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The Future of Democracy

Papers Submitted by Participants

Wednesday, December 10, 200810:15 A.M . 12:00 P .M .

Astor BallroomThe St. Regis Hotel

923 16th St, NWWashington, DC

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The Case for Liberal DemocracyZeyno Baran

The incoming administration needs to defend and promote democracy. In thecontext of the current international environment, support for democracy in other states isimportant not only as an expression of American values, but also as a means of protectingAmerican national security. Throughout the world, liberal democracy is once again beingchallenged both as a political system and, more fundamentally, as an ideology and as aset of beliefs.

The latter challenge stems primarily from two contrary ideologies: Islamism andwhat I will call Putinism. These two share many features: both value and use the ritual

of democracy, but not its substance. A small group of men allow economic openings butkeep a tight control over political culture. Both are imperial and have wide-rangingambitions, with which no true compromise is possible. And both are fundamentally anti-American: that is, they see any defeat or failure of America as a gain for themselves.

Whether we like it or not, we are engaged in a war of ideasand the US is losingground. Further spread of Islamism and Putinism will leave America isolated andpowerless to achieve its goals in security and foreign policy. This is especially true inEurope, for example, where the influence of Islamism has made support for Israel a rarephenomenon. Similarly, thanks to the influence of Putinism, few European states arewilling to defend Georgia or to support Ukraine.

Both ideologies are involved in a large-scale transformation of cultures and

societiestransformations that require discrediting and ultimately dismantling theexisting world order. This is why Islamists claim that the West is now engaged in acultural crusade against Islam. Huge amounts of money (mostly from oil and gas) isused to create institutions, media outlets, and even so-called civil society organizationsthat are neither civil nor authentically part of society. Similarly, we have seen a Russianstate that has rewritten history to such a degree that its young citizens believe that Stalinwas a great leader. (The analogy with Germany or Austria, where each generation istaught about the horrific crimes committed by Hitler and the Nazi regime, is particularlytelling.)

Faced with authoritarian threats in both religious and secular forms, the USshould not be questioningwhether to promote democracy; but should be decidinghow. A

democracy promotion effort needs to be not piecemeal, but comprehensive; a holisticchallenge requires a holistic response. The whole concept needs to be redesigned with aneye towards constructing a longer-term timeframe that lasts beyond any one presidentialadministration. If not, the US and its allies will continue to grow weaker as its opponentsstrengthen. The first step is to reclaim and promote liberal democracy by championing itsfundamental values and principles: critical thinking, free will, equality, and the dignity ofall human beings.

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The challenge to democracy from PutinismThe fierce campaign of anti-Americanism being waged by the Kremlin both

inside and outside Russia is stronger today than it was even during the Cold War.

Beginning in earnest with the Beslan terrorist attacks (which the leadership even blamedon the US), Russia's increasingly strident anti-Americanism has grown hand-in-hand withits increased authoritarianism. The ruling regime has created an image of the US as anenemyand relies on this image for its survival and legitimacy.

While it actively indoctrinates its own people against the West and against liberaldemocracy, the Kremlin wants to be viewed as a respectable member of the internationalcommunity. It believes that it can do this because it considers Western democraciesweak, easy to manipulate, and ready to appease. The Russian self-image, by contrast, isof a strong state that wants not to be loved, but to be feared.

By using Europes energy dependence and reticence towards confrontation, Putinhas managed to divide the NATO alliance. Most recently by invading Georgia and

unilaterally recognizing the independence of its two separatist regions, Putindemonstrated that the US was unable to help the country it called a beachhead ofdemocracy. He has challenged the West repeatedly and knew, with experience, that aftera short period business as usual would return. He has also managed to crush internaldissent (sometimes violently) and outside criticism, expecting that Western liberaldemocracies will acknowledge Russia's privileged interests in its sphere of influence,even though this acquiescence undermines not only the West's own values, but also theexisting world order.

In addition to military and financial methods, Putinism relies on Russias softpower over Americans, particularly in the academic sphere, who are devoted to Russia'sculture and language and who are genuinely interested in good bilateral relations.Unfortunately, many of these people subsequently end up advocating policies that are notin Americas interests.

The challenge to democracy from IslamismIslamism's ultimate threat to democracy stems from the absolutism of its goal: the

creation of an Islamic world order, which it holds to be the only means of bringing abouttrue justice and peace. Although various Islamists (Sunni and Shiite; state-backed andanti-state) do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards oneanother, they all agree on the final target to be reached: a world existing according to thedictates of political Islam.

Islamists target the US with accusations of imperialism because they see the USas the primary impediment to their own imperialist goalasserting political Islam as acivilizational alternative to Western civilization.

Why is Islamism such a threat to democracy? Because in Islamist ideology,Islamic law sharia regulates every aspect of an individuals life; since it is considered tobe Gods law, no compromises are possible. The holistic nature of Islamist ideologymakes it fundamentally incompatible with the self-criticism and exercise of free willnecessary for human beings to form truly liberal and democratic societies.

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Islamists are therefore strenuously opposed to secular governance. Instead, theybelieve that Islamic rules and laws based upon the Koran and theshariacode must shapeall areas of human society, from politics and education to history, science, the arts, andmore. In wholly sharia-based countries such as Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, there islittle distinction between religion and state, leaving no room for liberal democracy. The

formal ritual involving candidates, ballots, and victory speeches might be maintained, butin substance it is still an illiberal system lacking dissent, individuation, or criticalthinking.

Islamists increasingly use democracy as a means to get to power and also to winover Westerners who naively believe that the institutionalization of majority rule is thekey to progress in the Arab/Islamic world. Yet, Islamists vehemently reject thefundamental principle of liberal democracy, which is that sovereignty belongs to thepeople. That is why they talk about Islamic democracy and never democracy or,heaven forbid, secular democracy. While adding the adjective Islamic or Muslimto democracy may sound reasonable, it simply does not work. There are Muslims who aredemocrats and who accept democratic rule of law, of courseI proudly count myself

among thembut Islamists' understanding of these terms is very different. Islamists havenot only hijacked traditional Islam but also concepts like democracy, freedom and justice.They are sincere when they use these terms, but for an Islamist, justice means the fullimplementation of sharia law, while freedom means free to merge religion with thestate.

What the US fails to recognize is that over the last decade, a majority of Islamistmovements have altered previous strategies and begun participating in democraticelections; yet this is only a tactical move, as this has proven to be the easiest and mostlegitimate path to power. We see Islamist parties from Morocco to Malaysia increasinglyadvocating democracy and freedom, while eschewing references to sharia in favor ofslogans decrying corruption and espousing good governance. With their clear advantagein grassroots mobilization (through related charity, educational, and religious networks),some of these parties have already reached the point at which they would win clearmajorities in free and fair elections.

This happened after decades of social engineering by those believing in theeventual Islamization of the world to be enacted via a bottom-up process. ManyIslamists have moved away from advocating top-down Islamization (which often requiresconfrontation with the state), in favor of this gradual policy. The bottom up Islamizationbegins with people being transformed into true Muslimsrejecting Western norms ofpluralism, individual rights, and the secular rule of law. Next, the individuals family istransformed; then the society; then the state; and finally the entire world is expected tolive, and be governed, according to Islamic principles. It is this ideological machinerythat is also at the core of Islamist terrorism.

Recent Mistakes in Democracy PromotionIn general, the US looks for short-term successes when often generational

commitment is neededas the Bush administration originally stated. But again, the UShad to demonstrate success quickly, and thus went for the low-hanging fruitat pointseven sounding as doctrinaire about democracy promotion as those who oppose

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democracy. Now, as a result, we are back at the same point in the cycleif not lower.Quickly wanting to hold elections in Palestine, for example, brought us Hamas. Since theUS could not recognize the kind of political party that so broadly espouses terrorism, ithad to consequently pull back on democratization efforts.

Despite over 60 years of on-again, off-again efforts at democracy promotion, the

binary model that forces a choice between autocrats in power and populist extremists outof power has never really disappeared. It is a mystery to me why the US does not remaintrue to its own values and support the third optionthe liberal democrats. Yes, liberaldemocrats in Russia or the Middle East are but a small minority todaybut they willnever grow in support unless backed by the US; the other two sides already get all thefinancial and organizational help they could want.

I think the biggest mistakes took place in the broader Middle East region. I was atfirst very confused about some of the policies; now I understand that the US simply doesnot understand Islamism, even though it has been an active and increasingly powerfulcounter-ideology over at least three decades. Islamism is not compatible with democracy;Muslims can be democrats. There is a huge difference.

The prevailing viewthat Islamists should be co-opted into existing politicalsystemssimply will not work. The fallacy in this policy of appeasement lies inassuming that an individual or group that sounds moderate in fact is moderate. Often,Islamists are willing to make superficial concessions while continuing to hold anuncompromising worldview.

The academics, analysts and policy makers who argue that a movement like theMuslim Brotherhood today is moderate seem to disregard its ideology, history, andlong-term strategy. They even seem to disregard the Brotherhoods own statements. It istrue that most affiliates of this movement do not directly call for terrorist acts, are open todialogue with the West, and participate in democratic elections. Y et this is not sufficientfor them to qualify as moderate, especially when their ideology is so extreme. Turninga blind eye to the Brotherhood and its ideological extremismeven ifdone for the sakeof combating violent extremism and terrorismis a direct threatto the democratic order.

Unfortunately, since 9/11, the US has alienated many of its allies andstrengthened enemies in the Muslim world. This is one of the reasons why the US lost thesupport of the secular movement within Turkey, which is traditionally the domesticconstituency most closely allied to the West. It (correctly) perceives US policy aspromoting a moderate Islamist government in their countryone that can serve as amodel for the Muslim world. Yet even the current political leadership coming from anIslamist past opposes to be called moderate Islamist and instead prefers Muslimdemocrat as a description.

Turkey is truly unique for a country with nearly all Muslim citizens; the US needsto first understand what makes it unique before trying to change it so it fits a particulardemocratization theory. The end of the caliphate and the Islamic sharialegal systemand the separation between mosque and statewere revolutionary moves. Most Muslimcountries still have sharia law enshrined in their constitutions, something which hasimpeded their democratic evolution. For its part, Turkey has evolved as a democraticcountry because it was founded as asecular republic. It is in this context the country hasserved as a beacon of hope for liberal democrats across the Muslim world.

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The US has failed to grasp why freedom of the public sphere fromreligionatthe core of the Turkish and French conceptions of secularismis essential in a Muslim-majority country, whereas freedomofreligion based on the US model can open the wayfor gradual Islamization. Moreover, while it is true that Turkeys Islamists are the mostreformed and moderate, this is only a reflection of Turkey's status as the most reformed

and moderate country in the Muslim world.There are other inconsistencies: There is democratic erosion, especially in dissent,yet Washington has not expressed concern about such critical areas in Turkishdemocracymainly because the success of the moderate Islamist model became anend in itself. Second, if Turkey is increasingly perceived as a Muslim democracy andnot a Western one, how can it join the EU? Wanting to fit reality to theory, US oftenignores the reality.

What to do?Since 9/11, anti-American movements, groups and leaders have come closer

together in a shared hostility to the Western liberal system. The worldwide US

commitment to, and promotion of, liberal democracy must therefore not be tacked on asan afterthought, but must be at the core of the US foreign and national security strategy.This means returning to the fundamentals of what America is about: defending andguaranteeing freedom and dignity.

Yet, it is important to keep in mind that anti-American groups will continue to tryto take advantage of open societies. Some intentionally provoke incidents intended topromote an us versus them mentality. They also feed conspiracy theories. The Islamistnarrative, like Putinism, is about victimization and humiliation. Russia, as NATOsecretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently pointed out, feels itself victimized bythe spread of democracy and the rule of law. Putinism shares with Islamism the focus ona past golden age (whether the Caliphate or the Stalin-era Soviet Union) in which itsstrength was widely respected. Even though these victimization complexes are thusbased not in the experience of oppression by outsiders, but rather by a loss of ability tooppress, this sentiment is part of a deadly mixture of the feeling of political and economicinferiority with moral and ethical superiority.

This January, the inauguration of a new president will grant the US only short-term relief; both Islamists and Putinists are working on new narratives and searching fornew grievances, since their need to undermine the US and its democratic vision is soincredibly strong. Hopefully, the Obama administration will not be so eager to reverse theunpopularity of the Bush years that it will limit democracy promotion that is essential toadvance American interests.

America needs to be true to its values and principles. The US should not bepromoting moderate Islam but liberal democracy. There is no Russian or Arabexceptionalism; the leaderships come up with these arguments to continue to hold powerover their people. Even though people in different parts of the world may use differentterms, the yearning for what we call freedom and liberal democracy is indeed universal.

There are no easy solutions, but if the US does not show leadership, no one elsewill. We need to be patient and focus on institution-building to enable democraticcultures to take hold. Each country has its own path that is based on its own history,culture and traditions, and it takes time; there simply is no shortcut. The US seems to

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have a lot of patience with the democratization process in Saudi Arabiaso why isthere a different approach to Egypt?

We need to make a long-term commitment and not look for short-term successesthat jeopardize longer-term gains. It should be clear by now that democracy is not merelyabout the electoral process. Holding elections, however free and fair in a technical sense,

without first undertaking the difficult process of building institutions will get us only onething: Hamas. Simply put, hungry, fearful, and uneducated people cannot be democrats.They need to be safe from being killed purely because they are from the wrong ethnic,religious or sectarian background. People also need to be educatedilliteracy is aproblem in itself, but what is taught is as important. If all they are taught is how tomemorize the Koran or why to hate the West, how can they transcend this teaching? Andwithout building critical-thinking skills as well as teaching civics and democratic values,we will continue to see highly intelligent Western-educated doctors and engineerscommitting suicide attacks. People also need to be able to feed and clothe their families;but material successes are not enough to imbue one with a love for the liberal democraticsystem that makes them possible.

Clearly, the US cannot do this cheaplyespecially given how much everyoneelse is spending on anti-democratic agendas. In many of these programs, there can bepartnerships with Europeans and others who are similarly committed to democraticdevelopment. Moreover, compared to how much US is spending on wars and militarybudget, the amount will be minimal with huge returns. And, with the economic crisishitting parts of the world that are so critical, such as Pakistan, there is even greater needfor the US to allocate larger sums of money for education and institution building bysupporting organizations that would eventually lead to democratic civil societyparticularly secular organizations (press, judiciary, womens organizations, small andmedium business associations, etc).

In many parts of the world, following the shock of globalization and the resultingquestioning of identities, countries are reconstructing their own national identities. TheUS has to be influencing this process so destructive ideas do not take root. For thispurpose providing alternative media sources to Russian or Islamist propaganda iscritically important. The US must increase funding and coverage of both the Voice ofAmerica as well as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

2009 will be a particularly challenging year for democracy. There are elections inIran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Iran has gotten much stronger in Iraq and acrossthe wider regionand its influence will grow even further once it obtains nuclearweapons and once US begins leaving Iraq. Iraq may also witness serious clashes based onethnic and sectarian division lines that could even draw in neighboring states. If Pakistanfails, Islamists will finally have access to nuclear weapons, possibly first directed atIndia. Relations with Russia are up in the air at best. The list goes on.

There has to be a rethinking of democracy promotion in a holistic way in light ofthese very serious and imminent issues; otherwise the incoming administration mayrepeat the mistakes of previous onesmyopically solving short-term problems whileleaving the longer-term future picture more blurry than before.

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The Future of Democracy and U.S. Foreign PolicyLarry Diamond

The current moment represents a major historical conjuncture for democracy inthe world in several respects. First, it marks the close of one American presidentialadministrationthe one that has put the promotion of democracy most audaciously at thecore of its foreign policy, at least rhetorically. And that administration of George W.Bush is ending with its freedom agenda largely in ruins, particularly in the Middle East.

Second, power is rotating to a new American administration and a new approachto foreign policy. The world awaits the Obama Administration with a depth of hope,admiration, and anticipation rarely if ever equaled in the history of the American

presidency. During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama released a Strategy toPromote Global Development and Democracy that clearly signaled his support forpeaceful efforts to support democratic development and to stand behind strugglingdemocrats abroad. This included a pledge to enhance funding for American efforts toassist young democracies and to support democratic activists and civil societyorganizations, including through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Yetthere is a strong current of sentiment among foreign policy specialists, including manyObama supporters, that the Bush Administration over-prioritized democracy promotionand then also discredited it with its incompetence, inconsistency, use of force, andimperial overreach. There is thus some concern that democracy will be demoted in thenext administration, below the broader pursuit of global development, and now theoverriding priority to stabilize and revive the world economy.

Third, there is the new reality of global economic crisis, as yet unfathomable inscope, but which could become the most severe and prolonged contraction of economicoutput since the Great Depression. That was a calamitous time for freedom in the world,swallowing up many young and fragile democracies and evolving semi-democracies. Itis an axiom of political science theory on democracy, codified in the classic work ofSeymour Martin Lipset, that democracy depends for its stability to a unique degree onlegitimacy, that is a popular belief that the constitutional system is the best form ofgovernment for the society. Democracy is most stableand secure against reversal instressful timeswhen this belief is intrinsic and deeply rooted. However, in the absenceof crisis, democracy can persist indefinitely, either for want of a better alternative orbecause it generates what Lipset called performance legitimacy, particularly as a resultof good economic growth. Quite a number of the new democracies in Latin America,Central and Eastern Europe, and Africa have had in the last five to ten years asurprisingly good run of macroeconomic performance, relative to previous times. Sothere is now the danger that people will become disenchanted with democracy asprosperity suddenly evaporates. Even where people have been disappointed witheconomic performance under democracy, either relative to the previous authoritarianregime (as in East Asia) or in terms of the puny benefits of growth that they have actually

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experienced, the economic hardships since the transition may pale in comparison to whatwill soon come, especially if the hemorrhaging of economic confidence and theobstruction of capital flows are not soon reversed.

Finally, and unfortunately, the global economic recession comes at a time whenthe world has already slipped into some degree of democratic recession as well. This

downturn encompasses several phases and dimensions.

The Democratic Recession

The extraordinary growth in the number of democracies in the world leveled offin the mid to late 1990s, stabilizing at around 120, give or take a fewor roughly three infive states in the world. Since 1995, there have been important instances of democratictransitionincluding in such key states as Indonesia, Mexico, and Ukrainebut thesehave been offset by democratic reversals or breakdowns.

There has also been a rising trend of democratic reversals, with the October 1999military coup in Pakistan marking what I feared at the time would be and has in fact

become an important watershed or inflection point. Since the third wave of democracybegan in 1974, I count a total of 25 reversals of democracy (most recently, the militarycoup in Mauritania earlier this year). But 17 of these reversals, or about two-thirds, haveoccurred just in the last nine years (beginning with the coup in Pakistan). Moreover, adisturbing number of these reversals have come in big and strategically important states,such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria, and the Philippines.

This raises a third worry: Many democratic reversals have been sufficientlysubtle to escape coherent condemnation and painful sanction by the growing architectureof regional and international organizations that have adopted principles of democraticdefense, because these have been tied to the overt seizure of power in military orexecutive coup. When democracy dies by the creeping degradation of competitiveprocesses, political freedom, and independent institutions, as has happened in Russia,Venezuela, Nigeria and the Philippines, it does not generate the kind of outrage thatmight otherwise be mobilized by collective actors like the OAS or powerful democracieslike the United States. It is even harder to mobilize pressure when the continuity in theform and functioning of institutions is, as in Nigeria and the Philippines, so great that it ishard for outside actors to get a handle on what has happened.

This then suggests the fourth negative trend in democracy globally: the growingnumber of regimes in the world that fall into an ambiguous gray zone betweendemocracy (with its essential requirement for free and fair elections, buttressed by alarger climate of political and civil freedom) and dictatorship. If one were to insist upona more exacting standard of electoral democracy (with more freedom and institutionalintegrity, and a reasonably level political playing field) then a number of countriesclassified by Freedom House as democraciessuch as Georgia, Senegal, andGuatemalawould be reclassified as competitive authoritarian regimes (as StevenLevitsky and Lucan Way have done), and the number of democracies in the world todaywould drop by another ten to fifteen. We have in the world today a class of democraciesthat are so shallow, superficial and poorly functioning that they stretch the meaning of theword democracy. Pakistan is a classic case in point. In Thailand, the new civiliangovernment that has come to power via more or less free and fair elections is so

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paralyzed by political polarization and so lacking in authority and capacity at thismoment that it is something of a strain to call it a government at all, much less a regime.In Yemen, which fortunately Freedom House does not recognize as anything close to ademocracy (but which some observers once mistook for one) the writ of the centralgovernment is so limited that much of the country outside the capital is simply a no-

mans land. One thing that political science has (belatedly) rediscovered in the pastdecade is the obvious truth that democracy presumes a functioning state. Yet insignificant swaths of Africa, Asia, and now even parts of Latin America, the state itselflives a tenuous existence, or as in Liberia and East Timor (not to mention Iraq andAfghanistan) struggles to re-establish authority after civil conflict. If the globaleconomic recession proves protracted and severe, it will challenge the very viability ofmany states, not to mention the legitimacy of whatever democratic institutions may exist.

The Authoritarian Vulnerability

While a whopping worldwide recession has potentially alarming implications for

the stability of democracies, it may not turn out to be such a good thing for dictatorshipseither. And this exposes a possible silver lining in the present yawning crisis. If there isone word that captures the historical moment that is upon us now, it isvolatility. Wecannot know how cataclysmic this recession will be. We cannot exactly how it willaffect different types of regimes. But one thing we can predict is that it will generateuncommon stress and increased scope for political change of all kinds. One is tempted torecall the famous phrase about conjunctural crisis of Marx and Engels: All that is solidmelts into air.

Marx and Engels would acclaim the time ripe for some sort of revolutionaryupheaval against capitalist democracy. But I think the turbulence will take a differentform. If the economic crisis is long and severe, major dictatorships could be threatenedeven more than democracies. For, at least democracy rests on a legitimating idea orvalue. The remaining dictatorships of the world enter the current global crisis largelybereft of any intrinsic, ideational form of legitimacy. The capitalist-Leninist systems inChina and Vietnam and their postcommunist variant in Russia all rest purely for theirlegitimacy now on economic performance. China in particular may face a swelling tideof labor unrest and civic mobilization if economic growth falls even below five or sixpercent. The legitimacy of the Islamic Republic in Iran is long since drained, exceptamong a hard core of believers and beneficiaries. Even the quasi-authoritarian populismof Hugo Chavez depends largely by this point on his ability to pump oil-based patronageinto society. In fact, all of the worlds despotic oil-and-gas regimes with largepopulations will find themselves hard-pressed to maintain the flow of public subsidiesand private benefits that sustain their rule if oil remains under $70 or so a barrel. Moregenerally, most Arab authoritarian states (i.e., those that do not have so much oil incomerelative to population that they can easily ride out the storm) are headed for seriouspolitical strain, because of their huge youth bulge (with nearly two in five citizens underthe age of 15) and the failure of their economies to generate nearly enough jobs to absorbit even in the relatively good times of the last decade.

By contrast, the democracies of the world that are more clearly democratic have asystemic advantage. They have something other than short-term economic performance

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that they can offer their people as a foundation to justify their rule: namely, democracyitself. Fifteen years of public opinion surveys in the postcommunist world, Africa, Asia,and Latin America show that citizens in young democracies value the political outputs ofdemocracyfreedom, participation, electoral choice, accountability, responsiveness, andthe rule of lawas ends in themselves. To the extent they see these political outputs in

evidence they exhibit greater support for democracy and a more solid willingness toreject authoritarian alternatives. At least to date, these citizens have (on balance) shownan ability to distinguish between economic and political performance, surprising patiencein waiting for the material benefits of democracy, and support for democracy when itdelivers on its political promise (even if it falters on the economic side). Moreover,dissatisfied citizens in a democracy can change their government without changing thepolitical system. The only way citizens in an authoritarian regime can change theirleaders is to change their regime.

In democracies, the coming years will likely be a hard time for incumbentgovernments. But if those governments give their citizens a reasonably high quality ofdemocracywith effective representation, transparency, control of corruption, respect

for basic rights, and a rule of law with public orderthey can survive. In the face ofrising popular disenchantment, authoritarian regimes may be forced either to crack downharder or open up politically. The first path could generate deepening politicalpolarization and crisis while the second represents a slippery slope toward popularmobilization for democracy.

The Democratic Prospect

Given the combination of the prevailing democratic recession and the incipienteconomic recession, the prognosis for democracy in the next decade or so is not as grimas it might seem. Democracy will be challenged most where it is most deficientas ademocracy. Authoritarianism will be challenged most where it has seemed mostsuccessful and dynamicor least some kind of model or source of diffusionincountries like China, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, as well as in semi-authoritarianregimes like those in Singapore and Malaysia.

With this in mind, the clear imperative, as I will briefly outline , is first toimprove the quality of democracy where it is most deficient. The second imperative is toavoid giving stressed authoritarian regimes an obvious reason or context to blame us, theUnited States or more broadly the democratic West, for the troubles they will be having.The third imperative is to support democratic dissidents and organizations inauthoritarian situations, because in a volatile world, we cannot know specifically whereand when that support might become instrumental to a democratic breakthrough, but weknow from the experience of the last two decades that the potential is there.

There is one more acutely worrisome dimension to this prognosis, however, and italso has urgent policy implications. We should not assume that the unraveling ofauthoritarian regimes will lead to democracy. The most common successor to a failedautocracy is another type of autocracy, and often a worse one. There is more than atheoretical danger that if an economic depression knocks out the performance-basedfoundations of stability in China and Russia, the alternative could be not democracy butheightened and militarized authoritarianism, with nationalist and possibly fascistic

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overtones. This is why we need to maintain an overall framework of relationship withthese countries that will not be conducive to a framing of their national crisis in that way.

The problem in the Arab world is even more acute, in two respects. First, becauseof their youth bulges and the historic nature of the authoritarian bargain (roughly, breadfor freedom), the Arab regimes that lack sufficient oil revenue to buy off discontent

Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Yemen, possibly Algeria (and down the road maybe even SaudiArabia)are going to be severely strained. As Tamara Wittes argues in a wise andimportant new book, Freedoms Unsteady March, these regimes were already headed fora slowly gathering crisis because of their incapacity to generate sufficient jobs and otheropportunities for the next generation. Now the crisis may come sooner. But secondly, inthese countries, the principal political alternative to the current autocracy right now is notdemocracy as we would recognize it, but some form of radical Islamist regime.Undoubtedly, many traditional experts on the Middle East will argue that the global crisiswill require us to hang on to these regimes for dear life. A more sophisticated reading ofthe challenge, however, would suggest that we had better define a new strategy forfostering pluralism (and hence a third way between rotten dictatorship and radical Islam)

before it is too late.

The Democratic Imperative: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

The Obama Administration will inherit an unusually troubled and turbulentenvironment for regime stability around the world. But this hardly implies that weshould now demote concern for democracy and freedom as a key pillar of Americanforeign policy. Since my role in this project is mainly an analytical one, I will be ableonly briefly to spell out the policy implications, but I begin by stressing that we will onlydowngrade democracy globally at our peril. A more authoritarian world will not managethe social and political stresses of economic crisis more gracefully. It will be much moreat risk of giving nasty, nationalistic, and quite possibly violent vent to them. In SouthAsia, the failure of secular democracy in Pakistan and Bangladesh could usher in muchmore anti-American, Islamist political alternatives, or possibly state failure altogether. Inthe Arab world (and probably at least some of the Central Asian states), the failure toopen up the political and civic freedoms necessary for democratic alternatives to develop,mobilize, and gain support, could well, as Wittes warns, accelerate precisely the politicalcatastrophe we are trying to preempt. In Africabeginning with Nigeriaa lack ofdemocratic progress could accelerate the slide toward state failure, and what combinationof countries or actors will have the resources to stabilize and rebuild Nigeria if the statecollapses? Finally, downgrading democracy promotion would miss opportunities fordemocratic breakthroughsand to regimes much friendlier to the United Statesincountries like Iran and Venezuela.

The foregoing suggests four directions for U.S. policy.

First, the new Administration should reaffirm that supporting the emergence,defense, and improvement of democracy remains a bipartisan and enduring goal ofAmerican foreign policy. This does not mean that it is the only goal or that it will notcome into conflict at times and places that need to be frankly acknowledged. Nor does it

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mean we must pursue it with the same arrogance, inflated rhetoric, and unilateral style ofthe outgoing Administration. There are numerous under-utilized means of seeking toshore up, defend and advance democracy in the world, including through regionalorganizations like the OAS and global associations like the Community of Democracies.Persisting with the goal can even be consistent with giving it a different name to mark the

difference in tone: If necessary, call it democracy support, for example, instead ofdemocracy promotion.Second, we need a comprehensive program to improve and secure several

dozen young democracies that are at varying degrees of risk. Particularly in a contextof severe economic recession, these democracies could fail if they do not become betterdemocracies in the political sense. This requires substantial additional investment in bothgovernmental (primarily through USAID) and nongovernmental (for example throughNED) programs to help strengthen parliaments (both members and staff); improve thecapacity and autonomy of judiciaries and legal training; professionalize the stateadministration, and the military and police as well; enlarge and train counter-corruptionand audit agencies; make political parties more responsive, capable, and internally

democratic; enhance the resources and skills of independent media and civic associationsof all kinds; educate the public about democracy; and empower broader civic andpolitical participation, particularly of women, youth and minorities. Relative to what wespend on foreign assistance in general, these programs (and especially those to assist non-governmental actors) are very inexpensive and provide a significant prospect ofenhancing not just freedom but human development and political stability as well.

Third, we know from bitter experience and a long sad history of wasted resourcesthat state-to-state assistance to improve democracy, for example in parliamentary or rule-of-law spheres, does little good unless there is the political will to have a better, moreaccountable democracy. Unfortunately, such will emerges spontaneously all too rarely.It requires some push of incentives from outside, as well as pressure from below in civilsociety.Tying aid to demonstrated performance with respect to freedom,accountability, and the rule of law can help to generate these incentives. This meansnot only preserving the Millennium Challenge Account but enlarging (while somewhatreforming) it, andonce the budgetary climate permits an increase in overall U.S.foreign assistanceinvesting most new aid resources in those governments that arewalking the walk on good governance.

Fourth, now is not the time to dump the baby with the bathwater of fosteringdemocratic change in the Middle East. The Bush freedom agenda for the Middle Eastfailed not only because of the wrong means and tone and a number of strategic andoperational mistakes (amply articulated in Wittes book) but also because the BushAdministration lost its nerve when Islamists started winning elections or scoring gains inPalestine, Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq. We do not need to (and indeed cannot) reorganizeour whole foreign policy in the region around democracy in order to press for tangibleimprovements in political and civic freedom in the region. Rather, what is needed here isa shrewder strategic assessment of what is possible, at least incrementally, in eachindividual country; which countries are best poised for more significant political reforms;and what degree of leverage we have. That analysis will show we often have moreleverage than we use, and that we cant beat something with nothing. President Bush wasactually right about this in concept: If we dont help to generate and strengthen in these

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societies (and now we must include here much of South and Central Asia) a positivedemocratic alternative to the decrepit regimes, then their people will increasingly rallyaround the only available one, radical Islam.

Finally, we need tocontinue to support democratic dissidents and oppositionforces struggling against oppression. Morally it is the rightand indeed obligatory

thing to do, but also this is a strategically opportune moment to do so. If I am right thatthe next few years (and perhaps longer) will be a stressful time for dictatorships, too, thenit may also be a time when democrats can make surprising gains. Here, our instrumentsmust be mainly non-governmental, particularly when dealing with civic movements.And indeed the more they engage and seek to support opposition movements in theunderground, in exile, and in civil society, the more important it is that the assistance bedistanced from U.S. government agencies. NED has the knowledge, experience, andcredibility to play a leading role in this regard, which is why the Obama presidentialcampaign proposed a significant increase in its funding for this purpose. Lets also notforget the moral inspiration and practical assistance that international broadcastingthrough Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty gave to the forces of freedom under

communist tyranny during the Cold War. For relatively modest cost in dollars andgeopolitical capital, we can and should expand international broadcasting to authoritariancountries while ensuring that, in programming content and tone, it conveys our values ofpolitical pluralism and the independence and credibility of news reporting.

No doubt, the Obama Administration will pull back from the sweeping democracypromotion rhetoric of its predecessor and reevaluate some of its programs. But the worldneeds the new President to continue to express a strong American voice on behalf offreedom in the world. It is possible to find and sustain a middle course between afreedom crusade and a freedom retreat. That requires returning to the fundamentals ofdemocracy assistance, generating new incentives to improve democracy, and craftingsmart strategies for encouraging democratic change in the worlds remainingdictatorships. Evenno, especiallyin a time of global economic crisis, this is afeasible and indeed urgent agenda.

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The Future of Democracy PromotionCarl Gershman

As was suggested in the letter of invitation to this roundtable, the issue of theplace of democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy will certainly undergo an intensereview by the new Administration of President-elect Barack Obama. The main questionthat will be examined, which is also before us today, is not whether the U.S. should seekto defend and advance democracy in the world, but how it should continue to do so.

The idea that the U.S. has a national purpose to support democracy in the world isnothing new. It goes back to the very founding of the republic, when George Washingtondeclared on the eve of his first inauguration that the future and universal validity of theidea of self-government rested on the success of the American experiment. What todaywe call democracy promotion was initiated by President Reagan in 1982 in hisWestminster Address, when he called for a new effort to foster the infrastructure of

democracy in countries around the world. That led to the creation of the NationalEndowment for Democracy, which in its infancy in the 1980s was both highlycontroversial and very modest in scope, its budget being less than $20 million a year. Butwith the end of the Cold War, the resources devoted to democracy assistance expandedexponentially, both in the U.S. and in Europe, as did the range of institutions involved inthis work, from political foundations like the NED to development agencies, multilateralorganizations, and private foundations. The work has received broad bi-partisan support,and President Clinton, in his first address to the U.N. General Assembly, enunciated hisown doctrine of democratic enlargement and took a number of steps to implement thispolicy, among them expanding the role of USAID in this field and launching theCommunity of Democracies.

President Bush carried the idea of democracy promotion much further, making ita core part of the post-9/11 strategy to defeat terrorism and the animating principle of anew policy, a forward strategy of freedom the Middle East. As the letter of invitationsuggests, this has caused many people to question the goal of trying to aid democracy inthe Middle East and even the value of democracy promotion itself. But despite the bittercontroversies of the recent past, there are actually important areas of agreement that canbe built on in this period of transition. The critics are right that making democracypromotion the centerpiece of U.S. policy in the Middle East created unrealisticexpectations and was bound to foster disillusionment and cynicism. Even under the bestof circumstances, democracy will come only gradually to this difficult region, whilesecurity concerns will have to be addressed on a much more urgent basis. Still, the

President was not wrong in asserting that political and economic reform is the best long-term antidote to jihadist extremism, or in repudiating the doctrine that the Arab MiddleEast, alone among the regions of the world, is inherently unfit for democracy. And thispolicy, despite all the problems of concept and implementation, nonetheless helpedstimulate the emergence of new groups in Arab societies that are today pressing forgreater pluralism, political space, and free expression. Its important that these groupsnot be abandoned. Shaping an approach to the region that embeds democracy promotion

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as a long-term strategic objective, even as the U.S. focuses principally on moreimmediate priorities, will be one of the key challenges facing the new administration.

That same challenge applies to U.S. foreign policy more generally. The currentpolicy, which Secretary Rice has called Transformational Diplomacy, also gives a centralplace to the promotion of democracy. It is premised on the belief that the main threats to

American security today come not from states but from such non-state actors astransnational terrorist groups, and that the principal job of diplomacy is therefore not tomanage state-to-state relations but to transform states whose dysfunctions breed thesethreats.

It is appropriate for the U.S. to seek the democratic transformation of states thatfoster extremism, but linking official U.S. policy and diplomacy so closely to this efforthas a number of serious drawbacks. For one thing, its difficult to engage diplomaticallywith a government while simultaneously funding groups that may oppose thatgovernments policies and even its very legitimacy. For another, as with the Middle East,its exceedingly difficult to use a process as complex, uncertain and protracted asdemocratic change as an instrument to advance policy objectives that are inevitably

driven by immediate needs and crises. Not least, a diplomatic agency like theDepartment of State is ill-suited to carrying out an effective program of democracyassistance. Because of its diplomatic constraints, it is more likely to aid pro-democracyactivists in countries that are unfriendly to the U.S. and where our interests are not deeplyengaged than in relatively friendly autocracies, leading to charges of double standards. Inaddition, the State Department is required by its very nature to subordinate the goals andaspirations of the activists receiving the aid to its own policy objectives, and this cancompromise the credibility and integrity of the whole process. This is the very reason theCongress insisted that the NED be an independent institution, insulated from theimperatives of policy and therefore able to pursue a long-term and consistent approach todemocracy promotion.

Given the questions that are being raised about democracy promotion, and with somany different agencies and organizations now involved in this field, the time has cometo step back and consider how this work can be most effectively organized, funded andcarried out. What is needed is a new coherence in this area of policy, based on anappropriate division of labor among the various agencies of government, principally theState Department and USAID, and between them and non-governmental institutions; andon a realistic understanding of democratic development and its relation to U.S. foreignpolicy and national interests.

At the risk of over-simplifying, let me say that there are essentially two kinds ofdemocracy assistance top-down assistance to governments to improve theirperformance at all levels and increase their transparency and democratic accountability;and bottom-up assistance to independent and politically active civic groups working toeducate and empower citizens and to promote free media, human rights, economicopportunity, and political and cultural pluralism. Official development aid is needed inthe first category, above all in emerging democracies and in post-conflict countries wherethe most urgent priority is to build effective and accountable state institutions. Support inthe second category, which is properly termed political assistance, should logically beextended through non-governmental channels, especially in unfriendly and repressive

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political environments, though there are areas of civic development that are notpolitically sensitive and where official development aid would be appropriate.

Democracy assistance provided in this manner should be complemented by adiplomatic strategy designed to build broad multi-lateral coalitions to advance democraticobjectives. These objectives should include defending democracy activists who are under

attack in back-sliding states, deterring repressive and belligerent behavior by autocraticgovernments, and encouraging an international balance of power favorable to the UnitedStates and its democratic friends. Democracy activists and their support institutions inthe West will have a much easier time operating and will achieve better results in a worldwhere the democracies are cooperating politically and diplomatically on such a commondemocratic agenda.

Understanding democracy promotion as a way of aiding in appropriate ways theefforts of indigenous activists and organizations to expand political space, builddemocratic institutions and promote the rule of law should address the principal concernsof those who question its value and feasibility. Seen in this way, democracy promotion isnot, as the letter of invitation puts it, the primary basis of American foreign policy, but

rather a core national purpose informing policies that are formulated to address urgentsecurity issues and other pressing concerns. Nor is it an attempt, as is sometimes alleged,to impose our will on others, since its purpose is simply to give people the freedom andwherewithal to determine their own destiny and set their own course. Finally, it does notseek democracy as a short-term remedy for difficult and intractable problems but ratheras a long-term goal that can be approached only gradually, sometimes in fits and starts,and always with difficulty. To those who doubt that democracy is a realistic possibilityin many parts of the world (again to quote from the letter), let me say that there is nocountry where taking the next step toward greater openness or democratic possibility isnot feasible, from freeing political prisoners in Burma to breaking the informationblockade in North Korea to expanding freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia.

The concern expressed in the invitation that Americas ability to promotedemocracy in the world may have been permanently hindered by the unpopularity ofAmerican foreign policy in recent years has been belied by our recent election. Noelectoral process anywhere has ever been more closely or more widely followed aroundthe world. Beyond the goodwill that is now being extended to the United States over thehistoric election of an African-American as President, one can only imagine theeducational and inspirational impact on hundreds of millions of people throughout theworld of the election process itself, which was so open, fair, authentic, and riveting.While the United States has only recently developed the instrument of direct assistance topromote democracy, it has been the model of American democracy that historically hasbeen the main source of our countrys democratic influence. That is why AbrahamLincoln warned in 1854 that the monstrous injustice of slavery deprives our republicanexample of its just influence in the world enables the enemies of free institutions, withplausibility, to taunt us as hypocrites. Those enemies still exist, but as we approach thebicentennial of Lincolns birth, it is encouraging to know that the just influence of ourexample is still felt -- more widely today because of the communications revolution thanLincoln could ever have dreamed. But that influence must be used wisely, and that is thechallenge we all now face.

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Why and How the United States Should Support DemocracyAbroad

Michael McFaul

Most Americans and many people around the world will breathe a sigh of reliefwhen the Freedom Agenda retires with its author, President George W. Bush, onJanuary 20, 2009. Public opinion polls show a dramatic decline in support for Americandemocracy promotion abroad. In academia, the think tank world, and among televisiontalking heads, the realist renaissance is palpable. When seeking to praise President-ElectObamas national security team nominations, commentators frequently use words such aspragmatists and realists to distinguish the incoming administration from theideologues and idealists of the Bush administration.

This reaction to Bush is understandable. In the aggregate, neither Bushs soaring

rhetoric about freedom, liberty, and democracy or his actual policies has helped toproduce more freedom in the world. While Bush and his allies did destroy two of theworlds most repressive regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, democracy has not taken holdyet in either place in the aftermath. Georgias Rose Revolution in 2003 and UkrainesOrange Revolution did take place on Bushs watch, but democracy is struggling to takeroot in both places today. At the same time, democratic erosion gained momentum inRussia, Iran, and Venezuela also during Bushs time in office. The Bush Administrationhelped to prod a few positive democratic outcomes in places like Kenya, but otherdemocratic advances in the last eight years, such as in Pakistan, took place in spite ofBush policy, not because of it. Perhaps most disturbing are countries like Egypt whereearlier and marginally successful pushes for democratic change by the BushAdministration have now been reversed and the regime is more autocratic today than ithad been in 2001.

However, the response to this limited record of success should not be isolation, areturn to realism, or a rejection of the objective of democracy promotion. Short term,knee jerk reactions against Bush could produce long term strategic negativeconsequences for American national interests. Those fighting tyranny and seeking toadvance democracy around the world also would suffer. Instead, those responsible forpursuing American national security interests in the Obama Administration mustremember the moral and security reasons for why the United States should promotedemocracy, and then look for ways to pursue this policy objective more effectively.

When reviewing American security interests over the last two centuries and notjust during the last two presidential terms, there should be little doubt that the Americanpeople have enjoyed more security and prosperity as a result of democracys advancearound the world. Every serious enemy of the United States has been a dictatorship:Germany, Italy, J apan, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the past, andIran, Syria, and North Korea today. And in the last several years, it is more thancoincidence that Russian foreign policy has become more belligerent and anti-Americanas Russias regime has become more autocratic. Likewise, Al Qaeda and other non-stateenemies of the United States espouse illiberal ideologies and these movement recruit the

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majority (though not all) of their followers from disenchanted, disenfranchised peopleliving in autocratic countries.

No democracy has ever attacked us, and we have never attacked anotherdemocracy. The United States has relied on autocratic allies to achieve importantnational security objectives, and today the security and prosperity of the United States

and our democratic allies benefit from cordial relations with autocratic regimes in SaudiArabia, China, Angola, and Kazakhstan. In the long run, however, Americas mostreliable partners have been democracies, not autocracies.

Through a combination of increased trade and investment opportunities anddecreased defense expenditures, the American economy also have benefitedtremendously from transitions to democracy in Germany, Japan, and Italy after WorldWar II, and the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Conversely, the threats to American security interests from democratization,propagated by autocrats in such diverse places as Portugal, Philippines, South Korea,Chile, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, and Pakistan, have never been isbad as promised.

Beyond security and economic interests, those advocating an ethical foreignpolicy should embrace the idea of supporting democratic development abroad. WinstonChurchill was right: democracy is the worst form of Government except all those othersthat have been tried from time to time. Compared to other types of regimes, democracyprovides for more accountable government, better constrains the predatory behavior ofstates, and more vigorously protects individual and minority rights. Regarding economicperformance, democracies in the developing world over the last half century haveperformed as well as autocracies. When celebrating Chinas fantastic growth underautocracy over the last three decades, we also must remember the incredible economicfailures of autocracies in North Korea, Cambodia, Zaire, or Zimbabwe over that sametime period. Economic volatility is roughly twice as extreme under autocracies comparedto democracies, and the worst kinds of economic hardships and security threats famine,gulags, and genocide occur in autocracies, not democracies. Finally, public opinionpolls demonstrate that people around the world prefer democracy to other forms ofgovernments.

That the United States should promote democracy does not necessarily mean thatthe United Statescanpromote democracy. While the budgets for democracy assistancehave ballooned to over a billion dollars a year recently, it is striking how little we stillknow about what works and what does not work. If the Obama administration seeks tosupport democratic development abroad more effectively, the first step must be tocommission a comprehensive evaluation of previous programs and policies.

In parallel to this much needed learning exercise, some lessons from the past eightyears are already clear.

First, the United States must get its own house in order. Americans cannot inspireothers to embrace democracy if we ourselves do not continue to perfect our owndemocracy. We cannot champion human rights in other countries if we do not respecthuman rights at home and abroad. Its that simple. Closing Guantanamo, stoppingtorture, ending rendition, and placing more restrictions on wire tapping is just thebeginning of a long process of democratic renewal desperately needed.

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Second, President Obama must state clearly that the United States will never usemilitary force to promote democratic regime change. He could quote Ronald Reaganfrom his famous speech before the British parliament on June 8, 1982, when he rightlyobserved, regimes planted by bayonets do not take root.

Third, not only military force but most other forms of coercive power -- be they

economic sanctions, rhetorical threats, or covert assistance to freedom fighters -- have avery mixed record of success. Instead, the new administration should consider a dual-track engagement of state and society as an alternative strategy for promoting democraticdevelopment. In Chile, the Philippines, and South Korea in the 1980s, Americandiplomats helped to persuade our autocratic friends to leave office peacefully. Likewise,Mikhail Gorbachev began political liberalization in the Soviet Union during an era ofrapprochement with the United States, not during a tense period in bilateral relations. Inall of these cases, American non-governmental actors in parallel also engaged thedemocratic forces inside these countries, interactions (including direct financialassistance) that were facilitated by better state-to-state relations. This dual-trackengagement strategy should be pursued when seeking to support democratic change with

our allies in Morocco or Jordan or with our competitors in Iran or Russia.Fourth, the Obama administration must talk less and do more. President Bushdelivered several lofty speeches explaining why the United States should promotefreedom, yet Ayman Nour sits in jail in Egypt. Rather than speeches or even grand goals,the next administration should seek to achieve small, concrete outcomes that advancepolitical freedoms in very tangible ways and do so, without talking about doing so.

Fifth, the intertwined relationship between democracy and development must beappreciated and then pursued in tandem. Economic aid to corrupt governments is a waste.Countries that strengthen democratic institutions, such a free press, independentjudiciary, and a powerful parliament, are much more likely to control corruption andthereby be more responsible economic aid recipients. Aid mechanisms such as theMillennium Challenge Corporation which provide incentives for improving governancebeforedispersing economic aid should be expanded. And as Vice President-Elect JosephBiden has proposed, those courageous leaders who navigate the difficult transition todemocracy should be rewarded with a democratic dividend that is, an injection ofeconomic assistance -- to help their new governments succeed.

Sixth, the Obama Administration must accelerate the process of internationalizingdemocracy assistance, and even be prepared to channel American support for democraticdevelopment through the aid budgets of other countries and multilateral institutions. Inmany countries around the world, the Slovaks or Serbs as better partners than Americansfor providing grants and training for civil society groups, just as the United Nations orother regional organizations are considered more legitimate monitors of elections thanAmerican delegations. American government and non-government actors also shouldjoin with others to develop a code of conduct for democracy promotion.

Finally, the new Administration must be realistic and patient. The currentinternational context is not conducive to rapid or substantial democracy change. On thecontrary, preserving the democratic gains over the last three decades may be as importantfostering democratic change in autocracies. Pragmatism is not a substitute but anecessary condition for effective idealism. Small d democrats around the world havebeen inspired by Obamas election. To help these democrats realize the change they still

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believe in requires the development of realistic strategies and concrete actions for helpingtheir cause, and not an abandonment of their cause altogether.

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Principle and Pragmatism in Promoting Rights andDemocracy

J ack Snyder

The American public has become appropriately wary of clarion calls to promotedemocracy and human rights around the globe. Helping other countries becomedemocratic scored dead last on the list of foreign policy priorities in the Chicago Councilon Foreign Relations 2008 poll. Human rights fell to twelfth out of fourteen issues, evenbelow strengthening the UN. Its not that Americans have turned hard-hearted.Combating world hunger ranked eighth, above limiting climate change. Its just that theyare skeptical of schemes to push American values on societies that might resist them.

Many experts agree. The risk of political instability and war rises when countriesstart to democratize without the necessary economic and social foundations to sustain

freedom. Similarly, good human rights outcomes are mainly a result of favorableunderlying conditions: fairly high income, democracy, peace, and effectiveadministrative and legal institutions. In contrast, naming and shaming campaigns byrights activists are like Whack-a-Mole: publicized abuses may get beaten down, butothers pop up to maintain the countrys overall level of repression.

The United States agenda of global idealism needs to be tempered with a stiffdose of realism, but it does not need to be abandoned. Despite Chinas recent economicboom, liberal democracy so far remains the only unquestionably proven pathway tostable modernity. Although economic and political change is often turbulent in the shortrun, freedom, human rights, social peace, and economic growth are mutually reinforcingin the long run. These desirable outcomes serve US strategic interests, because maturedemocracies do not fight wars against each other, and they favor free trade. In that sense,Americas chronic urge to help other countries become more like us is not in itself a badidea.

But Americans need to understand that there are no shortcuts to progress throughlegalism, moralism, or military force. The United States often approaches problemsthrough the mindset of lawyers who see a problem and immediately think pass a law orput them on trial. But in human rights, legal solutions have been oversold. Studiesshow that signing treaties only improves rights outcomes for countries that have justestablished democracy and want to signal their sincerity; when dictators sign, its justcheap talk. Setting up war crimes tribunals failed to deter later atrocities even in theregions under their immediate jurisdictionin Srebrenica, Kosovo, and Eastern Congo.Criminalization of female genital cutting tends to drive the practice underground or shiftsit to earlier ages. The impact of legally banning child labor has been negligible comparedto the effects of high-quality public education and technological change on labor markets.

Moralism based on universalizing Western values risks backlash in non-Westerncultures. The most effective grassroots rights campaigners have learned to avoid self-defeating confrontations by checking with local religious leaders first, encouragingethical discussions based on the locals religious texts and traditional values, and lettingthe target community take the lead in talking about the rights they want to prioritize.

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Successful rights campaigns depend on building up incentives and trust through sustainedeconomic development or community service projects, and they take longer thanexpected.

One lesson that should be well learned by now is that democracy cannot beachieved through the barrel of a foreigners gun. Military intervention has succeeded in

installing self-sustaining democracy only in a handful of casesGermany, Japan, Italy,and Panamaand all of these had been somewhat democratic earlier in their history.If shortcuts lead to dead ends, what does work? A pragmatic approach to

achieving principled outcomes should keep in view four rules of thumb.First, power considerations always lead; justice follows. Nothing can be achieved

without power, and when power is inadequate, the first task is to enhance the power ofthe coalition that favors reform. Consider the tactics of post-conflict criminal justice.When the perpetrators of war crimes have been decisively defeated, they can be put ontrial. But when war criminals still command governmental power or a rebel army,amnesties are needed to induce them to resign or put down their weapons. Inintermediate cases, where weakened perpetrators want to quit fighting but could struggle

on if necessary, guarantees against prosecution can be combined with truth commissionsthat humiliate them and discredit them politically. Although it may seem paradoxical,amnesties have paved the way to democratic, rights-improving outcomes in hard casessuch as El Salvador, Mozambique, and South Africa, whereas prosecutions, indictments,and criminal investigations have arguably deterred no atrocities and succeeded only incomplicating peace settlements with the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda and withAlbanian fighters in Macedonia.

Second, reformers need to target the motivations of potential spoilers who mayoppose democracy or human rights improvements. Too often those who resist reform arecaricatured as motivated by undeterrable evil or insatiable fanaticism. In fact, smartstrategies can sometimes play effectively on their hopes or fears. Dictators are often poorstewards of their nations economy, and repression often provokes popular resistance,especially from ethnic minorities. When repressive leaders find their power andpopularity slipping, they are less likely to use violence in a gamble for politicalresurrection if they believe that a comfortable life awaits them after abdicating power.Conversely, dictators sometimes embrace partial reforms, especially market reforms, as away to extend their political life. Authoritarian regimes in Chile, Taiwan, and SouthKorea oversaw the development of thriving export-oriented market societies with strongmiddle classes, inadvertently creating conditions leading to democratic transitions.

Third, the success of reforms depends as much on favorable circumstances as onclever tactics. Experts generally agree on the list of factors that increase the odds of asuccessful democratic transition: moderately high per capita income, adequate literacy, astate bureaucracy that is not beset by extensive corruption, at least rudimentary rule oflaw, an economy that does not depend on oil production, agreement on what groupscomprise the nation that will exercise national self-determination, and a supportiveinternational environment. Absent these conditions, moderate democrats lack the tools tocompete effectively with divisive populist politicians who play the ethnic or sectariancard to mobilize popular support. Middle Eastern voters that have recently cast ballotsfor illiberal militants lived in states lacking almost all of these facilitating conditions.Several countries that were ill-prepared for democracy suffered through civil or

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international wars following incomplete democratic transitions in the 1990s, includingAlgeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, East Timor, Georgia, and Yugoslavia. In ethnicallydivided Burundi, the international donor community insisted on free and fair multipartyelections that triggered the outbreak of a war that killed over 200,000 Hutu and Tutsi. Incountries that lack favorable conditions, democracy promotion efforts may get better

results if they begin by bolstering economic growth, administrative competence, and ruleof law before pushing for national multiparty elections.Fourth, inducement is more effective than coercion. Making demands may be

more satisfying psychologically, but pressuring dictators to liberalize has rarely worked.A better approach has been to invite successfully reforming states to join the club ofliberal democracies and share in its benefits. The European Unions policy of opennessto new members that meet its democracy and economic standards has been a spectacularsuccess in luring swing constituencies in fence-sitting countries like Romania andSlovakia, which could have drifted away from liberalism without these incentives.Likewise, European trade treaties that link economic rewards to human rights outcomeshave led to improvements when carefully monitored. More generally, the free trading

system and international security system presided over by the United States and otheradvanced democracies has strengthened the hand of liberalizing coalitions in manytransitional states over the past three decades.

Since the time of Woodrow Wilson, America has repeatedly sought to promote itsliberal values on the world scene, despite disappointments and concerns about costs. It isunlikely that we will give up now. America can act on its principles withoutdisillusionment if we design strategies for promoting democracy and human rights basedon a pragmatic assessment of what has worked and what has not.

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Failing to Spread DemocracyShibley Telhami

The United States has historically stood for democracy and Human Rights andinspired many around the world largely through the power of its example. That powershould be restored and promoting democracy and human rights should remain asobjectives of American foreign policy. But our discourse about democracy, and the waythe Bush Administration framed and pursued democracy promotion have been seriouslyflawed. We have ignored that democracy in places like the Middle East has been far moreaffected by our military projects than by our specific democracy promotion policies,public pressure, or economic aid to democracy organizations.

To begin with, consider the reality of power. The United States has more than220,000 troops in the greater Middle East including dominating presence and influencein every Arab state in the Gulf region. It provides significant economic and military

assistance to key players such as Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian authority.Some of the governments in the region are so dependent on the United States that theyalmost never turn down an American request, big or small. Most of these states stronglyfelt that the war in Iraq was wrong-headed and that the consequences would be dangerousfor us and for them. But when the chips were down, they felt they had no choice but tosupport us, providing bases of operation, political and intelligence support, and transit forour troops.

In contrast, their publics, the vast majority of whom strongly opposed the Iraqwar, grew angrier with us and with their governments. The vast majority of the publicnever believed in our stated objectives. In annual public opinion polls that I conductedwith Zogby International (in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the United Arab

Emirates, and Lebanon) since before the Iraq war began, those who believed that we wereaiming to spread democracy, human rights, and peace in the Middle East have beensingle digit. Most believed that we were in it to control oil, help Israel, and weaken theMuslim world. The vast majority of the public had unfavorable views of the UnitedStates, but even worse, a significant majority (88% in 2008) named the United States asone of the two biggest threats to them. (In contrast, less than 10% named Iran as one ofthe two biggest threats).

The net result is a lethal antidemocratic mix, regardless of what else we do toadvocate democracy. The polls tell the story: despite years in which we pretended thatspreading democracy in the Middle East was our biggest concern, most Arabs polledbelieve that the Middle East is even less democratic than it was before the Iraq war. How

is this possible? When the gap between authoritarian regimes policies and public opinionexpands on issues that are central to both, the outcome is that regimes grow even moreinsecure. Instead of opening up the system for a public expression that can be usedagainst them, they unleash their security services to preempts opposition and anyorganizational capacity that can undermine their hold on powereven as they mayannounce some symbolic steps on elections and reform to deflect outside pressure. Thenet result is that the public in most places feels more repression than meaningful reform.

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One would think that since we have so much power and influence to persuadegovernments in the region even to go along with wars they dont like, we can alsopersuade them to reform themselves out of power. This is a naive view. First, for us, thepromotion of democracy will always be only a part-time job; for the regimes in theregion, staying in power is their full time joband they know far more about their

surroundings than we will ever be able to learn. That alone is a challenge. But there is afar bigger challenge when we are engaged in two demanding wars for the conduct ofwhich we need all the help we can get.

When you are at war, your military and intelligence considerations trump the aidthat USAID provides, or the talking points about democracy that your Ambassadors willgo through with usually un-empowered subordinates of powerful autocratic rulers. In thewar on terrorism, for which good intelligence is paramount and our own capabilities havebeen demonstrably low, cooperating with the intelligence services in the countries we aretrying to reform is essential. Sometimes we can tell good intelligence form bad, but atother times we cannot see that regimes use the relationship to target their own oppositiongroups. Our military needs the cooperation of the regional military forces for transit,

special operations, and basing of forces. In other words, when you are fighting two warsand have over 220, 000 troops to protect, your biggest institutional allies in every countryin which you operate are the intelligence and military servicesthe very backbone of theauthoritarian regimes that we are trying to weaken. In other words, our heavy militaryfeet always trump our waving democracy hands.

This suggests that our efforts for transformative reform in the region are not likelyto succeed so long as we are at war and have heavy military presence. But we can domore to shrink the gap between public opinion and governments as a prelude toincremental reform. This can only be done by putting forth a new vision for a broader andcredible foreign policy that addresses regional concerns beyond democracy itself. It startswith reforming ourselves and restoring our credibility particularly of issues of humanrights. It proceeds by working with international institutions to uphold commonlyaccepted norms and demanding compliance across the board. It pushes for crediblereform in which the public can trust, concentrating on areas in which governments in theregion may have incentives to cooperate, even if reluctantly. And it ends with therecognition that the power of our example must be restored as one of our greatest assetswhen it comes to inspiring democracy and human rights around the world.

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Some Thoughts on DemocratizationLeon Wieseltier

If the generals should not fight only the last war, neither should anybody else. Theimpact of the war in Iraq upon the discussion of democratization as an objective ofAmerican foreign policy is of course immense, and rightly so: there were lessons learnedthere. But the question of democratization is not the same as the question of Iraq, both asregards the ends and the means. The war in Iraq was preceded by two decades of intenseexperience in the field in the methods and the aims of democratization indeed, some ofthe flaws in American planning (or the lack thereof) for the Iraqi polity after the fall ofSaddam were owed to a blithe and somewhat contemptuous ignorance of all thatexperience. But the war in Iraq, which anyway seems not to be turning out disastrously,should not be the only point of regard from which we evaluate the cause of moredemocracy in the world. A great philosopher once remarked that people who begin by

looking backwards sometimes end up thinking backwards.I should say that, as a matter of principle, having to do both with my

understanding of the universal nature of the democratic ideal and my understanding ofAmericas role in world history, I support the view that democratization must remain acentral aim of American foreign policy. An American foreign policy that did not turn inpart on this belief, that acted solely on interests, that disguised indifference to the fate andthe freedom of other peoples as fidelity to the grand traditions of statecraft such aforeign policy would seem to me not only wrong but also, well, un-American. In thissense, I think, President Bush was propounding nothing controversial in his SecondInaugural Address, though he had a rare gift for burying his occasional good ideas inbitter controversy. I certainly do not see how a liberal can deny the responsibility of the

United States actively to support the spread of democracy to side, in deeds and not justin words, with oppressed peoples against oppressive governments. This is very general, Iknow, and even banal but in the climate of foreign policy opinion after the Bush years Iwould not overestimate its banality. There are times when first principles need to be re-stated and re-debated.

But the objection immediately arises -- we cannot go around overthrowingdictators everywhere we find them. That is certainly so, though I dare say that we are notexactly in danger of doing so: humanitarian intervention, as many observers haveremarked, is hardly in the ascendant these days. So the real perplexity aboutdemocratization is: in what cases, and how? For a start, there are the countries thatbroach, in our policy toward them, both our values and our interests more specifically,

that seem to pit our values against our interests. These are the morally awkward cases.Were the free and fair elections that brought Hamas to power in Palestine and led to theputsch in Gaza really such a good idea? Would we risk the Israeli-Egyptian peace on afree and fair election in Egypt? Is the Saudi offense to our values more egregious than theoffense to our interests that would ensue from a jihadist regime that might be the result ofpolitical liberalization there? And so on. Moreover, while it is true, as President Bushinsists, that for the United States more democracy means more security, security isalways and essentially an immediate goal, a matter of the short term as much as the long

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term; and the achievement of greater security at home obviously cannot wait upon theachievement of greater democracy abroad. They may become democratic later, but weneed to be safe now. So there are cases in which our philosophy is not all we need toknow in which democratization must be assessed coldly and systemically. Idealistshave a particular obligation to look at things realistically. Worrying about the

consequences of democratization in certain instances does not make you BrentScowcroft.Moreover, there will be very few cases in which democratization can be

accomplished at the point of a gun I mean ofour gun. One of the reasons that Iraqseems to be moving in the right direction is that the Iraqis themselves have tired of ourpresence there, and have chosen to turn responsibly against it. The new Iraqi insistenceupon self-reliance has a true and organic feel about it. For democratization, if it is to begenuine and not just a mask for a foreign alliance, is above all an indigenous process.How could it be otherwise? It consists in the transformation of a society -- a new self-definition and a new self-representation. When the will to such a transformation isincomplete, or is contested by force of arms, as in Afghanistan, there is not much that

American troops can do. We cannot force freedom upon traditional societies; they mustforce it upon themselves.When we try to force it upon them, they will experience our lofty enterprise as

rank imperialism, and thereby disqualify us from any further influence upon the presentcourse of their history.

But the choice for an American foreign policy that is serious about theadvancement of democracy is not a choice between words and war. There is a broadrange of instruments available to us, as we learned from our non-violent but resoluteresistance to communism in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Economic, political,and cultural support of the democratizers in a dictatorship has been shown to havedecisive and lasting results. The important thing is that there be democratizers already inplace. We cannot create an opposition, we can only support one. And in supporting ademocratic opposition, we must be prepared to complicate, and in some cases almost toruin, our relations with the regime that they oppose. In a case such as Iran, this poses (Ihope) no problem. But what about China? I confess that I am one of those dreamers whoare repelled by the surrender of our Chinese policy to economic considerations to bling;but even I must admit that we cannot make an out-and-out enemy of the Chinese regime,not least because of the great geo-strategic rivalry between China and America that is stillto come. Yet what really would have been the cost of the American president boycottingthe Beijing Olympics in the name of human rights? It is certainly true that the Chinesegovernment is completely impervious to moral gestures and appeals but the impactupon the human rights movement would have been extraordinary, and those are the menand women upon whom, historically speaking, we are counting. In the long term, wemust prefer the friendship of peoples to the friendship of governments. In winning thefriendship of representative governments, we are in fact winning the friendship ofpeoples.

I speak of the long term, because democratization is a policy that takes time. Afterall, it is a policy that deposes, or assists at the deposing of, one political culture so as tosee it replaced by another political culture. Democratization is a policy of destabilization,and so it requires patience. In this sense, the pace of political progress in Iraq has not

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been shocking at all. The transformation of a society is not an event, it is an era. But war,of course, is an event, which is why freedom cannot be established by force of foreign(that is, American) arms, even by shock and awe. The obstacles to immediate success onthe ground will always be many. But it is important to note also that there is an obstacleat home, too, which is that the only success that Americans now seem able to

contemplate is the immediate kind. This is true in all the realms of American life (and is asignificant cause of th