EN BANCANTONIO LEJANO,G.R. No. 176389Petitioner,Present:CORONA,C.J.,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,- versus -BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DELCASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ,MENDOZA, andSERENO,JJ.PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,Respondent.x --------------------------------------------- xPEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 176864Appellee,- versus -HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAELA. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIOFERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,PETER ESTRADA and GERARDOPromulgated:BIONG,Appellants.January 18, 2011x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xRESOLUTIONABAD,J.:On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses.[1]But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy.The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:Section 21.No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.x x xTo reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved.There is reason for this provision of the Constitution.In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused.If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.As the Court said inPeople of thePhilippinesv. Sandiganbayan:[2][A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression.The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.[3]Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible.But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action ofcertiorariunder Rule 65.[4]Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions.For instance, he avers that the Court must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence.[5]But he has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed.His claim that the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision[6]is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal perception.Complainant Vizconde cites the decision inGalman v. Sandiganbayan[7]as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case.But the government proved inGalmanthat the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was dictated, coerced and scripted.[8]It was a sham trial.Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA.He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process.Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility.He ascribes grave error on the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation.This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb,et als conviction.The judgment acquitting Webb,et alis final and can no longer be disturbed.WHEREFORE, the CourtDENIESfor lack of merit complainant Lauro G. Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.For essentially the same reason, the CourtDENIESthe motions for leave to intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.SO ORDERED.ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:I vote to grant the M.R.RENATO C. CORONAChief JusticeNo part, prior inhibitionANTONIO T. CARPIOCONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeNo part due to relastionship to a partyNo part; filed pleading as Sol GenPRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeI vote to grant the motion for reconsiderationSame vote as J. VillaramaTERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROARTURO D. BRIONAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeDIOSDADO M. PERALTALUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeNo partI vote to grant the motion for reconsiderationMARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOMARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate JusticeAssociate JusticeJOSE PORTUGAL PEREZJOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeSee concurring OpinionMARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOAssociate JusticeCERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice

[1]Private Complainants Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8.[2]G.R. Nos. 168188-89, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 185.[3]Id.at 207.[4]Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 676, 683-684.[5]Supra note 1, at 7.[6]Id.at 12.[7]228 Phil. 42 (1986).[8]Id.at 89.

THIRDDIVISIONPROSECUTOR HILARIO RONSON H. TILAN,Complainant,-versus-JUDGE ESTER PISCOSO-FLOR, RTC, BRANCH 34, BANAUE, IFUGAO,Respondent.A.M. No. RTJ-09-2188(FormerlyA.M. OCA-IPI No. 08-2995-RTJ)Present:CARPIO MORALES,J., Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR.,andSERENO,JJ.Promulgated:January 10, 2011

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

BRION,J.:

We resolve in this Decision the Administrative Matter against Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Banaue, Ifugao.The AntecedentsThe case arose from the verified complaint, datedSeptember 1, 2008,[1]filed by Public Prosecutor Hilario Ronson H. Tilan, charging Judge Piscoso-Flor with gross inefficiency, gross negligence and dishonesty.The records show that the prosecutor was then handling Criminal Case No. 127,People of thePhilippinesv. Juanito Baguilat, for Falsification of Public Document,and Criminal Case No. 140,People of thePhilippinesv. Wihlis Talanay, for Violation of RA 7610, pending promulgation before Judge Piscoso-Flor.He was also handling Criminal Case No. 221,People of thePhilippinesv. Macario Tenefrancia, for Libel,pending arraignment in the same court.InPeople v. Baguilat, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an order datedOctober 20, 2007[2]directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order. The complainant alleged that the judge failed to render a decision within the ninety (90)-day reglementary period; instead, she issued an order, datedApril 8, 2008,[3]reiterating her earlier directive for the parties to submit their respective memoranda.InPeople v. Talanay, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an order datedSeptember 25, 2007[4]giving the accused fifteen (15) days to file his formal offer of evidence, and five (5) days for the prosecution to file its comment/objections.Allegedly, Judge Piscoso-Flor again failed to resolve the case within the 90-day reglementary period; instead, she issued another order datedMay 21, 2008[5]giving the parties fifteen (15) days within which to file their memoranda.Prosecutor Tilan claimed that in both cases, Judge Piscoso-Flor resorted to the issuance of an order requiring the submission of the parties memoranda to circumvent the statutory period for the resolution of cases.Prosecutor Tilan pointed out thatthe father ofthe victim(a minor)inPeople v. Talanaysought the assistance of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) regarding the slow process of resolving the case,[6]and the CHR even called his attention on the matter.[7]In People v. Tenefrancia, Prosecutor Tilan alleged that the accused filed a Petition for Suspension of Trial, prompting Judge Piscoso-Flor to call a hearing on the petition.Despite the parties submission of the matter for resolution, Judge Piscoso-Flor failed to resolve the petition within the required period.The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)[8]required Judge Piscoso-Flor to submit her comment, and she complied onNovember 7, 2008.[9]Sheofferedthe following explanation: in the courts monthly reportforJanuary 2008,[10]Criminal Case No. 127,People v. Baguilat, was submitted for decision on January 31, 2008, and was due for decision on May 1, 2008;thereasonfor this was the parties failure to submit their memoranda as required in her order dated October 20, 2007; on April 8, 2008, she issued another order reiterating her directive for the parties to file their memoranda because the case had been heard previously by her two predecessors.Judge Piscoso-Flor further explained that onApril 28, 2008, accused Baguilat moved for extension of time to submit his memorandum.[11]She herself requested for an extension of time to decide the case up toJuly 2, 2008.[12]She promulgated the decision onSeptember 29, 2008,[13]after several postponements due to the absence of Prosecutor Tilan, the counsel for the accused, and of the accused himself.In conclusion, she stated that Prosecutor Tilan filed the present complaint after she personally went to Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales to complain about the formers actuations towards her,[14]and after she cited him for direct contempt.[15]On November 19, 2008, Prosecutor Tilan filed a reply,[16]reiterating the allegations in his complaint, and adding that he filed a Motion for Inhibition of Judge Piscoso-Flor in Criminal Case No. 228,People of the Philippines v. Eddie Immongor and Senando Bannog, which was deemed submitted for resolution on July 18, 2008.In a rejoinder datedNovember 25, 2008,[17]Judge Piscoso-Flor explainedthat in Criminal Case No. 142,People of the Philippines v. Myleen Dimpatan,for Estafa, which Prosecutor Tilan mentioned in his reply, she received the accuseds memorandum onApril 20, 2007, and that of the prosecution onApril 17, 2007.She added that on July 24, 2007, the courtreceiveda joint manifestation by Prosecutor Tilan, Private Prosecutor RufinoLamase,andthe accuseds counsel (Atty. Gerald Tabayan) asking that the promulgation of the decision be deferred pending a possible settlement of the case. It was only onOctober 8, 2008that Prosecutor Lamasemovedtohavethe case resolved for failure of the accusedtosettlethe civilaspectof the case. She immediately finalized the decision andscheduledits promulgation onNovember 14, 2008, but this was reset toNovember 24, 2008upon motion of the counsel for the accused.Judge Piscoso-Flor further explained that the motion for inhibition in Criminal Case No. 228 had been the subject of a contempt case which reached the Court of Appeals and gave rise to numerous complaints filed by Prosecutor Tilan against her. One of the cases had been considered closed and terminated by Deputy Court Administrator Reuben P. de la Cruz in a letter datedNovember 4, 2008.[18]Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court issued a Resolution on July 6, 2009:[19](1) re-docketing the case as a regular administrative matter; (2) directing Judge Piscoso-Flor to conduct an inventory of cases pending in her court and find out whether there were cases submitted for decision that had not been decided within the required period, and to decide these cases within thirty (30) days; and (3) requiring the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the records.Judge Piscoso-Flor and Prosecutor Tilan submitted the case for resolution onAugust 27, 2009andOctober 8, 2009, respectively.The Courts RulingIn his Memorandum datedMarch 19, 2009,[20]Court Administrator Jose P. Perez (now a member of the Court) found Judge Piscoso-Flor to have beenremissinherdutytodecide cases within the period required by law.He recommended that the judge be merely admonished considering thatthisis her first infraction and that she inherited most of the cases that gaverisetothecomplaint.At the same time, he recommended that a stern warning be given against the commission of a similar offense in the future.The OCA evaluation tells us that Judge Piscoso-Flor is guilty of failing to decide cases within the required periods, citing Criminal Case No. 127(People v. Juanito Baguilat)asthe principal basis of its conclusion.Inthis case, the OCA faulted Judge Piscoso-Flor for using as justification forher inaction the parties failure to submit their respective memoranda.TheOCAopinedthatthisis not a valid reason for not deciding the case; ifshebelievedshewouldnot be able to decide the case on time, she could have asked the Court for an extension of the required period. The OCA acknowledged though that Judge Piscoso-Flor requested for an extension to decide the case in her monthly report of cases and certificate of service.[21]We find the OCA evaluation in order.Although Judge Piscoso-Flor claimed that she had requested for an extension of time to decide Criminal Case No. 127, there was no showing that the request was ever granted. Over and above this consideration, she allowed the parties to control the period of disposition of the case through their lukewarm response to her call for the submission of memoranda, which she had to do twice.She could have acted more firmly, considering, as she said, that she only inherited the case, which implies that it had been on the docket for quite some time.In any event, Judge Piscoso-Flor should have known that [t]he Court may grant extension of time to file memoranda, but the ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall not be interrupted thereby.[22]The same is true with Criminal Case No. 140 (People v. Talanay).As early asMarch 6, 2006,[23]the CHR Office in the Cordillera Administrative Region relayed to Judge Piscoso-Flor the concern of the parent of the victim of the child abuse regarding the delay in the resolution of the case.It was only onMay 21, 2008when Judge Piscoso-Flor called for the submission of memoranda.Judge Piscoso-Florhad no comment on Criminal Case No. 221 (People v. Tenefrancia).On the other hand, the Motion for Inhibition in Criminal Case No. 228, filed by Prosecutor Tilan, was deemed submitted for resolution onJuly 18, 2008,[24]but Judge Piscoso-Flor herself admitted that she resolved the motion onNovember 10, 2008or beyond the required 90-day period.Judge Piscoso-Flor, however, cannot be held liable for delay in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 142 (People v. Dimpatan), which Prosecutor Tilan cited in his reply.[25]While he claimed that the casewasdeemed submitted for decision on March 12, 2007, it appears from the recordsthat he, Private Prosecutor Rufino Lamase, and the accuseds counsel(Atty. Gerald Tabayan)executeda joint manifestation[26]praying that the promulgation of the decision be deferred pending negotiations amongthemonthecivil aspect of the case.When the negotiations bogged down and upon motion of Prosecutor Lamase (datedOctober 8, 2008),[27]Judge Piscoso-Flor promulgated the decision onNovember 24, 2008.On the whole, we find Judge Piscoso-Flor guilty of undue delay in the disposition of cases. Except forPeople v. Dimpatan, Judge Piscoso-Flor failed to resolve the other cases within the required period, in violation of the law and the rules.No less than the Constitution sets the limits on this all-important aspect in the administration of justice.It mandates that lower courts have three (3) months or ninety (90) days within which to decide cases or matters submitted to them for resolution.[28]Also, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the Courts business promptly and decide cases within the prescribed period.[29]It cannot be over emphasized that judges need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously.Delay in the disposition of cases, it must again be stated, is a major cause in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the justice system.[30]For this fundamental and compelling reason, judges are required to decide cases and resolve motions with dispatch within the reglementary period.Failure to comply constitutes gross inefficiency, a lapse that warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against the erring magistrate.[31]Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court defines undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, punishable under Section 11(b) of the same Rule and imposes a penalty of suspension from office, without salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more thanP10,000.00 but not exceedingP20,000.00.In light, however, of the fact that this is Judge Piscoso-Flors first infraction and considering that most of the cases involved were inherited cases, we deem a fine in its minimum range an appropriate penalty for Judge Piscoso-Flor.WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor is declared liable for delay in the disposition of cases.Accordingly, she isFINEDP10,000.00, with a stern warning against the commission of a similar offense in the future.SO ORDERED.ARTURO D. BRIONAssociateJusticeWE CONCUR:CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate JusticeChairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate JusticeMARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.AssociateJustice

MARIALOURDESP.A. SERENOAssociate Justice

[1]Rollo, pp. 2-3.[2]Id.at 5; Complaint, Annex A.[3]Id.at 6; Complaint, Annex B.[4]Id.at 7; Complaint, Annex C.[5]Id.at 8; Complaint, Annex D.[6]Id.at 11.[7]Id.at 10.[8]Id.at 16; 1stIndorsement,September 29, 2008.[9]Id.at 17-18.[10]Id.at 19-20; Comment, Annex A.[11]Id.at 21-22; Comment, Annex B.[12]Id.at 23-24; Comment, Annex C & D.[13]Id.at 25-33; Comment, Annex E.[14]Id.at 38; Comment, Annex I.[15]Id.at 40; Comment, Annex K.[16]Id.at 42.[17]Id.at 63.[18]Id.at 66; Rejoinder, Annex C.[19]Id.at 7.[20]Id.at 67-71.[21]Supranote 12.[22]Administrative Circular No. 28,July 3, 1989.[23]Supranote 6.[24]Supranote 16.[25]Rollo, p. 42.[26]Id.at 64; Rejoinder, Annex A.[27]Id.at 65; Rejoinder, Annex B.[28]CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 15(1).[29]Rule 3.05.[30]Michael G. Plata v. Judge Lizabeth G. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-08-172,October 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 14.[31]Sanchez v. Vestil, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1419,October 13, 1998, 298 SCRA 1.