[G.R. No. 127755.April 14, 1999]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.D E C I S I O N

FACTS: The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. The conviction ofthe accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996.However, this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.

ISSUES: (1) Whether del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation at the time he was invited for questioning at the house of the barangay captain. OR Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.

(3) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

RULINGS: (1) YES. Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Herein like victim Virginia Bernas, del Rosario too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.

OR

(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not reviewed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should always be appraised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included invitations by police officers in the scope of custodial investigations. It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime. However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver.

(For issue number 2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (1) when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (2) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime wasc ommitted; and (3) when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after the consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately, the warrantless arrest was not lawful; this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.