Distance - Final Draft

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Establishing Distance: Gauging the Possibility of Transition from Non-Korean to Korean Identity in Today’s

“Multicultural” South Korea

By

Theodore J. Voelkel

June 2016

A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the

Master of Arts Program in the Social Sciences Faculty Advisor: Bruce Cumings Preceptor: Alicia VandeVusse

ii

Establishing Distance

ABSTRACT. Both the continued migration of ethnic minorities to South Korea and that

population’s growth, having eventuated construction of a multicultural South Korean society,

constitute a topic of growing importance. Research has shown that Koreans tend to consider

themselves a distinct subdivision of humanity, entrance or exit of which are equally

unfeasible, if not impossible. This study undertook a symbolic-interactionist approach to the

investigation of Korean identity as manifest in the form of a social boundary, characterization

of which was central to the research portion of the study. The term distance has been

employed in definition of such: a metaphorical gap established by Koreans between

themselves and non-Koreans mediating their concept of and interaction with one another. Via

21 qualitative interviews this study sought to investigate the conceptualization of identity

among younger South Koreans such that hypotheses concerning methods by which distance

might be bridged could be formulated. It was found that Korean identity is couched in a

variety of concepts preexistent with regard to birth, acquired thereafter, or tending to blur this

distinction. Application of these findings include the possible illumination of lesser

understood historical events and social trends, and provide a basis for policy

recommendations concerning both South Korea’s ethnically non-Korean population and

facilitation of its inevitably multicultural future.

Keywords: identity, Koreanness, migration, social boundaries, South Korea


1

"The whole social world seems populated with forces that in reality exist only in our minds."

-Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life ([1912] 1995, p. 228)

INTRODUCTION

Multiculturalism in South Korea (hereafter, Korea), driven primarily by the rise and resultant

implications of both labor and marriage migration, is a topic of ever-increasing importance.

In 2014, Korea recorded one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, at 1.25 births per

female,1 though this did constitute a slight increase from 1.15 in 2008.2 Further, in 1960, 42.3

percent of Korea’s population was between the ages of 0 to 14; by 2005, the falling fertility

rate had shrunk that age cohort to 19.2 percent. Concurrently, with the elderly comprising 9.1

percent of its 2005 population, up from 2.9 percent in 1960, Korea can be classified as an

ageing society3 today (Kim 2013). Finally, Korea maintains one of the world’s most

successful public education systems: the 2005 high school graduation rate was among the

highest globally at 97 percent,4 and 82 percent of high school graduates matriculated at

colleges and universities in 2011.5 Taken together, Korea is arguably headed toward

economic catastrophe, as the young are too few to replace the elderly segment of the

workforce, while, because of their educational achievement, those available may be unwilling

to accept employment in the form of low or unskilled manual labor.

That immigration may result in economic benefit for destination countries has been

studied extensively (Borjas 1995, Borjas 1999, Durkin 1998, Simon 1989). As of January 1,

1 “South Korean Birthrate Hits Lowest on Record,” The Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/08/26/south-korea-birthrate-hits-lowest-on-record/, (accessed Nov, 10, 2015). 2 “Did South Korea’s Population Policy Work too well?” Population Reference Bureau, http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2010/koreafertility.aspx, (accessed Nov, 10, 2015). 3 (as defined by? difference from “aged” society?) 4 “South Korea’s Education Success,” BBC News, last modified September 13, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/4240668.stm, (accessed Nov 13, 2015). 5 “After Decades of Building Colleges, South Korea Faces a Lack of Students,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, last modified November 27, 2011, http://chronicle.com/article/After-Decades-of-Expansion/129896/, (accessed Nov 13, 2015).


2

2012, 1,409,577 foreigners6 were living in Korea, an increase of 11.4 percent over 2011. Of

these, 588,944 (41.8 percent) were labor migrants, 144,214 (10.2 percent) were marriage

migrants, 168,583 (11.9 percent) were children;7 notably, all 168,583 children are Korean

citizens.8 Foreigners in general face the discrimination of a Korean public which views them

as permanent outsiders, while labor migrants specifically continue to be exploited, having

few options of legal recourse (Kim 2013). Simultaneously, portrayal of foreigners in Korean

media varies from generally positive, such as on popular television shows like the currently

running all-male group talk show “Non-Summit”9 and previously running all-female “Global

Talk Show,” to overtly negative, such as in the controversial May 28, 2012 MBC report “The

Shocking Reality about Relationships with Foreigners.”10 Additionally, 624,994 Chinese

migrants (56.5 percent of all foreigners) were living in Korea as of May 1, 2015, of whom

443,566 were ethnic Korean-Chinese11 (hereafter, Joseonjok) who are generally

problematized in Korean media portrayals (Waddell and Kim 2015). Whether or not such

examples constitute an accurate portrayal of foreigners continues to be the subject of debate.

However, it would arguably follow that views held by individual Koreans or foreigners

would vary as much as would majority views held by each group in opposition. Hence, when

the producer of the MBC report said he, “could not understand why foreign residents in

6 Use of “foreigner” comprises something of a terminological compromise, referring in this paper to all ethnic non-Koreans regardless of citizenship, and all legal non-Koreans regardless of ethnicity. While Koreans generally employ the term 외국인, “wae-guk-in” or foreigner (외 meaning outside, 국 meaning nation, and 인 meaning person) to describe individuals not perceived as ethnically Korean (excluding those commonly discussed with other terms such as 중국 사람, “jung-guk sa-ram” for Chinese and 일본 사람, “il-bon sa-ram” for Japanese), fully 292,096 of these individuals held South Korean citizenship as of January 1, 2012. Further, this group includes members, such as ethnic Koreans of Chinese or American nationality, not commonly referred to as “wae-guk-in,” but nonetheless counted among non-Koreans residents of Korea. 7 While not stated in the report, the remaining 36.1 percent are likely to have constituted a mix of the non-working family members of labor migrants, professional migrants, and diplomatic or other foreign government personnel. 8 Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS), 2012, “Foreign Resident Status (01/01/2012).” 9 The Korean 비정상회담, “Be-jung-sang-hwae-dam” is also translated as Abnormal Summit. 10 “The Shocking Reality about Relationships with Foreigners,” YouTube.com, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B09FXOZVw4g, (accessed Feb. 8, 2016). 11 “More Than 1 Million Foreigners Live in Korea,” The Chosunilbo, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/08/06/2009080600243.html, (accessed Feb. 8, 2016).


3

South Korea were upset by the five-minute report,”12 while a foreign editor living in Korea

characterized the MBC piece as, “rubbish tabloid television at its worst,’”13 the asymmetry

inherent to their opinions becomes clear.

The gap inherent to the juxtapositioning of these positions may be indicative of a

larger social phenomenon, involving, among other topics, the relationship between ethnicity

and identity. In a previous project, the researcher conducted interviews with 30 professional

migrant English instructors, nearly all of whom identified as “white” or “Caucasian,”14 and

all of whom were citizens of one of the seven English-speaking countries from which English

instructors in Korea must legally come to be issued a visa: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New

Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As such, specifics of

these seven different nationalities were less central than was the juxtapositioning of Koreans

and foreigners. The project findings indicated the existence of what was discussed as

disinclusion: an acculturative strategy actively being undertaken by the study’s participants

such that they were neither fully included in nor fully excluded from mainstream Korean

society.15

The intention of the present study is to investigate the opposite perspective, to

determine whether or not certain Koreans feel they are analogously distanced from

foreigners. It is hypothesized that disinclusion may constitute one example of a broader social

phenomenon, just as participants of the previous study constituted a thin slice16 of the 1.4

12 “MBC Producer: What’s the Fuss About?” The Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2012/06/07/mbc-producer-whats-the-fuss-about/, (accessed Jan. 31, 2016). 13 “Relationships with Foreigners are Shocking?” The Korea Times, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2012/06/162_112429.html, (accessed Jan. 31, 2016). 14 One participant declined to divulge his ethnicity. 15 Copies available upon request. 16 According to the Korean Immigration Office, 23,515 foreign English teachers were living in Korea as of 2010, but such is misleading in that it only reflects that year’s total number of valid language teaching visas (E2). Because the E2 is a “language teacher,” not “English language teacher,” visa, it is impossible to know how many were issued to only English teachers. Also, foreigners who earn their living teaching English, but live legally on other visas or illegally without them, cannot be accurately counted. Finally, ethnic Korean returnees working as English teachers may qualify for and be living in Korea on other visas. It is unclear whether or not any of these concerns are taken into account when tabulating the number 23,515.


4

million foreigners living in Korea. This phenomenon will be discussed with the term

distance, defined as the metaphorical gap established by Koreans between themselves and

foreigners which mediates their concept of and interaction with one another. The foci of this

study will be threefold: to argue the existence of distance, to investigate identity constitution

among younger Koreans, and to demonstrate correlation between the two. In the most general

terms, the question this study asks is, “What, if anything, stands in the way of the

construction of a multicultural society in Korea?” If foreigners are to acculturate to Korean

society, and new government programs set to come into effect in 2018 point to both the

necessity and inevitability of such,17 Korean identity must be investigated as thoroughly as

necessary to facilitate their inclusion. Furthermore, the study will focus on investigation of

the identity of younger Koreans, or those who have not yet reached middle age, because it

precisely the members of this age cohort who will be responsible for the construction of

multiculturalism in Korea. This is an entirely novel phenomenon for Korea and Koreans, at

once developmentally nascent and driven by factors never before seen in Korean history.

Likewise, it is unlikely to be completed before Koreans of middle and advanced age pass

away, if ever. Thus, the intersection of the way in which today’s younger Koreans understand

their own identity, and how that understanding informs their opinions of foreigners and

foreignness, constitutes a central nexus point in definition of what Korean multiculturalism

will be.

The independent variable of this study is younger Korean identification and the

dependent variable is Korean conceptualization of foreignness. The research question is: “to

what extent does younger Korean identity have an effect upon conceptualization of non-

Koreans?” It is hypothesized that the identity of younger Koreans is positively correlated

17 “2750년 인구 ‘0명’ 대한민국, 대규모 이민 받는다” (South Korean Population to be 0 by 2750, Massive Immigration to be Received), 머니투데이 (Money Today), http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2015122721551652955&outlink=1, (accessed Jan. 27, 2016).


5

with conceptualization of non-Koreans as foreign; the product of this interaction being

distance as defined above. It might be argued that such a hypothesis is rather obvious: of

course strong identification with one’s group sets it in opposition to others. However, such a

characterization is only accurate insofar as one’s group can be characterized overwhelmingly

by exclusivity, introducing the broad topic of nationalism. Please note this study focuses on

investigation of Korean identity at the individual level, so as to subsequently apply findings

toward the construction of generalization about how such might be understood collectively.

Hence, research instruments will not focus on collective notions of nationalism, and

participants will not be asked questions about how their identity may have formed

nationalistically, or top-down. Instead, the investigation of the basis of the individual

construction of Korean identity is investigated bottom-up: how the individual builds

nationalism, not how nationalism builds the individual. In this way, grounding for the

exclusive and inclusive tendencies of Korea’s ethnic nationalism will be sought via

investigation of individual notions of identity, which in turn may be based elsewhere, though

it seems entirely plausible to entertain the notion that the two are based in mutual and

reciprocal interaction. In any case, this study is not so much interested in arguing for or

against various characterizations of Korean nationalism, or how those may or may not be

related to Korean identity, as it is in demonstrating that the practice of such is the source from

which distance flows.

This paper will be arranged in the following manner. Theoretical basis for the study’s

argument is organized in two parts, beginning with sociological foundation and concluding

with material specific to the study’s cohort: Koreans. A methodology section specifically

detailing the procedure by which the study’s qualitative data was acquired follows this.

Discussion of data includes an analysis of identified patterns as the basis for conclusions at

which the study has arrived. The paper concludes with several policy suggestions concerning


6

how management of the continuing development of multiculturalism in Korea might be

undertaken, as based in the study’s findings, as well as possible avenues of future research.

Finally, please note, Korean terms have been written in revised Romanization.18

LITERATURE REVIEW

Blumer’s concept of symbolic interactionism (1969), whereby social interaction creates

meanings both modified by human interpretation and definitive of the way in which humans

act and interact with that in which meaning is invested and with each other, is most typically

applied to investigation of direct human interaction. Departing from this strict application, via

individual interviews this study seeks to investigate how participants understand Korean

identity and how such informs their understanding of others lacking that identity. As such,

this study endeavors to demonstrate a basis for the meaning of Korean identity, and thus that

such is meaningful, via two fundamental concepts: first, the individual identifying as Korean

invests her identity with meaning emphasized at the individual level, and second, Korean

identity is reinforced at the group level via interaction both among members of Korean

society and reciprocally between society and the individual. These will be discussed with the

terms social emphasis and social reinforcement, respectively.

Continuing with Blumer’s language, Foucault discusses, “a net-like organisation,”

between the threads of which individuals not only circulate, but are also positioned to

exercise and undergo power (Foucault 1980, 98). Social emphasis and social reinforcement

of Korean identity may constitute a circulation of power placing those exercising Korean

identity in a position distinctly privileged above those unable to exercise a commensurate

degree of such; foreigners are an obvious example of this second group. However, if those

18 The majority of transliterated terms used in this study are participant aliases. Thus, despite departing from standard academic use of McCune-Reischauer, such makes sense insofar as younger Koreans today typically transliterate their names according to the revised Romanization system. Other Korean terms have been written in revised Romanization for the sake of standardization throughout the paper.


7

foreigners were able to transition across the gap of distance, it is arguable that they would

find themselves in a position of newfound power vis-à-vis the ability to interact from a

standpoint approaching equality with regard to those able to justify their Korean identity via

social emphasis and social reinforcement. Thus, what remains to be discovered is the

distribution of power, which Foucault describes as neither anarchic nor democratic, stressing

instead, “that the most important thing is not to attempt some kind of deduction of power

starting from its centre and aimed at the discovery of the extent to which it permeates into the

base, of the degree to which it reproduces itself down to and including the most molecular

elements of society.” Instead, Foucault advocates the undertaking of an ascending analysis,

beginning with the infinitesimal mechanisms of power (Foucault 1980, 99). This study will

argue that Korean identity extends from the interplay of social emphasis and social

reinforcement, a circular exercise of power driven by concepts definitive of Korean identity,

or its own specific infinitesimal mechanisms. Likewise, because they take place between

individuals, interactions of power are discussed as micro in scale, thus their study is best

approached from below. Hence this study’s investigatory grounding in the qualitative

interviewing of Koreans: individual members of the dominant societal group, equipped with

the drivers of the identity by which their power is justified, positioned both to circulate power

via the net linking individuals in society, and exercise it over others dissimilarly equipped

and thus unequally positioned.

Geertz (1968) argued that the exercise of thought was facilitated by the utilization of

symbols as, “socially available ‘systems of significance,’” which order subjective life and

guide outward behavior, exemplified by, “beliefs, rites, [and] meaningful objects” (Geertz

1968, 95). Geertz continues: “Such an approach is neither introspectionist nor behaviorist; it

is semantic. It is concerned with the collectively created patterns of meaning the individual

uses to give form to experience and point to action, with conceptions embodied in symbols


8

and clusters of symbols, and with the directive force of such conceptions in public and

private life” (Geertz 1968, 95-96). As the primary concern of his text was religion, it might

be argued that Geertz’s symbols are necessarily religious, but it is arguably instructive to

conceptualize these socially available symbols as rather less limited, and thus inclusive of

any concept acting to order subjective life and guide outward behavior. Hence, the thrust of

the research portion this study will be to seek out the concepts discussed in Foucauldian

terms as infinitesimal mechanisms. This study seeks to demonstrate the active establishment

of distance as a manifestation of outward behavior by which those exercising Korean identity

subjectively order life, and how this practice is a product of Korean identity being couched in

certain definitive, perhaps even essential, concepts.

This study will argue that distance constitutes an example of social boundary, other

examples of which pervade sociological literature: Durkheim notably divided the world into

the sacred and the profane in characterization of the nature of religion as a whole (Durkheim

[1912] 1995). Lamont and Molnár (2002) define social boundaries as, “objectified forms of

social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources

(material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities,” and symbolic boundaries as,

“conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and

even time and space.”19 While their review connects these to a wide variety of topics, they

specifically describe two oppositional configurations of social and symbolic boundaries. The

former can be challenged and have its meaning repositioned by the latter while the latter can

be used to impose, preserve, standardize, or justify the former.20 This study will endeavor to

apply these concepts to the case of Korea; Koreans may maintain boundaries in the form of

perceived difference vis-à-vis foreigners, via understanding and categorization of them as

lower on, or not even part of, a social hierarchy consisting of positions constituted in part by 19 Michèle Lamont and Virág Molnár, “The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 28 (2002): p. 168. 20 Ibid., 186.


9

certain concepts inherent to Korean identity. Finally, that much of the substance of Lamont

and Molnár’s findings combines newer studies with the work of foundational sociologists,

such as Durkheim’s on communities, brings us full circle.

To continue with the concept of hierarchy, Seol and Skrentny (2009) argue for

organization of membership in Korean society around legal and social dimensions, the former

based on the economic interests of the Korean government and the latter on attitudes of the

Korean citizenry as described via survey results. As such, they outline their concept of

hierarchical nationhood, placing South Korean citizens first, Koreans born and/or residing

abroad second, Joseonjok third, and North Koreans last. Complicating the hierarchy, they

also place foreigners third, but cite a 1994 survey of small and medium business owners who

showed a preference for Han Chinese and Filipino workers over Joseonjok, who were

followed by Vietnamese. What emerges is a complex and fractured view of how

contemporary Korean society is organized vertically, which is rendered fundamentally

incomplete because the positions of several foreign groups currently residing in Korea are not

addressed. This study seeks to investigate if and where foreigners fit in this hierarchy, and if

they do so as a discrete group or if, split among groups, they occupy various positions

therein.

Connor (1994), while discussing a nation as a collection of individuals who consider

themselves to related by ancestry and nationalism as the loyalty to and identification with that

group, characterizes ethnonationalism as definitionally synonymous. Connor also mentions

the homogeneity of Koreans insofar as such was employed by the former North Korean

leader Kim Il Sung to justify Korean reunification, while problematizing the application of

ethnonationalism to discussion of nations about which apt and fruitful characterizations are

more often than not likely center on societal heterogeneity instead. A 1999 survey of Koreans

arrived at the following results: of those surveyed, 68.2 percent considered blood to be of


10

paramount importance vis-à-vis national definition, and 74.9 percent agreed that residence

and ideology were of no concern regarding the close relationship of all Korean people to one

another (Shin 2000, 2). Shin himself conducted a survey in 2000 which arrived at similar

results: of those Koreans surveyed, 93 percent agreed, “Our nation has a single bloodline,”

and 83 percent considered Koreans of foreign national residence continued to be part of the

Korean race because of shared ancestry (Shin 2000, 2). This rapport also excludes foreigners,

as 62 and 63 percent of respondents reported a stronger connection to Koreans in Japan and

America, respectively, while only 18 and 17 percent felt the same towards Japanese and

Americans in Korea, respectively (Shin 2000, 2). Thus, the results of this study would seem

to indicate that those surveyed consider themselves part of a discrete population which can be

neither left nor joined, findings this study is likely to either verify or nullify. In any case, it is

the central contention of this study that such a concept may act to impede, or complicate, the

development of multiculturalism in Korea.

With regard to nationalism, Brubaker (1999) notes nationalisms of any kind can be

inclusive and exclusive at the same time. He also overturns the concept that ethnic

nationalism and civic nationalism tend to be more exclusive and inclusive, respectively,

focusing instead on the variation inherent to the criteria upon which exclusivity or inclusivity

might be based. This study will seek to define the criteria upon which Korean exclusivity or

inclusivity might be based, as formative of Korean identity, which in turn may have a bearing

nationalism. Further, Gerteis and Goolsby (2005) argue that as regards American civic

nationalism’s characterization as either exclusive or inclusive, it was far easier to define who

falls into the exclusive “they” category than the inclusive “we” category. This means that

while the meaning of the term “American” remains unclear, it is not less culturally

meaningful. The term “American” may in fact act as a placeholder for an absent ethnic

identity, the boundaries of which might tend to be more distinct for others with such a


11

national identity. Korea does not lack an ethnic identity, and thus it is hypothesized that

investigation may demonstrate a basis at the individual level for just such a distinct ethno-

nationalism at work in Korea.

As mentioned above, in a previous project the author conducted 30 qualitative

interviews in investigation of migrant English teacher acculturation in Korea. The

dimensions upon which the study focused, time spent in Korea, marriage to a Korean person,

and acquisition of the Korean language, were hypothesized to correlate with a given

individual’s pursuit of a more or less inclusive acculturative strategy. While participants did

not report their acculturation as actively inclusive, neither did they relate active exclusion

from Korean society in general; as such their condition was described with the term

disinclusion. Participants were found to persevere in spite of disinclusion, to respond variably

vis-à-vis the study’s dimensions, ultimately resulting in perpetuation of their being subject to

disinclusion. For the purposes of the present study, the dimensions of time, marriage, and

language acquisition can be considered as representative of methods by which a foreigner

might attempt the transition in favor of Korean identity. The present study will approach the

situation of multiculturalism in Korea from the Korean side to ascertain Korean opinions vis-

à-vis the feasibility of just such a transition, whether or not distance can be overcome.

METHODOLOGY

First, the undertaking of an examination of personal concepts of Korean identity, combined

with the fact that this study can be conceived of as an extension of previous work,

necessitated a largely qualitative approach: a combination of library research and data

collection via semi-structured interviews. Second, because the study sought to focus on

identity of Koreans specifically, participants were only considered eligible for the study if

they were both ethnically Korean and had lived the majority of their life in Korea. Note that


12

focus on this group was not undertaken in order to characterize a concept of Korean identity

particular to it in opposition to that of other Korean groups, such as diasporic communities in

China or America. While such a focus introduces a limitation inherent to the contention that

Korean identity is likely to vary between groups, investigation of such a variation falls

outside the parameters of this study and thus is suggested as an avenue of future research.

Third, because the study sought to focus on identity of younger Koreans specifically,

participants were only considered eligible if they were below the age of 40.21 Additionally,

for the sake of IRB approval, participants were only considered eligible if they were legal

adults; hence the study included no participants below the American age of 18.22

The study was also subject to certain language and geographic limitations. For the

sake of obtaining responses as intelligible to the researcher as possible, interviews could not

be conducted in Korean. However, it was surmised this might be mediated after the fact via

examination of the nature of the interview responses concerning the study’s central topic of

identity. In short, if participant opinions concerning identity either centered exclusively on a

small core set of concepts, or were conversely found to span a range of ideas, a case could be

made for results being generalizable to the larger population, comprised of individuals

lacking the degree of English skill necessary to participate in the study; ultimately, both

characterizations would turn out to be accurate vis-à-vis characterization of the study’s

findings. The study also suffered from the limitation inherent to the geographic distance

existing between the researcher and target population. Sampling was not undertaken on a

migrant Korean population in closer geographic proximity to the researcher, as the

experience of migration is likely to cause variation in the independent variable, Korean

21 This age was chosen by halving Korea’s 2015 average life expectancy of 82, as reported by the WHO, and rounding to the nearest multiple of 10. 22 Due to the perseverance of traditional age calculation methodology, Korean age count tends to differ from those used in the west, calculated by total time elapsed since birth, by between 1 and 2 years. Koreans tend to consider babies as 1-year-old upon birth, and years of age are traditionally added for all Koreans on the first day of each new year. Hence a Korean child born on December 31st will be considered 2 years old the following day, while an American child born on the same day will only be considered 1-day-old.


13

identification, among members of such a group to a degree impossible to measure without

also undertaking a measure of that variable from among non-migrant Koreans, for the sake of

comparison. Travel to Korea was also ruled out because of cost and lack of time. Also, the

size of the sample presents a limitation, but such is arguably mediated in the same way as

was the limitation introduced by language, as discussed above. All told, participation in the

study was delineated by 4 parameters: ethnicity, age, language, and geography.

A total of 21 interviews were conducted between January 14, 2016 and May 5, 2016,

all of which were conducted via either the video teleconferencing program Skype or the

Korean text/phone call app KakaoTalk.23 The research phase of the study began with a

standard announcement posted on Facebook, both on the researcher’s personal page and in 9

groups, the central focus of which concerns Korea-related topics.24 Use of a single social

media website introduces a limitation, though it is noteworthy that social media usage, and

Facebook’s share thereof, continue to increase in Korea. The total percentage of Koreans

using social media jumped from 31.3 to 39.9 percent between 2013 and 2014 (Kim Y. 2015,

8). Furthermore, social media is popular among all Koreans and particularly popular among

younger Koreans, with 74.4, 61, 43.7, 21.5, and 5.1 percent of those in their 20s, 30s, 40s,

50s, and 60s, respectively, using it; all of these values constitute increases over 2013 numbers

(Kim Y. 2015, 8). Gender-wise, 41.6 and 38.2 percent of Korean men and women use social

media, respectively: increases over 2012 values (Kim Y. 2015, 8). Facebook’s market share

increased from 23.4 to 28.4 percent between 2013 and 2014, while simultaneously rising in

popularity among all age groups (under 10s, 10s, 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s). Facebook is

most popular among younger Koreans, as 45.3 and 20.5 percent of those in their 20s and 30s,

respectively, preferred it to other social media platforms in 2014 (Kim Y. 2015, 9); Korea’s

most popular social media platform, KakaoStory, decreased in popularity between 2013 and

23 Interviews were conducted with the voice call feature of KakaoTalk, not by text message. 24 A copy of the post is included in appendix I.


14

2014. Its share fell from 55.4 to 46.4 percent, with popularity among all age groups (under

10s, 10s, 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s) decreasing (Kim Y. 2015, 9). Facebook’s popularity in

Korea continues to rise, as 28.4 percent of all social media users preferred Facebook in 2014

(Kim Y. 2015, 9), while a 2015 poll arrived at a percentage of 60.25 Likewise, the number of

Facebook users in Korea is projected to rise from 10.7 million in 2012 to 14.4 million in

2018,26 roughly 29 percent of Korea’s 2015 population.27 Comparatively, 156.5 million28 of

321.4 million29 United States citizens used Facebook in 2015, a figure roughly equal to 49

percent of the total population. That this figure is slightly higher than that of KakaoStory in

Korea, coupled with Facebook’s rapid rise in popularity there, arguably indicates the depth of

Facebook’s penetration in Korea, particularly among younger Koreans, and is hence

indicative of its adequacy per utilization of such in locating a portion of the study sample.

Additionally, snowball sampling was employed in two ways. First, individuals seeing

the posting on Facebook, and subsequently referring an acquaintance to the study, extend the

reach of contact beyond that of the researcher alone.30 Second, that the limitation introduced

by sole use of Facebook might be mitigated, acquaintances of the researcher residing in

Korea were directly asked to refer individuals fitting the study’s participant parameters. In

total, four participants were recruited directly by the researcher: three responded to the initial

25 Kim, Yunhwa, KISDISTAT Report 15-03: Analysis of Social Media Trends and Patterns, March 25, 2015. http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/common/premium?file=1%7C13605. 26 “Number of Facebook users in South Korea from 2012 to 2018 (in millions)” Statista, http://www.statista.com/statistics/304833/number-of-facebook-users-in-south-korea/, (accessed April 11, 2015). 27 “South Korea,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html, (accessed April 11, 2016). 28 “Number of Facebook users in the United States as of January 2015, by age group (in millions),” Statista, http://www.statista.com/statistics/398136/us-facebook-user-age-groups/, (accessed April 11, 2015). 29 “United States,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html, (accessed April 11, 2016). 30 Use of Facebook for sampling introduces unknown variables inherent to the ways in which knowledge of the study was able to be passed from person to person after the initial posting was made, and thus after control of that knowledge passed out of the researcher’s purview. For example, acquaintances and non-acquaintances alike were able to view the posting. Further, whether or not the posting could be electronically shared (via the Facebook “share” function) between groups was dependent upon the rules of the specific group in which the posting was made; though the posting could obviously have been copied and reposted. In this way, it is impossible to calculate how many individuals saw, shared, or saw and shared the initial posting, and thus likewise impossible to know how effective this sampling method was objectively speaking.


15

Facebook posting (one of whom was a previous acquaintance) and one was recruited via

direct inquiry (previous acquaintance). The remaining 17 participants were recruited via

some form of snowball sampling, whether involving Facebook or not. Finally, while all

participants were asked how they had learned about the study, they were not asked whether

or not the person contacting them did so via Facebook. Thus, while nine participants

mentioned Facebook when asked how they had heard about the study, the actual number of

participants in some way recruited via Facebook remains unknown.

Once initial contact was made, all participants were emailed a standard, IRB-

approved informed consent document, asked to read it carefully, asking if they understood it

completely, and asking if they had any questions pertaining to it prior to the interview.31 It

was explained to all participants that their interview would be referred to with a unique

number, and that should any provided data be included in this final report of the study,

whether paraphrased or quoted, they would each be assigned a gender-specific Korean alias

to ensure anonymity; all participants agreed to this stipulation. Participants were reminded

that if at any point during the interview they felt disinclined to answer any question, or if they

wanted to end the interview at any point, they should inform the researcher; no participants

requested either.

Interviews consisted of three parts, each of which included questions focusing on a

specific topic. First, demographic background questions were asked; second, questions

related to the perception and understanding, both of Korean identity and representation of

non-Korean identity, were asked; third, questions were asked which focused on the

possibility of identity transition, both to and from Korean identification. Each interview

included the same standard series of questions,32 though follow-up questions tended to vary

with the degree to which such were based upon specific answers given by each participant.

31 Copies available upon request. 32 A copy of the full question list is included in appendix II.


16

Not all questions were applicable to each participant, and as such some were omitted from

particular interviews (i.e. participants without children were not asked to discuss their

offspring, etc.). All interviews were recorded, notes were taken during each, and all have

been at least partially transcribed. Each participant was compensated with a gift card for

approximately five dollars, redeemable at Starbucks for the equivalent cost of one beverage

in Korea.

Variation, in both the independent and dependent variable, was measured by first

attempting to arrive at a characterization of the core of what each participant considered their

identity both to be and not to be, then such was compared and contrasted with a

conceptualization of what they considered the core of foreign identity to be. In short, because

all participants lived the majority of their lives in Korea, and can therefore be understood as

fundamentally Korean, their concept of what it is to be Korean was compared and contrasted

with what they considered to be foreign. This data was examined according to a multi-step

process. First, data was gleaned from the first section of each interview and plotted on a

spreadsheet to facilitate ease of reference. Next, the second and third portions each interview

were examined such that answers to each question could be more easily compared and

patterns identified, in this way the interviews were at least partially transcribed. Third, the

repetition of key terms and concepts was noted, both from the recordings and the researcher’s

transcription, such that categories of concepts essential to the way in which participants

understand their specific identity could be defined.33 Fourth, this process was also applied to

data revelatory of participant conceptualization of foreigners. The third and fourth steps were

repeated multiple times for each interview to ensure a thorough examination of the data had

33 Note that repetitions were not counted within individual interviews, but tabulated from among all interviews, such that mention of a key term once by a given participant was weighted equally with any other participant mentioning the same term, or a comparable one, at least once, regardless of how many times the term was actually mentioned by a given participant. This was done to account for the possibility of a single term’s overrepresentation, so as to avoid, for example, erroneously equating a term mentioned once by five different participants each with another mentioned five times by only one participant.


17

been made, and results were plotted on a spreadsheet, again to facilitate ease of reference.

Finally, data patterns related to the independent variable, found in step three, were compared

with those related to the dependent variable, found in step four, to identity and characterize

the relationship between the two, such that a statement of correlation could be made for

argumentation.

FINDINGS

The longest interview lasted 53 minutes, 17 seconds and the shortest lasted 19 minutes, 18

seconds. Each interview began with a series of demographic questions, the results of which

are below. All participants were Korean citizens. Fourteen participants were female and

seven were male. That the study included twice the number of females as males introduces a

limitation, but it would seem that such is the case only insofar as participant answers were

directly gender referential; some were, but most were not. Furthermore, patterns isolated

from the data displayed an overlap whereby it could be argued that gender was not a factor.34

The eldest participant was 36 and the youngest three were 23; mean age was 27.4, the

median was 26, and the mode was 24 (5 participants). Eighteen participants were born in

Korea and three were born in the United States, but these three had lived the majority of their

lives in Korea. Nine participants were living in Seoul, six in the adjacent province of

Gyeonggi-do, two in Incheon, one in Dae-gu, and one in Busan; one participant was living in

Vancouver, Canada at the time of the interview, and another was living in Boston, but both

had lived the majority of their lives in Korea. With regard to personal relationships, three

participants were married: one with children, and two without. Two married participants had

foreign spouses, one had a Korean spouse, and the remaining 18 participants were unmarried 34 While an attempt was made to analyze participant interviews by comparing female to male responses, in order to examine results after controlling for gender, no significant patterns were in evidence. As such, gender and topics related to such were not subsequently investigated, do not constitute any portion of the study’s thesis, and thus will not be discussed further.


18

without children. Given Korea’s 2014 crude divorce rate of 2.3 per 1,000 people,35 that the

study included no divorced participants introduces a limitation, but such is likely due to mean

participant age. In 2015, mean age at first marriage in Korea was 30 among women, and

nearly 33 among men.36 Also, all participants but one reported some percentage of their

friends being foreign, though amounts varied widely from 1 to 90 percent, the mean being

roughly 28 percent.37

Educationally, at the time of the interview two participants had obtained a master’s

degree, seven had obtained a four-year degree and were enrolled in graduate study, six had

obtained a four-year degree and were not enrolled in graduate school, two had obtained a

two-year degree, and four had obtained a high school diploma and were enrolled at four-year

universities. Per the study’s requirements, all participants had spent the majority of their life

in Korea, though all also reported having traveled abroad at least once, and 17 had spent

some time living outside Korea. Among these, participants reported living in Australia,

Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United

States; four participants reported having lived abroad in more than one country. The longest

time spent living abroad was 10 years, the shortest was one month, and the mean was 3.1

years.38 Also, all participants had had some training in English, though the age at which that

training had begun varied to some degree: the earliest was at two years of age, the latest was

35 “Marriage and Divorce Statistics in 2014,” Statistics Korea, http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/11/index.board?bmode=download&bSeq=&aSeq=335937&ord=1, (accessed April 6, 2016). 36 “시도별 평균초혼연령 (Average Age of First Marriage Attempt)” Statistics Korea, http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1B83A05&vw_cd=&list_id=&scrId=&seqNo=&lang_mode=ko&obj_var_id=&itm_id=&conn_path=K1&path=, (accessed May 9, 2016). 37 Note because this figure is the mean of all reported percentages of foreign friends, it does not include data from one participant who did not respond to the question. Thus this mean is derived from data obtained from 20 of the 21 participants. 38 Note this is the mean number of years spent living abroad by the 17 participants reporting having done so, and thus does not include amounts below the lowest finding for the four participants who reported never having lived abroad.


19

at 16, the mean age was 10,39 the median was 10, and the mode was 10 (5 participants). All

participants were given the opportunity to gauge their English ability; 13 participants stated

they were advanced or fluent speakers, five stated they were between advanced and

intermediate, and three stated that their English was of an intermediate level. Two

participants reported fluency in a language other than Korean or English. Coincidentally,

both explained that they spoke fluent Japanese because they had lived there for three years

during adolescence; these participants were not acquainted. Six participants reported no

ability to speak a language other than English or Korean, while the rest all reported some

ability in Chinese, French, German, Japanese, or Spanish, and five participants reported some

ability in more than one language other than English and Korean.40

With regard to occupation, at the time of the interview seven participants were

employed, 11 were in school at some level, two described themselves as housewives, and one

reported being unemployed while preparing for graduate school. That so many participants

either were students or were preparing for school introduces a limitation, but this may be

explained in part both by average participant age and the high degree of Korean university

attendance at both the graduate and undergraduate levels; that every participant had acquired

some amount of secondary education speaks further in this regard.

CHARACTERIZATION OF KOREAN IDENTITY

Participants were initially asked to describe their identity and subsequently asked to identify

the meaning of the word “Korean;” an equal number of participants described their identity

with the word “Korean” as did those who characterized the word “Korean” as being central to

39 Note because this figure is the mean of all ages at which participants reported beginning English study, it does not include data from one participant who did not respond to the question. Thus this mean is derived from data obtained from 20 of 21 participants. 40 Note one participant did not answer the question, thus these results reflect responses from 20 of 21 participants.


20

their identity: six each. While it is interesting that without direct prompting slightly more than

half of the participants drew a direct line between their individual identity and the word

“Korean” in either of two ways, such is only revelatory insofar as characterization of what it

means to be Korean might be successfully accomplished. This was undertaken both directly

and indirectly, by asking participants about the constitution of their own identity as a Korean

and about what a foreigner might do to become Korean, respectively. At the most general

level, concepts central to participant reporting of their own Korean identity can be

categorized as either a priori with regard to birth, acquired thereafter, or existing in between

the two such that the line delineating them is blurred. These concepts have been grouped so

that they may first be compared categorically without regard for their level of representation

vis-à-vis the number of times each was mentioned; however, representation frequency will

also be discussed.

The first category contained three virtually identical concepts: three participants

reported Korean identity was connected to a concept of blood, four reported a connection

with ethnicity, and another four mentioned race (one of these mentioned blood also). These

have been grouped because they are the only reported concepts which in no way could have

been acquired subsequent to birth. In essence, it was the opinion of these participants that to

be Korean, one must be born Korean.41 While not agreeing with the concept, Ji-ho reported

that, “In Korea, we still have this big thing, I think I was taught in school about it: dan-il

min-jok,” which translates as single people,42 as in Koreans. He explained that this referred to,

“The only blood in Korea ... that kind of ideology is kind of big still in Korea, like even after 41 While it might be pointed out that via Blumer’s symbolic interaction, one is only able to place importance in blood or ethnicity after birth, meaning such significance is learned and thus subjective rather than objectively inherent, such an argument would tend to hold for any concept into which humans invest significance via symbolic interaction. Thus, doing so would defeat the point of categorization and nullify, before the fact, any knowledge that might be gleaned from engagement in such a process; therefore, such was not the case in this study. 42 In Korean, 단, dan means “only,” 인, il means “one,” and while 민족, min-jok is variously defined as “ethnic group,” “nation,” “people,” or “race,” when placed in this context the entire term can be understood as directly referential to a concept of Koreans as a single ethnically homogeneous group.


21

a lot of foreign workers [have moved] in here.” That such a characterization was made by a

member of a society which has been shown to display a strength of homogeneity extending

across international boundaries to encompass coethnics while simultaneously excluding non-

coethnics in Korea (Shin 2000) is not surprising; if anything, it is somewhat surprising that

this amount is not higher. Further, Korean identity couched in any concept conceived of as

existing a priori to birth constitutes as high a level of distance as was obtained in the study.

Ji-woo reported her opinion that, “Korea is one of the countries where sort of this blood-

relation thing, like [an] ethnonationality sort of concept is very strong and real within

people’s minds, and so I would think that is that much hard [sic.] for non-Koreans to feel

included.” Simply, if to be Korean one must be born of Korean blood, or born ethnically

Korean to begin with, any attempt by any person not fitting such a description to attempt

transition to Korean identity could only be described as futile. However, that so few

participants reported such an inflexible concept of Korean identity indicated the importance

other existent factors were likely to be playing.

The second category consisted of five concepts set aside from the first and third

categories because they constitute examples tending to some degree to straddle the line

between those existing a priori to birth and those learned or otherwise acquired afterward.

Appearance, mentioned by eight participants, because it is acquired at birth, develops through

life, and can be altered via plastic surgery,43 would seem rather less fixed than would be those

concepts discussed above and rather more fixed than concepts categorized below as acquired.

Seo-hyeon said, “most Korean people judge nationality from the appearance,” and Hyeon-jun

said, “If you kind of look like you're a Korean appearance-wise, I guess you can pass as a

Korean, but if you’re white or black, I don’t think so.” Also, family, mentioned by six

participants, and parents, mentioned by 11 (three participants mentioned both), were 43 It is noteworthy that globally Korea has one of the highest rates of plastic surgery prevalence. As noted by Holliday and Elfving-Hwang (2012), between 20 and 30 percent of Korean women underwent some form of invasive cosmetic procedure in 2008, while among Korean men some 15 percent did likewise in 2010.


22

similarly categorized, for while these cannot be selected by a given unborn child, she may opt

to disaffiliate with either later in life. Also, growing up in Korea, mentioned by eight

participants, will be discussed here as this experience takes place during a portion of each of

our lives before we are likely to be in a position to opt out of it.

In discussion of the identity a Korean child born outside of Korea might potentially

have, Do-hyun said, “If both parents are Korean and the kid was born and grew up in that

family, then they are going to inherit all their cultures [sic.], food, and everything.” Likewise,

Seo-yun said, “I don’t think where you were born matters as much as your family.” Likewise,

Ji-won opined that both children born in Korea of foreign parents and Korean children

adopted after birth in Korea to grow up abroad were not Korean. When asked what it was

about her that made her Korean, Eun-seo said, “Parenting,” pointing both to what is being

imparted, indicating education, and who is doing such. Conversely, Gyeong-hui reported a

dissenting minority opinion: “If that baby, let’s say, was born from American parents and that

baby was born here in Korea and raised for... stayed here for an extended amount of time,

let’s say ten years, twelve years. Then I would say that baby has Korean... I would say,

Koreanness.” While this final quote introduces time, the focus here is not only some amount

of such, but specifically where that time is spent; this is critical because Gyeong-hui also

mentioned growing up in Korea as a factor of Korean identity. Ultimately, while problematic,

it would seem that having Korean parents is more likely to lead a given person toward having

Korean identity, especially if those parents work to actively imbue that child with Korean

identity. Seo-yun, Ji-won, and Gyeong-hui’s quotes also introduce the final concept of this

category: geography.

Mentioned by 12 participants, geography was a difficult concept to characterize with

regard to Korean identity, in that some participants characterized it as essential to Korean

identity, and others discounted such. Young-sun said, “I’m a Korean because I was born in


23

Korea ... if I was born in another country, I wouldn’t think [I was] Korean.” However, not all

participants made such direct statements: while Gyeong-hui reported a combination of

geography, time, and growing up in Korea might engender Korean identity, Min-seo reported

the opposite, that no amount of time spent in Korea would allow a foreigner to become

Korean; however, the main thrust of her opinion concerned education: the learning of

traditional Korean values. Likewise, Myeong-sook said, “If a different race person was born

in Korea and grew up in Korea, I would still think [they are] a little bit different from Korean.”

However, in discussion of how the extreme example of an adoptee might be seen vis-à-vis

Korean identity, Ji-a stressed the centrality of geography, saying, “Because they are born in

Korea,” adoptees leaving Korea just after birth and growing up abroad nevertheless remain

Korean. Conversely, Seo-jun said, “If I move abroad, move to another country, and live there

long enough, then I will lose - probably - my Koreanness will, will wean off,” meaning even

a person having established Korean identity via geography and by growing up in Korea can

lose it by disaffiliating with Korea geographically. In this way, the only conclusions vis-à-vis

geography at which the study could arrive were that such could be characterized as a concept

either muddled with others, with a connection to Korean identity in some degree of flux, or

both.

This flux is best demonstrated by those reporting a desire to specifically disaffiliate

with Korea geographically via a phenomenon known in Korean as taljoseon,44 or “out of

Korea,” though such was mentioned by only two participants. Gun-woo discussed a variety

of personal reasons for being generally discontented with the quality of his life in Korea,

specifically mentioning how institutional corruption had become widespread enough to be

44 While tal derives from a Korean-Chinese word for “out” or “out of,” this term, written “탈조선” in Korean, refers to Korea with the name of the last Korean dynasty, Joseon, instead of using the modern South Korean name of the country, transliterated as Daehanminguk. This is meant, in a sarcastic way, to be pejorative, so as to indicate the desire to leave what is considered to be an “old fashioned” Korea. Today, many younger Koreans consider many customs and the traditional course of life in Korea to be unfavorable and/or outmoded, and so wish to leave Korea in order to escape them.


24

connected to virtually all parts of modern life: “I don’t like this culture at all, like even the K-

pop or their drama seems really trite to me, they are all predictable, and even in school you

can see plagiarism everywhere among the professor or students, corruption is ridiculous.”

However, when asked if it were possible to disaffiliate with Korean identity, he reported that

he would be likely to downplay the fact of having remained Korean despite having left Korea

geographically, because he considered taljoseon to be both a geographic and ideological

phenomenon:

Interviewer: It seems to me that [taljoseon] is a tendency to want to disaffiliate with Korea. Gun-woo: Yes. Interviewer: I’m wondering if that includes disaffiliation with actually being Korean. Gun-woo: Yes. Um... Interviewer: Taljoseon means like ‘Leaving Korea,’ right? Gun-woo: Yeah. Interviewer: But is it more geographically focused, or is it more like intellectually focused? Gun-woo: I think kind of both, if I get another country’s citizenship, and if I have to abandon Korean citizenship, I would happily give in [sic.] my Korean citizenship. Interviewer: Okay, but would you still identify as a Korean person? Gun-woo: Um, I have to, because that’s where I was grown up, so... Interviewer: Yeah, okay, is that Korean identity something that you can possibly make it go away, or is that just impossible? Gun-woo: I have to admit it’s impossible, but I will try my best to be vague about it.

Likewise, Da-eun reported, “the younger generation is very sick and tired of the hardships of

living in Korea, like culturally and also economically, and they are nowadays realizing the

irrationality embedded in the culture ... so quite many people are also being in a criticizing

position about Koreans and the Koreanness.” When asked what those hardships might be, she

answered,

Technically, it is really hard to find a decent job for the younger generation, and also the politics is not going very peacefully, and social security is not so good in Korea, and people are so competitive about


25

everything, even including the appearances [sic.]. So it’s a little bit tiring to live in this society sometimes, even just being a native Korean it’s not so easy to survive here and people are having like illusions or hopes to escape and they are supposed that the non-Koreanness would provide them a better or more rational conditions of living or conditions for work.

Finally, Da-eun was asked if she considered Korean identity to be something which could be

dismissed: “Yes, personally, if I was able to do so, I would have chosen to, but like

realistically the language barrier or other barriers block me from like leaving Korea, so I’m

kind of anchored here, but it’s not entirely according to my own will.”

Ultimately, it would seem that geography is a concept acting to complicate definitive

conceptualization of Korean identity. Also, while appearance, family, and parents remain

concepts in opposition of transition to being Korean, that the connection between Korean

identity and geography appears to be muddled, in flux, or both, hints at the possibility of

positive implications for distance, even if its being muddled is focused on Koreans in

general, and the flux of its connection with Korean identity is focused on the exit of those

having already established such an identity. Suffice it to say, if geography acts to complicate

Korean identity and/or if the concept of Koreans leaving Korea geographically and thus

disaffiliating with Korean identity becomes possible, both may facilitate some degree the

opposite phenomenon becoming that much more plausible. Also, because it cannot be

presumed that all wishing to undertake taljoseon will be successful, if those individuals are

discontent enough to consider leaving Korea, but cannot, they may opt instead to change that

with which they disagree, including concepts of identity couched a priori to birth, for

example. Distance may find a degree of mediation in just such a way.


26

The third category consisted of concepts acquired or learned by participants

subsequent to birth, consisting of the following 16;45 parenthetical numbers correspond to the

number of participants specifically identifying each, all participants reported more than one:

busy life (4), Confucianism (2), cuisine (6), education (5), hierarchy (5), history (5),

individual agency (11), language (15), legal concerns (18), social emphasis (12), social

reinforcement (17), socio-economic concerns (1), thinking like a Korean (5), time (4),

traditional values (2), and work (6). Additionally, two participants reported the opinion that

Confucianism was not part of Korean identity, and another stated that regardless of the

amount of time a foreign person spent in Korea, that person could never be considered

Korean; no other participants made identity observations of a negative quality.

First, education and history have been grouped, and the discussion below will not

explore them in more depth than to say that they serve to reinforce the idea that Korean

identity is at least in part something which is learned; however, it is not being argued that

Korean identity is only learned. Thus emphasis will be placed on concepts which, unlike

education and history are not learned in the classroom. A case could be made to add

language to this group, but because it was mentioned so often and in relation to such a wide

variety of other concerns, it will be treated separately. Second, socio-economic concerns, and

work have been grouped because of similarity, as have Confucianism and cuisine; all four

concepts have been dropped from the discussion.46 Third, the remaining concepts will be

explained and discussed in the following order: busy life, social emphasis, social

reinforcement, individual agency, language, and legal concerns; note that aside from busy 45 It must be noted that the term “culture” is not included among these terms. While this may seem to constitute a glaring omission, “culture” was considered and dealt with as a rather vague catchall term. Therefore, participants responding to questions with “culture,” were asked to elaborate as to the specifics of how they intended this term to be understood, and these responses were tabulated. 46 Confucianism has been dropped because its relevance to the study’s argument in encapsulated by hierarchy, though no single participant made mention of both. Cuisine has been dropped because the author did not feel it could be related to the argument; in short, people are more or less free to eat what they want, and while Koreans may feel that eating kimchi defines them to some degree, if doing so were the key to Korean identity then overcoming distance would a process too simple to provide for justification of this study. Socio-economic concerns and work, understood as obtaining a job in Korea, have been dropped for the same reason.


27

life, because these directly concern both Korean identity and transition of distance to achieve

such, they will be dealt with in both of the two following sections. Finally, thinking like a

Korean and traditional values have been grouped, and the concept ofjeong will be discussed

in exemplification of both.47 However, the author cautions the reader against assuming that

this constitutes anything even approaching a definitive statement concerning how Koreans

think, as such a massive statement could hardly be conceived of, let alone made. Instead, the

following discussion is intended to inform the reader concerning material gathered in the

research portion of this study; such is presented in the form of the thoughts, feelings, and

opinions of the study’s participants as regards, and in favor of, the study’s argument.

ACQUIRED KOREAN IDENTITY IN DETAIL

Modern Korean life is often described as “busy,” due to translation into English of the

common Korean epithet ppal-li ppal-li, meaning “fast, fast,” or “hurry, hurry.”48 Possible

explanations for use of this term run the gamut from population density in people per square

mile, which in 2014 was 517.4 in Korea49 compared to 34.9 in the United States,50 to the fact

that 82.5 percent of Koreans lived in cities in 2015.51 In describing modern Korean life, Min-

seo said, “I think there are certain aspects that [foreigners] think that it’s not reasonable, but

we Koreans think that that’s just something we must be like as a Korean, like ... traditional

47 Jeong constitutes an example of a word seemingly impossible to translate with perfect accuracy. In this way, the author wishes to make it clear that the included explanation of jeong is likely to be as contentious as any other. However, it can be argued that while this explanation is not entirely accurate, it is also not entirely inaccurate, and is thus useful for the purposes of the study insofar as it constitutes an attempt to get at the core of the concept. 48 “Busy Being Busy,” The Korea Times, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/04/636_182492.html, (accessed April 10,2016). 49 “Population Density (people per sq. km) in South Korea,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-korea/population-density-people-per-sq-km-wb-data.html, (accessed April 10, 2016). 50 “Population Density (people per sq. km) in the United States,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/population-density-people-per-sq-km-wb-data.html, (accessed April 10, 2016). 51 “South Korea,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html, (accessed April 10, 2016).


28

values and also the busy city life. Everything is just on 24 hours, right?” She explained that

Koreans do not find living this way stressful, but opined that such may not be the case for

foreigners. Also related are concepts mentioned as central to Korean identity by the study’s

participants involving social competition, such as education and work. Ji-a said, “Koreanness,

I think that is concentration. Koreanness is a [sic.] concentration for me, because people are

so eager to survive in this very dense society and Koreanness sometimes, for me, [means] to

concentrate on something very hardly [sic.] so that I can survive and I can compete with

other[s].” In 2014, it was reported that Korean students spend an average of 13 hours per day

studying, and that among high school students, getting an average of only 5.5 hours of sleep

per night is typical.52 Likewise, Korean workers spent an average of 2,124 hours (3rd highest

of OECD nations) working in 2014, just 104 hours below Mexico (1st) and well above the

U.S. at 1,789 (17th).53 Opting out of such a lifestyle can be understood to account, at least in

part, for the previously described phenomenon of taljoseon, meaning that certain younger

Koreans are actively choosing to reject at least part of what constitutes being Korean.

Further, while the two concepts, social emphasis and social reinforcement, may sound

indistinguishable, they are to be understood in opposition or as complimentary halves of a

single phenomenon. The first refers to how individuals respond outwardly, to emphasize that

which, secondly, is obtained inwardly via reinforcement by other members of society. When

asked if foreign children born in Korea could possible become Korean by living there, Ji-hye

said, “Babies or children, they think they are not different at first, but after a few years or

after passing time, they would... could... they can think like that, ‘Okay, I’m different.’” She

was then asked if, “A Korean person is Korean because the other people around them agree

that they are Korean,” to which she responded, “Agree they are Korea[n], yeah, I like that 52 “An Assault Upon Our Children: South Korea’s Education System Hurts Students,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/opinion/sunday/south-koreas-education-system-hurts-students.html?_r=0, (accessed April 10, 2016). 53 “Average Annual Hours Actually Worked Per Worker,” OECD.Stat, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS, (accessed April 10, 2016).


29

explanation, yes.” Further, Blumer (1969) described symbolic interaction as human

interpretation or definition of the actions of others, to the exclusion of simple action and

reaction, meaning interaction between humans must be mediated by symbols, interpretation,

or via determination of what another person’s actions mean. “This mediation is equivalent to

inserting a process of interpretation between stimulus and response in the case of human

behavior,” (Blumer 1969, 180). Hence, when discussing the interaction of Korean people vis-

à-vis social definition of identity, one category of such is insufficient, and as such two have

been identified: one, social reinforcement, regarding stimulus, and another, social emphasis,

of response.54 Social emphasis dictates both action and inaction; Ji-a spoke about the first,

I think what you have to know about the Korean identity is that, I think Korean has [sic.] a little bit [of] obsession to be seen well by other[s], I mean they have to be in the role, setted [sic.] role, and if they do not follow that track, as I mentioned, they might be identified as different or failure or losers ... So, university titles or job titles, that [sic.] kind of titles and the appearance itself is very important for Korean society ... So every girl is on a diet all the time and every guy have [sic.] to be like look good [sic.], like as you can see in K-pop stars, everyone looks very handsome and pretty, and those kinds of things are very important. Because that can be very important factor to be judged by other[s] and that is one of the key successful factor [sic.] in Korean society.

As for inaction, Ji-min noted, “It’s like a Korean culture that we must not express ourselves

much, because we have to listen more and we don’t have to express myself [sic.], like my

feelings. I can do [that] with my friends, but in the working places, I think it’s a little bit

different.” This bodes well for mediation of distance, as it means that via social emphasis

those foreigners attempting transition to Korean identity at least have a measure of individual

agency with which to do so. What remains is reciprocation, via social reinforcement, by

54 These terms were understood and tabulated without regard to type or quality of interpersonal relationship, such as family member, friend, acquaintance, or fellow group member. Because individuals are socially stimulated by and react socially to members of the group with which they identify, that a given person might choose to act more or less Korean in any given situation and depending upon who might be in their immediate vicinity at a given time was considered impossible to quantify with any degree of accuracy.


30

established members of the group, Koreans; note, that so many participants mentioned having

foreign friends likewise bodes well for this proposition.

The most direct characterization of social reinforcement was reported by Yae-jun,

Becoming Korean is not an individual problem ... because Koreans really consider other people’s ideas and what other people think ... even though one can speak maybe fluent Korean and understand Korean culture very well, even though he or she does that, [if] other people do not approve them, then I think it’s [sic.] him or her is not considered as Korean. Becoming a Korean is not just about culture and the language, it’s how others would think of him or her and that makes them Korean or not Korean.

Additionally, participants were asked to describe how foreigners are presented in Korean

media in general, and specifically on the currently running television show “Non-Summit.”

As to the show’s popularity, four participants mentioned it before being directly asked about

it, and all participants asked about it were familiar with it, speaking both to its popularity as

well as its pervasion in Korean society, and thus the appropriateness of using it with regard to

the purposes of this study. Specifically, 11 participants had a positive opinion of the show;

Do-hyun said, “That’s my favorite show, I watch it every week,” Four participants had a

negative opinion of it; Seo-jun, who felt that foreigners were, “seriously underrepresented” in

Korean media in the first place, felt the show was, “just dumb ... speaking one language

fluently is not something that should be, I don’t know, highlighted, through national

television.” Also, three participants reported they do not watch TV or had not watched it with

enough regularity to feel as though they had an opinion of it, and two were not asked about

the show.

Those expressing positive views of “Non-Summit,” exemplified description of social

reinforcement, such as Seo-yun, who said, “I think the show’s really nice because the guys,

just being a random handsome kind of good looking guy from their countries, the way they

talk and think actually represents their countries culture and their philosophies, so that was


31

pretty interesting.” Others spoke positively about the men on the show because of how they

had adapted themselves to life in Korea, such as Eun-jeong, who reported thinking of the men

on the show as smart. When asked why she thought so, she replied, “Of course one of the

reason [sic.] is they speak Korean as well, but the main reason that I think they are clever is

that they have their own opinion, but they don’t actually ... force other people to have the

exactly same opinion with [sic.] them.” Most participants reporting a positive opinion gave

similar answers with regard to the Korean language skill of the men. Gyeong-hui spoke in

this regard and even beyond it, saying, “Ten, you know, fifteen years ago, it was difficult to

see any westerner in Korea, but now it’s become a lot more common than in the past, and not

even that they’re now acting like Koreans, so Koreans were not used to that, they would

automatically think that westerners or non-Koreans would not be able to speak Korean, but

you see that in the media, in that way it’s refreshing.” Not only are the men of “Non-Summit”

lauded for speaking Korean, but perhaps their popularity also stems from their being able to

approximate Korean behavior. However, there seemed to be a limit to how authentically

Korean these foreign men could be, as when asked his opinion of the men on the show Ji-

won said he thought, “They are very quite [sic.] knowledgeable, I mean they know a lot of

Korea [sic.]. Some are right, but still some has [sic.] the limits of their viewpoint, because

they are not Korean.” In this way, it would seem that these men can speak and act Korean,

but they cannot truly be so.

Some participants appraised Koreanness among these foreign men negatively, like

Gun-woo, who said, “I think they’re all kind of Koreanized. They all have a weird make up. I

mean they wouldn’t do that in their home country, but I think they’re acting like... maybe

they’re asked to act like that. But they usually do not criticize the Korean politic [sic.]

situation or something. They usually always talk about good thing about Korea.” Gun-woo

explained that their presentation is honest, but he felt that it was incomplete or perhaps edited,


32

an opinion mentioned by other participants who felt that the men might be acting according

to how they were told to act. All in all, it would seem that social reinforcement comprises

defining others as Korean via examination of whether their behavior conforms to what is

expected of those exhibiting, or wishing to exhibit as it were, Korean identity. Therefore, an

examination of what participants considered a traditional behavior to be seemed in order.

While only mentioned by two participants, this study will undertake an exploration of the

Korean concept of jeong.

Jeong would seem to be of particular relevance with regard to the cycle of social

emphasis and social reinforcement, because, while commonly translated as “affection,” it

would seem both to exist on, and constitute at least part of the impetus behind, either side of

such, and thus both sides of Korean social relationships. When asked what the word

“Korean” meant to her, Myeong-sook discussed the individual expression of jeong,

Mostly I’m proud of it, since in Korean culture we always try to help other people and try to be nice to other people, but I think that’s the traditional identity of Korean [sic.], when we especially say jeong. You know what it means? I think it’s a very thoughtful meaning, like whenever I see other people who need any help, I would be willing to help them and also when I have many good things, like many good food and delicious thing, then I would like to share it with other people. I think it’s kind of word that means sharing something good with people and also helping and understanding other people.

By talking about the specific way in which she takes part in relationships involving jeong,

Myeog-sook’s description can be considered an expression of social emphasis: it is up to the

individual to take part in a relationship of jeong with others. Yae-jun directly equated

Koreanness with jeong, which he felt is a traditional Korean value in decline nowadays:

I don’t know it’s translated right or wrong, but Koreans have a lot of jeong, which can be translated into ‘affection’ or like having really keen interests, not an interest, but having an eye on someone else. They try to help people and they share the difficulties and also the good things and bad things and it’s all can be categorized into jeong... Koreans are


33

known to have jeong. I think it’s kind of traditional things that have been developed from the traditional society and I see that it’s been diminished or disappeared a little bit, because we are so much used to these individualism or these busy life that we are having that makes us not to have much... We don’t really have much time to take care of others or look for others, help others and we become much less having jeong in our daily lives. What I mean is, we used to have jeong in our history and in our culture, but it’s getting really diminished, but it’s still remains in our lives, but it’s very different in rural area and urban area.

In this way, he speaks to the social reinforcement side of the equation, that jeong is a value

collectively expressed by all Koreans. He warns against a selfish overemphasis on

individualism, a concept that he described as the opposite of jeong, when asked directly. He

also connects such overemphasis on self with the concept of busy life. Finally, he draws an

important line between the past and present, in that jeong is something passed down to

Koreans by their ancestors, speaking to the way in which jeong would seem to be infused

with traditional value.

That jeong refers both to a group consciousness and individual obligation to display

affection reciprocally back to others, means it is referential of a cycle connecting social

reinforcement with social emphasis. This cycle would seem to constitute completion of the

symbolic interaction circle whereby the actions of others are interpreted and responded to via

one’s own action. These will be intelligible to others because they are based in the

expectation of others flowing from how those actions are interpreted socially. In short, being

able to know what is expected of you, so as not to cause disharmony in the relationship, and

then doing it, is an accurate way of describing the social emphasis reaction to jeong

perpetuated from the group level as social reinforcement. However, as is true of many

concepts unique to discreet human populations, this description of jeong cannot be

understood as definitive or even complete. Nevertheless, the implications for mediation of

distance with which we are left at this point would seem twofold. First, one would need to

understand and adopt complex Korean social behaviors, such as jeong. Second, behaviors


34

like jeong would tend to be very nearly functionally impossible to understand, or because of

the implications of social reinforcement, considered impossible outside a Korean identity

context: Koreans may consider jeong something impossible for foreigners to understand.

Finally, however difficult a concept jeong might be to grasp, in both meanings of the word, it

is at its essence a concept, not a quality, and thus that it can be acquired cannot be denied as

completely as can acquisition of blood or ethnicity.

It is perhaps not surprising then that eleven participants discussed the possibility of

individual agency vis-à-vis choosing to identify as Korean, like Seo-hyun, who said, “If they

want to be a part of Korea, and they want to live in Korea forever, and they think themselves

Korean people, I think they are Korean people.” In this way, it can be seen how participants

often reported transition to Korean identity as being contingent upon coordination with other

concepts. These tended to vary to some degree, but most often included learning to speak

Korean. Seo-yun said, “I actually see some of my non-Korean friends living in Korea,

spending more time in Korea, learning Korean, becoming Korean. The way that they think is

kind of changing.” It is noteworthy that the individualism inherent to the expression of

individual agency, a concept seemingly in contradiction of jeong, would be considered a

means of effecting transition between foreigner and Korean. However, when asked about the

opposite side of individual agency, the identity of a Korean child born outside Korea, and

disaffiliation with Korean identity, Gyeong-hui said,

I think that identity, if you are a baby, you don’t really, you’re not really able to identify yourself with anything beyond... or before you reach 20, 21, I would say. So, if that baby was born from Korean parents, but raised in the states all his or her life, then after a certain age, if that person doesn’t think that he or she is Korean, I wouldn’t force the person to think he or she is Korean. If that person says, ‘I’m not Korean, although my parents are Korean,’ then I wouldn’t say that he or she is Korean.


35

Simply, if a Korean can privilege herself with the individual agency to disaffiliate from being

Korean, then some amount of individual agency may plausibly be relevant vis-à-vis a

foreigner becoming Korean.

Further, that results showed conflicting concepts of individual agency between

interviews points to the variety of individual notions of identity, to the possibility that the

opinions of those of the sample hinted at some sort of shift in the core of Korean identity, or

to both. Seo-yun identified just such a shift, saying, “I think [foreigners living in Korea] are

trying to break the conventional Koreanness, like that resides in Korea ... I believe that is

affecting actually the thinkings [sic.], the thoughts of Koreans in Korea. But, actually for

Koreans living in Korea, it’s going to take a really long time for them to change in terms of

our traditional thinking and philosophy.” Recall that Yae-jun discussed the decline of jeong,

explaining such was due to the individualism involved in the busy life culture: “I would say

that Koreans have jeong in their lives, but even though this [busy life] culture has been

developed in Korean society, but... So, jeong is getting diminished. This [busy life] cultures

[sic.] and this ‘busy life,’ they are affecting negatively to the jeong that we used to have.”55

Further, recall that one method for Korean rejection of busy life is leaving Korea via

taljoseon, in essence rejecting Korea geographically. Thus a decline in jeong, accompanied

by a rise in individualism may be driving a shift in Korean identity whereby the individual is

afforded a certain degree of agency; for the Korean disaffected by Korea such may manifest

itself in rejection of Korean identity, whereas for the foreigner enamored of Korea such may

manifest itself, via individual agency, in an attempt to adopt Korean identity. That Yae-jun

equated individualism with busy life in his earlier quote, demonstrates this directly.

Ultimately, if the individual can be the agent in construction of her Korean identity,

but because of social reinforcement that construction must be socially validated by acquiring

55 This quote originally included the Korean word for busy life, “빨리빨리,” which has been replaced with “[busy life],” hence the apparent repetition of this term.


36

some amount of the concepts in the third category, so as to be accepted by the group as

Korean, then exemplifying concepts a priori to birth becomes of lesser importance. This

would tend to indicate that overcoming distance is at least possible, as to be Korean one

would not need to born Korean, but be able to manifest Korean characteristics which can be

learned or otherwise acquired, such as both speaking and acting Korean, regardless of the

difficulty of doing both. It may, in fact, be the sheer difficulty of doing so, combined with

such difficulty being understood in the form of a shared social opinion, which might qualify

one for consideration as Korean by others of Korean identity.

Finally, when asked, and given the chance to answer, directly about what makes a

person Korean, participants were often unable to given simple responses, instead tending to

drift away from the concepts of the third category, such as individual agency, most often

toward language. When asked how a foreigner might best effect the transition inherent to

becoming Korean, language was often the most concrete response. However, another factor

was commonly compounded with this transition, constituting the most direct way in which

participants discussed establishment of distance: via conflation of identity with issues of

citizenship and nationality, introducing legal concerns to the milieu.

TRANSITIONING TO KOREAN IDENTITY

The third and final portion of each interview pertained most directly to distance, as each

began with a question pertaining to a how a given individual might become Korean, and if

such were possible along lines similar to such a process in the United States.56 This question

was designed to indirectly encourage participants, at least initially, to understand this

transition as legalistic in character. This addition was intentionally included so as to ensure as

high a probability as possible of its being subsequently subtracted in consideration of further

56 Question 27 in appendix II.


37

questions in this portion of each interview. Participants were then asked three questions

pertaining to situations involving the birth of Korean or foreign children in various locations

and under different circumstances;57 participants continuing with a legalistic frame in answer

of these questions were encouraged not to do so, or to restate answers without legalistic

concerns. These three questions were designed to probe the limits of a non-legal concept of

Korean identity vis-à-vis the implications of how such might function in situations located at

the extremes of possibility per Foucault’s recommendation: “one should try to locate power

at the extreme points of its exercise, where it is always less legal in character,” (Foucault

1980, 97). Such extremes can be characterized as points at which Korean and foreign

identities shift or overlap to such a degree that differentiation would become indistinct. The

third and final portion of each interview concluded with a direct question concerning the

method or process by which an individual might become Korean; again participants

mentioning legalistic concerns were specifically encouraged to entertain notions outside such

a realm.

Many participants were perplexed by these four questions,58 pausing to consider them

more carefully than others, and one asked for clarification in terms of whether or not the

focus was indeed legalistic. Fully 17 others did not ask for such clarification and simply

stated some form of legalistic concept upon which to base an argument either for or against

becoming Korean. When asked if someone could become Korean in the same way that they

might become American,59 Seo-jun asked, “Legally?” and otherwise could not answer the

question, while Ji-min said, “Yes, I think so, because I heard that in American the people

who are born in America, they can get the nationality of America, and I think that’s

reasonable. So in Korea, when foreigners, they get married in Korea, and they have their

children, they can be a Korean, I think.” Asked the same question, Myeong-sook said, 57 Questions 28-30 in appendix II. 58 Questions 27-30 in appendix II. 59 Question 27 in appendix II.


38

Myeong-sook: Yes. Interviewer: Okay, how is that? Myeong-sook: Like changing their nationality, or in a... in a... changing their nationality through the, um... Ambassador? Or... Interviewer: Like a legal process? Myeong-sook: Un-huh, un-huh. Interviewer: Okay. Is there any other way to do that? Myeong-sook: No, that’s the only way that they can change their nationality.

Note that the question made no mention of nationality, only of “becoming” Korean. Seo-jun

was so confused that he was unable to come up with an answer, Ji-min added actions

recognizable as potential steps in a legal process of changing one’s nationality, and Myeong-

sook simply assumed that this is what was being asked about. It is as if the notion of a person

actually becoming Korean was confusing enough from perhaps an ethno-cultural standpoint

that the question was immediately and automatically modified in the mind to one of legality,

i.e. nationality. Furthermore, encouraged to think about subsequent questions concerning

transition from foreign to Korean identity from a non-legalistic standpoint, several

participants could not answer, like Gun-woo, who said, “I don’t know really.” Others could

not help but return to a legalistic standpoint, like Eun-jeong, who when asked what steps a

person might take to becoming Korean, said, “First, I would advise to learn how to speak

Korean and after that, to take the legal steps, cause Koreans really think the legal documents

are important.” Finally, like Eun-jeong, many mentioned language, like Do-hyun, who when

asked the same question said, “Well language first, and then culture,” and also mentioned

education and finding work.

This points both to an active, purposeful choice behind a conceptualization of the

division inherent to Korean and foreign groups in the minds of the participants, and to a

characterization of that divide as existing between the complex or even inconceivable notion

of becoming Korean and the simplicity inherent to just being Korean. In short, being of


39

Korean ethnicity is rather more fixed, thus more easily conceptualized, and finally equated

with the simplicity of the way in which citizenship can be bestowed via legal means. In this

way, the unthinkable idea of shifting in either direction between fixed ethnic Korean and non-

Korean categories is mediated via active establishment of distance between Korean and the

concept of non-Korean, foreign identity. When directly asked to explicate the process by

which a foreigner could become Korean, participant responses were split among those who

stated or reiterated an opinion based upon legalistic concerns, i.e. nationality, those who

discussed the aforementioned language requirement, and those who did both.

Participants specifically did not note concepts related to social reinforcement during

this portion of the interview, arguably demonstrating either an unwillingness to discuss the

perhaps more vague details of becoming Korean via others deciding for you who you will be

or, as was the case with 11 participants, discussing individual agency to the effect that a

person wanting to become Korean could do so via personal conviction. However, these

answers tended to be vague, in that many participants simply stated something to the effect of

what Ji-min said: “I think if someone really wants to be a Korean, then I think they can be

Koreans [sic.].” Thus, many interviews ended with validation of a given individual’s ability

to become Korean, or effect transition to Korean identity, if she wanted to, but without clear

explication of how such might be accomplished in a social rather than specifically legalistic

frame. Thus, it would seem clear that while such a person would need validation of their new

Korean identity, expressed via social emphasis, to be socially reciprocated via social

reinforcement, how such might be achieved was not made clear. Participants answering by

advocating Korean language mastery as an essential part of becoming Korean could arguably

also be understood as answering in favor of individual agency, and perhaps speaking to this

conundrum, as it is the individual who decides to study and the individual who must then

effect the steps necessary to do so to in turn be understood as exhibiting Korean identity


40

socially. This was the most concrete answer obtained vis-à-vis how one might acquire

reciprocal acknowledgment of having transitioned to Korean identity. On the whole, such

bodes simultaneously poorly and well for mediation of distance, which while difficult to

obfuscating to mediate, would not seem to be completely impossible to overcome.

CONCLUSION

Emile Durkheim penned the quote with which this paper began in specific reference to

religious beliefs, but noted that such are only a special example of that general law: the social

life of human beings is filled with forces of our own imaginative creation. He then continued,

“From a physical point of view, man is nothing but a system of cells, and from the mental point of view, a system of representations. From both points of view, he differs from the animal only in degree. And yet society conceives him and requires that we conceive him from all reckless infringement–in other words, that imposes respect. This status which puts him in a class by himself, seems to us to be one of his distinctive attributes, even though no basis for it can be found in the empirical nature of man.”

Durkheim at once indicts our compulsion to establish distance, first, between our real selves

and the ideal beings we imagine ourselves to be, and again, between ourselves and other

living creatures, as but a degree of virtually meaningless dissimilarity. We endow upon

ourselves a note of distinction lacking in empirical base, from which we further construct our

very definition. Durkheim finishes his thought:

“But collective representations often impute to the things to which they refer properties that do not exist in them in any form or to any degree whatsoever. From the most commonplace object, they can make a sacred and very powerful being. However, even though purely ideal, the powers thereby conferred on that object behave as if they were real. They determine man’s conduct with the same necessity as physical forces.”


41

Durkheim says that it matters not that these distinctions by which we define ourselves are

actually fiction; they become reality precisely because we want them to be such, we need

them to be such, and ultimately, we make them such. Because we are all human, regardless of

how Korean identity might be characterized with regard to its being couched in this or that

essential concept for a given individual, it must be understood it is at least as real to Koreans

who understand it as real as the identities of foreigners are real to them. Given the results of

the research done for this study, distance, as a gap between Koreans and foreigners which

mediates their concept of and interaction with one another, can be similarly characterized:

distance is likely to be most “real” to those who invest it the most with that characterization.

But this is also arguably true of Korea’s future, for if immigration trends, the underlying need

for their perpetuation, and growth of the “foreign” subset of Korea’s population do not slow

significantly or stop altogether, and there is no reason to assume that they will, such will be

true vis-à-vis multiculturalism as well. Multiculturalism may not be real to the Koreans who

do not want it be so today, just as it may not be real to the foreigners who do, because their

opinions fall on deaf ears. Hence, the word “multiculturalism” was included in quotes in the

title of this paper in the way “real” has been so written, for the single reason that whatever

Korean “multiculturalism” might become depends entirely upon the extent to which

foreigners will be able to have a say in its construction. Hence while it is a “real”

inevitability, it is also “unreal” insofar as its character is, as of yet, unknown.

Furthermore, it would seem that Korean identity is constitutive of a web of

connections between numerous points, some which were discovered and have been identified

for description herein and an unknown number of which were not. These points, discussed as

concepts of identity, exist insofar as relevance is invested in them by members of the group,

in this case the group, or sample, can be described in general as Koreans and specifically

along the lines of the description provided in the first portion of the findings section. Because


42

some points were mentioned with greater frequency than others, it can be deduced that some

points are considered to be of greater importance, and are thus more heavily invested in;

hence it can also be deduced that Korean identity is relative to some degree. It is also likely a

sample taken from another group identifying with a group not described as Korean will

perhaps invest importance in some of the same points, some other points, and to different

degrees dependent upon the characterization of identity held by members of that group,

though it is left to others to verify this claim. Suffice it to say, members of the sample

described concepts which are considered to exist a priori to birth, combined with a level of

vagueness vis-à-vis explanation of central concepts of identity, such as jeong, induces the

author to make the tentative statement that enough evidence exists to posit the existence of

distance. This argument can also be extended in description of mediation of distance as well.

For, if distance is to be overcome, foreigners must first learn to invest importance in that

which Koreans are already invested. However, because of the dual nature of social emphasis

and social reinforcement, such action would not be sufficient, as such an investment can only

be made on the individual’s side of that relationship. This would tend to demonstrate that

Koreans must reciprocate from the side of social reinforcement. It is insufficient for a given

foreigner to learn to speak and act and think as a Korean does, as Korean people must also

learn to expect and appreciate and, ultimately, to respect the investments of foreigners

wishing to overcome distance, to effect transition, and finally to become Korean. The author

feels that evidence of a current shift in the fundamental meaning of Korean identity was

uncovered is this study’s most promising finding. However, answers so often lead to further

questions, and such would seem to be the case here.

Thus, it is suggested that one area of further study to be undertaken is an examination

of both the degree to which Korean identity is shifting and the character of that shift. For

their part, participants of this study indicated a connection between the decrease in at least


43

one traditional value equated to some degree with being Korean, jeong, and the increase in

busy life, equated with individualism. That it may be early in the process of development of a

new Korean individualism could explain why participant’s were so often confused in

description of a possible path to becoming Korean, why such was so often vague, and even

why distance was so uniformly established. From whence this individualism came begs

asking; has it arisen commensurately since Korea opened to the world in the late 19th century,

is it the product of more recent events, a combination of the two, something else entirely?

Identifying a source, or potentially sources, will allow for more precise speculation to be

made as to how this new individualism is most likely to develop. It is not likely that some

Koreans will respond to this new individualism by pushing for more traditionalism? In turn,

will not those whose identities have already begun to shift push back in favor of holding on to

their individualism? Is this the source of what is likely the most extreme contemporary

example of the rejection of Korean identity: leaving Korea or taljoseon? These questions

remain tantalizingly unanswered.

Finally, if distance indeed exists today in the way described in this paper, the ways in

which it might best be addressed with an eye to Korea’s multicultural future can be

summarized in the following policy recommendations. First, to date the Korean

government’s approach to multiculturalism can be described as “integration” only

superficially. Thus, to address the situation from the standpoint of ideology, the government

must pursue an integrationist policy encouraging the Korean people to assume an active role

in the construction of a new Korean society decentered from a foundation built upon concepts

of Korean identity which cannot be passed between individuals except via means a priori to

birth. In short, the essence of what it means to be Korean must be actively redefined as

something which can be sought after and acquired, rather than something with which one

must be born. From a certain point of view, this process has arguably already begun, as


44

results of this study show that the Korean television show “Non-Summit” was universally

known among participants, that most had watched it with enjoyment, and some reported it as

their favorite television program; even those who did not report enjoyment confirmed its

depiction of foreign men along lines important to Koreans. The importance of language and

social reinforcement of identity were reflected in the fact that many participants felt the

portrayal of handsome, well-dressed foreign men knowledgably, but not forcefully, relating

their opinions vis-à-vis socially relevant topics in eloquent, fluent Korean constituted an at

least partially realistic presentation. While some participants expressed doubt with regard to

how much the men on the show were being “real” versus how much they were “acting,” and

others mentioned a Korean conceptualization of not only a difference between Koreans and

foreigners but also among foreigners, it speaks volumes that such a show would even be

popular in a country so proud of its homogeneity. In short, if the average viewer can become

accustomed to this group of men speaking and behaving like Koreans, perhaps distance in

this regard is being mediated to some degree. Such is deserving of further study.

Second, to date the Korean government’s approach to multiculturalism has been

largely focused on attempting to teach foreigners how to be more Korean. Thus, to address

the situation methodologically, the government must pursue an education policy which

engages the totality of the Korean populace in education programs simultaneously

demonstrating the Korean point of view while highlighting the many ways in which

immigration will benefit the nation as a whole, in as balanced and equitable a way as

possible. Such a program must be enacted equally at all levels of society such that the widest

possible swath of individuals of all kinds, for example vis-à-vis age, educational achievement

level, occupation, geographic residence, and socio-economic status, is involved. This study

has already highlighted both the importance of and propensity for education among Koreans,

such that it becomes beyond question that at least the infrastructure for the execution of such


45

a goal is already in place. Third, it is incumbent upon the government to use any and all

means at its disposal to actively engage the nation as both an active leader as well as

participant. This would entail the swift execution of the previous two policies and their

further facilitation via the drafting of new laws to ensure engendering the inclusion of

foreigners at all levels of Korean society, including central and local government, the private

sector, and among institutions of civil society. If it can be argued that Korean society is

hierarchical in nature (Seol and Skrentny 2009), then it follows that those at the top of the

order must lead, such that the nation may benefit by their example.

REFERENCES

Armstrong, Charles K. “Introduction, Civil Society in Contemporary Korea,” in Korean Society, Civil Society, Democracy, and the State, edited by Charles K. Armstrong, 1-10. London: Routledge, 2002.

Blumer, Herbert. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1969. Borjas, George J. "The Economic Benefits from Immigration.” Journal of Economic

Perspectives. Vol. 9, No. 2 (1995): 3-22. ———. Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1999. Brubaker, Rogers. "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction Between 'Civic' and

'Ethnic’ Nationalism.” in Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective. edited by Hanspeter Kriesie, et al. (Zurich: Ruegger, 1999), 55-69.

Chapman, David. Zianichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity. New York: Routledge, 2008. Connor, Walker. Ethnonationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Simon & Schuster,

[1912] 1995. Durkin, John T. Jr. “Immigration, Assimilation and Growth.” Journal of Population

Economics. Vol. 11, No. 2 (May, 1998), 273-291.


46

Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977.

New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. Geertz, Clifford. Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia. New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Gerteis, Joseph and Alyssa Goolsby. “Nationalism in America: The Case of the Populist

Movement.” Theory and Society, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr. 2005), 197-225. Holliday, Ruth and Joanna Elfving-Hwang. “Gender, Globalization, and Aesthetic Surgery in

South Korea.” Body & Society, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jun. 2012), 58-81. Kim, Dong-No Kim. “Social Grievances and Social Protests against the Oppressive State,” in

Modern Korean Society and Its Development and Prospect. edited by Hyuk-Rae Kim and Bok Song, 179-204. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2007.

Kim, Hyuk-Rae “NGOs and the Governance of Migration.” in State-centric to Contested

Social Governance in Korea. edited by Hyuk-Rae Kim, 116-137. London: Routledge, 2013.

Kim, Suzy. Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 2013. Kim, Yunhwa. KISDISTAT Report 15-03: Analysis of Social Media Trends and Patterns,

March 25, 2015. http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/common/premium?file=1%7C13605. (accessed April, 11, 2016).

Lee, Namhee. The Making of Minjung, Democracy and the Politics of Representation in

South Korea. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007. Seol, Dong-hoon and John D. Skrentny. “Ethnic Return Migration and Hierarchical

Nationhood: Korean Chinese Foreign Workers in South Korea.” Ethnicities, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Jun. 2009): 147-174.

Shin, Gi-Wook, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. Simon, Julian L. The Economic Consequence of Immigration. (Ann Arbor: University of

Michigan Press, 1999). Voelkel, Theodore J. “Disinclusion: A Qualitative Study of the Acculturative Experience of

English Instructors in South Korea.” Master’s Thesis. Yonsei University. 2014.


47

Waddell, Ethan and Ann Meejung Kim. “The Barbarian Within: Images of Joseonjok in the Yellow Sea.” International Journal of Humanities & Social Studies. Vol. 3, No. 6 (2015): 102-109.

APPENDIX I

Hello, my name is Ted Voelkel and I am a graduate student in the University of Chicago

Master of Arts program in social science. I’m currently working on the research portion of

my master’s thesis and looking for interview participants. My study concerns the life and

identity of Koreans and its effect on multiculturalism in South Korea. I haven’t been awarded

any sort of grant for this research, but I am more than willing to send you coupon good for a

Starbucks coffee if you’d be willing to give me 1 hour or so of your time. So, if you are over

18 years of age, ethnically Korean, currently reside in South Korea, and would like to

participate in the study, please feel free to contact me via Facebook messenger or by email at

[email protected]. Thank you very much for your time and I hope to hear from you

soon!

APPENDIX II

Demographic Section 1. How did you hear about the study? 2. What is your birth date? 3. Where were you born? 4. Where do you currently live? 5. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 6. Have you always lived in South Korea? 7. How old were you when you started studying English? 8. How well would you say you speak English? 9. What languages do you speak other than English and Korean? 10. Where have you traveled abroad? 11. What is your current job? 12. What kind of foreigners do you work with? 13. How many foreign friends do you have? Probe: percent vs. Korean friends 14. How often to you attend church? 15. What kind of foreigners attend your church? 16. Are you married? Probe: how long Probe: nationality of spouse Probe: children


48

Korean Identity Section 17. If you had to pick three words to describe yourself, what would they be? Why? Probe: Character or identity? 18. What does the word Korean mean to you? 19. What does the word Koreanness mean to you? 20. What do you think is the difference between these words? 21. How are Korean and foreigners living in Korea different? 22. How are they the same? 23. What is the impression you get of foreigners in the media? 24. How do you feel about this impression? 25. Have you watched비정상회담 or 미수다? 26. How are foreigners presented on these shows? Shifting Identity Section 27. Can a person become Korean in the same way as one becomes American? Probe: legalistically 28. Is a child born in Korea automatically Korean by birth? Probe: non-legalistically 29. Is a Korean child born outside of Korea automatically Korean by birth? Probe: non-legalistically 30. Is a Korean child born in Korea and then adopted by foreign parents still Korean? Probe: non-legalistically 31. How can someone become Korean? Probe: non-legalistically 32. Is there anything you want to tell me that we haven’t covered?

Distance - Final Draft

Documents

Transcript of Distance - Final Draft