Task Team Leader EASTS Co-TTL

Cledan Mandri-Perrott Senior Infrastructure specialist FEUFG Infrastructure

Ratha Sann Infrastructure Operations Officer EASTS Infrastructure

Indira Dharmapatni Senior Social Development

Specialist

EASTS Social Safeguards

Leng Bunlong Environmental Safeguard

Specialist

EASTS Environmental

Safeguards

Vanna Nil Social Safeguard Specialist EASTS Social Safeguards

Seida Heng Financial Management Specialist EASTS FM

Ahsan Ali Senior Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement

Sreng Sok Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement

Luis Tineo Senior Procurement Specialist GPOBA Procurement

Teuta Kacaniku Economist FEUFG Economics

Geoffrey Read Project Engineer Consultant Infrastructure

Heinz Unger Environment Specialist Consultant Env. Safeguards

David Stiggers Contract Specialist Consultant Contracts

John Richardson Governance Specialist Consultant Good Governance

Henrike Brecht Senior Infrastructure Specialist EACTF Infrastructure

Roch Levesque Country Lawyer LEG Legal agreement

Yogita Mumssen Program Manager EASIN Team support


Joseph Daulta Marsangap

Siagian

Information Assistant SECPO IT support

China Chhun Program Assistant EACSF Team support

Peng Seng Tan Program Assistant EACSF Team support

Inneke Herawati Ross Program Assistant EASIN Team support

Sandra Walston Program Assistant EASIN Team support

Supervision/ICR

Lixin Gu Team Leader EASIN TTL

Abhas Jha Project Advisor, Regional

Disaster

EASIN Disaster

Management

Veasna Bun Co-Task Team Leader EASTS Co-TTL

Cledan Mandri-Perrott Senior Infrastructure specialist FEUFG Infrastructure


34

Indira Dharmapatni Senior Social Development

Specialist

EASTS Social Safeguards

Seida Heng Financial Management Specialist EASTS FM

Ahsan Ali Senior Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement

Sreng Sok Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement

Luis Tineo Senior Procurement Specialist GPOBA Procurement

Teuta Kacaniku Economist FEUFG Economics

Geoffrey Read Project Engineer Consultant Infrastructure

Heinz Unger Environment Specialist Consultant Env. Safeguards

David Stiggers Contract Specialist Consultant Contracts & Proc

John Richardson Governance Specialist Consultant Good Governance

China Chhun Program Assistant EACSF Team support

Sandra Walston Program Assistant EASIN Team support

Samnang Hir Project Engineer Consultant Roads / Procur.

Agus Sjamsudin Project Engineer Consultant Road engineer

Makathy Tep Environment Specialist Consultant Env. Safeguards

Latharo Lor Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement

Henrike Brecht Senior Infrastructure Specialist EACTF Roads

Bunlong Leng Environmental Safeguard

Specialist

EASTS Env. Safeguards

Vanna Nil Social Safeguard Specialist EASTS Social Safeguards

Katrinka Ebbe Economist Consultant

Sokhe Sun Water and Sanitation Specialist EASTS Watsan

Reaksmey Keo Sok Financial Management Specialist EASTS FM

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks US$ Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)

Lending

FY10 26.25 146.84

FY11 17.71 85.55

Total: 43.96 232.39

Supervision/ICR

FY11 14.28 278.73

FY12 29.22 94.70

FY13 18.70 104.03

FY14 21.76 158.54

FY15 6.50 46.99

Total: 90.46 682.99

35

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

Road Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Based on a survey of 385 households in villages along the improved roads4 in early 2012

(“before project”) and again in May/June 2014 (“after project”), the quality of the roads

was acknowledged to have improved dramatically with 76% of respondents rating the

rebuilt roads as of good or excellent quality (96% if we include “fair”) after KERRP,

compared to 80% of respondents rating the roads as poor or very poor “before project”.

Figure 5.1: Opinion of Road Users on Quality of Road –

“Before Project” (all 6 provinces) and “After Project” (excluding SRP5)

Description Covered HHs

Non-covered HHs

How does road condition affect daily

life: Baseline

End of

Project Baseline

End of

Project

Decreased income 10.4% 1.6% 10.1% 13.7%

Difficult access to health services 35.3% 2.4% 41.9% 17.3%

Difficult access to school 33.5% 3.0% 26.4% 22.5%

Difficult travel to social/ community

events 47.8% 3.8% 43.9% 24.9%

Increase in traffic accidents 65.0% 1.4% 8.10% 12.8%

How does road condition affect your

HH's business/ occupation: Baseline

End of

Project Baseline

End of

Project

Stop HH business 9.6% 2.2% 8.1% 11.2%

Increased transportation costs 40.0% 1.9% 39.2% 20.1%

Decreased business activities 21.0% 2.4% 21.6% 14.5%

Disconnected from business partners 59.2% 3.8% 52.0% 26.5%

Source: KERRP Household Survey – Baseline and End of Project

The same survey asked respondents to rate the effect of road conditions on their daily lives

and on business; the results are reported in the table that follows. Households in villages in

the KERRP road lines’ zone of influence were generally much better off than the non-

covered households.

4 The survey included 148 HHs sampled as “controls” from villages along non-KERRP road lines.

5 Siem Reap Province road sections were excluded in the analysis because the work in this province were completed

very late in the program and some were still under construction at the time of the survey so the effects of road improvement in Siem Reap would not yet be felt.

36

Effects on Daily Life: While 10.4% of KERRP households reported decreased income due

to the poor road conditions at baseline, only 1.6% felt that road conditions were depressing

their incomes at the conclusion of the project (possibly because not all KERRP road lines

extended fully to reach paved roads). At the same time, the percentage of non-covered

households believing the road conditions in their locality decreased their incomes worsened

from 10.1% at baseline in 2012 to 13.7% in mid-2014. Access to health services improved

for KERRP households between the baseline and endline (35.3% reporting difficulty in

2012 versus 2.4% in 2014) while the percentage of non-covered households reporting

difficulty also improved during the period from 41.9% to 17.3%. Similarly, 33% of covered

households had difficulty with access to schools initially and this figure improved

dramatically to 3% after road line rehabilitation, while these numbers improved only

slightly from 26.4% to 22.5% over the same period for non-covered households. Travel to

community events saw dramatic improvement in KERRP households as 3.8% of

households claim difficulty at endline compared to 47.8% at baseline, while there about

half as much improvement in non-covered households (43.9% in 2012 and 24.9% in 2014).

Finally, there was a highly significant improvement in respondents’ assessment of traffic

accidents. At the end of the project, only 1.4% of respondents (households) reported that

road conditions were a cause of increased traffic accidents, down from 65.0% at baseline.

The percentage of non-covered households believing that the road conditions in their

locality led to increased accidents, increased over the same period.

Table 5.2: Effect of road condition on access to services and on business (% of HHs)

Survey Questions Covered HHs

Non-covered HHs

How does road condition affect daily

life in terms of: Baseline

End of

Project Baseline

End of

Project

Decreased income 10.4% 1.6% 10.1% 13.7%

Difficult access to health services 35.3% 2.4% 41.9% 17.3%

Difficult access to school 33.5% 3.0% 26.4% 22.5%

Difficult travel to social/ community

events 47.8% 3.8% 43.9% 24.9%

Increase in traffic accidents 65.0% 1.4% 8.10% 12.8%

How does road condition affect your

HH's business/ occupation in terms of: Baseline

End of

Project Baseline

End of

Project

Stop HH business 9.6% 2.2% 8.1% 11.2%

Increased transportation costs 40.0% 1.9% 39.2% 20.1%

Decreased business activities 21.0% 2.4% 21.6% 14.5%

Disconnected from business partners 59.2% 3.8% 52.0% 26.5% Source: KERRP Household Surveys – Baseline and end of Project

37

Effects on Business/Occupation: While 9.6% of KERRP households reported “before

project” that the poor road conditions effectively stopped their household business, this

number decreased to 2.2% at the end of the project; non-covered households increased

from 8.1% to 11.2%. On transportation costs, the percentage of covered households that

reporting increased transportation costs due to the poor road conditions declined from 40%

“before project” to 1.9% “after project”: this is a major improvement especially when

compared to non-covered households where the number of households reporting higher

transportation costs was halved to 20.1% at the end of the project. Business activities were

reported to have improved in the project area, with the percentage of households suffering

effects of poor road conditions down to 2.4% from 21.0% at baseline. The percent of

households feeling disconnected from business partners declined from 24.7% to 0.3% after

KERRP intervention. Damage to vehicles was considered a consequence of poor road

conditions by 59.2% of KERRP households at baseline and only 3.8% at the end of the

project; non-covered households also improved over the period, but not as substantially,

from 52.0% down to 26.5%.

Roads with dust control

The project has treated 292.8 km of the rehabilitated roads with dust control (mainly SBST

and 2.8 km of concrete pavement). Dust control was applied to road sections which pass

through villages. According to the end of project road construction report and the

Commune Database 2010, 275 villages were covered by the dust control sections, with

about 43,500 households and 206,000 people benefitting from those road dust control

measures; the target for the project was 253 villages.

Households in target villages reported that the road dust affecting their residence was much

reduced. As presented in Table 6, 74.6% of covered households reported in the baseline

that the road produced dusty or very dusty conditions. This decreased to 56.2% in target

villages, while the non-target increased (71.1% in baseline to 82.6% at end-line). The

percentage of households from the covered target villages reporting “almost no dust”

increased from 5.2% to 26.3%. This would be expected to improve with time since the dust

control treatment was only performed in the last few months of the project, and in some

cases, it was not yet in place when the end-line survey was being conducted.

Respondents were also asked about dust conditions during their travel. As travelers,

household respondents also reported that the level of dust coming up from the road was

reduced. At baseline, most households (over 90% in both non-covered and covered groups)

reported conditions to be dusty or very dusty when traveling along the roads. This was

decreased to 63% along target road lines while non-project road lines barely improved with

83%. The good category of “almost no dust” improved in the project areas from 0% at

baseline to 19.3% at the end of the project, while it rose from 0% to 2.0% in the non-

KERRP roads. However, these “after project” data were collected too early to capture all

of the positive effects since the dust control treatment works were only recently completed

or were still ongoing. This was, of course, unavoidable as the survey was conducted as late

as possible – about two months prior to the end of the project.

38

In general, beneficiaries expressed high levels of satisfaction with:

Both the new roads and the quality of road construction;

The much reduced travel times and not having to wade through mud;

Much less dust;

Good quality water from nearby wells;

New latrines, conveniently located next to their houses.

39

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

A Project Completion and Dissemination Workshop took place at the Sokha Angkor Hotel,

Siem Reap Province, on July 28, 2014. It was attended by the Minister and the Secretary

of State of the MRD, the governors, respectively deputy governors, of the six project

provinces, district governors, chiefs of communes and villages, other government officials

involved in the project implementation, representatives of NGOs, project consultants, and

representatives of the project beneficiaries. Members of the Bank’s task team were also in

attendance: in total about 250 people.

The Minister MRD lauded the successful cooperation between RGC and the World Bank

in completing the project on time, and without an extension. He stressed the big

contribution the project has made towards development and poverty reduction. On behalf

of the MRD he requested all project participants to contribute towards the maintenance of

the project benefits for a long time.

A presentation of the project’s achievements was made, and the Project Director discussed

some of the challenges and problem-solving strategies, and the many valued and valuable

experiences the project provided to the various stakeholders. He praised

the efforts and the strong cooperation between RGC, Development Partners, contractors,

consultants, all level of local authorities, and local people in the region to implement this

project successfully.

Then the attendees were invited to ask questions and make comments. Below are the

highlights:

Have arrangements been made for the O&M of this new infrastructure?

Load limits for heavy trucks should be imposed on these roads to prevent damaging

them.

More rural roads of this type are needed for other villages.

Mrs. Chres Thida from Sret Kert village, Konthraing commune, Bakong district, Siem

Reap province, spoke on behalf of her people. She showed her appreciation for the new

roads that are “good, clean, and easy for people to access. Nowadays, these roads help

to increase the likelihood of the local people’s lives to be better”. Finally, she requested

to have the same type of project road in her commune, with a length of about 5km.

Mr. Ham Song from Banteay Chas village, Thnoat Chom commune, Baray district,

Kampong Thom province showed his appreciation, and expressed his thanks to MRD,

PDRDs, and WB who have reconstructed the Banteay Chas Bridge which is one of the

important bridges in his village.

Mr. Hoar Sophal from Boeng Proul Leu village, Boeng Proul commune, Tbong

Khmom district, Tbong Khmom province, mentioned that not only his villagers benefit

from the project, such as the pump wells and latrines, but also the people in Kampong

Cham and Tbong Khmom Province.

40

Further similar comments from benefiting community members were also received:

The road is now in good condition.

The road has been recently completed with a good standard.

The reconstructed road is smooth and easy for travelling.

People can drive faster than before.

Both adults and children can now travel to take care of their business such as going to

school, community events, and connecting to the market place.

The road as reconstructed by the project has nearby connection to the main road

toward the major town.

The reduction of dust has reduced illnesses.

Property damage and injury has been reduced because of the dust control work.

Local authorities reported that almost all households in target villages use the wells

constructed by the project, except if they need a large amount of water, in which case

they have to pump from canal/pond/lake.

Distance to clean drinking water used to be several kilometers, but now we have safe

water within a few meters.

The majority of households in the village now have latrines.

The latrines are safer for the women in the household.

We have understood the importance of sanitation for our health.

41

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR6

Typhoon Ketsana that struck Cambodia between 29 September 2009 and 5 October 2009

caused extensive flood damage to infrastructure, (estimated by the Post Disaster Needs

Assessment to cost $58 Million and losses of $74 Million), in 14 provinces. The RGC

formally requested IDA assistance on 9 October 2009, just four days after the disaster. The

Bank responded with the preparation of an Emergency Project Paper which contained

support for the emergency response that provided a) retroactive financing for specific

eligible expenditures made for emergency relief, b) for road reconstruction and

rehabilitation and provision of water supply and sanitation in six heavily damaged

provinces, (Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang,

Kampong Thom, and Siem Reap); c) Project implementation support and, d) technical

assistance to the NCDM. The Paper was approved one year later on 14 October 2010, the

Financing Agreement was signed on 11 November 2010 and thereafter the loan became

effective on 30 November 2010. The project end closure date remained unchanged as 31

July 2014.

The long-term development objective of the project was to restore the service levels of

transport and water and sanitation to the affected people in the project provinces and

strengthen RGC's capacity in disaster preparedness and management. From the Project

Development Objectives, the following Project Development Outcomes have been

achieved: (a) restored levels of infrastructure service to national standards; (b) improved

access to rural road, water, and sanitation facilities for the affected communities; and (c)

improved capacity for emergency preparedness and management capacity.

The provision of retroactive funding greatly assisted the Government to carry out

emergency repairs of about 15km urban roads in Siem Reap city ($4.2 Million)

and to pay for technical services to conduct road damage assessment surveys and

to mobilize an individual managing consultant for the project preparation and

initial implementation stages.

MRD – Components 2 and 3

Following a protracted procurement process, the International Managing Consultant (MC)

mobilized in September 2011. Surveys and detailed engineering designs were conducted

and the first package of road contracts was awarded in September 2012. The Contractors

experienced mobilization delays due to high levels of flooding and works did not get under

way until December 2012. The successive road packages were awarded in February 2013

(Packages 2 and 3), and in September 2013 (Package 4) with work commencing in

November 2013.

6 This executive summary of the Borrower’s main project completion report as prepared by MRD

was edited for brevity and clarity, and also reformatted. Relevant sections of the separate NCDM

completion report for Component 4 were added to this annex.

42

Revisions were made to Project Design Targets in June 2012 as the project was an

emergency project and therefore a full appraisal had not been carried out and without a

feasibility study or any form of engineering information collected.

By the unchanged project closing date of 31 July 2014, some 615km, (on 67 road sections),

had been restored to better than pre-disaster levels; 290km were treated with SBST for dust

control. All roads were completed with new or repaired box culverts (74), pipe culverts

(338) and 5 minor bridges and one major bridge. In addition, 2.79km of concrete roads

(“causeways”) were constructed in flood-prone villages for dust control. The total value of

road works was $27.3 Million.

Also by the closing date, 1,220 successful wells, (total value $4.2 Million), were drilled in

180 villages and 1,220 Water and Sanitation User Groups (WSUG) trained in pump

operation and maintenance and hygiene promoted to the respective WSUG.

18,645 pour-flush latrines (total value $4.4 Million) were constructed in 150 villages and

by 31 July 2014, some 11,641 (63%) superstructures had been built on the latrine

substructures by householders. Beneficiaries clearly have taken ownership and started to

use the latrines, resulting in reduced Open Field Defecation (OFD).

Considerable risks were identified by the Bank during the Project preparation. Mitigation

actions included the engagement of an experienced international engineering firm as the

managing consultant (MC), the deployment of an experienced and qualified national

financial management consultant, and the use of the IPA for procurement. No major social

or environmental issues have arisen during the Project.

Project Development Objectives and outcomes were fully met. Beneficiaries expressed

high levels of satisfaction with both the new roads and their quality: the much reduced

travel times and not having to wade through mud; much less dust; good quality water from

wells; and new latrines – conveniently located next to their houses. Project targets were

met or exceeded and the project was completed on time and within budget.

The Project built local capacity of contractors in the country, the capacity of MRD staff

and it introduced climate change resistant design elements into the infrastructure

improvements – all of which will pay dividends in the future.

The Project was considered highly relevant as it was consistent with RGC’s “Rectangular

Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency, Phase-III” of September 2013,

which is a clear blueprint to guide the activities of all stakeholders to further pursue and

strengthen long-term sustainable development aimed at promoting economic growth,

creating jobs, equitable distribution of the fruits of growth, and ensuring effectiveness of

public institutions and management of resources. The Project addressed element within

three of the four “Rectangles”; in particular: Rectangle II: (Development of Physical

Infrastructure), explicitly calls for transport infrastructure development; Rectangle III

(local private sector strengthening); and Rectangle IV, (improved water supply, sanitation

and health). The Rectangular Strategy was underpinned by a call for good governance and

leveraging of partnerships for the country’s development, reduction in poverty and

43

achievement of Cambodia’s Millennium Development Goals (CMDG); all of which the

will Project contributed to.

In terms of sustainability, the project design aimed to “build back better” the roads

damaged by the Typhoon, to include climate change resilient designs and to make the roads

more sustainable. This aim has been generally achieved through the construction of good

quality roads with many suitably sized cross-drainage structures. The road drainage

structures have been well protected from erosion by the use of either grouted riprap or cast

in-situ concrete. The roadside slopes have been made erosion resistant by the planting of

indigenous grass, especially in villages and road sections treated with SBST. An average

road base of laterite, with a compacted thickness of 225mm, was used on the roads.

For the water and sanitation facilities, sustainability was expected to be achieved through

the formation of WSUGs, taught their roles and responsibilities and good hygiene practices

explained to them, with a particular emphasis on the need to use the household pour-flush

latrines built under the project. There has been good uptake by householders as they have

constructed the latrine superstructures voluntarily. MRD is committed to work with all

concerned to ensure that all the superstructures are built before the target date of 31

December 2014.

All roads, wells and latrines have been constructed to national standards. Roads have been

designed with improved cross-drainage as an adaptation to the more frequent and intensive

flooding that can be expected from climate change.

A household survey of project and non-project households was undertaken at baseline in

2012 and at the end of the project in May/June 2014. The positive effect of the project road

reconstruction on daily life and livelihoods was dramatic. 10.4% of KERRP households

reported decreased income due to the poor road conditions at baseline, and only 1.6%

thought that road conditions were depressing their incomes at the conclusion of the project.

Access to health services improved for KERRP households between the baseline and at the

end of the project (35.3% reporting difficulty in 2012, versus 2.4% in 2014). Similarly,

33% of covered households had difficulty with access to schools initially and this figure

improved dramatically to 3% after road line rehabilitation. Travel to community events

saw dramatic improvement in KERRP households as 3.8% of households claim difficulty

at the end of the project compared to 47.8% at baseline.

There was a highly significant improvement in respondents’ assessment of traffic accidents.

At end line, 1.4% of respondents (households) reported that the road condition was a cause

of increased traffic accidents, down from 65.0% at baseline.

The effects of the Project on businesses or occupations were also positive. While 9.6% of

KERRP households reported that poor road conditions negatively affected their household

business at baseline, this number decreased to 2.2% at the end of the project.

On transportation costs, the percentage of covered households reporting increased

transportation costs due to the condition of the road declined between baseline and the end

44

of the project from 40% to 1.9%. Business activities were reported to have improved in the

project area with the percentage of households suffering the effects of a poor road down to

2.4% from 21.0% at baseline. Damage to vehicles was considered a consequence of poor

road condition by 59.2% of KERRP households at baseline and only 3.8% at the end of the

project.

Traffic volumes have increased dramatically along the project’s road sections as shown by

traffic surveys conducted on a representative sample of 19 out of KERRP’s 67 road

sections. Goods traffic which is comprised of trucks of 2 or more axles, has increased very

substantially by 164% while motorized passenger traffic which is comprised of hand

tractors, buses, mini-buses, cars and motorcycles, has increased by 25% from 2012 (before

project intervention) to mid-2014 (after completion of the road line rehabilitation). Overall,

non-motorized traffic (bicycles and pedestrians) was found to have decreased by 10% over

the same period as these travelers apparently shifted to motorized means of transportation.

Based on a survey of 385 households from villages along the improved road lines in early

2012 (before project) and again in May/June 2014 (after project), the quality of the road is

acknowledged to have improved dramatically with 76% of respondents rating the road as

good or excellent quality (96% if we include “fair”) after KERRP compared to 80% rating

the road as poor or very poor in the baseline. According to a road speed survey, the road

driving speed improved, on average from 9.2 km/h before the road was rehabilitated, to

43.0 km/h afterwards, based on a sample of 19 road sections covering all six KERRP

provinces.

An economic analysis was carried out using the HDM IV model by comparing transport

costs for road agency and transport users under “with-project” and “without-project”

options. The economic analysis used two categories of benefits: (i) saving of vehicle

operating costs due to improved road conditions, and (ii) saving of travel time due to

increased travel speeds. The economic analysis indicated that the road investments yielded

an EIRR of 50.1%.

Generally, the Project delivered the expected impacts:

KERRP, with the assistance of MC, improved the capacity of the PMU to plan and

design and conduct construction supervision of the roads and these works were built to

the specified construction quality and within the allocated Project budget.

Similarly MRD staff capacity in the planning, assessment, design, and construction

supervision of the wells and latrines was improved. However, the MRD thinks that

even more capacity building benefits could have accrued for its staff, if they had been

provided with a modest additional income to support them during the intense project

operations, working with the MC.

MRD, both at the PMU and PPIU levels, now have a much better understanding and

have actually put into practice the environmental and social safeguards required under

RGC and Development Partner regulations. There were no serious environmental

impacts or resettlement issues during the project and the few cases were dealt with to

the satisfaction of the Bank.

45

MRD’s monitoring and evaluation capacity was improved through the assistance of the

MC consultants who developed a Project Performance Management framework,

database and reporting formats in close coordination with MRD staff. MC provided

M&E training in the form of workshops and on-the-job activities.

The capacity of some 14 National civil works contractors has been greatly

strengthened, particularly in construction management and in technical areas such as

earthworks, reinforced concrete, and materials testing.

The Project was designed to produce positive environmental and social impacts. And

indeed interviews, discussions in several community meetings and field observations

carried out during field visits in all road sections suggested significant initial positive

impacts of the road rehabilitation and installation of the water and sanitation facilities.

Road improvements have increased access to markets for agricultural products, health

centers, schools, nearby villages and commune centers, as well as to agriculture land.

In particular, the improved roads have significantly reduced travel time and costs,

increased travel convenience, reduced risks of damage to home industry products (such

as water jars), promoted densification of villages as new houses are being constructed,

promoted new and expanded small businesses, (especially small shops), improved

opportunities to sell higher priced agricultural products, and improved health

conditions, (due to less road dust particularly in the SBST areas, improved air quality

(as a result of the dust control measures/SBST in the community areas), and cleaner

houses. Children can now reach their schools more timely. Social interactions can be

strengthened due to improved road access, and tourist biking is more convenient in

Siem Reap especially. Road improvement has also generated additional incomes for

the households from the cash-for work grass and tree planting on road embankments.

The initial positive impacts of wells and latrines installation were obvious. Villagers

claim that the wells now provide them close access to better water which is potable and

which will be available throughout the year. The wells are particularly benefiting

women and children. Ownerships of the wells seem to be high as the WSUGs are aware

on their responsibility to maintain them with the provided toolkits and manuals. The

latrines installed by the project have also reduced the OFD of the villagers but

awareness of avoiding OFD still needs to be increased.

Project stakeholder performance was generally very good with proactive cooperation

between the various project stakeholders, in particular between MRD and MEF and

between MRD and the MC. Direct communications between the MRD and the Contractors

to ensure they understood the contractual and cost implications of poor quality work

resulted in the final result of all works being completed according to the technical

specifications and drawings by Project closure.

Initial Loan and Grant disbursement was slow initially; this was caused by a number of

factors: (i) delayed procurement of the MC services; (ii) delayed procurement of the civil

works; (iii) extreme and unusually extensive flooding in the 2012 and 2013 rainy seasons.

46

Some of the lessons learned from this project are as follows:

Incorporation of public road safety awareness and campaigns should be included in

future project designs, given that traffic speeds increase dramatically on improved

roads;

Procurement procedures for an emergency project should be streamlined and

shortened;

Thorough physical inspections of bidders completed (or ongoing) contracts should be

conducted during evaluation to screen out contractors lacking the experience to execute

quality work in compressed timeframes;

Both technical and non-technical components of procurement documentation should

be explicit; pre-bid meetings should be held to properly brief potential civil works

bidders so that they can bid accurately and realistically;

Conditions of Contract, critical bid information and a glossary of terms should be

translated into the local language to aid contractors comprehension and compliance

with the requirements;

The absence of reliable cost data on road construction and rehabilitation can lead to

shortfalls in Project outputs, therefore extra efforts and cooperation to obtain, and make

public, this information is recommended (such as posting on relevant Ministry and

Development Partner websites);

Contractor capacity building was done during project implementation. It was found that

only ”on-the -job” training, together with direct mentoring and support by practical

engineers and contracts specialists, was really effective;

To achieve sustainability of project outcomes, community development activities need

to be done for WATSAN projects and for rural road maintenance. As such activities

should start early in the project cycle and take time they may not be fully compatible

with a short-term emergency project;

Field based data collection and reporting using smart phones is an effective means of

reporting especially for emergency projects. GPS-tagged smart phones may also be

used for future projects;

If communities are well-informed of the benefits and duration of a Project prior to

commencement, they will be more likely to understand and be patient during the

Project activities and accept temporary inconveniences during construction.

In summary, the World Bank had responded to Typhoon Ketsana with the preparation of

an Emergency Project Paper which contained support for the emergency response that

provided retroactive financing for specific eligible expenditures made for emergency relief.

The paper was approved one year later on 14 October 2010 and, thereafter, the loan became

effective on 30 November 2010. The provision of retroactive funding greatly assisted the

Government to carry out emergency repairs on roads in Siem Reap city and to employ

individual consultants to help prepare the project.

The Bank had prepared a generally well-designed innovative project in the 12 months

between the request and approval. The PDO were simple but clear and thus achievable with

47

appropriate implementation arrangements that did not require any technical modifications

during the Project. Indeed there were few significant changes in the Project design, despite

it being prepared without the usual, time-consuming Project appraisal normally carried out

for Bank projects. The design was prepared in such a way that environmental and social

safeguards were well covered; the former through a good initial environmental assessment

and EMP, and the later by the use of the resettlement policy framework.

The Project design noted that World Bank supervision would need to be relatively intensive

given the emergency nature of the Project and because of the risks that were identified in

the Project Paper. MRD has noted that the Bank was reasonably flexible in its approach to

the Project due to the dynamic post-disaster conditions. The Bank’s regular supervision missions, as well as the technical missions, (conducted

during the latter part of the construction activities), were of high quality and thorough and

were much appreciated by MRD as these helped to keep the Project on track and helped

highlight actions to taken by the various stakeholders to improve project progress and

implementation.

The Bank supervision met the following key criteria for good quality:

The Bank team members were proactive throughout their supervision and with their

support.

There was a consistent focus on the PDO which remained unchanged, and the

project scope was modified to still meet the PDO.

Safeguard aspects were consistently supervised which resulted in positive

environmental impacts and only minor problems, (that were resolved during the

Project), as far as land acquisition was concerned.

Financial management was consistently satisfactory.

Full supervision teams, staffed with experienced and highly qualified specialists

visited the project on average twice a year and conducted detailed site visits and

intensive dialogues with MRD, MEF, the Project Consultants and the communities.

Lastly, three areas of improvement for the Bank are worth considering: a more rapid

response in the preparation of the Project Paper; more consistent Procurement advice; and

for future IDA supported projects consideration is made for the provision of project staff

support in the form of salary supplements.

MRD believed that the Bank’s performance overall has been satisfactory with excellent

and intense supervision throughout the life of the Project. In summary, MRD is pleased to

note that the Bank has ranked the overall project implementation as “satisfactory”. Despite

the difficult circumstances, the project was completed within the original Project timeframe

and nearly the entire budget was utilized. This was achieved through collaborative

teamwork between the MRD, MEF, World Bank, the MC, and the civil works contractors.

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NCDM – Component 4

Introduction

Cambodia lies within the Mekong, Tonle Sap and Bassac river basins. Hydro-

meteorological hazards dominate the hazard profile of Cambodia - serious flooding

occurred in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2009, 2011 and 2013 while the propensity for widespread

but highly localized drought is ever present. The impacts of climate change were

considered to be a major issue. Occasionally, Cambodia is affected by Pacific typhoons

and in 2009, Typhoon Ketsana affected many provinces. The rationale for the project is the

increasing hazard profile of the country, dominated by floods and other hydro-

meteorological hazards. Strengthening the country's disaster management systems and the

capacities of the NCDM, was a positive and proactive way of addressing these growing

problems.

Component 4 of the project supported the NCDM through institutional strengthening and

capacity development in national and provincial risk identification, in the generation,

communication, analysis and reporting of emergency management information, in the

strengthening of the early warning systems, and in the development of rural housing and

building codes.

Procurement

Since the NCDM did not have any procurement capacity, all procurement activities under

the project were carried out by the IPA on behalf of NCDM7. 15 out of 17 goods packages

have been procured and the expenditures exceeded went 26% over the actual budget. For

works 3 of the 4 packages were completed at estimated costs of US$ 115,306, with 8%

cost increase. The task completed included: (i) setting up of the Disaster Information

Center; (ii) renovation and setting up of 8 PCDM Information Offices in 8 provinces; and

(iii) renovation of ECC Building. Consultant services, 6 of the 8 packages were completed

using an estimated budget of US$ 1,907,998, with the main consultant services package to

the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) that provided implementation assistance

to NCDM.

Implementation

7 Clarification by Bank: Use of the IPA was applied to all Bank-financed project due to the high

fiduciary risk in Cambodia. RGC and the Bank agreed on using the services of a procurement

agent (IPA) engaged by the Recipient under terms of reference satisfactory to the Bank for all

procurement to be undertaken under the Grant and Credit except Direct Contracting, SSS of

Firms, selection of individual consultants (regardless of value), hiring of NGOs, and procurement

of goods estimated to cost less than $50,000 per contract, procurement of works estimated to cost

less than $100,000 per contract, and procurement financed by sources other than the Grant,

including by the Recipient, which would not be undertaken through the procurement agent but by

the NCDM itself.

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The project was implemented by NCDM’s implementation unit, headed by a project

Director along with qualified staff, including procurement officer, financial management

consultant, and head of the technical operation unit. NCDM maintained an Operational

Manual that covered financial arrangements, and procurement safeguards procedures.

Throughout project implementation, NCDM maintained a financial management system.

An audit firm was engaged for the financial audits of the project for the 2011, 2012, 2013

and 2014 financial years.

Implementation of the work plan required close a working relationship between NCDM

and ADPC and also between the ADPC Bangkok team and the ADPC team in Phnom Penh.

Much of the technical work required under the contract was undertaken by a team of

experts selected under this project who worked in coordination with NCDM for validation

of outputs through workshops attended by a range of stakeholders and in discussions with

NCDM. The KERRP covered eight priority Provinces: Preah Sihanouk, Takeo, Prey Veng,

Steung Treng, Kratie, Pursat, Kampong Thom and Beantey Meanchey. Visits were made

to all these provinces for specific activities; eight communes (one per province) were

identified as focus communes for activities requiring a higher level of involvement. These

visits were particularly important for activities under Sub-component 2: the provincial level

awareness raising workshops on early warning systems and their strengthening, and the

local level group workshops for developing risk and evacuation maps.

Adjustments and justification of minor changes to project outputs

Since Cambodia is not prone to landslides their risk assessment was omitted from sub-

component 1. Under sub-component 3, establishing building codes would have required

legislation; this was not possible prior to project closing because of the short

implementation period of this emergency project. NCDM and the Bank agreed that a

handbook and comprehensive guidelines would be prepared that could be converted to

building codes in the future. These minor changes were agreed in late 2013.

Project outputs

Cambodia lacked comprehensive disaster risk information and analytical tools to assist

with risk assessment that can be used to promote safer development and to enhance

economic planning. In response to this, the sub-component 1 developed open source

disaster risk and economic modeling platforms and quantified the impacts of disasters on

the population, physical capital, and the overall economy, both in the short- and the long-

term. Following a hazard assessment covering storm, flood, drought and epidemic hazards,

the probabilistic risk was modeled using the CAPRA platform to estimate the direct disaster

risk in terms of damages and losses with their spatial and probabilistic distributions. The

CATSIM economic model was used to analyze fiscal and long-term economic risk

integrating probabilistic hazard, vulnerability, exposure and risk information. The

CATSIM model was built based on the probability distribution of annual economic damage

so as to fit the budgetary planning cycle of Cambodia. In addition, both static and time-

dependent input-output models were built to estimate the rippling effects of a particular

50

disaster event, quantifying the impacts on the agriculture and transport sectors. All key

stakeholders in Cambodia were consulted in the development of the risk assessments at

each step of the analysis. Transfer of knowledge and capacity building of NCDM and

stakeholders was done throughout the project period. For the consultation with and training

of officials from NCDM and other stakeholders, a series of workshops was held. In order

to share the risk information with the risk management and the general public, a digital risk

atlas was created as a web portal. The user-friendly tool available in the atlas allows to

customize risk information for specific applications and situations.

Sub-component 2 included the setting up of a MHEWS and the preparation of the roadmap

for establishing a DMIC. NCDM held consultation meetings at national and provincial

levels i.e. in the eight project provinces. A gap assessment was carried out at the national,

provincial and commune levels to gain insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the

existing EWS in Cambodia. Based on these stakeholder consultations, the consultants

prepared a detailed road map for setting up an end-to-end MHEWS. The MHEWS has

already been set up within NCDM and is now in the initial functional stage. Some of the

important technical features of the EWS include:

Capability to deliver automated critical alert messages to the population at risk;

Ability to balance the traffic load and prevent congestion;

Less or no human intervention during the alert execution enabling a more secure

alert execution process;

Ability to integrate with existing GIS (Geographical Information Systems),

primarily by using WMS (Web Map Services); and

Possibility to integrate with sirens and public address (PA) systems.

Although the system was functional at end of project, certain recommendations will need

to be implemented to make it more effective and efficient for warning dissemination.

Under sub-component 3 a working group was established to review and approve the two

key products of the sub-component, the guidelines and the handbook on flood- and storm-

resistant rural housing construction. Following a review of the current housing and building

design and standards, data on housing and infrastructure damage caused by large-scale

disaster events in Cambodia was collected. Then a study on existing building and

construction design, standards, guidelines and codes in Cambodia was done; it included a

review of technologies available and global good practices with regard to resilient housing

construction for rural areas. Lastly, guidelines and a user-friendly handbook on flood- and

storm-resistant rural housing construction in Cambodia were prepared. Dissemination

could not take place within the short timeframe of the project. However, recommendations

were made on how dissemination could be organized.

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Achievements of PDOs and project outcomes, plus key recommendations

A series of workshops were held close to the project closing date to review the project

achievements, give training in early warning systems (EWS), extract lessons and good

practices learned, and provide a discussion forum for disaster management professionals.

The project helped with general capacity development of NCDM, PCDM, DCDM and

CCDM. Through this project, NCDM’s capacity was developed for scaling up any future

activities through proper coordination and management. It also provided experience to the

focal points as well as the PCDM to become trainers for future activities, and the

stakeholders were exposed to conducting simulations and drills.

Risk maps and a risk atlas were provided to NCDM. An advanced multi-hazard early

warning system (MHEWS) was set up within NCDM for early warning dissemination; it

is in its initial functional stage. NCDM will need to follow the detailed roadmap for the

EWS and Disaster Management Information (DMIC) that was provided to them. The

MHEWS as well as the risk maps and risk atlas that were prepared during the project are

linked to the DMIC. This center will also act as a medium for effective and quick

dissemination of information in the event of a disaster. Sub-component 3 outputs are the

storm and flood-resistant guidelines and handbook for rural housing. In the post project

period, NCDM will need to disseminate the guidelines at the national and provincial levels;

the handbook should be distributed widely to districts and communes to create awareness

of how to build hazard-resilient rural housing. A dissemination work plan has been

prepared.

Intended and unintended project impacts

NCDM’s increased capacity to manage and prepare for disasters through sub-component

1 will minimize the potential damages and the time of recovery. It will not only reduce the

losses from disasters, but it will also reduce the expenditure diversions from development

funds to response and rehabilitation. Thus funds would eventually be secured for

sustainable development, improving social welfare and living standards. Under sub-

component 2, NCDM staff received hands-on training for handling the newly installed

EWS gauges and a two-week course on GIS. These courses will assist NCDM to handle

the EWS and the future DMIC. Exposure to software such as Geonode and CAPRA was

another area of capacity development for NCDM staffs. The training courses benefitted

other stakeholders, such as various line ministries and NGOs. Through sub-component 3,

the NCDM can work towards the issuance of the necessary legislation for rural housing

and building codes. The dissemination of the guidelines and handbook, developed by the

project, will increase the knowledge of government officials in rural areas, local communes,

village builder groups, and house builders in flood- and/or storm-prone areas by giving

them guidance on flood- and storm-resistant house construction resulting from the

dissemination of the documentation. An additional impact will be to provide rural people

with little or no building skills, who may use both, recycled and new local materials

traditional construction methods, with simple "how-to" guidance on rural house

construction in areas affected by floods and storms; it will also assist those who want to

improve the safety of their houses without significant/additional costs.

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Evaluation of performance

Bank supervision was relatively intensive given the emergency nature of the project as well

as considering the short implementation period. The Bank evaluated the project critically

and gave their suggestions and opinions on the project; they were taken into consideration

and implemented. The Bank’s regular support during the project period was much

appreciated as it helped to keep the project on track and highlighted actions to improve

project progress and implementation.

Comments from RGC

The Minister of Rural Development in his letter dated Jan 26, 2015 advised the Bank that

MRD had no comments. He stated, however, the following:

“On behalf of the MRD, I extend my utmost felicitation and appreciation for the support

of the World Bank in the interest of the Cambodian people. As highlighted in the report,

this project has been implemented successfully and in time. The project has also

contributed a great impact on the livelihood of the rural people of the six target provinces.”

On February 13, 2015 the Senior Minister for Special Missions and First Vice-President of

NCDM advised the Bank that there are no comments on the part of the NCDM.

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Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

World Bank Aide Memoires. December 2009 to October 2014.

The World Bank and the Royal Government of Cambodia. Post-Disaster Needs

Assessment – Main Report. March 2010.

The World Bank. Environmental and Social Screening Assessment Framework (ESSAF).

April 2010.

The World Bank. Emergency Project Paper for the Ketsana Emergency Reconstruction

and Rehabilitation Project - Report No. 57322-KH. October 2010.

Financing Agreement. November 2010.

Sheladia Associates, Inc. KERRP Project Completion Report [for MRD components].

August 2014.

Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. Project Completion Report (NCDM-KERRP).

November 2014.

Project Preparation Technical Team, PMO, KERRP. Road Reconstruction Completion

Inspection Report. October 2011.

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Annex 10. Project Pictures

Fig. 1: Laterite road construction

Fig. 2: Reinforced concrete roads were built in locations prone to flooding

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Fig 3: Banteay Chas Bridge, destroyed by Typhoon Ketsana

Fig. 4: New Banteay Chas Bridge at Project Completion

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Photos 5 & 6: Dramatic improvement in dust control by use of SBST

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Fig. 7 & 8: Application of SBST for dust control

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Fig. 9: Multiple pipe culvert drainage structure

Fig. 10: Multiple box culvert drainage structure

with channel erosion and slope protection

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Fig. 11 & 12: Handpump on well pad with drainage channel

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Fig. 13 - 15: Different types of latrine superstructures built by householders

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