Doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0 Submission May 2002 Martin Lefkowitz, Texas InstrumentsSlide 1 Implicit...
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Transcript of Doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0 Submission May 2002 Martin Lefkowitz, Texas InstrumentsSlide 1 Implicit...
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 1
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Implicit Initialization Vectors
Martin Lefkowitz,
Texas Instruments
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 2
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Presentation Overivew
• History of the IV in an 802.11 packet
• Application of the IV in future implementations
• Issues involved in Changing the IV, or format of a packet.
• Optimization of 48 bit IV Extension
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 3
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
1999 WEP Properties
• 8.2.2 Properties of the WEP algorithm– It is reasonably strong: The security afforded by the algorithm
relies on the difficulty of discovering the secret key through a brute-force attack. This in turn is related to the length of the secret key and the frequency of changing keys. WEP allows for the changing of the key (k) and frequent changing of the IV.• Hah!
– It is self-synchronizing: WEP is self-synchronizing for each message. This property is critical for a data-link level encryption algorithm, where “best effort” delivery is assumed and packet loss rates may be high..
– It is efficient: The WEP algorithm is efficient and may be implemented in either hardware or software.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 4
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
1999 WEP Properties
• — It may be exportable: Every effort has been made to design the WEP system operation so as to maximize the chances of approval, by the U.S. Department of Commerce, of export from the U.S. of products containing a WEP implementation. However, due to the legal and political climate toward cryptography at the time of publication, no guarantee can be made that any specific IEEE 802.11 implementations that use WEP will be exportable from the USA.
• — It is optional: The implementation and use of WEP is an IEEE 802.11 option.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 5
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
History of IV in packet (WEP)
• 8.2.3 WEP theory of operation– The IV may be changed as frequently as every MPDU and, since it
travels with the message, the receiver will always be able to decipher any message. The IV is transmitted in the clear since it does not provide an attacker with any information about the secret key, and since its value must be known by the recipient in order to perform the decryption.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 6
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
IV Problems Described in 1999
• 8.2.3 WEP theory of operation– When choosing how often to change IV values, implementors
should consider that the contents of some fields in higher-layer protocol headers, as well as certain other higher-layer information, is constant or highly predictable. When such information is transmitted while encrypting with a particular key and IV, an eavesdropper can readily determine portions of the key sequence generated by that (key, IV) pair. If the same (key, IV) pair is used for successive MPDUs, this effect may substantially reduce the degree of privacy conferred by the WEP algorithm, allowing an eavesdropper to recover a subset of the user data without any knowledge of the secret key. Changing the IV after each MPDU is a simple method of preserving the effectiveness of WEP in this situation.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 7
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Application of IV for Future Implementations
• While there is no properties section in the current draft, in general, the WEP properties (goals) are valid for future forms of encryption.– It is reasonably strong
• This is a moving target.
– It is self-synchronizing• This is now true not only for packet loss, but for the QOS property of packets
coming out of order.
– It is efficient• While it is an advantage to be able to do this in software, even Hardware
implementations, and the protocol can benefit from efficiency. – Efficiency = performance.
– It may be exportable• No longer an issue
– It is optional
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 8
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Solution to IV Issues
• Enforce IV change for every packet– Introduce sequential count
• Enforce that IV never be reused with the same key.– Three possible solutions:
• Rapid Rekeying: Change Key before IV runs out.
• Extend the IV: 48 bit
• Both
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 9
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Issues With Rapid Rekey
• Disadvantage– Making sure Queues are flushed when packets
can come out of order, and may be stalled makes it hard to know when exactly to change over. Very complicated. Hard to get right.
• Advantage– Key changing happens automatically
• The user/IT administrator need not know exactly when the key changes
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 10
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Need for Rekeying
• At the given rates the a single key can last > 100 years there is no reason to rekey, other than human issues.– The longer a key is used the longer someone may find
it through other means than cracking
– Disgruntled Employee.
• Group Key Rekey– Too many people may have the means to decode the
key, therefore it would be a good idea to rekey eariler
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 11
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
48 Bit IV Expansion Issues
• Adding 4 more bytes to the packet– Certain legacy hardware implementations take
advantage of the frame format, and require the IV to be in that place, for TKIP.• This can be overcome by reordering the IV fields to make
keymixing more streamlined.
• More Overhead for packet.– Regardless of size, we are adding 40,000 extra bytes
per 10,000 packet. • Depending upon the size of the packet this decreases
throughput from .02-6 %
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 12
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Issues with Both 48bit IV and Rekeying
• Can be the worst or best of both solutions.– We could be having the complication of rapid
rekeying, as well as adding 4 bytes to each packet.
– We could use 48 bits to simplify, or eliminate the need for rekeying.• This must be done for all cases, or we get the worst
of both solutions.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 13
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Issues With Extending/Changing the IV Format
• Interoperability with Legacy Stations– These Stations will be using TKIP, not WEP.
• Existing Hardware can be made to conform to a stronger encryption scheme.– Uses the same general frame format.
– Enforces a count in the IV.
– Mixed Network with OCB.• OCB is new Hardware, but uses the same general
frame format.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 14
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Advantage of 48 Bit IV
• More Secure (Obviously)
• Makes Rekeying Easier– No need to worry about Key Exhaustion if a
STA always begins to use the newest key.• Send Pong key over when a key change needs to
occur. There is no need to reuse the ping key.
• A queue flush must occur during the life of the session.– There is a MSDU lifetime usually set to about ½ second.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 15
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
WEP
TKIP
AES/OCB
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 16
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Optimization of 48 bit IV Extension
• Use 1 IV padding bit as a “Edge Sensitive” toggle when overflow occurs during the counting of the IV.– TKIP example –Key must start at zero
– And So on…
IV Lower Count (hex) Implicit Upper Count
00000 – 0FFFF 0
10000 – 1FFFF 1
20000-2FFFF 0
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 17
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Optimization of 48 bit IV Extension (continued)
• Incrementing the upper count.– The upper count can not be “officially”
incremented until after the replay window expires from the packet that contained the last pre-rollover count.• For the OCB mode since each Traffic Class has a
different IV space this is not an issue.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 18
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Implicit IV Group Key Solution
• Beacon/Probe Response contains the current upper, and lower IV count– Unambiguous for powersave– IBSS STA can get initialized.– Lower IV count sent to avoid race condition
• Association Response contains current upper, and lower IV count for initialization for infrastucture situation.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 19
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Why Implicit Upper IV works
• It is self-synchronizing:– With each packet, and the maintance of the upper IV in
the it’s memory, the STA has the ability to unambiguously determine the IV for that packet.• Works with dropped packets, or out of order packet
• Unambiguous– You can not miss 655536 packets and still care about whether you
are associated, or receiving correct data.• If you do you should be able the overhead of reassociating.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 20
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Why Impicit Upper IV is Better
• We can use a 16 counter for AES/OCB reduces the amount of overhead required for the IV in AES/OCB mode.– Either eliminate 14 bits, or have 14 bits of
padding/other information.
• We can use 48 bit IV space for TKIP without transmitting an extra 4 bytes per packet.
May 2002
Martin Lefkowitz, Texas Instruments
Slide 21
doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/318r0
Submission
Conclusion
• Having a 48 bit IV does simplify Rekeying.
• Designing in the implicit Upper IV does not decrease the over the air performance.
Best of both worlds