perimeter. The Chinese 58thDivision's reported intentions torenew its attack against Hagaru-riseem to have been thwarted bywell-placed air attacks during theday and heavy artillery and mortarfires during the night. Ridge's sup-porting arms coordinator alsoexperimented with night close airsupport, using converging bandsof machine gun tracer fire to pointout targets to the Corsair "nighthecklers" overhead.

At 0800 on 30 November, themorning after George Company'sarrival and a scant night's sleep,Ridge ordered Sitter to passthrough Myers' position on EastHill and continue the attack.Drysdale's 41 Commando was heldin reserve. This company-sizedforce of highly trained RoyalMarines gave Ridge a small butpotent maneuver element, farmore promising than the scratchreserve formations he had beenforced to use. Drysdale and hisofficers spent much of the dayreconnoitering possible counterat-tack routes and acquainting them-selves with supporting fire plans."I felt entirely comfortable fightingalongside the Marines," saidDiysdale.

Sitter, stoic and unflappable,sent out his 1st and 2d Platoons topass through Myers' toehold onthe hill. They were then to attackon both sides of the ridge. The 3dPlatoon and two platoons of AbleCompany engineers would followin reserve. Progress was slow andSitter used his reserve to envelopthe Chinese right flank. The attackbogged down and Sitter asked forpermission to set up defensivepositions on the ground previouslyheld by Myers who had withdrawnhis meager force. Corsairs werebrought in and worked over thecrest of the hill again and again,hut George Company could nottake the contested ground.

That same day at Hagaru-ri, 30November, Colonel Brower, com-manding the 11th Marines, camedown with a serious liver infection.Command of the regiment passedto his executive officer, LieutenantColonel Youngdale.

Disaster Threatens RCT-3 1

Sung Shi-lun was amazinglywell informed as to exactly whathis opponents were doing.Chinese reconnaissance was good;

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and Korean civilians, including linecrossers, were at least as useful tothe Chinese as they were to theAmericans. Moreover, he apparent-ly had a serviceable quantity of sig-nal intelligence from radio inter-cepts. Stymied by the Marines'stubborn defense at Yudam-ni andHagaru-ri, he decided to finish offthe U.S. Army forces east of thereservoir by adding the weight ofthe 81st Division to the 80thDivision already engaged againstTask Force Faith.

National Archives Photo (USAF) AC40314

Ammunition and supplies for the embattled Marines descend from a C-i 19Flying Boxcar of the Far EastAir Forces Combat Cargo Command. This was theonly photograph the US. Air Force photographer was able to take before 23-degree-below-zero weather froze the shutter on his camera.

The curious command relation-ships at Yudarn-ni continued.Without a common commander inplace on the ground, the two col-located regiments pursued theirseparate missions. Smith hadissued an order on the afternoon of29 November directing Murray toassume responsibility for the pro-tection of the Yudam-ni area withhis 5th Marines, while Litzenbergwas to employ the entire 7thMarines in clearing the MSR toHagaru-ri "without delay."

Almond Issues New Orders

At noon on 29 November,Almond departed Haneda airfieldin Japan on his return flight fromhis meeting with MacArthur.Enroute to Yonpo he directed hisG-3 and other staff members tocommence planning the break-offof the offensive and the consolida-tion of the corps. When Almondarrived at his war room inHamhung he saw that, in additionto the predicament of the 1stMarine Division and RCT-31 at theChosin Reservoir, his remainingforces were in considerable disar-ray. Soule's 3d Infantry Divisionwas headed in two different direc-tions. A CCF column at Sachang farto the southwest of Yudam—ni hadalready engaged the division's 7thInfantry. The remaining two regi-ments, the 15th and 65th, wereregrouping at Yonghong on thecoast preparatory to attackingwest, in accordance with orders torelieve pressure on the EighthArmy's dangling flank. In Barr's 7thInfantry Division, MacLean's RCT-31 was already isolated and heavi-ly engaged east of the reservoir.Barr's remaining regiments, the17th and 32d Infantry, were pullingback to the Pungsan area. By 2100that evening X Corps OperationOrder Number 8, providing for thediscontinuance of the attack to the

northwest and the withdrawal offorces into the Harnhung-Hungnam perimeter, was ready forAlmond's approval.

By that order, Almond placedunder Smith's command all Armytroops in the Chosin Reservoirarea, including Task Force Faithand elements at Hagaru-ri, effec-tive 0800 the next morning. Alongwith the assignment of thesetroops came a highly optimisticorder from X Corps to Smith to"redeploy one RCT without delayfrom Yudam-ni area to Hagaruarea, gain contact with elements ofthe 7th Inf Div E of ChosinReservoir; coordinate all forces inand N of Hagaru in a perimeterdefense based on Hagaru; openand secure Hagaru-Koto-ri MSR."

At 0600, 30 November, Litz-enberg and Murray issued a jointorder for the breakout. (Smith didadmit in his log entry for 30November: "An ADC [assistant divi-sion commander; that is, Craig]would have come in handy at thispoint.") That same morning,Almond gave the senior membersof his staff a fuller briefing on theMacArthur decision to go over tothe strategic defensive. He made itknown that he had also issuedorders to the ROK I Corps to pullback. By this time the 3d ROKDivision was at Hapsu and theCapital Division above Chongjin.They were now to withdraw toSongjin, a deepwater port about100 miles northeast of Hungnam.

General Barr, who had estab-lished an advance command postat Hungnam, was among thosepresent. After the briefing, Barr—whether at Almond's suggestion oron his own initiative is not clear—flew to Hagaru-ri. There he metwith OP. Smith and Hodes andthen borrowed a Marine helicopterto go forward to Faith's position.Smith asked Hodes to draft a mes-sage advising Faith that his com-

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mand was now attached to the 1stMarine Division. Barr at this pointwas out of the operational chain-of-command to Task Force Faith,but RCT-31 was still, of course, partof the 7th Infantry Division. Barrtold Smith that he was recallingHodes from the Chosin Reservoirarea to avoid any misunderstand-ing as to command arrangements.(Hodes would pay a last visit toHagaru-ri on 2 December.)

Barr arrived at Faith's commandpost shortly before noon. He pre-sumably informed Faith of thechanged command status, either insubstance or by delivering theHodes dispatch.

On his return to Hagaru-ri, Barragreed with Smith that Task ForceFaith, with Marine and Navy closeair support, could extricate itselfand get back to Hagaru-ri. Almondarrived at about this time and metwith Smith, Barr, and Hodes atSmith's forward command post, afew hundred yards from whereRidge's Marines were contendingfor possession of East Hill. Almondannounced that he had abandonedany idea of consolidating positionsin the Chosin Reservoir area. Awithdrawal would be madeposthaste to Hungnarn. Almondauthorized Smith to destroy orburn all equipment that wouldimpede his movement. Resupplywould be by air. Smith demurred:"I told him that my movementswould be governed by my abilityto evacuate the wounded, that I

would have to fight my way backand could not afford to discardequipment and that, therefore, I

intended to bring Out the hulk ofmy equipment."

Almond shrugged. He thendirected Smith and Barr to workout a time-phased plan to pullback the three Army battalions ofRCT-31 making up "Task ForceFaith." Furthermore, if Faith failedto execute his orders, Almond

ordered Reidy (who was sufferingfrom a badly infected foot) to takecharge of the sizable number ofsoldiers from various units—including a detachment of the185th Engineer Battalion—that hadnow collected at Koto-ri.

With Task Force Faith

Hagaru-ri on 1 December.

opined that he should be relieved.Almond later said that in addi-

tion to general instructions onwithdrawal of forces and a specif-ic plan for the withdrawal of RCT-31, he also asked Smith for anexplicit plan for the evacuation ofboth Army and Marine woundedby way of the airstrip being com-pleted at Hagaru-ri.

Almond told Barr that on hisflight up to Hagaru-ri he hadpassed over a column of truckshalted on the road a few milessouth of Koto-ri and recognized itas the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry,which was working its way upfrom Chinhung-ni. He suggestedto Barr that he relieve the slow-moving battalion commander,West Pointer Lieutenant ColonelRichard F. Reidy. Barr objected,saying he did not know the situa-tion confronting the battalion. Hemay also have reminded Almondthat all movements up to Koto-riwere being coordinated by XCorps. Almond telephoned (byradio link) his chief of staff, theable Major General Clark L.

Ruffner, and ordered him to expe-dite the movement north of the 2dBattalion, 31st Regiment, to joinPuller's forces at Koto-ri. Before

leaving, Almond told Barr andSmith that Soule's 3d InfantryDivision was doing a "magnificent"job of covering the gap with theEighth Army.

After Almond had departed,Barr and Smith agreed that notmuch could be done for RCT-31until the 5th and 7th Marinesarrived at Hagaru-ri from Yudam-ni. Smith did order Litzenberg andMurray to expedite their withdraw-al, destroying any supplies andequipment that had to be aban-doned.

Ruffner sent Captain Joseph L.Gurfein, West Point 1944, to getReidy, a short, chunky man whoseface showed the marks of his box-ing days at the Academy, moving.Gurfein found Reidy and his bat-talion, which had only two riflecompanies, stalled about threemiles outside Puller's position.(The other rifle company had goneforward earlier, had been withTask Force Drysdale, and was nowin place, more or less intact, atKoto-ri.) Reidy's battalion, urgedon by Gurfein, made a falteringnight attack and eventually pushedits way into Koto-ri. Puller gavethe battalion a sector of Koto-ri'sdefensive perimeter. He also

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During the daylight hours of 30November, Don Faith worked out:counterattack plans to meet a pen-.etration of his perimeter. TheChinese, not waiting for nightfall,began their attack in the after-noon. Task Force Faith's perimeterat Sinhung-ni was now isolatedand alone with no friendly forcesbetween it and Hagaru-ri. By mid-night the attack against Faith'sperimeter had built up to unprece-dented intensity. There were pen-etrations, but Faith sealed these offwith local counterattacks. At theaid station, medical supplies werecompletely exhausted. The dead,frozen stiff, were laid out in rowsstacked about four feet high.

Meanwhile, well to Faith's rear,headquarters elements of RCT-31and the 31st Tank Company atHudong-ni, with 1st Marine Di-vision approval, had fallen back toHagaru-ri. Two disabled tanks hadto be abandoned along the four-mile route, but otherwise themarch, about 325 soldiers altogeth-er, was made without incident.The regimental S-3, LieutenantColonel Berry K. Anderson, thesenior Army officer present, was incharge. A new 31st Infantry head-quarters was being formed atHamhung, with Colonel John A.Gavin, USA, as its designated corn-mander, but it was not sent for-ward to Hagaru-ri.

Intimations of an Evacuation

By the end of November it wasincreasingly obvious that Rear

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC353607

Cases of ammunition are sorted out and lashed together at Yonpo airfield on 29November before loading into C-4 7 transports of the Far East Air Force's CombatCargo Command. This ammo was intended Jbr RCT-31, better known as TaskForce Faith, east of the reservoir. First airdrops directly from Japan would be to

Admiral James Doyle, who hadlanded the Marines at Inchon andagain at Wonsan, was now goingto have to lift them out ofHungnam as part of a massiveamphibious withdrawal. Doyle, asComman-der, Task Force 90,issued plans on 28 November for aredeployment of United Nationsforces. Doyle's plans called for thedivision of his Task Force 90 intotwo amphibious task groups. TaskGroup Three, under Rear AdmiralLyman A. Thackrey, would providefor amphibious evacuation on thewest coast of Eighth Army units ifrequired. Task Group One, underDoyle's immediate command,would execute the amphibiousevacuation of east coast ports, pri-marily Hungnam. Task GroupThree, with two-thirds of theamphibious force, would go to thewest coast where the situation, atthat moment, seemed more critical.There would not be nearly enoughamphibious ships for these tasks;there had to be an enormous gath-ering of merchant shipping. ViceAdmiral Joy's deputy chief of staff,newly promoted Rear AdmiralArleigh Burke, largely ran thiseffort.

The carrier-based aircraftbrought together for the Inchonlanding and then the Wonsan land-ing had by mid-November beenlargely dispersed. Left with TaskForce 77 were the fast carriersLeyte (CV 32) and Philippine Sea(CV 47). Also still on station wasthe escort carrier Badoeng Strait(CVE 116)—"Bing-Ding" to theMarines and sailors—but her sistership Sicily (CVE 118), havingdropped off VMF-214, the"Blacksheep" squadron, atWonsan, was in port in Japan.Major Robert P. Keller had com-manded the squadron until 20November when he was detachedto become the Marine air liaisonofficer with Eighth Army and Fifth

Air Force. In World War, Kellerserved in the Pacific with MarineFighter Squadrons 212 and 223 andwas credited with at least one aer-ial victory. Command of VMF-214was taken over by Major WilliamM. Lundin.

The big carrier Valley Forge (CV45), which on 3 July had been thefirst carrier to launch combat mis-sions against North Koreaninvaders, was on her way home fora much-needed refit. Now theemergency caused her to turnabout and head for the Sea ofJapan. Also on the way was thePrinceton (CV 37), hurriedlyyanked out of mothballs. But untilthese carriers could arrive, tacticalair operations, including all impor-tant close air support, would haveto be carried out by shore-basedMarine squadrons and Navy andMarine squadrons in the Leyte,Philippine Sea, and Badoeng Strait.

On 1 December the Far East AirForces relinquished control of alltactical air support of X Corps tothe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,which, in the words of air historianRichard P. Hallion, "performed bril-liantly." The Princeton arrived onstation on 5 December. By thenTask Force 77 was giving theChosin exodus its full attention.

Carrier-based Vought F4U Cor-sairs and Douglas AD Skyraiderswere the workhorses of Task Force77. A typical ordnance load for theCorsair on a close air support mis-sion was 800 rounds for its 20mmguns, eight 5-inch rockets, and two150-gallon napalm bombs. Withthis load the plane had anendurance of two-and-one-halfhours. The Navy's Skyraider, muchadmired by the Marines, packed anordnance load comparable to aWorld War II Boeing B-17 heavybomber, commonly 400 rounds of20mm, three 150-gallon napalmbombs, and either twelve 5-inchrockets or twelve 250-pound frag-

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mentation bombs. The Sky-raidercould stay in the air for four hourswith this load.

Bad Night at Hagaru-ri

The Marines at Hagaru-ri hadanother had night on 30November. The Chinese, the .58thDivision now augmented by the59th, assaulted Ridge's wearydefenders once again in an attackpattern that repeated that of thenight of the 28th. One regiment ormore came in against the south-west face of the perimeter andunfortunately for them hit ItemCompany's well-entrenched posi-tion. First Lieutenant Joseph Fisher,always optimistic in his counting ofenemy casualties, guessed that hekilled as many as 500 to 750 ofthem. His own losses were twoMarines killed, 10 wounded.

Another Chinese regiment cameacross the contested ground onEast Hill hitting the reverse slopedefenses held chiefly by Sitter'sCompany G and 1st EngineerBattalion's Companies A and B.General Smith watched the fightfrom the doorway of his commandpost, two-thirds of a mile away.Some ground was lost. Ridge sentup a portion of his preciousreserve, 41 Commando, to rein-force Company G, and the lostground was retaken by early morn-ing.

After the night's action, Ridge,the defense force commander,came to see Smith at about 0900."He was pretty low and almostincoherent," Smith wrote in his logfor 1 December. "The main troublewas loss of sleep. He was muchconcerned about another attack.He felt with the force available tohim he could not hold both theairstrip and the ridge [East Hill] eastof the bridge. I told him he wouldhave to hold both and would haveto do it with what we had."

Casualty Evacuation and Resupply

Friday, 1 December—althoughno one thought of it that way atthe time—was the turning point ofthe campaign.

Lieutenant Colonel John Part-ridge's 1st Engineer Battalion hadsucceeded in hacking out the sem-blance of an airstrip from thefrozen earth in 12 days of around-the-clock dangerous work, theengineers at times laying downtheir tools to take up rifles and

machine guns. Heroic though theengineering effort was, the airstripwas only 40 percent complete. Itsrough runway, 50-feet wide and2,900-feet long, fell considerablyshort of the length and conditionspecified by regulations for opera-tion of transport aircraft at thosealtitudes and temperatures. Smithdecided that the urgency of theevacuation problem was such thatthe uncompleted airfield must beused, ready or not.

Its impossible load of casualties

was overwhelming the divisionfield hospital—a collection of tentsand Korean houses. Navy CaptainEugene R. Hering, the division sur-geon, met with General Smith thatmorning. Two additional surgicalteams had been flown in by heli-copter from Hungnam. The twocompanies, Charlie and Easy, ofthe 1st Medical Battalion, alreadyhad some 600 patients. Heringexpected 500 more casualties fromYudam-ni and 400 from the Armybattalions east of the reservoir.Grim as his prediction of casualtieswas, these estimates would proveto be much too low.

Until the airstrip was opera-tional, aerial evacuation of themost serious cases had been limit-ed to those that could be flownout by the nine helicopters and 10light aircraft of Major Gottschalk'sVMO-6, which also had manyother missions to perform. From27 November to 1 December,VMO-6, struggling to fly at thecold, thin altitudes, had lifted out152 casualties—109 from Yudam-ni, 36 from Hagaru-ri, and 7 fromKoto-ri. One of Gottschalk's pilots,First Lieutenant Robert A. Long-staff, was killed on an evacuationflight to Toktong Pass.

At 1430 on Friday afternoon, thefirst Air Force C-47 transporttouched down on the frozensnow-covered runway. A half-hourlater the plane, loaded with 24casualties, bumped its way off therough strip into the air. Threemore planes came in that after-noon, taking out about 60 morecasualties. "It takes about a halfhour to load a plane with litterpatients," Smith noted in his log."Ambulatory patients go verymuch faster." The last plane in forthe day, arriving heavily loadedwith ammunition, collapsed itslanding gear and had to bedestroyed.

Because of Smith's foresight,

LtCol Murray, exact location and time unknown, but possibly mid-November atHagaru-ri, briefs Maj VincentJ. Gottschalk commanding officer of VMO-6, onthe locations of units of his regiment. Between 27 November and 1 December,VMO-6's helicopters flew 152 medical evacuation missions in addition to manyother reconnaissance and liaison missions.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130916

283

Hagaru-ri was already stockpiledwith six days of rations and twodays of ammunition. The first air-drop from Air Force C-119 "FlyingBox Cars" flying from Japan wason that same critical 1st ofDecember. The drops, called"Baldwins," delivered prearrangedquantities of ammunition, rations,and medical supplies. Some dropswere by parachute, some by freefall. The Combat Cargo Commandof the Far East Air Forces at firstestimated that it could deliver only70 tons of supply a day, enoughperhaps for a regimental combatteam, but not a division. By whatbecame a steady stream of trans-ports landing on the strip and airdrops elsewhere the Air Forcedrove its deliveries up to a 100tons a day.

Toward the end of the dayLieutenant Colonel William J.McCaffrey, West Point 1939 and

the X Corps' deputy chief of staff,visited Smith. McCaffrey, who hadbeen Almond's chief of staff in the92d Infantry Division in Italy, out-lined for Smith the plan for con-striction into a Hungnam perimeterand its subsequent de-fense.Soule's 3d Infantry Division was tomove elements to the foot ofFunchilin Pass and provide a cov-ering force through which the 1stMarine Division would withdraw.The 1st Marine Division wouldthen organize a defensive sectorwest and southwest of Hungam.The 7th Infantry Division wouldoccupy a sector northeast andnorth of Hungnam.

The consolidation of X Corps inthe Hamhung-Hungnarn areaincluded the evacuation ofWonsan to the south. MajorGeneral Field Harris, commandingthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,ordered MAG-12----the Marine air-craft group had three tacticalsquadrons and a headquarters

Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5683

Casualty evacuation from Hagaru-ri airstrip began on 1 December, although thecondition of the field fell far short of what safety regulations required. Here, ona subsequent day, an ambulance discharges its cargo directly into an Air ForceC-47 or Marine Coips R-4D transport. Weapons of other, walking wounded,casualties form a pile in the foreground.

Mountains of supplies were rigged at Yonpo Airfield by Capt Hersel D. C.Blasingame's 1st Air Delivery Platoon for parachute drop, free airdrop, or sim-ply as cargo for the transports flying into Hagaru-ri. The 1st Marine Divisionneeded 100 tons of resupply a day, delivered by one means or another.

Photo by SSgt Ed Barnum, Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A130436

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squadron—to move up fromWonsan to Yonpo. The group com-mander, Colonel Boeker C.

Batterton, 46, Naval Academy1928, had spent most of World WarII with a naval aviation mission inPeru. MAG-12 completed themovement of its aircraft in oneday—that same busy 1 December.Some planes took off fromWonsan, flew a mission, and land-ed at Yonpo.

East of Chosin

Total strength of RCT-31 hasbeen calculated at a precise 3,155,but of this number probably notmore than 2,500 fell under DonFaith's direct command in "TaskForce Faith" itself. On the morningof 1 December, Lieutenant ColonelFaith, on his own initiative, beganhis breakout from Sinhung-ni tothe south. He did not have a solidradio link to the 1st MarineDivision, and had nothing morethan a chancy relay throughMarine Captain Edward P.

Stamford's tactical air control net.Faith's own 1st Battalion, 32dInfantry, would lead off, followedby the 57th Field Artillery, with the3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, bringingup the rear. Trucks would beunloaded so as to carry thewounded. The howitzers werespiked. Most jeeps and all inopera-ble trucks were to be destroyed, aswould be all supplies and equip-ment. In execution the destructionof the surplus was spotty. About 25to 30 vehicles—all that were still inoperating condition—formed upinto column. The overriding mis-sion for Task Force Faith was nowto protect the truck convoy with itshundreds of wounded. Muchreliance would be placed on theautomatic weapons fire of thetracked weapons carriers, down tothree in number, two quad SOsand one dual 40mm.

The column began to move outat about 1100. The soldiers couldsee the Chinese in plain sight onthe surrounding high ground.Progress was slow. Mortar roundscontinued to fall, causing morecasualties, and Chinese infantrybegan pressing in on the column.The fighting for the first half-milewas particularly intense. Officersand noncommissioned officers suf-fered disproportionate losses.Control broke down.

Captain Stamford and his tacticalair control party tried to keep closeair support overhead as continu-ously as possible. Navy Corsairsfrom the fast carrier Leyte came onstation at about 1300. WithStamford calling them in, theCorsairs used napalm and rocketsand strafed with 20mm cannon.One napalm drop hit close toFaith's command group causingeight or ten casualties. This ghastlyaccident was demoralizing, butsurvivors agreed that without closeair support the column wouldnever have cleared the perimeter.

Some of the soldiers on thepoint began to fall back. Faithdrew his Colt .45 pistol and turnedthem around. Panicky KATUSAs—and some Americans—tried toclimb into the trucks with thewounded. Riflemen assigned tomove along the high ground onthe flanks started to drift back tothe road. The head of the columnreached a blown bridge just northof Hill 1221 at about 1500. Some ofthe trucks, trying to cross thefrozen stream, broke through theice and had to be abandoned.

The Chinese held the highground on both sides of a road-block that now stood in the wayand were in particular strength onHill 1221. Faith, .45 in hand, gath-ered together enough men toreduce the roadblock. Other smallgroups of men clawed their waycrossways along the slope of Hill

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1221. This fight was almost the lastgasp of Task Force Faith. In thewords of one major, "[After Hill1221] there was no organizationleft."

Even so, by dusk the columnwas within four-and-one-half roadmiles of Hagaru-ri when a grenadefragment that penetrated his chestjust above his heart killed Faithhimself. His men propped up hisbody, with a blanket wrappedaround his shoulders, in the cab ofa truck—rather like a dead El Cidriding out to his last battle—hop-ing that word of his death wouldnot spread through the columncausing more demoralization. Justwhat happened to his body afterthat is not clear.

As the column struggled onsouthward the Chinese methodi-cally continued their destruction ofthe convoy, truck by truck.Individual soldiers and smallgroups began to break away fromthe column to attempt to cross thefrozen reservoir on foot. TaskForce Faith, as such, had ceased toexist.

At Hagaru-ri

During the fighting at Hagaru-rifrom 28 November through 1

December, Ridge's 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, had suffered 43 killed, 2missing, and 270 wounded—atotal of 315 battle casualties and athird of its beginning strength. Thebits and pieces of Marine andArmy units that made up the restof the Hagaru-ri defense force hadcasualties perhaps this high if nothigher. These casualties, however,did not come even close to thosesuffered by RCT-31 east of thereservoir.

Throughout the night of 1

December survivors of Task ForceFaith drifted into the north side ofthe perimeter at Hagaru-ri, most ofthem coming across the ice.

During that last night all sem-blance of unit integrity dissolved.At about 0230 on the morning of 2December, Marine Captain Stam-ford appeared in front of CaptainRead's artillery battery position.Stamford had been briefly takenprisoner but escaped. By mid-morning, 670 soldier survivors,many of them wounded or badlyfrostbitten, had found their wayinto Hagaru-ri warming tents.They had a terrible tale to tell.

Dr. Hering, the division sur-geon, reported to Smith that 919casualties went out on 1

December, but that among themthere was a large number of malin-gerers. "Unfortunately," Smith en-tered in his log, "there are a goodmany Army men, not casualtieswho got on planes. . . . Men goton stretchers, pulled a blanketover themselves and did a littlegroaning, posing as casualties.Tomorrow we will get this situa-tion under control and will haveMPs at the planes. No man will beable to board a plane without a[medically issued] ticket." Smith,who had ordered Army LieutenantColonel Berry K. Anderson toorganize physically fit soldier sur-vivors into a provisional battalion,now "talked" to Anderson again

and told him to get his soldiersunder control.

X Corps had set up a clearingstation at Yonpo. Triage deter-mined those casualties who wouldrecover in 30 days or less. Theywent to the 1st Marine DivisionHospital in Hungnam, the Army's121st Evacuation Hospital in

Hamhung, or the hospital shipConsolation in Hungnam harbor.Casualties expected to requiremore than 30 days hospitalizationwere flown on to Japan.

Lieutenant Colonel Olin L.

Beall, 52, a quintessential salty oldmustang and a great favorite ofGeneral Smith, commanded the1st Motor Transport Battalion,which held a position on thenortheast quadrant of the Hagaru-ri perimeter. Smith, not flamboyanthimself, liked colorful leaders suchas Beall and Puller. Murray, a verydifferent style of leader, said ofBeall: "We all agreed that hewould have had to lived a thou-sand years to have done all thethings he claimed to have done.But when people began checkingup on some of the things that hehad said he had done, by God, hehad done them."

Beall had enlisted in the MarineCorps on 5 April 1917, the daybefore war was declared on

Photo courtesy of Sgt Norman L. Strickbine, USA

Moving toward the perceived safety of Hagaru-ri, soldiers of Task Force Faithmarch in a well dispersed but terribly exposed single column across the snow-covered, frozen surface of Pungnyuri Inlet. The march across the ice would con-tinue throughout the night of 1 December.

Marine wounded await evacuation at Yudam-ni. A total of 109 went out by heli-copter. The rest would go out by ambulance or truck once the 5th and 7thMarines broke their way through to Hagaru-ri. Fixed-wing aerial evacuationfrom Hagaru-ri began on 1 December.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4858

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impossible.

Germany. He served in Cuba andHaiti, gained a temporary commis-sion, and went to France just asthe war ended. He reenlisted in1920 and served as an officer—asdid many other Marine noncom-missioned officers—in the Gen-darmerie d'Haiti chasing bandits.In 1935 he reached the much-respected warrant grade of Marinegunner. By the end of World War IIhe was a major and a veteran ofOkinawa.

On Saturday, 2 December 1950,Beall led a rescue column of jeeps,trucks, and sleds across the icelooking for other Task Force Faithsurvivors. Marine Corsairs coveredhis efforts, flying so low that hesaid, "I could have scratched amatch against their bellies." Hebrought in 319 soldiers, many ofthem in a state of shock. TheChinese did little to interfereexcept for long-range rifle fire.

There is no agreement on exactArmy casualty figures. Perhaps1,050 survivors reached Hagaru-ri.Of these only 385 were found tobe physically and mentally fit for

combat. These soldiers were givenMarine weapons and equipment.Not a single vehicle, artillery piece,mortar, or machine gun of TaskForce Faith had been saved. WhenAlmond visited Smith that sameSaturday, he had, in Smith's words,"very little to say about the tacticalsituation. He is no longer urgingme to destroy equipment."

Coming Out of Yudam-ni

All day long on Thursday, 30November, at Yudam-ni theChinese harried the perimeter withlong-range small arms fire andminor probing attacks. As a step inthe regroupment of their batteredregiments, Litzenberg and Murrayorganized a provisional battalionmade up rather strangely of thecombined Companies D and E, 7thMarines; and sections of 81mmmortars from the weapons compa-nies of the 2d and 3d Battalions,7th Marines; and Companies A andG, 5th Marines. Dog-EasyCompany, under First LieutenantRobert T. Bey, was really no more

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than two under strength pla-toons—a Dog Company platoonand an Easy Company platoonLitzenberg gave overall commandof this odd assortment to MajorMaurice Roach, former comman-der of the 3d Battalion and nowthe regimental S-3.

A good part of the reason forforming the battalion was to freeLieutenant Colonel Davis ofresponsibility for Dog-Easy Com-pany and other attachments. Thebattalion, which was given its ownsector in the perimeter, wasassigned the radio sign"Damnation" and that became theshort-lived battalion's title. Some-one tore up a green parachute tomake a neckerchief, the practicecaught on, and a green necker-chief became the battalion'sbadge.

The most difficult task in thedisengagement probably fell toRoise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,which held a long line stretchingfrom Hill 1426 to 1282. Covered byair and artillery, Roise fell backabout a mile from Hill 1426 to Hill1294. This and other movementsfreed up Harris' 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, to move to a positionastride the MSR about 4,000 yardssouth of Yudam-ni.

Litzenberg and Murray issuedtheir second joint operation orderon the morning of 1 December.Essentially it provided that the 7thMarines would move overland andthe 5th Marines would move alongthe axis of the MSR. Both regi-ments put what were widelyregarded as their best battalionsout in front. Davis' 1st Battalion,7th Marines, would take to thehills; Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, down to half-strength,would lead the way down theroad. They were to converge in thegeneral vicinity of Fox Companyon Toktong Pass. Point for theadvance along the road would be

Photo by Cpl Alex Klein, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC353559

PFC Ralph C. Stephens, wounded at Koto-ri, receives whole blood at the 1stMarine Division hospital in Hamhung on 1 December. Administering the bloodare HM 2/C Emmett E. Houston and Lt(j) Vernon L. Summers. Until the airstripsopened at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri, evacuation of the wounded was virtually

Roach's "Damnation Battalion"was to have followed Davis acrosscountry, but Litzenherg reconsid-ered and broke up the battalionon 1 December returning its partsto their parent organizationsexcept for Dog-Easy Company,which only had about 100 effec-tives. Litzenberg passed theorphan company to Murray who,in turn, passed it to Taplett, hisadvance guard commander.

All available Marine aircraftwere to be in the air to cover thewithdrawal. They were to hejoined by carrier aircraft from TaskForce 77. On the ground only thedrivers and the critically woundedwould move by vehicle; the restwould walk. It was decided toleave the dead at Yudam-ni and afield burial was held for 85Marines.

the single Marine tank that hadreached Yudam-ni. Staff SergeantRussell A. Munsell and anothercrewman were flown up by heli-copter from Hagaru-ri to drive it.

Major William McReynolds' 4thBattalion, 11th Marines, was ingeneral support of both regimentsbut under the command of nei-ther. The arrangement was madeto work with Lieutenant Colonel

Harvey A. Feehan, commander ofthe 1st Battalion, 11th Marines,acting as coordinator of support-ing artillery fire. McReynolds' bat-talion was ordered to shoot upmost of its 155mm ammunitionbefore pulling out. Excess gunnerswere then organized into nine rifleplatoons. The guns themselveswere to bring up the rear of theconvoy.

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The grand parade began at 0800on 1 December. Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, came downfrom its positions north of Yudam-ni, followed an hour-and-a-halflater by Stevens' 1st Battalion.Company B of Stevens' battalionunder First Lieutenant John R.

Hancock made up the rear guardcoming out of the town.Meanwhile the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, under Harris proceededto clear both sides of the roadleading south, Company H goingup Hill 1419 east of the road whilethe rest of the battalion wentagainst Hill 1542 on the west side.Roise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,having cleared the town, relievedDavis' 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,on Hill 1276, freeing up Davis topursue his overland mission.Harris was slow in taking Hill1542. By mid-afternoon, an impa-tient Taplett was in positionbehind Harris, ready to attacksouth astride the road even withhis right flank somewhat exposed.

Company H, 7th Marines, com-manded by First Lieutenant

Photo by cpl L, •B. Snyder, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5667

Maj Maurice E. Roach, the 7th Marines jack-of-all-trades, and for the momentcommander of a provisional battalion, pauses for a photo with the regimentalcommander, Col Litzenberg, before leaving Yuda rn-ni on 1 December. Roach iswearing the Navy parka that was part of the winter unform, but Litzenberg findsan A rrny field jacket sufficient for the daytime cold.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4862Marines depart Yudam-ni on 1 December. The general plan MajGen Smith did not formally designate an overall corn-for the breakout was that the 5th Marines would follow the mander, but LtCol Murray deferred to Col Litzenbergaxis of the MSR and the 7th Marines would move overland, because of seniority.

The 7th Marines command group breaks camp at Yudam-ni on 1 December inpreparation for the march back to Hagaru-ri. The jeep in the foreground carriesa radio. Note the long antenna. Below zero temperatures caused problems withbattery life. Extra five-gallon cans of gasoline are lashed to the front bumper.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5666

Howard H. Harris, met trouble onHill 1419. Harris' battalion com-mander, Lieutenant Colonel Harris,was fully occupied with problemson Hill 1542. Litzenberg, realizingthat Hill 1419 was too far from Hill1542 for a mutually supportingattack, detached How Companyfrom the 3d Battalion and assignedit to Davis' 1st Battalion. Davis, Hill1419 now his responsibility, senthis Able Company to add itsweight to How Company's effort.

(Continued on page 292)

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OVERLEAF: "Band of Brothers" byColonel Charles H. Waterhouse,USMCR (Ret), widely regarded bymany Marine veterans of the KoreanWar as Waterhouse's masterpiece,shows the column of Marines windingits way down Funchilin Pass.Courtesy of Col Waterhouse and theChosin Few Association.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Harris hadbeen wounded and SecondLieutenant Minard P. Newton, Jr.,had taken over the company. AbleCompany, under Captain David W.Banks, passed through HowCompany and took the hill atabout 1930.

Davis now stripped his battaliondown for its cross-country trek.Everything needed for the marchwould have to be hand carried. Hedecided to go very light, takingonly two 81mm mortars and sixheavy machine guns (with doublecrews) as supporting weaponsfrom his Weapons Company. Hisvehicles, left behind with his sick,walking wounded, and frostbitecases as drivers, were to join theregimental train on the road.Baker Company, now commandedby First Lieutenant Joseph R.

Kurcaba, led off the line of march,followed by Davis and his com-mand group, then Able Company,Charlie Company, battalion head-quarters, and How Company, stillattached.

It was a very dark night. Theguide stars soon disappeared. Thesnow-covered rock masses alllooked alike. The point had tobreak trail, through snow knee-deep in places. The path, oncebeaten, became icy and treacher-ous. Marines stumbled and fell.

Radios would not work reliably.Davis, moving ahead and floun-dering in the snow, lost touch withthe forward elements of his battal-ion for a time. He continued for-ward until he reached the point.His map, hurriedly read by a flash-light held under a poncho, toldhim that they were climbing Hill1520, the slopes of which wereheld by the Chinese. Baker andCharlie Companies converged onthe Chinese who were about a pla-toon in strength, taking them bysurprise. Davis stopped on theeastern slope of Hill 1520 to reor-ganize. Enemy resistance hadslackened to small arms fire fromridges across the valley but Davis'men were numb with cold andexhausted. At 0300 he again haltedhis advance to give his Marines arest, sending out small patrols forsecurity. Now, for the first time, hegained radio contact with regi-ment.

On the MSR with the

5th Marines

Taplett, meanwhile, was march-ing southward astride the MSR, led

National Archives Photo (IJSMC) 127-N-A5670

The heaviest guns in the defense of Yudam-ni were the 1 55mm howitzers of the4th Battalion, 11th Marines, commanded by Maj William McReynolds. Shownhere, the big guns are preparing to leave the perimeter, towed by their tractorprime movers. Excess gunners were reorganized into provisional rifle units.

Before leaving Yudam-ni, as a matter of professional pride, the 5th and 7thMarines 'policed up the area." Trash, including remnants of rations, was col-lected into piles and burned. Slim pickings were left for Chinese scavengers who,desperate for food, clothing, and shelter, followed close behind the departingMarines.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, 1)epartment of Defense Photo (USMC) A4848

292

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5666

In coming back from Yudam-ni, the 1st Marine Division's large number of road-bound wheeled vehicles was both an advantage and a handicap. They carriedthe wherewithal to live and fight; they also slowed the march and were a temp-tation for attack by the Chinese. Here an 11th Marines howitzer can be seen in

firing position to cover the column 's rear.

by the solitary Pershing tank, fol-lowed by a platoon from his HowCompany and a platoon of ever-useful engineers. His radio callsign, "Darkhorse," suited his owndark visage. He advanced forabout a mile before being haltedby heavy fire coming from bothsides of the road. He fanned outHow and Item Companies andthey cleared the opposition by1930.

Taplett gave his battalion a briefrest and then resumed theadvance. Item Company, led byCaptain Harold Schrier, ran intostiff resistance on the reverse slopeof still-troublesome Hill 1520 eastof the road. Schrier received per-mission to fall back to his jump-offposition so as to better protect theMSR. The Chinese hit with mortarsand an infantry attack. Schrier waswounded for a second time andSecond Lieutenant Willard S.

Peterson took over the company.Taplett moved George Companyand his attached engineers intodefensive positions behind ItemCompany. It was an all-night fight.

and How Company were bothdown to two-platoon strengths.

As a reserve Taplett had Dog-Easy Company, 7th Marines,detached from the now-dissolved"Damnation Battalion." Dog-EasyCompany moved Onto the roadbetween How and GeorgeCompanies. By noon GeorgeCompany, commanded by CaptainChester R. Hermanson, had takenHill 1520 and Dog-Easy had runinto its own fight on the road.Second Lieutenant Edward H.Seeburger, lone surviving officer ofDog Company, was severelywounded while giving a fire com-mand to the solitary tank. Herefused evacuation. (Seeburgerfaced long hospitalization and aftera year was physically retired as afirst lieutenant. In 1995 he receiveda belated Navy Cross.)

Corsairs reduced the roadblockthat held up Dog-Easy Company."Darkhorse" trudged on, How andGeorge Companies on both sidesof the MSR and Dog-Easy movingdown the middle, followed by theengineers and the solitary tank.

In the morning, 2 December, 342enemy dead were counted in frontof Item Company. Peterson hadonly 20 Marines still on their feetwhen George Company passedthrough his position to continuethe attack against Hill 1520. George

After leaving Yudam-ni, a unit of the 7th Marines, possibly a company of LtColDavis' 1st Battalion, leaves the road to climb into the hills. Davis' objective was tocome down on Toktong Pass from higher ground so as to relieve Capt Barber'sembattled Fox Company.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4849

293

With Davis' Battalion in the Hills

East of the MSR at daybreak,Davis reoriented the direction ofhis march. The 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, passed over the east slopeof Hill 1520 and attacked towardHill 1653, a mountain a mile-and-a-half north of Toktong Pass. Davis'radios could not reach Barber onFox Hill nor could he talk directlyto the Corsairs circulating over-head. Fortunately opposition waslight except for Chinese nibblingagainst the rear of his columnwhere Company H, 3d Battalion,was bringing up the wounded onlitters. Davis converged on Hill1653 with his three organic riflecompanies.

At last, radio contact was madewith Captain Barber on Fox Hill.Barber jauntily offered to send outa patrol to guide Davis into hisposition. Davis declined the offerbut did welcome the control ofVMF-312's Corsairs by Barber's for-ward air controller. Just beforenoon, lead elements of Company Breached Barber's beleaguered posi-tion.

Company A halted on the northside of Hill 1653 to provide man-power to evacuate casualties.Twenty-two wounded had to becarried by litter to safety. The regi-mental surgeon, Navy LieutenantPeter E. Arioli, was killed by aChinese sniper's bullet whilesupervising the task. Two Marines,who had cracked mentally andwho were restrained in improvisedstrait jackets, died of exposurebefore they could be evacuated.Marines of Kurcaba's Company Bcelebrated their arrival on Fox Hillwith a noontime meal of air-dropped rations. They then wenton to take the high ground thatdominated the loop in the roadwhere the MSR passed throughToktong Pass. First LieutenantEugenous M. Hovatter's Company

A followed them and the two com-panies set up a perimeter for thenight. Meanwhile the balance ofDavis' battalion had joined Barberon Fox Hill. Barber's Company Fhad suffered 118 casualties—26killed, 3 missing, and 89 wound-ed—almost exactly half of his orig-inal complement of 240. Six of theseven officers, including Barberhimself, were among the wounded.

5th Marines on the Road

At the rear of the column on theMSR, Lieutenant Colonel Roise's 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, the desig-nated rear guard, had troubles ofits own on Hill 1276 during theearly morning hours of 2

December. Captain Uel D. Peters'Company F was hit hard. Nightfighters from VMF(N)-542 came onstation and were vectored to thetarget by white phosphorus roundsdelivered by Company F's 60mmmortars. Strafing and rockets fromthe night fighters dampened theChinese attack, but the fight con-tinued on into mid-morning withFox Company trying to regain lostground. By then it was time forRoise to give up his position onHill 1276 and continue the marchsouth.

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Stevens'1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had itsfight that night of 1-2 Decembereast of the road, being hit by aChinese force that apparently hadcrossed the ice of the reservoir.Stevens guessed the number ofChinese killed at 200, at least 50 ofthem cut down in front of CharlieCompany by machine guns.

Lieutenant Colonel WilliamHarris' 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,meanwhile was continuing to havetrouble on Hill 1542. Litzenbergreinforced Harris with a compositeunit, called "Jig Company," madeup of about 100 cannoneers, head-quarters troops, and other individ-

294

uals. Command of this assortmentwas given to First Lieutenant AlfredI. Thomas. Chinese records cap-tured later indicated that theythought they had killed 100Americans in this action; actualMarine losses were somethingbetween 30 and 40 killed andwounded.

Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri,

2-3 December

At the head of the column,Taplett's Darkhorse battalion onthe morning of 2 December had tofight for nearly every foot of theway. George Company still hadHill 1520 to cross. Dog-EasyCompany was moving along theroad itself. South of Hill 1520 at asharp bend in the road a bridgeover a ravine had been blown, andthe Chinese covering the breakstopped Dog-Easy Company withmachine gun fire. Twelve Corsairscame overhead and ripped into theravine with strafing fire and rock-ets. Dog-Easy Company, helped byHow Company, re-sumed itsadvance. The attached engineerplatoon, now commanded byTechnical Sergeant Edwin L. Knox,patched up the bridge so vehiclescould pass. The engineers hadstarted out with 48 men; they werenow down to 17. Taplett continuedhis advance through the night untilby 0200, 3 December, he was only1,000 yards short of Fox Hill.Taplett could only guess whereDavis might be with the 1stBattalion, 7th Marines.

To the rear, the Chinese peckedaway at the Marines withdrawingfrom Hills 1276 and 1542. Stevens'1st Battalion, 5th Marines, contin-ued to provide close-in flank pro-tection. Marine air held off much ofthe harassment, but the column ofvehicles on the road moved slowlyand the jeep and truck driversbecame targets for Chinese snipers.

the way. As he remembered it afew months later: 'That was thetime when there was no outfit, youwas with nobody, you was aMarine, you were fighting witheverybody. There was no more 5thor 7th; you were just one outfit,just fighting to get the hell out ofthere, if you could."

Column Reaches Hagaru-ri

detachments.

That night the Chinese got throughto Lieutenant Colonel Feehan's 1stBattalion, 11th Marines, and theartillerymen had to repulse themwith howitzer fire over opensights.

Six inches of new snow fell dur-ing the night. In the morning, 3December, Taplett combined theremnants of Dog-Easy Companywith George Company andreturned the command to FirstLieutenant Charles D. Mize, whohad had George Company until 17November. From up on Fox Hill,Davis made a converging attackagainst the Chinese still holding aspur blocking the way to Hagaru-ri. He pushed the Chinese into theguns of Taplett's battalion. An esti-mated battalion of Chinese wasslaughtered. By 1300, Davis'"Ridgerunners" had joined up withTaplett's "Darkhorses."

1)avis and Taplett conferred.

The senior Davis now took thelead on the MSR with his battalion.The lone tank still provided thepoint. The truck column reachedToktong Pass. The criticallywounded were loaded onto thealready over-burdened vehicles.Less severely wounded wouldhave to walk. Stevens' 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, followedDavis' battalion, passing throughTaplett's battalion. Taplett stayed inToktong Pass until after midnight.Coming up from the rear on theMSR was Roise's 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, followed by Harris' 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, now therear guard.

Sergeant Robert B. Gault, leaderof the 7th Marines GravesRegistration Section, came out ofYudam-ni in the column on theMSR with his five-man section anda truck with which to pick upMarine dead encountered along

295

The six fighter-bomber squad-rons of Field Harris' 1st MarineAircraft Wing flew 145 sorties onSunday, 3 December, most of themin close support of the 5th and 7thMarines. Under this aerial umbrel-la, Davis' 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, marched along almostunimpeded. In the early evening,Ridge sent out Drysdale with 41Commando, supported by tanksfrom Drake's 31st Tank Company,to open the door to the Hagaru-riperimeter. At about 1900, a fewhundred yards out, Davis formedup his battalion into a route col-umn and they marched into theperimeter, singing The Marines'Hymn. Hagaru's defenders greetedthe marchers with a tumultuouswelcome. A field mess offered anunending supply of hot cakes,syrup, and coffee. Litzenberg's 7thMarines command group arrivedshortly after Davis' battalion andwas welcomed into the motortransport area by Litzenberg's oldfriend, Olin Beall.

In Tokyo that Sunday, Mac-Arthur sent a message to the JointChiefs of Staff that X Corps wasbeing withdrawn to Hungnam asrapidly as possible. He stated thatthere was no possibility of unitingit with Eighth Army in a line acrossthe peninsula. Such a line, he said,would have to be 150 miles longand held alone by the sevenAmerican divisions, the combateffectiveness of the South Koreanarmy now being negligible.

I'hoto by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4840

Dead Marines at a Yudam-ni aid station wait mutely on their stretchers for load-ing onto the truck that will take them to eventual burial. Once on the march,practice was to carry those who died in the savage fighting in the hills down tothe road where they could be picked up by the regiments' Graves Registration

The 5th and 7th Marines on arrival at Hagaru-ri combatbase found hot chow waiting for them. The mess tents, oper-ating on a 24-hour basis, provided an almost unvarying but

Sketch by Sgt Ralph Schofield, USMCR

inexhaustible menu of hot cakes, syrup, and coffee. After afew days rest and reorganization, the march to the southresumed.

The Chinese made no seriousobjection to the last leg of themarch from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-riuntil about 0200 on Monday morn-ing, 4 December, when the primemovers hauling eight of Mc-Reynolds' 155mm howitzers at therear of the column ran out ofdiesel fuel. That halted the columnand brought on a Chinese attack.Taplett's battalion, unaware of thebreak, continued to advance. Theartillerymen—assisted by bits andpieces of the 1st and 2d Battalions,5th Marines, who were on the highground to the flanks—defendedthemselves until Taplett could facearound and come to their rescue.

It was a bad scene. The eightheavy howitzers had been pushedoff the road, perhaps prematurely,and would have to be destroyedthe next day by air strikes. A half-mile farther down the MSR was a

cache of air-delivered diesel fuelthat would have fueled the primemovers. By 0830 the road wasagain open. Chinese losses wereguessed at 150 dead.

At 1400 on Monday, the rearguard, still provided by the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, marchedinto Hagaru-ri and the four-day,14-mile, breakout from Yudam-niwas over. The Marines hadbrought in about 1,500 casualties,some 1,000 of them caused by theChinese, the rest by the cold. Smithobserved in his log: "The men ofthe regiments are. . . pretty wellbeaten down. We made room forthem in tents where they could getwarm. Also they were given hotchow. However, in view of theircondition, the day after tomorrow[6 December] appears to be theearliest date we can start out forKoto-ri."

296

Reorganization at Hagaru-ri

Ridge's Marine defenders ofHagaru-ri breathed much moreeasily after the arrival in theirperimeter of the 5th and 7th RCTs.A sanguine corporal opined to hiscompany commander: "Now thatthe 5th and 7th Marines are here,we can be resupplied by air, holduntil spring, and then attack againto the north."

General Almond flew intoHagaru-ri on Monday afternoon tobe briefed on the breakout planand while there pinned ArmyDistinguished Service Crosses onthe parkas of Smith, Litzenberg,Murray, and Beall. Almond thenflew to Koto-ri where he decoratedPuller and Reidy (who had beenslow in getting his battalion toKoto-ri) with Distinguished ServiceCrosses. Nine others, including

Gurfein, who had nudged Reidyinto moving, received Silver Stars.Reidy was relieved of his com-mand not much later.

For the breakout, Murray's RCT-5, with Ridge's 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, and 41 Commandoattached, would briefly take overthe defense of Hagaru-ri whileLitzenberg's RCT-7, beginning atfirst light on Wednesday, 6

December, would march to thesouth. Puller's RCT-1 would con-tinue to hold Koto-ri andChinhung-ni. All personnel exceptdrivers, radio operators, and casu-alties were to move on foot.Specially detailed Marines were toprovide close-in security to theroad-bound vehicles. Any thatbroke down were to be pushed tothe side of the road and destroyed.Troops were to carry two-days of Crations and one unit of fire, whichtranslated for most into full car-tridge belts and an extra bandoleer

of ammunition for their M-1 rifles.Another unit of fire was to be car-ried on organic vehicles. The vehi-cles were divided into two divisiontrains. Lieutenant Colonel Banks,commanding officer of the 1stService Battalion, was put in com-mand of Train No. 1, subordinateto RCT-7. Train No. 2, subordinateto RCT-5, was given to LieutenantColonel Harry T. Milne, the com-mander of the 1st Tank Battalion.Although Smith had stated that hewould come out with all his sup-plies and equipment, more realisti-cally a destruction plan, decreeingthe disposal of any excess suppliesand equipment, was put into effecton 4 December. Bonfires werebuilt. Ironically, loose rounds andcanned foods in the fires explod-ed, causing some casualties toMarines who crowded close to thefires for warmth.

Air Force and Marine transportshad flown out over 900 casualties

on Saturday, 2 December, fromHagaru-ri, and more than 700 thenext day. To the south that Sunday,47 casualties were taken out bylight aircraft from. the strip at Koto-ri. But casualties kept piling upand by the morning of Tuesday, 5December, some 1,400 casualties—Army and Marine—still remainedat Hagaru-ri. In a magnificenteffort, they were all flown out thatday. Altogether, in the first fivedays of December, by best count,4,312 men—3,150 Marines, 1,137soldiers, and 25 Royal Marines—were air-evacuated.

Even a four-engine Navy R5Dventured a landing. Takeoff with aload of wounded in an R5D was sohairy that it was not tried again. AnR4D—the Marine equivalent of thesturdy C-47—wiped out its landinggear in landing. An Air Force C-47lost power on take-off andcrashed-landed outside the Marinelines. Marines rushed to the rescue.

Members of this patrol, moving along the abandoned nar- the point and rear riflemen provide watchful cover. Norow gauge railroad track that paralleled the main supply wounded Marine need worry about being left behind.route, help along a wounded or exhausted comrade while

Sketch by Sgt Ralph Schofield, USMCR

297

ated. "He seemed somewhat sur-prised," wrote Smith.

The plane had to be abandonedand destroyed, but there were nopersonnel casualties during theentire evacuation process.

During those same first fivedays of December, 537 replace-ments, the majority of them recov-ering wounded from hospitals inJapan, arrived by air at Hagaru-ri.Most rejoined their original units.A platoon sergeant in WeaponsCompany, 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, wounded in the fightingin Seoul, assured his companycommander that he was glad to beback.

Visitors who could wanglespaces on board the incomingtransports began arriving atHagaru-ri. Marguerite "Maggie"Higgins of the New York Herald-Tribune, well known to theMarines from both the PusanPerimeter and the Inchon-Seoulcampaigns, was among the gaggleof war correspondents that arrivedon Tuesday, 5 December, includ-ing former Marine combat corre-spondent Keyes Beach. Higginsan-nounced her intention tomarch out with the Marines.General Smith disabused her of

her intention and ordered that shebe out of the perimeter by air bynightfall.

A British reporter made theimpolite error of referring to thewithdrawal as a "retreat." Smithpatiently corrected him, pointingOut that when surrounded therewas no retreat, only an attack in anew direction. The pressimproved Smith's remark into:"Retreat, hell, we're just attackingin a new direction." The new tele-vision technology was demonstrat-ed by scenes taken of the aerialevacuation of the casualties andan interview with General Smithand Lieutenant Colonel Murray.

Major General William H.Tunner, USAF, commander of theCombat Cargo Combat and greatlyadmired by the Marines becauseof the sterling performance of hiscommand, was one of the visitors.Tunner had flown the Hump fromBurma into China during WorldWar II and later commanded muchof the Berlin Airlift. He solicitous-ly offered to evacuate the rest ofthe troops now in Hagaru-ri. Smithstiffly told him that no man whowas able-bodied would be evacu-

Almond met with Major GeneralSoule, commander of the 3dInfantry Division, that Tuesday, 5December, and ordered him toform a task force under a generalofficer "to prepare the route ofwithdrawal [of the 1st MarineDivision] if obstructed by explo-sives or whatnot, especially at thebridge site." The site in questionlay in Funchilin Pass. Almondapparently did not know that thebridge had already been de-stroyed. The downed span threat-ened to block the Marines' with-drawal. Soule gave command ofwhat was designated as "TaskForce Dog" to his assistant divisioncommander, Brigadier GeneralArmistead D. "Red" Mead, a hard-driving West Pointer who hadbeen G-3 of the Ninth Army in theEuropean Theater in World War II.

Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, 6 December

At noon on Tuesday, 5

December, Murray relieved Ridgeof his responsibility as Hagaru-ridefense commander, and the bat-talions of the 5th Marines plumpedup the thin lines held by the 3dBattalion, 1st Marines. TheChinese did not choose to test thestrengthened defenses, hut atabout 2000 that evening an AirForce B-26 mistakenly dropped astick of six 500-pound bombsclose to Ridge's command tent.His forward air controller couldnot talk to the Air Force pilotbecause of crystal differences intheir radios, but an obligingMarine night-fighter from Lieuten-ant Colonel Max J. Volcansek, Jr.'sVMF(N)-542 came overhead andpromised to shoot down any AirForce bomber that might return torepeat the outrage.

The well-liked Max Volcansek,36, born in Minnesota, had come

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4909

Aerial evacuation of wounded and severely frost bitten Marines and soldiers fromHagaru-ri saved many lives. During the first five days of Decembe'; 4,312 men—3,150 Marines, 1,137 soldiers, and 25 Royal Marines—were air evacuated by AirForce and Marine transports that also brought in supplies and replacements.

298

60th, 76th, 79th, 80th, and 89th.Two more divisions—the 77th and78th—were reported in the areabut not yet confirmed.

Later it would be learned thatthe 26th CCF Army—consisting ofthe 76th, 7 7th, and 78th Divisions,reinforced by the 88th Divisionfrom the 30th CCF Army, hadmoved down from the north intopositions on the east side of theMSR between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. They had relieved the 60thDivision, which had moved intopositions south of Koto-ri.Elements of the 60th Division werepreparing for the defense ofFunchilin Pass including positionson the dominant terrain feature,Hill 1081. Even farther south the89th Division was positioning itselfto move against the defenders ofChinhung-ni.

Murray has given a characteristi-cally laconic account of the attackby the 5th Marines against EastHill:

MacArthur's staff

into the Marine Corps as an avia-tion cadet in 1936 after graduatingfrom Macalester College. DuringWorld War II he had flown Corsairswhile commanding VMF-222 in thePacific and had scored at least oneJapanese plane. During the battlefor Seoul he had been woundedand shot down but quickly recov-ered and continued in commandof VMF(N)-542.

The plan of attack forWednesday, 6 December, called forthe 5th Marines to clean up EastHill while the 7th Marines movedsouth along the MSR toward Koto-

ri. Close air support for the attackagainst East Hill was to be on sta-tion at 0700. With a touch of con-descension, Murray's Marines toldRidge's Marines to stand back andwatch for a demonstration of howa hill should he taken.

Smith wanted to march out withhis men, but Shepherd orderedhim to fly to Koto-ri. Death orwounding of Smith, or worse, hiscapture by the Chinese, could notbe risked. By this time the lurkingpresence of seven CCF divisionshad been identified by prisoner ofwar interrogations—the 58th, 59th,

299

I had been ordered to takea little hill, and I had HalRoise do that job. When hegot over there, he foundabout 200 Chinese in a mass,and he captured the wholecrowd of them. So we hadabout 200 prisoners we hadto take care of. . . . A lot ofthem were in such bad shapethat we left them there, leftsome medical supplies, andleft them there for theChinese to come along andtake care of them after weleft.

It was not quite that simple.Heavy air, artillery, and mortarpreparation began at 0700 onThursday, 6 December. CaptainSamuel S. Smith's Dog Companyjumped off in the assault at 0900,beginning a fight that would go onuntil daylight the next morning. All

l'hoto by Cpl Arthur Curtis, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC354492

After her adventures at Ghosin, including her aborted ef/bris to march out withthe Marines, Marguerite 'Maggie" Higgins, wearing a Navy parka and shoe-pacs,arrived saftly at Haneda Air Force Base, Tokyo, on 15 December. Her broadlysmiling traveling companion is Army MajGen William F. Marquat of

three rifle companies of Roise's 2dBattalion and Charlie Company ofthe 1st Battalion were drawn intoit. Estimates of enemy killed ran ashigh as 800 to 1,000. East Hill wasnever completely taken, but theChinese were pushed back farenough to prevent them frominterfering with the exit of the divi-sion from Hagaru-ri.

RCT-7 Attacks South

General Smith planned to closehis command post at Hagaru-ri onWednesday morning, 6 December.Before he could leave GeneralBarr, commander of the 7thInfantry Division, who arrived tocheck on the status of his soldiers,visited him. The survivors of TaskForce Faith coupled with units that

had been at Hagaru-ri andHudong-ni added up to a provi-sional battalion of 490 able-bodiedmen under command of ArmyLieutenant Colonel Anderson. Asorganized by Anderson, the "bat-talion" actually was two very smallbattalions (3d Battalion, 31stInfantry, under Major Carl Witteand 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry,under Major Robert E. Jones) eachwith three very small rifle compa-nies. Smith attached Anderson'sforce to RCT-7 and it was some-times called "31/7."

tanks, on the MSR as the advanceguard; Davis' 1st Battalion on the

300

right of Changjin River and theMSR; Anderson's provisional Armybattalion on the left of the road;and Harris' 3d Battalion on theroad as the rear guard.

Lockwood, it will be recalled,had stayed at Hagaru-ri with hiscommand group and much of hisWeapons Company while Com-panies D and E went forward toYudam-ni and Company F heldToktong Pass. At 0630, tanks fromCompany D, 1st Tank Battalion,led Lockwood's reunited, but piti-fully shrunken battalion out of theperimeter through the south road-block. Almost immediately it raninto trouble from Chinese on theleft side of the road. The morningfog burned off and air was calledin. A showy air attack was deliv-ered against the tent camp south ofthe perimeter, abandoned daysearlier by the Army engineers andnow periodically infested withChinese seeking warmth and sup-plies. Lockwood's two rifle com-panies—Fox Company and Dog-Easy Company—pushed throughand the advance resumed at noon.Meanwhile, barely a mile out ofHagaru-ri, Captain John F. Morris'Company C, 1st Battalion, sur-prised an enemy platoon on thehigh ground to the southeast of thehamlet of Tonae-ri and killed mostof them.

At 1400 Smith received a reas-suring message from Litzenbergthat the march south was goingwell. Smith decided that it wastime to move his command post toKoto-ri. His aide, Major Martin J."Stormy" Sexton, World War II

raider, asked the commander ofWeapons Company, 3d Battalion,1st Marines, for the loan of a jeepto take his boss to the airstrip. A10-minute helicopter ride tookSmith and Sexton to Koto-ri wherePuller was waiting. Smith beganplanning for the next step in thewithdrawal.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A5520

In a ceremony at Masan on 21 December, LtCol Harold S. Roise, the stalwartcommander of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, receives a Silver Star Jbr actions inci-dent to the seizure of Kimpo Airfield qfter the Inchon landing. Further awardsfor Roise for heroism at Chosin would come later.

Litzenbergmen—aboutstrength—forKoto-ri. HisLockwood's

had about 2,200half his originalthe breakout toattack order put

2d Battalion, with

Meanwhile Lockwood's 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, had runinto more serious trouble anothermile down the road. Davis' 1stBattalion, up in the hills, could seethe enemy; Lockwood's battalion,on the road itself, could not. FoxCompany, with some help fromDog-Easy Company and the Armymini-battalions under Anderson,pushed through at about 1500.Davis' battalion continued to playcompany-sized hopscotch fromhilltop to hilltop on the right of theroad. By dark, lead elements ofRCT-7 were about three milessouth of Hagaru-ri. Enemy resis-tance stiffened and air reconnais-sance spoke of Chinese columnscoming in from the east, butLitzenberg decided to push on.After two more miles of advance,Lockwood's battalion was stoppedin what Drysdale had called HellFire Valley by what seemed to be asolitary Chinese machine gun fir-ing from the left. An Army tank

solved that problem. Another half-mile down the road a blownbridge halted the column. Theengineers did their job, the march

Col Litzenberg 'S 7th Marines led oJf the march south fromHagaru-ri on 6 December. Here one of his units pauses atthe roadblock held by Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 1st

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5464

Marines, before exiting the town to watch a drop of napalmby a Marine Corsair against a camp abandoned by Armyengineers, now infested with Chinese.

7th Marines, had no more troubleas it marched the last few milesinto Koto-ri. Through all of thisLockwood, sick with severe bron-

resumed, hut then there was chitis, had sat numbly in his jeep.another blown bridge. At dawn on Early that morning his executiveThursday things got better. Air officer, Major Sawyer, had beencame overhead, and 2d Battalion, wounded in the leg by a mortar

Coming out of Hagaru-ri, Col Litzenberg used LtCol Lockwood's 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, reinforced with tanks, as his advance guard. Here a heavy machinegun squad rests by the side of the road while a M-26 Pershing medium tank trun-dIes by. The M-26 mounted a powerful flat-trajectory 90mm gun.

Photo by Sgt Frank c. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5469

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were identified as being from the76th and 77th Divisions of 26thGC'F Army.

For Almond, most of Wednes-day, 6 December, was absorbedwith a visit by General J. LawtonCollins, the Army chief of staff.Collins and Almond dropped in atthe command posts of the Army's7th and 3d Infantry Divisions, but"weather precluded flying to Koto-ri" for a visit with Smith. Collinsleft at nightfall for Tokyo. The visithad gone well and Almond notedcontentedly in his diary: "Gen.Collins seemed completely satis-fied with the operation of X Corpsand apparently was much relievedin finding the situation well in

At Koto-ri, 7 December

First Lieutenant Leo R. Ryan, thesionally the Chinese reached the road. adjutant of the 2d Battalion, 7thfragment and was Out of action. Marines, alarmed by LieutenantMajor James F. Lawrence, Jr., 32, Colonel Lockwood's apathy,University of North Carolina 1941, pressed the battalion surgeon andthe battalion S-3, had become the assistant surgeon, Lieutenants (jg)de facto commander.

Things were going even lesswell on the left flank and rear ofthe column. The Army provisionalbattalion, fragile to begin with, hadfought itself Out and was replacedby Harris' 3d Battalion, 7thMarines. By 2100 the Chinese hadcome down to within hand-grenade range of the trucks on theroad. Harris deployed his Georgeand Item Companies to push themback. Sometime before dawn,Lieutenant Colonel William Harris,son of Major General Field Harris,disappeared. He was last seenwalking down the road with tworifles slung over his shoulder. Asearch for him found no body andit was presumed he had beentaken prisoner. Major WarrenMorris, the executive officer of the1st Battalion, took over commandof the 3d Battalion and it reached

Photo by Sgt Prank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5428

Marching, encumbered with weapons, packs, and winter clothing, on the roadfrom Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri was heavy work even without Chinese interference.This unit of the 7th Marines, taking advantage of a halt, manages a quick nap.Most of the fighting was on the high ground on both sides of the MSR, but occa-

hand."

Koto-ri at about 0700 on Thursdaymorning.

Chinese prisoners taken alongthe road from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri

The role of the rfle companies in the breakout from Hagaru-ri on 6 Decemberwas to take the high ground on both sides of the road. Much jbught over "EastHill" dominated the exit from Hagaru-ri. It was never completely taken, hut theChinese were pushed back far enough to permit the relatively safe passage of thedivision trains of vehicles.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5465

302

Laverne F. Peiffer and Stanley I.

Wolf, to examine him. Neither doc-tor was a psychiatrist, but theycame to the conclusion thatLockwood was suffering from aneurosis that made him unfit forcommand. This was communicatedto Colonel Litzenberg who con-firmed Major Lawrence as the act-ing commander.

In mid-morning, Thursday, 7December, to ease the passage ofthe division train, both the 2d and3d Battalions, 7th Marines, wereordered to face about, move northagain, and set up blocking posi-tions on both sides of the roadbetween Koto-ri and Hill 1182. Onthe way the 2d Battalion picked up22 Royal Marine survivors who hadbeen laagered up in a Koreanhouse ever since Task Force

Drysdale had passed that way. AVMO-6 pilot had spotted themthree days earlier by the letters "H-E-L-P" stamped in the snow andhad dropped rations and medicalsupplies.

Elsewhere on Thursday, 7December, X Corps and EighthArmy had received orders fromGHQ Tokyo to plan to withdraw,in successive positions if necessary,to the Pusan area. Eighth Army wasto hold on to the Inchon-Seoularea as long as possible. X Corpswas to withdraw throughHungnam and eventually to pass tothe command of Eighth Army.

Almond visited Smith at Koto-riand assured him that Soule's 3dInfantry Division would providemaximum protection from Chin-hung-ni on into Hamhung. Smith

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LtCol William F Harris, commandingofficer of the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, and son of MajGen FieldHarris, disappeared on the marchfrom Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri. He was lastseen moving down the road with tworfles slung over his shoulder. Hisexact fate remains a mystery.National Archives l'hoto (USMC) 127-N-A45353

Soldiers, readily recognizable as such in their short parkas,march in single tile on 6 December along the MSR south qfHagaru-ri. RCT-31, badly mauled east of the reservoir and

Photo by Sgt Frank c. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A5466

reduced in combat effectives to a smaliprovisional battalioncommanded by LtCol Berry K. Anderson, USA, was attachedto the 7th Ma rifles for the breakout.