Dissertation - The Development of British Amphibious Theory and Doctrine during the Interwar Period

7/25/2019 Dissertation - The Development of British Amphibious Theory and Doctrine during the Interwar Period

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The Development of British Amphibious Theory and

Doctrine during the Interwar Period.

Thomas Metcalfe

2016

Supervisor:Professor Alaric Searle

A dissertation presented in the University of Salford in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of:

Contemporary Military and International History BA (Hons).


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Introduction.

The ability to project power from the sea through the landing of a military force onto a hostile

or potentially hostile shore is among the oldest and perhaps most essential capability for any

maritime power to possess in times of war, excepting perhaps the ability to prevent a landing

on ones own shores. Described by Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, as the most difficult of all

operations in modern warfare,1amphibious operations are complex and require considerable

skill to succeed, yet their potential to achieve decisive results and the flexibility that they grant

has meant that they have been of use throughout the history of warfare.2 Amphibious

operations are commonly defined as a subset of maritime power projection that involves the

insertion of a sea-based military force into a hostile, or potentially hostile, territory, subdivided

into four categories: assaults; raids; withdrawals and feints/demonstrations.3 Although

helicopter carriers now enable sea-based forces to disembark further inland,4 amphibious

operations have largely been characterised throughout history by the direct landing of a

military force at the shoreline.

In the decade prior to the start of the First World War, the concept of both combined

strategy and joint army-naval operations had grown firm roots within British military thought

with major advocates such as Sir Julian Corbett, Colonel C.E. Callwell and Sir George Aston

to name just a few of the more well-known examples. Although certainly not the sole

constituent of joint-operations between the army and navy, amphibious operations were

largely seen as the most important for Britains armed forces to master, with the 1911 and

1Ernest J. King, Third Report to the Secretary of the Navy (1945), p.171, atwww.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USNatWar/USN-King-3.html,[accessed 16 October 2015].2Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck,Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics from Gallipoli to Iraq (London, 2nd

Edition, 2014), pp. 7-12.3Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century (London, 2ndEdition, 2009), pp. 184-190.4Speller and Tuck,Amphibious Warfare, pp. 28-29.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USNatWar/USN-King-3.htmlhttp://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USNatWar/USN-King-3.html


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1913 editions of the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations focusing solelyon

amphibious operations.5

With the exception of the Gallipoli campaign, no major opposed amphibious operations

were conducted by the British during the First World War, and the failure of Gallipoli has often

been seen as heralding the end of any serious approach to examining amphibious warfare in

Britain until shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War.6As a consequence of both

this and the habit of comparing British amphibious development during the interwar period to

that occurring in both Japan and the United States, it has predominantly been viewed as

lacking in merit and appreciation until recently.7Among the most cited works taking a more

positive outlook on the development of British amphibious capability during the interwar period

is David Massams 1995 D.Phil. thesis, British Maritime Strategy and Amphibious Capability

1900-1940. This work argued that instead of abandoning amphibious operations after the

Gallipoli debacle the army and navy learnt many important lessons from the experience, as is

evidenced by the preparations made for the aborted landings in Belgium in 1917, and that

Britain continued to develop its amphibious capability throughout the interwar period. In his

view although costly, the landings themselves succeeded even if the campaign had not and

the losses inflicted at Gallipoli, as well as the failure of the campaign as a whole, led to

improved communications between the army and navy for future amphibious operations.8A

similar view is given by Richard Harding, whose studies give a detailed overview of the

development of multiple aspects of British amphibious capability throughout this period, such

5The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (hereafter, TNA), WO 33/569, Manual of Combined Navaland Military Operations (1911), p. 7; WO 33/644, Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1913),pp. 6-7. During this period and until the end of the Second World War, amphibious operations in Britain weremore commonly referred to as combined operations. See Richard Harding, Amphibious Warfare, 1930-1939 inRichard Harding (ed.) The Royal Navy, 1930-2000: Innovation and Defence (2005), pp. 44-45.6For a detailed overview of how analysis of the Gallipoli campaign has largely been attributed to interwaramphibious developments, see Ian Speller, In the Shadow of Gallipoli? Amphibious Warfare in the Inter-WarPeriod, in Jenny MacLeod (ed.) Gallipoli: Making History(London, 2004), pp. 136-149.7Works that have given a negative impression of British amphibious theory and doctrine during the interwarperiod include B. Fergusson, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations (London, 1961); Arthur J.Marder, The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914-1918, PacificHistorical Review, 41/4 (1972), pp. 413-443; David MacGregor, The Use, Misuse and Non-Use of History: The

Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons of the First World War, The Journal of Military History, 56/4 (1992), pp.603-616.8Speller, In the Shadow of Gallipoli?, pp. 138-139.


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as the often neglected impact of air power, and mention several theoretical developments,

although not in great detail.9

Among the most notable aspects of previous studies is the lack of focus on such

theoretical developments in the use and conduct of amphibious operations, barring a few

general references to the work conducted at the staff colleges, and little in the way of analysing

doctrinal development. Although the organisational and materiel aspects that have been the

focus of most previous studies do highlight the causes of many of the difficulties that Britain

would face when confronted with the prospect of amphibious warfare during the Second World

War, they are limited in that they alone cannot ascribe a reason for the way in which the British

armed forces would approach them. Based on this slant to the current historical wisdom, the

question which then arises is: What advances were made in British amphibious theory and

doctrine during the interwar period?

Theory, either naval or military, can be categorised as a formulated collection of ideas

that provide a conceptual foundation for understanding the nature, purpose and/or conduct of

war in their respective environment.10It can be written by both professional servicemen and

civilians and is usually published in books and journals, although theoretical views and

debates on them can also be examined through other sources such as correspondence and

staff college lectures.11 During the interwar period Britain was a country whose armed forces,

as with those throughout Europe who had fought through the First World War, were concerned

with the development of new or refined ways of waging war. In addition to the purely military

experience of the First World War driving theoretical development, there were both social and

political factors such as: the birth of the first communist state, the Soviet Union; the growth of

9Richard Harding, Learning from the War: The Development of British Amphibious Capability, 191929,Mariners Mirror, 86/2 (May 2000), pp. 173-185; Harding, Amphibious Warfare, 1930-1939.10Thomas G. Mahnken, Strategic Theory in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray (eds.), Strategy in

the Contemporary World (Oxford, 3rdEdition, 2010), p. 68.11Alaric Searle, Inter-service Debate and the Origins of Strategic Culture: The Principles of War in the BritishArmed Forces, 19191939, War in History, 21/1 (2013), p.5.


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fascism; economic constraints; and the bounds of international law, the Washington and

London naval treaties being those of most concern to Britain.12

Although certainly influenced by the works and ideas of military theorists, naval theory

had largely developed both separately and under different circumstances to that of warfare on

land and in many ways remained largely disconnected from it.13Whilst the two figures who

dominated military theory at the time, Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz,

were both veterans of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and began writing either

during or shortly after the wars themselves, naval theory only began to develop in any real

sense towards the end of the nineteenth century and focussed much of its analysis on the

experiences of predominantly maritime nations as opposed to the continentalist land powers

in whose armies Jomini and Clausewitz had fought.14Imperial rivalries, the emergence of new

threats and rapid developments in naval technology were the driving force behind the growth

of naval theory at this time, rather than the recent experience of major conflicts.15 Although

the role of sea power had been touched on by Jomini and efforts to place naval theory within

a broader theory of war as a whole had been taken by writers such as Corbett and Aston, the

overarching themes which influenced naval strategy were still largely disassociated from those

of strategy on land. Even though Corbetts ideas became more widely accepted within the

navy after the First World War (although not without controversy),16the overarching view that

the naval blockade against Germany was the decisive factor in winning the First World War

12For works that give a detailed overview of the factors that affected British military thought in this period, seeBrian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980); Christopher Bell, The RoyalNavy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars(Stanford, 2000).13J.J. Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his Contribution to Military and Naval Thought(Farnham, 2012), p. 155.14Peter Gretton, Maritime Strategy: A Study of British Defence Problems (London, 1965), pp. 4-5; John Shy,Jomini in Peter Paret (ed.), The Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1986), pp.143-185; Peter Paret,Clausewitz in Peter Paret (ed.), The Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 186-213.15John Gooch, Maritime Command: Mahan and Corbett, in Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett (eds.),Seapower and Strategy (Annapolis, 1989), pp. 27-31.16Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy, pp. 20-21.


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reinforced the views of those of the blue-water school who viewed naval warfare as being

fundamentally separate from the waging of war on land.17

Whilst military or naval theory does not necessarily have any official recognition within

the armed forces, military and naval doctrine does. The most recent edition of BR 1806, or

British Maritime Doctrine, describes doctrine as a framework of principles, practices and

procedures, the understanding of which provides a basis for action,18whilst the newest edition

of UK Defence Doctrine includes the caveat that Doctrine is a guide to commanders and

subordinates on how to think, not what to think.19Usually published in official manuals and

actively taught to those within the service in question, doctrine draws on both historical and

recent experience, tradition and theoretical developments in an attempt to create a common

approach to planning and conducting operations that is likely to meet the circumstances of

future conflict.20 It has been described as providing a bridge between theory and practice,

[Interpreting] ideas about war, and how they affect its conduct and its character, by combining

strategic theories and operational plans into functional guidelines for action.21 Between 1919

and 1939 there were in total four editions of the Manual of Combined Operationspublished,

increasing from the 47 pages of the earlier 1913 edition to 230 pages in the 1923 edition.22

In order to answer the question already posed, we will first need to examine the

development of British amphibious theory and doctrine prior to the First World War, making

use of published theoretical works, both from books and articles, as well as the first two

editions of the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations. Secondly, views on the

17For a contemporary naval view on the impact of the blockade on the outcome of the war, see R. G. O. Tupper,The Blockade of Germany by the Tenth Cruiser Squadron in the Atlantic, Journal of the Royal United ServicesInstitution, 68/469 (February 1923), pp.1-22.18British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806), (London: Ministry of Defence, 3rdedition, 2004), p. 4.19UK Defence Doctrine (JDP 0-01), (London: Ministry of Defence, 5thedition, 2014), p. iii.20Simon Hollington, The Royal Navy needs Doctrine, Naval Review, 83/1 (1995), pp. 12-15.21Geoffrey Sloan, Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis andTheory, International Affairs, 88/2 (March 2012), p. 244.22Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1911); Manual of Combined Naval and MilitaryOperations (1913); TNAAIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923).During theperiod covered in this work, the name of the publication was altered twice, with the 1911 and 1913 editions beingtitled the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, the 1923 and 1925 editions being titled the Manual

of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations, and the 1931 and 1938 editions being titled the Manual ofCombined Operations. For the purposes of brevity, when not referring to a specific edition these publications willbe referred to as the Manual of Combined Operations, or simply Manual.


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utility of amphibious operations that developed during the interwar period will be examined,

analysing how important amphibious operations were perceived to have been to the

implementation of British strategy and in which circumstances were they seen to have likely

been of use. In order to do this contemporary books and journal articles, Admiralty and War

Office reports, correspondence, and staff college lectures and assignments will be used in

addition to the interwar editions of the Manual of Combined Operations. Finally, views on the

conductof amphibious operations, by which we mean what were seen as the operational and

tactical requirements for the successful execution of an amphibious operation, will be

examined, again making use of staff college lectures and assignments, correspondence,

reports, contemporary books and journal articles, and published doctrine.

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British Amphibious Theory and Doctrine before the First World War

The emergence of dedicated naval theory towards the end of the nineteenth century appears

to have been the main catalyst for deeper theories on amphibious operations to develop. As

stated before, significant discussions on the nature, purpose or conduct of naval warfare

developed later than those concerning the waging of war on land and were the product of a

number of different factors.23Perhaps the most prominent theorist of naval warfare in Britain

prior to the start of the First World War was Sir Julian Corbett. Originally educated as a lawyer

before turning to the study of naval history, Corbett became not only a respected historian

(although not without critics), but eventually became lecturer of naval history at the Royal

Naval College in Greenwich and through close association with the First Sea Lord, Admiral

Sir John Fisher, became somewhat of an unofficial strategist for the Admiralty.24His two most

important books to consider the importance of amphibious operations were England in the

Seven Years War (1907) and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911).

Pre-eminent in Corbetts understanding of naval warfare was its relation to the conduct

and outcome of war on land as, in Corbetts mind, naval power was largely impotent when

used in isolation.25He described amphibious operations, particularly in the context of their

use during the long eighteenth century, as being the form of war in which Great Britain most

successfully demonstrated the potentiality for direct continental interference of a small army

acting in conjunction with a dominant fleet.26

Corbett considered amphibious operations to

fall under two categories based on their strategic purpose: those to facilitate the conquest of

territory, usually overseas and colonial in nature; and operations directly against an enemys

23For an overview of the factors that led to an increased interest in naval history, theory and strategy in Britaintowards the end of the nineteenth century, see D. M. Schurman, The Education of a Navy (Chicago, 1965), pp. 1-15. For an overview of naval theory and strategy in this period, see Azar Gat,A History of Military Thought: Fromthe Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford, 2001), pp. 441-493.24J. J. Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and His Contribution to Military and NavalThought (Farnham, 2012), pp. 15-28.25Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London, 1911), pp. 8, 11-12; Julian Corbett, England inthe Seven Years War (London, 1907), p. 5.26Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 51.


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seaboard, designed to frustrate or divert their plans, potentially open up a new front, and to

strengthen the position of both the nation conducting the operation and its allies.27In a war

in which Britain had a major continental ally, such as the Seven Years War or the French

Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the threat of potential seaborne operations also led to

the containment of troops along the coast out of proportion to those which threatened them,

and as such drawing them away from the more decisive fronts.28

Corbetts view was that an amphibious expedition should consist of four elements: the

landing force itself; the transports and landing flotilla; the squadron incharge of transports,

which would provide both the close protection of the transports in transit and support the

landing operation; and the covering squadron to deter or if necessary engage enemy naval

forces to prevent interference with the expedition en route.29Thus, although he considered

local sea control to be essential to successful large-scale amphibious operations, he also

considered the possibilities of operations being carried out in disputed seas.30As his focus

was primarily naval, he did not pay considerable attention to the question of how to

successfully conduct the actual landing, with the notable exception of his consideration of the

debate over the effectiveness of naval artillery for covering opposed landings.31

Whilst Corbett had examined amphibious operation from a largely naval perspective,

Colonel (later Major General) C. E. Callwell, now widely known for his 1896 book Small Wars:

Their Principles and Practice, self-admittedly approached the subject from the point of view

of his own profession,32 producing two books which cover the subject of amphibious

operations: The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo (1897);

and Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and Interdependence

(1905). The first book was little more than an overview of a number of campaigns from across

27Ibid., p. 51.28Ibid., p.57.29Ibid., p. 259.30Ibid., pp. 258-259.31Ibid.,pp. 264-265.32C. E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and Interdependence(Edinburgh and London, 1905), p. 5.


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the world in which superior sea power had had an effect, directly or indirectly, on the outcome

of military operations on land during the past eighty-two years with some added commentary,

whilst the latter has been described as [possibly] the best study of joint warfare that has ever

been written.33 Certainly the depth in which he examines joint army-naval operations,

including amphibious operations, eclipses the writings of the other figures mentioned here.

Callwell considers the role that amphibious operations could play in in a variety of situations,

from the destruction of enemy fleets in harbour to the capture of territory either for permanent

occupation or as a means of bargaining during peace negotiations, to the capture of harbours

suitable for naval purposes.34Like Corbett, he also discusses the ability of amphibious raids

to induce an enemy to concentrate their land forces on defending their coasts rather than

committing them to the main theatres of battle.35He also considers the problems of that often

neglected form of amphibious operation, the withdrawal,36 as well as operations in which

marines and bluejackets could carry out minor, ad hoc landings.37

Callwell largely drew from historical examples to construct his theory whilst also

examining the ways in which new technology and other changes could have altered the way

in which wars were conducted and how that in turn affected the ability to successfully conduct

an amphibious operation. Whilst the discussion on whether opposed landings were possible

or not was largely avoided by Corbett, Callwell dedicated an entire chapter to their

consideration,38 arguing that they had become far more difficult than those which had

occurred in the past for a variety of reasons. The increased range of modern small arms and

artillery fire is the first development he brings up, arguing that the landing force would be

under fire for a considerably longer period of time during the ship-to-shore stage of the

operation, the stage in which they would have been most vulnerable, than in the past. 39With

33Colin S. Gray Introduction in C. E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relationsand Interdependence (Annapolis, 1996), p. xv.34Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, pp. 94-95, 110-113, 129, 180-182.35Ibid., pp. 323-324.36Ibid., pp. 362-368.37Ibid., p. 361.38Ibid., pp. 243-368.39Ibid., pp. 358-353.


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some prescience, he stated that The evolution in tactical conditions works entirely in favour

of the troops repelling an attempted landing, as against the troops making the attempt. . . . If

the attacking army is prepared to accept heavy loss, it may succeed. But the operation is not

one to be ventured on with a light heart, or one to be undertaken without counting the cost

and without accepting the risk of disaster.40 To remedy these new difficulties, he was an

advocate of utilising feints and deception to lure enemy forces away from the intended landing

sites in order to land with at least depleted opposition.41His view on night landings was that

they were best avoided and that the advantages gained from being less susceptible to enemy

fire would be offset by the difficulties of navigation, orientation and the likelihood of causing

unneeded confusion in both the landing force and the naval forces.42

Callwell concludes his study by bringing up areas of improvement that he believes are

essential if Britain were to successfully conduct amphibious operations in the near future. He

suggests the development of specialised ships of shallow draft with large guns, not dissimilar

from the monitors the Royal Navy would later develop, to provide naval gunfire support

nearer to the landing sight, enabling for better communication with the forces ashore and that

consideration should be made for equipping these ships to fire shrapnel as opposed to the

standard high-explosive ammunition used within the navy.43Himself an artillery officer, he

also advocated the early deployment of mountain guns or pack-howitzers after the beach

itself was free from direct fire in order to provide artillery support for any troops moving further

inland.44Most importantly to him, however, was the need for the army and navy to consider

methods of co-operation and co-ordination before the outbreak of any future conflict.45

The final theorist for consideration shared Callwells concern for increasing co-

operation between the services and was one of the main driving forces behind such attempts

40Ibid., pp. 359-360. For another contemporary opinion questioning feasibility of opposed landings beingconducted under modern conditions, see I. S. Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? (London, 1899), pp. 117-120.41Ibid., pp. 345-347.42Ibid., pp. 361-362.43Ibid., pp. 431-435.44Ibid., pp. 438-439.45Ibid., pp. 443-444.


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before 1914. Sir George Aston was an officer in the Royal Marine Artillery who, in spite of the

pitfalls that usually befell marine officers regarding promotion at this time, came to a position

of both respect and influence within both services.46Such were his efforts at fostering such

ties that Colin S. Gray has argued that Aston had the greatest impact on the army of any pre-

First World War amphibious theorist.47His first major venture into amphibious theory was a

lecture delivered at the Royal United Services Institution in 1907, in which he outlined what

he considered to be the major strategic principles of joint army and naval strategy, the primary

ones being concentration of effort, the importance of maintaining lines of communication, and

the need for command of the sea to be achieved beforehand.48He also considered the use

of amphibious operations for a variety of purposes including the capture of advanced bases

for naval forces, the containment of a disproportionate number of enemy troops along their

coast through threatened landings, the severing of an enemy armys communications if they

are situated near the coast, and the occupation of territory to influence the terms of peace.49

Aston used this lecture as the basis of a more detailed work focusing on the conduct of what

he referred to as amphibious wars within the last few decades, such as the Chilean Civil

War of 1891, the Spanish-American War and the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars. 50This

contemporary focus was in part a measure to assuage criticism from some circles as to the

practicability of successful amphibious operations, many of whom objected to the examples

used by theorists such as Corbett as they tended to predate more recent innovations in

weaponry and transport.51Perhaps his most important work, Sea, Land and Air Strategy,was

published in 1914, and unlike his previous book, which added little to the thoughts he had

first articulated in his 1907 lecture, Sea, Land and Air Strategy examined the role of

46For a full and comprehensive account of Sir George Astons efforts at stimulating inter-service co-operation inBritain before the First World War, see Jim Beach, The British Army, the Royal Navy, and the Big Work of SirGeorge Aston, 19041914, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29/1 (February 2006), pp. 145-168.47Gray, Introduction, p. xli.48George Aston, Combined Strategy for Fleets and Armies; Or Amphibious Strategy, Journal of the RoyalUnited Services Institution, 51/345, (July 1907), pp. 984-1004.49Ibid., pp. 994-996.50George Aston, Letters on Amphibious Wars (London, 1907).51Beach, The Big Work of Sir George Aston, pp. 153, 156, 163.


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amphibious operations within a wider theory of war which appears to largely draw from the

ideas of both Corbett and Sir Edward Hamley.52

In it he offers little in the way of new thoughts on the utility of amphibious operations

than had already been put forward by himself and others, apart from discussing the potential

of small-scale raids, something that both Corbett and Callwell dealt little with.53His main

contributions to the discussion lie in his views on the conductof amphibious operations, and

some of Astons most interesting and prescient thoughts in this work relate to the potential

effects of air power on the conduct of war as a whole and amphibious operations in particular.

He notes the increased danger to ships approaching an enemys coast posed by bomb -

dropping aircraft, and mentions the possibility of using aircraft to sink ships in harbour.54He

also noted their potential to act as spotters for naval guns firing at onshore targets beyond

their visible range, providing the landing forces with a far greater chance of securing a

sufficiently large beachhead.55 But perhaps Astons greatest contribution was not in

theoretical developments, but in encouraging the British armed forces to consider amphibious

operations as potential actions of a future war, actions which in turn would contribute to

Britains first doctrinal efforts on the matter.

Moving on from the development of theory, the development of British amphibious

doctrine during this period must now be considered. Although given the prevalence of

amphibious theory being developed in Britain during this period it might seem that the

development of amphibious doctrine was directly influenced by it, this does not appear to be

the case. The first official field manual on operations published by the British Army, the 1909

Field Service Regulations: Part I, included a brief mention of amphibious operations in the

sub-chapter entitled Movements by Sea.56On the utility of amphibious operations it lists

three potential aims:

52George Aston, Sea, Land and Air Strategy (London, 1914),passim.53Ibid., 291-301.54Ibid., pp. 103, 215.55Ibid., pp. 217-218, 263-264.56War Office, Field Service Regulations, Part I: Operations, 1909 (London, 1909), pp. 64-67.


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i. The establishment of a base for military operations either againstthe enemys field armies or against a coast fortress.

ii. The establishment of a flying naval base.

iii. Raids against shipping, communications, &c.57

Apart from being adamant on the need to attain and preserve command of the sea,58there

is nothing written on the conditions appropriate for the landing of troops or how to conduct

the landings themselves, with most of what little was written within these few pages focusing

on the embarkation process and the division of duties between the army and the navy.59

Following this publication, the War Office published a number of other manuals

detailing more specific areas, such as individual manuals for the infantry, cavalry, engineers

and field artillery,60 and it is in this context that we must place the publication of the first

Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations. Published in 1911, the first few pages

were identical to the sub-chapter in the Field Service Regulations in discussing the utility of

amphibious operations, although the publication as a whole was considerably longer.61There

were two main sources from which the new manual drew. The first was a report on a joint

amphibious exercise carried out in 1904 which attempted to replicate the conditions of an

unopposed landing near Colchester. This report mostly concentrated on the division of duties

between the services, and large sections were copied verbatim from the report into the

manual.62The second major source was the result of a number of annual inter-service staff

tours, organised by Aston, from 1905 onwards to stimulate a dialogue between the two

services, often involving visits to the coastal areas of southern England in which members of

the staff colleges from both services would discuss how best a landing could be effected in

the area from the point of view of each service.63

57Ibid., p. 64.58Ibid.59Ibid., pp. 64-67.60Christopher Pugsley, We Have Been Here Before: The Evolution of the Doctrine of Decentralised Command inthe British Army 1905-1989, Sandhurst Occasional Papers, 9 (2011), p. 11, atwww.army.mod.uk/documents/general/rmas_occ_paper_09.pdf.61TNA, WO 33/569, Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1911).62Beach, The Big Work of Sir George Aston, pp.149-150.63Ibid., pp. 150-152.
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/rmas_occ_paper_09.pdfhttp://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/rmas_occ_paper_09.pdf


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The 1911 manual, and its revised 1913 edition, lay out a clear organisation for the

planning and conduct of amphibious operations. On the issue of choosing a suitable landing

site, the views of the navy are given priority over those of the army.64The troops which were

to be landed would be organised into two groups: the covering force, who would land in the

first wave and secure a suitable beachhead;65 and the main body, who would later

disembark along with the armys supplies and equipment under the protection of the covering

force.66 The manual emphasises the need for the covering force to be landed at night,

especially if the landings are opposed.67The revised 1913 edition strays little from the 1911

edition, largely just clarifying a number of the statements made in the original with a small

number of new thoughts added, such as the statement that ships would likely be unable to

provide indirect fire support to the landing troops.68 All three publications are largely

organisational in content and methodical in nature, tending to proscribe action for best-case

scenarios rather than in trying to consider guidelines for action under less favourable

circumstances, and there appears to have been little to no influence from the ideas of pre-

First World War theorists, excepting perhaps the imperative to publish on the subject. All

these problems would begin to be rectified once the decision to revise the Manual was agreed

on following the end of the First World War.

. . .

64TNA, WO 33/569 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1911), pp. 23-24.65Ibid., 24-25.66Ibid., 24, 26-27.67Ibid., p. 24.68TNA, WO 33/644, Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1913), p. 44.


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The Utility of Amphibious Operations

The need to redress the problems of the existing Manual of Combined Naval and Military

Operationswas acted upon soon after the end of the war. Following the results of a 1919

paper exercise involving officers from both the naval and army staff colleges held at

Camberley, a joint report was issued to both the War Office and the Admiralty. 69Describing

the 1913 manual as obviously out of date,70this report laid the foundations, and brought up

many of the conflicting schools of thought which would surround the debates over amphibious

operations for the next twenty years as well as leading to the establishment of the

Interdepartmental Committee on Combined Operations in 1920 to organise the publication of

a new version of the manual.71 The immediacy of the decision to re-examine amphibious

operations so soon after the conclusion of the First World War challenges the idea that

amphibious operations were immediately discredited by Britains armed forces following the

debacle at Gallipoli,72as does the decision to hold joint paper exercises on them at the Staff

College, Camberley twice a year from 1919 onwards.73There was clearly then a belief within

at least a sizeable proportion of the armed forces that amphibious operations were not only

practicable, but were also an important element of Britains ability to wage war. As the Director

of the Naval Staff College in 1919 described them, These operations had a large share in

building up the British Empire, and there seems little doubt that they will be constantly needed

to maintain it.74

69TNA, ADM 116/2086, Report on Combined Naval and Military Exercise, 1919, W.H. Anderson, n.d.70Ibid., p. 4.71Harding, Learning from the War, p. 176.72For one such view, and the one from which the term discredited was specifically used, see Marder, TheInfluence of History on Sea Power, pp. 432-433.73TNA, ADM 116/2086, Major Gen. Sir W. E. Ironside, K.C.B., etc., proposed guest of C in C, Atlantic Fleet

during Spring Cruiserequest for information re, investigations relative to combined operations, 5 January 1922,Minute Sheet no. 1.74TNA, ADM 116/2086, Drax to Director of Training and Staff Duties Division, Admiralty, 8 December 1919, p. 2.


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Nor was this view a lone one at the time. In one of his first lectures delivered to the

students at the Senior Officers Course at Greenwich, Sir Herbert Richmond echoed both

Callwell and Corbett in advocating in the case of another major continental conflict:

Using our army in an auxiliary sense to support the continental armies and adjust the

military balance. In such a purpose a small, very efficient force would be effective;

and we could use it wherever it might most usefully be employed, our sea-power

enabling us to place it in any part of the world we desired. Such an army is strongly

out of proportion to its numbers. It can be a professional army, and man for man better

than a short service army, while the power of transferring it to any theatre at will adds

an additional strength to its quality and mobility.75

Considering amphibious operations to be essential to the projection of naval power, Richmond

also claimed that, The maritime offensive, to be used with effect, must be a combined

offensive. Troops are always needed, but troops embarked are a very real and useful addition

to the powers of the fleet.76

Continuing throughout the interwar period, the views of the major proponents of a

maritime or amphibious strategy against a continental enemy appear to have held sway in

certain circles. In a lecture delivered at the Royal United Services Institution in 1934,

Lieutenant-Commander G.B.H. Fawkes examined the merits of the three pre-First World War

schools of strategic thought and the prospects they held for British strategy in a future major

war. After dismissing the views of the blue-water school (which he himself termed the insular

school) and being highly critical of the continental school, he claims that, despite possessing

some inherent faults, a maritime strategy, wherein our Army should have conferred upon it

the benefits which sea power can bestow would be the best course of action, and that the

skilful use of combined naval, military, and air power may well be the means of restoring

offensive action to the high plane it has always held in the history of the British Empire. 77

75Caird Library, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich (hereafter, NMM), Admiral Sir H.W. Richmond papers,RIC/10/1, Lectures at R. N. War College, Greenwich: Spring Session, 1920, Volume I, Policy and Strategy, n.d.

p. 12.76Ibid., pp. 19-20. Underlining in the original.77G. B. H. Fawkes, British Strategy, RUSI Journal,79/515 (1934), pp. 590-594.


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Neither were these opinions held solely by naval officers. Similar views were put forward

in Major General Sir Fredrick Maurices British Strategy: A Study of the Application of the

Principles of War (1929), where he claimed that Both we and our forbears [sic] have been

accustomed to think of our military power as amphibious, . . . the chief criticism which our

descendants will have to make of our conduct of the Great War will be that we did not make

the best use of our amphibious power.78He believed that, in the army at least, British military

thought prior to the First World War had been dominated by the ideas of continental theorists

and that, rather than approaching strategy from the view of Britains unique (from a European

standpoint) geostrategic position, they had instead attempted to transform Britain into a land

power, something in which she would be at a great disadvantage when compared to the great

continental land powers of Europe.79He also argued that the ability to land unexpectedly and

anywhere on an enemys coast had in the past given the British army an advantage in winning

the initiative over numerically superior foes.80Given that this was an officially endorsed work,

Maurice being given an advance copy of the new Field Service Regulations(1929) whose list

of the principles of war he used as the basis of his work and an introduction being provided by

Field Marshal Sir George Milne,81it demonstrates that there was still a clear belief within the

British Army during the interwar period of the need to consider the utility of amphibious

warfare. But, although the traditional pre-war concepts of amphibious utility against a

continental enemy espoused by Richmond, Maurice and others would later become

popularised by writers such as Sir Basil Liddell Hart later on in the interwar period, 82in the

immediate post-war years there was no longer a major European threat to Britain in which

amphibious operations could be used in this way. Instead, amphibious operations began to

78F. Maurice, British Strategy: A Study of the Applications of the Principles of War (London, 1929), pp. 54-55.79Ibid., pp. 49-50, 54.80Ibid., p. 150.81Searle, Inter-service Debate and the Origins of Strategic Culture, pp. 18-19.82For a criticism on both the originality and strength of Liddell Harts argument that there had always been aBritish way in warfare, see Hew Strachan, The British Way in Warfare in David Chandlerand Ian Becket (eds.),The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (Oxford, 1994), pp. 417-434.


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be incorporated into new roles in British strategic thinking, most importantly that of imperial

defence and policing the Empire.

Although imperial defence had long been the main role of Britains armed forces,83the

interwar period had thrown up a number of new challenges. In the first instance, between 1914

and 1919 the British Empire had grown by some 1.8 million square miles and incorporated

approximately 13 million new inhabitants at the expense of both the German and Ottoman

Empires.84Despite this tremendous increase in responsibilities, Britains armed forces were

being reduced and one of the greatest benefits to British imperial defence planning since 1902,

the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was to be discontinued.85As Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, perhaps the

most important British military theorist of the interwar period, put it: Our army is smaller than

it was in 1914, and yet costs twice as much; our Empire is larger than it was in 1914, and is in

a very unsettled and nervous condition. How, then, are we to protect it?.86

Fuller himself divided the problems of imperial defence into three categories: imperial

defence during great wars, imperial defence during small wars, and imperial defence to

maintain domestic tranquillity.87He argues that in the first category there is little difference to

the waging of conventional wars, other than logistics, and instead focuses, as most writers of

the time did, on the latter two, and given his view that in these conflicts rapidity of movement

is the predominant factor, it is understandable that amphibious operations came to be seen

as an essential part of British plans on maintaining the Empire.88Fuller argued that a fleet of

warships and transports which possessed both an amphibious capability, aircraft carriers and

sufficient troops could become a completely self-contained fighting force capable of operating

on and in the three elements of water, earth, or air. The possibilities of such a force, for the

83For works on this subject, see Greg Kennedy (ed.), Imperial Defence: The Old World Order, 1856-1956(Oxford, 2008),passim; D. M. Schurman, Imperial Defence, 1868-1887(London, 1999).84Niall Ferguson, Empire (London, 2003), p. 315.85For a work examining both the causes for and the effects of the termination of the alliance, see Phillips PaysonOBrien, Britain and the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in Phillips Payson OBrien (ed.), The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922 (London, 2004), pp. 264-284.86J.F.C. Fuller, The Reformation of War(1923), p. 192.87Ibid., p. 190.88Ibid., pp. 190-191.


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major police work of the Empire, need no accentuation, for they must be visible to all. 89He

also advocated for the development of small amphibious tanks for use by the fleet in such

conditions:

Suppose that a rebellion threatening the lives of British citizens broke out at Hong-

Kong and there were no troops there, the crew of our present-day cruiser could render

small assistance on land, but, equipped with four tanks, it could make its presence

felt, and felt in such a manner that the rebellion might well be quashed in a few hours.90

Similar views on the employment of ship-based tanks for colonial policing were held by an

anonymous contributor to the Naval Review in 1931.91

Ideas promoting self-contained naval response forces to combat imperial unrest appear

to have been common around this time.92One report on the future role of the Royal Marines

points to their ability to provide a fast and flexible response in savage warfare, providing a

landing force to preserve order, or to deal promptly with trouble in out of [the] way places.93

Another report on the same subject also advocated this role of colonial peace enforcement,

stressing the need for the Corps of Royal Marines to carry out its peace mission of policing

the outer portions of the Empire, by landing detachments specially trained in shore operations,

for the preservation of British lives and interests during disturbances on shore, or for carrying

out small punitive expeditions.94 Even in the late 1930s by which time the threats posed by

both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had become apparent, imperial defence remained a

major concern in British military thought. Imperial police work carried out by ships landing

parties were featured in lectures at the Royal Naval Staff College as late as 1936,95whilst

books such as Major General H. Rowan-Robinsons Imperial Defence: A Problem in Four

89Ibid., p. 200.90Ibid.,p. 209.91Anon., Naval Landing Parties, Naval Review, XIX/4 (November 1931), p. 696.92For examples, see Anon., Naval Landing Parties, Naval Review, XIX/4 (November 1931), 694-698; Anon.,The Bluejacket Landing Party, Naval Review, XX/1 (February 1932), pp. 58-66;93TNA, ADM 1/8664/134, Memorandum B, 28 September 1923, pp. 6-7.94TNA, ADM 1/8664/134, Committee on the Corps of Royal Marines. Report, 6 August 1924, p. 10.95NMM, Captain Richard Oliver-Bellasis papers, BEL/151, Aids to the Civil Power, Precis of Lecture, Lt. ColonelK. M. Loch, 9 November 1936.


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Dimensions (1938) continued to examine this aspect of British defence policy, including the

role of amphibious operations within it.96Nevertheless, it is clear that during the interwar period

amphibious operations were viewed not only as having been a feature of the past for use in

the capture of new territories, but as also a vital part in maintaining them. As one anonymous

commentator in the Naval Reviewput it: The co-operation of the navy and army in combined

operations is mainly responsible for the vastness of the British Empire, and will be responsible

for its retention and defence in the future.97

Of all the many and varied colonies of the British Empire, the newly acquired Middle

Eastern territories were perhaps the most troublesome in the eyes of British defence planners.

In November 1924 Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond had expressed concern over the threat

which Persia and Iraqi nationalists, or the Soviet Union through subversive activities, posed to

both the newly acquired Mandate of Iraq and the Anglo-Iranian oilfields in the Persian Gulf. If

these oilfields, of vital importance to both the navy and the British Empire as a whole, were

taken, Richmond believed that they would have to be retaken by a major amphibious operation

involving all three services.

98

Britains interests in the Middle and Near East stretched beyond

her colonies however. Neither the armistices of 1918 nor the subsequent peace treaties signed

by the Central Powers ended British active service against other nations, with Turkey being a

particular target of British aggression. During the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923)

the Royal Navy both assisted with the Greek landings at Smyrna in May 1919,99and conducted

a number of their own minor landings, both opposed and unopposed, in June 1920 in order to

prevent Turkish Nationalist forces from threatening the sea-route through the Dardanelles, the

Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus.100Although an armistice was signed in October 1922 and

the Treaty of Lausanne established peace in 1923, Turkey remained a potential hotbed for

96H. Rowan-Robinson, Imperial Defence: A Problem in Four Dimensions (London, 1938), pp. 111-115.97Anon., Review of The Army and Sea Power, Naval Review, XVI/1 (February 1928), p. 163.98Richmond to Keyes, 14 November 1924, Volume 121 - The Keyes Papers Vol. II: 1919-1938, Publications ofthe Navy Records Society(1980), pp. 105-106.99Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. 1 (London, 1968), pp. 183-185.100For a first-hand account of a number of these operations from an unnamed British naval officer, see Anon.,Some British Naval Operations against the Turkish Nationalists, Naval Review, XII/4 (November 1924), pp. 619-633.


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conflict with Britain; the 1924-1926 Mosul crisis prompting another reconsideration of

amphibious utility when discussions were undertaken over whether or not it would be possible

to conduct amphibious landings in either western Anatolia or European Turkey if the crisis

escalated into war.101

As much as colonial pacification and the protection of British interests in the Middle and

Near East were the major concerns of British defence planning for much of the early interwar

period, as far as the Royal Navy in the 1920s was concerned the most likely rival to Britain in

the foreseeable future would be Imperial Japan. Although Britain had been in a formal alliance

with Japan since 1902 and both nations had fought on the same side during the First World

War, from its conclusion Japan was increasingly regarded as themajor naval threat to Britains

possessions and interests in Asia.102The greatest challenge that Britain was likely to face in

this endeavour would be one of logistics. Neither Hong Kong nor the as of yet uncompleted

naval base at Singapore were near enough to Japanese home waters for a fleet to operate

there, most British war plans focussing on the defeat of the Japanese battle fleet followed by

the implementation of a blockade.

103

The solution was to devise a method for rapidly

establishing a base nearer to the area of operations to provide suitable anchorages for fuelling,

minor repairs, and resupply.104

This led to the development of war plans which relied on the ability of the fleet to first

secure a suitable site for a temporary naval base and then to begin the construction of one,

known as Mobile Naval Bases.105 As there was no guarantee that the area in which they

wished to construct one would be in friendly territory, and the most likely territory being the

Japanese-controlled Ryukyu Islands,106 it was acknowledged that amphibious landings,

101 Paul Halpern, Volume 158 The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, 1919-1929, Publications of the NavyRecords Society(2011), pp. 457-460.102Andrew Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939: Planning for War against Japan (London,2004), pp. 1-16.103Douglas Ford, A Statement of Hopes? The Effectiveness of US andBritish naval war plans against Japan,1920-1941, Mariners Mirror, 101/1 (February 2015), p. 70.104Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, pp. 53-71.105Ibid., pp. 160-164.106Ibid., p. 65.


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possibly in the face of hostile forces, would be necessary in order to construct and defend

such a base. 107 Those proposing the creation of an organisation to carry out this work

envisioned it as a distinct tactical unit of the fleet,108composed mainly of Royal Marines and

a naval labour force, and as such these operations were viewed as entirely naval rather than

combined. Nevertheless, there was consideration over the potential need to work with the

army if the intended area was well defended.109The other major scenario considered for a war

between Britain and Japan also featured an important amphibious element. In this scenario it

was supposed that the Japanese would strike first and capture either Hong Kong or Singapore,

and before the war could be taken to Japanese home waters, they would have to be

recaptured.110Many of both the field and paper exercises on amphibious operations during

the interwar period were devised around this scenario.111

However, when viewing the wider, less specific debates about the utility of amphibious

operations during the interwar period, it is their use for the acquisition of advanced naval

bases, as in the first scenario for a war against Japan, which appear to have been the main

consideration. Writing in the Naval Review, Lieutenant C. H. Drage advocated the need for

advanced bases to facilitate continuous activity and to economise force and stated that they

will almost always have to be seized during war, often against opposition; and the progress

of the naval or of the general campaign may render their seizure absolutely essential to its

further prosecution.112In their book The Army and Sea Power (1927), Majors R. B. Pargiter

and H.G. Eady largely examined the role of amphibious operations either to establish

advanced bases for ships or to attack enemy naval bases,113

although given that this works

intention was to argue that the army had an important role to play in the growth and

107TNA, ADM 116/2335, Organisation of Mobile Naval Bases, n.d. [c.1920], p. 2.108Ibid., p. 10.109TNA, ADM 116/2335, Walker to multiple recipients, 14 July 1926.110Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, pp. 76-83.111Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. 1, pp. 538-540. For specific paper exercises based on thisscenario, see NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (10), Combined Operations,Camberley, 1925, n.d.; NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/8 (6), Scheme 44, FarEastern Situation, 2 June 1925; NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/8 (7),

Combined Operations, Appreciation of the Naval Situation, January 28 thMDCCCCXXV, 26 February 1925.112C.H. Drage, Land Operations in Maritime Warfare, Naval Review, XI/2 (May 1923), p. 218.113R. B. Partiger and H. G. Eady, The Army and Sea Power (London, 1927), pp. 193, 206-212.


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maintenance of British sea power rather than considering the impact of sea power on the

conduct of the army,114this is understandable.

The other major role that appears to have been given to amphibious operations during

the interwar period was for the construction of air bases close enough to an enemys own

forces or vital regions for the conduct of an independent bombing campaign.115The twice

yearly exercises held at Camberley were all tri-service affairs and, whilst the ways in which

amphibious operations could be of use to the implementation of either naval or military strategy

is immediately obvious, the extent to which they would benefit a predominantly aerial strategy

was less so. In part due to the need to justify its existence as an independent service, the RAF

in the interwar period came to regard strategic bombing as its main mission in the event of

war and although the air force could realistically carry out this function against enemy targets

within range of its existing bases, beyond this range such an aerial strategy would be

impracticable.116As such, within the RAF the possibility of rapidly creating a new base nearer

to the area of operations, very similar in many respects to the navys plans for Mobile Naval

Bases, became a concern when examining joint warfare with the other services. As with

Mobile Naval Bases, there was a strong chance that in order to construct them there would

have to be an amphibious landing on a potentially hostile shore. Although this was considered

an impractical plan against an enemy who possessed a modern air force within range which

had not already been neutralised or in a territory with strong opposition on the ground, it was

seen as a possible measure against less industrialised or powerful enemies.117On both a

number of the field exercises, and in many of the paper exercises carried out during the

interwar period, the main objective of the landing was to capture, secure and hold an area

114Ibid., pp. 9-11.115Richard Harding, Amphibious Warfare, 1930-1939, pp. 52-53.116For an overview of the development of independent air strategies within the RAF, see Phillip S. Meilinger,Trenchard and "Morale Bombing": The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II, Journal ofMilitary History,60/2 (April 1996), pp. 243-270. For one more specifically related to the use of airpower forpolicing and pacifying colonies, see James S. Corum, Colonial Air Control: The Europeans Develop NewConcepts of Air Warfare, in James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson (eds.),Airpower in Small Wars: FightingInsurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence, 2003), pp. 51-86.117TNA, ADM 116/2086, Report on Combined Naval and Military Exercise, 1919,W. H. Anderson, n.d.,Annexure 1; NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (4), Combined Operations (AirAspect), n.d. [c1925].


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large enough to construct and defend an air base to conduct an independent bombing

campaign.118

In spite of this new aerial consideration, discussions on the utility of amphibious

operations appear to have been dominated by the concerns of the navy over those of the other

two services, something that becomes apparent when examining the revised editions of the

Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, which are now Admiralty publications

rather than War Office publications.In the first of these to be produced during the interwar

period, renamed the Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), we begin

to see considerably more thought given to the question of the utility of amphibious operations

than in the pre-war editions. It asserts that as an island nation, unless the army is to take a

purely defensive role in a future conflict, co-operation with the navy is essential and that if a

friendly port within the theatre of operations is not available for disembarkation, be it an ally or

colony, an amphibious operation would be the sole means of bringing the army to the

enemy.119 Equally it echos Corbetts views on the limitations of naval power alone and

emphasises the importance of amphibious capability to the maintenance of the Empire.

120

Whilst there was little advancement on ideas concerning the utility of amphibious operations

in the following two editions of the Manual,121the 1938 edition demonstrates a marked leap in

examining the utility of amphibious operations. Many of the concepts brought up in the interwar

period are mentioned, including the ability of amphibious operations to provide an attacking

force with increased mobility and surprise, the ability to police and defend the Empire, to

conduct minor raids against valuable targets, theatre entry landings, landings to acquire the

118For examples, see TNA, ADM 116/3395, Report on Landing Operations 1934, n.d.; NMM, Vice AdmiralThomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (4), Combined Operations (Air Aspect), n.d. [c1925]; NMM, ViceAdmiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (10), Combined Operations, Camberley, 1925, Generaldescription of the operation, n.d., pp. 2-3.119TNA AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), p. 12.120TNA AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), pp. 13-14. It should benoted, however, that from the 1923 edition onwards the manuals dealt with a wider number of joint operations

than just amphibious landings, unlike the previous editions.121TNA, AIR 10/1206, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1925), pp. 13-16; TNA, DEFE2/708, Manual of Combined Operations (1931), pp. 1-6.


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ground on which to construct an air base, and the capture of harbours for advanced naval

bases.122

Yet, despite there being many roles for which amphibious operations were perceived to

have been of use, towards the end of the interwar period the question of whether or not

amphibious operations would be of any use against what were now clearly Britains most likely

foes, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, had yet to be agreed on. Speaking of his experiences

at Greenwich in 1938, Rear Admiral L.E.H. Maund, later the first chairman of the Inter-Services

Training and Development Centre, recalled that:

On a number of occasions during the [Senior Officers] course,strong views about ourunpreparedness to undertake a landing attack of any kind had been voiced. . . . The

view, which was being widely accepted, that we should never need to land on enemy

held territory again was said to be ridiculous: our history told of a long sequence of

landing attacks to capture or recapture places of importance to our strategy.123

Britain certainly was unprepared to undertake amphibious operations at the time, possessing

only nine modern landing craft at the beginning of 1938 and with very little practical experience

among servicemen,124and this would become apparent to everyone following the start of the

Second World War. However, despite a lack of specialist equipment and sufficient training,

the interwar period had seen considerable debate over the details, methods and practicalities

of actually conducting an amphibious operation. These debates would influence the

development of Britains amphibious doctrine during the interwar period, and, in turn, influence

the outcome of Britains amphibious operations during the Second World War.

. . .

122TNA, ADM 186/117, Manual of Combined Operations (1938), pp. 17-19.123L.E.H. Maund,Assault from the Sea (London, 1949), p. 1.124Ibid., pp. 4-5; Fergusson, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations, pp. 35-45.


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The Conduct of Amphibious Operations

As the Gallipoli landings were the largest amphibious operations of the First World War, the

experience of this campaign was the source of most of the interwar debate on the conduct of

amphibious operations, a debate which included those who had been strong advocates of

amphibious warfare before the start of the war.125Two of the three major pre-war theorists of

amphibious warfare, Aston and Callwell, published their opinions of what the causes of failure

were at Gallipoli in 1919, whilst Corbett was responsible for covering them in the official history

of the Royal Navys role in the First World War. Corbetts contribution to the post-war debate

on the Gallipoli campaign, found in Volume II of Naval Operations (1920-1923),126 was

primarily focused on the naval aspect of the campaign and provided little in the way of outright

criticism of any of the parties involved in the endeavour.127Although expressing concerns over

the high number of casualties which were inflicted upon the landing forces, he believed that

they now possessed an unparalleled feat to [their] credit a feat accomplished in the face of

every difficulty that delay, inadequate means and a well-prepared enemy could place in the

way of success.128That feat was the ability to land and establish a beachhead under fire from

an enemy who had prepared for their arrival, something which many commentators before the

First World War had considered to be an impossibility in modern warfare.129

One such sceptic of the feasibility of successfully conducting an opposed landing before

the war was Callwell, whose analysis of the campaign, entitled The Dardanelles,130

was

published in 1919. In addition to being a major proponent of amphibious warfare before the

First World War, Callwell also served as the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at

125For an overview of the impact of the Gallipoli campaign on British amphibious development during the interwarperiod, see Speller, In the Shadow of Gallipoli?, pp. 137-145.126Julian Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol. 2 (London, 1921).127Unlike his analysis of the Battle of Jutland in the following volume which was posthumously published with adisclaimer from the navy disputing his conclusions. See J. J. Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy, pp. 20-21.128Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol. 2, p. 347.129Bloch, Is War Now Impossible?, pp. 117-120; Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, pp.359-360.130C. E. Callwell, The Dardanelles (Boston and New York, 1919).


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the War Office from August 1914 until January 1916,and as a result was himself involved in

part with planning the conduct of the campaign.131Although the book is largely narrative, the

final chapter focuses on what he considered to have been the outstanding lessons of the

campaign.132

The first lesson which Callwell covers, and the one which he considered to be the most

essential, is the importance of planning and forethought, something which he also links to the

need to select objectives based on available means rather than potential results, and the role

of politicians in influencing or dictating strategy.133The second lesson that Callwell points to is

the greater difficulty posed to the attacking force during an amphibious landing due to the

increased sizes of modern armies: in these days, when whole nations take to the field and

when armies consequently muster as vast multitudes, command of the sea cannot be turned

to account to such good purpose in connection with land operations as was formerly the

case.134 He argued that large scale amphibious operations were likely to fail in any future

conflict due to the likelihood of the defending armies being larger than those conducting the

landing and that even if there was no opposition on the beach, enemy troops could still be

concentrated in the area of operations with great speed, although he believed that smaller

scale raids were likely to still be practicable due to their limited nature. 135Similar concerns

were also expressed by Sir Herbert Richmond.136 The other major lessons which Callwell

claimed had been taught by the Gallipoli campaign, some of which will be covered in more

detail later, were the need for advanced bases near the intended landing site; the impact that

the submarine would now have on amphibious operations; the ineffectiveness of naval gunfire

during the campaign; the need to secure a large area immediately after landing; and the need

for immediate reserves to replace casualties.137

131T. R. Moreman, Callwell, Sir Charles Edward (18591928), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford,2004), online edition, January 2008:www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32251 [accessed 19 Dec 2015].132Callwell, The Dardanelles, pp. 332-347.133Ibid.,p. 335.134Ibid.,p. 335.135Ibid., p. 336.136Herbert Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World(London, 1934), pp. 173-174.137Callwell, The Dardanelles, pp. 337-347.
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Astons views on the causes of the failure at Gallipoli were published in 1919 as part of

his larger examination of the lessons of the First World War entitled War Lessons, New and

Old.138As with Callwell, he considered political interference with military and naval strategy to

have been the greatest cause of failure, the entire campaign being in his view a distraction

from the most important task of the war, the defeat of the German army and the destruction of

the German fleet.139On the landings themselves, he believed that many of the difficulties could

have been avoided through a greater use of deceptive measures such as feints,140and greater

rapidity in both decision and action, considering speed to be the all-important factor in all

amphibious operations.141

Aston saw both the political nature of the decision to force the straits and lack of rapidity

of either decision or action as jointly responsible for the greatest blunder of the campaign:

attempting to force the straits by naval power alone without having an amphibious force held

in reserve to attempt a landing as soon as the first method had failed. It was the delay between

the initial attack on 18 March 1915, which Aston saw largely as the result of political

interference in strategy, which allowed for the defending forces to reinforce the areas around

the straits and prepare defences in the knowledge that this would be the area most likely to

be attacked.142In Astons own words, as secrecy was impossible, rapidity of decision and of

action was of vital importance. Every day allowed to the enemy for perfecting his preparations

would add to the difficulties in landing the army in the face of opposition. 143On whether or not

the Gallipoli campaign had proved opposed landings to be impracticable, his views were

similar to those of Corbett, believing that the landings had in fact proven that it was possible

to land troops on and capture a defended beach, even if they had then failed to advance

further inland.144 Yet although the Gallipoli campaign was to remain the focus of British

138George Aston, War Lessons, New and Old (London, 1919).139Ibid., pp.55-56. Further criticism on how political interference with strategy led to the failure of the Dardanellescampaign can also be found in NMM, Admiral Sir Arthur Malcolm Peters papers, PET/7 (2), Precis of lecture onCombined OperationsThe Army Point of View, Col. Mayer, 15 May 1930, p. 1.140Aston, War Lessons, New and Old, p. 76.141Ibid., p. 71.142Ibid., pp. 67-75.143Ibid., p. 69.144Ibid., pp. 76-78.


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analysis on amphibious operations during the interwar period, there were many new

challenges to the successful execution of an amphibious landing that had not been present at

Gallipoli yet would be the subject of interwar debates on the issue, including recent

developments in naval and aerial warfare.

The first consideration for whether or not an amphibious operation is practicable is

whether or not it is possible to transport the landing force and supporting ships to the desired

landing site.145 Although the Royal Navy had managed to maintain almost complete sea

control outside of the Dardanelles Straits in 1915,146two weapons which had appeared shortly

before the war would come to dramatically alter the conduct of naval warfare and the ability to

safely transport troops, namely the submarine and the aeroplane. As Callwell remarked on

the dangers posed by the former, It has always been recognised that the transport of troops

across the seas during hostilities is in principle only permissible if the state carrying out the

operation enjoys maritime command; but so long as opposing submarines are about, maritime

command is necessarily relative and cannot be complete.147Although the Royal Navy had

managed to overcome the threat posed by the German unrestricted submarine campaign

against merchant shipping in 1917-1918,148the danger posed to an amphibious expeditionary

force was still a major concern, for the loss of even a single troopship could jeopardise the

operation.149 The main assumption remained, as it had before the war,150 that the safest

measure was to sail the troopships in convoy with a suitably strong escort, something which

experience in protecting merchant ships from submarine attack had reinforced.151

145Speller and Tuck,Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics, pp. 39-45.146Although there were a small number of isolated torpedo attacks on allied ships anchored off the Gallipolipeninsular later on in the campaign, they were not sufficient enough to dramatically alter the navys ability toassist the army onshore. See Lawrence Sondhaus, The Great War at Sea(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 181-182.147Callwell, The Dardanelles, p. 339.148For an overview of how the German submarine campaign of the First World War was overcome , seeSondhaus, The Great War at Sea, pp. 241-278.149Speller and Tuck,Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics, p. 39.150Although he had been sceptical about the use of escorted convoys for protecting merchant shipping before

the First World War, Corbett had still advocated that they be used for protecting the troopships of an amphibiousexpedition. See Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 259-260.151TNA, ADM 203/61, Military Sea Transport. General Principles, H. Stansbury, 1 October 1921, p. 11.


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The submarine, along with the aeroplane, also contributed in part to greater Corbettian

influences in British amphibious theory and doctrine. Prior to the start of the First World War,

Corbett had argued that the conventional understanding of command of the sea as being

absolute was erroneous, that its only practical meaning was the control of the sea lines of

communication, and that this control was rarely absolute and could be either permanent or

temporary, local or general.152When reading many of the interwar discussion on amphibious

operations, it becomes clear that Corbetts ideas are becoming far more accepted.153Both this

changing understanding of the nature of command of the sea, and understanding of the

importance which air power would have to play in future amphibious operations would later be

reflected in British interwar amphibious doctrine. Whilst the 1913 Manual of Combined Naval

and Military Operations had merely stated that command of the sea,was a requisite for

conducting an amphibious landing, the 1923 edition reflects a changing understanding of what

this means, instead stating the need for a certain degree of control both by sea and air of the

sea lines of communication, and in the case of opposed landings, local command of the sea

and air superiority.154

The importance that air power would now have on the conduct of amphibious operations

was recognised early on. The very first page of the Camberley report from 1919 argued that

all three services would now have to be involved in the planning and execution of such

operations, rather than just the army and navy.155 Aircraft posed both challenges and

opportunities to a force wishing to land on a hostile coast. In defence, aircraft were able to

provide reconnaissance of the enemys approach; contest the enemys efforts at gaining air

superiority; attack transports, escorting warships and store-ships both prior to and during the

landing; attack troops on the beach or the landing craft transporting them there; and provide

152Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 77-92.153For example, see NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (6), CombinedOperations, I-III, Lt. Colonel Foster, n.d. [c1924-1925], p. 1; NMM, Admiral Sir Arthur Malcolm Peters papers,PET/7 (2), Precis of lecture on Combined Operations The Army Point of View, Col. Mayer, 15 May 1930, p. 3.154TNA, WO 33/644 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (1913), p. 7; TNA, AIR 2/1059 Manual

of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), p. 13.155TNA, ADM 116/2086, Report on Combined Naval and Military Exercise, 1919, W. H. Anderson, n.d., p. 1. Formore information on the report, see page 17 of this work.


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artillery observation for batteries firing on any of the former.156 The difficulties posed by

attempting a landing against an enemy who possessed an air force were immense, as even if

a force was landed on an undefended beach, the speed at which the defenders air forces

could reinforce and concentrate in the landing area could still threaten the entire operation.157

These were the challenges which led to an emphasis on the need to gain air superiority, if not

outright air supremacy, in British amphibious theory and doctrine during the interwar period.

All interwar editions of the Manual of Combined Operations stated the need to gain air

superiority before the landing commences.158If the intended landing site was close enough to

an already established British airbase, this was relatively straight forward. However, if not, this

would cause major difficulties, as the consensus at the time was that land-based aircraft would

always possess an advantage over carrier or other sea-based aircraft.159As one contributor

to the Journal of the Royal United Services Institutionexplained it:

The aeroplanes which are most powerful in relation to their weight are those equipped

to work from land aerodromes. On the other hand, aircraft carriers are very vulnerable

to attack, both from the air and sea; and seaplanes, flying boats and amphibians, and

aeroplanes launched from aircraft carriers and other warships, all suffer from

disabilities, either as to speed, ceiling or hardiness. Nevertheless, they have to be

employed unless the coast of the assailant, or other land in his possession, is in close

proximity to that of the defender. Therefore, plane for plane, the defender will

generally have over his adversary an advantage which will go far to cancel any

numerical superiority the latter may possess, and this advantage will naturally grow in

proportion to the length of the assailants stroke.160

Once air superiority had been gained, however, the attackers aircraft could then be employed

in assisting the landing by attacking the enemys troops and communications, observing for

naval gunfire, and conducting further reconnaissance of enemy movements.161 The new

156NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (4), Combined Operations (Air Aspect),n.d. [c1925], pp. 1-2.157NMM, Admiral Sir Arthur Malcolm Peters papers, PET/7 (2), The Air Aspect of Combined Operations, GrpCaptain Banatt, 13 May 1930, p. 1.158TNA, AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923), pp. 14 -15; TNA, AIR10/1206, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1925), pp. 12-13; TNA, DEFE 2/708, Manualof Combined Operations (1931), pp. 4-5; TNA, ADM 186/117, Manual of Combined Operations (1938), pp. 120-121.159Geoffrey Till,Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Survey(London, 1979), pp. 68-70.160H. Rowan-Robinson, The Role of Aircraft in Coast Defence, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution,

75/499 (1930), p. 474.161NMM, Vice Admiral Thomas Hope Troubridge papers, TRO/401/5 (4), Combined Operations (Air Aspect),n.d. [c1925], pp. 1-2.


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importance given to the aerial aspect of British amphibious doctrine is evident from the

decision to retitle the publication as the Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations

for both the 1923 and 1925 editions.162

As much of a challenge as aircraft posed to amphibious operations, they were not the

only concern for advocates of amphibious warfare the problems of assaulting a defended

beach still remained and at this time there were doubts in some circles as to whether or not a

successful opposed landing was still possible in modern warfare. These views have been

magnified by some historians,163yet are better understood as either just one side of a dispute

rather than a consensus, or as comment on current capability, rather than on what would be

possible within the foreseeable future if advances in training, doctrine or materiel were made.

One such historian, David Macgregor, argued in his 1992 article The Use, Miss-use and Non-

Use of History: The Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons of the First World War, that the

British armed forces during the interwar period focused almost entirely on conducting

unopposed night landings, that they placed an over-emphasis on the need for secrecy, and

that they believed that landings which were either opposed or were conducted in daylight

would be impossible, something which he believed held British amphibious capability back

prior to the start of the Second World War.164 Although it is certainly true that unopposed

landings were seen almost unanimously as preferable to opposed landings, to claim that

opposed landings were ignored, or that efforts to examine the possibility of reducing expected

opposition and ensure secrecy were wasteful or counterproductive, would be a mistake.

Following the Camberley exercise in 1919 there was certainly doubt as to Britains ability

to conduct opposed landings with the available equipment and doctrine. For instance, the

commandant of the Naval Staff College, Admiral Reginald Drax, opined that: It is very possible

162TNA, AIR 2/1059, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1923); TNA AIR 10/1206, Manualof Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations (1925).163See Fergusson, The Watery Maze; Marder, The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal Navy and theLessons of 1914-1918; Adrian R. Lewis, Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Chapel Hill and London, 2001), pp.

34-56.164David MacGregor, The Use, Miss-use and Non-Use of History: The Royal Navy and the Operational Lessonsof the First World War, Journal of Military History, 56/4 (October 1992), pp. 603-616.


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that science and careful preparation will provide in the future the requirements needed for

success, but there is little doubt that we are not in possession of those essentials at the present

time.165But a pessimistic opinion

Dissertation - The Development of British Amphibious Theory and Doctrine during the Interwar Period

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Transcript of Dissertation - The Development of British Amphibious Theory and Doctrine during the Interwar Period