Distrust in Government Leaders, Demand for Popular ... 2011...Distrust in Government Leaders, Demand...

ORI GIN AL PA PER

Distrust in Government Leaders, Demandfor Leadership Change, and Preferencefor Popular Elections in Rural China

Lianjiang Li

Published online: 12 June 2010

� Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Abstract This paper examines the relationship between distrust in incumbent

government leaders and demand for systemic changes in rural China. It finds that

individuals who distrust government leaders’ commitment to the public interest

have both stronger demand for leadership change and stronger preference for

popular elections. It argues that distrust in government leaders may have enhanced

the demand for leadership change, which in turn may have reinforced the preference

for elections. It further argues that distrust in incumbent leaders has in effect

induced a demand for systemic changes, as introducing popular election of gov-

ernment leaders would require a major constitutional amendment. The paper sug-

gests that two distinctive mechanisms may be at work in determining whether

distrust in current government authorities induces preference for systemic changes.

Whether citizens can engineer leadership change through existing channels influ-

ences the generation of idealistic wishes for a better political system. Perceived

availability of better and viable alternatives affects whether idealistic wishes

become a practical preference.

Keywords Political trust � Distrust in government leaders � Leadership change �Systemic changes

Introduction

Trust in incumbent government authorities enhances system support while distrust

generates demand for leadership and policy changes (Abravanel and Busch 1975,

p. 57; Muller and Jukam 1977; Chanley et al. 2000; Hetherington 2004). Scholars,

L. Li (&)

Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong,

Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong, China

e-mail: [email protected]

123

Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

DOI 10.1007/s11109-010-9111-3

however, disagree about whether distrust in incumbent government leaders induces

preference for systemic changes. As regards the United States, one side argues that

distrust in current authorities may ultimately weaken public acceptance of

democratic principles and result in support for undemocratic alternatives (A. Miller

1974a, b; Caddell 1979). The other side argues that distrust in political authorities

does not undermine support for the democratic system (Citrin 1974; Abravanel and

Busch 1975, p. 80; W. Miller 1979). Further empirical studies on the US and other

democracies have not settled this debate. Some researchers observe that distrust in

current administration significantly weakens support for a democratic system

(Miller and Listhaug 1990; Waldron-Moore 1999; Bratton and Mattes 2001;

Seligson 2002a, p. 180; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; also see Avery 2006, 2007;

Weitz-Shapiro 2008). Others find that distrust in incumbent government authorities

has little impact on democratic support (Lipset and Schneider 1983; Citrin and

Green 1986; Finkel et al. 1989; Rose and Shin 2001).

These studies concentrate on democracies where free election of government

leaders has been institutionalized. The debate has thus focused on whether distrust

in freely elected government authorities weakens support for democracy. Only

recently have scholars begun to address another dimension of the theoretical puzzle,

which is whether distrust in political authorities who are not freely elected

stimulates demand for systemic changes in authoritarian and transitional societies.

Their findings, though, vary from place to place. On one hand, a study by Rose

(2007) finds that distrust in government leaders in post-soviet Russia, Ukraine, and

Belarus, where elections fall short of being free and fair, does not generate

preference for further democratization. On the other hand, Johnson (2005, pp. 79–

80) observes that distrust in political leaders in the quasi-authoritarian Ukraine

enhances support for democracy, while a more recent study by Jamal (2007) finds

that in the Arab world individuals who have less confidence in authoritarian

government have stronger support for democracy.

This study joins the discussion by examining the relationship between distrust in

current government leaders and demand for systemic changes in China. The case of

China is interesting for two reasons. First, the country has witnessed a growing

number of popular protests in the last two decades (Walker 2006; Cai 2008; O’Brien

2008), which suggests that trust in government authorities may have declined

(cf. Abravanel and Busch 1975; Muller and Jukam 1977). Second, public demand

for systemic changes seems to be on the rise. Disillusioned protest leaders, for

instance, have openly called for ending one-party rule (Li 2004, p. 239; Li and

O’Brien 2008, p. 23). More importantly, a three-wave survey conducted in the

Chinese capital city finds that ‘‘diffuse support for the regime had declined by more

than 6 percent’’ from 1995 to 1999 (Chen 2004, p. 184). Is distrust in government

leaders associated with demand for systemic changes in China? What can we learn

from the China case about the relationship between distrust in government

authorities and preference for systemic changes?

Drawing on survey data collected in the Chinese countryside, this paper

addresses these questions. It first examines how distrust in government leaders’

commitment to the public interest is associated with demand for leadership change

and preference for popularly electing government leaders. It then explores how

292 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

123

distrust in leaders may foster idealistic wishes for a better political system and why

only certain idealistic wishes become practical demands for systemic changes. It

concludes with a discussion about the theoretical and methodological implications

of survey findings from rural China.

Data and Methods

This study relies on a local survey conducted in 2007. The field sites were Dongshan

county and Wuping county in Fujian province, Shangrao county in Jiangxi province,

and Yongjia county in Zhejiang province. The four counties were selected by

convenience. Sampling in each county was conducted in three stages. First, five

townships were selected with probability proportionate to size (PPS). Second, four

villages were selected from each township with PPS. Lastly, within each selected

village around 20 randomly chosen individuals over the age of 18 were interviewed,

regardless of village population size. Interviews were administered by advanced

undergraduate students in the Department of Sociology from a leading university in

South China under the supervision of their professor. Altogether 1,600 farmers were

interviewed. Cases are weighted according to the rural population size of the county.

To adjust for survey design effects, each selected township is treated as a stratum

and each village a cluster.

As with other survey studies (e.g., Zhu 1996; Berinsky 2004), this research faces

the unavoidable problem of missing responses. Altogether 7.7% of 1,600

respondents did not answer one or more of the 45 questions analyzed in this study.

Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test (Little 1988) showed that the

data were not MCAR (N = 1,600; v2 = 3,437; df = 3,063; p = .000). Assuming

that the data were missing at random (MAR), missing values were multiply imputed

to increase the efficiency of estimation and to make inferences valid by reflecting

additional variability due to the missing values (Rubin 1987; Schafer and Olsen

1998; King et al. 2001). Five multiply imputed datasets were generated using the

Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (Schafer 1997; SPSS Inc 2008, p. 25).

The imputed datasets were analyzed with Mplus 5.0 (Muthen and Muthen 2006,

p. 315). Estimates and standard errors of direct and indirect effects obtained from

imputed datasets were then combined using the rules given by Rubin (Rubin 1987;

Schafer and Olsen 1998, pp. 556–557). For the purposes of comparison, the analytic

model was also fitted to the original data using listwise deletion and to a singly

imputed dataset generated with the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm

(Little and Rubin 1987). Results obtained from the three alternative treatments of

missing values are highly consistent.

The data analysis proceeded in two steps. Confirmatory factor analysis was used

to assure that multiple measures of latent theoretical constructs were reliable. A path

model was then estimated to examine the relationships between the outcome,

explanatory, mediator, control, and background variables. Ordinal and binary

indicators of latent constructs were treated as crude measurements of latent

continuous factors. The WLSMV (weighted least squares mean and variance

adjusted) estimator was used to correct for the bias that might result from having

Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 293

123

ordinal endogenous variables in the model (Muthen and Muthen 2006, p. 424).

Since it relies on a local probability sample, the research focuses on exploring

relationships between variables (Manion 1994).

The Outcome Variable: Preference for Elections as an Indicatorof Demand for Systemic Changes

The outcome variable is preference for popularly electing government leaders.

Preference for elections is used as an indicator of demand for systemic changes in

China for two reasons. First, an expressed preference for elections may signify a

certain degree of disapproval of the current political system, under which ordinary

citizens have little say in the selection of government leaders (Burns 1989; Chan

2004). Second, a preference for popular elections may indicate a demand for an

institutional change that will require a major constitutional amendment. The

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (adopted 1982, last amended 2004)

stipulates that government leaders of all levels are elected by deputies to the

corresponding levels of people’s congress rather than ordinary citizens (Arts. 79.1;

101.1) (see O’Brien 1990, pp. 61–64, 127–137; Manion 2000, 2008).1

Preference for elections was tapped by asking whether government leaders

should be directly elected by the people through one-person one-vote. Three choices

were provided to the respondents: (1) should not; (2) should but conditions are not

ripe; (3) should and elections can be held now. The question was asked,

respectively, about the state chairman (i.e., the Chinese president), provincial

governor, city mayor, county head, and township head (see Appendix for variable

descriptions). Individuals who found elections undesirable were expected to choose

‘‘should not,’’ those who wished to elect government leaders but found it

impractical were expected to choose ‘‘should but conditions are not ripe,’’ and

those who found elections both desirable and feasible were expected to choose

‘‘should and can be held now.’’

The measure was relevant and stimulating. Excepting for a few experimental

elections of township heads in Sichuan province and Guangxi province (Li 2002;

Dong 2006), no popular election of government leaders had been held at any level in

China. Equally important, the measure made good sense to Chinese farmers, many

1 It is worth noting that preference for elections is not equivalent to support for democratization, not to

mention demand for overall regime change. As important as it is, popular election of government leaders

is only one of several major dimensions of a democratic system. Moreover, election without multiparty

competition can hardly be considered a criterion for democracy. Even if government leaders at all levels

are elected with one-person one-vote, China will at best become an ‘‘electoral authoritarian’’ country

(e.g., Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006) rather than a democracy if such elections are limited to and run by a

single ruling party and exclude all potential organized opposition. Recent survey studies of political

support in urban China have used more direct measures to tap popular demand (or the lack of it) for

regime change, e.g., to what extent an individual feels proud to live under the current political system and

feels obliged to support the current political system, if an individual believes that the communist-led

multi-party system should be changed, and whether an individual finds political stability more important

than democratization (Chen 2004, p. 23; Tang 2005, pp. 70–76).

294 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

123

of whom had directly elected villagers’ committees through one-person one-vote for

nearly a decade by the time of the survey (Manion 1996, 2006).2

Preference for elections turned out to be fairly widespread (Table 1). Over two-

thirds of the respondents agreed that leaders of all five levels of government should

be directly elected through one-person one-vote, either immediately or when

conditions are mature. A preference for elections was strongest in regard to

township head, and decreased steadily regarding higher levels of government

leaders. While 86% of the respondents agreed that township heads should in

principle be popularly elected, 70% thought the same about the state chairman.

Similarly, a practical preference for elections was much stronger for lower level

government leaders than for higher levels. Nearly 39% of the respondents thought

that township heads should and could be popularly elected right away, when only

16% thought the same about the state chairman.

The Explanatory Variable: Distrust in Government Leaders’ Commitmentto the Public Interest as an Indicator of Distrust in Government Authorities

The explanatory variable is distrust in incumbent government leaders, which is

multi-dimensional as its objects include leaders’ commitment, competence,

character, equity, honesty, and responsiveness (Abramson 1972, p. 1245;

Weatherford 1984, pp. 188–189; Citrin and Muste 1999). This study focuses on

distrust in government leaders’ commitment to rule in the interests of the governed

(Levi and Stoker 2000, p. 476), because popular elections can improve the incentive

compatibility or ideological congruence between elected elites and their constit-

uents (Achen 1978; Dalton 1985; Huber and Powell 1994; Manion 1996).

Individuals who distrust the current leaders’ commitment to the public interest

are expected to prefer popular elections, because it will enable them to remove

untrustworthy leaders imposed from above and to choose trustworthier ones on their

own.

Distrust in government leaders’ commitment to the public interest was tapped

with three indicators. Respondents were asked whether they believed that

Table 1 Do you think the following government leaders should be directly elected by the people through

one-person one-vote?

Should not Should but

conditions not ripe

Should and can

be held now

Non-response

The state chairman 28.8 53.7 16.4 1.1

Provincial governor 26.1 55.8 16.9 1.2

City mayor 24.2 56.1 18.7 1.1

County head 16.9 52.9 29.0 1.2

Township head 12.1 47.9 38.9 1.1

Note: N = 1,600. Row entries are percentages, which may not add up to 100 due to rounding errors

2 Villagers’ committees are not a level of government but ‘‘mass organizations of self-government.’’

Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 295

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government leaders: (1) put their own interests before those of farmers; (2) do not

care whether farmers will agree when they make policies; and (3) care primarily

about the powerful and rich and neglect the interests of ordinary people. Provided

choices were: (1) fully disbelieve; (2) disbelieve; (3) half believe and half doubt;

(4) believe; and (5) fully believe. The question was asked about all five levels of

government leaders: central, provincial, city, county, and township.

Measured by these three indicators, popular distrust was highest for township

leaders and decreased for higher levels. Over 22% of the respondents had no

confidence in township leaders in all three aspects, while 15% had no trust in central

leaders. Conversely, over 35% of the respondents were confident about central

leaders in all three aspects, while less than 20% had full confidence in township

leaders. The observation corroborates a previous finding that the Chinese people

have less trust in lower levels of government than in higher levels (Shi 2001; Li

2004).

Confirmatory factor analysis showed that for each level of government leaders

the responses to the three questions constituted a single latent construct (standard-

ized factor loadings ranged from .712 to .898). Five latent continuous variables were

then constructed to measure distrust in central, provincial, city, county, and

township leaders (see Appendix).

Mediator Variable: Demand for Leadership Change

Demand for leadership change is assumed to be the mediator through which distrust

in leaders affects preference for elections. First, distrust in the incumbent leaders

does not always induce demand for leadership change. Some Chinese farmers, for

instance, do not want to see corrupt officials replaced on grounds that ‘‘when a full

tiger leaves, he will inevitably be replaced by a hungry wolf’’ (Li and O’Brien 1996,

p. 34). Second, distrust in incumbent leaders may induce demand for leadership

change without generating demand for any systemic changes. An individual who

wants leadership change may remain confident in the existing system of top-down

appointment and may look to higher levels for the desired change. Only those

individuals who both want leadership change and no longer have confidence in top-

down appointment are likely to favor popular election as an alternative means of

choosing government leaders.

To tap their demand for leadership change, respondents were asked whether they

would vote for the incumbent government leader if, hypothetically, a democratic

election was held. Provided choices were: (1) yes; (2) unsure; and (3) no. The

question was repeated about the state chairman, provincial governor, city mayor,

county head, and township head. Reservations about voting for the incumbent were

interpreted as an indication of demand for leadership change.

Demand for leadership change turned out to be remarkably widespread (Table 2).

Over 40% of the respondents showed reservations about voting for the incumbent

state chairman. Demand for leadership change was stronger for provincial governor,

city mayor, county head, and township head, as over 60% of the respondents were

either unsure or determined not to vote for the incumbent.

296 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

123

Three hypotheses were formulated. First, distrust in government leaders should

lead to a stronger demand for leadership change. Second, demand for leadership

change should lead to a stronger preference for elections. Lastly, distrust in leaders

should have a positive indirect effect on preference for elections by inducing a

stronger demand for leadership change.

Control Variables

Since it included a mediator variable, the analysis had two sets of control variables.

Life satisfaction and perception of corruption were controlled to determine if

distrust in current leaders’ commitment to the public interest had an independent

effect on demand for leadership change. Individuals who were satisfied with their

lives might give credit to incumbent government leaders (cf. Catterberg and Moreno

2006, p. 43) and prefer they stay in office, while those who were unsatisfied might

blame current leaders (cf. Kinder 1981) and want leadership change. In the

meantime, individuals who were more acutely aware of political corruption were

expected to have a stronger demand for leadership change. Life satisfaction was

tapped with three measures: (1) self-assessment of change in family income in the

last 2 years; (2) expectation of change in family income in the coming 2 years; and

(3) satisfaction with one’s life in general (see Appendix). The three indicators

constituted a single latent construct (standardized factor loadings ranged from .650

to .796). Perception of corruption was also tapped with three indicators.

Respondents were asked if township officials, county officials, and provincial and

city government officials had in the last decade engaged in corruption. Provided

choices were: (1) no; (2) do not know; (3) it is said so; and (4) yes. The three

indicators constituted a single latent construct (standardized factor loadings ranged

from .728 to .970).3 Both life satisfaction and perception of corruption were

expected to have a direct impact on demand for leadership change. They were also

expected to indirectly affect demand for leadership change by influencing distrust in

government leaders.

Table 2 Would you vote for the incumbent leader if a democratic election was held?

Yes Unsure No Non-response

The state chairman 58.1 37.7 3.8 .4

Provincial governor 37.8 57.0 4.8 .5

City mayor 32.9 61.0 5.7 .4

County head 30.8 59.0 10.0 .2

Township head 29.1 57.7 13.0 .2

Note: N = 1,600. Row entries are percentages, which may not add up to 100 due to rounding errors

3 The answer ‘‘do not know’’ was treated as a valid response rather than a missing value because it was

read out as an alternative answer during the interview and it indicates a level of perception of corruption

which is stronger than answering ‘‘no’’ but weaker than answering ‘‘it is said so.’’

Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 297

123

Five variables were controlled to determine if demand for leadership change had

an independent effect on one’s preference for elections. First, life satisfaction was

controlled, as it has been observed to affect diffuse support for the political system

in China (Chen 2004, p. 111). Individuals who were unsatisfied with their lives were

expected to have a stronger preference for elections. Second, perception of

corruption was controlled, as individuals who were more acutely aware of

corruption were expected to have a stronger preference for popularly electing

government leaders. The third control variable was internal political efficacy, i.e.,

the sense of competence in understanding public affairs and participating in politics

(Abramson 1972; Balch 1974; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Craig et al. 1990). To tap

their sense of efficaciousness, respondents were asked, hypothetically, if they would

be able to: (1) judge whether a county head has done a good job after listening to

his/her work report; (2) judge which one is better if two candidates for county head

debated each other; and (3) judge whether decisions by a county head benefit or

harm their interests (see Appendix). The three indicators constituted a single latent

construct (standardized factor loadings ranged from .855 to .960). More efficacious

individuals were expected to have a stronger preference for elections in that they

might be more confident of their abilities to work the new system.

The fourth control variable was assessment of elected village leaders. In rural

China, elections of villagers’ committees were designed to serve as a democratic

training class (see O’Brien and Li 2000, pp. 469–470). It has been argued that as

farmers realize that they can use their ballots to oust unpopular village leaders, they

will wish to do the same to government officials (Shi 1999, pp. 394–395). To see if a

preference for popularly electing government leaders might derive from the

appreciation of the instrumental value of village elections, respondents were asked

to compare elected village cadres with appointed ones in four regards: (1) honest

and clean; (2) eager to serve farmers; (3) dare to speak for farmers and resist wrong

decisions of the township government; and (4) handle affairs impartially. The four

indicators constituted a single construct (standardized factor loadings ranged from

.861 to .911). Individuals who found elected village leaders more honest,

responsive, and impartial than appointed ones were expected to have a stronger

preference for popular election of government leaders.

Lastly, social trust was controlled as it might increase confidence in universal

suffrage and ease worries about ‘‘tyranny of the majority’’ (Dahl 1971; Putnam

1993; Reisinger et al. 1994, p. 206). In rural China, social trust may be particularly

important in cultivating a preference for elections, as village politics often involves

long-standing lineage rivalries (Manion 2006, pp. 312–313; Tsai 2007, p. 360). To

measure their trust in other people, respondents were asked whether they would in

general believe what the following people told them, including: (1) fellow villagers;

(2) people introduced by relatives and good friends; and (3) most people in society

(see Appendix). The three indicators tapped the same latent factor (standardized

factor loadings ranged from .691 to .931).

Four demographic features, i.e., gender, age, education, and membership in the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), were assumed to affect all attitudinal variables

described above. Three regional dummy variables, i.e., Wuping county in Fujian

province, Shangrao county in Jiangxi province, and Yongjia county in Zhejiang

298 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

123

province were included to control for the effect of unobserved differences between

the four selected counties. Dongshan county in Fujian was used as the reference.

The county dummies were assumed to affect all endogenous variables.

Model and Results

A path model was constructed based on the theoretical considerations discussed

above. Exogenous variables listed in the rectangular box on the left-hand side of

Fig. 1 were allowed to influence all endogenous variables on the right-hand side of

the bracket. Distrust in government leaders’ commitment to the public interest was

assumed to affect demand for leadership change, which in turn was assumed to

affect preference for elections. Distrust in leaders was assumed to have no direct

impact on attitudes toward election. Life satisfaction, perception of corruption,

internal political efficacy, assessment of elected village leaders, and social trust

were allowed to directly influence preference for elections. As was explained above,

life satisfaction and perception of corruption were also allowed to influence

preference for elections indirectly by affecting distrust in leaders and demand for

leadership change. The model has five versions, which are identical except that they

estimate, respectively, the relationships between distrust in leaders, demand for

leadership change, and preference for elections regarding five different levels of

government leaders in China.

Gender Age Education CCP membership

Wuping county Shangrao county Yongjia county

Demand for leadership

change

Distrust in leaders

Preference for elections

Perception of corruption

Internal efficacy

Assessing elected cadres

Social trust

Life satisfaction

Fig. 1 The relationship between distrust in government leaders, demand for leadership change, andpreference for elections. Note: Exogenous variables listed in the rectangular box are allowed to affect allendogenous ones on the right side of the bracket. Indicators of latent constructs and error/residual terms ofendogenous variables are suppressed for the sake of clarity

Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 299

123

The model is not an exact fit. Analyses of individual datasets showed that the chi-

square statistic (v2) ranged from 35 to 50 with 19 or 20 degrees of freedom (DF),

which indicated an imperfect fit (p \ .01) (not shown). However, three widely-

accepted close fit indexes reported in Table 3, i.e., Comparative Fit Index (CFI),

Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI, also called Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI)), and Root

Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) met conventional cut-off criteria,

which are, respectively, CFI [ .950, TLI [ 950, and RMSEA \ .060 (see Hu and

Bentler 1999; also see Marsh et al. 2004). The goodness-of-fit test results assure us

that estimated coefficients are acceptable descriptions of the data and can be used to

test hypotheses.

The results appearing in Table 3 can be grouped into three general findings. First,

distrust in current government leaders’ commitment to the public interest was

positively associated with demand for leadership change. All else being equal,

individuals who had stronger distrust in government leaders were more likely to

have stronger reservations about voting for the incumbent government leaders if

democratic elections were held. The positive correlation between the two variables

was highly significant regarding all five levels of government leaders (p B .001,

one-sided test).

Second, demand for leadership change was positively associated with a

preference for elections, and the correlation was significant regarding the state

chairman, provincial governor, city mayor, and township head (p B .05, one-sided

test). All else being equal, individuals who had a stronger demand for leadership

change were more likely to agree that government leaders should be popularly

elected. Furthermore, individuals who were more eager to see leadership change

were more likely to agree that elections could be held right away. The effect of

demand for leadership change on preference for elections was statistically

insignificant regarding county head, probably because individuals who had similar

attitudes toward replacing the incumbent county head shared similar ideas about the

desirability and feasibility of popularly electing the county head.

Lastly, distrust in government leaders’ commitment to the public interest had a

positive indirect impact on a person’s preference for elections by positively

affecting demand for leadership change. All else being equal, the more distrustful

one felt about government leaders’ commitment to the public interest, the stronger

one’s demand for leadership change, and the stronger one’s preference for popular

elections. The indirect effect was statistically significant regarding the state

chairman, provincial governor, and township head (p B .05, one-sided test). The

result offered additional support to the hypothesis that distrust in government

leaders might reinforce a preference for elections by enhancing demands for

leadership change.

Due to the lack of longitudinal data, this research cannot establish causal

relationships between distrust in government leaders, demand for leadership change,

and preference for elections. In fact, alternative models that posit different relations

between the key variables would fit the data equally well (see Stelzl 1986). Based on

empirical and ‘‘theoretical grounds’’ (Warwick 1998, p. 597), however, it is

reasonable to believe that distrust in government leaders may have enhanced

demand for leadership change rather than the other way around, and it is also

300 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

123

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Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 301

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302 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

123

reasonable that demand for leadership change may have reinforced preference for

elections rather than the other way around. First, it is more plausible to assume that

distrust in government leaders occurs prior to the formation of demand for

leadership change. It is true that an individual who has a pre-formed demand for

leadership change may be inclined to view incumbent leaders with skepticism such

that one’s demand for leadership change enhances one’s distrust in government

leaders. In China, however, this is not a very likely scenario. For one, it is hard to

see how individuals would develop an interest in leadership change without having

doubts about incumbent leaders. Second, most people are socialized into having

faith in political authorities, particularly in national leaders. Political education in

Chinese schools is designed to cultivate faith in the ruling party and the regime.

Cultural myths about ‘‘benign emperors’’ and ‘‘parent-like mandarins’’ may also

help inculcate trust in political authorities. Lastly, the observation of corrupt

behavior such as using power for private gain and practicing favoritism may induce

distrust in government leaders (Chanley et al. 2000; Seligson 2002b; Anderson and

Tverdova 2003; Bowler and Karp 2004), but it does not necessarily create demand

for leadership change. In light of these considerations, it is more likely that an

individual finds government leaders untrustworthy and then develops an interest in

leadership change.

It is also more plausible to assume that demand for leadership change occurs

prior to the formation of a preference for elections in China than otherwise. It is true

that pro-election individuals may be more likely to view unelected government

leaders with distrust and want leadership change because the leaders have not been

chosen through procedures that they believe are appropriate. But this is not very

likely in the Chinese countryside. The surveyed rural residents had no prior

experience with democratic election of government leaders, and Chinese farmers

have relatively little knowledge of democratic political systems and philosophies.

They are unlikely to have been socialized into pro-election views prior to interaction

with government officials. It is more likely that Chinese farmers’ interactions with

government authorities affect their trust in government leaders and their demand for

leadership change, which in turn condition their preference for elections.

The two arguments are supported by two other empirical findings. First, all else

being equal, individuals who were more acutely aware of corruption had stronger

distrust in government leaders at provincial, city, county, and township levels

(p B .001, one-sided test) (not shown in Table 3) as well as stronger demand for

leadership change at the provincial, city, county, and township levels (p B .001,

one-sided test). Moreover, perception of corruption had a significant indirect impact

on preference for popularly electing the provincial governor, city mayor, and county

head by affecting distrust in these three levels of leaders (p B .05, one-sided test).

Although it is possible that one’s preference for elections leads to a demand for

leadership change, which in turn induces a stronger perception of corruption, it is

more likely that perception of corruption occurs prior to distrust in government

leaders, demand for leadership change, and preference for elections.

Second, individuals who were less satisfied with their lives were generally more

distrustful of government leaders’ commitment to the public interest and thereby

had stronger demands for leadership change. The direct impact of life satisfaction

Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 303

123

on distrust was significant regarding county and township leaders (p B .01, one-

sided test), and its indirect effect on demand for leadership change by increasing

distrust was also significant regarding county and township leaders (p B .01,

one-sided test), probably because these two levels of government are most directly

responsible for the local economy and governance. This finding supports the

argument that distrust in leaders occurs prior to demand for leadership change. It is

possible that individuals who are more eager to see county and township heads

replaced are more likely to develop distrust in county and township leaders, which

in turn makes them more unsatisfied with their lives. It is, however, much more

plausible that life satisfaction affects confidence in township and county leaders,

which in turn affects demand for leadership change at these two levels.

In sum, it seems that Chinese farmers became doubtful about government

leaders’ commitment to the public interest if they knew or heard that sub-national

authorities were corrupt and/or if they were unsatisfied with their lives. And then as

a consequence of this, they wanted to see untrustworthy leaders replaced and

preferred to effect the leadership change through popular elections.4 This line of

interpretation is supported by the finding that individuals who were more confident

of their abilities to assess and choose county government head tended to have a

stronger preference for elections. The effect of internal efficacy was significant on

preference for popularly electing county and township government heads (p B .01,

one-sided test). This finding suggests that Chinese farmers base their choice of

leadership selection systems on assessment of their own political competence. They

favor popular elections if they feel more confident about working the new system.

Three minor findings of this research are worth mentioning. First, individuals

who found elected village community leaders more honest, impartial, and

responsive than appointed ones were more likely to favor popular election of

government leaders. This effect, though, was statistically insignificant after

controlling for the effects of other variables. The finding thus offers limited support

to the ‘‘spill-over’’ argument that village elections may enhance demand for popular

election of government leaders (Shi 1999).

Second, contrary to what has been observed in industrialized democracies, social

trust in rural China had a negative effect on preference for elections, and the effect

was significant in regard to electing county and township heads (p B .05, one-sided

test). It is possible that interpersonal trust and political trust are positively correlated

in rural China, as social capital theory suggests. The finding offers some support to

the argument that social trust in undemocratic societies is associated with support

for authoritarian patterns of rule (Jamal 2007).

Lastly, preference for elections varied considerably from one location to another.

Farmers from Yongjia county, Zhejiang province had a significantly stronger

preference for popular elections than those from the other three counties, probably

because Yongjia had the highest level of economic development. It will be

4 It ought to be noted that many unobserved factors might have affected distrust in government leaders,

demand for leadership change, and preference for elections. Failed attempts to defend one’s lawful rights

and interests through non-electoral channels such as petitioning and administrative litigation, for

example, may result in stronger distrust in government leaders, stronger demand for leadership change, as

well as stronger preference for elections.

304 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

123

interesting to see how the local economy, political history, and government

performance in different Chinese counties affect political attitudes and values of the

local populace. For this study, the fact that correlations between distrust in current

government leaders, demand for leadership change, and preference for elections

remain highly significant after controlling for the effects of county dummies

suggests that the key findings reported above may be generalizable to other parts of

rural China.

Conclusions

This research finds that distrust in incumbent government leaders’ commitment to

the public interest is associated with stronger demand for leadership change, which

is in turn associated with stronger preference for popular elections of government

leaders in rural China. It argues that distrust in government leaders’ commitment to

the public interest may have enhanced demands for leadership change, which in turn

may have reinforced a preference for popular election as an alternative mechanism

of leadership selection. It further argues that distrust in current government leaders

may have in effect induced a demand for systemic changes. The belief that

government leaders should be popularly elected may indicate disapproval of the

existing leadership selection system, which is characterized by top-down appoint-

ment and limited popular participation. The belief that government leaders should

and can be popularly elected right away may indicate a demand for immediately

changing the existing system of leadership selection. Yet introducing popular

election of government leaders, as noted above, will require a major constitutional

amendment.

As regards the theoretical debate about whether distrust in government

authorities induces demand for systemic changes, the China case suggests that

two mechanisms may be at work. First, whether ordinary people can engineer

leadership changes through existing channels affects the generation of idealistic

wishes for a better alternative system. Second, perceived availability of better and

viable alternatives affects whether an idealistic wish becomes a practical demand.

The distinction of the two mechanisms helps explain why authoritarianism may be

more vulnerable to the corrosive effect of distrust in incumbent government leaders

than democracy is. Under authoritarian rule ordinary people have little institution-

alized recourse to get rid of untrustworthy government leaders, so they are more

likely to feel frustrated with the existing system and develop idealistic wishes for a

better one (cf. Anderson and LoTempio 2002, p. 349). In the meantime, their

idealistic wishes can readily develop into a practical preference for elections, which

have proven elsewhere to be a better and more viable system of leadership selection.

Democracy, by contrast, has somewhat stronger immunity to the corrosive effect of

distrust in incumbent government authorities (see Sztompka 2000, pp. 140–150). It

enables the people to engineer leadership changes through regular elections, thereby

generating less frustration with the overall system and weaker wishes for a better

one. Equally important, it is harder for idealistic wishes for a system better than

democracy to become a practical demand for systemic changes, because better and

Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 305

123

viable alternatives may not be in sight (Rose 2007, p. 112; Rose and Shin 2001,

p. 340). Viewed from this perspective, both sides of the theoretical debate may be

correct on whether distrust of freely elected leaders induces a preference for

undemocratic alternatives. Distrust in freely elected government leaders may foster

idealistic wishes for an even better system. Such wishes, however, may never

materialize into practical demands due to the lack of ‘‘real’’ choices (Fraser 1970,

p. 415).

Methodologically, the research reaffirms the importance of specifying the object

of political trust in survey research (e.g., Citrin and Muste 1999; Levi and Stoker

2000). If the dependence on global measures has led to the overestimation of

distrust in the United States (Hill 1981), then it may have the opposite effect in the

study of political trust in China. As is shown in this research, measures of trust need

to be administered at all five levels of government. Asking only about trust in

central leaders would have missed distrust in local government authorities; asking

broadly about local government leaders would have missed the fact that public trust

decreases significantly for every lower level of the government hierarchy. Since

popular trust in Chinese central leaders may remain robust even when trust in local

authorities is declining, focusing exclusively on the central government would

unveil the tip of an iceberg of public distrust in government leaders but fail to

expose its growing body.

Acknowledgements This project was funded by the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong

Government (Grant No. CUHK2440/06H). I thank my collaborators for administering the survey. For

insightful comments and suggestions, I thank the editors, two anonymous reviewers, Pierre Landry,

Xiaobo Lu, Jeremy Wallace, and especially Kevin O’Brien and Melanie Manion.

Appendix

See Table 4.

Table 4 Description of variables

Mean SD Std. factor loading

Outcome variables

Observed preference for elections

Do you think the following government leaders should be directly elected by the people through one-

person one-vote?

1 = should not; 2 = should but conditions are not ripe; 3 = should and elections can be held now

The state chairman 1.879 .668

Provincial governor 1.911 .657

City mayor 1.946 .659

County head 2.119 .674

Township head 2.264 .670

306 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

123



Explanatory variables

Do you believe the following statements?

1 = fully disbelieve; 2 = disbelieve; 3 = half believe and half doubt; 4 = believe; 5 = fully believe

Latent distrust in central leaders’ commitment to the public interest

They put their own interests before those of farmers 2.703 1.240 .765

They do not care if farmers agree when they make policies 2.745 1.220 .823

They care primarily about the powerful and rich and neglect the

interests of ordinary people

2.598 1.236 .898

Latent distrust in provincial leaders’ commitment to the public interest





2.746 1.073 .863

Latent distrust in city leaders’ commitment to the public interest





2.838 1.017 .871

Latent distrust in county leaders’ commitment to the public interest





2.980 1.069 .863

Latent distrust in township leaders’ commitment to the public interest





3.001 1.121 .848

Mediator variables

Observed demand for leadership change

Would you vote for the incumbent leader if a democratic election was held? 1 = yes; 2 = unsure;

3 = no

The state chairman 1.459 .574

Provincial governor 1.672 .566

City mayor 1.730 .561

County head 1.792 .605

Township head 1.838 .630

Control variables

Latent life satisfaction

How do you compare your family’s economic situation with 2 years ago?

1 = a lot worse; 2 = somewhat worse; 3 = same; 4 = somewhat better; 5 = a lot better

Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311 307

123



How do you predict your family’s economic situation in the coming 2 years?

1 = worse; 2 = uncertain; 3 = no change; 4 = better

All in all, are you satisfied with your life?

1 = very unsatisfied; 2 = unsatisfied; 3 = so-so; 4 = satisfied; 5 = very satisfied

Family economic situation compared to 2 years ago 3.969 .865 .796

Family economic situation in the coming 2 years 3.407 .894 .715

Overall level of satisfaction with life 3.611 .784 .650

Latent perception of corruption

In the last decade did the following government officials engage in corruption?

1 = no; 2 = do not know; 3 = it is said so; 4 = yes

Township government officials 2.701 1.075 .728

County government officials 2.550 1.046 .970

Provincial and city government officials 2.427 .984 .759

Latent political efficacy

Do you think you can do the following?

1 = definitely can’t; 2 = can’t; 3 = unsure; 4 = can; 5 = definitely can

Judge a county head’s performance after listening to his/her work

report

3.173 .927 .855

Judge which one is better if two county head candidates debate

each other

3.182 .944 .960

Judge if a county head’s decisions benefit or harm self-interests 3.288 .963 .862

Latent assessment of elected village leaders

How do you compare elected village cadres with appointed ones in the following aspects?

1 = appointed ones are better; 2 = same; 3 = elected ones are better

Honest and clean 2.471 .591 .870

Eager to serve farmers 2.500 .584 .911

Dare to speak for farmers and resist wrong township decisions 2.527 .590 .901

Handle affairs impartially 2.472 .603 .861

Latent social trust

In general, do you believe what the following people tell you?

1 = fully disbelieve; 2 = disbelieve; 3 = half believe and half doubt; 4 = believe; 5 = fully believe

Fellow villagers 3.343 .679 .691

People introduced by relatives and good friends 3.146 .682 .931

Most people in the society 2.995 .735 .727

Demographic variables

Gender (0 = female; 1 = male) .516 .500

Age (range 18–88) 41.30 13.59

Education (0–21 years) 8.02 3.47

CCP membership (0 = non-member; 1 = member) .17 .38

Notes: N = 1,600; missing data are multiply imputed. Row entries are means, standard deviations, and

standardized factor loadings

308 Polit Behav (2011) 33:291–311

123

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