Document of The World Bank...07 16‐May‐2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.64 08...

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00003648

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

TF093011, TF099946, TF099943, TF012069, TF015934, TF015935, H‐9920, TF0A1813

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 29.43 MILLION EQUIVALENT

TO THE

Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning

FOR A/THE

SOUTHERN SUDAN EMERGENCY FOOD CRISIS RESPONSE PROJECT ( P113586 )

February 22, 2019

Agriculture Global Practice

Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective {Feb 12, 2018})

Currency Unit = South Sudanese Pound

130.26 = US$1

US$ 1.452010 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 ‐ June 30

Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem

Country Director: Carolyn Turk

Senior Global Practice Director: Juergen Voegele

Practice Manager: Mark E. Cackler

Task Team Leader(s): Melissa Williams

ICR Main Contributor: Melissa Williams, Behnaz Bonyadian Dehkordi

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

2008 PP The original Project Paper creating the Emergency Food Crisis Response Project 2011 PP The first Additional Finance Project Paper dated June 20, 2011 2012 PP The second Additional Finance Project Paper dated June 15, 2012 2013 PP The third Additional Finance Project Paper dated October 1, 2013 2014 PP The fourth Additional Finance Project Paper dated February 28, 2014 2016 PP The fifth Additional Finance Project Paper dated April 11, 2016 AAH Africa Action Help ACTED Agence d'Aide a la Cooperation Technique et au Developpement CMU Country Management Unit CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CSO Civil Society Organization EFCRP Emergency Food Crisis Response Project EFNSP Emergency Food and Nutrition Security Project EA Environment Assessment ESA Environment and Social Assessment ESIA Environment and Social Impact Assessment ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESMP Environmental and Social Mitigation and Monitoring Plan ESSAF Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FCV Fragile, Conflict and Violence FPCR Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund GFRP Global Food Crisis Response Program GOSS Government of Southern Sudan/Government of South Sudan IBRD The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICRR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IPDP Indigenous Peoples Development Plan IPPF Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework IRI Intermediate Results Indicator ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status Report JAM Joint Aid Management International LICUS Low‐income Countries Under Stress Grant M&E Monitor and Evaluation

MAFS Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, which previously known as Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NGO Non‐governmental Organization NPA Norwegian People’s Aid OP Operations Manual Policy and Procedures PCF Post‐Conflict Funds PDO Project Development Objective PHRD Policy and Human Resources Development Fund PIU Project Implementation Unit POC Project Operational Coordinator

PMP Pest Management Plan PP Project Paper RAP Resettlement Action Plan RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SSTC Southern Sudan Technical Committee—a technical secretariat within the SSPSC responsible

for overall coordination and oversight of the project SSTSC Southern Sudan Technical Steering Committee—an inter‐ministerial, high level Committee

chaired by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and responsible for implementation of the project

SAFDP Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project TOC Theory of Change UN United Nations WFP World Food Programme WVI World Vision International

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET ........................................................................................................................... 1

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ........................................................ 7

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL ........................................................................................................... 7

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................... 10

II. OUTCOME ...................................................................................................................... 12

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs .............................................................................................................. 12

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ........................................................................................ 13

C. EFFICIENCY ............................................................................................................................. 21

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ..................................................................... 22

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................. 23

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 24

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION..................................................................................... 24

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................................. 25

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 28

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................. 28

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 29

C. BANK PERFORMANCE ............................................................................................................. 31

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ........................................................................................ 34

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................. 35

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ............................................................ 38

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 49

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT............................................................................. 51

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 52

ANNEX 5. OVERVIEW OF CHANGES TO THE RESULTS INDICATORS ......................................... 55

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ...................................................................... 57

ANNEX 7. MAP OF PROJECT COUNTIES .................................................................................. 59

The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )

Page 1 of 60

DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID Project Name

P113586 Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response

Project

Country Financing Instrument

South Sudan Emergency Recovery Loan

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B)

Related Projects

Relationship Project Approval Product Line

Additional Financing P125381‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project

29‐Jun‐2011 Special Financing

Supplement P130396‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project (AF)

15‐Jun‐2012 Recipient Executed Activities

Supplement P145339‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project‐ AF III

13‐Mar‐2014 Recipient Executed Activities

Supplement P149698‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project Additional Financing IV

Recipient Executed Activities

Supplement P149700‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project AF IV

13‐Mar‐2014 IBRD/IDA

Supplement P151031‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project

12‐Apr‐2016 Recipient Executed Activities


Page 2 of 60

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO

Increased access to food for consumption by food insecure households or groups living in six of the most distressed counties ofSouthern Sudan.

Revised PDO

To support adoption of improved technologies for food production and storage, and provide cash or food to eligible beneficiariesinSouth Sudan.

PDO as stated in the legal agreement

See ICR text for elaboration


Page 3 of 60

FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

World Bank Financing

P113586 TF‐93011 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000

P113586 TF‐99943 1,500,000 1,500,000 1,500,000

P113586 TF‐99946 700,000 700,000 700,000

P113586 TF‐12069 3,000,000 2,999,718 2,999,718

P113586 TF‐15935 3,800,000 3,799,982 3,799,982

P113586 TF‐15934 3,730,000 3,730,000 3,730,000

P113586 IDA‐H9220 9,000,000 8,929,337 8,641,597

P113586 TF‐A1813 2,700,000 2,672,083 2,672,083

Total 29,430,000 29,331,120 29,043,380

Non‐World Bank Financing 0 0 0

Total 0 0 0

Total Project Cost 29,430,000 29,331,121 29,043,381

KEY DATES

Project Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

P113586 03‐Oct‐2008 27‐Oct‐2008 16‐Feb‐2011 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2017

P130396 15‐Jun‐2012 31‐Dec‐2017

P145339 13‐Mar‐2014 31‐Dec‐2017

P149698 31‐Dec‐2017

P149700 13‐Mar‐2014 31‐Dec‐2017

P151031 12‐Apr‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017


Page 4 of 60

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

29‐Jun‐2011 4.95 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

15‐Jun‐2012 7.20 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

01‐Oct‐2013 10.20 Additional Financing Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

28‐Feb‐2014 11.70 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

11‐Apr‐2016 17.73 Additional Financing Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Modest

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 24‐Dec‐2008 0

02 29‐Jun‐2009 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory .81

03 22‐Dec‐2009 Moderately

Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 2.05

04 04‐Jun‐2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.08

05 04‐Apr‐2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.70

06 11‐Mar‐2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.62


Page 5 of 60

07 16‐May‐2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.64

08 09‐Dec‐2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.20

09 26‐Jul‐2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 14.22

10 02‐Jan‐2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 21.66

11 09‐Mar‐2016 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 26.28

12 05‐Jul‐2016 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 26.34

13 18‐Jan‐2017 Moderately

Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 26.44

14 04‐Nov‐2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 29.04

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 70

Crops 60

Public Administration ‐ Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry 10

Social Protection 30

Social Protection 30

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Private Sector Development 100

Jobs 100

Human Development and Gender 100

Nutrition and Food Security 100

Food Security 100


Page 6 of 60

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Hafez M. H. Ghanem

Country Director: Kenichi Ohashi Carolyn Turk

Senior Global Practice Director: Juergen Voegele Juergen Voegele

Practice Manager: Karen Mcconnell Brooks Mark E. Cackler

Task Team Leader(s): John Jaramogi Oloya Melissa Williams

ICR Contributing Author: Behnaz Bonyadian Dehkordi


Page 7 of 60

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

1. The Emergency Food Crisis Response Project (EFCRP) was a series of small grants financed through

the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund (FPCR), Global Food Crisis Response Program Trust Fund (GFRP),

IDA, and the Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) trust fund. It was implemented over 9.5

years between September 2008 and December 2017. The final project cost totaled to $29.43 million. The

components and activities remained largely consistent throughout implementation, with funds shifting to

reflect the increasing food insecurity in the country. At the time of appraisal, Southern Sudan was just

emerging from 25 years of protracted violent conflict with the Government of the Sudan, and the 2005

Comprehensive Peace Agreement had established the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) as an

autonomous entity.1 GOSS’ capacity was still very weak, with few staff in public ministries.

2. Southern Sudan faced continuing residual violence from the previous conflict, returning refugees

following the 2005 Peace Agreement, and structural food insecurity stemming from a combination of: (a)

low agricultural productivity; (b) poor state of infrastructure; (c) the lost productivity ensuing from

incessant violent conflict; (d) inadequate provision of agricultural services; (e) weak institutions and lack

of policies and regulations; (f) inadequately skilled human resources; (g) irrational use of natural

resources; and (h) absence of an appropriate land tenure system and land law. Southern Sudan already

relied heavily on food imports,2 which were already expensive due to fuel and transport costs. When

global commodity prices increased, food prices in local markets jumped by as much as 30 percent over a

three‐month period, and local production could not offset expensive imports due to persistent insecurity

in Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria and in Abyei.

3. The 2008 Project Paper (2008 PP) explained that the EFCRP also demonstrated to donors and the

UN that the Bank was willing to make financial commitments to Sudan. Since re‐engaging in the country

in 2000, Sudan’s arrears prevented the Bank from re‐establishing a normal program. Instead, the Bank

had provided $10 million in IBRD surplus to the two multi‐donor trust funds and funded projects using

Post‐Conflict Funds (PCF) and Low‐income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) grants. The EFCRP, drawing on

Global Food Crisis Response Program, addressed the criticisms about the Bank’s commitment to the

country.

Theory of Change (Results Chain)

4. Neither the 2008 PP nor the additional financings were required to explicitly outline a theory of

change. Based on the results framework and descriptions in the project paper, a final overarching theory

of change can be discerned and is presented in table 1. This TOC supported items 2 and 3 of the

1 On 9 July 2011, the Government of Southern Sudan became the Government of South Sudan following a referendum on independence. GOSS refers to both Government of Southern Sudan and Government of South Sudan depending on the time. 2 A 2008 FAO/WFP estimate put the cereal gap at 93 thousand tonnes.2 With approximately 372,000 returnees anticipated in 2008, the gap was expected to increase.


Page 8 of 60

Government of Southern Sudan’s 2008 strategy, which called for, inter alia, targeted safety net programs

and enhancing quick impact agricultural interventions to resource poor farmers to address the price crisis.

Table 1 EFCRP Final Theory of Change

Issues/Challenge Activities Inputs Outputs Outcomes

Low food production leads to high prices

Investment support to crop and livestock production

Improved cereal, vegetable, and pulse seeds

Increased production and higher yields

Increased availability of food for local markets and producer households

Increase agriculture labor opportunities

Cultivation techniques training

Mechanization for land preparation

More land prepared and faster

Animal restocking/health

Increased meat, milk, and eggs

Fishing equipment provision/training

Increased availability of fish

Investment support to post harvest management

Post‐harvest management training

Decreased food loss Increased food availability into lean season Fish processing training

Availability of protein for longer period

Mechanization for processing

Value addition to agriculture products

Increased trade in processed flour

Increased income potential

Poor infrastructure for agriculture

Cash for Work/Food

Grain storage construction

Increased storage capacity

Increased food availability over time

Road repair Improved access to markets More food arriving

in local markets

Households cannot afford food

Market repair Better facilities for sellers

Payment for work Increased household income

More food for households

5. EFCRP sought to address both the supply and demand challenges in local markets. It promoted

local production of key staple foods, vegetables, and animal products, which fed the producer households

and supplied local markets. It did this by providing technology for production, storage, and processing in

addition to training on good farming and harvest practices. The cash for work program invested in

infrastructure important to farmers (e.g., market access roads, grain storage facilities) and put cash in the

hands of food insecure households so they could purchase food locally. As the project added additional

financings, the TOC clarified as did the indicators measuring it—changing from general goals (such as,

increased food reserves) to more concrete inputs (such as, fallow land brought under cultivation, storage

capacity added). As the security and hunger situation deteriorated, the project added unconditional cash

transfers and ultimately food aid through WFP for those too ill or old to work or who could not work due


Page 9 of 60

to conflict in the area. Two underlying assumptions to the TOC were that the security situation would

improve as would the macro‐economic situation. Section IIIB “Factors Affecting Implementation”

discusses at length how these assumptions did not hold during implementation, and how the scope of the

security, economic, and food security crisis ultimately far exceeded the ability of EFCRP to have a

significant and sustainable impact.

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

6. The 2008 Project Paper (2008 PP) PDO in the data sheet was “to increase access to food for

consumption by the food insecure households living in six of the most distressed counties of the Southern

Sudan”. There were variations in how the PDO was presented between the data sheet, PP text, and the

Grant Agreement (GA), but the differences were minor and still adhered to the theory of change. In

keeping with World Bank practice, the ICR uses the text in the GA, which reflects text agreed during

negotiations: “The objective of the project is to assist the Recipient increase access to food for

consumption by food‐insecure households and groups in six counties of Southern Sudan.”

7. The 2008 PP defined food insecure households as those lacking assets and technical support,

mostly constituted by smallholder farmers. Implementing NGOs worked with local authorities to identify

those households in the project area. The project approach invested in: (a) supporting an accelerated

supply response of productivity enhancing technologies to increase “own production of staple foods for

own consumption and internal distribution;” and (b) safety net measures that will target food insecure

households in the same locations through public works. Some of the technologies to be introduced

included improved seeds, animal traction, mechanized land preparation and crop management, post‐

harvest mechanization, and storage facilities.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

8. The project proposed measuring progress toward the PDO through two indicators: (a) the percent

of targeted farmers adopting improved technologies for food production in the targeted areas,

corresponding to the goal of accelerated production for consumption; and (b) percent of target

population receiving cash transfers, corresponding to the safety net measures. While the indicators

aligned to the goals of the PDO, they stopped at measuring inputs rather than whether the amount of

food accessible to households for consumption increased. Measuring production increases of different

crops, changes in local market prices, and the actual purchase of food by the safety net beneficiaries would

have provided better measures of PDO achievement.

Components

9. The project had two technical components and one management component through the fourth

additional finance, which remained largely unchanged in terms of the activities they supported (see

Section I(B) for additional details). The most frequent change was the addition of funds and the outcome

targets. The fifth additional finance added a new component, which is discussed in Section I(B). The

original project included the following three components:

Component 1: Support to Agricultural Productivity (appraisal: $3.0 million, project close:

US$11.43 million) sought to increase farmers’ own production and improve postharvest handling


Page 10 of 60

and management of food crops. It supported provision of inputs (seeds and tools), technical

advice on production and postharvest management, and construction of low‐cost food storage

facilities and granaries at household and community levels.

Component 2: Strengthening Community Safety Nets (appraisal $1.5 million, project close:

US$13.2 million) created temporary job opportunities and income for the food insecure people

to increase their access to food. It supports cash for work activities where target beneficiaries get

cash transfers in exchange for labor. Typical activities included opening access roads to

agriculturally productive areas and construction of grain storage facilities and markets, among

others.

Component 3: Support to Project Implementation (appraisal: $0.50 million, project close:

US$2.1 million) designed to finance administrative costs of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU)

including financial management, procurement, environment and social safeguards management,

monitoring, reporting and evaluation of activities under the project.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Revised PDOs

10. The original PDO—to assist the Recipient increase access to food for consumption by food‐

insecure households and groups in six counties of Southern Sudan—was revised three times. In the first

additional finance in June 2011 (2011 PP), the PDO was revised to “support adoption of improved

technologies for food production by eligible beneficiaries, increase storage capacity for staples, and

provide cash or food to eligible people participating in public works programs in six counties in Southern

Sudan.” This aligned the PDO more closely to the PDO indicators being used by the team and reflected

the changes in geographic targeting agreed in the original negotiations, although it focused the PDO on

activities as opposed to more strategic outcomes. The restated and amended GA used the same text for

the new PDO. The second additional finance in June 2012 (2012 PP) revised the PDO to align to the

proposed change in geographical reach of the project and recognize the change in name of the country

after independence. The fourth additional finance in 2014 (2014 PP) streamlined the description of

Component 1 and reflected the introduction of direct food support to vulnerable people who could not

participate in cash for work programs due to conflict, age, or infirmity.

Revised PDO Indicators and Outcome Targets

11. The project adjusted its targets with each additional finance made changes to the project

indicators. Ultimately, none of the indicators from the 2008 PP remained at the end of the project.

Changes and additions brought clarity to the indicators and how they were measured.

12. Based on instructions from the GFRP, which funded the project, the team changed the PDO

indicators to farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (number and

percentage) and targeted population receiving cash transfers (number instead of percent). These were

agreed with MAFS and the implementing NGOs at a workshop in December 2009, which introduced

indicators specified by the GFRP Secretariat after the 2008 PP had been approved. Annex 5 gives a full

review of the indicators


Page 11 of 60

Revised Components

13. The fifth additional financing project paper in April 2016 (2016‐PP) added a new component,

Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes, that sought to increase the production and consumption of

foods of high nutritional value and build institutional capacity to support nutrition‐sensitive agriculture.

The project PDO did not change with the addition of this component, which had three subcomponents:

Strengthening of farmer groups for increased diversification of locally produced foods would

build the capacity of the smallholder farmers already supported under the EFCRP project in

Nagero, Tali, Morobo, Jur River, Juba, and Aweil South counties to diversify their local food

production to include legumes, fruits, vegetables, and small animal products.

Improved Food and Nutrition Practices would improve households’ knowledge and practices of

food and nutrition to improve food consumption patterns—focusing on both farmers and mother

support groups. It also promoted new technologies and incentives to reduce post‐harvest losses,

test labor, and energy saving technologies especially for women as well as address health issues

such as aflatoxins in foods.

Strengthening Institutional Capacity to Improve Integration of Nutrition in Agriculture would

build the capacity of national institutions for better nutrition outcomes through integration of

nutrition in agriculture and promotion of a multi‐sectoral approach to addressing malnutrition

and exploring the possibility of bio‐fortification to enhance nutrition.

14. Ultimately, implementation of this component was delayed by one year due to another outbreak

of fighting in July 2016, which caused the Bank and most other donors and NGOs to evacuate the country

for several months. The grant was implemented between July 1 and December 31, 2017 but only in Jur

River, Juba, and Aweil South counties due to time constraints and remaining security restrictions in

Nagero, Tali, Morobo.

15. From the beginning of the EFCRP to the project closure on 31 December 2017, Component 1 on

agricultural production shifted from being 60 percent of total project cost to 47 percent. The component

on safety nets shifted from 30 percent of project cost to 50 percent. This shift in investment in the

components was consistent with the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country. By the end of

the project, the final four components were:

Table 1. Project costs by component

Component

Original Project 2008

Additional Finance (US$ million)

Total 1

2011 2

2012 3

2013 4

2014 5

2016

Support to Agricultural Productivity 3.00 1.30 1.40 2.73 3.00 ‐ 11.43

Strengthening Community Safety Nets 1.50 0.70 1.50 4.00 5.50 ‐ 13.20

Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 2.30 2.30

Support to Project Implementation 0.50 0.20 0.10 0.80 0.50 0.40 2.50

Total 5.00 2.20 3.00 7.53 9.00 2.70 29.43


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Other Changes

16. The third Additional Financing (2013), added upgrading of the Palotaka Basic Seed Center to

component 1 “Support to Agricultural Productivity”. The fourth Additional Financing (2014), a $5 million

activity for general food distribution through World Food Programme (WFP) was added to Component 2

in response to the worsening food security situation.

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

17. All the changes made to the PDO statement, funding amount, and key performance indicators

were aligned with the original theory of change which had the PDO outcome of increasing the ability of

food insecure households to access food. The addition of the investment for the Palotaka Basic Seed

Center supported the PDO and the goal of increasing production by facilitating the bulking and

multiplication of higher yielding seeds thus making them available for farmers because quality seeds are

a major constraint to farmers throughout the country.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

18. Relevance the PDO is rated substantial. While the PDO wording changed three times, the theory

of change remained constant, and it was very relevant to the food security issues facing Southern/South

Sudan. The significant change in wording came in the 2011 PP, which changed the language to focus more

explicitly on the inputs and activities the project supported. In 2016, new PDO and intermediate outcome

indicators were added to track activities to improve nutrition in addition to food security. EFCRP’s

objectives aligned to the World Bank Interim Strategy Note (ISN) of 2008 for Sudan, which, in Southern

Sudan, focused on improved governance and decentralized service delivery to the states, counties, and

communities, drawing on the experiences of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement period (2005‐2011).

Subsequent additional financings were similarly informed by the World Bank's 2011 strategy for Africa,

Africa's Future and the World Bank's Support to It, the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict,

Security and Development, and the South Sudan Interim Strategy Note (2013‐2014). The goals remained,

perhaps, even more relevant after closing in December 2017 given the conflict/post‐conflict conditions

prevailing in the country and the high level of food insecurity. Activities like those under EFCRP are being

implemented under the current Emergency Food and Nutrition Security Project (EFNSP) with a greater

emphasis on humanitarian aid.

19. The relevance of the project design is conservatively rated as substantial. When the original

project was designed, Southern Sudan was affected by low production and a dependence on food imports

that resulted in high food prices that were exacerbated by the global food price crisis. EFCRP provided a

rapid intervention that brought assets (seeds and tools) to farmers and created work opportunities for

food insecure households to earn cash for food. The combination of agricultural productivity and cash for

public works should be considered a good practice approach for such conditions because it addressed

both the supply side and demand side constraints within a given area. More food was produced, and

people had more money to buy the food, which increased income for the producers to invest in additional


Page 13 of 60

production. The simple and modular design—which remained throughout the life of the project—allowed

it to respond to the different needs of project communities as implementation progressed. Once the

security situation deteriorated, this also allowed the implementing NGOs to determine what activities to

focus on given the fluid conditions was also a good decision. In interviews with some NGO staff they

indicated they are often limited by other programs to delivering humanitarian aid, even when the targeted

communities ask for farming assistance over food.

20. There were some weaknesses in the design decisions that lead to the conservative rating. It may

have been better for the grants to be linked directly to the Support to Agriculture and Forestry

Development Project (SAFDP) under the MDTF‐S as additional financing, especially since the initial

geographic targeting aligned in part to that project. SAFDP was already under implementation when

EFCRP was designed, and MAFS was the implementing agency for both projects, and the 2008 PP

discussed the complementarities between the two projects. The clear connection in terms of activities is

evident in that the EFCRP activities in Leer and Panyikang counties were ultimately shifted for a time to

the SAFDP project with the 2011 PP using the same implementing partner—Norwegian Peoples’ Aid.

Attaching the grant to SAFDP could have facilitated better synergies between the two projects, simplified

monitoring for the stretched resources in MAFS, and allowed the Bank and MAFS to reassess the

continuation of EFCRP when SAFDP closed in 2012. One reason for keeping EFCRP separate was raised in

the 2008 PP, and that was the need to show development partners that the Bank was willing to invest its

own resources, as opposed to MDTF‐S resources, into Southern/South Sudan. At the time, the FPCR trust

fund was perceived as Bank funds.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

21. Efficacy is rated substantial. Considering the FCV environment, it is extraordinary that over the

life of the project, EFCRP reached 339,433 people, of which 47 percent were women. This fell just short

of the target of 384,500 people, (of which 50 percent women).3 This achievement was made even though

implementation was hampered by increasing insecurity. The assessment looks at project delivery on the

major goals in three phases:

Phase 1: September 2008‐June 2011, which implemented in Yambio, Morobo, Leer, Panyikang,

Raga, and Tonj North counties;

Phase 2: July 2011‐June 2016 which covers the first through the fourth additional finance and

implemented in Yambio, Morobo, Leer,4 Jur River, Panyikang, Raga, Tonj North, Terekeka, Maban,

Nagero, and Pochalla; and

Phase 3: July 2016‐December 2017, which added the focus on nutrition and implemented in Jur

River, Juba, and Aweil South counties.5

3 The final progress report from MAFS gives a figure of 442,921, of which 51 percent were women, but the ICRR team used World Bank ISR reporting throughout the report to be consistent. The more conservative number reported reflects 4 Leer and Yirol ultimately had to be dropped due to insecurity. 5 Nagero, Tali, and Morobo had to be dropped due to insecurity.


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Component 1 Goal: Increasing the Supply of Food

22. Farmers adopting new production technology. Phase one measured the number of farmers that

adopted at least one improved technology for food production, setting a target of 130,000. According to

project reports, the IPs surpassed that target, helping 189,000 farmers adopt an improved technology by

July 2011. In phase 2 the project continued to measure the number of farmers adopting improved

technologies for food production, surpassing the final target of 266,000 by achieving 272,620. Phase 2

also clarified the PDO and indicators, and the technical interventions—seeds and planting materials, small

processing equipment and tools, advisory services, and the goal of expanding current household’s areas

under cultivation to a minimum of five feddans.

23. The technological inputs included mainly seeds,

malodas, toria, some ox ploughs, and in a few instances

power tillers or tractors. According to the 2011 project

paper, the impact of this technology on yields was positive—

yields of sorghum on EFCRP farmer field increased 100

percent in Panyikang, 71 percent in Morobo, and 43 percent

in Yambio. Given that cultivation had decreased or ceased

during the war with Sudan, the significant increase is

understandable. Farmers supported by the project toward

the end of Phase 1 cultivated an average of 0.43‐1.3 hectares

of land.6 The distribution of seeds was more equitable than

market‐oriented than originally intended. MAFS wanted to

include farmers with larger farms who could produce more

food for local markets. The support for households working

the smaller plots was a trade‐off—more households

engaged in the project, with just enough for food security

and a little surplus for local markets (at least those

cultivating 1.3 hectares).7

24. In Tonj North, WVI also supported crop production

through distribution of seeds, malodas, hoes, and some ox

ploughs. It worked beyond staple crops and trained five women’s groups in improved vegetable

production techniques and installed vegetable gardens. Another group of 25 women received sheep and

goats, and 50 households received training on fish drying/handling. WVI reported an 80 percent increase

in households with diversified income sources and a 40 percent increase in target households with

vegetable gardens and producing green leafy vegetables.8

25. Expansion of land under cultivation. Given the cultural practices in the allocation of land—in

6 2011 PP 7 MAFS. 2014. Private Sector‐Driven Agricultural Modernization Working Paper 3 for the Agricultural Development and Food Security Project. 8 World Vision. Project completion report Tonj North County, September 2010 ‐ July 2011. Received by ICRR team July 2018.

Farmer in Ngingo boma, Yambio, with her casava mosaic virus free crop (credit AAH‐I).

Tonj North Farmer Field Day training (credit WVI) where farmers learn, inter alia, the benefits of planting in rows instead of broadcasting seed for cultivation.


Page 15 of 60

some areas, the village head allows people to cultivate land, but ownership does not change hands, so

the land remains communal. The plot size per household was not tracked; however, new land brought

under cultivation was. By introducing labor saving equipment for land preparation—e.g., ox ploughs,

power tillers, tractors—the project surpassed the target of 38,800 hectares of previously fallow land by

roughly 170 percent to achieve 104,741 hectares.

26. Introducing post‐harvest technology. Post‐harvest

technology was supported in phase 1, reaching approximately

82,000 farmers, but it was explicitly tracked in the results

framework in phase 2. In terms of the number of farmers

adopting practices and initiatives for postharvest handling and

management, the project surpassed the final target of 100,700

with the final figure of 125,211. By the project end, 125,211

farmers adopted new practices and initiatives for postharvest

handling and management after being trained by the project,

surpassing the target of 100,700. The project also provided new

machinery to facilitate new introduction of technology, which

the beneficiaries adopted as reported in the anecdotal reports

accessed (see photos).

27. Increasing storage capacity. The project was not able to

measure the number of food insecure households in the project

area that had food reserves during phase 1 due to the difficulty

in establishing a baseline and difficulty in measurement given

that there were investments in household and community

storage—depending on the community demand. The indicator

was revised for Phase 2 to track the additional grain storage

capacity created overall. According to project ISRs, the project

exceeded the final target of 8700 metric tons of storage capacity

by building 11,092 metric tons of storage capacity at the

community and household levels. In most areas, the project

supported more rudimentary technology for storage, which was

within the ability of communities to build and maintain and for

which materials were readily available.

28. The overall project impact on food production was as

follows:

a. Under the 2008 PP (2008‐2011), about 190,000

beneficiaries cultivated on average about 1.0 feddans (or 0.425 hectare) equaling 80,750

hectares. Based additional data provided on beneficiary cultivation patterns in Yambio and

Morobo during phase 1, about 83 percent of cropping was used for cereals. Taking a more

conservative estimate of 70 percent of EFCRP cropping area going to cereals, that would mean

Training in fish drying/smoking in Tonj North (credit WVI)

Food Preparation and Preservation of Vegetable in Tonj North (credit WVI)

Improved granary in Morobo

Rice mill in Morobo


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56,227 hectares were planted with cereals in the project areas. Data from FAO/WFP in the CLIMIS

database for 2011 show that in the six counties where EFCRP operated, the total area under cereal

production was 66,268 hectares. Therefore, upwards of 85 percent of cereal production in the

EFCRP counties in 2011 is attributable to the project. See tables 2 and 3.

b. During the remaining years of the project (from 2011‐2016), an additional 83,620 farmers

adopted improved technology with the goal of cultivating 5 feddans per farmer. Assuming an

average of (1.275 hectares) per beneficiary, 106,616 hectares were added (tables 2 and 3).

c. Up to 2014 when the bulk of project lending for productivity had already occurred, cropped area

and total production maintained a healthy increase over the early years of the project (tables 2

and 3). Due to the conflict, however, area under cereals harvested reduced, resulting in reduced

production (see graph FAOSTAT).

d. The project supported the adoption of post‐harvest technologies for 125,000 farmers and an

additional 11,000 tons of storage capacity to ensure temporal availability of foods, all contributing

to reduced losses and longer availability of processed foods for consumption. According to field

reports from IPs, several farmers indicated that they would construct their own household

granaries after they saw how effective

Table 2 Total cereal production area (hectares) in EFCRP counties during the life of the project

State County 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Central Equatoria

Morobo 10,351 10,060 12,550 13,079 25,099 37,603 9,783

Terekeka 26,858 18,409 18,961 18,224

Western Equatoria

Nagero 2,311 1,731 1,914

Yambio 25,080 29,251 34,970 36,414 37,770 33,156 22,302

Lakes Yirol 28,583 25,594 36,505

Warrap Tonj North 22,143 15,065 30,333 25,543 18,736 20,505 22,809

Western BeG

Raga 6,406 6,946 7,221 9,553 11,056 11,388 6,260

Jonglei Pochalla 6,003 5,007 5,894 6,625

Unity Leer 3,536 3,007 2,814 4,105 639

Upper Nile

Maban 4,362 4,546 3,461 4,990 5,370

Panyikang 2,090 1,939 2,016 2,522 ‐ 162 680

69,606 66,268 94,266 128,623 150,432 159,984 131,111 Source: FAO/WFP data in CLIMIS database. http://www.climis‐southsudan.org/crop/data

Table 3 Net cereal production (tonnes) in EFCRP counties during the life of the project

State County 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Central Equatoria

Morobo 7,453 7,243 9,036 11,510 32,126 51,140 12,522

Terekeka 21,486 16,200 10,618 13,122

Western Equatoria

Nagero 1,849 1,524 1,684

Yambio 27,086 30,422 36,369 40,784 45,324 34,483 23,194

Lakes Yirol 25,750 24,570 32,125

Warrap Tonj North 15,057 7,834 15,773 16,348 14,989 16,404 18,247

Western BeG

Raga 6,406 6,946 4,910 7,643 12,383 10,932 6,010

Jonglei Pochalla 5,763 5,207 4,715 5,300


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State County 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Unity Leer 1,980 505 900 1,971 1,117 224 358

Upper Nile

Maban 2,094 2,182 1,661 3,194 3,437

Panyikang 1,254 489 968 1,614 N/A 104 435

101,843 94,829 119,003 133,510 156,606 157,908 116,434 Source: FAO/WFP data in CLIMIS database. http://www.climis‐southsudan.org/crop/data

Increasing Income Through Safety Nets

29. Cash for Work. Project reports cite initial difficulties implementing the safety nets because the

IPs were not familiar with the approach promoted by the project. However, the World Bank team, MAFS,

and the NGOs worked to overcome the confusion, and by the end of phase 1 in June 2011, the project

reached 24,462 people with cash for work, exceeding the PDO target of 20,000.

30. The original project also had some learning

by doing regarding what could be measured under

the circumstances and how. The practice of paying

by task instead of daily rates is one example of

difficulty in tracking data as originally planned in

project design. Similarly, the initial criterion for

targeting food insecure households was not

effective due to the local culture. Box 1 describes

how Africa Action Help—the IP in Morobo and

Yambio counties—entered communities and

identified beneficiaries for the safety nets

component (see box 1).

31. By the end of phase 2, EFCRP supported

110,000 beneficiaries with cash for public works,

averaging 22,000 beneficiaries per year. It had also

informed the technical design of the Skills Development and Safety Nets Project, which was approved in

2013.

32. As agreed with GOSS, the cash for work activities enhanced agricultural productivity in the project

area—e.g., feeder roads, market cleaning/upgrading, grain storage, and the like. For example, in two road

rehabilitation projects, there were 690 individuals (510 men and 180 women) employed to repair 6.5 kms

of the Morobo‐Iraga road and 7 kms of Aboroto‐Yugufe road. Activities included clearance and stumping,

road formation (earth works), drainage, murram digging, and spot murraming.9 In Morobo, 300 people

(198 men and 102 women) were employed to rehabilitate 23.6 km of feeder road by bush clearing,

excavating, and spreading murram to selected sections, and another 76 people renovated the Karua and

Wuli bridges. In Tali, 225 people (180 M/45 F) were involved in the opening, swamp raising, and gravelling

sections of 11 km feeder road linking Tali center to Pagara Boma.

9 Murram is a gravelly lateritic (clayey) material, often used to surface minor roads in parts of Africa.

Box 1 Safety nets entry activities by AAH

To introduce project public works activities, the NGO held

three Boma meetings in Lujulo, Panyume and Gulumbi

Payams, which were attended by 54 participants including

farmers, chiefs, and local authorities. The three contractors

selected to manage the work were introduced to the

construction sites through meetings with local authorities

and the community, where 37 participants attended the

meeting. Eligible households for public works were selected

based on the following criteria: level of food insecurity, idle

youth not involved in productive work, those involved in

charcoal burning and forestry destruction, and individuals

capable of working. Feeder road formation training was

given to 69 beneficiaries (62 male, 7 female) that formed the

core group for road repair. The training covered road

alignment, measurement for feeder road dimension

formation and compaction.


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Rehabilitation of Karua bridge in Morobo county Installing culverts as part of road rehabilitation in Nagero

33. Unconditional food transfers. The 2014 PP started after the civil war began and added

unconditional food or cash transfers to the project deliverables given the severe food insecurity in the

country. This was the first time that IDA funds were used in EFCRP. The unconditional food aid—

amounting to $5 million—was managed by WFP. A target of 138,000 beneficiaries provisioned with two

months of food was set in the project paper. In the contract with MAFS, however, WFP committed to

reach about 58,000 with four months of provisions. Ultimately, it reached 58,680 beneficiaries with four

months of food supplies, substantially achieving the overall target (138,000 x 2 months=276,000

compared to 58,680 x 4 months = 234,720). WFP reported efficiencies in food procurement due to

exchange rate gains and sourcing commodities from various sources. Given the dispersed locations of

those in need, the “land, transportation, storage, and handling” comprised 63 percent of the contract cost

compared to 17 percent to procure the food. This provides a stark picture of the transport challenges in

the country.

Table 4 General food distribution and BSP by state

States Cereals Pulses Oil Salt Supercereal Total MT Beneficiaries Aug‐Dec 2014

Jonglei 697.70 151.50 20.76 71.88 941.84 25,250

Upper Nile 334.95 12.00 46.81 65.12 458.87 10,401

Central Equatoria 245.95 14.41 20.05 280.41 16,708

Eastern Equatoria 0.75 0.75 207

Unity 350.75 11.70 4.38 366.83 5,846

Lakes 16.05 16.05 268

Total 1,645.40 175.20 87.11 20.05 137 2,064.75 58,680

34. Given the difficulty in getting on the ground in country for supervision once the war broke out,

the team only caught the disconnect by the time of the May/June 2016 ISR, just before the close of the

project. If the indicator tracking the WFP work had not been at the PDO level, the mismatch could have

been corrected relatively easily.

Improved Nutritional Outcomes

35. Activities related to improving nutrition were the focus of phase 3, which was supposed to begin

in July 2016. The outbreak of violence in July 2016 delayed the start of implementation until July 2017, at

which point the World Bank and MAFS agreed to contract the Food and Agriculture Organization of the

United Nations (FAO) to manage implementation. FAO subcontracted World Concern Development

Organisation (WCDO), Joint Aid Management (JAM), and World Vision International as implementing

partners. The phase was originally supposed to build the capacity of the smallholder farmers already


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supported under the EFCRP in Nagero, Tali, Morobo, Jur River, Juba, and Aweil South counties with the

codicil that locations could change based on the security situation. When operations resumed in July 2017,

Nagero, Tali, and Morobo were dropped due to insecurity.

36. In contrast to the other grant activities under EFCRP, phase 3 had the affirmative goal to impact

nutrition through dietary diversity,10 and it introduced two new PDO indicators. Against a target of 1800

households increasing the number of foods they produce, the project achieved 4600 households. To do

this, the project collaborated with State Ministries of Agriculture and Health, the Relief and Rehabilitation

Commission, UNICEF, WFP, International Rescue Committee, Action for Development, and Die Johanniter,

a German humanitarian organization operating in the area, to sensitize communities to the project

activities and to nutrition through meetings in collaboration with county/payam administrators, local

chiefs, and sultans. Following that, 4600 targeted households were organized into 163 groups (20 in Aweil

South, 40 in Juba, and 103 in Jur River). FAO procured and distributed about 4.8 tonnes of vegetable

and legume seeds, including amaranth, collard, cowpea, eggplant, okra, onion, tomato, and

watermelon. Hand tools—including, hoes, rakes, spades, watering cans and plastic buckets—were

distributed to beneficiaries. Beneficiaries in Jur River also received fishing kits comprising gill nets,

fishing hooks, and twine. To increase availability of animal protein, the project provided 5000 vulnerable

households with investment vouchers to acquire 20,000 chickens and 18,000 sheep or goats from the

local market, which generated income for local livestock sellers. Demonstration plots covering 12.6 ha

provided training on agronomic practices and animal husbandry.

37. The project increased the dietary diversity of 6000 households (against a target of 1900).

Interventions to achieve this goal included providing vouchers to 6000 mothers of children under‐five

years of age and vulnerable households to access nutritious foods in the local market. The NGOs also

formed and trained 18 mother‐to‐mother support groups with 450 mothers (100 mothers in Juba and 350

in Jur River) on income generation, business skills and market linkages. It also established small kitchen

gardens for 2300 beneficiaries (79% women) and trained 2500 beneficiaries (82% women) on food

processing and storage and 400 beneficiaries (38% women) on fish net braiding, processing, and

10 Other NGOs did provide support to vegetable production—e.g., AAH, WVI, and Mercy Corps.—however, nutrition impacts were not an explicit goal of the other investments.

Beneficiaries redeeming their vouchers for poultry pose with the poultry trader

A beneficiary shows off her tomato crop


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preservation.

38. Beyond assets, the project trained households on the types of basic foods they could grow

throughout the year for dietary diversity and how they could prepare and process/preserve the food.

Beneficiaries were trained on food processing, preparation and infant feeding practices, and mother

support groups were formed and trained in business skills. Awareness‐raising sessions were conducted

on nutrition sensitive technologies and on energy‐saving technologies—such as, cooking baskets and solar

drying for vegetable preservation. Beneficiaries for nutrition education were selected following a

participatory process with the involvement of, and consultation with, relevant stakeholders in the

nutrition sector. They included households with young children on the verge of falling into the

malnutrition trap and children who have graduated from UNICEF treatment. While these households

benefited from nutrition vouchers to buy healthy food, they also received nutrition education and

demonstrations on cooking, food preparation, and preservation; and they were trained on setting up

kitchen gardens and using energy and labor‐saving technologies. Radio programs were designed with

beneficiaries to improve knowledge of the importance of a diversified diet. Ultimately, 2781 households

reported adopting healthier eating habits and 2500 households were using improved food processing and

storage methods and facilities.

39. The project also conducted a national capacity assessment to review the institutional

environment for nutrition and coordination. State level consultations with relevant stakeholders from the

State Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, and the Universities of Juba and Bahr el‐Ghazal were

held, followed by a workshop to raise awareness among six states of the Greater Bahr el‐Ghazal region

and draft action plans to mainstream nutrition in agriculture. Given the short timeline of the project

(essentially 5 months for implementation), the planned national stakeholder workshops could not be

organized to build stakeholder capacity for nutrition mainstreaming. By project close, 40 agriculture

professionals reported increased understanding of their role in improving nutrition, which falls short of

the target, but is an impressive achievement given the context and the short implementation timeline.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

40. Overall efficacy is rated substantial because the objectives of increasing food production and

A hay solar cooking basket (fireless cooker) is one of the labor saving technologies introduced by the project

Children from Marial Ajiith recording a role play at Voice of Hope Radio Station in Wau


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providing access to cash for work were surpassed, despite the difficulties presented by increasing

insecurity and poor accessibility. EFCRP was able to substantially achieve or surpass its targets despite the

challenges of implementing in an area where the government was just being established, the population

had been traumatized by years of civil war, accessibility due to poor roads was an issue between April and

November, and where active conflict ultimately engulfed the new country for four years of the

implementation.

41. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, much of the evidence of the project’s achievements came

from indirect sources and not the M&E office of the PIU. This is why the project is rated substantial instead

of high. Progress monitoring in FCV settings cannot be expected to reach the levels of rigor that are

achieved in non‐FCV countries, particularly in times of active conflict. EFCRP experienced consistent

difficulties in monitoring; however, implementing through reputable international NGOs that were able

to collect data at the local level and were willing to meet with the ICRR team even 6 years after the close

of their activity increased the confidence in the effectiveness of the project. In the early years of the

project the World Bank and MAFS officials made regular visits to the field to validate reporting from IPs,

which increased the confidence in the reporting that was submitted from the field during the rest of the

project when field monitoring was limited for MAFS and extremely limited for the World Bank. The ICRR

team accessed original completion reports from World Vision, Africa Action Help, ACTED, Mercy Corps,

and FAO and held a workshop with IPs in July 2018 to review their implementation experience and

achievements. This supplemental data verification, in addition to secondary sources and World Bank

implementation supervision reports and project papers, helps tell a more plausible story of the project’s

achievements.

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

42. Overall, the project efficiently managed seven grants over the life of the project with no delays in

expensing the grants. Early inefficiencies in the procurement process were resolved, and the PIU brought

the project in while fully accounting for all funds and receiving clean audit reports. Nevertheless, efficiency

is conservatively rated as modest largely because of deficiencies in direct project monitoring by carried

out by the PIU. In addition, the urgency of the crisis response during preparation and the general lack of

basic data in South Sudan meant that no financial or economic analysis was carried out prior to project

implementation in 2008, 2011, 2012, or 2013 (original project and the first three additional financings).

The 2013 PP committed to collecting data for ex‐post computation of financial and economic returns on

farm income towards the end of project implementation; however, the civil war erupted shortly after

approval of that additional financing, which delayed implementation for several months and limited field

data collection necessary for analysis until the end of the project.

43. Based on a representative crop model for sorghum and maize that was developed for the

preparation of 2014 PP to estimate financial gross margins in the project area. For EFCRP, average prices

for maize and sorghum in December 2015, six months before the end of the project were used to

determine the gross margin. Sorghum prices ranged from SSP 12/kg in Rumbek to SSP 15/kg in Wau. Maize

prices ranged from SSP 10.3/kg in Wau and to SSP 11.7 in Rumbek. Drawing on the EFNSP analysis, the


Page 22 of 60

analysis assumes an average of 1 ha/beneficiary. Based on these numbers, the average gross margin six

months before project close was US$257 for sorghum and US$150 for maize.

44. While sorghum and maize are the major crops in South Sudan and a priority for food security

production, those two crops represent just a part of the cropped area under the project. Seeds and

cuttings were provided for groundnut, cassava, pulses, vegetables, and sim sim, but data was not available

to do an adequate analysis of these crops. Prices were volatile throughout the project, so financial returns

were similarly volatile. Informal analysis done by one of the implementing NGOs during Phase 1 of the

project (around 2010) showed a higher cost of production that negatively affected gross margins for

maize. There was insufficient data to analyze the returns to mechanization—both for land preparation

and post‐harvest processing, but this was a small element of the project assets introduced.

45. The analysis of the cash for work program looked to analysis from similar projects for indications

of the potential returns. For this, the World Bank’s SNSDP project, which drew on EFCRP for its technical

design, did provide an analysis that showed it would cost US$2.07 to transfer US$1.00 in wage benefits to

the intended recipients, which compared well to similar programs. The EFNSP cash for works component

ultimately reached 47,595 people with an investment of $8.2 million—about $172 invested per

beneficiary. This is averaged over the life of the project, and it includes the cost of materials. Detailed data

on the number of people reached each year in each county was not systematically collected, but AAH

provided full financial data in their 2014‐15 completion report. In Yambio, Nagero, and Tali counties, the

public works component provided an average of 56 days employment at about $7/day. This was manual

repair of several kilometers of road and installation of culverts for each community. Due to the prevalence

of bartering in South Sudan, the project noted that introducing cash wages would increase purchasing

power and stimulate demand in local markets. That EFCRP also supported the supply response in local

market offset the risk of inflation that could have happened in the absence of functioning markets.

46. The amount allocated for operations under the nutrition component in phase 3 was US$2.3

million. The funds supported 6000 HH, averaging roughly $54 per person to increase production and

dietary diversity, and the households were continuing to produce and even sell surplus in the market six

months after the close of the project. By comparison, the general food distribution under phase 2, cost

$5 million to reach 58,680, and average of $85 per person—this is largely due to the expense of delivering

food support in high conflict areas. The cash for work generated about US$4.6 million in wages under the

public works schemes. With 110,000 benefiting from public works, the project paid out US$42 per person

annually.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

47. Based on the strong results on the ground in an increasingly dangerous FCV context, there was a

good argument to rate the overall outcome as satisfactory; however, the team decided on a the more

conservative rating of moderately satisfactory due to the lack of traditional evidence and analysis. The

overall relevance of the PDO was substantial and the design of the project was an excellent response to

the challenge being addressed—investing in both the demand and supply‐side constraints in a project

area to increase food security. Based on the robust data available (albeit from indirect sources), EFCRP

achieved or surpassed its targets for increasing food security:


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272,620 farmers adopting improved technologies for production (102% of the target)

104,741 hectares of idle land brought under production (270% of target)

11,092 metric tons of storage capacity built, which increased the time that food was available in

communities (127% of the target)

47,595 participants in the cash for work public works program (128% of target)

4500 households reporting an increase in the number of foods produced (250% of target)

6000 households reporting increased household dietary diversity (316% of target)

2500 households using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities (161% of

target).

48. Having the safety net component focus on improving farm to market roads, increasing storage

capacity and preparing farm land created a virtuous synergy with the food production component. The

simple, modular design also allowed relatively easy expansion of the project as the situation on the ground

deteriorated. Despite this, the difficulties in project implementation caused by steadily increasing conflict

and violence, economic crises, weather‐related site accessibility, and capacity gaps that were not

addressed meant that the project simply did not have the data to prove efficacy and efficiency to meet

the moderately satisfactory threshold.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender

49. None of the grants had specific goals along the lines of increasing women’s agency—e.g., power

to make decisions about how household resources are allocated, etc. —or reducing gender‐based

violence. The focus on women’s inclusion varied across implementing partners, but all made sure to

include women in project activities—some explicitly targeted female headed households (e.g., World

Vision, Mercy Corps) while others reported the number of women reached. In line with the emerging

requirements for the World Bank core indicators, the team started tracking the number of beneficiaries

disaggregated by gender, and it achieved 47 percent women’s inclusion against a target of 50 percent

according to World Bank ISRs. The fifth additional finance, with its focus on nutrition, reached a higher

proportion of women—e.g., 79 percent of the beneficiaries of kitchen garden training, and 82 percent of

trainees on food processing and storage.

Institutional Strengthening

50. Regardless of the definition of institutional strengthening used, EFCRP was not primarily designed

to contribute to this goal. That said, the primary project paper did say that EFCRP would contribute to the

increased capacity of MAFS and local authorities to manage and monitor projects. Despite a rocky start,

the project did build a new working relationship between MAFS and the NGOs (see the next section for

elaboration). NGOs report close collaboration with local authorities, including county agriculture

department and payam extension workers, who supported implementation and were provided transport

facilities to facilitate their work. Local officials participated in trainings to be able to provide support after

the end of the project. In addition, EFCRP did provide funding to upgrade the Palotaka Seed Center for

the purposes of producing quality seeds for farmers.


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Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

51. The project was not designed to mobilize private sector financing given the emergency nature of

the operation and the fragile context of the country.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

52. As an emergency project designed to meet immediate food security needs, the project did not

focus on poverty reduction or growth, per se. Given the focus on food security through production and

income support, it certainly increased incomes of producers and mitigated the impacts of poverty during

implementation. However, given the continuing conflict, it has been challenging to measure the impact

on either of the twin goals.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

53. Early in the project—by June 2010—the team noted that there was impact on youth jobs with

public works providing livelihood opportunities. Anecdotes from the NGOs indicate that the youth were

especially involved in farm mechanization efforts and took the lead in land preparation in some areas and

the rehabilitation of public roads and the construction of storage facilities. With the first additional

financing, the project started measuring youth participation in the safety nets activities and it was

reported that they surpassed their target of 50 percent.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

54. At the time EFCRP was designed, the Government of Southern Sudan was just forming and had

low human resource capacity to manage development projects. Several ministries had few or no staff on

the ground. EFCRP was designed shortly after the Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development

Project (SAFDP) which was financed by the Multi‐Donor Trust Fund‐South Sudan (MDTF‐SS) and was

managed by the same ministry. These two projects were not the only agriculture/food security projects

under the MDTF‐SS, so the management burden was not small.

55. The management structure followed SAFDP in that the project was integrated into the normal

operations of the MAF Technical Directorate for Research and Extension with the Director General (DG)

as Project Operational Coordinator (POC) for day‐to‐day coordination. This meant that a government

official was essentially managing the project in addition to the rest of his or her portfolio, which was sub‐

optimal given the fiduciary, safeguards, and technical issues that needed intense attention.

56. The decision to use technical assistance and implementing partners (NGOs) for EFCRP ran against

the preference of GOSS, but it was a necessity given limited capacity on the ground and the need to act

quickly. Given the government’s aversion to technical assistance, this decision created further challenges

during implementation that, perhaps the inclusion of capacity building activities for MAFS staff (e.g.,

training seminars with visiting staff from the Bank) could have mitigated.

57. The decision to have project sites spread across six states (and later expanded) was a trade‐off in

terms of management efficiency. The reason for this is that South Sudan has very weak transport


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infrastructure, with most roads impassable during the rainy seasons, and sporadic insecurity that existed

even at the time of project design. This made management and monitoring especially difficult for an

already stretched Ministry and Bank team.

58. As with SAFDP, the design team lacked information on weather, physical conditions, the social

dynamics of the proposed project areas, and the nature of local markets in the target areas as well. The

project overcame the lack of capacity and information by hiring strong, reputable NGOs for

implementation—Action Africa Help, Norwegian People's Aid, World Vision, Mercy Corps, HARD‐SSS, and

ACTED—to implement the project. This prevented the project from adding more detail to the design of

implementation arrangements and from designing a robust monitoring and evaluation strategy.

59. The emergency nature of the project combined with delays in contracting the NGOs, fed into the

failure to sufficiently orient MAFS and NGO staff to the design principles of the project where early on,

there was confusion over how to implement the safety nets component and how to divide the agriculture

production activities between subsistence and more market‐oriented farmers (cultivating 5+ feddans).

This created confusion early on in implementation, which was ultimately overcome, but not without lost

opportunities.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

60. EFCRP spanned almost 10 years during which its operating environment changed drastically. It is

impressive that the project achieved what it did given the circumstances unfolding in the country. This

section describes the factors that impacted the implementation progress.

61. Conflict and civil war. The deteriorating security situation ultimately became the defining factor.

While December 2013 marks the start of a civil war period, intermittent insecurity affected the project as

early as December 2009, and delayed or prevented implementation in some area (e.g., Pochalla and Yirol

West).

62. In December 2013, one month after approval

of the 2013 PP, civil war broke out, forcing the Bank to

evacuate the country between 20 December 2013 and

30 April 2014. During this time, implementation was

minimal in most locations, but given the increasing

need, the Bank pushed through a fourth additional

financing in February 2014, which included direct food

aid through WFP. By the fourth additional financing in

2014, the project was providing food security support

in nine counties across seven states (table 4).

63. The project’s flexible implementation model,

giving authority to the implementing partners to

determine where and what to implement based on the

local conditions allowed implementation to continue. The Bank returned to Juba in April 2014, but field

visits were minimal for the Bank and MAFS due to continued insecurity. A peace agreement was reached

A landmine uncovered in Maban county during excavation of a farm pond in 2013 under the grant implementated by Mercy Corps


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in September 2015, after which the Bank, MAFS, and the NGOs made efforts to return to normalcy. The

2014 PP was set to close in June 2016. Preparations for a fifth additional financing through the PHRD trust

fund—this time focused on nutrition—commenced and the grant was approved in June 2016. However,

the peace agreement fell apart in July 2016, prompting the evacuation of staff from July 2016 to April

2017.

64. Economic turbulence and decline. Economic crises at different points of implementation

(2008/2009, 2012, and 2016) constrained public sector investment and limited the government’s ability

to import food. Very early in the project (2008‐2009), oil prices dropped by around 70 percent, at a time

when 90 percent of Southern Sudan’s revenue came from oil. Oil prices rebounded somewhat, but a 2012

dispute over oil with Sudan again restricted the amount of food imported from Sudan and curtailed access

to fuel by large‐scale mechanized farmers in South Sudan. The situation was exacerbated by an influx of

refugees and returnees that increased overall food demand. The conflict in December 2013, shut down

five oil fields, which severely constrained government revenue. Ultimately, GDP per capita dropped from

$1,111 in 2014 to less than $200 in 2017. Growing insecurity, low government revenues, and the move to

monetize the debt led to extraordinarily high inflation—including for food—later in project

implementation.

Figure 1 South Sudan Consumer Price Index 2011‐2017 with dates of each additional financing

65. Project design elements. The project design had both positive and negative elements. EFCRP was

simple, with two technical components that could be easily replicated, and adjusted, to work in different

geographies. The activities were familiar to most NGOs and so could be deployed quickly at various points

across the country. The synergy between the two components multiplied the positive impact of the

project. On the downside, the small, short‐duration grants prevented the NGOs from establishing the

long‐term trust relationship necessary to affect change. They could not plan out on a sufficient time

horizon the engagement they think was needed. The many restructurings to add financing to the project

also created an administrative burden for the project team (dual track approval and reporting), which was

as different times during implementation, also implementing the SAFDP, preparing a follow‐on agriculture

project, and preparing and implementing the EFNSP. At the same time, the dispersed nature of the project

made monitoring difficult, particularly during the rainy season when rain made roads inaccessible.

Jun‐11100

Jun‐12174

Apr‐13153

Mar‐14153

Jun‐16720

0

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5000

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66. Accessibility. Aside from security issues, South Sudan is one of the most difficult countries to

travel due to the lack of paved roads. In fact, between April to May and October to November, most roads

in South Sudan are inaccessible. As insecurity grew during implementation, the costs of monitoring and

delivering goods increased substantially. At times, logistical issues led to the delayed delivery or loss of

inputs due to road accidents.

67. Weather. Weather shocks—including drought, rain, and flood—repeatedly affected accessibility

to project areas and success of cropping. Early in the implementation, the project learned that drought

had affected beneficiaries in Upper Nile State, destroying all early planted crops.11 In 2011/2012, delayed

and erratic rainfall in most parts of South Sudan affected the harvest while drought in the neighboring

countries limited the availability of food for import. These events coincided with a conflict between Sudan

and South Sudan over oil that triggered macroeconomic decline that exacerbated the rapidly increasing

food insecurity in the country.

68. Implementation through NGOs. EFCRP started when Southern Sudan was an autonomous region

that had only existed for about three years. Government agencies were severely short of staff. The

decision to implement through reputable NGOs, some of which were able to provide their own pre‐

financing in anticipation of the funds being reimbursed by MAF, was critical to successful implementation.

Building trust between the local authorities and the NGOs also took time, which delayed progress at first.

Trust was eventually established, and a positive working relationship characterized the rest of

implementation. GFRP ultimately highlighted the partnership between the NGOs and the government

(see box 2).

Box 2 Establishing a New Partnership between NGOs and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS)

Four international NGOs were contracted to support the implementation of the GFRP South Sudan Program: Norwegian People’s Aid, World Vision, Africa Action for Hunger International and the Agency for Cooperation in Technical Development. The contractual relationship was defined by an agreement based on Bank procedures that clearly identified NGOs as consultants delivering services required by the GoSS. The selected NGOs had working experience in the agricultural sector in South Sudan, extensive knowledge of the local communities, and appropriate operational structures ready to be quickly scaled up. However, after the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) and the subsequent independence in 2011, new working procedures were established. While previously NGOs were only accountable to their donors, they began to be supervised by the new government in place.

It took some time for the NGOs to adjust to the new reporting requirements; however, they successfully engaged with the local authorities. They played a crucial role in promoting awareness on important topics, especially related to gender issues. Although governmental institutions remained structurally weak, they played an important role by providing counterparts to supervise the project; facilitating the exemption of taxes on equipment, materials, and inputs for the project; and disclosing policy documents related to agriculture and forestry development in South Sudan. Therefore, the relation between NGOs and the GoSS positively evolved during the implementation of the GFRP program. In terms of management, the Internal Coordination Committee, a forum in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, brought together the different actors monthly to discuss implementation of the project and helped in the identification and resolution of key implementation challenges also related to accessibility, logistics, and insecurity.

Source: World Bank 2012 “Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP): Progress and Lessons Learned”

11 World Bank. 2009. Implementation Status and Results Report. Sequence 2.


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IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

69. Monitoring and evaluation was modest. The original project paper outlined more of a supervision

plan than a monitoring strategy beyond defining the indicators and describing the sources for the data.

Given the dearth of information about M&E in the 2008 PP (and subsequent additional financings) and

that EFCRP used the implementation structure and fiduciary systems as defined under the MDTF‐S and

used for implementation of the SAFDP, it is likely that the project design team planned to build on the

M&E system defined in the final project paper for SAFDP. Like SAFDP, EFCRP suffered from the paucity of

data available to establish baseline values.

70. Taking a lesson from SAFDP, where “in the absence of a clear plan, a piecemeal approach became

the actual modus operandi of the project as far as M&E was concerned”,12 EFCRP developed a set of

indicators directly linked to the project and held at least two workshops to reach agreement on the

indicators and their measurement. There were, however, changes to the initial indicators once monitoring

requirements from the FCRP trust fund were communicated after the project was approved. This led to

a disconnect between the 2008 project paper results framework and the one that was used during

implementation support. Despite the additional preparation, there was some initial confusion over some

indicators—e.g., what constituted an improved technology—and difficulty measuring other indicators—

e.g., calculating person‐days of labor was not possible due to the nature of assigning and jobs and making

payment. The original results indicators were completely different by the second additional finance in

2012.

M&E Implementation

71. M&E remained weak throughout implementation. By the close of the project, there was no M&E

specialist on staff, and the PIU did not have staff or budget to prepare a borrower completion report. No

consolidated management information system database to track physical progress and supplementary

data was created according to interviews with the Project Director. In the absence of capacity, the PIU

assembled the progress reports from the NGO implementers for the World Bank team. Technical

assistance was supposed to be used throughout implementation, which could have bolstered M&E

activities; however, the Government was not enthusiastic about outside technical assistance, so coverage

was patchy.

72. There was a missed opportunity to gather supplementary data on, for example, the types of

technology used, the amount and types of seeds distributed, the production levels of crops, the prices

earned by producers, the difference in prices in local markets once the farmers began selling, the

kilometers of roads rehabilitated, etc. Enriching data like this was done or not depending on the NGO, and

12 World Bank. 2013. Implementation Completion and Results Report for the Support To Agriculture And Forestry Development Project. World Bank: Washington, DC.


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there was no defined methodology to guide the gathering of the information. Therefore, good efficiency

and impact analysis was not possible.

73. In the early years of the project, regular field missions by the Bank and MAFS could verify the data

provided by the NGOs, and local authorities were also working with the NGOs to do site monitoring. Due

to the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, field missions reduced significantly. While implementation

resumed by March 2014, access to field areas for data validation was constrained. The World Bank team

noted that for most of 2015, MAFS officials were unable to make field visits due to insecurity and could

only resume monitoring visits in early 2016.

M&E Utilization

74. The indicators finally adopted by the project as of 2012, were enough to gauge progress on project

implementation; however, the World Bank team consistently reported problems with data verification.

Nonetheless, field verification missions that included World Bank staff were possible through 2013, which

adds a measure of confidence to the data that the NGO partners were reporting. Based on project

completion reports submitted by the project implementers—available from every implementing NGO

except for one—there was a wealth of data being collected that could have been consolidated and use to

enrich the project knowledge base. For example, there are doubts about the acceptability of animal

traction and other mechanization among communities. EFCRP supported such mechanization and could

have collected data on adoption rates and qualitative information on issues limiting adoption. Some

implementing NGOs reported on farmers engaging in contracts with private sector buyers in larger cities.

It would have been good to collect data on what farmers and/or cooperatives were able to engage in such

contracts and to gather qualitative data on how these contractual arrangements were formed.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

75. Quality of M&E is rated negligible because by the end of the project, the paucity of verifiable data

and reports meant that the ICRR team could not validate any outcomes. The introduction of capacity

building for PIU staff could have helped increase the acceptance of the technical assistance that was

needed but not readily accepted by the implementing agency, and it could have improved the overall

confidence in the data.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

76. Environmental and Social. EFCRP was a Category B project for environmental safeguards

throughout the life of the project. The 2008 PP triggered OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP

4.09 (Pest Management). The 2011 PP added OP 4.10 (Indigenous Peoples) and OP 4.12 (Involuntary

Resettlement, then the 2012 PP added OP 4.04 on Natural Habitats and OP 4.36 on Forests. Relevant

safeguards documents were prepared and disclosed as specific to OPs as follows: Environmental and

Social Management Framework (ESMF), including a Pest Management Plan (PMP) for OPs 4.01 and 4.04;

an Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF) for OP 4.10; and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF)

for OP 4.12. During these updated PPs, an Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment

Framework (ESSAF) was prepared for the whole of the South Sudan portfolio in 2012.

77. Despite capacity weaknesses in safeguards management in the implementing agency, EFCRP


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started and ended implementation in safeguards compliance with respect to documentation. Compliance

lags occurred in preparation of subsequent management plans – Environmental and Social Management

Plans (ESMPs) and Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs). At the time of the 2013 PP, a South Sudan Social

Assessment concluded that most of the people in South Sudan met the criteria for OP 4.10, so an IPP was

deemed no longer necessary. In May 2013, an environmental and social audit conducted by the Bank

found that safeguards continued to be implemented satisfactorily at the NGO level. By October 2013

(when 2013 PP was approved), a consulting firm had been hired by the PIU to manage all safeguard issues.

That firm, which continued through the end of EFCRP and assured safeguards compliance on the ground.

According to project reporting, project interventions remained small in scale and resulted in minimal

safeguard risks that were easily mitigated by the NGO implementers. The collaboration between the NGOs

and the local authorities was particularly helpful in managing localized conflict between groups.

78. Financial Management and Audits. The implementing entity maintained effective financial

management arrangements throughout the life of the project in compliance with the Bank’s policies and

procedures. A consultant financial management specialist supported the project for the entire duration.

The overall financial management performance was rated Moderately Satisfactory for most of the

implementation period, except for the period between July 2016 and January 2017 when it was rated

moderately unsatisfactory due to disruptions occasioned by the July 2016 conflict. To mitigate the

heightened fiduciary risk following the conflict, implementation of key project components under the

2016 PP was contracted out to FAO, which had adequate capacity. The project submitted all the interim

financial reports to the Bank within the timelines stipulated in the legal agreement. It also submitted all

the audit reports to the Bank on time except the audit report for the financial year ended June 30, 2017

which was delayed. All the audit reports expressed unqualified opinions with no major financial

management issues except the audit report for the financial year ended June 30, 2018 when the auditor

expressed a disclaimer of opinion based on inability to obtain documentary evidence relating to

expenditure of USD 2.5 million incurred through FAO. Withdrawal applications were submitted to the

Bank on a regular basis with no major delays in funds flow.

79. Procurement risk rating remained high throughout project implementation. Challenges included

the institutional weakness to independently implement project procurement activities and the general

geographical and political factors during implementation period. The 2008 PP was prepared when the

establishment of government systems were at initial stages with challenges related to overall oversight

and accountability of procurement decisions. The Ministry of Finance and Planning issued in 2006 the

Interim Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations (IPPDR) that were not generally adhered to by

institutions. Regulations have no legal framework and to date no Procurement Act has been passed by

the government. The other factor is the long lead time in procurement process due to both the

infrastructural and capacity challenges in the country. At a rate of not less than six months to hire a firm,

project procurement did at times negatively affected the project’s ability to adhere to the cropping

calendar. Conflict in some project areas especially during the period 2014‐2017 affected the procurement

and contract management. Project supervision was limited to Juba town as corporate security restricted

movement of Bank staff beyond Juba town. Procurement and contract management was supported by

experienced procurement consultants. Post Procurement Reviews conducted showed moderately


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satisfactory ratings and though with some challenges, procurement objective(s) were largely met with no

mis‐procurement activities recorded. Procurement performance is rated as moderately satisfactory.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

80. Quality at entry was satisfactory. The design of EFCRP was particularly strong in that it addressed

both the supply side and demand side constraints affecting food security. When it was being designed,

several other programs—financed through the MDTF‐SS were under implementation, many working on

complementary issues of food production and safety nets. This included the SAFDP, which had been under

implementation for a couple of years, was trying to address issues of capacity at the center and local

levels, which would have benefitted EFCRP operations.

81. Implementation arrangements were complex at first, following SAFDP, which mainstreamed

project activities into the operations of MAF Technical Directorates. The Southern Sudan Technical

Steering Committee (SSTSC) was an inter‐ministerial committee chaired by the Minister of Agriculture and

Forestry was responsible for implementation of the project. The Southern Sudan Technical Committee

(SSTC) was a technical secretariat at the Undersecretary level within the SSPSC and was responsible for

overall coordination and oversight of the project. A Director General, who was a member of the SSTC, was

appointed to provide a link between the national level and the NGO implementers at the decentralized

level and was to be supported by a short‐term project management and administrative specialist and a

road engineer as the core personnel for the PIU for the project. The PIU for EFCRP was embedded within

the Project Coordination Unit of MAF so it could be fully supported by their expertise in the said unit.

82. EFCRP supplemented the capacity of the government with well‐established international NGOs

with extensive experience working with the local communities on agriculture and safety nets. This was a

good decision that impacted the ability of the project to start activities despite delays in establishing the

contracts for the NGOs, and it paid off in term of safeguards management and implementation in conflict

areas when the security situation worsened. The project also brought in technical assistance in the PIU to

complement the government staff working on the project.

83. EFCRP reflected the lessons that had already been learned through SAFDP. It had a comparatively

simple results framework with a few indicators that were directly related to the project activities instead

of broad sector monitoring indicators. The team held workshops on M&E with the implementing agency

and the NGOs to overcome difficulties experienced in developing the M&E system under SAFDP. Based

on the quality of EFCRP’s data, more was needed to get a workable system established, such as capacity

building on database creation and management, data verification, using project data for decision support,

etc.

84. The World Bank team planned for rigorous supervision of the project, but the selection of far flung

implementation sites should have been avoided given the poor transport infrastructure in the country.

Most of the team was based in the Juba Office and provided direct support and supervision as frequently

as required. In keeping with the practice of other emergency projects, a minimum of four intensive

support missions per year were planned in addition to bimonthly review meetings with the implementing


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agencies. A project review was planned for the end of the first year of implementation to focus on: (a) the

fiduciary issues; (b) the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms; and (c) achievements of results.

Implementing agencies were required to produce technical audit reports every six months and the

government was tasked with making regular spot visits to project sites.

Quality of Supervision

85. The quality of supervision is conservatively rated moderately satisfactory, especially given the FCV

context. The World Bank team is to be commended for adhering to a critical pillar of the World Bank’s

approach in countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence, which is to stay engaged. The team

worked with MAFS to apply for additional funds to keep the EFCRP operation going, preparing additional

financing proposals while the staff were evacuated due to insecurity. Ultimately, the experience of EFCRP

into the design of the Safety Nets and Skills Development Project and the Emergency Food and Nutrition

Security Project. For the latter, it is highly likely that the relationship established between the World Bank

and the GOSS through EFCRP facilitated the rapid preparation of that project.

86. During Phase 1 and the early parts of Phase 2, the World Bank team was in the Juba office and

worked closely with MAFS and the NGOs to monitoring implementation progress. It also hired an

additional consultant to provide close implementation support to MAFS. The team held workshops with

MAFS and the NGOs to agree on monitoring indicators and measurement—although more capacity

building was required to get the M&E system functioning—and it provided training on safeguards

implementation. The World Bank team undertook regular field visits and joined project coordination

meetings with MAFS. Given the lack of capacity on the part of such a new government and the lack of

experience on the part of the NGOs and the Government in working together, it sometimes fell to the

World Bank team to drive implementation, which they did, by and large.

87. Once civil war erupted in December 2013, supervision became almost impossible (table 5). The

Bank offices were twice evacuated to Nairobi: (a) 20 December 2013–30 April 2014; and (b) July 2016‐

April 2017, but the Bank team still arranged for the 2014 PP during the first and the follow‐on EFNSP

during the second.

88. Insecurity ultimately precluded field visits in some areas—especially by the World Bank team—

and it impeded project implementation in several areas. Given the rapidly changing circumstances in the

country (both from a security and food insecurity perspective), the World Bank team and MAFS adopted

a flexible approach to implementation, where the combinations of activities (agricultural production,

public works, and direct food support) implemented in a project area were dictated by local circumstances

and relied on the judgement of the implementing agency.


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Table 5 EFCRP implementation calendar with security issues

89. Nevertheless, despite persevering under extremely challenging conditions, there were oversights

and missed opportunities that might have been avoided. For example, providing capacity building to

government staff at the national level could have built more long‐term impact than hiring in technical

assistance. Even training workshops during supervision, VCs with Bank experts for additional training and

guidance, and mentoring of staff by Bank team members could have be workable. The reporting and

record keeping on the part of the Bank team was less than optimal. The team’s candor about the

implementation issues, including scale of the conflict was weak throughout implementation. There were

14 ISRs for a 9.3‐year project (less than the twice per year guideline), and they sometimes lacked detail

on the nature of the issues being incurred. Finally, the Bank’s handling of two of the additional financings

in 2014 and 2016 created errors that dragged down the ratings of efficacy and relevance. In the 2014 PP,

it’s not clear that the PDO needed to be changed to add unconditional cash transfers to the project,

although this may have been required under the circumstances. The indicator to track that activity did not

need to be at the PDO level, since there was already a beneficiary indicator, and the other safety net

activities were tracked at the intermediate outcome level. An intermediate outcome indicator could have

been correctly quickly and painlessly revised once the confusion between the Bank’s targets and the

MAFS‐WFP contract was identified, preventing the shortfall on the target. In the 2016 PP, the failure to

revise the PDO to fit the changed nature of the grant led to a break in the relevance of the design in the

project, even though the activities by themselves were relevant to the context.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

90. Based on the above, while consideration was given to rating overall performance as satisfactory,

the conservative rating of moderately satisfactory was chosen for the reasons cited above. Project

preparation reflected lessons from ongoing project, but the lack of contextual information on the ground

and lack of capacity for World Bank project management in the implementation agency led to weaknesses

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D

2008 PP

2011 PP

2012 PP

2013 PP

2014 PP

2016 PP

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D

2008 PP

2011 PP

2012 PP

2013 PP

2014 PP

2016 PP

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D

2008 PP Active implementation

2011 PP

2012 PP Bank evacuated from Juba

2013 PP

2014 PP Implementation under security restrictions

2016 PP

2016 2017

2014 2015

2008 2009 2010 2011

2012 2013


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in baselines and monitoring systems that were not overcome. During implementation, the growing

insecurity ultimately made field level close supervision impossible. The chaos resulting from the unfolding

situation in South Sudan during this time, certainly explain the shortcomings; however, the World Bank’s

failure to catch these issues during preparation and supervision reviews and to bring in the extra resources

to adequately address them led to important data and lessons being lost.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

91. The risk to development outcome is high. The continued conflict and macroeconomic collapse in

the country have resulted in one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Table 6 provides an

overview of how key humanitarian indicators have degraded over time. The scale of the conflict and

economic collapse where beyond the ability of the project to overcome.

Table 6 Humanitarian situation in South Sudan at various points of time

Dec‐12 Apr‐14 Jun‐16 Jun‐17 Jul‐18

IDPs 183,000 817,700 1,600,000 1,940,000 1,840,000

POCs N/A N/A 170,000 216,956 198,444

Severely food insecure 2,400,000 3,200,000 6,100,000 7,500,000 7,100,000

Refugees N/A 287,600 727,610 1,940,000 2,480,000

92. Given the insecurity in the country and the ensuing internal displacements, the sustainability of

project investments cannot be confirmed, and it is likely that much of the progress registered by the

project has been lost due to displacement and damage or destruction of infrastructure in the conflict

affected areas. For example, Mercy Corps implemented in Maban County in the payams of Korakimar,

Bunj and Banachuwa between November 2012 to May 2013. By 2014, sources reported escalating conflict

in Upper Nile, including in Maban County (Bunj payam) and in Panyikang County. It is unknown how many

beneficiaries were displaced and how much of the cropping and public works activities survived.13 The

July 2018 workshop with MAFS and implementing NGOs confirmed that some infrastructure in Yambio

has survived the conflict, but that many of the farmers had fled the area. Nagero and Morobo counties

remained inaccessible. The investments in Phase 3 were still operating in June 2018, six months after

project close. Follow up surveys or monitoring have been next to impossible for MAFS and especially for

Bank staff.

93. Donor activities in South Sudan now focus almost exclusively on humanitarian aid, including the

World Bank’s EFNSP, which has supported general food distribution through World Food Programme;

nutrition, health, WASH, and psycho‐social support services through UNICEF; and continued support to

production for food security through FAO. Despite the loss to conflict, EFCRP did influence the design of

two follow‐on projects—SNSDP and EFNSP. It also created lessons that will inform the design of future

recovery and resilience projects in terms of the type of inputs, technology, and other support that should

be provided.

13 Radio Tamazuj. 2014. “MAP: Who controls Upper Nile state?” https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/map‐who‐controls‐upper‐nile‐state


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V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

94. The following lessons learned and recommendations from the project are intended to inform

future World Bank finances operations being implemented in the FCV context.

What worked well

Working with NGOs. In a context of fragility and conflict, strong, reputable NGOs that are familiar

with the project area and cultural issues can help overcome lack of information on the part of the

World Bank and the implementing agency. This is especially true in areas that were isolated for a

long time due to war. Difficult human relations that arose due to the war are better understood and

addressed by people who have worked and/or have thorough knowledge about the local setting.

This can accelerate progress at the beginning of the project as they can hit the ground running. This

approach also has trade‐offs. The World Bank and implementing agency must ensure a shared

understanding of project goals, methodologies, and monitoring priorities up front to avoid confusion.

Working with Local Authorities. Working with local authorities—including sector officers, local

administrative officers, and traditional leaders—is critical to managing risk and delivering results on

the ground. EFCRP benefitted from County level coordinating meetings with officials that helped

minimize overlap among donor programs. In addition, local authorities played a key role in resolving

localized conflicts between groups when they occurred.

Youth in Agriculture. Youth do exhibit interest in agriculture, and they are especially attracted to

machinery for land preparation and crop processing, in addition to road rehabilitation and storage

construction. These types of activities can attract more youth in future project and create sustainable

enterprise opportunities for them.

Pushing technical boundaries. NGO partners, working with government scientists to identify best

varieties for different locations were able to introduce good quality seeds with traits beneficial to the

South Sudan context, such as: Red Beauty groundnut, which is tolerant to rosette and leaf spots;

NERICA rice, which is more resistant to environmental stresses and contains more protein than

traditional varieties; TME 14 variety of cassava for high yields and disease and pest resistance; Longe

5 maize, for drought‐tolerance and protein content. In addition, seed multiplication in areas of relative

security was possible and beneficial to continued production.

Mechanization is possible and essential. Even with small grant sizes and a short implementation

period, EFCRP was able to introduce animal traction, push tillers, some tractors, and machinery for

post‐harvest processing. Land preparation mechanization is critical to bringing sufficient amounts of

fallow land under cultivation, so a community can start to tackle food security, and the post‐harvest

machinery is important to extending storage life of crops.

Adaptive changes during implementation

Technical assistance vs. capacity building. There is a trade‐off, particularly when working in FCV

countries, between achieving project goals in a timely manner through technical assistance and

building lasting skills on the ground through capacity building. While technical assistance is needed

up front in low capacity contexts, a strong program of mentoring and capacity building is needed for


Page 36 of 60

longer‐term change. Close supervision is also needed to more effectively track progress,

communicate and establish teamwork among PIU and donors.

Maintaining momentum. It is important to counter the impacts of high staff turnover, including by

staying in active communication with changing country context and PIU staff, and by working to

foster capacity of and ownership by incoming stakeholders through dialogue and periodic training

sessions.

Proactivity and Flexibility in Project Design and Implementation. Projects in FCV face fluid

situations—in terms of natural disasters and conflict—requiring adaptive risk management at all

levels—e.g., Bank team, CMU and Senior Management. Projects should be flexible enough to

continue operating as circumstances on the ground change. For example, in Northern Bahr el Ghazal,

when plans for donkey‐powered traction clearly did not work due to tse‐tse fly infestation, the

government and the NGO partner quickly identified alternative activities that would benefit farmers.

When the insecurity made it next to impossible to go to the field, the World Bank and MAFS agreed

with the NGO partners on the priorities and to decentralize decision‐making on what interventions

would work in each setting. This allowed the project to keep moving forward on at least one

component until security improved.

Recommendations for Future Projects in FCV

Learning from experience. This project could serve as an example that despite challenging country

context, results can be achieved, especially in dire situations such as a food crisis. There is also merit

in assessing the counterfactual risk of not engaging in countries needing basic services. For these

circumstances, a feasible and measurable M&E framework is needed and should be given credence

when assessing final outcomes.

Value of better targeting that trades off need and accessibility. Having analysis that would effectively

measure the accessibility dimension would provide evidence to better support the technical design of

projects in the future. The demands of this project were especially clear given the grants responded

quickly to the food crisis, however may have missed the potential of conjoining the accessibility

dimension for greater impact.

Pre‐planning and clear fund flows help maintain implementation momentum. A project operating

in and FCV context should map out as much as possible, its initial procurements and locations for

prepositioning so that supplies—seeds, construction materials, equipment—can be purchased,

imported, and pre‐positioned close to the implementation sites. This will help the project keep

moving if weather or conflict block transport. It can also ensure that the seeds and tools for cultivation

are in place before cropping needs to begin and not delay implementation for a season.

Longer implementation timelines are needed to achieve impact. All of the NGOs reported that having

small grants over a short period prevents planning for a longer engagement and trust with the

communities, which need more intensive engagement to move from humanitarian to resilience

building. The NGOs could not plan out on a sufficient time horizon the engagement they think was

needed. The many restructurings to add financing to the project also created an administrative


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burden for the project team (dual track approval and reporting), which was as different times during

implementation

Third‐party monitoring. Having one or more independent agencies monitoring project processes as

well as implementation progress is important in fragile contexts. These monitors can not only verify

results, but also identify areas where confusion over approaches or measurement techniques are

evident so that additional capacity building or other adjustments can be made quickly. They can also

facilitate knowledge sharing across project areas.

Use technology to enhance M&E. Where interventions are highly dispersed and difficult to access,

technology such as those offered by GOST, can boost the value of data collected. First, it provides

time and GPS tagged data that can be used to ensure project staff are working where they claim to

be working. Second, data can be uploaded directly to the PIU and the Bank at any time, allowing for

closer tracking of project progress. Third, it makes M&E interesting—something even youth in the

project areas might enthusiastically embrace. Fourth, it can facilitate satellite monitoring of project

areas. Finally, photos of the implementation locations can be attached to records to increase

understanding of the situation of the ground and to provide before and after comparisons of project

interventions. .


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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: Increased access to food for consumption by food insecure households

Indicator Name Unit of Measure

Baseline Original Target Formally Revised

Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Number of vulnerable persons benefiting from unconditional food or cash transfers

Number 0.00 138000.00 138000.00 58680.00

03‐Feb‐2014 03‐Feb‐2014 03‐Feb‐2014 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Added in the 2014 PP to capture beneficiaries of direct food distribution from WFP (43% of target achieved). Due to apparent miscommunication between the World Bank team and MAFS, the 2014 PP gave the 138,000 target, but the contract between MAFS and WFP was for the amount achieved. The May/June 2016 ISR noted that “the number of vulnerable households benefiting from unconditional food support (food aid) stands at 58,680 and these accrue primarily from the contract that was issued by the Government to the World Food Program.” The project was not restructured at the time to align the targets.



Target


Direct project beneficiaries Number 213462.00 215500.00 384500.00 339433.00

20‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2011 11‐Apr‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Female beneficiaries Percentage 42.00 45.00 50.00 47.00


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20‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2011 11‐Apr‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target (88% achieved). Indicator introduced in 2011 PP as a mandatory core indicator. It replaced "targeted population receiving cash transfers" as a PDO indicator, and participants in public works was tracked for the rest of the project through an intermediate outcome indicator. This indicator will capture beneficiaries under components one and two only (component two beneficiaries disaggregated as an intermediate indicator).

Objective/Outcome: Increased production and availability of food in targeted areas



Target


Number of farmers adopting improved technologies for food production.

Number 0.00 189000.00 229800.00 272620.00

23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 16‐May‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (102% achieved). The indicator was introduced in 2011 and replaced the indicators "Farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (number and percent). It is proxy for reporting on number of farmers targeted for own food production. Original target from 2008 PP was targeted farmers adopting improved technologies for food production in the targeted areas. This was replaced with 2 GFRP indicators in 2009: Farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (number and percent). This current indicator was the final version used from the 2011 PP onwards. The target was revised upward with each additional finance until 2016.



Target


Metric tons of storage capacity built

Metric ton 1636.00 2600.00 8700.00 11092.00

01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2011 03‐Feb‐2014 31‐Dec‐2017


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Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (427% achieved). New PDO indicator in 2011 will report on investments made in response to the demanded post‐harvest storage capacity identified at household and community level. It is a proxy to capture strategies taken by the project to promote increase practices that would reduce household vulnerability to seasonal availability of food for consumption.

Objective/Outcome: Increased production and consumption of highly nutritious foods by selected farmers and vulnerable households



Target


Number of households reporting an increase in the number of foods produced due to the project

Number 0.00 1800.00 4600.00

11‐Apr‐2016 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (250% achieved). This indicator was added under the final grant (PHRD) accessed by the project. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.



Target


Numbe rof households that report an increased household dietary diversity

Number 0.00 1900.00 6000.00

11‐Apr‐2016 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (316% achieved). This indicator was added under the final grant (PHRD) accessed by the project. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.


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A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Component 1 Support to Agricultural Productivity



Target


Number of farmers adopting new practices and initiatives for postharvest handling and management.

Number 0.00 83000.00 100700.00 125211.00

23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (151% achieved) New indicator in 2011. Introduced to report innovations promoted by the project to improve household consumption through better food management and handling. It will report effects of investments in training, construction of food stores or granaries, processing and other post‐harvest management. It is a subset of the indicator above.



Target


Number of hectares of idle land brought back into production

Hectare(Ha) 0.00 4000.00 38800.00 104741.00

23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (262% achieved) New indicator in 2011. Introduced to track increased production through expansion of beneficiaries planted area through clearing of idle land.



Target


Percent of targeted food Text 12% 65% 0 74%


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insecure households in project areas with food reserves

23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Dec‐2011

Comments (achievements against targets): Original indicator from 2008 PP was "Numbers of food insecure households in the project area with food reserves" with a target of 1000. This was revised to the current target in 2011 and dropped in 2012 due to difficulty in terms of time and cost in obtaining accurate and reliable data on the indicator, potential problems with attribution of impact to project interventions, and lack of a reliable baseline.



Target


Number of househjolds using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities

Number 0.00 0.00 1550.00 2500.00

23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (161% achieved) Added in 2016 as part of AF #5 (2.7M PHRD), this is a new indicator associated with the projects new components. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.

Component: Component 2: Strengthening Community Safety Nets



Target


Number of participants in public works program

Text 0 25462.00 37300.00 47595.00

01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Percent of which are youth Text N/A 50% 70% 62%

23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017


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Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (187% achieved) Added in 2011 as requested by the GFRP Secretariat, to report the number of individuals that participated and possibly benefited from cash and/or food from public works. It was simplified to record participation rather than benefits as the latter would require survey, and the original target was set based on elaborate criteria targeting households. Based on the nature of activities selected and the required time for completion, self targeting predominated the selection in 50% of the areas selected.

Component: Component 3: Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes



Target


Number of housholds adopting healthy eating practices and using essential nutrition practices

Number 0.00 0.00 1650.00 2781.00

23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (169% achieved) Added in 2016 as part of AF #5 (2.7M PHRD), this is a new indicator associated with the projects new components. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.



Target


Number of agriculture professionals reporting an increased understaning of their role in improving nutrition and integrated nutrition activities in their work

Number 0.00 0.00 120.00 40.00

23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017


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Comments (achievements against targets): Added in 2016 as part of AF #5 (2.7M PHRD), this is a new indicator associated with the projects new components. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.



Target


Number of jopint activities and meetings invloving nutrition and agricutlure/food security coordination mechanisms

Number 0.00 0.00 5.00 8.00

23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (160% achieved) Added in 2016 as part of AF #5 (2.7M PHRD), this is a new indicator associated with the projects new components. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.

Component: Component 4: Support to Project Implementation



Target


Planned implementation progress based on annual work plans is achieved and timely actions taken on implementation problems including fiduciary issues.

Yes/No N Y Y Y

23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2017

Comments (achievements against targets):


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Target


Feebacks and follow‐up recorded on fiduciary issues (number)

Text 4 0 0 0

23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008

Comments (achievements against targets): Dropped in 2012 in favor of Planned implementation progress based on annual work plans is achieved and timely actions taken on implementation problems including fiduciary issues. However, the ISR template was not updated until the following year.


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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Increased access to food for consumption by food insecure households

Outcome Indicators 1. Number of vulnerable persons benefiting from unconditional food or cash transfers

2. Direct project beneficiaries

Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Number of participants in public works program

Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)

1. 58,680 people benefitted from unconditional food distribution through WFP (43% of stated target)

2. 339,433 direct project beneficiaries, of which 47% were women (88% of target)

3. 47,595 people participated in public works programs (128% of target) of which 62% were youth (89%

of target)

Increased production and availability of food in targeted areas

Outcome Indicators 1. Number of farmers adopting improved technologies for food production

2. Metric tons of storage capacity built

Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Number of farmers adopting new practices and initiatives for postharvest handling and management

2. Number of hectares of idle land brought back into production


1. 272,620 farmers adopted improved technologies for food production (102% of target)

2. 11,092 metric tons of storage capacity built (127% of target)


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3. 125,211 farmers adopting new practices for post‐harvest management (124% of target)

4. 104,741 hectares of idle land brought under cultivation (270% of target)

Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes14

Outcome Indicators 1. Number of households reporting an increase in the number of foods produced due to the project

2. Number of households that report an increased household dietary diversity

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Number of households adopting healthy eating practices and using essential nutrition practices

2. Number of households using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities

3. Number of agriculture professionals reporting an increased understanding of their role in improving

nutrition and integrated nutrition activities in their work

4. Number of joint activities and meetings involving nutrition and agriculture/food security coordination

mechanisms


1. 4,500 report increased number of foods produced (250% of target)

2. 6,000 households reporting increased dietary diversity (316% of target)

3. 2781 households report adopting healthy eating practices (169% of target)

4. 2,500 households using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities (161% of target)

5. 40 agriculture professionals reporting increased understanding of their role in improving nutrition

(33% of target)

14 This was not part of the PDO, but was the objective of the phase 3 grant. See Sections IIA and IIB for explanation.


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6. 8 joint activities and meetings involving nutrition and agriculture/food security coordination

mechanisms (160% of target)


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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name Role

Preparation

Supervision/ICR

Melissa Williams Task Team Leader(s)

Ocheng Kenneth Kaunda Odek, Pascal Tegwa Procurement Specialist(s)

Stephen Diero Amayo Financial Management Specialist

Christine E. Cornelius Team Member

Jeeva A. Perumalpillai‐Essex Team Member

Tracy Hart Environmental Safeguards Specialist

Juvenal Nzambimana Team Member

Varalakshmi Vemuru Social Safeguards Specialist

Evarist F. Baimu Counsel

Srilatha Shankar Team Member

Abel Lufafa Team Member

Museme Munira Issa Team Member

Eric Brintet Team Member

John Barakia Team Member

Grace Tabu Felix Team Member

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation


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FY09 5.573 33,822.36

FY10 0 0.00

Total 5.57 33,822.36 Supervision/ICR

FY09 8.358 32,206.60

FY10 23.351 111,520.88

FY11 39.461 117,881.87

FY12 19.661 47,720.84

FY13 16.470 123,350.67

FY14 0 1,737.27

FY15 1.800 7,914.26

FY16 0 273.77

FY18 6.088 39,112.82

FY19 3.878 23,034.92

Total 119.07 504,753.90


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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Component

Original Project

2008 (US$, millions)

Additional Finance (US$ million)

Total 1

2011 2

2012 3

2013 4

2014 5

2016

Support to Agricultural Productivity 3.00 1.30 1.40 2.73 3.00 ‐ 11.43

Strengthening Community Safety Nets 1.50 0.70 1.50 4.00 5.50 ‐ 13.2

Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes

‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 2.30

2.3

Support to Project Implementation 0.50 0.20 0.10 0.80 0.50 0.40 2.5

Total 5.00 2.20 3.00 7.53 9.00 2.70 29.43


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ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

95. Because of the urgency of the crisis response during preparation and the general lack of basic data

in South Sudan, no financial or economic analysis was carried out for the project in 2008, 2011, 2012, or

2013 (original project and the first three additional financings). The 2013 PP committed to collecting data

for ex‐post computation of financial and economic returns on farm income towards the end of project

implementation. Within two months of approving the 2013 PP, however, the civil war broke out in South

Sudan forcing the Bank to evacuate Juba in late December 2013 until April 2014. The 2014 PP was

prepared while the Bank office was evacuated, so the World Bank team used available data (including

targets set in the 2014 PP) to provide some preliminary financial and economic analysis while highlighting

the uncertainties associated with the following estimates:

Cash wages paid to 37,300 participants in public works projects in the project area were valued

at US$1.6 million or US$42 per person per year constituting 11 percent of the South Sudan poverty

line per person per year.

In EFCRP, ultimately 47,595 people participated in the public works program; however, payment in some areas followed a daily wage rate while other used a task‐based rate, which incentivized rapid completion of works. According to analysis in the 2011 PP using 2009 data, the payments were equivalent to daily rates ranging from SDG 13‐15 SSP per day in Yambio and Morobo to SDG 20‐25 per day in Raja.

Direct food support to 138,000 people for 2 months was valued at US$7.6 million at a rate of

US$27.5 per person per month equivalent to 86 percent of the poverty line.

As pointed out in section IIB, due to miscommunication between the World Bank team and the PIU, the assumption of 138,000 beneficiaries served for two months was inaccurate. The PIU contracted with WFP to provide GFD for 58,680 beneficiaries over a period of four months. GFD represented 17 percent of the project cost, so the analysis below looks at the financial returns for the support to agriculture production, which was 39 percent of the project.

The economic benefit cost ratio of increased community grain storage was estimated at 1.3 with

an economic NPV of US$1 million and an ERR of 20 percent.

The data and assumptions used to arrive at these figures were not available to the ICRR team, so a follow up analysis was not done.

96. While the NGOs were able to restart with implementation after March 2014 and the Bank

returned to Juba one month later, insecurity throughout the country preventing the collection of solid

data for analysis. This ICRR provides some financial analysis of the support to agriculture production

(component 1) using a representative crop model for sorghum and maize that was developed for the

preparation of the 2014 PP. It also draws on project documents and evaluations of similar projects inside

and outside of the Bank to get a sense of the returns to investments to public works programs (component

2) like those under EFCRP.

97. EFNSP used a representative crop model for sorghum and maize that was developed for the

preparation of 2014 PP to estimate financial gross margins in the project area. For EFCRP, average prices


Page 53 of 60

for maize and sorghum in December 2015, six months before the end of the project were used to

determine the gross margin. Sorghum prices ranged from SSP 12/kg in Rumbek to SSP 15/kg in Wau. Maize

prices ranged from SSP 10.3/kg in Wau and to SSP 11.7 in Rumbek. Drawing on the EFNSP analysis, the

analysis assumes an average of 1 ha/beneficiary. Based on these numbers, the average gross margin six

months before project close was US$257 for sorghum and US$150 for maize.

Table 7 Financial analysis of sorghum and maize production under EFCRP

Unit Sorghum Maize

Yield kg/ha 900 800

Crop price US$/kg 0.73 0.5

Operating costs by Project US$/ha 200 125

Operating costs by farmer US$/ha 200 125

Gross Margin US$/ha 257 150

98. There are a few caveats to the analysis. The final reported number of farmers adopting improved

technologies for production under EFCRP is 272,620, and while sorghum and maize are the major crops in

South Sudan and a priority for food security production, those two crops do not represent 100 percent of

the cropped area. Seeds and cuttings were provided for groundnut, cassava, pulses, vegetables, and sim

sim, but the project did not track the number of hectares dedicated to each crop across seasons. It should

also be noted that prices were volatile throughout the project, so financial returns were similarly volatile.

Financial analysis of production for maize and groundnut done by one of the implementing NGOs during

Phase 1 of the project (around 2010) showed a higher cost of production, particularly for maize in Yambio

county. However, this data had not been validated, and some details were missing, so the analysis could

not be included.

99. There was insufficient data to analyze the returns to mechanization—both for land preparation

and post‐harvest processing, but this was a relatively small element of the project assets introduced.

100. The analysis of the cash for work program looked to analysis from similar projects for indications

of the potential returns. For this, the World Bank’s SNSDP project, which drew on EFCRP for its technical

design, did provide an analysis that showed it would cost US$2.07 to transfer US$1.00 in wage benefits to

the intended recipients, which compared well to similar programs. The EFNSP cash for works component

ultimately reached 47,595 people with an investment of $8.2 million—about $172 invested per

beneficiary. This is averaged over the life of the project, and it includes the cost of materials. Detailed data

on the number of people reached each year in each county was not systematically collected, but AAH

provided full financial data in their 2014‐15 completion report. In Yambio, Nagero, and Tali counties, the

public works component provided an average of 56 days employment at about $7/day for average annual

wage of $414. This was manual repair of several kilometers of road and installation of culverts for each

community.

Component 1

Agriculture

Component 2

Safety Nets

Component 3

Management

Number of people

employed Mandays

Average days/ person

Total Wage Bill

Average daily wage

Yambio 37.2% 24.9% 37.9% 276 14,691 53.23 112,059.07 7.63


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Component 1

Agriculture

Component 2

Safety Nets

Component 3

Management

Number of people

employed Mandays

Average days/ person

Total Wage Bill

Average daily wage

Tali 40.6% 17.2% 42.2% 225 13,667 60.74 99,638.96 7.29

Nagero 42.6% 25.2% 32.2% 568 31,150 54.84 224,081.00 7.19

101. Noting the prevalence of bartering in South Sudan, the project noted that introducing cash wages

would increase purchasing power and stimulate demand in local markets. That EFCRP also supported the

supply response in local market offset the risk of inflation that could happen in the absence of functioning

markets. The public works supported by EFCRP had multiplier effects as well. For example, the focus on

farm to market road rehabilitation would have contributed to lowering the cost for transport to market

by farmers, which would have increased access to relatively affordable food in local markets. The

monitoring system for the project did not systematically record the kilometers of road that were

rehabilitated, and no baseline data on the cost of transport to market was collected. A review of a World

Food Programme feeder road project (an activity supported by EFCRP as well) did not perform an

economic or financial analysis.


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ANNEX 5. OVERVIEW OF CHANGES TO THE RESULTS INDICATORS

Line Item Type Indicator Introduced

Dropped or

Replaced Comments

1 PDO % of targeted farmers adopting improved technologies for food production in the targeted areas

Sep‐08 Dec‐09 Replaced by GFRP indicators (#2 and #3)

2 PDO Farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (number of farmers)

Dec‐09 Jun‐11 Replaced by simplified #4 in June 2011

3 PDO Farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (% of farmers targeted)3

Dec‐09 Jun‐11 Replaced by #4

4 PDO Number of farmers adopting improved technologies for production

Jun‐11 N/A

5 PDO % of target population receiving cash transfers

Sep‐08 Dec‐09 Replaced by #6

6 PDO Targeted population receiving cash transfers (number)3


7 PDO Number of vulnerable persons benefiting from unconditional food or cash transfers

Feb‐14 N/A Added in 2014 to capture beneficiaries of direct food distribution from WFP

8 PDO Metric tons of storage capacity built Jun‐11 N/A

9 PDO # of project beneficiaries (% of which are female)

Jun‐11 N/A Captured all beneficiaries under components one and two.

10 PDO Number of households reporting an increase in the number of foods produced

Jun‐16 N/A Exclusive to the PHRD grant

11 PDO Number of households that report an increased household dietary diversity


12 IOI Food insecure households in the project area with food reserves

Sep‐08 Jun‐11 Replaced by #17

13 IOI Number of food insecure households in the project area that participate in public works

Sep‐08 Jun‐11 Reformulated in 2011 and merged with number of participants of public works program

14 IOI Beneficiaries of public work programs (number of individuals)


15 IOI Person‐days provided in labor intensive public works (number)

Dec‐09 Jun‐11 Difficulties in measurement as some areas of South Sudan paid by task rather than by day.

16 IOI Feedbacks and follow‐up recorded on fiduciary issues (number)

Sep‐08 Jun‐12 Replaced by #21


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Line Item Type Indicator Introduced

Dropped or

Replaced Comments

17 IOI Percent of targeted food insecure households in project areas with food reserves

Jun‐11 Jun‐12 Dropped due to difficulty in gathering data

18 IOI Number of participants in public works program (% of which are youth)

Jun‐11 N/A

19 IOI Number of farmers adopting new practices and initiatives for postharvest handling and management.

Jun‐11 N/A Introduced to track additional focus on post‐harvest management.

20 IOI Number of hectares of idle land brought back into production

Jun‐11 N/A

21 IOI Planned implementation progress based on annual work plans is achieved and timely actions taken on implementation problems including fiduciary issues.

Jun‐12 N/A

22 IOI Number of households adopting healthy eating practices and using essential nutrition practices


23 IOI Number of households using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities


24 IOI Number of agriculture professionals reporting an increased understanding of their role in improving nutrition and integrated nutrition activities in their work


25 IOI Number of joint activities and meetings involving nutrition and agriculture/food security coordination mechanisms



Page 57 of 60

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)

World Bank. 2008. Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project (ISDS). Washington, DC: World Bank. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=9817324

World Bank. 2011. Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 05 . Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=14004193

World Bank. 2012. Main report Vol. 1 of South Sudan ‐ Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : environmental assessment. South Sudan ; s.n.. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=17736742

Lufafa, Abel. 2012. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 06 . Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=16898647

Lufafa, Abel. 2013. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 07 . Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=17721318

World Bank. 2013. Environmental and social management framework Vol. 3 of South Sudan ‐ Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : environmental assessment. South Sudan ; s.n.. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=17747304

World Bank. 2013. Environmental and social assessment report Vol. 2 of South Sudan ‐ Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : environmental assessment. South Sudan ; s.n.. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=17747175

Lufafa, Abel. 2013. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 08 . Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=18622981

Lufafa, Abel. 2014. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 09 . Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=19892291

World Bank. 2011. Sudan ‐ Additional Financing for the Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project . Washington, DC: World Bank. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=14450486

0000A8056. 2015. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 10 . Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=23141880

World Bank. 2013. South Sudan ‐ Additional Financing for the Emergency Food Crisis Response Project. Washington DC: World Bank. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=18367768

Lufafa,Abel. 2016. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 11 . Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group.


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https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=26047282

Lufafa, Abel. 2016. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project: P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 12 . Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=26550495

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World Bank. 2014. Official Documents‐ Recommendation of Statutory Committee for Grant H922‐SS, TF015934 and TF015935 (Closing Package) . Washington, DC: World Bank. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=19427303

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ANNEX 7. MAP OF PROJECT COUNTIES The project implemented in select payams within each operational county.

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