1. How far have we fallen into the delusion of carnal Christianity if we don't only encourage in-depthstudy, but demand it as normative? https://www.facebook.com/groups/reformedbaptist/552315468201364/?notif_t=group_comment_replyHow reasonable is it for a pastor to expect his people tostudy greek and Hebrew?http://www.reformedbaptistinstitute . org/?p=105

2. https://www.blueletterbible.org/Bible.cfm?b=Rom&c=10&t=ESVHoliness is the habit of being of one mind with God, according as we find His minddescribed in Scripture. It is the habit of agreeing in Gods judgmenthating what Hehatesloving what He lovesand measuring everything in this world by the standard ofHis Word. He who most entirely agrees with God, he is the most holy man. J.C. Ryle,Holiness, page 35.Posted in Calvinism, Law and Gospel, Means of Grace, Pastoral Ministry,Preaching, Puritanism, Reformed Theology, Scripture, Uncategorized, Worship 3. Covenant Theology and Baptism,Baptism, Covenant Theology, Reformed Theology, Regulative Principle ofWorship, Scripture.We Labor Diligently for the Conversion of SoulsIn reading from my great teacher John Owen, I came across this wonderfulsection from his sermon titled The Duty of a Pastor. It may be found in hisWorks, vol. 9:460-462. I shall mention one duty more that is required of pastorsand teachers in the church; and that is, that, we labor [...] Amazon From$398 to $280 16 volume setOr $2 for the Works of John Owen kindle edition27 booksWise observations from the great early New England pastor: Cotton Mather on SermonPreparation:If they [i.e. God's people] hear preachers boasting that they have been in their studiesbut a few hours, on a Saturday or so, they reckon that such persons rather glory in theirshame. Sudden sermons they may sometimes admire from their accomplishedministers, when the suddenness has not been a chosen circumstance. The bestministers in New England ordinarily would blush to address their flocks withoutpreparation. Nothing is more fulsome and nauseous than for a preacher to valuehimself on such a crime as his not spending much time in study.Spurgeon had a sermon on "God Without Mood Swings"http://www.spurgeon.org/~phil/articles/impassib.htm Copyright 2000 by Phillip R.Johnson. All rights reserved. This article is excerpted from Bound only Once, edited byDouglas Wilson, published by Canon Press.Perhaps the most difficult biblical dilemma for those of us who affirm the classic view ofan utterly sovereign and immutable God is the problem of how to make sense of thevarious divine affections spoken of in Scripture. If God is eternally unchangingif Hiswill and His mind are as fixed and constant as His characterhow could He everexperience the rising and falling passions we associate with love, joy, exasperation, or 4. anger?Classic theism teaches that God is impassiblenot subject to suffering, pain, or the ebband flow of involuntary passions. In the words of the Westminster Confession of Faith,God is "without body, parts, or passions, immutable" (2.1).God without passions? Can such a view be reconciled with the biblical data? ConsiderGenesis 5:6-7: "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and thatevery imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And it repentedthe Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart" (emphasisadded). In fact, Scripture frequently ascribes changing emotions to God. At various timesHe is said to be grieved (Psalm 78:40), angry (Deuteronomy 1:37), pleased (1 Kings3:10), joyful (Zephaniah 3:17), and moved by pity (Judges 2:18).Classic theism treats such biblical statements as anthropopathismsfigurativeexpressions ascribing human passions to God. They are the emotional equivalent ofthose familiar physical metaphors known as anthropomorphismsin which hands(Exodus 15:17), feet (1 Kings 5:3), eyes (2 Chronicles 16:9), or other human body partsare ascribed to God.We know very well that God is a Spirit (John 4:24), and "a spirit hath not flesh andbones" (Luke 24:39)so when Scripture speaks of God as having body parts, wenaturally read such expressions as figures of speech. Almost no one would claim thatthe biblical tropes ascribing physical features to God are meant to be interpretedliterally.[1]But the texts that assign emotions to God are another matter. Many Christians are lothto conclude that these are meant to be taken figuratively in any degree.[2]After all, one of the greatest comforts to any believer is the reassurance that God lovesus. But if love is stripped of passion, we think, it's a lesser kind of love. Doesn't thedoctrine of divine impassibility therefore diminish God's love?To complicate matters further, when we try to contemplate how any of the divineaffections can be fixed and constant, we begin to imagine that God is inert andunfeeling.Fearing such inferences, some veer to the opposite extreme and insist instead that Godis even more passionate than we are. In one of those ubiquitous Internet theologicalforums, a minister who hated the doctrine of divine impassibility wrote, "The God of theBible is much more emotional than we are, not less so!"Someone else sarcastically replied, "Really? Does your god have even bigger moodswings than my mother-in-law?"The point was clear, even if made indelicately. It is a serious mistake to impute anykind of thoughts to God that are cast in the same mold as human passionsas if God 5. possessed a temper subject to involuntary oscillation.In fact, a moment's reflection will reveal that if God is "subject to like passions as weare" (cf. James 5:17), His immutability is seriously undermined at every point. If Hiscreatures can literally make Him change His mood by the things they do, then Godisn't even truly in control of His own state of mind. If outside influences can force aninvoluntary change in God's disposition, then what real assurance do we have that Hislove for us will remain constant? That is precisely why Jeremiah cited God'simmutability and impassibility as the main guarantee of His steadfast love for His own:"It is of the Lord's mercies that we are not consumed, because his compassions failnot" (Lamentations 3:22). God Himself made a similar point in Malachi 3:6: "For I amthe Lord, I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed."Still, many find the doctrine of divine impassibility deeply unsatisfying. After all, whenwe acknowledge that an expression like "the ears of the Lord" (James 5:4) isanthropomorphic, we are recognizing that God has no physical ears. So if we grant thatthe biblical expressions about divine affections are anthropopathic, are we alsosuggesting that God has no real affections? Is He utterly unfeeling? If we allow thatGod's grief, joy, compassion, and delight are anthropopathic, must we thereforeconclude that He is really just cold, apathetic, and indifferent?=================================================================================THE IMPASSIVITY OF GOD Reformed Baptist Fellowship &Theology ForumBill Hier Some teach that the anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms used inScripture to describe God's interaction with His creatures are data that teaches He doeschange, relationally, according to attributes He willed to add to Himself after creating,with said ad extra attributes not affecting His intrinsic essence. They say this explainsthose types of passages where God is said to be angry, grieve, and other suchexpressions.This has come to be known as "modified theism," whereby God, through these ad extraattributes, interacts relationally (or covenantally) with His creatures.The problem with all modified theistic views is that, no matter how they spin it, God has,indeed, decreed to take on mutable, finite attributes whereby He does, indeed, change.One (classic theism) looks on such language as God making known His unchangingattributes at points of time and space in redemptive history through finite expressionswhich we can comprehend; the other (all forms of modified theism) looks upon suchlanguage as proving that God has taken upon Himself (all I have read states by Hisdecree) attributes that are subject to input from His creatures.http://carm.org/what-is-open-theism 6. My opinion is that openness is a dangerous teaching that undermines thesovereignty, majesty, infinitude, knowledge, existence, and glory of God andexalts the nature and condition of man's own free will. Though the open theistswill undoubtedly say it does no such thing, it goes without saying that the God ofOpen Theism is not as knowledgeable or as ever-present as the God oforthodoxy.====================================================================God Without Mood SwingsRecovering the Doctrine of Divine ImpassibilityCopyright 2000 by Phillip R. Johnson. All rights reserved. This article isexcerpted from Bound only Once, edited by Douglas Wilson, published by CanonPress.Perhaps the most difficult biblical dilemma for those of us who affirm the classic view ofan utterly sovereign and immutable God is the problem of how to make sense of thevarious divine affections spoken of in Scripture. If God is eternally unchangingif Hiswill and His mind are as fixed and constant as His characterhow could He everexperience the rising and falling passions we associate with love, joy, exasperation, oranger?Classic theism teaches that God is impassiblenot subject to suffering, pain, or the ebband flow of involuntary passions. In the words of the Westminster Confession of Faith,God is "without body, parts, or passions, immutable" (2.1).God without passions? Can such a view be reconciled with the biblical data? ConsiderGenesis 5:6-7: "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and thatevery imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And it repentedthe Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart" (emphasisadded). In fact, Scripture frequently ascribes changing emotions to God. At various timesHe is said to be grieved (Psalm 78:40), angry (Deuteronomy 1:37), pleased (1 Kings3:10), joyful (Zephaniah 3:17), and moved by pity (Judges 2:18).Classic theism treats such biblical statements as anthropopathismsfigurativeexpressions ascribing human passions to God. They are the emotional equivalentof those familiar physical metaphors known as anthropomorphismsin whichhands (Exodus 15:17), feet (1 Kings 5:3), eyes (2 Chronicles 16:9), or otherhuman body parts are ascribed to God.We know very well that God is a Spirit (John 4:24), and "a spirit hath not flesh andbones" (Luke 24:39)so when Scripture speaks of God as having body parts, wenaturally read such expressions as figures of speech. Almost no one would claim thatthe biblical tropes ascribing physical features to God are meant to be interpreted 7. literally.[1]But the texts that assign emotions to God are another matter. Many Christians are lothto conclude that these are meant to be taken figuratively in any degree.[2]After all, one of the greatest comforts to any believer is the reassurance that God lovesus. But if love is stripped of passion, we think, it's a lesser kind of love. Doesn't thedoctrine of divine impassibility therefore diminish God's love?To complicate matters further, when we try to contemplate how any of the divineaffections can be fixed and constant, we begin to imagine that God is inert andunfeeling.Fearing such inferences, some veer to the opposite extreme and insist instead that Godis even more passionate than we are. In one of those ubiquitous Internet theologicalforums, a minister who hated the doctrine of divine impassibility wrote, "The God of theBible is much more emotional than we are, not less so!"Someone else sarcastically replied, "Really? Does your god have even bigger moodswings than my mother-in-law?"The point was clear, even if made indelicately. It is a serious mistake to impute any kindof thoughts to God that are cast in the same mold as human passionsas if Godpossessed a temper subject to involuntary oscillation.In fact, a moment's reflection will reveal that if God is "subject to like passions as weare" (cf. James 5:17), His immutability is seriously undermined at every point. If Hiscreatures can literally make Him change His mood by the things they do, then God isn'teven truly in control of His own state of mind. If outside influences can force aninvoluntary change in God's disposition, then what real assurance do we have that Hislove for us will remain constant? That is precisely why Jeremiah cited God's immutabilityand impassibility as the main guarantee of His steadfast love for His own: "It is of theLord's mercies that we are not consumed, because his compassions fail not"(Lamentations 3:22). God Himself made a similar point in Malachi 3:6: "For I am theLord, I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed."Still, many find the doctrine of divine impassibility deeply unsatisfying. After all, whenwe acknowledge that an expression like "the ears of the Lord" (James 5:4) isanthropomorphic, we are recognizing that God has no physical ears. So if we grant thatthe biblical expressions about divine affections are anthropopathic, are we alsosuggesting that God has no real affections? Is He utterly unfeeling? If we allow thatGod's grief, joy, compassion, and delight are anthropopathic, must we thereforeconclude that He is really just cold, apathetic, and indifferent?The Alternative God of Open TheismThat is precisely the way most open theistsand even some who reject open 8. theismhave misconstrued the doctrine of divine impassibility. A recent articlein Christianity Today asserted that the doctrine of impassibility is actually just anoutmoded relic of Greek philosophy that undermines the love of God.If love implies vulnerability, the traditional understanding of God as impassiblemakes it impossible to say that "God is love." An almighty God who cannot sufferis poverty stricken because he cannot love or be involved. If God remainsunmoved by whatever we do, there is really very little point in doing one thingrather than the other. If friendship means allowing oneself to be affected byanother, then this unmoved, unfeeling deity can have no friends or be our friend.[3]Open theist Richard Rice similarly exaggerates the doctrine of impassibility. According tohim, here is the view of God that has dominated church history:God dwells in perfect bliss outside the sphere of time and space . . .. [H]eremains essentially unaffected by creaturely events and experiences. He isuntouched by the disappointment, sorrow or suffering of his creatures. Just ashis sovereign will brooks no opposition, his serene tranquility knows nointerruption.[4]Elsewhere, Rice claims classic theists commonly dismiss the biblical terminology aboutdivine affections as "poetic flights essentially unrelated to the central qualities that theOld Testament attributes to God." Instead, according to Rice, the God of classic theism"is made of sterner stuff. He is powerful, authoritarian and inflexible, so the tenderfeelings we read of in the prophets are merely examples of poetic license."[5] To hearRichard Rice tell it, the God of historic mainstream Christianity is aloof, uncaring,unfeeling, and utterly indifferent to His creatures' plight.By contrast, Rice depicts the God of open theism as a God of fervent passion, whose"inner life"[6] is moved by "a wide range of feelings, including joy, grief, anger, andregret."[7] According to Rice, God also experiences frustrated desires, suffering, agony,and severe anguish. Indeed, all these injuries are inflicted on Him by His own creatures.[8]Clark Pinnock agrees. "God is not cool and collected but is deeply involved and can bewounded."[9] Pinnock believes the essence of divine love and tenderness is seen inGod's "making himself vulnerable within the relationship with us."[10]And so the open theists want to set a stark dichotomy before the Christian public. Thetwo clear and only options, according to them, are the tempestuously passionate God ofopen theism (who is subject to hurts that may be inflicted by His creatures), and theutterly indifferent God they say goes with classic theism (who, at the end of the day,"looks a lot like a metaphysical iceberg"[11]).Consider carefully what the open theists are saying: Their God can be wounded; His own 9. creatures may afflict Him with anguish and woe; He is regularly frustrated when Hisplans are thwarted; and He is bitterly disappointed when His will is stymiedas itregularly is.[12] Open theists have placed God in the hands of angry sinners, becauseonly that kind of God, they claim, is capable of true love, genuine tenderness, ormeaningful affections of any kind.In fact, since the God of classic theism is not capable of being hurt by His creatures,open theists insist that He is also incapable of being "relational"; He is too detached,unfeeling, apathetic, and devoid of all sensitivity. According to open theism, those arethe inescapable ramifications of the doctrine of divine impassibility.That is, frankly, open theism's favorite cheap-shot assault on classic theism. It has greatappeal for their side as far as the typical Christian in the pew is concerned, because notrue believer would ever want to concede that God is callous or uncaring.[13]And the sad truth is that these days the doctrine of divine impassibility is oftenneglected and underemphasized even by those who still affirm classic theism. Manywho reject the other innovations of open theism are wobbly when it comes toimpassibility. They have been too easily swayed by the caricatures, or else . they havebeen too slow to refute them.[14]Sorting Out Some of the DifficultiesTo be perfectly frank, impassibility is a difficult doctrine, both hard to understand andfraught with hazards for anyone who handles it carelessly And dangers lurk on bothsides of the strait and narrow path. While the radical-Arminian open theists are busilylampooning the doctrine of divine impassibility by claiming it makes God an iceberg, afew hyper-Calvinists at the other end of the spectrum actually seem prepared to agreethat God is unfeeling and cold as ice.[15] Obviously, people on both sides of the opentheism debate are confused about this doctrine. And that is to be expected. After all, weare dealing with something we cannot possibly comprehend completely. "For who hathknown the mind of the Lord?" (Romans 11:34).We must begin by acknowledging that we are all too prone to think of God in humanterms. "You thought that I was just like you," God says in Psalm 50:21. "I will reproveyou and state the case in order before your eyes" (NASB). "My thoughts are not yourthoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higherthan the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than yourthoughts" (Isaiah 55:8-9). Again and again, Scripture reminds us that the affections ofGod are ultimately inscrutable (cf. Ephesians 3:19; Romans 11:33).To cite just one example, consider that God's love never wavers and never wanes. Thatalone makes it utterly unlike any human love we have ever experienced. If we considerhow the Bible defines love rather than how we experience the passions associated withit, we can see that human love and divine love both have all the same characteristics,which are spelled out in detail in 1 Corinthians 13. But notice that not one characteristic 10. in the biblical definition of love has anything whatsoever to do with passion. Real love,we discover, is nothing at all like the emotion most people refer to when they mention"love."That's why we must let Scripture, not human experience, shape our understanding ofGod's affections. Those who study the matter biblically will quickly discover that God'sWord, not merely classic theism, sets the divine affections on an infinitely higher planethan human passions. We can learn much from the anthropopathic expressions, but to alarge degree the divine affections remain hidden in impenetrable, incomprehensiblemystery, far above our understanding.We cannot completely grasp what Scripture means, for example, when it tells us thatthe eternally unchanged and unchanging God became so angry against Israel at Sinaithat He threatened to annihilate the entire nation and essentially void the Abrahamiccovenant:And the Lord said unto Moses, I have seen this people, and, behold, it is a stiffneckedpeople: Now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and thatI may consume them: and I will make of thee a great nation. And Moses besought theLord his God, and said, Lord, why doth thy wrath wax hot against thy people, which thouhast brought forth out of the land of Egypt with great power, and with a mighty hand?(Exodus 32:10-11).Two things are perfectly clear from such an account: First, we are not to read thispassage and imagine that God is literally subject to fits and temper tantrums. His wrathagainst sin is surely something more than just a bad mood. We know this passage is notto be interpreted with a wooden literalness.How can we be so sure? Well, Scripture clearly states that there is no actualvariableness in God (cf. James 1:17). He could not have truly and literally been waveringover whether to keep His covenant with Abraham (Deuteronomy 4:31). Moses'intercession in this incident (Exodus 32:12-14) could not literally have provoked achange of mind in God (Numbers 23:19). In other words, a strictly literal interpretationof the anthropopathism in this passage is an impossibility, for it would impugn eitherthe character of God or the trustworthiness of His Word.Nonetheless, a second truth emerges just as clearly from this vivid account of God'srighteousness anger. The passage destroys the notion that God is aloof and uninvolvedin relationship with His people. Even though these descriptions of God's anger are not tobe taken literally, neither are they to be discarded as meaningless.In other words, we can begin to make sense of the doctrine of impassibility only afterwe concede the utter impossibility of comprehending the mind of God.The next step is to recognize the biblical use of anthropopathism. (Since our thoughtsare not like God's thoughts, His thoughts must be described to us in human terms we 11. can understand. Many vital truths about God cannot be expressed except throughfigures of speech that accommodate the limitations of human language andunderstanding.)[16]The anthropopathisms must then be mined for their meaning. While it is true that theseare figures of speech, we must nonetheless acknowledge that such expressions meansomething. Specifically, they are reassurances to us that God is not uninvolved andindifferent to His creation.However, because we recognize them as metaphorical, we must also confess that thereis something they do not mean. They do not mean that God is literally subject to moodswings or melancholy, spasms of passion or temper tantrums. And in order to make thisvery clear, Scripture often stresses the constancy of God's love, the infiniteness of hismercies, the certainty of His promises, the unchangeableness of His mind, and the lackof any fluctuation in His perfections. "With [God there] is no variableness, neithershadow of turning" (James 1:17). This absolute immutability is one of God'stranscendent characteristics, and we must resist the tendency to bring it in line with ourfinite human understanding.What Does Impassibility Mean, Then?What about the charge that impassibility turns God into an iceberg? Thecomplaint turns out to be bogus. In truth, mainstream classic theism has alwaysdenied that God is cold and remote from his creation. One of the earliest ChurchFathers, Justin Martyr, said any view of God that sees Him as apathetic amountsto a kind of atheistic nominalism:If any one disbelieves that God cares for [His creation], he will thereby eitherinsinuate that God does not exist, or he will assert that though He exists Hedelights in vice, or exists like a stone, and that neither virtue nor vice areanything, but only in the opinion of men these things are reckoned good or evil.And this is the greatest profanity and wickedness.[17]God isn't like a stone or an iceberg. His immutability is not inertia. The fact thatHe doesn't change His mind certainly doesn't mean He is devoid of thought.Likewise, the fact that He isn't subject to involuntary passions doesn't mean He isdevoid of true affections. What it does mean is that God's mind and God'saffections are not like human thoughts and passions. There's never anythinginvoluntary, irrational, or out of control about the divine affections. Here's howJ. I. Packer describes the doctrine of impassibility:This means, not that God is impassive and unfeeling (a frequentmisunderstanding), but that no created beings can inflict pain, sufferingand distress on him at their own will. In so far as God enters intosuffering and grief (which Scripture's many anthropopathisms, plus thefact of the cross, show that he does), it is by his own deliberate decision; 12. he is never his creatures' hapless victim. The Christian mainstream hasconstrued impassibility as meaning not that God is a stranger to joy anddelight, but rather that his joy is permanent, clouded by no involuntarypain.[18]Notice Packer's emphasis: God's affections are never passive and involuntary, butrather always active and deliberate. Elsewhere, Packer writes,[Impassibility is] not impassivity, unconcern, and impersonal detachment inface of the creation; not insensitivity and indifference to the distresses of a fallenworld; not inability or unwillingness to empathize with human pain and grief; butsimply that God's experiences do not come upon him as ours come upon us, forhis are foreknown, willed and chosen by himself, and are not involuntarysurprises forced on him from outside, apart from his own decision, in the waythat ours regularly are.[19]R. L. Dabney saw the doctrine in a similar light. He described God's affections as "activeprinciples"to distinguish them from mere passive emotions. He wrote,These are not passions, in the sense of fluctuations or agitations, but none theless they are affections of his will, actively distinguished from the cognitions inhis intelligence. They are true optative functions of the divine Spirit [expressionsof God's spiritual desires and wishes].[20] However anthropopathic may be thestatements regarding God's repentings, wrath, pity, pleasure, love, jealousy,hatred, in the Scriptures, we should do violence to them if we denied that hehere meant to ascribe to Himself active affections in some mode suitable to hisnature.[21]Note that both Packer and Dabney insist, and do not deny, that God has true affections.Both, however, see the divine affections as always active, never passive. God is thesovereign initiator and instigator of all His own affectionswhich are neveruncontrolled or arbitrary. He cannot be made to emote against His will, but is always thesource and author of all His affective dispositions.Edwards made another helpful distinction. He wrote,The affections and passions are frequently spoken of as the same; and yet, inthe more common use of speech, there is in some respect a difference. Affectionis a word that, in its ordinary signification, seems to be something moreextensive than passion, being used for all vigorous lively actings of the will orinclination; but passion for those that are more sudden, and whose effects onthe animal spirits are more violent, and the mind more overpowered, and less inits own command.[22]Edwards was suggesting that passions are involuntary and non-rational; whereasaffections are volitions and dispositions that are under the control of the rational 13. senses.Given such a distinction, it seems perfectly appropriate to say that whereas God is"without passions," He is surely not "without affections." In fact, His joy, His wrath, Hissorrow, His pity, His compassion, His delight, His love, his hatredand all the otherdivine affectionsepitomize the very perfection of all the heartfelt affections we know(albeit imperfectly) as humans. His affections are absent the ebb and flow ofchangeableness that we experience with human emotions, but they are real andpowerful feelings nonetheless. To suggest that God is unfeeling is to mangle the intentof the doctrine of impassibility.So a proper understanding of impassibility should not lead us to think God is unfeeling.But His "feelings" are never passive. They don't come and go or change and fluctuate.They are active, sovereignly-directed dispositions rather than passive reactions toexternal stimuli. They differ in this way from human passions.Furthermore, God's hatred and His love, His pleasure and his grief over sinare as fixedand immutable as any other aspect of the divine character (Numbers 23:19; 1 Samuel15:29; Malachi 3:6; James 1:17).[23] If God appears to change moods in the biblicalnarrativeor in the outworking of His Providenceit is only because from time to timein His dealings with His people, He brings these various dispositions more or less to theforefront, showing us all the aspects of His character. But His love is never overwhelmedby His wrath, or vice versa. In fact, there is no real change in Him at all.How can that be? We don't know. As humans we can no more imagine how God'saffections can be eternally free from change than we can comprehend infinity itself. InDabney's words, "Can we picture an adequate conception of [God's affections]? No; 'it ishigh; we cannot attain to it.' But this is the consistent understanding of revelation, andthe only apprehension of God which does not both transcend and violate man'sreason."[24] God's affections, like every other aspect of His character, simply cannot beunderstood in purely human terms. And that is why Scripture employs anthropopathicexpressions.Dabney also gave a wise word of caution about the danger of brushing aside themeaning of biblical figures of speech. While he acknowledged the widespread use ofanthropopathism in Scripture, he was not willing to evacuate such metaphors of theircommon-sense implications. These may be figurative expressions, Dabney argued, butthey are not devoid of meaning. Citing some verses that speak of God's delight and Hiswrath, Dabney asked, "Is all this so anthropopathic as not even to mean that God'sactive principles here have an objective? Why not let the Scriptures mean what they soplainly strive to declare?"[25]Unlike the modern open theists, Dabney saw clearly both sides of what the Scripturesstrive to declare: God is unchanging and unchangeable, but He is not devoid of affectionfor His creation. His impassibility should never be set against His affections. Hisimmutability does not rule out personal involvement with His creatures. Transcendence 14. isn't incompatible with immanence.God is not a metaphysical iceberg. While He is never at the mercy of His creatures,neither is He detached from them. His wrath against sin is real and powerful. Hiscompassion for sinners is also sincere and indefatigable. His mercies are truly over all Hisworks. And above all, His eternal love for His people is more real, more powerful, andmore enduring than any earthly emotion that ever bore the label "love." Unlike humanlove, God's love is unfailing, unwavering, and eternally constant. That fact alone oughtto convince us that God's affections are not like human passions.In fact, isn't that a basic principle of Christianity itself? Anyone who imagines the divineaffections as fluid, vacillating passions has no biblical understanding of the steadfastnessand faithfulness of our God. That is why I object so strongly to open theism's denial ofGod's impassibility. In the name of making God more "relational," they haveundermined the constancy of His love; they have divested Him of yet another of Hisincommunicable attributes, and they have taken another giant step further towardrefashioning Him in the image of His creatures. Who can tell where the campaign tohumanize God will end?[26]NOTES1. Presumably, even most open theists would not claim that God has a physical body.Recently, however, I corresponded with a pastor from a well-known evangelical churchin the United Kingdom who told me he believes God does have a physical form. Heworships a corporeal deity, a being not unlike the gods one reads about in Greekmythology. And this pastor, like so many open theists, had the temerity to insist that it isthe God of classic theism who is derived from Greek thought!2. Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale Divinity School,says he rejected the doctrine of impassibility after the death of his own son. Shatteredby grief, Wolterstorff concluded that God could not possibly be unmoved by humantragedy. "I found that picture [of God as blissfully unperturbed by this world's anguish]impossible to acceptexistentially impossible. I could not live with it; I found itgrotesque." ["Does God Suffer?" Modern Reformation (Sept-Oct 1999), 45.]3. Dennis Ngien, "The God Who Suffers," Christianity Today (3 February 1997), 38. Thearticle's subtitle distills the message: "If God does not grieve, then can he love at all? Anargument for God's emotions."4. Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, David Basinger, TheOpenness of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994), 12.5. Ibid., 25.6. Ibid., 23-24. 15. 7. Ibid., 22.8. Ibid., 24.9. Ibid., 118.10. "An Interview with Clark Pinnock," Modern Reformation (Nov-Dec, 1998), 37.11. Ibid.12. In their zeal to avoid what they wrongly imagine makes God apathetic, they havereplaced Him with a god who is merely pathetic.13. According to Pinnock, the doctrine of impassibility is "the most dubious of the divineattributes discussed in classic theism." [Pinnock, et al., The Openness of God, 118.]Impassibility has certainly proven to be a much easier target for open theists than theother aspects of God's immutability.14. For example, Wayne Grudem's mostly-superb Systematic Theology quickly dismissesthe doctrine of impassibility. Grudem writes, "I have not affirmed God's impassibility inthis book . . .. God, who is the origin of our emotions and who created our emotions,certainly does feel emotions" (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 166. Grudem seems tothink the Westminster Confession's statement that God is "without . . . passions" meansto portray God as utterly apathetic. He therefore agrees with the critics of classic theismwho claim the doctrine of impassibility makes God cold and unfeeling. What Grudemdoesn't discuss is the nature of God's "emotions" and how they differ from humanpassions. His entire discussion of divine immutability is marred by this, and it evenseems to cause him to take a weak stance on the question of whether God actuallychanges His mind.15. I have a thick file of Internet correspondence from various ultra-high Calvinists whoinsist that the optative expressions ascribed to God in Scripture (see note 20) are utterlymeaningless because they are anthropopathisms. One man whose ultraism had got thebetter of him wrote me, "God has no desires and no affections, no true delight or grief,and certainly no sorrow over anything that comes to passbecause His mind is pure,sovereign, irresistible will. You yourself acknowledge that the verses that talk aboutdivine affections are anthropopathic. Why can't you see that such expressions teach usnothing whatsoever about how God really thinks?" That man and the open theists havefar more in common than he would care to admit. Both are convinced that the doctrineof impassibility makes God utterly cold and unfeeling. Both are wrong, however. Whileanthropomorphisms are not to be taken as wooden, literal truths, they certainly aremeant to convey some truth about the mind and heart of God (as we shall note againnear the end in this chapter.)16. Open theists must concede this point if they are honest. Unless they are willing toargue that God has physical features (like that British pastor mentioned in note 1), theythemselves tacitly acknowledge that figurative language is regularly employed 16. throughout Scripture to describe God. Yet inconsistently, they insist on a hermeneuticthat interprets every reference to divine passions in a rigorously literal sense. Since bothsides already understand and agree that true knowledge of God far surpasses thelimitations of human thought and language, there is simply no good reason for opentheism's stubborn refusal to allow for anthropopathism where Scripture is dealing witha subject as mysterious and incomprehensible as the divine affections.17. First Apology (c. 150), 28.18. J. I. Packer, "God," in Sinclair Ferguson and David Wright, eds., New Dictionary ofTheology (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1998), 277.19. "Theism for Our Time," in Peter T. O'Brien and David G. Peterson, God Who Is Rich inMercy (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986), 16.20. The question of whether God can in any sense "desire" what He does notsovereignly bring to pass further complicates the whole question of divine impassibilitybut is too involved to deal with fully in this chapter. It is worth noting, however, thatScripture often imputes unfulfilled desires to God (e.g., Deuteronomy 5:29; Psalm 81:13;Isaiah 48:18; Ezekiel 18:31-32; Matthew 23:13; Luke 19:41-42). And the question ofwhat these expressions mean involves the very same issues that arise out of the debateover impassibility.Specifically, we know that expressions of desire and longing from the heart of Godcannot be taken in a simplistically literal sense without compromising the sovereignty ofGod. After all, Scripture says God accomplishes all His pleasure (Isaiah 46:10); He worksall things after the counsel of His own will (Ephesians 1:11). Nothing can ever frustrateHim in an ultimate sense. Therefore the yearning God expresses in these verses must tosome degree be anthropopathic. At the same time, we must also see that theseexpressions mean something. They reveal an aspect of the divine mind that is utterlyimpossible to reconcile with the view of those who insist that God's sovereign decreesare equal to His "desires" in every meaningful sense. Is there no sense in which God everwishes for or prefers anything other than what actually occurs (including the fall ofAdam, the damnation of the wicked, and every evil in between)? My own opinionandI think Dabney would have agreedis that those who refuse to see any true expressionof God's heart whatsoever in His optative exclamations have embraced the spirit of thehyper-Calvinist error.21. "God's Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy," in Discussions, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: Bannerof Truth, 1982 reprint), 1:291.22. Treatise Concerning the Religious Affections (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1961reprint), 26-27 (italics added).23. Someone with whom I once corresponded on these issues raised the questionwhether all God's affections, including the negative ones, are eternally and equally 17. unchanging: "Is the Holy Spirit endlessly and permanently grieved?"Careful reflection will reveal that God's holy hatred of sin must be an immutableaffection in the very same sense that His love is unchanging and unwavering. Surely weare not to imagine that His hatred of sin diminishes or grows stronger at varying times.He hates evil with a perfect hatred. And His utter loathing for sin is the main gist of whatScripture refers to when it says the Holy Spirit is "grieved" by our sin. (The expressiondoes not mean the Almighty is literally made to suffer.) So God's hatred of sin is a divineaffection that is permanent, fixed, eternal. The manifestation of that hatred maychange, however, which is why we perceive that the Holy Spirit is grieved with this orthat particular act of sin on particular occasions (cf. 2 Samuel 11:27).This argues for the doctrine of eternal punishment. Since God's mind is eternallyunchanging, the dispositions that color His attitude toward sin (grief, wrath, hatred, etc.)must be as eternal and unwavering as His love. The eternality of His wrath is seen in thebiblical descriptions of hell.24. Dabney, 293.25. Ibid., 292.26. Wolterstorff, who rejects impassibility, admits that the denial of this doctrine is likea thread that, when pulled, unravels our entire understanding of God. "Once you pull onthe thread of impassibility, a lot of other threads come along . . .. One also has to give upimmutability (changelessness) and eternity. If God responds, then God is notmetaphysically immutable; and if not metaphysically immutable, then not eternal."["Does God Suffer?", 47.]==================================================================================The Transcendental Argument for the Existence ofGodMatt Slick http://carm.org/transcendental-argumentThis is an attempt to demonstrate the existence of God using logical absolutes. Theoversimplified argument, which is expanded in outline form below, goes as follows:Logical absolutes exist. Logical absolutes are conceptual by nature--are not dependenton space, time, physical properties, or human nature. They are not the product of thephysical universe (space, time, matter) because if the physical universe were todisappear, logical absolutes would still be true. Logical Absolutes are not the product ofhuman minds because human minds are different--not absolute. But, since logicalabsolutes are always true everywhere and not dependent upon human minds, it mustbe an absolute transcendent mind that is authoring them. This mind is called God.Furthermore, if there are only two options to account for something, i.e., God and noGod1 2, and one of them is negated, then by default the other position is validated. 18. Therefore, part of the argument is that the atheist position cannot account for theexistence of logical absolutes from its worldview.Logical AbsolutesLaw of IdentitySomething is what it is and isn't what it is not. Something that exists has aspecific nature.For example, a cloud is a cloud--not a rock. A fish is a fish--not a car.Law of Non-ContradictionSomething cannot be both true and false at the same time in the same sense.For example, to say that the cloud is not a cloud would be a contradiction since itwould violate the first law. The cloud cannot be what it is and not what it is at the sametime.Law of Excluded Middle (LEM)A statement is either true or false without a middle ground."I am alive" is either true or false. "You are pregnant" is either true or false.Note one: "This statement is false" is not a valid statement (not logically true)since it is self-refuting and is dealt with by the Law of Non-contradiction. Therefore, itdoes not fall under the LEM category since it is a self-contradiction.Note two: If we were to ignore note one, then there is a possible paradoxhere. The sentence "this statement is false" does not fit this Law since if it is true, thenit is false. Paradoxes occur only when we have absolutes. Nevertheless, the LEM is validexcept for the paradoxical statement cited.Note three: If we again ignore note one and admit a paradox, then we mustacknowledge that paradoxes exist only within the realm of absolutes.Logical absolutes are truth statements such as:That which exists has attributes and a nature.A cloud exists and has the attributes of whiteness, vapor, etc. It has the nature ofwater and air.A rock is hard, heavy, and is composed of its rock material (granite, marble,sediment, etc.). 19. Something cannot be itself and not itself at the same time.It cannot be true to state that a rock is not a rock.Something cannot bring itself into existence.In order for something to bring itself into existence, it has to have attributes inorder to perform an action. But if it has attributes, then it already has existence. Ifsomething does not exist, it has no attributes and can perform no actions. Therefore,something cannot bring itself into existence.Truth is not self-contradictory.It could not be true that you are reading this and not reading this at the sametime in the same sense. It is either true or false that you are reading this.Therefore, Logical Absolutes are absolutely true. They are not subjectively true;that is, they are not sometimes true and sometimes false, depending on preference orsituation. Otherwise, they would not be absolute.Logical Absolutes form the basis of rational discourse.If the Logical Absolutes are not absolute, then truth cannot be known.If the Logical Absolutes are not absolute, then no rational discourse can occur.For example, I could say that a square is a circle (violating the law of identity), orthat I am and am not alive in the same sense at the same time (violating the law of non-contradiction).But no one would expect to have a rational conversation with someone whospoke in contradictory statements.If Logical Absolutes are not always true, then it might be true that something cancontradict itself, which would make truth unknowable and rational discourseimpossible. But, saying that something can contradict itself can't be true.But since we know things are true (I exist, you are reading this), then we canconclude that logical statements are true. Otherwise, we would not be able to rationallydiscuss or know truth.If they are not the basis of rational discourse, then we cannot know truth or errorsince the laws that govern rationality are not absolute. This would allow people tospeak irrationally, i.e., blue sleeps faster than Wednesday.Logical Absolutes are transcendent.Logical Absolutes are not dependent on space. 20. They do not stop being true dependent on location. If we travel a million lightyears in a direction, logical absolutes are still true.Logical Absolutes are not dependent on time.They do not stop being true dependent on time. If we travel a billion years in thefuture or past, logical absolutes are still true.Logical Absolutes are not dependent on people. That is, they are not the productof human thinking.People's minds are different. What one person considers to be absolute may notbe what another considers to be absolute. People often contradict each other.Therefore, Logical Absolutes cannot be the product of human, contradictory minds.If Logical Absolutes were the product of human minds, they would cease to existif people ceased to exist, which would mean they would be dependent on human minds.But this cannot be so per the previous point.Logical Absolutes are not dependent on the material world.Logical Absolutes are not found in atoms, motion, heat, under rocks, etc.Logical Absolutes cannot be photographed, frozen, weighed, or measured.Logical Absolutes are not the product of the physical universe since that wouldmean they were contingent on atoms, motion, heat, etc., and that their nature wasdependent on physical existence.If their nature were dependent upon physical existence, they would cease to existwhen the physical universe ceases to exist.If they were properties of the universe, then they could be measured the sameway heat, motion, mass, etc., are measured. Since they cannot be measured, they arenot properties of the universe.But, if the universe did not exist, logical absolutes are still true.For example, if the universe did not exist, it would still be true that somethingcannot bring itself into existence and that if A=B and B=C, then A=C. The condition ofthe universe does not effect these truths.For example, if the universe did not exist, it would still be true that somethingcannot be itself and not itself at the same time.Therefore, Logical Absolutes are not dependent on the material world.Logical Absolutes are conceptual by nature. 21. Logic is a process of the mind. Logical absolutes provide the framework for logicalthought processes. Therefore, it seems proper to say that Logical Absolutes areconceptual by nature since Logical Absolutes are truth statements about Logical things.If you disagree that Logical Absolutes are conceptual by nature, then pleaseexplain what they are if not conceptual realities.If you cannot determine what they are, then how can you logically assert thatthey are not conceptual realities since logic is a process of the mind and logicalabsolutes are truth statements which are also products of the mind? Expanded: Logicalabsolutes are either conceptual by nature, or they are not.If they are conceptual by nature, then they are not dependent upon the physicaluniverse for their existence.If they are dependent on the physical universe for their existence, then are theysaid to be properties of the universe the same way that red is a property of an apple?If Logical Absolutes are said to be properties of the universe, then can they bemeasured the same way that other properties of the universe can be measured? If theycannot, then how are they properties of the physical universe?If they are not properties of the universe and they are of the mind, then it seemsproper to say that they are conceptual by nature, and that they depend on mind fortheir existence.If they are not conceptual by nature, then:What is their nature?If it is denied that Logical Absolutes are either conceptual or not conceptual, thenthis is impossible because "conceptual or not conceptual" entails all possible options.Either Logical Absolutes are conceptual by nature or they are not.If they are not conceptual by nature, then what are they? If it is not known whatthey are, then how can it be said what they are not since, it seems fair to say, thatknowing what something is not also entails knowing something about what it is?For example, I know what water is. If someone says that a piece of wood iswater by nature, I would say that it is not. If someone says that a frying pan is water bynature, I would say it is not. If someone were to say to me that a "flursist" (a word I justmade up that represents an unknown thing) is by nature hard, how then can I rationallydeny such a claim by saying "I don't know what a flursist is, but I know it isn't hard"?The response would be, "Since you don't know what it is, how do you know what it isnot?" Is the response correct or not correct?Thoughts reflect the mind 22. A person's thoughts are the product of that person's mind.A mind that is irrational will produce irrational thoughts.A mind that is rational will produce rational thoughts.It seems fair to say that an absolutely perfect mind would produce perfectthoughts.Since the Logical Absolutes are transcendent, absolute, are perfectly consistent,and are independent of the universe, then it seems proper to say that they reflect atranscendent, absolute, perfect, and independent mind.We call this transcendent, absolute, perfect, and independent mind God since aphysical brain is not transcendent by nature because it is limited to physical space; andGod is, by definition, transcendent in nature.Objections AnsweredLogical Absolutes are the result of natural existence.In what sense are they the result of natural existence? How do conceptualabsolutes form as a result of the existence of matter?How does one chemical state of the physical brain that leads to another physicalstate of the physical brain produce Logical Absolutes that are not dependent upon thephysical brain for their validity?If they are a part of natural existence (the universe), then they would cease toexist if the universe ceased.This has not been proven to be true.It implies that logic is a property of physical matter, but this is addressed inpoint 5 above.Logical Absolutes simply exist.This is begging the question by saying they exist because they exist and does notprovide an explanation for their existence. Simply saying they exist is not an answer.Logical Absolutes are axiomsAn axiom is a truth that is self-evident. To say that Logical Absolutes are axiomsis to beg the question by saying they are simply self-evident truths because they areself-evident truths and fails to account for their existence.Logical Absolutes are conventions. 23. A convention, in this context, is an agreed upon principle. But since people differon what is and is not true, then logical absolutes cannot be the product of human mindsand therefore are not human conventions, that is, of human agreements.This would mean that logical absolutes were invented as a result of an agreementby a sufficient number of people. But this would mean that logical absolutes are aproduct of human minds, which cannot be the case since human minds differ and areoften contradictory. Furthermore, the nature of logical absolutes is that they transcendspace and time (not dependent on space and time for their validity) and are absolute(they don't change) by nature. Therefore, they could not be the product of humanminds which are finite and not absolute.This would mean that if people later disagreed on what was a Logical Absolute,then the absolutes would change based on "vote," and they would not then beabsolute.Logical Absolutes are eternal.What is meant by stating they are eternal?If a person says that logical absolutes have always existed, then how is it theycould exist without a mind (if the person denies the existence of an absolute andtranscendent mind)? After all, logic is a process of the mind.Logical Absolutes are uncaused.Since the nature of logic is conceptual and logical absolutes form the frameworkof this conceptual upon which logical processes are based, it would seem logical toconclude that the only way logical absolutes could be uncaused is if there was anuncaused and absolute mind authoring them.Logical Absolutes are self-authenticating.This means that logical absolutes validate themselves. While this is true, it doesnot explain their existence.It is begging the question. It just says they are because they are.Logical Absolutes are like rules of chess, which are not absolute and transcendent.The rules of chess are human inventions since Chess is a game invented bypeople. In fact, the rules of chess have changed over the years, but logical absoluteshave not. So, comparing the rules of chess to logical absolutes is invalid.There are different kinds of logic.Saying there are different kinds of logic does not explain the existence of logicalabsolutes. 24. In different systems of logic, there must be undergirding, foundational principlesupon which those systems are based. How are those foundational principles accountedfor? The same issue applies to them as it does to Logical Absolutes in classical logic."Logical absolutes need no transcendental existence: saying 'they would be trueeven if matter didn't exist' is irrelevant because we're concerned with their existence--not their logical validity. Saying 'the idea of a car would still exist even if matter didn'texist' doesn't imply that your car is transcendental (reductio ad absurdum)."Why do logical absolutes need no transcendental existence? Simply saying theydon't need a transcendental existence doesn't make it so nor does it account for theirexistence.Also, why is it irrelevant to say they would be true even if matter didn't exist? Onthe contrary, it is precisely relevant to the discussion since we're dealing with the natureof logical absolutes which are conceptual realities--not physical ones.The illustration that a car would still exist if matter did not exist is illogical. Bydefinition, a car is made of matter; and if matter did not exist, a car could not logicallyexist. By contrast, logical absolutes are not made of matter. The objection is invalid."Logical abstractions do not have existence independent of our minds. They areconstructs in our minds (i.e., brains), and we use them to carry out computations vianeural networks, silicon networks, etc., suggested by the fact that logic--like language--islearned--not inbuilt (balls in your court to demonstrate an independent existence orproblem with this)." ( . . . continued in next objection . . . )How do you know that logical abstractions do not have existence independent ofour minds? Saying so doesn't make it so. This is precisely one of the points about thenature of logical absolutes; namely, that they are a process of the mind but are notdependent upon human bodies because human minds contradict each other and arealso self-contradictory. This would preclude our minds from being the authors of whatis logically absolute. Furthermore, if they are constructions of our minds, then all I haveto do is claim victory in any argument because that is how I construct my logicalabstractions. But, of course, you wouldn't accept this as being valid. Therefore, thisdemonstrates that your assertion is incorrect.How can an atheist logically claim that one chemical state in the brain whichleads to another state necessitates proper logical inference? It seems quite unlikely andwithout proof of some sort saying that Logical Absolutes are abstractions of (human)minds doesn't account for them.(continued from previous objection . . . ) "Logical absolutes are absolute and notbecause of some special quality but because we judge them using logic. Therefore, theirabsoluteness doesn't arise from any special ontological quality (category error on yourpart)." 25. You are begging the question. You use logic to demonstrate that logical absolutesare absolute. You are not giving a rational reason for their existence. Instead, youassume their existence and argue accordingly.Furthermore, when you presuppose the validity of logical absolutes todemonstrate they are absolute, you contradict your statement in your previousobjection about them being constructs of human minds. They cannot be constructs ofhuman minds because human minds contradict each other and themselves whereLogical Absolutes do not.Where is the category mistake? The nature of logical absolutes is that they areconceptual. This is something I have brought out before so that their categories do notget mixed. The nature of logical absolutes is exactly relevant to the question.(continued from previous objection . . . ) "Logical absolutes can be accuratelydescribed as conventions in communication. The fact that they are widely employeddoes not imply anything transcendental, any more than the wide employment of theword "lolly" as something small and yummy implies that the word "lolly" istranscendental (non sequitor)."Saying that they are "widely employed does not imply anything transcendental" isinaccurate. Something that is transcendental, as in logical absolutes, would naturally bewidely employed because they are valid and transcendent; otherwise, they wouldn't beuniversally used. You have recognized that they are widely used, but they are becausethey are transcendent. They do not become transcendent because they are widelyused.This still does not account for the existence of logical absolutes.(continued from previous objection . . . ) "Logical processes are clearly carried outby material constructs, usually neural or electrical. They do this without any known"input" or "guidance" from anything transcendental, which makes you wonder whyanything transcendental is needed in the equation at all (reality check)."You haven't defined "material construct" or what you mean by neural orelectrical (constructs). If you mean a computer or something of that kind, this doesn'thelp you because humans designed them using logic. If you mean that they are theprocess of the human brain, you still haven't solved the problem of their existence; sincethe implication would be that if our minds do not exist, logical absolutes would not existeither. But this would mean that logical absolutes were not absolute but dependentupon human minds. Again, the problem would be that human minds are different andcontradict each other. Therefore, logical absolutes, which are not contradictory, cannotbe the product of minds that are contradictory.As stated above how does one establish that one chemical state in the brainwhich leads to another state necessitates proper logical inference? Asserting it doesn't 26. make it so, and concluding that chemical reactions lead to logical inferences has not yetbeen established to be true or even that it could be at all.You don't have to know the input or understand the guidance from anythingtranscendental for the transcendentals to be true."Logic is one of those characteristics that any healthy human 'has.' It's not free tovary from one person to the next for the same kind of reason that 'number of eyes' is avalue that doesn't vary between healthy humans."Saying that logic is something that everyone "has" does not explain its existence.Essentially, this is begging the question stating that something exists because it exists.The analogy of "eyes" is a category mistake. Eyes are organs. Differentorganisms have different kinds of eyes and different numbers of eyes. Logic isconsistent and independent of biological structures.Logic is the result of the semantics of the language which we have chosen: astatement is a theorem of logic if and only if it is valid in all conceivable worlds. If thelanguage is trivalent (true/indetermined/false), tertium non datur is invalid. Uniformityof the universe can be rationally expected in a non-theistic universe. If there is no onearound with the transcendental power to change it, why should the behavior of theuniverse tomorrow differ from its behavior today?"Semantics of the language." Semantics deals with the study of the meaning ofwords, their development, changes in meaning, and the interpretation of words, etc.But semantics by nature deals with the changing meaning of words and the oftensubjective nature of language and its structures. To say the absolutes of logic are aresult of the use of the subjective meanings of words is problematic. How do you derivelogical absolutes from the non-absolute semantic structures of non-absolute languages?Furthermore, simply asserting that logic is a result of the semantics of thelanguage does not explain the transcendent nature of logic. Remember, the TAGargument asserts that Logical Absolutes are independent of human existence--reasonsgiven at the beginning of the paper. Since language, in this context, is a result of humanexistence, the argument would suggest that logic came into existence when languagecame into existence. But this would invalidate the nature of logical absolutes and theirtranscendent characteristics. Therefore, this objection is invalid.If logic is the result of language, then logic came into existence with language.This cannot be for the reasons stated above.If logic is the result of language and since language rules change, then can weconclude that the laws of logic would also change? If so, then the laws of logic are notlaws; they are not absolute.Saying that "a statement is a theorem of logic" does not account for logic but 27. presupposes existence of logic. This is begging the question.Only two optionsIf we have only two possible options by which we can explain something and one ofthose options is removed, by default the other option is verified since it is impossible tonegate both of the only two exist options.God either exists or does not exist. There is no third option.If the no-god position, atheism, clearly fails to account for Logical Absolutes from itsperspective, then it is negated, and the other option is verified.Atheism cannot account for the necessary preconditions for intelligibility, namely,the existence of logical absolutes. Therefore, it is invalidated as a viable option foraccounting for them and the only other option, God exists, is validated.See Related ArticlesResponse to Wiki Criticism of the CARM Transcendental Argument1. This is an antonymic pair that has no third option. There either exists a god, orthere does not exist a god. Polytheism includes the idea of at least one god existing asdoes panentheism and pantheism. Therefore, it is included in the "god" position.2. I sometimes update articles, often in responses to criticism or just polishing. I haveupdated this article in response to a criticism found athttp://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Transcendental_argument by mentioningthe conclusion here at the beginning, 10/19/11. Since I have already modified thisargument in the past, I am not aware of what version of the article the criticism tacklessince it seems to ignore answers to objections included in the original document.