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TitleSocial Learning, Social Control, and Strain Theories: A Formalization of Micro-level Criminological Theories

Permalinkhttps://escholarship.org/uc/item/20p8s027

AuthorProctor, Kristopher Ryan

Publication Date2010 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIARIVERSIDE

Social Learning, Social Control, and Strain Theories: A Formalization of Micro-level Criminological Theories

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfactionof the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sociology

by

Kristopher Ryan Proctor

August 2010

Dissertation Committee: Dr. Austin Turk, Chairperson Dr. Jonathan H. Turner Dr. Kirk Williams

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Copyright byKristopher Ryan Proctor

2010

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The Dissertation of Kristopher Ryan Proctor is approved:

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________ Committee Chairperson

University of California, Riverside

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ACKNOWELDGEMENTS

This dissertation represents the culmination of years of training, and I can not claim

sole responsibibility for its production or completion. I would like to thank the members

of my disseration committee - Austin Turk, Jonathan Turner, and Kirk Williams - for all

their invaluable comments and advice during the dissertation process. I would also like to

acknowledge Steven Brint, Robert Hanneman, Peter Burke, Robert Nash Parker, and Jan

Stets for their mentorship during my tenure as a graduate student at UCR. Without the

infl uences of all these faculty members, this dissertation would not have been possible.

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DEDICATIONS

This dissertation is dedicated to Catherine Rippergerger and my parents. I would

like to thank Catherine for her love and support throughout all of graduate school and all

of our zany adventures. I would like to thank my parents, Jerry and Elizabeth Proctor, for

bringing me into this world and supporting me at each step on the seemingly endless stair-

way to my doctorate.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Social Learning, Social Control, and Strain Theories: A Formalization of Micro-level Criminological Theories

by

Kristopher Ryan Proctor

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in SociologyUniversity of California, Riverside, August 2010

Dr. Austin T. Turk, Chairperson

This dissertation proposes theoretical formalization as a way of enhancing theory devel-

opment within criminology. Differential association, social learning, social control, and

general strain theories are formalized in order to identify assumptions of human nature,

key theoretical concepts, theoretical knowledge claims, and scope conditions. The result-

ing formalization allows greater comparability between theories in terms of explanatory

power, and additionally provides insights into integration and elaboration as forms of

theory development.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction……........………………………………………………….…………1 The Integration/Elaboration Debate.....................................................................2

Sociological Theory Formalization........................................................................4

Proposed Theoretical Method................................................................................7

Proposed Formalization of Criminological Theory...........................................10

Theory Evaluation.................................................................................................13

Conclusion..............................................................................................................16

Chapter 2 Differential Association Theory………........…………………………….……..18

Theoretical Overview............................................................................................19

Assumptions of Human Nature............................................................................20

Theoretical Restatement.......................................................................................26 Scope Conditions...................................................................................................35

Conclusion..............................................................................................................37

Theoretical Restatement.......................................................................................38

Chapter 3 Social Learning Theory………..……........……………………………………..41

Assumptions of Human Nature...........................................................................42

Theoretical Formalization....................................................................................45

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Scope Conditions...................................................................................................58 Conclusion..............................................................................................................59

Theoretical Restatment........................................................................................60

Chapter 4 Social Control Theory…………........……………………………….………..…63

Assumptions of Human Nature...........................................................................64

Theoretical Formalization....................................................................................66

Scope Conditions...................................................................................................75

Conclusion..............................................................................................................77

Theoretical Restatment........................................................................................78

Chapter 5 General Strain Theory………........…………………………………….……….81

Assumptions of Human Nature...........................................................................82

Theoretical Formalization....................................................................................87 Theoretical Ambiguities and Tautologies...........................................................96 Integrative Tautologies.......................................................................................103

Scope Conditions.................................................................................................107

Conclusion............................................................................................................108

Theoretical Restatment.......................................................................................110

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Chapter 6 Theory Evaluation……...................................……………………….……..….113

Human Nature and Scope Conditions...............................................................113

Explanan and Explanatory Power.....................................................................126

Theoretical Explanandum..................................................................................133

Conclusion...........................................................................................................135

Chapter 7: Conclusion…………….......………………………………….…………...138

References…………………………………………………………………..………….150

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Figures Figure 1.1: Cohen’s Theoretical Model................................................................8

Figure 2.1: Differential Association Theory.......................................................27

Figure 3.1: Parsimonious Social Learning Theory Model................................46

Figure 3.2: Detailed Social Learning Theory Model.........................................56

Figure 4.1: Social Contol Theoretical Model.....................................................67

Figure 4.2: Generalized Social Contol Theoretical Model ..............................74

Figure 5.1: General Strain Theory......................................................................88

Figure 5.2: Conceptual Overlap Among General Strain Theory Concepts.............................................................................................97

Figure 5.3: Conceptual Overlap Between General Strain Theory Concepts and Social Control and Social Learning Theory Concepts...............................................................................102

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Tables Table 6.1: Scope Conditions of Formalized Criminological Theories............118

Table 6.2: Summary of Explanan of Formalized Theories.............................127 Table 6.3: Summary of Explananda of Formalized Theories.........................132

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The late 1970s and the entire 1980s was an era of great theoretical concern for

criminologists. With a perceived failure of criminological theory to account for suffi cient

variation in crime, Elliot and his colleagues (1979) proposed an integration of learning,

control, and strain theories in order to better explain delinquency. Following this integra-

tive effort, criminologists began to seriously debate the nature of theory development in

criminology. While many supported integrative efforts (e.g., Bernard 1989, 2001; Ber-

nard and Snipes 1996; Elliot, Ageton, and Canter 1979; Short 1979, 1985), others argued

that theoretical integration was a poor mode of theory development because integrated

theories would inevitably lack logical consistency since they tended to have contradic-

tory assumptions (e.g., Hirschi 1979, 1989; Liska, Krohn, and Messner 1989; Thornberry

1989).

The purpose of this dissertation will be to promote a yet untapped method of al-

lowing for cumulative theory development in criminology. With the exception of DeFleur

and Quinney (1966), no effort to formalize existing criminological theory has been made,

and doing so could greatly enable criminologists to better assess criminological theory

prior to engaging in integration or elaboration. Working towards this end, and priori to

engaging in any theoretical formalizations, four issues will be discussed that are relevant

to theoretical development within criminology. First, an overview will be provided of the

integration/elaboration debate that occurred within criminology. This debate surrounded

whether criminological theories could be integrated, or instead should be elaborated

because integration was not seen by some as a satisfactory mode of theory development.

Second, theoretical formalization will be discussed in order to articulate its meaning. As

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there are many ways a theory can be formalized, it is important to review the various

ways theories can be stated before selecting a theoretical method for formalizing crimino-

logical theories. Third, an approach to formalizing criminological theories will be de-

tailed that focuses on differential association, social learning, social control, and general

strain theories. Since these theories have been at the center of the integration/elaboration

debate, they serve as an excellent starting point to begin formalizing criminological theo-

ries. Fourth, a method for evaluating theory will be discussed that assesses theory based

upon theoretical and empirical criteria.

The Integration/Elaboration Debate

Perceiving theoretical stagnation in criminology, Elliot, Ageton, and Canter

(1979) proposed an integration of anomie, control, and learning theories in order to maxi-

mize explanatory power when attempting to explain delinquency. The basic model held

that variables associated with anomie theory were most remote to delinquency and that

control and learning theory variables moderated the effects of anomie on crime. While

Short (1979) was generally supportive of the effort, Hirschi (1979) was not. Hirschi

identifi ed several modes of theory integration, but ultimately concluded that no mode of

integration is appropriate because the theories being integrated inevitably contain contra-

dictory assumptions and such efforts necessarily violate them. In Hirschi’s view, theo-

retical competition was healthy and integrative efforts were to be avoided. Elliot (1985)

defended the use of integration and noted that theories are constantly changing and being

adapted for new uses. He further argued that theoretical competition was a failure, an ob-

servation later echoed by others (e.g., Bernard 1989, 2001; Bernard and Snipes 1996), by

noting that crucial tests have been largely ineffective in resolving theoretical competition.

He also observed that most criminological theories were really a handful of variables ex-

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plaining only particular aspects of crime and that these theories were perhaps more aptly

identifi ed as hypotheses.

The debate culminated in a conference where criminologists attempted to sort out

how theoretical development should occur. The resulting conference, and the edited book

it produced, did little to resolve the debate. While some preferred theoretical elaboration

over integration (e.g., Hirschi 1989; Liska, Krohn, and Messner 1989; Thornberry 1989),

others maintained their support for integration (e.g., Akers 1989; Short 1989; Bernard

1989). Those preferring theoretical elaboration maintained their concern for logical con-

sistency in theory, while those favoring integrative efforts stood strong in their position

that different theories were really operating at different levels of analysis and that many

of the assumptions preventing integration were really unnecessary in the fi rst place.

Throughout the integration debate several issues proved central. The initial is-

sue was whether competing theories with contradictory assumptions could be logically

joined. Hirschi (1979, 1989) was the most vocal critic of integrative efforts and argued

that criminological theory had evolved out of an “oppositional tradition” in which theo-

ries were explicitly formulated to contradict rival theories. Since these theories were

contradictory, crucial tests could be devised and as a result the pool of competing theories

could be reduced. Akers (1989) disagreed with this perspective and argued that many

of the assumptions being discussed surrounding human nature were unnecessary to their

respective theories. If these assumptions were truly unnecessary, it only followed that

they could be eliminated and integration efforts could proceed. A second issue was that

differing levels of analysis complicated the “oppositional tradition” because theories were

explaining different aspects of crime at different levels of analysis (Short 1985, 1989).

Under this view, since theories were explaining crime at different levels of analysis they

were not really in competition with one another and assumptions bearing on theories at

one level of analysis had little to do with theories being specifi ed at another level.

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As integrationists and those favoring the “oppositional theory” were largely talk-

ing past one another, a third view on the matter was presented which largely fell upon

deaf ears. Jack P. Gibbs (1972, 1985, 1989) had long argued that the major problem

with sociological and criminological theory was that it was formulated discursively. As

a result of the informality in which theory was communicated, defi nitions and relation-

ships presented within theories were often ambiguous and such theories often proved

untestable. Meier (1985b) had also begun to emphasize this concern by gathering several

criminologists to write on the issue of theoretical methods. Meier (1985a) himself noted

that within criminology it was particularly diffi cult to train criminologists in theoretical

methods because they tend to have highly substantive interests. Despite the interest of

others in theoretical methods, Gibbs remained rather pessimistic about the prospects of

formal theory and remarked, “Should an imaginative criminologist realize a formal state-

ment of Sutherland, Merton, and Hirschi that promotes defensible tests, there might be no

accolades” (1989: 48).

Regardless of Gibbs’ prophetic warning, it is the intent of this dissertation to pre-

cisely realize a formal statement of “oppositional tradition” theories in an effort to pro-

vide another tool in assisting theory development in criminology. Prior to attempting such

an effort, it is fi rst important to discuss formal theory in more detail.

Sociological Theory Formalization

If criminological theory is to be advanced through formalization, it is necessary to

specify what formalization entails. While there is no agreement as to how theory should

be formalized (Gibbs 1972; Hage 1994), at a bare minimum a theory can be considered

formal when it is expressed in terms that are not part of conventional language (Gibbs

1972).

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Turner’s (1991) discussion of theoretical formats is particularly useful when

discussing theory formalization. Turner specifi es three theoretical formats which will

be relevant to this proposed dissertation: (1) axiomatic schemes; (2) formal theoretical

schemes; and (3) analytic models. Ultimately, a hybrid methodology containing elements

of all three schemes will be employed when formalizing criminological theories.

Axiomatic Schemes

Axiomatic theories contain propositional statements that can be hierarchically

ordered, provide defi nitions of concepts that are both abstract and concrete, and pro-

vide scope conditions which specify the types of situations in which the theory is able

to accurately make predictions (Turner 1991). There are many who advocate this mode

of theorizing (e.g., Gibbs 1972, Fararo 1989, Freese 1980). Turner (1991) notes there

are several advantages and disadvantages to axiomatic theory. In terms of advantages,

axiomatic theories tend to be stated abstractly, and as a result have greater explanatory

power. Additionally, the logical connection between concepts in axiomatic theories allows

for the derivation of unanticipated propositions. Despite these strengths, weaknesses of

this approach surround problems associated with the ability to precisely defi ne concepts

or state relationships between concepts within sociology. Additionally, axiomatic theory

requires the control of extraneous variables, and this is something sociology can rarely

adequately perform.

Beyond Turner’s critiques of axiomatic theory, two additional critiques could be

made. First, there is no consensus on what the terms employed by axiomatic theories

mean (Gibbs 1972). Propositions, axioms, hypotheses, and theorems tend to be used

interchangeably. As a result, one wishing to employ such a scheme must either select a

theoretical method from a cornucopia of different methods or create one. Second, since

there is no agreement on what conventions are to be used when engaging in formal theo-

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rizing, the employment of any axiomatic method, regardless of whether it is chosen from

a selection of preexisting methods or generated anew, requires the theorist to: (1) devote

a great deal of effort to specify the method being employed; (2) provide defi nitions of all

the terms used in the method (in addition to defi ning the terms of the theory itself); and

(3) engage in a little wishful thinking that a sociological audience will take the time to

learn the theoretical method in addition to the theory. In short, axiomatic theory creates

a large transaction cost. While it could be argued that things may be different in crimi-

nology, not one of the major theories in criminology is stated in an axiomatic format,

and criminologists in general tend to be more concerned with substantive issues (Meier

1985a).

Formal Theoretical Schemes

The second theoretical scheme discussed by Turner (1991) is formal theory. The-

ories of this type are much like axiomatic schemes in that they entail abstract concepts

and relationships and hope to explain empirical events as instances of a particular law.

They differ from axiomatic schemes in that rather than trying to account for the impact of

extraneous phenomena on a theoretical explanation, propositional schemes instead state

relationships to hold ceteris paribus.

Analytical Models

Analytical models are like path analytical models, except the relationships speci-

fi ed are theoretical rather than empirical (Turner 1991). These models allow for the

visual representation of complex relationships between multiple concepts. Complex

relationships might include causal feedback loops and tend to work well with formal and

axiomatic theory. These models allow for the parsimonious presentation of complex

formalized theory.

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Proposed Theoretical Method

While Turner’s distinction between axiomatic and formal theories is useful, in

reality the distinction between these two types of theories can be blurred; this is particu-

larly the case with Cohen’s (1980, 1989) theoretical method. Cohen’s basic formaliza-

tion scheme consists of knowledge claims, initial condition statements, scope condition

statements, and observational statements that can be specifi ed in simple propositional

terms or in a more elaborate axiomatic format. Within this framework, theories consist

of a number of interconnected knowledge claims, which are propositional statements

between abstract concepts. When translating these statements into empirically testable

observational statements, initial condition statements are employed to link empirical phe-

nomena to corresponding concepts located within the knowledge claim being examined.

Scope condition statements are employed in order to further specify the conditions under

which the knowledge claim is expected to hold true. Rather than engage in a complicated

calculus to formally deduce hypotheses1, Cohen employs a rather simple process for

deriving hypotheses in which initial condition statements specify the epistemic relation-

ship between a concept in the knowledge claim and an empirical term in the observational

statement. This allows for an observational statement to be derived from the knowledge

claim and the knowledge claim to be tested.

Figure 1.1 provides an illustration of Cohen’s model. As evident in the example,

terms within the initial and scope condition statements correspond to concepts contained

within the knowledge claim. Additionally, the empirical terms identifi ed in the initial

and scope condition statements are then used in the operational statement to allow for

the knowledge claim to be tested. Scope conditions also play an important role as they

demarcate the conditions under which the knowledge claim is likely to be verifi ed. While

the derived terms in the initial conditions statement may not adhere to the rigorous deduc-

tive logic advocated by Gibbs (1972), and be more in line with what (Turner 1994) identi-

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Figure 1.1Cohen’s Theoretical Model

Scope Condition: Family is held constant.

Knowledge Claim: The more the family stability the less a person will participate in crime.

Initial conditions: (1) In society x at time y, a marriage is a type of family.

(2) In society x at time y, the number of fi ghts a couple gets into is an example of marital instability.

(3) In society x at time y, driving a car while intoxicated is an instance of a crime.

Observational Statement: In society x at time y, holding family constant, driving while intoxicated will increase with levels of couple fi ghts.

fi es as “folk deductions”, Cohen’s strategy has an advantage over purely formal schemes

in that it allows for a clearer epistemic relationship between a theoretical propositions

and observational statements. This strategy also has an advantage over purely axiomatic

schemes in that it is rather parsimonious and incurs much less of a transaction cost for

those who should wish to learn it.

In terms of criminological theory, this mode of theorizing has tremendous impli-

cations. As noted by countless criminologists (e.g., Akers 1968; Cressey 1951; Gibbs

1965; Jeffery 1959; Quinney 1965; Turk 1964), etiological theories of crime say nothing

about variations that lead to the defi ning of acts to be criminal. Hirschi ([1969] 2005)

defi nes law to be the product of value consensus in control theory2, while others defi ne

law to be the product of confl ict (e.g., Becker 1963; Bonger 1969; Turk 1969; 2001; Vold,

9

Bernard, and Snipes 1998). In criminological theories, defi nitions of crime can be also

be viewed as scope conditions rather than assumptions. This allows for theories to be

elaborated as scope conditions are relaxed. It also allows for future integrative efforts as

relaxed scope conditions no longer serve as a logical barrier to integration.

As previously noted, no consensus exists in terms of what theoretical method is

best to employ when formalizing theory. This being the case, Cohen’s theoretical method

will be combined with the use of analytical models in order to formalize “oppositional

tradition” theories. This selection is appropriate for several reasons. First, theoreti-

cal arguments surrounding the “oppositional tradition” rest on the various assumptions

contained within the theories. Using a purely formal mode of formalization would not

allow for this problem to be addressed because it lacks the ability to translate assumptions

into scope conditions. Second, despite the best efforts of Gibbs, axiomatic theory has

never taken off in criminology or sociology. The transaction costs associated with this

theoretical method are simply too high to expect such an effort to have an impact. Since

this dissertation is intended to help resolve problems in criminological theory develop-

ment, it is also important for the formalizations to be conducted in a manner amenable to

criminologists whose interests lie in substantive theory. Cohen’s model allows for the best

combination of formality and parsimony that is also able to address the problem of con-

tradictory underlying assumptions in criminological theory.

Analytical models will also be employed in order to provide a topology of the

knowledge claims contained within the various theories. While Cohen’s overall theoreti-

cal method can allow for the in-depth analysis of particular knowledge claims, the use of

analytical models can provide a detailed, yet also parsimonious, view of the constellation

of knowledge claims within a theory. In the next section, the use of these methods as they

apply to the “oppositional tradition” will be further specifi ed.

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Proposed Formalization of Criminological Theory

In order to help resolve problems in theoretical integration and cumulative theory

development in criminology, those criminological theories identifi ed to be part of the “op-

positional tradition” will be formalized. Several steps will need to be taken to ensure that

the formalization process results in a system of knowledge claims that adequately refl ect

the relationships specifi ed as part of the original theory. The fi rst step will be to identify

the “oppositional tradition” theories that will be formalized. The following steps will

detail the process of theory formalization.

Theories to Be Formalized

As a result of Elliot, Ageton, and Cantor’s (1979) attempted integration, the three

main theoretical traditions that have been at the heart of the integration/elaboration debate

have been control, anomie, and learning theories. During the debate, the implicit as-

sumptions contained within these theories, as identifi ed by Kornhauser (1978), served as

the basis for denying the possibility of criminological theory integration. When selecting

among “oppositional theories” to be formalized, only those theories that were both part

of the integration/elaboration debate and those theories identifi ed to have contradictory

assumptions by Kornhauser will be included. These theories include differential associa-

tion (Sutherland 1947; Sutherland, Cressey, and Luckenbill 1992), social learning (Akers

1985, 1992; Burgess and Akers 1966), social control (Hirschi [1969] 2004), and general

strain theories (Agnew 1992, 2006). While anomie theory (Merton 1968) originally

represented strain theories within the oppositional tradition, it will be substituted in this

formalization effort with general strain theory because anomie theory is a macrolevel

explanation of deviant behavior and all other theories provide microlevel explanations

of deviant behavior. The use of general strain theory enables theoretical comparison to

focus on only microlevel theories. It is important to compare theories at the same level

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of analysis because theories explaining criminal behavior at disparate levels of analysis

necessarily contain different assumptions as a result of their need to hold phenomena at

other levels of analysis constant to arrive at specifi c predictions.

While these theories have been elaborated over time, it is important to note that

the purpose of this dissertation is not to assess their empirical support or elaborate upon

their historical development. As such, this dissertation will only focus on identifying the

knowledge claims and scope conditions of “oppositional tradition” theories and will not

seek to translate these into observational or initial condition statements. Additionally, no

effort will be made to provide a detailed intellectual history of the theories being formal-

ized. In the case of differential association theory, its intellectual history is explored only

insofar as doing so allows the formalization to contain defi nitions of theoretical concepts.

This is necessary as a result of Sutherland’s failure to provide defi nitions within dif-

ferential association theory. The intent of this dissertation is to formalize these theories

because debates surrounding their knowledge claims and assumptions continue to hinder

cumulative knowledge development in criminology.

Defi ning Key Theoretical Terms

All theories contain concepts that are intended to either explain phenomena or be

explained. Some concepts within a theory serve both functions. For each “oppositional

tradition” theory, the original formulation of the theory will be scoured in order to provide

defi nitions of key concepts. In some cases ambiguities or contradictions may be found

when attempting to formulate defi nitions.

Conceptual defi nitions can also be easily confused with propositions (Gibbs

1972). For example, when Hirschi (1969) specifi es that law is the product of value-

consensus, it unclear if this is a defi nition or an assumption that can be false. In these

cases, the defi nition will be stripped of its propositional component and the propositional

12

aspect will be respecifi ed as a scope condition. While some may argue this takes away

from the spirit of the theory, it is far better to have such an assumption converted into a

scope condition that can potentially be relaxed than to leave it as an assumption which, if

demonstrated to be false, undermines the entire theory.

Identifying Theoretical Propositions

Theories will be closely examined in order to identify key propositions or knowl-

edge claims. These propositions will be formally expressed in an analytical model that

serves the dual function of expressing theoretical propositions and inventorying them.

Additionally, knowledge claims will be stated in a propositional form that also specifi es

the necessary scope conditions in order to establish the conditional nature of particular

theories.

Identifying Scope Conditions

Key to the “oppositional tradition” is the presence of assumptions, with types of

assumptions varying considerably. Some assumptions are used to hold constant pro-

cesses viewed as exogenous to the theory. For example Sutherland (1940), argues that

social disorganization leads to differential associations. Sutherland does not elaborate

on differentiation dynamics within differential association theory, but rather takes these

dynamics to be a given in order to formulate his theory. Unfortunately, the degree to

which societies are differentiated varies tremendously and this could limit the explanatory

power of differential association theory. Rather than call this an assumption, this will

be treated as a scope condition when formalizing differential association theory. Other

types of assumptions run the risk of being overly metaphysical. Assumptions of this kind

tend to focus on human nature or the essence of the law, and run the risk of committing

the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Human nature is neither that of unadulterated

13

self-interest nor perfect malleability. Insofar as a theory specifi es a human nature is being

assumed, this human nature will be treated as a scope condition that acknowledges under-

lying variation within the phenomena. Such assumptions should not be seen as a strength

of a given theory, but rather they should be seen a limitation in the types of propositional

statements it can make. This also holds true for conceptions of law. Control theory, for

example, assumes law to be the product of value-consensus. As a result of this assump-

tion, propositions within control theory are most likely to be upheld: (1) in societies

where law is by and large the product of value consensus; or (2) for those acts which are

legally proscribed on the bases of value-consensus. Lastly, levels of analysis will also be

treated as scope conditions and theories will have their respective levels of analysis speci-

fi ed.

This process of formalization will hopefully shed a great deal of light on the

underpinnings of criminological theory and possibilities for future elaboration and inte-

gration. One way in which this formalization effort can facilitate these possibilities is

through the ability of formalized theory to be assessed utilizing theoretical, as well as em-

pirical, criteria. The next section will discuss how the effort to evaluate these formalized

theories will be undertaken. This will allow for concerns other than “explained variance”

to play a role in theory evaluation.

Theory Evaluation

Elliot, Ageton, and Cantor’s (1979) evaluation of theory based upon explained

variance is but one way to assess the strength of a theory. But this method alone is of

little use. In order for a purely empirical method to be effective, all theories being as-

14

sessed must be specifi ed to explain the exact same phenomena under the exact same

conditions. For example, if one theory is attempting to explain crime in a highly differ-

entiated society, and another theory attempts to explain crime in a society with low levels

of differentiation, then explained variance will not prove useful in assessing the theories

because they are not attempting to explain the same thing under the same conditions. As

a result of this problem, other criteria are required in order to evaluate criminological

theory. Cohen (1989) identifi es explanatory power to be important in assessing theories.

Cohen defi nes explanatory power as follows:

“An explanans, E1, is more powerful, than another explanans, E2, if every ex-planandum for E2 is also an explanandum for E1 and at least one explanandum for E1 is not an explanandum for E2” (1989: 296; italics in original).

Explanatory power, then, is not simply explained variance, but also the number of

different things the theory can explain. As a result, scope conditions are likely to highly

limit the explanatory power of theories. Employing this criterion for the above example

relating to differentiation and crime, a more powerful theory of crime would be a theory

that accurately explains crime in a society regardless of levels of differentiation. The

question of which theory offers a more powerful explanation rests on the degree to which

it is being utilized in a manner consistent with its scope conditions, and how it compares

to other theories that are explaining the same phenomena.

Evaluating theories in terms of theoretical explanatory power allows for not only

the identifi cation of which theory or theories have the greatest amount of explanatory

power, but also allows for the identifi cation of those areas where theories could be elabo-

rated in order to increase explanatory power or be integrated on the basis of non-contra-

dicting assumptions.

15

In utilizing explanatory power as a criteria for theory evaluation, one could also

evaluate a theory in terms of its testability, accuracy, range, intensity, or discrimination

(Gibbs 1972). These criteria are of little use for the current formalization effort for sev-

eral reasons. First, all theories have been demonstrated to be testable. Second, accuracy

is a problematic criterion when evaluating these theories because empirical tests of the

theories have failed to rigorously apply scope conditions when assessing the theories and

the failure to do so can dramatically affect the accuracy of a theory’s predictions. Third,

as all theories tob formalized are specifi ed at the microlevel, all theories contain the same

range (the number of different units of analysis to which the theory applies) since their

explanations do not extend beyond the individual level of analysis. Fourth, all formalized

theories fail to make statements pertaining to whether a particular explanans is a better

or worse predictor of an explanandum than other explanans within the theory. Because

of this omission, all theories fail to discriminate between the explanatory power of par-

ticular explanans. As a result of these evaluative dimensions of explanatory power being

constants across all theories, they will not be employeed when evaluating the formalized

theories.

Several non-explanatory power evaluation criteria will also not be employed in

this formalization effort. Gibbs (1972) notes that parsimony, logical consistency, and

plausibility all serve as methods of evaluating theory; however, no consensus exists in

sociology pertaining to their application when evaluating theory. Criteria pertaining to

parsimony and plausibility will not be employed as a result of a lack of consensus sur-

rounding their use. Unlike parsimony and plausibility, logical consistency has been an

area of focus among the theories to be formalized. While oppositional tradition theories

have been seen as tending towards logical consistency, integrative theories have largely

been seen as logically inconsistent (Hirschi 1989). Since the theories being formalized

are derived from the oppositional tradition, they overall tend to be logically consistent.

16

The only theory that demonstrates signifi cant logical problems is general strain theory.

When formalizing this theory, potential logical inconsistencies will be identifi ed and will

serve as a basis for evaluating the theory.

Conclusion

The intent of the proposed dissertation is to aid in the development of cumulative

theory in criminology by formalizing the “oppositional tradition” theories that were at the

heart of the integration/elaboration debate. The intent is not to arrive at a conclusion that

any particular theory is intrinsically better than another, but rather to specify under which

conditions a given theory should be expected to perform more consistently than other

theories, and to indicate opportunities for theoretical growth by proposing directions for

elaboration or integration. It is entirely possible that Gibbs is correct and there may be no

accolades for such an effort. Regardless, it is important to do so for no other reason than

it remains an untapped source for cumulative theory development in criminology. Such

an effort could not only have a bearing on those theories that are to be formalized, but it

could also have implications for those theories which have sought to elaborate upon these

traditions.

Working towards these ends, the dissertation will be organized into several chap-

ters that formalize particular theories, and one chapter that evaluates the formalized

theories in terms of theoretical explanatory power. Chapter 2 will provide a formalization

of differential association theory (Sutherland 1947; Sutherland, Cressey, and Luckenbill

1992). In formalizing differential association theory, it will be necessary to investigate its

intellectual history in order to defi ne key theoretical concepts and clarify the theory’s as-

sumptions of human nature. Chapter 3 will formalize social learning theory (Akers 1985,

2009; Burgess and Akers 1966). As an elaboration of differential association theory un-

der principles of operant conditioning and behavioral modeling, social learning theory is

17

very similar to differential association theory in many respects. Despite numerous simi-

larities with differential association theory, it also differs in several key ways which will

be discussed. In Chapter 4, a formalization of social control theory (Hirschi [1969] 2004)

will be proposed. Social control theory will differ from differential association and social

learning theories in terms of its emphasis on only those factors that limit one’s engage-

ment in criminal behavior. Chapter 6 will formalize general strain theory (Agnew 1992;

2004). As a microlevel elaboration of anomie or strain theories (e.g., Cloward and Olin

1960; Cohen 1955; Merton 1968), general strain theory specifi es the microlevel forces

that moderate the likelihood that strains (goal blockages, exposure to averse stimuli,

or loss of something positively valued) will result in criminal behavior. Chapter 7 will

evaluate the formalized theories in terms of limitations of explanatory power that are the

result of a theory’s scope conditions, propositions, or explanandum. Chapter 8 will con-

clude the dissertation by discussing the issue of integration within criminological theory.

Endnotes

1 Cohen (1989) does discuss how one could use mathematical tools and symbolic logic to deduce additional knowledge claims from theories; however, it is not necessary to the formalization process.

2 While Hirschi ([1969] 2005) argues that his defi nition of law is borrowed from Durkheim, Durkheim did not see law as static. For Durkheim ([1933] 1984), law was variable and the degree to which law refl ected value-consensus was a function of a soci-ety’s level of differentiation.

18

Chapter 2

Differential Association Theory

In many ways differential association theory is the criminological theory best

suited for formalization. Unlike other criminological theories that have emphasized

substantive issues and eschewed a formal mode of expression, in formulating differential

association Sutherland acknowledged the cumulative nature of scientifi c theory and was

more deliberate in his approach to theory construction. This notion of science is pres-

ent in several of his writings (Sutherland [1932] 1956a, [1932] 1956b, [1942] 1956), but

is most articulated in his response to the Michael-Adler report criticism that criminol-

ogy was too empirical (Sutherland [1932] 1956a). Here, Sutherland responds by noting

that although concepts in new sciences may be too empirical, as research is undertaken

concepts become more abstract1 and are further developed in light of new fi ndings. For

Sutherland, criminology was nascent science and as such an emphasis on empirical

phenomenon was important, but should ultimately lead to conceptual developments.

This view is not without its shortcomings, but of particular importance to this effort to

formalize differential association is that as a result of this philosophy differential associa-

tion theory is spread across a wide array of publications, is partly left to inference, and is

overall incomplete (Vold 1951).

In light of these challenges, it is important to emphasize several aspects of the

formalization process as it specifi cally relates to differential association theory. First, it

important to formalize the theory by relying on a array of Sutherland’s writings that will

be integrated into a more cohesive statement of the theory. In some cases some creative

interpolation may be required, but in doing so all efforts will be made to maintain the in-

tegrity of the theory. Second, while differential association theory is Sutherland’s most

well known thesis on criminality, his theory of differential social organization was crucial

19

to his overall theory of crime even though it was far less developed (Matsueda 1988).

This is especially germane because in many ways differential association theory does not

make complete sense without understanding how associations relate to social organiza-

tion. Despite the relationship between differential social organization and differential as-

sociation, it is beyond the scope of this formalization to attempt to articulate Sutherland’s

macrolevel theory. Instead, differential social organization will be discussed as a scope

condition relevant to differential association theory.

In working towards these ends of formalization, the chapter will be organized into

several sections. The fi rst section will provide an overview of differential association

theory and be followed by a second section which elaborates the theory’s assumptions

of human nature. Next, a restatement of the theory will be proposed which includes a

formal model, an elaboration of theoretical concepts, and the specifi cation of theoretical

scope conditions. The fi nal section will outline basic assumptions, conceptual defi nitions,

proposition, and scope conditions present within the theory.

Theoretical Overview

Despite other efforts to elaborate differential association theory (e.g., Adams

1973; Akers 1985, 2009; Burgess and Akers 1966; Glaser 1960; Jeffery 1966), and a pre-

vious effort to convert its statements into set theory (DeFleur and Quinney 1966), differ-

ential association theory remains a distinct theory onto itself which has not changed since

Sutherland’s fi nal statement of the theory prior to his death. The fi nal statement of the

theory presented a learning theory of crime which contained nine propositions (Suther-

land 1947: 6-7):

1. Criminal behavior is learned.2. Criminal Behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of

communication.

20

3. The principle part of the learning of criminal behavior is occurs within inti-mate personal groups.

4. When a criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a) techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes very simple; (b) the specifi c directions of motives, drives, rationalizations, and at-titudes.

5. The specifi c direction of motives and drives is learned from defi nitions of legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.

6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of defi nitions favorable to violation of law over defi nitions unfavorable to violation of law

7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and inten-sity.

8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any learning.

9. Though criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is explained by those general needs and values since non-criminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values.

In stating differential association theory, Sutherland (1947) specifi es an etiologi-

cal theory of crime which sees crime as being the result of the defi nitions of the situation

one learns throughout his or her life which are favorable to the violation of criminal laws;

whereas the defi nition of the situation to which one is exposed in contingent upon the

social organization of values within one’s environment and an individual’s interactions

with them. Within the theory, a crime only in those situations in which an individual has

an excess of defi nitions of the situation favorable to law violation and an opportunity to

commit a crime is present.

Assumptions of Human Nature

The assumptions of human nature contained within differential association theory

are perhaps the most misinterpreted aspects of the theory. This is largely a result Ko-

21

rnhauser’s (1978) critique of theories of delinquency and the utilization of her critique

against cultural deviance theories by Hirschi (Hirschi 1979, 1989) to argue that, as a re-

sult of logically inconsistent assumptions of human nature, the integration of criminologi-

cal theories is not possible. This argument rests upon Kornhauser’s (1978) assertion that

differential association assumes human nature to be tabula rasa and that society perfectly

imprints individuals with the culture of the group.

A large part of this misinterpretation of differential association theory is a result

of Sutherland’s failure to clearly articulate the connection between differential associa-

tion theory and the symbolic interactionism of Thomas (1966; [1923] 1967) and Thomas

and Znaniecki ([1927] 1966a, [1927] 1966b). Sutherland ([1942] 1956), as well as oth-

ers (e.g., Gaylord and Galliher 1990; Schuessler 1973) have noted the presence of this

connection; however, this connection has never been articulated beyond a discussion of

intellectual infl uences when in fact differential association can be seen as an application

of this social psychological perspective to criminal behavior. This connection is particu-

larly evident in differential association theory’s fourth, fi fth, sixth, and ninth propositions.

Here, Sutherland (1947) argues: (1) that it is the direction of drives, motives, and attitudes

that are learned; (2) the specifi c direction pertains to whether the defi nitions learned are

favorable or unfavorable to the legal code; (3) criminal behavior is the result of an excess

of criminal defi nitions; and (4) that criminal behaviors are not reducible to either general

needs or values.

In order to clarify the assumptions of human nature contained within differen-

tial association theory, human nature as conceived within the theory will be discussed in

terms of its biological foundations, its plasticity, and its emergence as a result of biologi-

cal and social forces.

22

Biological Foundations

Motivations, drives, and attitudes were all crucial elements in the social psychol-

ogy of Thomas (1966; [1923] 1967) and Thomas and Znaniecki ([1927] 1966a, [1927]

1966b), which acknowledged biology as an infl uence on human behavior. According to

Thomas’s ([1923] 1967) notion of the four wishes, human behavior contained four basic

motivations which originated in human biology and the salience of a wish varied from

individual to individual. These wishes included the need for new experience, the desire

for security, the desire for response (approval from others), and the desire for recognition

(status). Additionally, humans possessed innate drives, such as those related to hunger or

reproduction (Thomas [1923] 1967; Thomas and Znaniecki [1927] 1966a, [1927] 1966b).

These innate drives were seen as amoral in nature, as a given drive could be realized in

both socially approved and deviant ways. Thomas ([1923] 1967), for example, observes:

“The moral good or evil of a wish depends on the social meaning or value of the activity which results from it. Thus the vagabond, the adventurer, the spendthrift, the bohemian are dominated by the desire for new experience, but so are the in-ventor and the scientist...” (28).

As a result of the possibility a drive might be manifested behaviorally in morally

distinct ways, such drives or motivations were seen as having limited explanatory power

in regards to explaining human behavior.

Within this perspective, drives and motives are part of a more general class of be-

havioral predispositions called natural attitudes (Thomas and Znaniecki [1927] 1966a).2

Under this view, natural attitudes serve as the basis of all behavioral motivations and are

fundamentally instinctive, hedonistic, and tend to be pursued in the most effi cient way

possible. Natural attitudes are not organized in meaningful ways and may be suppressed

by other natural attitudes, push other natural attitudes aside in order to be expressed, or

23

simply not be expressed at all. Additionally, when two natural attitudes are expressed

concurrently it is the result of habit, not social organization. Thus, one’s desire to repro-

duce may be displaced by hunger, but there is no innate predisposition to combine a meal

and the drive to reproduce into a date.

Since all natural attitudes have biological origins, the content one learns through

interactions with others is not the motivation or drive itself, but rather the social meaning

attached to the act. These meanings are contingent upon how one’s group regulates the

wishes (Thomas [1923] 1967) and this process of sublimation is part of a more general

process in which all biological predispositions are potentially subject to social control.

The process of social regulation results in the transformation of natural attitudes into so-

cially conditioned cultural attitudes (Thomas and Znaniecki [1927] 1966a, [1927] 1966b)

and demonstrates that human behavior is seen as being plastic within the theory.

Plasticity

The sublimation of natural attitudes into socially desirable predispositions repre-

sents the transformation of natural attitudes into cultural attitudes3 (ibid). Neither cul-

tural nor natural attitudes can be reduced to one another, and cultural attitudes represent

an emergent property which is result of the interaction of a particular social environment

on preexisting natural attitudes. Cultural attitudes differ from natural attitudes in several

key ways. First, cultural attitudes tend to be organized and as a result social events or

situations may link a wide array of human needs into being realized at one time. Second,

cultural attitudes tend to be refl ective, remembered, and repeated. Third, cultural atti-

tudes allow for the more permanent subordination of other attitudes than is possible with

natural attitudes, which are more susceptible to impulsivity. Individuals suppress natural

attitudes on a daily basis as they hold off from eating until specifi c mealtimes, or use the

lavatory in lieu of relieving themselves wherever they so choose. Fourth, just as natural

24

attitudes are biological in nature, cultural attitudes are social in nature and depend upon

the social environments to which one has been exposed. Lastly, cultural attitudes can

become relatively fi xed overtime and as a result an individual may have a diffi cult time

acquiring new cultural attitudes.

The process in which a natural attitude becomes socially molded into cultural at-

titude requires both an individual to act upon a natural attitude and for there to be value

within the social environment which corresponds to the attitude in question (e.g., thirst

and soy milk). Thomas ([1923] 1967) defi nes the term value broadly as either being a

stimulus or “…any object, real or imaginary, which has meaning and may be the object of

an activity” (233). This molding process involves one’s group engaging in social control

efforts to bring the natural attitudes of an individual in line with the social values of a

group (Thomas [1923] 1967: Chapter 8). Thus, whereas an attitude is a property of an

individual, a value is a property of a group.

A defi nition of the situation is both a cultural attitude and value. At the individual

level, defi nitions of the situation are cultural attitudes that determine actions in both

habitual and contemplative ways. They can be habitual when a particular environment is

relatively static and the outcomes of behaviors are relatively determined by circumstance

(ibid). They can also be deliberative as a result of situational uncertainty as to which

behaviors are appropriate depending on the circumstances at hand (Thomas 1966). Under

such situations, individuals actively interpret meanings within the environment prior to

acting. At the social level, defi nitions of the situation exist as social values that serve as

behavioral stimuli which not only can evoke cultural attitudes, but also specify which

methods of acting upon a stimuli are appropriate (Thomas [1923] 1967).

The ability to shape natural attitudes in accordance with the rules and regulations

present within a group’s social values refl ects an underlying assumption in differential as-

sociation theory that human behavior is plastic. But since all behaviors have their origins

25

in natural attitudes, human nature is not assumed to be tabula rasa within differential

association theory.

Emergence

The underlying assumption of human nature contained within differential associa-

tion is that an individual’s human nature is a result of the interplay between biological and

social forces. Since natural attitudes can be realized in both moral and amoral ways, the

presence of a drive alone is insuffi cient when attempting to explain a particular behavioral

outcome. But just as the explanation of a behavior cannot be reduced to a drive or moti-

vation, it can also not be reduced to the social values of a group (Sutherland 1947). This

is because individuals who are exposed to a particular value may differ in terms of their

natural attitudes (Sutherland 1947; Thomas [1923] 1967; Thomas and Znaniecki [1927]

1966a; [1927] 1966b). Thus, a criminal behavior within differential association theory

is neither explainable by a give natural attitude nor it is explainable by a particular social

value. Instead, in order to explain human behaviors, relevant natural attitudes and social

values must be examined as cultural attitudes - that is, as emergent phenomena not reduc-

ible to either biological drives or social values.

In summary, differential association makes three assumptions about human nature.

First, human nature is built upon a biological foundation. This foundation contains basic

needs and drives which serve as the basis of all human activity and motivation. Differen-

tial association theory also acknowledges that these biological foundations are variable

in that within a given situation the salience of particular drives or wishes vary, and that

these natural attitudes also vary between individuals. Second, human nature is plastic

and is shaped by the social environment to which one is exposed. While human nature

26

is plastic, it is not a blank slate because innate biological drives exist independent of any

learning process. Third, human nature is an emergent property of biological and social

forces, and it is irreducible to either force. Biological drives and values alone are both

insuffi cient when attempting to explain human behavior.

Theoretical Restatement

A major criticism of differential association theory has been its failure to clearly

articulate the meaning of theoretical concepts (Cressey 1960b; Short 1960). Utilizing the

previous discussion on the theory’s assumptions of human nature, it is possible to more

clearly defi ned key theoretical concepts within differential association theory in order

to arrive a more clear statement of the theory. Figure 2.1 displays the causal relation-

ships proposed by differential association theory (Sutherland 1947). The theory posits

that criminal behavior occurs when an individual encounters the subjective opportunity

to engage in criminal behavior and has learned an excess of defi nitions of the situation

favorable to criminal behavior, compared to defi nitions unfavorable, as a result of being

exposed to defi nitions favorable to criminal behavior.

Exposure to Patterns of Values

Differential association theory proposes that individuals learn the techniques for

engaging criminal behaviors and the “specifi c direction of motives, drives, rationaliza-

tions, and attitudes” through interactions with criminal and anti-criminal patterns (Suther-

land 1947: 6). There has been much confusion surrounding this component of differential

association theory on two grounds.

First, it is unclear what Sutherland meant when he specifi ed it is the direction of

motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes that are learned (see Akers 2009). While

Sutherland did not defi ne these terms, the previous discussion of Sutherland’s intellec-

27

Level of Exposure to Values

Unfavorable to Law Violation

Level of Exposure to Values

Favorable to Law Violation

Degree to Which Definitions Favor

Law Violation

Presence of Subjective

Opportunity

Occurrence of Criminal Behavior

+

-

+

+

Figure 2.1Differential Association Theory

tual infl uences can possibly elucidate the theory’s meaning in this regard. As previously

discussed, Thomas and Znaniecki ( [1927] 1966a; [1927] 1966b) distinguish between

natural and cultural attitudes. Whereas natural attitudes refl ect the basic biological drives

of an organism and serve as the basis of all human motivation, they are indeterminate

in terms of predicting deviant behavior because the behaviors one might engage in as

a response to a particular drive can be either deviant or conforming depending upon

the values of one’s group. Thus, aggression can either lead one to commit assault, or it

could lead an individual to play football. Both activities represent actions that are mo-

tivated by aggression, but they differ in terms of their legal status. And while Thomas

and Znaniecki do not discuss rationalizations, a rationalization could likewise justify a

criminal or noncriminal act. Differential association theory’s conception that directions

are learned indicates Sutherland’s use of the term attitudes is synonymous with Thomas

28

and Znanaiecki’s concept of natural attitudes and therefore the terms attitudes, drives, and

motivations in the theory’s fourth proposition are redundant.

A second area of confusion surrounds whether differential association theory

posits an individual engages in criminal behavior as a result of associating with criminal

others (see Cressey 1960b). Differential association theory’s second proposition states

individuals learn criminal behaviors from others through a process of communication

(Sutherland 1947), but it is not the associate per se that causes an individual to commit

a crime, rather it is the pattern of the content of the value communicated. In response to

criticism of the theory surrounding whether associations cause an individual to engage

in criminal behavior, Cressey (1960b) notes that it is one’s associations with patterns

of criminal behavior that are important in learning to engage in criminal behavior. It is

therefore not one’s associations that causes one to engage in criminal behavior, but rather

the content communicated through one’s associations. Cressey (1960b) further clarifi es

this point when stating:

“Thus, if a mother teaches her son that ‘Honesty is the best policy’ but also teaches him, perhaps inadvertently, that ‘It is all right to steal a loaf of bread when you are starving,’ she is presenting him with an anti-criminal behavior pattern and a crimi-nal behavior pattern, even if she herself is honest, noncriminal, and even anti-crim-inal. One can learn criminal behavior patterns from persons who are not criminals, and one can learn anti-criminal behavior patterns from hoods, professional crooks, habitual offenders, and gangsters” (49).

In light of differential association theory’s connection to the social psychology

of Thomas and Znaniecki, and Cressey’s further clarifi cation and reiteration that it is the

content of the patterns one is exposed to that matters, it is possible to more clearly articu-

late how an individuals learns to engage in criminal behavior. An individual learns to

engage in criminal behavior as a result of being exposed to values that that convey to an

29

actor the objects to which he or she can orient his or her behavior in relation to a specifi c

natural attitude, and how one should act in response to a given value. Values are therefore

real or imaginary stimuli that orient his or her behavior (Thomas [1923] 1967); and skills

are a subcategory of values that represent the specifi c behaviors one should engage in as

a response to a particular stimulus (or value). Values therefore represent objects to one

can orient his or her behavior (e.g., the direction for natural motives, drives, attitudes),

while skills are a special kind of value that specify the actual actions one should engage in

response to a particular stimulus. In the example provided by Cressey, starvation rep-

resents the natural attitude of hunger, bread represent the social object to which one has

learned to direct his or her hunger, and stealing represents the skills or actual behaviors

one should engage in to satisfy his or her hunger.

Before explaining how one’s exposure to criminal or anti-criminal patterns vary,

it is important to clarify that values and defi nitions of the situations are synonymous

terms. Within the social psychology of Thomas and Znaniecki ([1927] 1966a; [1927]

1966b), the actions of others are perceived by an individual as values that provide defi ni-

tions of the situation on how to behave under similar conditions. These defi nitions of the

situation of a groups can be seen as rules or schemes of action that specify how individu-

als are to act in specifi c situations or across situations (Thomas [1923] 1967; Thomas and

Znaniecki [1927] 1966a) . But since these defi nitions of the situation are external to the

actor when being observed in the actions of others, they are perceived as social objects

and therefore they are a property of the external actor or group that the actor represents.

As the socialization process entails conveying to new member of a group the appropriate

defi nitions of the situation held by that group (Thomas [1923] 1967), the defi nitions of

the situation one is exposed to are in fact the values of the group. Since an individual can

also possess defi nitions of the situation in the form of cultural attitudes, the dual existence

30

of defi nitions of the situation can create confusion within the theory. As a result of this

possibility, the term values will serve a substitute for the term defi nitions of the situation

when discussing defi nitions of the situation that are external to an actor.

Differential association theory (Sutherland 1947) specifi es that individuals learn

criminal or anti-criminal defi nitions of the situation (directions of motives and skills)

because of exposure to patterns of values that vary by frequency, duration, priority, and

intensity. This learning process can related to direct interactions with others or can also

relate to exposure to values that are present in the media.

Frequency and Duration

Sutherland (1947) states that the defi nitions of frequency and duration “as modali-

ties of associations [that] are obvious and need no explanation ” (7). While the frequency

and duration of interactionswith criminal values increases the likelihood of learning

criminal defi nitions, another aspect of frequency and duration is the role of isolation and

value-neutral activities on limiting one’s exposure to various values (ibid.). Isolation

occurs because of anomic organization within a community and the absence of agents

of social control who would ordinarily convey defi nitions unfavorable to law violations.

While it is also possible to be isolated from values favorable to law violation, Sutherland

does not highlight this possibility and instead isolation is discussed in terms of one’s

isolation from anti-criminal values. Effective social control efforts would seek to isolate

individuals from such values. The concept of isolation, thus, solely relates to one’s expo-

sure to values unfavorable to law violation within differential association theory.

Value-neutral activities are those activities that do not directly relate to the law,

but are important because they occupy the time of individuals and lower their exposure to

criminal defi nitions (Sutherland 1947). This relationship is complex in that value-neutral

31

activities can provide exposure to criminal defi nitions in anomic communities. As previ-

ously noted youth clubs in disorganized communities may actually bring delinquents into

contact with one another and facilitate the exchange of criminal defi nitions of the situa-

tion (Sutherland [1936] 1956). As a result of this possibility, value-neutral activities are

important only insofar as they are truly value-neutral.

Priority

Priority represents a developmental component of differential association theory.

According to the theory, behaviors acquired in childhood are possibly more persistent

than behaviors acquired later in life (Sutherland 1947). Priority may also be important for

reasons other than those cited by Sutherland. Under the social psychological tradition on

which differential association theory is based, the cultural attitudes one acquires through-

out life as a the result of exposure to values not only predispose individuals to certain

courses of actions, but they also preclude other lines of behaviors (Thomas and Znaniecki

[1927] 1966a). As these attitudes become more fi xed overtime into one’s personality, not

only are behaviors associated with these attitudes more durable, but it becomes diffi cult

to learn new behaviors which are incompatible with an individual’s previously organized

attitudes (ibid.).

Intensity

Whereas priority refers to the developmental state of an individual, and frequency

and duration refer to the temporal aspects of an interaction with a particular meaning,

intensity refers to the nature of the interaction itself. Sutherland (1947) does not clearly

defi nite intensity, but does suggest it relates to the emotional connection an individual

has to the source of a value, or the source’s level of prestige. This notion of intensity is

refl ected in the theory’s third proposition where Sutherland specifi es that most learning

32

occurs within intimate personal groups and notes the relative weakness of newspapers or

other media sources in infl uencing behavior.

Defi nitions of the Situation

As a result of one’s exposure to criminal and anti-criminal values that vary in

frequency, intensity, duration, and priority, an individual learns defi nitions of the situation

that are either favorable or unfavorable to criminal behavior (Sutherland 1947). These

defi nitions of the situation include the skills necessary to commit a crime, along with the

directions of motives, drives, attitudes, and rationalizations (ibid).

At the individual level, the term defi nitions of the situation are synonymous with

the concept of cultural attitudes that has been previously discussed. As cultural attitudes,

defi nitions of the situation afford an individual the ability to recognize those objects with-

in the environment to which he or she can orient his or her behavior in response to natural

attitudes, and specify which actions an individual should engage in response to a specifi c

object. Differential association theory captures this notion that one learns to recognize

objects as something to which one can orient her or her behavior when it specifi es that the

direction of motives, drives, and attitudes are learned (Sutherland 1947). The previous

example from Cressey illustrates this point. Differential association theory (Sutherland

1947) also specifi es that individuals learns the skills or behaviors required to engage in

criminal behaviors. While skills or criminal behaviors can be simple or complex, they

must be learned and can not be the result of behavioral innovation (Sutherland 1947).

This will be further discussed as a scope condition of the theory.

In addition to learning skills and the direction of natural attitudes, individuals

also learn rationalizations or neutralizations that allow an individual to engage in crimi-

nal behavior despite having defi nitions of the situation opposite to it. Sutherland (1947)

never clearly defi nes rationalizations, and the concept is most elaborated by Cressey

33

(1952) and Sykes and Matza (1957). While Cressey (1952) suggests a potential mean-

ing when discussing how white-collar criminals might rationalize a theft as borrowing in

order to reconcile their self-concept with their criminal behavior, Sykes and Matza (1957)

elaborate this concept more specifi cally in relation to criminal behavior by noting how

individuals deny responsibility for action, deny victims are harmed, claim victimization

is the result of just deserts, condemn the condemners, or appeal to higher loyalties when

justifying their actions. Such neutralizations refl ect individuals who are actively ma-

nipulating specifi c elements of a crime, that is, elements of a situation, in order to justify

a particular course of action. By claiming a person deserves to be assaulted, an offender

can manipulate the defi nition of the situation in order to follow through with the criminal

assault. Thus, a particular drive or motive can gain expression within a situation when an

actor redefi nes the situation in terms of alternate values even if the original defi nition of

the situation did not call for, or even prohibited, a particular course of action.

While the concept of neutralizations provides a crucial elaboration to differential

association theory, it is also raises questions with Sutherland’s (1947) contention that

behaviors are not innovated. In Sykes and Matza (1957), neutralizations served as innova-

tions pertaining to how one classifi es an act in order to resolve the discrepancy between

an individual’s law-abiding self-concept and his or her criminal-behavior. In Cressey’s

(1952) study of violations of fi nancial trust, it was not embezzlement behaviors that were

innovated, but rather it was the reclassifi cation of theft as “borrowing” or conceiving

crimes as conventional behaviors. Ironically, individuals learned how to embezzle funds

when learning how to audit accounts and detect embezzlement.

Unlike Cressey’s work on verbalizations that saw neutralizations as existing prior

to a criminal act, Sykes and Matza (1957) observe neutralizations as initially following

criminal behavior, but subsequently serving to enable it. According to neutralization

34

theory, neutralizations initially serve to ameliorate the negative emotions an individual

feels after engaging in a behavior he or she beliefs to be wrong. The neutralizations one

employs to mitigate negative emotions represent extra-legal applications of legally recog-

nized “defenses for crimes” that remove an individual from culpability. Once an individ-

ual develops a neutralization for a given act, it frees the individual from subsequent social

controls and serves as a defi nition favorable to criminal behavior.

Summarizing the concepts of defi nitions, defi nitions represent the cultural at-

titudes an individual has learned as a result of being exposed to values. These cultural

attitudes represent the defi nitions of the situation an individual possesses that contain

knowledge of: (1) the types of values to one can orient his or her behaviors; (2) the

behaviors one can employ in response to a given value; and (3) the neutralizations that

are necessary to reclassify an act in order enable a criminal act to be justifi ed despite the

individual possessing cultural attitudes or defi nitions of the situation that would ordinar-

ily oppose such an act. Differential association theory (Sutherland 1947) further proposes

that that one must have a surplus of defi nitions favorable to criminal behavior compared

to defi nitions against it in order to engage in criminal behavior.

Presence of Subjective Opportunity

According to differential association theory (Sutherland 1947), an individual will

engage in criminal behavior if and only if an individual possesses an excess of defi nitions

favorable to criminal behavior and he or she has the subjective opportunity to engage in

criminal behavior. Contrary to other opportunity theories (e.g., Cohen and Felson 1979)

differential association theory posits it is the presence of subjective opportunity, not ob-

jective opportunity, that leads an individual to engage in criminal behavior. Since differ-

ential association theory holds that an individual learns the direction of natural attitudes,

the presence of an objective opportunity is insuffi cient to produce criminal behavior be-

35

cause an individual may not have come to subjectively view that opportunity as an object

to orient his or here action. Cressey (1960b) illustrates this point when observing:

“….one person who walks by an unguarded and open cash register, or who is informed of the presence of such a condition in a nearby store, may perceive the situation as a “crime committing” one, while another person in the identical circumstances may perceive the situation as one in which the owner should be warned against carelessness” (52).

Thus, depending upon the values to which one was exposed, and the defi nitions or

cultural attitudes one has as a result of the exposure to particular values, two individuals

may subjectively perceive an objective opportunity in very different ways. For this rea-

son, differential association theory (Sutherland 1947) sees defi nitions as being a necessary

condition for criminal behavior, while subjective opportunity is only a suffi cient cause of

criminal behavior.

Crime

As criminal laws exist external to the actor, crime can be viewed as a politically

important value (Sutherland 1947: 19) to which one can orient his or her behavior. Dif-

ferential association theory therefore contains a legalistic defi nition of crime in which for

a behavior to be considered a crime it must be legally prohibited within the criminal code

(Sutherland 1947, 1983).

Scope Conditions

Within differential association theory there are several scope conditions which

limit the theory’s explanatory power.4 These relate to the theory’s inability to account

36

for: (1) behavioral innovations and crime; (2) the learning process; (3) particular personal

networks; and (4) why certain values are codifi ed within the criminal law.

Behavioral Innovation

Sutherland (1947) was clear in his assertion that criminal behaviors were not

invented; however, he did acknowledge that with social psychological theory there is the

possibility of innovation (Sutherland [1942] 1956). For Sutherland, the fi rst instance of

a crime was the result of changes in the legal code and not behaviors (ibid.). As has been

previously noted, neutralizations are a particular point of contention in regards to innova-

tion since neutralizations refl ect individuals manipulating meanings in order to innovate

behavioral outcomes. This conception of innovation is compatible with the cognitive

psychological view on the subject that sees behavioral innovations as pertaining to the

use of analogies or metaphors within novel situations (e.g., Holyoak and Nisbett 1988).

Since neutralizations entail the application of legal defenses for crimes to extralegal situ-

ations, these neutralizations could be viewed as being analogous to their legal counter-

parts and as a result allow for defi nitional innovation. Despite this possibility, Sutherland

(1947) explicitly states that behavioral innovations do not occur and therefore criminal

behavioral innovations, that is, innovations that pertain to behaviors that have never been

observed in any context, are beyond the scope of the theory.

The Learning Process

A criticism of differential association theory is that it fails to specify the actual

learning process (see Burgess and Akers 1966). While the theory’s modalities of interac-

tion and communication (frequency, duration, intensity, and priority) specify the nature

of an interaction with patterns of criminal or non-criminal values, the theory does not

37

specify the actual mechanism involved in the learning process. As such, the mechanisms

of learning are beyond the scope of the theory.

Personal Networks

Sutherland (1947) acknowledges the differential association theory does not spec-

ify why a particular individual has a particular set of social network. While Sutherland

does propose that the differential social organization of communities potentially infl u-

ences the defi nitions to which one is exposed, this macrolevel perspective does not predict

one’s actual exposure to these defi nitions. Sutherland acknowledged that even in areas

with high rates of deviance one could fi nd non-delinquent youth. As such, the reason why

an individual has a particular set of associations is beyond the scope of differential asso-

ciation theory.

Existence of a Criminal Law

Differential association theory does not specify how behaviors become defi ned

as criminal. While Sutherland (1983, [1929] 1956) does suggest criminal laws are the

product of social confl ict in which groups seek to legally proscribe the behaviors of others

failing to conform to group values, and that some groups may be more infl uential than

others in shaping laws, this process is not well defi ned and as a result is beyond the scope

of the theory.

Conclusion

Sutherland was cautious in terms of theory construction for fear that the premature

development of scientifi c concepts could actually impede the development of scientifi c

knowledge and therefore saw differential association theory as a work-in-progress. The

discussion of differential association theory presented in this chapter should be seen in the

38

same way. The purpose of this formalization effort was to attempt to clarify differential

association theory in terms of its conceptual meanings, assumptions of human nature,

hypothesized relationships, and theoretical limitations in order to allow for future efforts

to develop the theory either through theoretical integration or elaboration. As such, this

chapter should not be seen as an attempt to produce a defi nitive statement of the theory.

In addition to the formalization effort already presented, a restatement of differen-

tial association theory follows which attempts to more clearly state the theory in terms of

assumptions, conceptual defi nitions, propositions, and scope conditions.

Theoretical RestatementAssumptions

A1. Biological drives serve as the basis of all human behavior

A2. Human behavior is plastic

A3. Human nature is an emergent property of biological drives, human plasticity, and the social environment to which one is exposed

Conceptual Defi nitions

D1. Defi nition of the Situation – a Cultural attitude which specifi es in a given situa-tion the social objects which can serve as a behavioral stimulus (the directions of motives, drives, attitudes, or rationalization), along with the courses of action one should take in response to the stimulus (e.g., skills).

D2. Exposure to Values – An individual’s exposure to that are favorable or unfavorable to criminal behavior that vary in frequency, duration, intensity, and priority.

A. Values - The real or imaginary stimuli that are external to an actor that ori-ent his or her behavior towards an object and specify the skills or behav-iors one should engage in as a response to a particular stimuli.

B. Criminal values – Values that defi ne a criminal behavior as being an ap-propriate responses to a particular stimulus.

39

C. Anti-criminal values – Values that defi ne criminal behavior as not being appropriate response to a particular stimulus.

D3. Subjective Opportunity – The presence of an value in the environment to which an individual possesses a corresponding defi nition of the situation.

D4. Crime – a value that is legally defi ned as being criminal.

Knowledge Claims

P1. The degree to which an individual possesses defi nitions of the situation favorable to law violation is:

A. A positive function of the individual’s exposure to criminal values.

B. A Negative function of the individual’s exposure to anti-criminal values.

P2. The occurrence of a criminal act positive multiplicative function of:

A. The presence of an excess of defi nitions in favor of law violation, and

B. The presence of a subjective opportunity to commit a crime.

Scope Conditions

SC1. The dynamics leading to the classifi cation of an act as criminal is beyond the scope of differential association theory.

SC2. Crime in undifferentiated societies is beyond the scope of differential association theory.

SC3. The dynamics which lead a person to have a particular set of associations are be-yond the scope of differential association theory.

SC4. Criminal behaviors that are the result of behavioral innovations that are not learned from others are outside the scope of differential association theory.

40

SC5. The precise mechanisms of learning are beyond the scope differential association theory.

Endnotes

1 Sutherland (1932] 1956c) further elaborates upon this point when discussing Cooley’s notion that behavior can be abstracted from actions in social processes.

2 Thomas and Znaniecki ([1927] 1966a) also use the term temperamental attitudes to refer to natural attitudes.

3 Thomas and Znaniecki ([1927] 1966b) also use the term character to refer to natural cultural attitudes.

4 Another possible scope condition pertains to differential association theory’s ability to explain the relationship between personality and crime (see Cressey 1960b). While state-ments of differential association theory (Sutherland, Cressey, and Luckenbill 1992) that have been made after Sutherland’s death acknowledge the theory’s inability to account for personality characteristics and crime, Sutherland ([1942] 1956) contends that even if an individual were to possess a personality trait conducive to criminal behavior it would ultimately be directed along particular course of action depending upon the defi nition of the situation the person was exposed to in the environment.

41

Chapter 3

Social Learning Theory

The development of social learning theory represents a signifi cant elaboration

of differential association theory. By the early 1960s, differential association theory was

seen as being defi cient for its failure to specify how individuals actually learn criminal

behavior (Burgess and Akers 1966; Cressey 1960b). While specifi c modalities of interac-

tion (frequency, duration, intensity, and priority) specifi ed those dimensions of interaction

which were seen as being relevant to the learning of defi nitions favorable or unfavorable

to criminal behavior, the learning process itself remained undeveloped. Although Jeffery

(1966) fi rst suggested that differential association theory could be further developed by

incorporating principles from operant conditioning theory, Jeffery only suggested this

connection and never set forth to restate differential association theory under behaviorist

principles (Akers 2009; Burgess and Akers 1966). Burgess and Akers (1966) proposed

such a synthesis of differential association and operant conditioning theories; and this

newly formed differential-association/differential-reinforcement theory of criminal be-

havior restated differential association theory in terms of behavioral principles relating to

operant conditioning, which held that behavior was learned as a result of punishments or

rewards associated with particular behaviors in response to particular stimuli.

This integration was not without its critics. Criticisms of the theory emphasized

that the mentalistic concepts of attitudes or defi nitions were fundamentally incompat-

ible with the with the empiricism of behaviorism that denied the use of mental constructs

(Adams 1973; Halbasch 1979; Jeffery 1980). While differential-association/differential-

reinforcement theory was met by its fair share of criticism, the theory would not remain

static and developments would occur which overtime brought the theory more in line with

42

the symbolic interactionism of differential association theory (Akers 2009). As Akers

(1985, 2009) began to incorporate ideas from psychological social learning theory (e.g.,

Bandura 1977), such as vicarious learning and self regulation into the theory, the cogni-

tive components associated with criminal behavior again became a point of emphasis and

the theory became increasingly referred to as “social learning theory” (Akers 2009).

With these developments in mind, this formalization will rely upon the most

recent statement of social learning theory, which is seen as being its most defi nitive state-

ment (Akers 2009). As this formalization will focus on social learning theory, no atten-

tion will be paid to the outdated earlier statements of the theory which have served as the

target of theoretical criticisms. These early statements of the theory will be incorporated

within the formalization only insofar as they are present in the most recent statement of

the theory. This formalization will proceed by identifying social learning theory’s as-

sumptions of human nature, core theoretical concepts, key theoretical relationships, and

theoretical scope conditions.

Assumptions of Human Nature

As mentioned in Chapter 2, cultural deviance theories have been criticized for

purportedly assuming human nature to be a tabula rasa. While it was demonstrated that

such an assumption was not present in regard to differential association theory, the ac-

curacy of this criticism in regard to social learning theory remains open to debate. Ak-

ers (1996, 2009) has explicitly sought to address the cultural deviance critique (Hirschi

[1969] 2005; Kornhauser 1978); however, his response neglected to address the basic

premise on which the criticism held.

The cultural deviance critique contains three major components (Akers 1996;

Akers 2009; Kornhauser 1978). First, the critique holds that cultural deviance theories

assume human nature to be a tabula rasa. Second, cultural deviance theories assume that

43

the socialization process perfectly instills within group members the culture of the social

group. Third, and following from the previous two assumptions, cultural deviance theo-

ries imply individuals cannot be deviant because any deviance on the part of an individual

is a direct refl ection of the deviant status of the social group to which he or she belongs.

Therefore, even perceived acts of deviance are actually acts of conformity within a par-

ticular group or subculture (Kornhauser 1978).

In responding to the cultural deviance critique as it relates to social learning theo-

ry, Akers focused on whether or not individuals were perfectly socialized into the values

of their social groups. Akers (1996, 2009) noted that group membership is never perfect

and individuals are exposed to a wide array of defi nitions from various groups. Since an

individual might be exposed to a plurality of cultural values, no individual perfectly re-

fl ects the values of a social a particular group and therefore the cultural deviance critique

that socialization is a perfect process is inaccurate. Moreover, Akers also accused Korn-

hauser of selectively quoting from the works of Sutherland and representing only extreme

cases. In doing so, even if an individual were to be perfectly socialized into a deviant

group, this would represent a very small number of cases in which group membership is

orthogonal (ibid.).

While Akers did address the issue of whether individuals are perfectly socialized

into the values of a singular group, his response failed to address the issue of whether

social learning theory assumed human nature to be a tabula rasa. Moreover, it could be

argued that Akers further cemented this assumption of human nature within the theory

because part of his response acknowledged that motivations were, in fact, learned. Thus,

while it is inaccurate to claim social learning theory assumes the values of a group in a

differentiated society are perfectly instilled within its members, it remains accurate to

identify the theory with a tabula rasa assumption of human nature.

44

This distinction is important because much of the debate surrounding theory in-

tegration in criminology has hinged on the issue of whether criminological theories with

contradictory assumptions of human nature could be integrated. Even if social learning

theory is not a cultural deviance theory, its tabula rasa assumption of human nature re-

mains incompatible with assumptions of human nature resting on hedonism (see Hirschi

1979, 1989). One cannot be perfectly plastic while at the same time being predisposed to

pursue pleasure over pain. As illustrated in Chapter 2, this problem is not present within

differential association theory since individuals naturally possess hedonistic natural at-

titudes that provide the foundation for all behavioral motives. Within social learning

theory, however, no equivalent concept exists.

While social learning theory makes no concrete statement surrounding the pres-

ence of innate drives, one should refrain from interpreting it as having a tabula rasa

assumption of human nature for several reasons. First, since behaviorism argues that ani-

mals learn as a consequence of punishment and rewards, and that the avoidance of averse

stimuli is in itself is a reward, it is clear that behaviorism does not signifi cantly differ

from homo economicus assumptions of human nature relating to hedonism. Second,

social learning theory acknowledges the existence of non-social sources of reinforcement,

which can originate within an individual. Hunger, for example, can serve as an averse

stimulus (Akers 2009) which motivates an individual to seek relief through eating. These

two points illustrate that social learning theory does not, in fact, assume human nature to

be a tabula rasa. A blank slate contains no predisposition to prioritize pain over pleasure,

nor would it allow for fl uctuations in biological states to “drive” an individual to seek a

reprieve from averse stimuli.

As a result of social learning theory’s behaviorist foundation, three assumptions of

human nature can be identifi ed within the theory. First, humans are predisposed to favor

pleasure over pain. Under behaviorism, learning is simply not possible without such

45

a predisposition. Second, an organism’s biological state can provide it with positive or

averse stimuli. Just as eating relieves hunger, pulling one’s hand away from a fi re relieves

the immediate pain. All of these stimuli could be directly related to notions of hedonism,

and therefore social learning theory’s acknowledgement that non-social stimuli affect

behavior furthers distances the theory from assuming human nature to be a tabula rasa.

Third, any theory which proposes a behavior can be learned assumes the organism learn-

ing possesses a degree of behavioral plasticity – that is, the organism is not prepackaged

with immutable behaviors towards environmental objects. The assumptions of human

nature contained within social learning theory, then, are three fold.

These three assumptions of human nature are not signifi cantly different from dif-

ferential association theory, nor will they be signifi cantly different from social control

theory (see Chapter 4) or general strain theory (Chapter 5). Additionally, in light of the

assumptions of human nature presented in regard to differential association theory in

Chapter 2, and those discussed here in reference to social learning theory, it is apparent

that the cultural deviance construct was nothing more than a misrepresentation of social

learning theories that has been used to further advance control perspectives on deviance.

Theoretical Formalization

Social learning theory specifi es that four major factors are associated with the gen-

esis of criminal or deviant behaviors: differential associations; differential reinforcements

(both social and non-social); behavioral modeling (vicarious learning); and defi nitions fa-

vorable to deviant/criminal behavior (deviant/criminal cognitions). Social learning theory

predicts that criminal behavior is a positive function of the degree to which: (1) an indi-

vidual associates with individuals or other sources of information which contain social

meanings that directly promote criminal behavior; (2) a person is exposed to behavioral

models (both real or fi ctitious) which indirectly promote criminal behavior, (3) a person

46

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47

experiences reinforcements for criminal behavior; and (3) a person possesses defi nitions

(cognitions) which are favorable to criminal behavior. The concepts and relationships

between these concepts will be further explicated. Figure 3.1 provides a summarization

of the basic causal relationships within social learning theory; at the end of the section a

more detailed model will be proposed.

Differential Association

A person’s associations with others and various media expose the individual to

behavioral reinforcements or punishments and the normative dimensions surrounding

a particular behavior (Akers 2009). Primary groups, such as the family or peer groups,

serve as the primary associations related to the learning of criminal behavior. Primary

groups control reinforcements and punishments pertaining to specifi c behaviors, and they

additionally provide an individual with behavioral models. As a result of social control

efforts on the part of one’s primary group, patterns of behaviors and defi nitions of the

situation are learned which are either favorable or unfavorable to criminal behavior.

Secondary groups, such as the media, also provide individuals with behavioral and defi -

nitional reinforcements, although the infl uence of secondary groups is seen as being less

infl uential than that of primary groups.

An individual’s interaction’s with primary and secondary groups vary by frequen-

cy, duration, intensity, and priority (Akers 2009; see also Sutherland 1947). Frequency

and duration simply referred to the amount of time spent interacting with others who

reinforce criminal behaviors. Intensity refers to the signifi cance, salience, and importance

of the association, while priority refers to the age at which an interaction occurs. Social

learning theory, like differential association theory, holds that interactions which occur

early in life are more infl uential than those which occur in adulthood.

48

Primary groups are high in these modalities of interaction and therefore weigh

heavily on the degree to which an individual will learn criminal behaviors and defi nitions.

An individual’s fi rst relationships with others occur in primary groups and thus these

interactions are likely to be high in regards to intensity and priority. Interactions with pri-

mary groups also occur more frequently and regularly than interactions with other types

of groups. Additionally, interactions with primary groups are more likely to be present

throughout one’s life.

As a result of the importance of interactions with primary groups, characteristics

of primary groups can serve as a global indicator for criminal behavior (Akers 2009). To

the degree to which a primary group is in line with conventional values, an individual

will likely experience interactions which punish criminal behavior, provide defi nitions

in the form of morals against criminal behavior, and provide behavioral models which

promote behavior that is in line with conventional values (ibid.).

Differential Reinforcement

Within social learning theory, criminal behavior is learned through operant con-

ditioning in which criminal behavior is either rewarded or punished (Akers 1985, 2009).

Unlike respondent behavior, which is mediated by the autonomic nervous system and is

the focus of classical conditioning, operant behavior is learned as a result of being ex-

posed to environmental stimuli. In operant conditioning, an individual learns a behavior

in response to stimuli depending upon the degree to which that behavior is rewarded or

punished. Rewards can either be positive or negative. Positive rewards entail behaviors

which are followed by a positive outcome, such as pleasure, while negative rewards entail

the withdrawal of an averse stimulus following a behavior. While rewards increase the

probability that a behavior will be exhibited in the future, punishments lead to the inhibi-

tion, reduction, or termination of a behavior. Like rewards, there are both positive and

49

negative forms of punishment. In the case of positive punishment, a person experiences

an averse stimuli following a behavior. In the case of negative punishment, an individual

loses a reward following a behavior. In social learning theory, an individual’s reinforce-

ment history pertaining to criminal activities refl ects the degree to which that individual

has learned criminal behavior.

Differential reinforcement serves as the primary mechanism by which behaviors

are learned within the theory. Differential reinforcement occurs in several ways within the

theory. First, one’s primary group serves as the origin for many patterns of reinforcement.

These patterns consist of both rewards and punishments. A father or mother may scold a

child for taking something from the grocery store without paying for it, or a close friend

my reward the same behavior with approval. In both cases rewards and punishments are a

direct function of one’s associations. Secondly, criminal behavior results in the formation

of defi nitions of the situation which are either favorable or unfavorable to future criminal

behaviors. This point will be elaborated in in the section that discusses defi nitions in more

detail; however, for now it is important to note that a component of the learning process is

not simply the behavior itself but also cognitions surrounding that behavior. Third, crimi-

nal behaviors in themselves may be rewarding in either social or non-social ways. Some

crimes, like illegal drug use, may be intrinsically rewarding independent of any social

approval that may be associated with the behavior (Akers 2009). Additionally, individu-

als who are physiologically predisposed to be thrill seeking also may engage in criminal

acts on the basis of intrinsic rewards. While non-social rewards do occur, most criminal

behavior is either rewarded or punished in social interactions, and social rewards include

such things as status or prestige.

While the previous discussions have emphasized environmental, or external, con-

stellations of rewards and punishments, it is also possible for an individual to engage in

self-punishment and regulate his or her own behavior. As a result of conditioning histo-

50

ries, individuals internalize values present within their environment and through role-tak-

ing behavior can engage in self-punishment following a given behavior (ibid.). Another

component of the self-regulation of behavior entails the anticipation of punishment or

rewards by others. This process of anticipation occurs within the individual and serves to

regulate behavior regardless of whatever forms of social control are ultimately exercised

by others (ibid.). This process of self-regulation, through self-punishment or the anticipa-

tion of punishment, leads an individual to form self-control. Self-control may be specifi c

to a situation, or it may extend across a wide array of situations. The incorporation of the

concepts of self-control, anticipated sanctions, and self-punishment into social learning

theory suggests cognition plays an important part in the learning process. This will be dis-

cussed in more detail in the section on defi nitions.

An additional element of self-control relates to one’s choice of associations.

Since individuals are capable of anticipating rewards and punishments from others, a con-

sequence of this awareness is that individuals seek to interact with others who are likely

to reward his or her behavior (ibid.). Thus, a “fl ocking” phenomenon occurs whereby

individuals are not simply passively subject to the socialization efforts of their primary

groups, but rather individuals actively seek interaction with others that will likely reward

criminal behavior.

Behavioral Modeling/Imitation

Sutherland (1947) originally mentioned imitation as one way in which behaviors

could be learned and social learning theory further develops this idea by borrowing from

Bandura (1977) the notion of vicarious learning. The modeling of behavior, though seen

as being less infl uential than differential reinforcement, nonetheless provides an alternate

way in which behavior may be learned. A person experiences vicarious reinforcement

depending upon the degree to which the individual holds a behavioral model in high es-

51

teem and the degree to which the model demonstrates pleasure in response to a particular

stimulus (Akers 2009). When an individual fi nds him or herself in a similar situation, the

individual is more likely to engage in the behavior which was demonstrated by the behav-

ioral model.

Vicarious learning need not relate to real individuals or situations experienced

fi rsthand (ibid.). While differential association theory acknowledged the potential for

media to infl uence behavior, vicarious learning allows for individuals exposed to media

to vicariously experience behaviors to which they are not witness. At the time of Suther-

land’s writing, media were far less developed and therefore may have been less infl uential

(ibid.). Regardless of its source, within social learning theory, as was the case in differen-

tial association theory, imitation or vicarious learning is seen to be a mechanism of learn-

ing less effective than actual interactions with others in learning criminal behavior.

The notion of vicarious learning assumes that cognitions pertaining to the ob-

served rewards experienced by others are being stored within the memory of an indi-

vidual in a manner that can be used should the individual encounter a similar situation.

Social learning theory does not fully articulate the nature of these cognitions, although the

psychological social learning theory (Bandura 1977) from which it is drawn does specify

this vicarious learning process in more detail. This process fi rst entails the observation of

a model engaging in some form of behavior in which an individual observes the salient

characteristics of the model, the behavior the model is engaging in, and the reward or

punishment attached to the behaviors. During this part of the process, an individual sym-

bolically encodes his or her observations into memory, which allows for the individual to

call the observation to mind regardless of whether the environmental stimulus relating to

the observation is present. Through the use of language and verbal codes these observa-

tions can be rehearsed, with such a rehearsal strengthening the encoded model in memory.

Efforts to engage in a modeled behavior require the individual to partly rely upon memory

52

and partly rely upon imagination in order to engage in that behavior. Once the memories

of the model are supplemented by imaginal representations, the behavior is reproduced

through an effort to replicate, in terms of motor functioning, the original behavior of the

model. To the degree to which an individual possesses necessary skills, accurately trans-

lates ideas to behaviors, and refi nes the behavior through trial and error, an individual is

able to eventually reproduce a model’s behavior. Simply observing, encoding, rehearsing,

and possessing the ability to reproduce an observed form of behavior is insuffi cient for an

individual to actually reproduce the behavior. In order for the modeled behavior to occur,

an individual must also want the reward associated with the behavior.

This incorporation of vicarious learning into social learning theory further places

the theory to be much more in line with the symbolic interactionism that served as the

foundation of differential association theory (Akers 2009). In doing so, the radical behav-

iorism originally contained within the original statement of social learning theory (Bur-

gess and Akers 1966) has been greatly de-emphasized and the theory has become a soft

form of behaviorism (Akers 2009).

The cognitions generated through observational learning, and operant learning as

well, lead to the formation of defi nitions of the situation either favorable or unfavorable

to law violation within social learning theory. In the next section, the concept of defi ni-

tions is further explicated.

Defi nitions

Unlike differential association theory, which saw defi nitions as a necessary

condition for criminal behavior, social learning theory (ibid.) postulates that defi nitions

may proceed or succeed a criminal act. Within social learning theory, the term defi nitions

pertains to a wide array of cognitive factors associated with action, these include: skills

53

pertaining to a specifi c act; defi nitions of the situation; neutralizations; and self-concepts.

Much like differential association theory, within social learning theory skills

provide individuals with the opportunity to engage in criminal behavior. Skills can be

considered a form of defi nition because, within a situation, they orient the actions of an

individual. Skills need not be specifi c to a particular crime, although for particular crimes

specifi c skills may be required, and skills vary in terms of complexity. For example,

writing a bad check requires minimal skill. Forging checks, on the other hand, requires

far more skill. Additionally, skills can be learned through both noncriminal and criminal

activities. In Cressey’s (1950, 1952) study of embezzlement, skills learned in the course

of an individual’s occupation, accompanied by skills learned to detect fi nancial crimes,

afforded individuals the necessary skills required to engage in trust violations should an

individual wish to do so.

Skills can be subsumed under a broader concept of defi nitions. While the concept

of the defi nition of the situation was carried over from differential association theory, its

origins lie within the social psychology of Thomas ([1923] 1967]. Defi nitions contain at-

titudes and motives, which orient an individual’s behavior toward particular social ob-

jects. Thus, a defi nition not only specifi es how one should act towards a social object, but

also specifi es to which objects one should orient his or her behavior. Within social learn-

ing theory, defi nitions are learned primarily through operant conditioning and therefore to

the degree to which an individual has been differentially reinforced to engage in criminal

activities, an individual will contain cognitions – specifi cally, defi nitions of the situation

– which predispose the individual to engage in similar future criminal behaviors. Unlike

differential association theory in which only the direction of motives could be learned,

within social learning theory motives themselves can be learned (Akers 1985, 1996,

2009).

54

In addition to skills, motives, and attitudes, another kind of defi nition is a neutral-

ization. Like all defi nitions, neutralizations may precede or succeed a criminal act (Akers

2009, Sykes and Matza 1957). Within social learning theory, neutralizations serve as a

discriminant stimulus within a situation that negates defi nitions unfavorable to the com-

mission of a criminal act and frees an individual from either internal or external values

that regulate the particular behavior. Thus, neutralizations grant an individual a moral

reprieve within a situation and allow for one to engage in criminal behavior. Neutraliza-

tions provide individuals with exceptions to general held social values (e.g., denying

one is responsible for criminal behavior or framing the act in terms of it being justifi ed

because of higher obligations) and can be seen as an extension of legally recognized

defenses for criminal behaviors that are not recognized by the legal system or society at

large (Sykes and Matza 1957).

Another form of defi nition which is less emphasized in social learning theory is

one’s defi nition of self. As a result of socialization through learning processes related

to operant conditioning and behavioral modeling, an individual learns to self-regulate

behavior and take the role of the other (Akers 2009). Self-regulation occurs when an

individual punishes himself or herself following a behavior. Self-regulation also occurs

when an individual engages in role-taking behavior and anticipates potential rewards or

punishments that others may apply should the individual engage in a particular behavior.

Due to these dual mechanisms of self-regulation, one develops a sense of self-control.

This notion of self-control is not well articulated within social learning theory.

The theory does not explicitly state that, in fact, one has defi nitions of self, and instead

discusses self-control in regard to differential reinforcement. However, since reinforce-

ment histories lead to the formation of defi nitions, it must be through these defi nitions

that one self-regulates behavior. Self punishment requires an awareness of the moral sta-

55

tus of the act, which is cognitive in nature, and role-taking behavior requires an individual

to be aware of the morals possessed by others in order to anticipate whether an act will be

followed by reward or punishment.

While the previous discussion has focused on the content of defi nitions, it is also

important to emphasize their structure in terms of generality and specifi city (ibid.). All

defi nitions vary in the degree to which they apply to particular situations or across situa-

tions. Within a given situation, there are a variety of individuals or symbols that indicate

to an individual whether an act is likely to be reinforced. These discriminant stimuli vary

in the degree to which they are present across situations and times. An internalized defi ni-

tion, such as it is wrong to kill people, would be a general defi nition insofar as it applied

to a variety of contexts. However, even should such a general defi nition be present, a

neutralization could serve as a discriminant stimuli which neutralizes the relevance of a

particular defi nition within a given situation or set of situations. It may be perceived by an

individual to be immoral to kill another, but it would be permissible to do so if within a

situation such an act related to self-defense.

Criminal/Deviant Behavior

Social learning theory serves as an etiological explanation of criminal or devi-

ant behavior. Within the theory, criminal behavior is seen simply as a subset of a more

general class of deviant behavior that is codifi ed in the form of laws, and deviant behavior

is simply a behavior which violates the social norms of a group (Akers 1985, 2009). Thus,

social learning theory attempts to explain deviant behavior, which serves as an umbrella

term for a wide array of behaviors, including: criminal behavior; delinquent behavior; and

other behaviors which violate social norms.

Figure 3.2 outlines the detailed causal relationships proposed within social learn-

ing theory. An individual’s exposure to reinforcements or punishments favorable or

56

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57

unfavorable to criminal behavior is largely the result of the individual’s associations with

others that control behavior reinforcements. These reinforcements can directly affect

criminal behavior within a situation, and they additionally lead to the creation of defi ni-

tions (cognitions) within the individuals that are either favorable or unfavorable to crimi-

nal behavior. One’s associations can also create within an individual defi nitions favorable

to criminal behaviors by providing the individual with models of criminal behavior. Defi -

nitions favorable or unfavorable to criminal behavior are the result of exposure to behav-

ior models, reinforcements, and punishments pertaining to a specifi c behavior. Should an

individual experience the opportunity to commit a crime, these defi nitions – in the form

of attitudes, motives, concepts of self, and concepts of others – result in criminal behavior

insofar as the defi nition of the situation holds that criminal behavior will be rewarded.

Subsequent to an individual’s criminal behavior, the rewards or punishments he or

she experiences are moderated by: the individual’s associations with others; the degree to

which the behavior is non-socially reinforced; the degree to which the individual engages

in self-punishment; and the degree to which the individual possesses neutralizations

that justify the criminal act. If one’s associates administer punishment for the behavior,

then defi nitions of the situation unfavorable to future occurrences of the behavior will be

generated. Should an individual be rewarded for criminal behavior by others, the indi-

vidual will internalize a defi nition of the situation favorable to the act which will increase

the probability of future demonstrations of the behavior. Likewise, should an individual

experience non-social rewards as a result of the behaviors (e.g., a drug induced euphoria),

the criminal behavior will be reinforced and defi nitions favorable to future enactments of

the behaviors will be created. On the other hand, should an individual become violently

ill following drug use, the illegal behavior is less likely to reoccur and the individual will

possess defi nitions unfavorable to the behavior. Lastly, if an individual recognizes the

58

immoral status of an act, the individual is likely to engage in self-punishment, which de-

creases the likelihood of future occurrences of the behaviors. If an individual possesses

neutralizations that justify the criminal behavior, however, the individual can be freed

from self-punishment and is more likely to repeat the criminal or deviant behavior in the

future.

Scope Conditions

Social learning theory contains several scope conditions that relate to the theory’s

level of explanation. As a microlevel theory of criminal behavior, social learning theory

does not explain the distribution of reinforcements or behavioral models within the

environment. While Akers (2009) has specifi ed a complementary macrolevel theory, it is

beyond the scope of social learning theory to explain reinforcement and modeling pat-

terns within the environment.

An additional scope condition pertaining to social learning theories level of analy-

sis is that it does not explain why an individual possesses certain biological predisposi-

tions to engage in particular behavioral patterns, nor does it explain how various biologi-

cal mechanisms might affect the learning process. The theory does state that non-social

rewards or punishments can be present. This might relate to thrill-seeking behavior or

biological reactions to drug behavior (Akers 2009), or even basic biological functioning

such as hunger. The genetic, hormonal, biomechanical, or other biochemical processes

occurring within the individual which affects how non-social reinforcements or punish-

ments might be experienced are beyond the scope of the theory.

Another limitation of social learning theory is that it postulates learning only oc-

curs as a result of operant conditioning or vicarious learning processes. This empirical

stance does not allow for cognitive innovations that might precede an individual’s expo-

59

sure to rewards, punishments, or behavioral models. Within cognitive psychology, induc-

tion through the use of analogy or metaphor is seen as allowing individuals to act in novel

situations (see Holyoak and Nisbett 1988). Such situations would be free of a particular

reinforcement history and behaviors that are the result of mental operations relating to the

use of analogy or metaphor are therefore outside of the scope of social learning theory.

Conclusion

As an elaboration of differential association theory, social learning theory speci-

fi es how behaviors and defi nitions favorable to criminal activities are formed through

processes of operant conditioning and vicarious learning. Learning is possible as a result

of the biological tendency of human beings (and other animals as well) to favor rewards

over punishments. Additionally, human behavior is assumed to be plastic, otherwise

learning could not occur. The theory further specifi es that differential associations af-

fect the genesis of criminal behavior because they control behavioral reinforcements and

present individuals with behavioral models. These reinforcements and behavioral models

lead an individual to learn defi nitions favorable or unfavorable to criminal behavior, and

additionally provide individuals with self-concepts, which allow for the self-regulation of

behavior. While an individual may engage in self-punishment, it is also possible that an

individual might possess neutralizations that mitigate this punishment.

Social learning theory only explains a behavior at the level of the individual and

does not attempt to explain macrolevel sources of variation pertaining to reinforcements

or models, nor does the theory attempt to explain how the biological functioning of an

organism affects the degree to which non-social reinforcements or punishments are ex-

perienced. In order to further summarize and re-articulate social learning theory, a formal

statement of the theory is presented.

60

Theoretical Restatement

Assumptions

A1. Human nature contains a predisposition to favor rewards over punishments.

A2. Human behavior is plastic.

A3. An individual’s biological state can provide him or her with non-social stimuli which serve as either behavior rewards or punishment.

Conceptual Defi nitions

D1. Differential Association – The degree to which an individual interacts with other individuals or sources of social information (e.g., media, works of fi ction) which provide reinforcements, punishments, behavioral models, and defi nitions (all of which may be structured or patterned) which encourage criminal or deviant be-haviors.

D2. Differential Reinforcement – The degree to which an individual receives rewards or punishments following criminal or deviant behaviors.

A. Positive reinforcement – The degree to which an individual experiences plea-sure or positive stimuli following an individual’s engagement in a particular behavior.

B. Negative reinforcement – The degree to which an individual experiences an adverse stimuli which is avoided or mitigated following an individual’s en-gagement in a particular behavior.

C. Positive punishment – The degree to which an individual experiences averse stimuli following a behavior.

D. Negative reinforcement – The degree to which a positively valued reward is removed following one’s engagement in a particular behavior.

D3. Behavioral Modeling – The process whereby one learns vicariously by the ob-

servation of others (whether real or fi ctional/directly or indirectly) experiencing

61

rewards or punishments following a behavior and the formation of defi nitions sur-rounding this behavior.

D4. Defi nitions - Cognitions stored in memory in the form of skills, motives (including anticipated rewards), attitudes, neutralizations, and self-concepts which orient an individual’s behavior within a given situation or across a wide array of situations.

A. Neutralization – A specifi c kind of defi nition which justifi es a criminal act on the basis that it is an exception to a generally held social value.

B. Self-control – the process whereby an individual inhibits criminal or devi-ant behaviors on the basis of punishments an individual imposes on him or herself, or refrains from criminal behavior as a result of anticipating punishment from other.

D5. Criminal behavior – A deviant behavior which violates a criminal law.

D6. Deviant behavior – A behavior which violates the norms of a social group.

Knowledge Claims

P1. Criminal or deviant behavior is a positive function of frequency, duration, priority, and intensity of one’s:

A. Associations that are favorable to criminal violations.

B. Behavioral models which experience rewards for engaging in criminal behaviors.

C. Defi nitions which see criminal behavior as being rewarding.

P2. Criminal or deviant behavior is a positive function of the level of reinforcement one experiences following a criminal behavior.

P3. The degree to which a criminal or deviant behavior is reinforced is a:

A. Positive function of the degree to which the behavior is non-socially re-warding.

B. Negative function of the degree to which self-control produces punish-ments for the behavior.

62

C. Positive function of the degree to which an individual possesses neutral-izations for the specifi c behavior or class of behaviors.

D. A positive function of the degree to which associations provide reinforce-ments for the behavior (e.g., approval, status).

P4. The degree to which an individual possess defi nitions favorable to engaging in criminal or deviant acts is a positive function of:

A. The degree to which a criminal/deviant behavior has been reinforced in the past (either socially or non-socially).

B. The degree to which one has been exposed to behavioral models which are reinforced for criminal or deviant behavior.

P5. The degree to which an individual differentially associates with sources favorable to criminal or deviant behavior is a positive function of the degree to which an individual anticipates reinforcements for criminal behavior from an association.

Scope Conditions

SC1. The distribution of association within an individual’s environment is beyond the scope of the theory.

SC2. The biological or physiological sources of variation affecting the way in which a person experiences a particular stimulus is beyond the scope of the theory.

SC2. Other possible source of learning (such as those relating to induction, analogies, or metaphors) are beyond the scope if the theory.

63

Chapter 4

Social Control Theory

The emergence of social control theory represented a response to learning and

strain theories of criminal behavior which were predominant prior to the 1960s (Hirschi

1989). Operating upon the assumption that human nature was essentially hedonistic, so-

cial control theory posits that the absence of social control is suffi cient in explaining why

individuals did not engage in criminal behaviors and no special explanation of criminal

motivation was necessary to explain the occurrence of a crime (Hirschi [1969] 2005).

Within social control theory, controls are not merely internal or external constraints on

behavior but rather they are emergent properties of an individual’s bonds to society. That

is, social control is a property of one’s embeddedness in conventional relationships and

the degree to which one lacks conventional ties he or she is free to deviate from the norms

of conventional society.

The processes of formalizing social control theory will specify the theory’s causal

relationships in more detail and in doing so will focus particular attention on the theory’s

assumptions of human nature, core theoretical concepts, and propositional relationships.

Additionally, attention will be given to the theory’s scope conditions. Prior to engaging

in this formalization, however, it is important to distinguish social control theory from

self-control theory (Gottfredson and Hirschi [1990] 2004). Whereas self-control theory

emphasizes that individuals with the durable trait of low self-control are more likely to

engage in criminal behavior, social control theory emphasizes an absence of bonds to so-

ciety as being the primary source of criminal behavior. While both theories share similar

assumptions of human nature, they remain distinct theories (Hirschi [1969] 2005: xiv).

As such, this formalization only will focus upon social control theory.

64

Assumptions of Human Nature

Perhaps one of the most emphasized aspects of social control theory is its assump-

tion of human nature. This is primarily for two reasons. First, at the time of its inception

social control theory was unique in that the motivation of criminal offenders was viewed

as something that did not require a special explanation (Hirschi [1969] 2004). Rather

than trying to explain criminal motivations as being learned or the result of social pres-

sures, social control theory has emphasized the Hobbesian question of why individuals

conform to societal rules. Thus, the primary research problem social control theory

sought to explain surrounds why individuals fail to conform to societal rules rather than

why individuals deviate from them.

A second reason the role of human nature is so unambiguous within social control

theory is that it was central to the integration-elaboration debate which held the attention

of criminologists throughout the late 1970s and the entire 1980s (see Messner, Krohn,

and Liska 1989). As a result of efforts by Elliot, Ageton, and Cantor (1979) to integrate

empirically strain, differential association, and social contol theories, a fi restorm of de-

bate ensued surrounding whether it was possible to integrate criminological theories with

seemingly contradictory assumptions of human nature. Whereas cultural deviance theo-

ries assumed human nature to be tabula rasa and strain theories assumed human nature to

be essentially pro-social or to tend towards conformity, control theories assumed human

nature to be hedonistic. As a result of these contradictory assumptions of human nature

the three theories were seen as incompatible in regards to theoretical integration (Hirschi

1989). This discussion of the underlying assumptions of human nature contained within

criminological theories will be revisited in the fi nal chapter. For now, it is suffi cient to

simply observe these disparate takes on the human condition and further elaborate upon

the consequences social control theory’s assumption of human nature has upon the rela-

tionship between the theory’s explanan and explanandum.

65

Social control theory includes two basic assumptions of human nature: hedonism

and plasticity. While its assumption of hedonism is in line with hedonistic assumptions of

human nature contained within differential association and social learning theories, social

control theory’s view of plasticity is more limited.

Hedonism

Social control theory (Hirschi [1969] 2005) views human nature to be hedonistic

and assumes hedonistic tendencies to be constant across all individuals. This view of

human nature is a response to the question of why individuals engage in criminal behav-

ior. Social control theory’s response to this question is that all individuals are capable of

engaging in criminal behavior because hedonism, and therefore motivation, is a human

constant. Despite seeing individuals as being inherently hedonistic, social control theory

does not assume motivation necessarily leads to criminal or non-criminal outcomes (Hirs-

chi, [1969] 2005: 33). Instead, social control theory does not problematize motivation,

and rather than asking why an individual engages in criminal behavior, the theory asks

why don’t individuals engage in crime?1

Plasticity

Since social control theory is only interested in explaining why individuals do not

engage in criminal behavior, it is only interested in socialization processes insofar as they

prevent criminal behavior. Social control theory (Hirschi [1969] 2005) does view human

nature as being plastic in regards to this question, as the theory sees individuals as being

capable of being socialized to hold beliefs in the legitimacy of the social order and the

immorality of certain behaviors. While plasticity is present in regards to learning not to

engage in criminal behavior, it is more limited than social learning theory in its view of

plasticity since social control theory eschews the possibility of learning motives.

66

In sum, social control theory assumes human nature to be hedonistic and plastic.

While human nature can be molded through socialization, socialization processes result

not in the learning of behavioral motivations but rather in the self-regulation of pre-exist-

ing innate and hedonistic tendencies through one’s belief in the conventional moral order.

The theory does not assume hedonistic tendencies lead to criminal or non-criminal behav-

iors. Instead, it utilizes its assumption of hedonism to hold constant motivation across all

actors.

Theoretical Restatement

Social control theory (Hirschi [1969] 2005) proposes that individuals do not

engage in criminal behaviors as a result of their bonds to conventional society. Thus, un-

like other theories being formalized, social control theory is not explaining the occurrence

of crimes, but rather the absence of crimes. In explaining the absence of crimes, social

control theory posits that one’s level of social control is positively related to the absence

of criminal behavior.

Level of Social Control

The amount of social control to which an individual is exposed is a result of the

individual’s level of: (1) attachment to convention members of society; (2) commitment

to the conventional society; (3) involvement in conventional activities; and (4) belief in

the norms and values of the society. The social bonds one has with society serve to regu-

late behavior from engaging in criminal behavior.

Attachments

Rather than emphasizing the role a superego or other mental concepts refl ect-

ing the internalization of social values might play in regulating criminal behavior, social

67

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68

control theory emphasizes the degree to which an individual is attached affectually to

conventional members of society as both directly and indirectly affecting the absence of

criminal or delinquent behavior (Hirschi [1969] 2004). Under this view, should behavior

patterns take a turn in a criminal direction, this is not the result of an individual laps-

ing into temporary psychosis or a change in one’s conscience. Instead, it is the result of

changing affectual ties and such ties are seen as being both directly and indirectly regulat-

ing human behavior. Attachments to parents, peers, and teachers are particularly empha-

sized within the theory.

Attachment to Parents. A parent exercises direct controls when he or she engages

in direct supervision of the activity a child and thus impedes upon the child’s freedom to

engage in criminal behavior (ibid.). But such direct supervision is only a small part of so-

cial control, and social control theory holds that indirect controls are far more important.

When confronted with the opportunity to engage in delinquent activity in the absence of

direct controls, children will contemplate what a parent would think of a particular behav-

ior and as a result will refrain from such activities insofar as the child believes a parent

would disapprove. This virtual control is the result of children sharing a mental life with

his or her parents and is accompanied by the perception that parents are always aware of

their children’s location and activities. The degree to which a child shares a mental life

with his or her parents is refl ected by the degree to which the child relates to his or her

parents by: (1) seeking their opinions; (2) sharing his or her thoughts and feelings; (3)

discussing future plans; or (4) having parents clarify rules or understand things the child

otherwise doesn’t understand. The importance of a shared mental life lies not with the

frequency of interactions, but rather lies within the content conveyed during such mental-

life sharing activities. The content of such exchanges, however, are not the source of

attachment, but rather moral attachment lies within the bond itself. Additionally, it would

be tempting to infer that a bond could facilitate both legally conforming and deviant

69

behavior depending on the nature of the shared mental life and whether or not a parent

or parents were criminals. Social control theory rejects such a possibility by noting that

such a relationship would require a parent to share information pertaining to his or her

criminal activities with his or her children. Social control theory denies such a phenom-

enon occurs (ibid.).

In addition to the direct and indirect functions of attachment in regulating behav-

ior, it also generates a generalized capacity within children to become attached to others

as well (ibid.). Attachments to parents instill children with the ability to attach to other

individuals, particularly authority fi gures, and additionally fosters a general belief in the

legitimacy of social rules. As such, attachment to parents affects one’s level of freedom

to engage in criminal behavior in terms of direct and indirect controls, the genesis of the

generalized capacity to attach to others, and the belief in the conventional moral order it

instills within a child.

Attachment to school. In addition to being attached to parents affectively, chil-

dren also are attached to schools in a variety of ways (ibid.). Unlike families which may

deviate from conventional society, schools, when part of a universal system of education,

are tightly coupled with the conventional social order. As such, they not only facilitate

bonds related to attachment, they also foster social bonds related to involvement, com-

mitment, and belief. The process whereby one becomes attached to school entails: (1) the

student’s academic ability; (2) the objective level of academic performance which follows

from academic ability; (3) the emergence of self-perceptions of academic ability; and (4)

attachments to the school which are the result of academic achievement. To say one is

attached to a school affectively, then, is to say that a child cares what teachers or school

personal thinks of him or her (ibid.).

For social control theory, the affective relationships which develop between chil-

dren and agents of the schools are fi rst based upon the academic abilities of a child (ibid.).

70

Within the theory, academic ability is related to intelligence, and a child possessing high

levels of academic ability will perform better in school. The increased school perfor-

mance leads to attachments to teachers and other agents of the school. Aditionally, it lee-

ads to involvement in conventional activities, which have the effect of further increasing

a child’s academic performance and commitments to conventional society. As a result

of the additional attachments and stakes in conformity generated by successful academic

performance, a child is less free to engage in delinquent activity.

Attachment to Peers. Unlike competing theories of crime, such as differential

association theory, which would argue attachment to delinquent peers would be causally

related to delinquency, social control theory holds that no such relationship exists (ibid.).

While a general attachment to conventional others fosters social control and impedes

the occurrence of delinquent acts, attachment to delinquent peers is theorized to not be

related to delinquency within social control theory for several reasons. First, this is pri-

marily because non-delinquents are unlikely to have delinquent friends as a result of their

higher stakes in conformity. Second, since social control theory states that the absence of

social control explains both why individuals engage in delinquent acts and why he or she

associates with delinquent peers, the existence of any relationship between having delin-

quent friends and engaging in delinquency is seen as being spurious since they both are

caused by the absence of social bonds.

While the social bond of attachment is often related to other social bonds, attach-

ment represents an affectual bond between two individuals for whom which a mental

life is shared – that is, one anticipates what others would think of his or her actions and

adjusts his or her behavior accordingly. Within social control theory, the fear of what

parents, teachers, or conventional peers might think should an actor engage in a delin-

quency serves as either a direct or indirect control over an individual’s behavior and leads

71

to the absence of criminal behavior. Social control theory does not contain any concept

which pertains to latent mental constructs such as a superego or conscience and instead

sees attachment as the sociological equivalent of these concepts (ibid.). Within social

control theory, one may believe in the moral order, but it is only through the other bonds,

attachment and commitment in particular, do these beliefs carry weight.

Commitment

Within social control theory, commitment refl ects the degree to which an individ-

ual has investments in the conventional social order and stands to lose something should

he or she engage in deviant or criminal behavior (ibid.). Social control theory proposes

that the time and energy spent achieving conventional goals (such as academic success or

career aspirations) instills within individuals a vested interest in conformity. Thus, social

control theory also takes into account the rationality of actors (ibid.). Unlike classical

economic theory’s view of actors as a having perfect knowledge, however, social control

theory allows for a person’s ignorance of the criminal status of an act to explain why an

individual engages in a criminal behavior.2 Ignorance, in this situation, refl ects a failure of

social controls to socialize an individual to not engage in certain acts.

Involvement

Involvement, as a form of social bond, is intricately related to commitment.

Whereas commitment refl ects an individual’s stakes in conformity, involvement refl ects

action taken on the part of an actor which are intended to realize conventional goals

(ibid.). Within social control theory, involvement does not represent the proposition that

boredom leads to crime, but instead represents the notion that conventional goals lead to

conventional activities. In an effort to realize conventional goals, individuals will engage

in conventional activities. Once an individual has achieved conventional goals, his or

72

her commitment to the conventional order is increased. Thus, there is a positive feedback

loop present within the theory in which commitment leads to involvement, and involve-

ment feeds subsequently increases commitment. As a result of the interrelated nature of

commitment and involvement, involvement can be more specifi cally defi ned as being the

engagement in any conforming behavior which is oriented towards a conventional goal.

Since involvement is only important insofar as it increases commitment to conventional

society, the relationship between involvement and the absence of criminal behaviors is

indirect.

Belief

Unlike other theories of crime or delinquency which have emphasized heterogo-

nous social values within a society, social control theory assumes value-consensus exists

within a society (ibid.). This assumption, however, does not mean individuals are invari-

ant in terms in their belief in the legitimacy of social rules. Within social control theory,

everyone is aware of the shared moral order, but as a result of variations within individual

levels of commitment and attachment, the degree to which an individual believes he or

she should adhere to conventional morality varies from person to person. Within social

control theory, then, belief simply refers to the degree to which an individual perceives

societal rules as being binding on one’s behavior and the legitimacy one attributes to

those enforcing these rules. It does not, however, pertain the belief in subcultural values

because such beliefs under social control theory refl ect the absence of attachments and

commitments to conventional society, and therefore, the belief in subcultural values in

fact represents an absence of bonds to conventional society. Since motivation is assumed

within the theory, such an absence of social bonds is suffi cient in explaining delinquent

behavior and any relationship between subcultural values and delinquency is spurious.

73

Absence of Delinquency

Although social control theory assumes value-consensus in regards to morality,

the theory is oddly silent on the issue of legality. Social control theory seeks to explain

the absence of delinquency, and defi nes delinquency as being “…acts, the detection of

which is thought to result in punishment of the person committing them by agents of the

larger society” (Hirschi [1969] 2004: 47). While it is clear delinquent acts are defi ned in

terms of the punitive reactions they would generate should they be discovered, the theory

does not specify the legal status of such acts as being important or that the age of an indi-

vidual is in anyway relevant. As a result of the theory’s omission of potential age or legal

dimensions in regards to its defi nition of delinquency, various acts ranging from those

punishable by disciplinary action taken by one’s employer or teacher to those punish-

able by agents of the state would be defi ned as being delinquent acts. Delinquency, then,

under social control theory is consistent with general notions of deviance (Hirschi [1969]

200).

It is also important to note that social control theory is not explaining the occur-

rence of delinquent behavior, but rather its absence. Social control theory is not con-

cerned with why an individual engages in a specifi c criminal behavior because the moti-

vation to engage in particular acts is seen as being constant. Instead, social control theory

is concerned what factors prevent an individual from engaging in any type of criminal

behavior. Since the absence of delinquent behavior can only be explained within social

control theory as a function of the presence of social control, social control theory can

explain the occurrence of a delinquent behavior as a function of the absence of control.

Although this allows for social control theory to positively explain delinquent behavior

as a function of the absence of social controls, it does not allow the theory to explain why

an individual engages in a particular criminal behavior since motivation is seen within the

theory as being constant.

74

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The original statement of social control theory can be further generalized from its

original specifi cation. In its original form, social control theory emphasized particular

attachments and commitments related to the educational system and the degree to which

they impacted the absence of delinquent behavior. As will be seen in the next section, this

emphasis on social controls related to the educational system implies such a system must

be universally in place in order for these forms of control to be exercised (ibid). Howev-

er, it is possible to create a more generalized form of the model which is more concerned

with attachments, commitments, involvements, and beliefs than is present within Figure

4.1. A generalized model is specifi ed in Figure 4.2.

Scope Conditions

Social control theory contains two major scope conditions that limits its ability

to explain criminal behavior. First, the theory assumes the value-system of a society is

culturally homogenous. Second, the theory is incapable of explaining particular criminal

behavior and instead can only predict the outcome of criminal behavior in general.

Cultural Homogeneity

As a result of social control theory’s emphasis on value-consensus and social

control, value-consensus within a society is necessary in order for social control theory to

make accurate predictions surrounding delinquency. Value-consensus, however, is not a

given, and structural relations can either enhance or diminish the presence of consensus

within a society. Three particular forms of structural relations are particularly important

in order for value-consensus to be present within social control theory.

76

First, disparate ethnic groups who differ signifi cantly in social values and yet oc-

cupy a common political territory would violate social control theory’s scope condition

of value-consensus. Thus, social control theory would be of limited power in explaining

delinquency under conditions of primary cultural confl ict (see Sellin 1938), foreign oc-

cupancy of a state by a foreign power which imposes its own legal order, or under condi-

tions in which autonomous ethnic nations exist within a political region which differ in

moral beliefs. While it is possible social control theory could still yield accurate pre-

dictions under such conditions, social controls would need to be respecifi ed in terms of

connections to particular groups, and much theoretical work would be required in order to

preserve the assumption of value-consensus.

Second, internal sources of social differentiation, which have traditionally been

viewed to accompany modernity, also diminish value-consensus. As societies become

more differentiated internally as a result of population increases and the accompany-

ing differentiation which occurs within the economic division of labor, value-consensus

diminishes and a plurality of groups emerge which potentially possess disparate values

(Durkheim [1933] 1984). But shared institutions can mitigate the negative impact social

differentiation has on shared values, and the educational system can serve a vital role in

establishing common values (e.g., Durkheim 1956). In regards to the value-consensus

scope condition, then, societies which have high levels of internal differentiation are only

beyond the scope of social control theory’s explanatory range insofar as the society also

lacks integrating institutions, such as a universal educational system. Additionally, social

control theory assumes the presence of rule enforcement agents is necessary in order for

the bond of commitment to constrain individual behaviors effectively (Hirschi [1969]

2005). Any system of social control would also need to be universal in its application in

order for such control efforts to maintain consistent enforcement of the values of conven-

tional society. Insofar as internal differentiation undermines the consistency and univer-

77

sality of enforcement activities, a society in possession of such characteristics would also

lie outside the scope of social control theory.

Although the assumption of value-consensus contained within social control theo-

ry limits the theory’s applicability to societies with high levels of values-consensus, when

treated as a scope condition, such a limitation also allows for the theory to make accurate

predictions surrounding delinquency when the value-consensus scope condition is met.

Under conditions of value-consensus, social control theory may have greater predictive

power than theories, such as differential association, which assume high levels of social

differentiation and the presence of confl icting values.

Specifi c Criminal Behaviors

As a result of social control theory’s explanandum being the absence of delinquent

behavior, the theory is unable to explain why an individual engages in a specifi c criminal

behavior. But because the theory can explain the absence of delinquent behavior, it can

also explain the reciprocal of the absence of delinquent behavior – that is, the occurrence

delinquent behavior. Since social control theory holds motivation constant, and therefore

cannot explain why an individual engages in one act over another, explaining specifi c

criminal behaviors are beyond the scope of the theory.

Conclusion

Within social control theory, the absence of social controls is theorized to cre-

ate delinquent outcomes, while the presence of social controls are intended to explain

the absence of delinquent acts. Affective attachments generated within the family not

only provide direct and indirect controls that regulate an individual’s behaviors, but such

attachments are also theorized to generate a general capacity to bond affectively with oth-

ers, particularly authority fi gures. This capacity to bond allows for children to generate

78

attachments to teachers who additionally provide a source of social control. The social

control exercised within the school is not simply a function of attachments to teachers,

however, as the academic ability of an individual can lead an individual towards academ-

ic success. Academic success in turn fosters greater stakes in conformity and involve-

ments in conventional activities that are aimed at achieving conventional goals. Attach-

ments, commitments, and involvement in conventional activities all generate within the

individual a belief in the legitimacy of the moral order and all these bonds together serve

to regulate one’s freedom to deviation.

But social control theory is not without its limitations. As a result of its emphasis

on explaining the absence of delinquent behavior, it is only able to explain the occurrence

of deviance behaviors and not their forms. An Additional theoretical limitation exists in

terms of the theory’s scope condition which specifi es the theory works best in homog-

enous societies. With these conceptual relationships and scope conditions in mind, a

theoretical restatement will be proposed.

Theoretical Restatement

Assumptions

A1. Human nature is hedonistic.

A2. Hedonism is the source of human motivations.

A3. Hedonism is a human constant.

A4. Human nature is plastic.

79

Conceptual Defi nitions

D1. Social Control – the regulation of hedonistic tendencies which is the result one’s bonds (attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief) to conventional society.

A. Attachment – An affectual bond between individuals and conventional oth-ers in which the anticipated reactions of conventional others to the com-mission of a delinquent act serves to limit one’s engagements in such acts.

B. Commitment – The amount of conventional social rewards or anticipated social rewards an individual stands to lose should he or she engage in de-linquent activities.

C. Involvement – The amount of conventional activity one engages in which is intended to allow for the achievement of conventional goals.

D. Belief – The degree to which an individual within a society perceives the rules of the society to be binding upon one’s behavior and the degree to which rule enforcement agents of the conventional order are seen as being legitimate.

E. Delinquency – An act which is punishable by representatives of conven-tional society should it be detected.

Knowledge Claims

P1. The absence of delinquency is a positive additive function of one’s:A. Level of attachment.B. Level of commitment.C. Level of involvement.D. Level of belief.

P3. One’s level of commitment is a positive function of one’s:

A. Level of attachment. B. Level of involvement.

P4. One’s level of involvement is a positive function of one’s level of commitment.

80

P5. One’s level of belief is a positive function of one’s:

A. Level of attachment.B. Level of commitment.

Scope Conditions

SC1. Heterogeneous societies which lack value-consensus are beyond the scope of social control theory in explaining delinquent behavior.

SC2. The reasons why an individual engages in a specifi c criminal act is beyond the scope of the theory.

Endnotes

1 Hirschi [1969] 2005 advocates for explanations that explain the absence of a phenom-enon. Thus, social control theory is only intended to explain the absence of criminal behavior and not its positive occurrence.

2 This indicates that social control theory is not entirely incompatible with cultural con-fl ict theory or differential association theory as both also allow for ignorance of conven-tional order to be a predictor of criminal activity.

81

Chapter 5

General Strain Theory

The anomie/strain theory tradition is one of criminology’s longest-running theo-

retical traditions. As originally proposed by Merton (1968), anomie theory seeks to

explain rates of deviance as a function of people’s inability to achieve commonly held

societal goals. Elaborations of the theory have emphasized how different goals - such

as monetary wealth (Merton 1968), middle-class status (Cohen 1955), status in general

(Cloward and Olin 1960), achieving masculinity (Greenberg 1977; Messerschmidt 1993),

or pursuing leisure activities (Greenberg 1977) - can potentially lead to criminal behav-

iors. Unlike these theories that have emphasized how macro-structural relations affect

goal attainment, general strain theory (GST) attempts to specify the microlevel founda-

tions of how adverse circumstances can lead to criminal behavior.

While all anomie theories emphasize how the inability to achieve goals leads to

crime, GST additionally specifi es that exposure to adverse stimuli or the loss of valued

things can also serve as a motivating forces for criminal behavior (Agnew 2006). The

basic argument of GST is that an individual who experiences a strain (a goal blockage,

exposure to adverse stimuli, or the loss of valued things) experiences a negative affective

state which motivates the individual to engage in coping behavior intended to alleviate

the negative affect he or she is experiencing (ibid). Coping behavior need not be criminal,

but it is likely to take on a criminal direction depending on the degree to which an indi-

vidual is disposed to criminal behavior, possesses the ability to legally cope, and poten-

tially experiences high costs for engaging in criminal behavior.

GST is unlike differential association, social learning, and social bonding theo-

ries in that it explicitly seeks to elaborate the relationship between emotions and crime.

82

While emotions could be viewed as rewards or punishments within social learning theory,

this aspect of social learning theory has been underdeveloped and only focuses on how

negative emotions produce self-regulation – not how they serve as positive motivators for

criminal behavior.

The process of formalizing GST is more diffi cult than the other formalizations

which have been presented thus far. Many of the concepts within GST are ambiguous as

to whether they are propositional or defi nitional statements. Gibbs (1972) has long ob-

served this to be a problem in theories which have not been formalized. This problem is

particularly evident within GST as the underlying elements of major theoretical concepts

contain a tremendous amount of overlap with elements that are subsumed under other

concepts. This problem of ambiguity also creates potential problems with relationships

being tautological.

Despite these diffi culties, the formalization of GST will be organized in a similar

manner to previous chapters. First, the theory’s assumptions of human nature will be

discussed. Second, a theoretical model of GST will be presented, theoretical concepts

will be defi ned, and the theory’s causal structure will be discussed. Third, conceptual

problems will be discussed that pertain to possible tautologies that are present within

the theory. Fourth, GST contains an end-to-end integration with social control and social

learning theories. The relationship between GST and these theories will be discussed in

regard to potential tautologies that exist as a result of this integration. Fifth, theoretical

scope conditions contained within GST will be identifi ed in order to identify limitations

in the theory’s explanatory power. The fi nal section will conclude the chapter and restate

GST in terms of its assumptions of human nature, conceptual defi nitions, knowledge

claims, and scope conditions.

83

Assumptions of Human Nature

GST rests upon several assumptions of human nature when attempting to explain

criminal behavior: pragmatism; hedonism; and plasticity. The theory’s view of humans

as pragmatic can be traced back to early statements in anomie theory (Cloward and Olin

1960; Cohen 1955; Merton 1968). Within these theoretical statements, individuals active-

ly problem solved and innovated behaviors in the face of the failure to attain positively

valued goals. But these early theories also assumed human nature to be moldable as well.

In anomie theory (Merton 1968), actors learned both socially approved goals and the ap-

propriate behaviors to be employed pursuing these goals. When individuals encountered

a discrepancy between the goals they held and their ability to achieve these goals, they

pragmatically adapted. If human nature was static, no such adaptation would be possible.

Cohen’s (1955) and Cloward’s and Ohlin’s (1960) elaborations of anomie theory also

share these assumption of human nature. When individuals are faced with the inability

to achieve goals, they not only innovate, but the particular path individuals follow is con-

tingent upon the resources within a community that foster the learning of particular kinds

of innovations. GST shares these assumptions of human nature and further elaborates

upon them.

Pragmatism

Versions of strain theory prior to GST have emphasized how criminal behavior

can emerge as result of the failure of individuals to attain positively valued goals. Within

anomie theory (Merton 1968), when faced with the inability to attain commonly held suc-

cess goals individuals either reacted by conforming to conduct norms and not innovating

(conformity), rejecting conduct norms and continuing to pursue the success goals (in-

novation), rejecting a success goal but dogmatically subscribing to the behavioral norms

regulating its pursuit (ritualism), rejecting both the success goals and behavioral norms

84

(retreatism), or attempting to restructure the society to have new success goals and new

socially approved behaviors to pursue them (revolutions). Although Merton specifi ed

only the types of adaptations and not the specifi c factors leading to one adaptation over

another, the very use of the term adaptation connotes that individuals are seen as modify-

ing their behaviors in light of their failure to achieve goals. That is, actors are seen as

being pragmatic. Also working in the anomie tradition, Cohen (1955) explicitly states

humans are seen as being ‘problem solvers’ and this theme is also evident in Cloward’s

and Ohlin’s (1960) versions of strain theory as well. GST further develops the pragmatic

assumption of anomie theory by specifying that the resources one has access to largely

infl uences the particular adaptations one will engage in when faced with the inability to

achieve a commonly held goal.

While early versions of anomie theory have focused on the inability to achieve

goals as a motivating force for criminal behavior (Agnew 1992, 2006), GST expands the

potential sources driving one to engage in criminal behavior. Within GST (Agnew 2004),

in addition to the failure to achieve goals, individuals can also engage in criminal behav-

ior as a result of experiencing an averse stimuli or losing something of value. These ideas

will be further developed in the next section, for now it is important to observe that GST

maintains the pragmatic assumption of human nature common to all anomie theories.

Hedonism

In order for an individual to adapt pragmatically to the particular situation, he

or she requires some source of motivation. In pragmatism, the problem itself is seen as

a motivation, yet this can be specifi ed in greater detail. GST (Agnew 2006) argues that

individuals engage in criminal coping behaviors in an effort to mitigate the negative

emotions which result from strains. The negative emotions one experiences as a result of

85

strains can therefore be seen as the problem one seeks to solve. GST is explicit in stating

that individuals seek to escape the pressures associated with negative emotions and in do-

ing so emotions are implied to be one way in which an individual can experience pleasure

or pain.

The assumption of human nature contained within social control theory (Hirschi

[1969] 2005) holds that individuals are hedonistic and prefer pleasure over pain. Within

social control theory, criminal behavior is seen as pleasurable and therefore requires no

special theory of motivation. Pleasure, however, is only one side of the hedonism coin,

and individuals acting hedonistically also seek to avoid or escape displeasures. Since

negative emotions are specifi ed to be unpleasing within GST, it is possible for a hedonis-

tic explanation of human behavior to be positively motivated as a result of an individual

experiencing displeasure. As a result of this hedonistic assumption that is key to both the

theory as a whole and its pragmatic assumption of human nature, GST does not contain

assumptions of human nature that are contradictory to differential association, social con-

trol, and social learning theories of criminal behavior.1

Plasticity

GST also assumes human nature to be plastic. Earlier versions of strain theories

demonstrated this assumption in several ways. First, the goals individuals pursued within

these theories were a function of socialization processes. Within anomie theory, common

success goals were a property of a society and not an individual. Merton (1968) noted

that the accumulation of monetary wealth was unique in that one could always attain

more. Nonetheless, a goal of monetary acquisition can only occur in societies with money

and therefore the goal itself was seen as being heavily contingent on the particular goals

available within a society. Cohen (1955) emphasized that individuals pursue “middle-

class” status as a goal. Like the pursuit of monetary wealth, middle-class status is highly

86

contingent upon economic relationships within a given society. Other types of goals have

also been emphasized. Greenberg (1977), for example, noted that teenagers often attempt

to achieve a masculine identity and such an identity would also be heavily infl uenced

by the particular society in which an individual lives. In all these situations, a particular

goal does not exist independent of a larger social group. As such, individuals must learn

particular goals.

In addition to goals being structured by a group or society, the legitimate means

for pursuing these goals must also be learned. In anomie theory (Merton 1968), the learn-

ing of conduct norms is present in several ways. First, conformists are those who have

learned both the socially approved goals of a society and the socially approved means

for achieving these goals (e.g. conduct norms). But should an individual no longer fi nd

satisfaction in either a goal or the means of achieving the goal, adaptations occur. With

the incentives to conform under such a situation diminished, individuals become free to

engage in forms of deviance. This ability to adopt new goals or new forms of behavior

refl ects that anomie theory does imply human nature to be plastic. Other anomie theorists

also specifi ed how individuals were able to learn how to engage deviant behavior. For

example, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) noted that communities contained various resources

which could instruct an individual on how to engage in specifi c kinds of deviant behav-

iors.

GST also assumes human nature to be plastic and specifi es this plasticity in

greater detail. Within GST, individuals may learn social skills that help them to cope with

aversive stimuli, they may learn how to justify behaviors in the face of certain aversive

stimuli, and they may also develop certain personality traits as a result of exposure to

adverse circumstances. These items will be discussed in more detail in the next section

where GST is more clearly articulated.

87

GST shares key assumptions of human nature with the other formalized theories.

Unlike anomie theory, GST does not assume everyone is identically socialized (see Ko-

rnhauser 1978) and allows for variation in socialization or exposure to strains to differen-

tially result in criminal behavior. The difference between GST and other anomie theories

in this regard is a function of GST’s microlevel emphasis that does not require individuals

to be socialized identically into social values in order to explain how strains can result in

criminal behavior. GST simply assumes individuals are plastic, pragmatic, and hedonistic.

Theoretical Restatement

GST (Agnew 1992, 2009) proposes criminal behavior occurs when an individual

encounters a strain and utilizes criminal behaviors as a way of coping with the nega-

tive emotions generated by strains. GST specifi es both a situational theory of criminal

behavior and theory of criminality that details how individuals develop predispositions

to engage in criminal behavior (Agnew 1992). The core concepts utilized by GST in

explaining criminal behavior include: dispositions for criminal coping; strains; criminal

coping behavior; one’s ability to legally cope; the cost of criminal coping; and negative

emotional states. As will be evident when these concepts are more clearly defi ned, the

concepts within GST severely overlap, and it becomes unclear at times whether relation-

ships between concepts are defi nitional or propositional in nature. Figure 4.1 presents a

theoretical model of the basic causal relationships proposed by GST. This model empha-

sizes GST’s situational explanation and omits relationships among moderating concepts,

between moderating concepts and strains, and between moderating concepts and negative

emotions due to the afore mentioned conceptual ambiguities within the theory. This prob-

lem will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.

In addition to detailing how strains are theorized to produce criminal outcomes,

the theory has been elaborated to specify the macrolevel dynamics associated with GST

88

and how the theory compliments social control and social learning theories of criminal

behaviors (Agnew 1999). This formalization will focus solely on the microlevel statement

of the theory since the emphasis of this dissertation is on microlevel theories. GST also

attempts to integrate with social learning and social control theories. The relationships

among these theories will be discussed later in the chapter.

Strains

The concept of strains within GST relates to the degree to which an individual

experiences a loss of something of value, is exposed to an aversive stimuli (usually by

others), or is unable to achieve a given goal (Agnew 1992, 2006). A strain can be either

experienced or anticipated, and can additionally be objective or subjective. Objective

strains are those circumstances or events which are disliked by most people, while sub-

jective strains are those circumstances or events which are subjectively evaluated as being

negative depending upon an individual’s dispositions, goals, or values (Agnew 2006).

Level of Strain

Level of Criminal Coping

Level of Negative Affect

Ability to Legally Cope

Degree Individual is Disposed to Criminal

Behavior

+

Costs of Criminal Coping

+

__

+

Figure 5.1General Strain Theory

Notes: Adapted from Agnew (2006: 19).

89

In addition to varying in subjectivity and objectivity, strains also vary in terms

of magnitude (Agnew 1992, 2006). The magnitude of a strain pertains to its, degree,

centrality, and temporal dimensions. A strain’s degree depends upon the type of strain

experienced (Agnew 1992). In terms of goal blockage, the degree of a strain relates to the

discrepancy between one’s expectations for realizing a goal and his or her actual achieve-

ment of that goal. Those who expect to achieve a goal and fail will experience a high

degree of strain compared to those who fail to achieve a goal but have low expectations

of success in the fi rst place. In regards to the loss of a valued object, the degree to which a

strain is experienced coincides with the amount lost. In such situations, a strain’s degree

could refl ect the monetary or emotional value of a lost object. In terms of one’s exposure

to averse stimuli, a strain’s degree represents the amount of pain or discomfort experi-

enced by the individual.

Centrality refers to the degree to which a strain “threatens the core goals, needs,

values, activities, and/or identities of the individual” (Agnew 2006: 60).2 A particular

set of values GST emphasizes relating to strains pertains to justice norms (Agnew 2006).

As individuals possess a sense of equity in social matters, should a particular strain be

viewed as intentional, voluntary, and in violation of a justice norm, the strain is seen as

high in centrality and therefore high magnitude. In addition to being the result of the

breach of a justice norm, a sense of injustice can also emerge depending upon the degree

to which a strain is different from previous occurrences in similar situations or the degree

to which others of equal status differentially experience a strain.

Lastly, strains also very in regards to temporal dimensions (Agnew 1992, 2006).

These include a strain’s: frequency; duration, recency, expected duration, and clustering.

Strains that occur frequently, are high in duration, occurred recently, have high levels of

expected duration, and are clustered in time are high in magnitude. Strains which are high

90

in these temporal dimensions can be viewed as being chronic. Chronic strains are par-

ticularly important within GST as they are more likely to generate particular dispositions

within individuals which increase the likelihood of criminal behavior.

As a result of experiencing a strain, individuals experience a negative emotional

state which creates within individual a pressure to engage in some form of coping that

can alleviate the negative affect an individual is experiencing.

Negative Emotional States

As a result of experiencing a strain, an individual experiences a negative affective

state (ibid.). GST specifi es an individual is likely to experience the emotions of anger,

depression, or fear as a result of experiencing a goal blockage, the loss of a valued item,

or experiencing adverse treatment by others. Although GST (Agnew 2006) acknowl-

edges depression and fear to be negative emotions which can result in particular forms of

criminal behavior (e.g., drug use, truancy), the theory emphasizes the emotion of anger in

motivating criminal behaviors.

Within GST, the emotion of anger is seen as being associated with the emo-

tions of frustration, malicious envy, and jealousy (ibid.). Anger is an emotional state that

often results from unjust treatment by others and motivates an individual to correct the

perceived injustice (Agnew 2006: 32). GST treats frustration as a subcategory of anger

which is experienced when individuals experience diffi culty satisfying goal. Like frustra-

tion, malicious envy and jealousy are also seen as subcategories of anger within GST.

Malicious envy relates to feelings of inferiority, longing, or animosity which arise when

an individual believes he or she has a right to things that others possess. Jealousy entails

feelings of suspicion, distrust, or fear of loss which are associated with the potential loss

of an important relationship to a rival.

91

Anger and its associated emotions are particularly likely to result in criminal

behaviors for several reasons within GST (Agnew 2006). These emotions are aversively

experienced by individuals, they create a pressure or motivation for corrective actions,

they inhibit an individual’s ability to accurately assess situations (ability to legally cope),

they increase the likelihood individual will perceive injustices (dispositions for criminal

coping), they temporarily reduce one’s ability to contemplate the consequences of actions

(perceived costs of criminal coping), and they tend to direct actions towards others (as in

the case of revenge).

Criminal Coping Behavior

GST proposes that individuals experiencing negative emotional states as a result

of strains are likely to engage in criminal behavior as a way of mitigating the negative

affect associated with a particular strain (Agnew 1992, 2006). GST observes that several

coping strategies are possible as ways to mitigate negative affect. These include behav-

ioral, cognitive, and emotional coping strategies. When an individual engages in a be-

havioral coping strategy, he or she engages in behaviors that directly target the source of

a given strain. This might entail murdering an unfaithful sexual partner or punching the

school bully. In both cases the behavior targets the source of a strain. A second way of

coping entails an individual cognitively reinterpreting the situation in order to mitigate

the negative affect he or she is experiencing. Individuals engaging in cognitive coping

strategies try to ignore or minimize the importance of a strain. Cognitive coping strate-

gies include lowering one’s standards in the face of a failure to achieve goals, convincing

oneself a strain was deserved, or reinterpreting a strain’s level of adversity (Agnew 1992).

Emotional coping strategies entail an individual engaging in efforts to directly mitigate

the negative emotions he or she is experiencing (Agnew 1992, 2006). Emotional coping

92

strategies include drug use, exercise, meditation, or other strategies intended to lower

negative affect. Emotional strategies are often used when other strategies are unavailable.

Behavioral and emotional coping strategies are the only strategies that can direct-

ly result in criminal behavior. Acts of revenge intended to retaliate against someone for

a perceived wrong or drug abuse can both be behaviors that are criminal in nature. GST

fails to provide a defi nition of crime and instead implies crimes are simply violations of

the criminal code. Delinquency, as a special case of crimes, is only used to distinguish

juvenile from adult offenses, and GST is intended to explain both criminal and delinquent

behaviors (Agnew 1992). Within GST, criminal behavioral or emotional coping strategies

(actual behaviors) that occur as a result of an individual experiencing a negative emotion-

al state serve as the explanandum of the theory.

Although cognitive coping strategies are not criminal acts within themselves, they

may nonetheless allow individuals to engage in criminal behaviors. This may occur as

individuals cognitively cope with a given strain and come to the conclusion that criminal

behavior is justifi ed within a particular situation (Agnew 2006). Thus, criminal coping

strategies may lead to the formation within individuals of beliefs pertaining to the legiti-

macy of criminal acts within specifi c situations. This will be discussed in greater detail in

the section the specifi es the factors which moderate the likelihood of criminal coping.

Moderators of Criminal Coping

GST specifi es that several factors moderate the degree to which an individual will

engage in cognitive coping strategies as a result of experiencing a negative emotional

state which is the result of a strain. The factors that moderate the likelihood of criminal

coping include: (1) one’s disposition for criminal coping; (2) one’s ability to legally cope;

(3) and the costs associated with criminal coping.

93

Disposition for Criminal Coping

Drawing upon the psychological literature on personality traits, GST specifi es

that a number of psychological traits can predispose an individual to engage in criminal

behaviors as response to experiencing negative emotional states associated with strains

(Agnew 1992, 2006). These personality traits relate to negative emotionality and low

constraint and the belief that criminal behavior is appropriate within a given situation.3

The personality traits of negative emotionality and low constraint are the key

personality characteristics associated with criminal behavior within GST (Agnew 2006;

Agnew, Brezina, Wright, and Cullen 2002). Individuals possessing the personality trait of

low constraint tend to be impulsive, risk-taking, reject social norms, and have little regard

for the rights and feelings of others. Individuals possessing the personality trait of nega-

tive emotionality tend to be easily upset, quick to anger, blame others for their problems,

attribute hostile intent to others, have antagonistic interaction styles, be aggressive, and

experience intense emotions. In general, individuals possessing the traits of low con-

straint and negative emotionality are more likely to cope with strains in a criminal man-

ner, act without thinking, lack interpersonal skills, be easily upset, and have actual and

perceived lower costs for engaging in criminal behaviors.

Negative emotionality and low constraint are related to criminal behaviors in sev-

eral ways (Agnew 2006). Individuals possessing these characteristics are more likely to

experience subjective or objective strains, they’re more likely experience negative emo-

tional states as a result of strains, and their general behavioral patterns reduce their ability

to legally cope with strains and the costs of criminal behavior in response to strains.

Another personality characteristic that predisposes an individual to engage in

criminal coping behaviors in response to experience strains is the degree to which an in-

dividual believes criminal behavior is appropriate means of coping (ibid.). The belief that

94

criminal behavior as a legitimate response to a strain can either be innovated in response

to the strong negative emotions one feels in connection with the strain (e.g., anger and the

desire for revenge) or can be the result of social learning processes that occurs through an

individual’s interactions with delinquent others.

In sum, individuals possessing personality characteristics which dispose them

to employ a criminal coping strategies in response to strain are more likely to not only

engage in criminal behaviors, but also experience more strains.

Ability to Legally Cope

Individuals who possess a greater ability to legally cope in response to strains are

less likely to engage in criminal coping behaviors (Agnew 1992, 2006). GST identifi es a

wide array of factors which increase the likelihood an individual will engage in non-crim-

inal coping strategies upon experiencing strains. The items that increase an individual’s

ability to include certain personality characteristics, one’s level of social support, and the

amount of resources an individual possesses.

Several personality characteristics decrease the likelihood an individual will

engage in criminal coping behaviors (ibid.). An individual’s intelligence, problem solving

skills, social skills, level of self-effi cacy, and level of self-esteem all decrease the likeli-

hood an individual engage in criminal behaviors as a response to strains. GST does not

thoroughly defi ne all of these concepts. Nor does it specify precisely how they increase

one’s ability to legally cope with strains. GST does specify that individuals with a greater

sense of self-effi cacy in their ability to legally cope will tend to legally cope in response

to strains. Additionally, GST states that individuals with high levels of self-esteem are

more able to absorb the negative emotions associated with strains. The concept of “prob-

lem solving skills” is the most articulated of these concepts within GST. Citing Dodge’s

and his colleagues’ (Dodge, Pettit, McClaskey, Brown, and Gottman 1986) work on

95

aggression, Agnew (2006: 93) discusses the utilization of problem solving skills within

a specifi c situation as involving an individual searching for cues, correctly interpreting

cues, generating responses to cues, considering the consequences of behaviors, and enact-

ing a chosen response. Additionally, Agnew notes the problem solving skills can be basic

and relate to such things as maintaining eye contact with others, recognizing the feelings

of others, and interacting with others in assertive, but not aggressive, ways.

The likelihood one will engage in criminal coping behavior is also moderated by

his or her level of conventional social support (Agnew 1992, 2006). GST (Agnew 1992)

identifi es three types social support that can decrease the likelihood of criminal coping

behaviors. These include instrumental support, informational support, and emotional sup-

port, and correlate to the coping strategies previously discussed. Thus, social support can

assist an individual in cognitive coping when it entails informational support, an indi-

vidual’s efforts to behaviorally cope can be assisted instrumentally by others, and having

others simply listen to one’s problems and be there for him or her can provide emotional

support. GST further specifi es that social support must come from conventional others,

such as parents or friends, in order for it to mitigate the likelihood of criminal coping

behaviors.

Individuals are also more able to legally respond to strains depending upon the

number of resources they have at their disposal (Agnew 1992, 2006). GST conceives of

resources primarily in terms of socioeconomic resources. Individuals with greater fi nan-

cial resources tend to have more savings to endure hardships associated with strains, have

a greater ability to procure social services (e.g., legal or psychological counseling) to as-

sist them in legally coping with strains, and have higher levels of education that have pro-

vided them with increased social skills. Additionally, individuals of high socioeconomic

status tend to have more extensive social networks that can help them through diffi cult

times.

96

One’s ability to legally cope also increases what he or she stands to lose if one

engages in criminal coping behaviors (Agnew 2006). Engaging in criminal behaviors can

cost one his or her job, valued social relations, and generally serve as a detriment to his or

her fi nancial status.

Costs of Criminal Coping

Individuals who possess low costs associated with engaging in criminal behaviors

are more likely to engage in criminal coping behaviors (ibid.). Within GST, costs can

be internal in the form of the guilt one might feel by engaging in a criminal behavior. Or

costs might be external in the form of job loss or the loss of friends. When individuals are

faced with a situation in which the costs of criminal coping are low and the rewards are

high, individuals are likely to engage in criminal coping behaviors.

GST proposes that individuals engage in criminal behavior as a way of mitigating

the negative emotions that accompany the presence of strains. The likelihood of crimi-

nal behavior is decreased when individuals possess an increased ability to legally cope

with strains and have high costs associated with criminal behavior. The likelihood an

individual will engage in criminal behavior, however, increases should an individual pos-

sess dispositions, such as the traits of negative emotionality or low constraint, that foster

criminal behaviors.

Theoretical Ambiguities and Tautologies

GST contains several theoretical ambiguities and tautologies that make it diffi cult

to distinguish between causal and defi nitional relationships among concepts. Virtually

every major concept within GST overlaps with some other concepts within GST. These

areas of ambiguity primarily pertain to distinctions between: (1) strains and negative

97

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emotions; (2) the moderators of criminal coping; and (3) strains and dispositions for

criminal coping. These conceptual overlaps are presented in Figure 5.2.

Conceptual Ambiguities Between Strains and Negative Emotions

Several conceptual problems exist between the concepts of strains and negative

emotions. First, the emotion of anger plays a central role within strain theory. In describ-

ing anger, Agnew (2006) observes anger is connected to perceived injustices and notes:

“Anger is associated with feelings of power (potency) and a desire to correct or respond

to the perceived injustice” (32). But injustice is not only crucial to understanding anger

within GST, it is also contributes to the centrality of a strain and therefore infl uences its

magnitude. If an injustice is part of the defi nitions of both anger and strains, than any

relationship between strains and negative emotions that relate to perceived injustices be-

comes tautological. A strain becomes aversive because the individual experiencing it feels

negative affect not because of some intrinsic property of the strain itself. Likewise, frus-

tration overlaps with the degree of a strain as it relates to the discrepancy between one’s

expectations and actual outcomes. If frustration is experienced because of the failure to

achieve goals, then frustrations and strains are not entirely distinct. Moreover, the case

could be made that strains are only subjectively experienced because they produce nega-

tive affective states. In its current form, GST needs to better distinguish between strains

and negative emotions or consolidate these concepts.

Conceptual Ambiguities Between Moderating Concepts

A great deal of conceptual overlap exists between one’s ability to legally cope, an

individual’s dispositions towards criminal coping, and the costs associated with crimi-

nal coping. One source of conceptual overlap lies within the concepts of dispositions

for criminal coping and ability to legally cope. The personality traits of low constraint

99

and negative emotionality are characterized by tendencies to not contemplate the conse-

quences of criminal actions; to think without acting; to have little regard for feelings or

the rights of others; to act in an aggressive manner; to provoke and antagonize others;

lack personal skills; blame others for their problems; and frustrate parents (Agnew 2006:

20-22). As previously discussed, effective problem solving skills relate to the ability to

interpret cues, consider the consequences of actions, and interpret the feelings of others.

In comparing GST’s concepts of low constraint and negative emotionality to its concept

of problem-solving skills, part of what constitutes the traits of low constraint and negative

emotionality is their lack of problem-solving or social skills. Thus, the personality traits

of negative emotionality and low constraint can potentially be interpreted in regards to

individuals who simply lack social or problem solving skills.

The personality traits of negative emotionality and low constraint also relate to

the costs of criminal coping. Because individuals with these traits are more likely to

disregard social norms or the rights and feelings of others (Agnew 2006), they are less

concerned about the costs associated with criminal coping. People with these traits are un-

likely to feel guilt and therefore are less likely to experience internal costs associated with

criminal behavior. Additionally, individuals with these traits are less likely to take into

account the feelings of others or be concerned with the consequences of their actions and

are therefore less subject to the perceived external costs of criminal behavior.

In regards to conceptual ambiguities between one’s ability to legally cope and the

costs of criminal coping, one’s ability to legally cope by defi nition increases the costs he

or she potentially faces in regards to criminal behavior. Individuals with good jobs, social

networks, and other resources simply stand to lose more should engage in criminal behav-

ior.

100

It is evident that there is a tremendous degree of overlap between the concepts

theorized by GST to moderate the occurrence of criminal behavior. This overlap makes

it virtually impossible to determine if the relationship between ability to legally cope and

costs of criminal coping is defi nitional or propositional. The same problem holds for all

other possible combinations of moderating concepts.

Conceptual Ambiguities between Dispositions and Strains

Conceptual ambiguities also exist between the concepts dispositions for criminal

coping, strains, and negative emotional states. Agnew (2006) does distinguish between

emotional states and traits. While emotional states pertain to a temporary state in which

an individual experiences a particular emotion, emotional traits referred to a tendency of

certain individuals to experience certain emotions. Individuals possessing the disposition

for criminal coping of negative emotionality are more likely to experience negative affect

and subjectively perceive strains. The potential problem between distinguishing negative

emotions from strains has already been discussed, but is also present here. The relation-

ship between negative emotionality and subjectively perceived strains is potentially

tautological because by defi nition individuals with negative emotionality are more likely

to experience events is aversive and attribute malicious intent to others (Agnew et al.

2002). Since individuals with negative emotionality are more likely to experience events

as aversive, they are by defi nition more likely to experience strains. And since they are

more likely to experience negative emotions, by defi nition they strains they do experience

will produce negative affect.

These tautologies present within GST serve as major shortcoming of the theory.

The empirical implications of these tautologies is that a given measure for one moderator

of criminal behavior could also serve as an indicator of other moderators, or even strains

101

or emotions. It is unclear how the trait of negative emotionality, for example, could be

measured independently of one’s levels of subjective strains or negative emotions. While

it may be possible to unpack these concepts in order to minimize theoretical tautologies,

doing so would require abandoning the over-encompassing conceptual categories of

dispositions for criminal coping, ability to legally cope, and costs of criminal coping. In

their current form, these moderating concepts are not mutually exclusive and serve more

as a set of heuristics that organize a multi-factor approach to criminal coping than as a set

of clearly defi ned concepts that are part of a logically consistent theory.

These conceptual problems are further present in GST’s attempt to demonstrate

how theory relates to social control and social learning theories.

Numerous conceptual issues plague GST in its current form. While some of these

problems are tautological in nature, others simply stem from GST’s failure to clearly

delineate boundaries between concepts. GST’s origins in strain theory and its strong em-

phasis on incorporating insights from other disciplines (particularly psychology), are both

its greatest strength and weakness. While expanding the concept of strains to incorporate

the loss of a valued item and experiencing averse stimuli has greatly expanded the scope

of strain theory, its development of factors seen as moderating the relationship between

negative emotional states and criminal behavior remains less complete. Under its current

form, the factors moderating the relationship between negative emotions and criminal

behavior are nothing more than loose categories that serve to organize a variety of predic-

tors for criminal behavior. These predictors can be loosely viewed to conform to the fac-

tors identifi ed by GST, but they are really predictors of disparate theoretical approaches

that are employed in GST in a multi-factor manner. The concept of dispositions for crimi-

nal behavior is derived from research grounded in psychology, which has little theoretical

102

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relationship to GST’s sociological concepts, such as socioeconomic status. Additionally,

each moderating concept is potentially nothing more than list of predictors of criminal

behaviors that may be broadly correlated to other predictors within the category, but GST

does not adequately specify logical or theoretical connections between these predictors.

Thus, like the multifactor approaches Sutherland was so critical of when he formulated

differential association theory, GST, while grounded in strain theory, relies upon a vari-

ous predictors drawn from disparate theoretical perspectives to explain why individuals

engage in criminal behavior as result of experiencing strains.

Integrative Tautologies

While GST was originally formulated as an elaboration of the strain tradition

and avoided integrative efforts (see Agnew 1992), additional elaborations of the theory

sought to more explicitly emphasize how GST could compliment social control and social

learning explanations of criminal behavior. In demonstrating the complementary nature

of GST to these theories, Agnew (2006) observed that social control theory emphasized

the absence of relationships to conventional individuals or institutions and social learn-

ing theory focused on the positive relationships one has with delinquent others. Agnew

proposed that because GST focuses on how individuals are pressured into crime, it could

supplement these theories by demonstrating how strains can affect one’s relationships

with conventional others or motivate an individual to join delinquent groups as a means

of trying to fi nd social support for his or her problems. Figure 5.3 displays the theorized

relationships among social control, social learning, and general strain theories.

GST (Agnew 2006) specifi es that strains can lead to reduced social control and

foster the social learning of dispositions for criminal coping. Strains that are chronic,

such as parental abuse, can weaken the social control to which one is exposed. Likewise,

temporary strains, such as anger towards an attachment fi gure, can temporarily reduce

104

social controls. As a result of reduced social controls, individuals are more free to associ-

ate with delinquent others, and are also more free to engage in criminal behavior. Strains

also can directly foster the social learning of criminal behavior. Individuals who experi-

ence strains, and have lack the ability to legally cope, are likely to see delinquent groups

as a potential unconventional form of social support. In interacting with such groups,

individual learn criminal coping behaviors and the belief such behaviors are justifi ed.

Additionally, certain strains, such as parental abuse, provide individuals with behavioral

models that directly foster the social learning of criminal behavior.

In attempting to elucidate the theoretical relationships between general strain, so-

cial control, and social learning theories, Agnew goes beyond discussing how these theo-

ries might operate in parallel and attempts to provide an end-to-end integration of how

social control and social learning theories affect GST concepts (ibid.). These relation-

ships are omitted from Figure 5.3 because they produce the same conceptual problems

that were previously observed in endogenous GST concepts. Social control and social

learning theories both contain concepts that overlap with concepts found within GST and

the tautologies that result from this problem will be further explicated.

Social Control Theory

Social control theory contains several concepts that are also present within GST.

First, social control theory (Hirschi [1969] 2005) posits individuals with a greater com-

mitment to the conventional order are less likely to engage in criminal behavior. This

concept of commitment is also present within GST’s concept of costs of criminal coping.

As both concepts relate to the things one potential might lose by engaging in criminal

behavior, these concepts are redundant in the end-to-end elaboration. Agnew (2006)

notes that the lower one’s social control, the lower his or her costs will be for engaging in

criminal behavior. Since concepts pertaining to the cost of criminal behavior are present

105

in both theories, it is unclear if an absence of social control leads to less costs for crimi-

nal coping by defi nition or whether these are seen as being causally related. If there are

seen as being causally related, the relationship would be fundamentally tautological. If

the relationship is purely defi nitional, then the concept of costs of criminal coping can be

demonstrated to be similar to commitments within social control theory independent of

any attempt at theoretical integration.

Social control theory’s concept of attachment also overlaps with GST’s concept

of social support. Chapter 4’s formalization of social control theory (Hirschi [1969]

2005) discussed how one’s attachments to his or her parents was evident when one sought

their opinions, shared their though or feeling with them, or had them clarify rules or

other things an individual didn’t understand. The concept of attachment within social

control theory is very similar to GST’s conception of conventional social support, which

is subsumed under the broader concept of ability to legally cope. GST (Agnew 2006)

specifi es that social support provided by conventional others can provide informational

or instrumental support that can ameliorate the negative affect experienced as result of

strains. Insofar as it is informational, it seems to correspond with attachment relationship

where individuals share their opinions or clarify rules. Additionally, the rules or beliefs

one learns could represent the results of cognitive coping efforts that serve are referred to

as social skills in GST. Insofar as the support is purely emotional, it could also correspond

to attachment relationship where feelings are shared.

Social Learning Theory

Social Learning theory (Akers 2009) also contains concepts that overlap with

concepts within GST. First, the concept of costs of criminal coping overlaps with social

learning theories concept of anticipated reinforcements. Although social learning theory

tends to emphasize criminal behavior as being rewarding, anticipated reinforcements in

106

the form of anticipated punishments can deter an individual from engaging in criminal

behavior. Second, GST’s concept of conventional social support also is represented in

social learning theory. The social support one receives can be seen within social learning

theory as a negative reward (the withdrawal of an adverse stimulus) insofar as instrumen-

tal supports reduce the negative emotions one is experiencing as a result of a strain. Inso-

far as the support is only emotional, it also mitigates the negative emotions one is feeling

because of a strain. Additionally, the actual advice or knowledge transmitted, while seen

as social skills within GST, could be viewed as prosocial attitudes or defi nitions within

social learning theory - that is, defi nitions unfavorable to criminal behavior. Third, GST’s

concept of dispositions for criminal coping overlaps with social learning theory’s concept

of defi nitions. One’s dispositions for criminal coping include the belief that criminal

behavior is warranted or justifi ed. This corresponds with social learning theory’s concept

of neutralizations and attitudes. The personality traits of negative emotionality and low

constraints that also serve as dispositions for criminal behavior within GST could also be

re-expressed within social learning theory as being packages of attitudes that involve par-

ticular orientations towards others (e.g., aggressiveness) or willingness to blame others

for their problems.

Lastly, GST specifi es that social learning process can lead one to experience

strains since the delinquent groups in which one participates can lead to numerous unde-

sirable outcomes (Agnew 2006). The concept of strains with GST corresponds to social

learning theory’s concept of punishments. Within social learning theory (Akers 2009),

punishments are positive or negative. Positive punishments involve one being exposed

to a noxious stimulus, while negative punishments represent the loss a positive stimu-

lus. Since GST conceives of strains as pertaining to goal blockages, experiencing averse

stimuli, and losing of something of value, the concept of strains perfectly corresponds to

the concept of punishment within social learning theory. Whereas exposure to adverse

107

stimuli and the loss of something of value correspond to positive and negative punish-

ment, goal blockage could be seen within social learning theory as relating to anticipated

negative punishment. That is, the anticipate loss of something that is seen as being re-

warding. With this in mind, GST could be seen as not being distinct from social learning

theory, but rather as attempting to provide an explanation of how punishments can posi-

tively motivate criminal behavior. Since all the moderators with GST have correspond-

ing concepts within social learning theory, GST could be seen as an elaboration of social

learning theory that specifi es how various defi nitions (e.g., attitudes) and reinforcements

(e.g., social support and costs of criminal coping) affect the likelihood an individual will

engage in criminal behavior to escape a punishment. This is not to say it is such an elab-

oration, as GST does emphasize social skills and other dimensions of cognition and social

support not present within social learning theory, but it would be possible to attempt to

respecify it as a special case of learning theory should an individual translate concepts

from GST into social learning theory.

In addition to possessing overlapping endogenous concepts, concepts within

GST also overlap signifi cantly with concepts contained within social control and social

learning theories. As such, the end-to-end integration of GST with these theories cre-

ates problems, as concepts are redundant within these theories. Insofar as GST is simply

highlighting conceptual similarities, this overlap is not a problem. This overlap is prob-

lematic, however, as GST argues social control and social learning processes lead to GST

processes and vice versa. The conceptual problems that have been discussed that are

present both within the theory and with its connections to other theories represent a major

shortcoming in logical consistency of general strain theory. Have discussed these limita-

tions, it is now important to turn to limitations within GST that are a result of the theory’s

scope.

108

Scope Conditions

GST primarily has two scope conditions that limit its explanatory power. In order

for an individual to become motivated to commit a crime, GST argues that an individual

must experience negative affect as result of experienced or anticipate goal blockage,

exposure to averse stimuli, or loss of a valued item. Criminal behavior that occurs as a

result of cultural confl ict (ignorance of a law) or because a criminal behavior is in itself

rewarding is beyond the scope of GST. A second scope condition relates to GST’s failure

to specify how individuals come to value a goal or why individuals perceive particular

things as being rewards. GST specifi es that subjective strains emerge from learning

processes and as a result individuals may experience strains that other individuals do not.

However, GST emphasizes the ability to perceive the strains and underemphasizes why

an individual values a goal or pursues a specifi c reward in the fi rst place. While GST

acknowledges individuals have multiple goals and may differ from others in their goals,

it does not explain why a particular person has a particular goal. The current statement of

the theory only pertains to learning processes as they relate to coping behaviors and not

as they relate to the initial rewards or goals an individual pursues. Therefore, while an

individual may possess certain goals or desires, the reason why an individual possesses

these is beyond the scope of GST.

Conclusion

GST represents a major advancement in the strain theory tradition. In extending

the concept of strains beyond goal blockages to include the loss of something of value

and experiencing an averse stimuli, GST expands the source of motivations for criminal

behavior. GST also specifi es the nature of the emotions one experiences as a result of

strains and which factors moderate the likelihood an individual engage in criminal cop-

109

ing behaviors an effort to reduce the negative emotions associated with the strain. But

these elaborations are not without their shortcomings. In order identify the various factors

that moderate the likelihood an individual will engage in criminal coping behaviors as a

result of experiencing strains, GST has drawn upon psychological and sociological factors

which do not share a common theoretical base. The end result of this mixture is a multi-

factor approach that specifi es a variety of factors believed to moderate the likelihood of

criminal coping which are only united conceptually by the fact they are believed to mod-

erate criminal coping. While they are loosely classifi ed under categories of dispositions

for criminal coping, ability to legally cope, and costs of criminal coping – these categories

are very loose, highly permeable, and do little to organize the underlying predictors of

criminal coping in a theoretical manner. Instead, they represent a multi-factor approach

which is informed by numerous theoretical insights that have not been theoretically inte-

grated.

Strain theories have long faced theoretical challenges in their development. Ef-

forts to elaborate GST utilizing an end-to-end approach with social control and social

learning theories (e.g., Elliot et al. 1979) were criticized on the grounds but they produced

logically inconsistent theories (Hirschi 1979, 1989). Theoretical efforts to elaborate strain

theories highlight the need for criminologists to distinguish between basic and applied

science. Whereas basic science seeks to identify and test theoretical principles in order

to arrive at logically consistent and internally valid theory, applied science instead draws

upon multiple theoretical frameworks in order to maximally explain empirical variations

pertaining to a particular phenomenon. Efforts by Elliot and his colleagues (Elliot et al.

1979; Elliot et al. 1985) have been interpreted by criminologists to be an exercise in basic

science and as result criticized for being logically inconsistent (Hirschi 1989); however,

the moment one’s goal becomes to maximize explained variation over identifying and

isolating relationships between theoretical concepts, the research inherently becomes

110

applied. GST also illustrates this problem. In its current form, it fails to clearly articulate

relationships between key theoretical concepts and additionally fails to clearly defi ne

them or delineate the boundaries. Instead, it emphasizes identifying all factors related to

criminal coping regardless of their theoretical relationships with one another.

GST’s effort at integration also refl ects this applied approach. Whereas GST

could have borrowed insights from social control and social learning theories and rein-

terpreted them as new concepts that were logically consistent with GST, Agnew (2006)

instead resorted to an end-to-end integration approach that reproduced the logical prob-

lems for which integrative efforts have been so criticized.

In concluding this chapter, a theoretical restatement of GST is proposed a propo-

sitional form. As a result of conceptual and propositional ambiguities among key theo-

retical concepts, the proposed restatement is limited in scope to only those relationships

which are most clearly defi ned as being causal in nature. Additionally, it is it is impossi-

ble to clearly defi ne all theoretical concepts and this restatement is unable to exercise the

logical problems from GST. As such, concepts are defi ned in a manner consistent with

conceptualization presented within GST (Agnew 1992, 2006; Agnew et al. 2002), regard-

less of whether the defi nition is inherently tautological or teleological.

Theoretical Restatement

Assumptions

A1. Human nature is assumed to be pragmatic and capable of innovation within GST.

A2. Human nature is assumed to be hedonistic within GST. Specifi cally, GST as-sumes fi nd certain situations or event to be aversive and engage in activities to minimize displeasure when in aversive situations or circumstance.

A3. Human nature is plastic.

111

Conceptual Defi nitions

D1. Strain – A situation or set of circumstances in which an individual experiences, or anticipates experiencing, a goal blockage, the loss of something of value, or being exposed to aversive stimuli.

A. Objective Strains - Strains that are disliked by most people.

B. Subjective Strains – Strains that are negatively evaluated as a result of one’s dispositions, goals, or values.

C. Magnitude of a strain – The strength of a strain along the dimensions of degree, centrality, and temporality.

i. Degree – The strength of a strain as it pertain to the discrepan-cies between one’s expectations and outcomes (goal blockage), the value of a lost thing of value, or the amount of displeasure one feels in response to the strain.

ii. Centrality – The degree to which a strain threatens the goals, needs, values, activities, and identities of an individual.

iii. Temporality – The frequency, duration, recency, expected duration, and clustering of a strain.

D2. Negative Emotional State – A state in which an individual experiences the emo-tions of anger (including frustration, malicious envy, and jealousy), depression, or fear.

D3. Dispositions for criminal coping – The psychological characteristics of an indi-vidual that increase the likelihood and individual will experience strains and will cope with negative affective states through criminal behavior.

D4. Ability to Legally Cope – The personality characteristics, resources, and social support one has which promotes pro-social coping strategies.

D5. Costs of Criminal Behavior – The internal and external aversive experiences one would likely have should he or she engage in criminal behavior.

D6. Criminal Behavior – Behaviors that are classifi ed as criminal under the criminal code, including both juvenile and adult offenses.

112

Knowledge Claims

P1. The level of negative affect an individual experiences is positive function of the magnitude of the strain he or she experiences.

P2. The amount of criminal behavior an individual will engage in is a

1. Positive multiplication function of the level of negative affect and the degree to which an individual possesses dispositions for criminal coping

2. Individual has the ability to cope with strains in a legal manner.

3. Negative multiplication function of the level of negative affect and one’s costs for criminal behavior.

Scope Conditions

SC1. Criminal Behaviors that occur in the absence of negative affect or strains are be-yond the scope of the theory.

SC2. The dynamics associated with the formation of goals or values are beyond the scope of GST.

Endnotes

1 GST does not differ for social control or social learning theories in terms of hedonism; however, it does differ from differential association theory in terms of innovation. Where-as differential association theory (Sutherland 1947) explicitly states humans do not in-novate criminal behaviors, GST, with its pragmatic assumption of human nature, assumes individuals are capable of behavioral innovation.

2 The degree dimension of a strain can possibly be subsumed under centrality. If individu-als possess needs surrounding the desire to not have things of value taken from them, not be exposed to a person stimuli, or not have their goals blocked, then a strains degree can simply be expressed in terms of its centrality.

3 Agnew (2006) also specifi es that experiencing chronic strains can produce within an individual emotional trait that predisposes individual to experience a specifi c emotion in

113

response to strains. Agnew primarily discusses emotional traits in regards to the personal-ity traits of negative emotionality and therefore is not discussed separately.

114

Chapter 6

Theoretical Evaluation

Differential association, social learning, social control, and general strain theo-

ries all provide a microlevel explanations of the etiology of criminal behavior. In this

chapter, the explanatory power of these theories will be evaluated and compared in order

to identify their strengths and limitations. These theories will be evaluated in terms of

constraints related to their assumptions of human nature, scope conditions, explanans,

and explananda. A discussion of other means of evaluating these theories will be reserved

for the fi nal chapter.

Human Nature and Scope Conditions

Although the theoretical formalizations presented have distinguished between as-

sumptions of human nature and scope conditions, this distinction was only made because

assumptions of human nature have served as a cornerstone to theoretical elaboration/

integration debate in criminology (e.g., Hirschi 1989). Assumptions of human nature can

also be treated as theoretical scope conditions and therefore can also limit the explanatory

power of a theory. Interpreted this way, the predictions of a given criminological theory

hold under only those conditions where it’s assumptions of human nature are met. The

primary difference between the explicated assumptions of human nature and the identi-

fi ed theoretical scope conditions is that assumptions of human nature pertain to scope

conditions that are intrinsic to the human organism, whereas the identifi ed scope condi-

tions have primarily emphasized dynamics external to humans. In discussing the limita-

tions of the formalized criminological theories, this distinction will be preserved.

115

Human Nature

The criminological theories formalized have both agreements and disagreements

in terms of their assumptions of human nature. In terms of agreements, differential associ-

ation, social learning, social control, and general strain theories agree that human nature is

hedonistic and plastic. Within differential association theory (Sutherland 1947), all human

behavior is motivated by biological drives that are hedonistic in nature. Social learning

theory’s (Akers 1985, 2009) reliance upon reinforcements as a mechanism of learning

and behavioral motivation indicates the theory assumes human nature to be hedonistic

because humans fundamentally prefer rewards over punishments. Social control theory

(Hirschi [1969] 2005) explicitly states humans are hedonistic and therefore is not differ-

ent from differential association or social learning theories in this regard. Lastly, general

strain theory (Agnew 1992, 2006) also emphasizes human nature to be hedonistic in that

individuals are willing to engage in a wide array of behaviors in order to escape from the

punishing effects of negative emotions that are associated with strains. Although general

strain theory does not emphasize the pursuit of pleasure, it does emphasize the avoidance

or amelioration of pain.

These theories also agree that human nature is plastic. Differential association and

social learning theories explicitly emphasize how individuals learn to engage in criminal

behavior. Likewise, social control theory states that socialization processes can instill

beliefs within an individual pertaining to the legitimacy of the conventional order or the

morality of specifi c acts. General strain theory also emphasizes plasticity in that individu-

als can develop durable dispositions favorable to criminal behavior as a result of previous

experiences, or people can also learn social skills that enable them to legally cope with

strains.

Despite these similarities, these theories differ in regard to human nature in two

ways. First, these theories do not treat the implications of hedonism and plasticity equally.

116

Differential association, social learning, and general strain theories all acknowledge that

individuals can learn either conventional or criminal forms of behavior. Social control

theory, on the other hand, specifi es that the learning of conventional behaviors are impor-

tant in explaining criminal behavior. Thus, while its view of plasticity is similar to the

other formalized theories, the potential explanans it can derive from this assumption are

more limited.

A second way in which these theories differ in regards to human nature pertains to

behavioral innovations and the degree to which individuals are seen as pragmatic. Gen-

eral strain theory (Agnew 1992, 2006) holds that individuals are capable of innovation

when attempting to cope with strains. Social learning and social control theories would

likely contend that behavioral innovations are simply those behaviors that maximize

pleasure and minimize pain within a novel situation, but they nonetheless do not explic-

itly address the issue of behavioral innovation. Differential association theory (Sutherland

1947) explicitly states that behaviors must be learned through interactions with others and

that criminal behavior is not the result of behavioral innovation. This is particularly inter-

esting because Sutherland (1947) does acknowledge that social reorganization along new

lines often follows after periods of social disorganization. Despite differential association

theory’s heritage, it explicitly denies the possibility of behavioral innovation.

Scope Conditions

Differential association, social learning, social control, and general strain theo-

ries contain numerous scope conditions that limit their explanatory power. As etiological

theories of criminal behavior, these theories all assume a particular behavior has been

legally or socially defi ned as being criminal or otherwise prohibited; however, they do

not provide an explanation as to why a particular act is defi ned as criminal. Beyond this

117

one common scope condition, these theories contain numerous scope conditions which

uniquely limit their abilities to explain criminal behavior.

In addition to differential association theory’s inability to account for behavioral

innovations that are criminal, the theory also cannot explain crime in undifferentiated

societies, does not specify learning mechanisms, and is unable to explain why an individ-

ual has a particular network of associations. Sutherland (1947) saw social differentiation

as leading to cultural heterogeneity, and this was seen as the primary source of criminal

behavior in modern societies. Based upon differential association theory’s assumption of

cultural heterogeneity, the theory’s explanatory power does not extend to undifferentiated

societies. Differential association theory also does not specify the precise mechanisms of

learning other than noting that the associations through which defi nitions are learned vary

in frequency, duration, intensity, and priority. While social learning theory has elaborated

differential association theory and specifi ed learning mechanisms, these remain beyond

the scope of differential association theory. A fi nal scope condition of differential associa-

tion theory is that it fails to specify why an individual is exposed to particular associa-

tions. Although Sutherland (1947) does note differential social organization can create

a context in which individuals are exposed to defi nitions favorable to criminal behavior,

an individual’s personal networks can differ from the networks of others and individuals

within a particular community may be differentially exposed to criminogenic defi nitions

as a result of their different associations (ibid.). The theory does not explain why some

individuals are exposed to more criminal defi nitions than others and thus this remains

beyond the scope of the theory.

Social learning theory also contains several limitations in its ability to explain

criminal behavior. As a microlevel theory, social learning theory does not explain the

distribution of associations, reinforcements, or vicarious reinforcements within one’s en-

vironment. The theory does not also account for potential variations in biology or physi-

118

ology that can affect either the nonsocial reinforcers one experiences (e.g. chronic pain

leading to marijuana use) or how an individual learns or interacts with the environment

(e.g., intelligence). Lastly, social learning theory fails to identify learning mechanisms not

associated with operant conditioning or vicarious learning. One source of learning not re-

lated to these two processes is learning through the use of analogy, metaphor, and induc-

tion (see Holyoak and Nisbett 1988). Individuals attempting to act within novel situations

often utilize metaphors or analogies to induce behavioral solutions to a situational prob-

lem. This process is beyond the scope of behaviorism and therefore social learning theory

as well.

Beyond the scope conditions associated with social control theory’s assumptions

of human nature, the theory is also limited in explaining crime in undifferentiated societ-

ies. Social control theory assumes cultural homogeneity and value-consensus within a

given society and therefore is unable to explain crime in culturally pluralistic societies.

In such societies, attachments, commitments, involvements, and beliefs would be differ-

entially aligned depending upon one’s group memberships.

General strain theory also contains several limiting scope conditions. First, the

theory’s emphasis on negative emotions as positive motivators for criminal behavior

limits the theory’s ability to explain criminal behaviors that are not motivated by negative

emotions or the strains that produce them. Thus, crimes that are the result of anticipated

positive rewards (e.g., recreational drug use) are beyond the scope of the theory. A second

scope condition pertains to general strain theory’s failure to specify why an individual has

particular goals. While the theory does state that some strains are subjective, and articu-

lates how harsh punishment can lead an individual to learn to perceive more subjective

strains, general strain theory does not specify how one develops subjective goals that can

potentially serve as a source of strains related to goal blockages.

119

Notes:1General strain theory limits it view of hedonism to only relate to pain avoidance.2Social control theory only assumes plasticity in regards to socialization processes. Social control theory denies the possibility that motives can be learned.

Locus of Scope Condition

Differential Association Theory

Social Learning Theory

Social Control Theory

General Strain Theory

Hedonism Hedonism Hedonism Hedonism1

Plasticity Plasticity Plasticity2 Plasticity

Learning process is ambiguous

Learning process is explicitly stated

Learning process is ambiguous

Learning process is ambiguous

Incapable of Innovation

Fails to account for learning not subsumed under operant conditioning or vicarious learning

Pragmatism

Fails to account for presence of goals

Only explains microlevel behaviors

Only explains microlevel behaviors

Only explains microlevel behaviors

Only explains microlevel behaviors

Criminal behavior must be defined a priori

Criminal behavior must be defined a priori

Criminal behavior must be defined a priori

Criminal behavior must be defined a priori

Society must be culturally heterogeneous

No assumptions about cultural heterogeneity

Society must be culturally homogenous

No assumptions about cultural heterogeneity

Does not explain why an individual possesses certain associations

Does not explain why an environment has a particular distribution of associations

Does not account for macro-structural sources of strain or goals

1. Microlevel

2. Macrolevel

Table 6.1Scope Conditions of Formalized Criminological Theories

120

Limitations of Explanatory Power

The assumptions of human nature and theoretical scope conditions identifi ed

within differential association, social learning, social bonding, and general strain theories

all serve to limit the explanatory power of these theories. Table 6.1 contains a summary

of the scope conditions present within each theory which limits its explanatory power.

Within the table, assumptions of human nature have been reconceptualized as scope con-

ditions. This is not only because assumptions of human nature can limit the explanatory

power of a theory, but is also because the term human nature connotes an essentialist and

metaphysical view of human nature that is fundamentally unfalsifi able. This reclassifi ca-

tion allows research to potentially relax scope conditions pertaining to human nature in

order to determine the degree to which a given assumption impacts a theory’s empirical

predictions. The identifi ed scope conditions pertain to theoretically limitations that exist

at the micro and macro levels of analysis.

Microlevel Scope Conditions

Hedonism. All formalized theories contain scope conditions relating to hedonism.

Should an actor not be acting in accordance with the avoidance of pain or the pursuit of

pleasure, these theories would be limited in their ability to explain the actor’s behavior.

But the implications of this scope condition is of limited utility. Avoiding any possible de-

bate about hedonism and altruism, such as scope condition is essentially meaningless as

any particular act could potentially be interpreted as being hedonistic. This scope condi-

tion is only limiting in regard to general strain theory because the theory only emphasizes

explaining criminal behaviors which are motivated by strains (or unpleasant experiences).

This emphasis inhibits the theory’s ability to explain criminal behavior that is not related

to the avoidance of pain and therefore is more limited in its explanatory power than dif-

ferential association, social learning, and social control theories.

121

Plasticity. Plasticity is another scope condition present within each of the formal-

ized theories. While differential association, social learning, social control, and general

strain all acknowledge individuals can learn to both refrained from or engage in criminal

behaviors, they differ in terms of the degree to which an individual learns motivations to

engage in criminal behavior. Differential association theory specifi es that the directions

of natural attitudes are learned, not the motivations themselves. Social learning theory

contends that individuals can learn to fi nd things rewarding or punishing, and therefore

motivations can be learned. General strain theory locates motivation within negative

emotions; however, individuals can learn to perceive subjective strains that produce nega-

tive emotions. Social control theory contends motivations are simply hedonistic desires

and are not learned.

Differential association theory and social learning theory are less limited in ex-

planatory power in terms of plasticity and motivation than the other formalized theories.

While differential association theory specifi es that only the direction of motives are

learned, since its conception of attitudes are derived from the concept of natural attitudes

within Thomas and Znaniecki ([1927] 1966a, [1927] 1966b), and natural attitudes are

hedonistic and can be shaped and redirected through socialization, there is little to dif-

ferentiate differential association from social learning theory in terms of plasticity and the

learning of motives. General strain theory is more limited in terms of plasticity only in

that it solely considers negative emotions and how learning relates to them when ex-

plaining criminal behavior. Social control theory is more limited than the other theories

in terms of plasticity and the learning of motives. While social control theory specifi es

individuals can learn moral beliefs prohibiting acts, it denies that motivations can be

learned for either a criminal or non-criminal act because all motivation is hedonistic and

there is no more of a natural motivation for criminal behavior than there is for conforming

behavior (Hirschi [1969] 2004: 32-33). Thus, while differential association, social learn-

122

ing, and general strain theories all acknowledge learning can positively shape motivation,

social control theory only acknowledges socialization can constrain it. Within social

control theory, motivation is not redirected, it is suppressed.

Since differential association, social learning1, or general strain theories all as-

sume human behavior and motivations are plastic, these theories would be unable to

explain the criminal behavior of individuals who possess a decreased ability to learn. For

social control theory, since motivation is seen as being constant across individuals, and

learning is important only insofar as relates to socialization within conventional society,

individuals with learning defi cits would experience lower social control as a result of

their decreased capacity to learn. Therefore such individuals would remain within the

scope of social control theory.

Specifi cation of Learning Process. With the exception of social learning theory,

all formalized theories fail to specify learning processes. Within differential association

theory, the learning process is ambiguous and only specifi es the modalities of interaction

which are theorized to facilitate learning. The theory does not explicate how learning

actually occurs. Social control theory states individuals learn moral beliefs as a result

of socialization processes; however, the theory is silent on how learning works. General

strain theory also fails to specify how individuals learn to legally cope with strains or

form dispositions that increase the likelihood of criminal coping. While the theory does

acknowledge that learning processes occur and specifi es the types of events which might

cause an individual to learn dispositions favorable to criminal behavior (e.g., subjection

to harsh and inconsistent discipline), the theory nonetheless fails to specify a learning

process. 2 The failure of differential association, social control, and general strain theo-

ries to specify learning processes translates into these theories have been less explanatory

power than social learning theory.

123

Even though social learning theory does specify how individuals learn to engage

in or refrain from criminal behavior, the theory’s explanatory power related to learning is

limited by its reliance on operant conditioning and vicarious learning principles. Another

source of potential learning relates to induction and how individuals use analogies and

metaphors to learn in novel situations (see Holyoak and Nisbett 1988). The use of analo-

gies and metaphors are purely cognitive operations which are beyond the scope of social

learning theory in its current form. Thus, social learning theory is limited to explaining

only those behaviors which are learned through operant conditioning or vicarious learn-

ing principles.

Behavioral Innovation and Goal Formation. Several scope conditions also exist

which are unique to particular theories and operate at the individual level. First, differen-

tial association theory explicitly denies the ability of individuals to innovate behaviors,

while general strain theory sees actors as capable of engaging in behavioral innovation.

While this would seem to indicate prima facie that general strain theory has greater

power than differential association theory along this dimension, general strain theory

fails to specify how behavioral innovations occur within its explanan. Thus, any potential

benefi t in explanatory power general strain theory may gain from its acknowledgment of

human pragmatism is lost as a result of its failure to specify how behavioral innovations

might occur. Second, general strain theory fails to account for why an individual pos-

sesses particular goals. While the theory argues some goals are objective and universal

in nature, it also states goals can be subjective and vary among individuals. The theory

does not explain the source of goals. Social control theory would simply explain goals in

terms of salient hedonistic desires. Social learning theory would explain goals in terms

of anticipated reinforcements which are the result of previous reinforcements or vicari-

ous learning. And differential association theory could explain goals in terms of learned

124

defi nitions that are the products of interactions with others. General strain theory takes a

subjective goal as being a given and does not specify its origin.

Macrolevel Scope Conditions

In addition to limitations of these theories’ explanatory power that exist at the

individual level, the formalized theories also contained several scope conditions that are

external in nature to an actor. The limitations pertain to: (1) how behaviors become de-

fi ned as being criminal; (2) why an individual has a particular associations; (3) a society’s

assumed level of differentiation; and (4) an overall concern for microlevel forces and a

general disregard for macrolevel dynamics.

Criminalization. All formalized theories assume a given act is defi ned to be

criminal a priori. None of these theories detail the process that leads to particular acts

being defi ned as being prohibited by a group or legally proscribed. While these theories

differ in terms of whether their explanandum must be a crime (differential association and

general strain theories), an act of deviance (social learning theory), or an act punishable

by society (social control theory), all theories assume an act has previously been defi ned

as having a prohibited status.

Associations. differential association does not provide an explanation of why indi-

viduals possess particular social networks or associations (associations include exposure

to media or other non-personal form of interaction). The theory does not account for why

an individual has a particular set of associations, although Sutherland’s (1947) concep-

tion of differential social organization does acknowledge that particular communities

may have different distributions of particular types of associations. Social learning theory

accounts for individual’s association insofar as they provide individual with rewards.

General strain theory provides an explanation for associations and argues individuals

125

will associate with deviant others as a means of trying to cope with the negative emotions

associated with strains in the absence of conventional forms of social support. Social

control theory also explains delinquent associations as simply being a function of the

absence of social controls. Within social control theory, associating with delinquent others

necessarily follows from the absence of social controls. As a result of differential associa-

tion theory’s failure to specify why an individual possesses a specifi c network of social

relations, it is more limited in scope than social learning, social control, and general strain

theories.

Cultural Differentiation. Another limitation in the explanatory power of these

theories pertains to assumptions of cultural differentiation. Differential association theory

assumes a society to be culturally heterogeneous. It is therefore limited in its ability to

explain criminal behavior in culturally homogenous societies because they would lack

the differentiation necessary to possess a disparity in defi nitions favorable or unfavor-

able to criminal behaviors. In opposition to differential association theory, social control

theory assumes society to be culturally homogenous. As a result of these assumptions, the

application of differential association theory to explain crime in culturally homogenous

or simple undifferentiated societies is inappropriate, whereas the application of social

control theory to complex differentiated societies is inappropriate. Social learning theory

does not contain differential association theory’s assumption of cultural heterogeneity and

therefore is not equally limited in its explanatory power. Likewise, general strain theory

contains no assumptions pertaining to societal differentiation and is therefore also not

limited in its explanatory power in this regard.

Microlevel Emphasis. A fi nal theoretical limitation is common to all formalized

theories. As all these theories have been formulated to explain individual differences in

criminal behavior, they have necessarily failed to explicate the macrolevel dynamics as-

126

sociated with criminal outcomes. These theories are only concerned with environmental

factors insofar as they relate to explanan believed to predict criminal behavior. They are

thus treated as a property of the individual (e.g., associations or social bonds) and not a

property of the environment that theory intends to explain.3

In evaluating the explanatory power of the formalized theories pertaining to scope

conditions, social learning theory is the least restricted of all the theories. Social learning

theory can explain criminal behavior in situations that other theories cannot, and none of

the other formalized theories can explain criminal behaviors in situations outside of the

scope of social learning theory. General strain theory is second in regards to its limita-

tions in explanatory power because it contains no limitations on the particular society in

which it is applicable. General strain theory is narrower in scope than differential associa-

tion theory in terms of its emphasis on hedonism solely as it relates to the avoidance of

unpleasurable things, but it is broader than differential association theory in its acknowl-

edgment that behavioral innovation can occur and its ability to potentially explain one’s

social networks as an effort to cope with strains. Differential association theory is less

limited in its explanatory power than social control theory because of its broader concep-

tion of plasticity. Depending on the level of differentiation of the society to which the

theory is being applied, differential association theory may be less powerful of an expla-

nation than social control theory in situations where the society has low levels of differ-

entiation. Social control theory only contains more explanatory power than differential

association theory when attempting to explain crimes in homogenous societies.

Having discussed limitations of explanatory power in regards to theoretical scope

conditions, it is now time to turn to comparisons of the actual explanations of crime in

order to evaluate which of the formalized theories has the most powerful explanan.

127

Explanan and Explanatory Power

The explanatory power of the formalized theories can be compared along two di-

mensions. The fi rst dimension pertains to whether a theory possesses an explanans which

is absent from other theories that is crucial to explaining criminal behavior. A second

dimension of explanatory power relates to the degree to which a theory possesses an ex-

planans that is broader in scope or possibly subsumes predictions made by an explanans

contained within another theory. Table 6.2 contains a summary of the primary explanan

of each of the formalized theories. Since explanans within social learning theory poten-

tially subsume explanans in all other theories, this section will be organized in terms of

social learning theory’s explanan. At the end of this section, explanan that are not con-

tained within social learning theory will be discussed. The primary explanans of social

learning theory include: (1) differential associations; (2) differential reinforcements (both

experienced and vicarious); and (3) defi nitions.

Differential Associations

Differential association, social learning, and general strain theories all possess

an explanans related to how criminal behavior may result as a consequence of learn-

ing criminal behaviors from others. Differential association theory captures this learn-

ing dimension by specifying that individuals learns to engage in criminal behaviors as a

result of interacting with the patterns of defi nitions favorable to criminal behaviors that

are exhibited by others. Likewise, as an extension of differential association theory, social

learning theory labels these patterns of interactions as differential associations and speci-

fi es they are the primary source of one’s exposure to differential reinforcements or vicari-

ous reinforcements that facilitate the learning of criminal behavior. General strain theory

acknowledges social learning processes may contribute to criminal behavior and addition-

ally specifi es that a harsh disciplinary practices can lead to the learning of dispositions

128

Differential Association

Theory Social Learning Theory Social Control Theory General Strain Theory

Exposure to values Possession of a surplus of definitions favorable to criminal behavior compared to definitions unfavorable to it.

Differential Associations

Vicarious Learning Differential Reinforcements

Possession of Definitions favorable to criminal behavior.

Attachments

Commitments Involvements Beliefs

Dispositions for criminal coping

Ability to legally cope Costs of criminal coping

Table 6.2Summary of Explanan of Formalized Theories

favorable to criminal behavior. Each of these theories contain an explanan of criminal

behavior that focuses on learning processes that enable an individual to engage in crimi-

nal behaviors. These theories propose that both motivations and one’s ability to engage in

criminal behavior can be infl uenced by the learning process. Social control theory, on the

other hand, explicitly denies that individuals positively learn to engage in criminal behav-

iors and therefore is limited in its explanatory power. This limitation stems social control

theory’s denial that criminal behaviors requires special skills or motives.

Differential Reinforcements

In addition to specifying learning sources, social learning theory also specifi es a

learning process in terms of differential reinforcements and vicarious reinforcements. In

addition to facilitating learning, reinforcements can also serve as situational motivators

within social learning theory for particular courses of action. Social learning theory is

more powerful than differential association theory in this regard due to differential associ-

ation theory’s failure to contain explanans that explicate the learning process or situation-

129

al inducements for criminal behavior. Social learning theory also provides a more pow-

erful explanation of criminal behavior than social control theory because social control

theory also fails to specify the learning processes associated with socialization and also

does not provide a situational theory of criminal behavior. General strain theory is also a

less powerful theory than social learning theory in regards to reinforcements for several

reasons. First, general strain theory acknowledges the possibility that vicarious learn-

ing can lead to dispositions favorable to criminal behavior and therefore matches social

learning theory in terms of its explanatory power relating to behavioral modeling. General

strain theory, however, does not specify that individuals can positively learn to engage

in criminal behaviors through reinforcements and instead attempts to specify how social

learning theory can supplement general strain theory in this regard. This externaliza-

tion of learning processes reduces general strain theory’s explanatory power in terms of

learning. Second, general strain theory emphasizes social support and access to resources

as increasing a person’s ability to legally cope with strains in order to mitigate criminal

behavior. Social learning theory would see social support or resources as providing an

individual with negative rewards pertaining to a given strain and therefore social learn-

ing theory would also predict social support and resources could reduce the likelihood of

criminal behavior in certain situations.

As a result of social learning theory’s reliance on operant conditioning and vicari-

ous learning principles, it also provides a more powerful explanation of behavioral mo-

tivations than all other formalized theories. Differential a ssociation theory’s reliance on

biological drives as the source of all human motivation fails to specify how these drives

serve to positively motivate behavior. Because these drives could also be subsumed under

social learning theory’s concept of nonsocial reinforcers, social learning theory is not

only able to account for drives as motivators, but also specifi es how drives can serve as

nonsocial reinforcers that positively motivate behavior. Social control theory assumes

130

hedonism is a constant motivator across all individuals, but only states social controls

prevent criminal behavior. It is incapable of explaining how situational inducements can

positively motivate criminal behavior.

Social learning theory also provides a more powerful explanation of motivation

than general strain theory because general strain theory is only able to account for how

punishments positively motivate criminal behavior. Social learning theory postulates that

both reinforcements and punishments can serve to positively motivate criminal behavior

and therefore is of greater explanatory power than general strain theory. Before com-

pletely discounting the insights of general strain theory in this regard, it is important to

note that Agnew (2006) has correctly observed that social learning theory has tended to

focus on how criminal behavior can be seen as rewarding. General strain theory’s empha-

sis on goal blockage, exposure to averse stimuli, and the loss of something of value as

motivators for criminal behavior has provided the valuable insight that criminal behavior

can be motivated in terms of negative rewards - that is, the removal of noxious stimuli.

Ultimately, it is possible to integrate this insight into social learning theory’s current

framework because social learning theory already acknowledges punishments and nega-

tive rewards as comprising the learning process.

Defi nitions

Social learning theory also contains a more powerful explanation of criminal

behavior than other formalized theories in regard to the role of cognition in explaining

criminal behavior. As an elaboration of differential association theory, it subsumes dif-

ferential association theory’s concept of defi nitions (e.g., attitudes, the direction of mo-

tivations, neutralizations) and additionally emphasizes the role of anticipated reinforce-

ments in producing criminal behavior. Additionally, social learning theory’s concept of

anticipated reinforcements can account for all of social control theory’s predictions in

131

terms of the role attachments, commitments, and beliefs play in deterring criminal behav-

ior. Hirschi ([1969] 2005) specifi es that attachment functions as a result of an individual

imagining how others would react to a given behavior if they were present. Such a con-

ception of attachment can be subsumed by social learning theory’s concept of anticipated

reinforcements. Social control theory also specifi es that one’s commitments, or stakes in

conformity, can also dissuade an individual from engaging in criminal behaviors. This can

likewise be explained by social learning theory in terms of anticipated reinforcements.

Additionally, social control theory’s concept of beliefs can be explained by social learning

theory’s concept of attitudes that account for the moral dimensions of behavior.

Social learning theory also contains several cognitive explanations of criminal

behavior that are simply absent from social control theory. Social learning theory con-

tends that neutralizations can exist and free an individual to engage in criminal behavior,

while social control theory sees neutralization’s solely as ad hoc justifi cations for crimes.

Should an individual engage in a criminal behavior as a result of the possession of an a

priori neutralization, such an act would be beyond the explanatory power of social con-

trol theory. Likewise, social control theory denies the possibility that skills can be learned

in relation to specifi c crimes. Any crime that requires complex and crime specifi c skills

(e.g., money laundering) cannot be explained by social control theory because it is only

concerned with those things that constrain criminal behavior. Lastly, social control theory

ignores the possibility that individuals can learn to engage in criminal behaviors. Social

control theory sees beliefs as restraining immoral behavior; however, the theory cannot

account for situations where an individual believes he or she should engage in a criminal

behavior. This includes both the previous discussion of neutralizations and other situa-

tions, such as the code of the street (Anderson 1999), in which an individual might pos-

sess attitudes that specify crime is appropriate in specifi c situations.

132

Social learning theory also provides a more powerful cognitive explanation of

criminal behavior than general strain theory. First, general strain theory relies upon social

learning theory to explain how individuals can learn to be rewarded by criminal behavior.

Second, the cognitions learned within general strain theory relating to the theory’s con-

cept of dispositions can be subsumed within social learning theory’s concept of attitudes.

General strain theory specifi es that individuals who possess dispositions favorable to

criminal behavior tend to possess the personality traits of negative emotionality and low

constraint. Negative emotionality is marked by tendencies to become easily upset, be

quick to anger, blame problems on others, be aggressive, and attribute hostile intent to

others. Since general strain theory argues these dispositions are learned as a result of the

exposure to previous strains (e.g., harsh discipline), then they can be subsumed under

social learning theory’s concept of attitudes which pertain to orientations towards things.

Likewise, general strain theory’s concept of low constraint relates to impulsiveness, risk-

taking behavior, the rejection social norms, and disregarding the feelings of others. Char-

acteristics of low constraint can also be subsumed by social learning theory’s concept of

attitudes.

Second, general strain theory specifi es that one’s ability to legally cope can de-

crease the likelihood of criminal behavior. General strain theory possesses several explan-

ans that are absent from social learning theory in this regard and therefore can provide

several explanations of criminal behavior that social learning theory cannot. An individ-

ual’s intelligence4, self-effi cacy, and self-esteem all are theorized to reduce the likelihood

of criminal behavior in response to strains. Social learning theory possesses no equivalent

explanans. Other explanan within general strain theory are able to be accounted for by

social learning theory in regard to one’s capacity to legally cope with strains. Problem

solving skills and social skills all could be subsumed under social learning theory’s con-

133

cept of attitudes as they refl ect particular orientations towards action within specifi c types

of situations or across general types of situations. Additionally, social learning theory

avoids the tautological relationships between dispositions, problem solving, and social

skills that are present within general strain theory (see Chapter 5) by subsuming the prop-

erties of these concepts within the singular general concept of attitudes.

Third, general strain theory specifi es that the costs associated with criminal coping

decrease the likelihood an individual will engage in criminal behavior in response to ex-

periencing strains. Just as social learning theory was able to subsume predictions derived

from social control theory’s concept of commitments, general strain theory’s explanan

of costs of criminal coping can be subsumed under social learning theory’s concept of

anticipated reinforcements. Insofar as an individual possesses things of value they fear to

lose should they engage in criminal behavior, the potential loss of these things serve as an

anticipated punishment should an individual engage in criminal behavior.

Summarizing the comparisons of explanatory power between formalized theories,

social learning theory provides a more powerful explanation of criminal behavior than

Table 6.3Summary of Explananda of Formalized Theories

Differential Association

Theory Social Learning Theory Social Control Theory General Strain Theory

Crimes as defined by the legal code.

Deviant behavior Criminal behavior as a legally proscribed subcategory of deviant behavior.

Absence of delinquency (as defined as being a punishable act by conventional members of society)

Crimes as defined by the legal code (including both juvenile and adult offenses).

134

the other formalized theories. Social learning theory can account for all explanations of

criminal behavior proposed by differential association and social control theories. It can

also account for most of the predictions of general strain theory, with the exception of

general strain theory’s explanans relating to self-esteem, self-effi cacy, and intelligence.

As a result of general strain theory’s emphasis on strains, in some ways it could be seen

as simply a more precise specifi cation of how punishments potentially lead to criminal

outcomes. Such a claim would need to be tentative as social learning theory still cannot

account for how self-esteem, self-effi cacy, and intelligence relate to crime.

Theoretical Explanandum

Having compared the formalized theories’ scope conditions and explanan, it is

also possible to compare their explanandum in order to determine which theories explain-

ing a broader class of behavioral outcomes. The variations in explanandum between the

theories could also be treated as theoretical scope conditions since some conceptions of

criminal behavior could be broader or narrower than others. The explanandum of these

theories can be evaluated in terms of their assumptions pertaining to a legal order and

whether they are able to predict the types of crimes one might commit. Table 6.3 contains

a summary of the explanandum of differential association, social learning, social control,

and general strain theories.

Legality

Differential association and general strain theories share a common explanandum.

Both theories attempt to explain criminal behavior as defi ned as being behavior that is

legally proscribed. While general strain theory also emphasizes that it explains delin-

quent behavior, such behavior is still legally proscribed even if the proscription is age

contingent. Social learning and social control theories both are broader in terms of their

135

explanandum than differential association and general strain theories. Social learning

theory attempts to explain both deviant and criminal behavior. It sees criminal behavior as

being a special case of deviant behavior. Unlike the other formalized theories that explain

legally proscribed behaviors to some degree, social control theory instead attempts to ex-

plain delinquent behaviors that are punishable by conventional members of society. Such

behaviors need not be proscribed in a legal manner.

As a result of their defi ned explanandum, differential association and general

strain theories are limited to explaining criminal behaviors to those societies that possess

legal institutions that allow for the formal legal prohibition of particular behaviors. Social

learning theory does not explain acts that are criminal, but not deviant, because it sees

criminal acts as being a subcategory of deviance by defi nition. Running a stop sign in a

rural area, for example, may not be considered deviant among the locals, even though it

is legally proscribed. While social learning theory could explain such an act in terms of

rewards or punishments, it’s defi nition of criminal acts as being necessarily deviant can

create an awkward logical inconsistency with its explanandum in certain situations.

Social control theory contains no assumptions pertaining to the legal organization

of a society in its explanandum. Hirschi ([1969] 2005) states that social control theory

explains delinquent behavior and that delinquent behavior is defi ned as being behavior

that is punishable by members of conventional society. As a result of this defi nition, social

control theory would not be limited to explaining criminal behavior to those societies that

are capable of legally prescribing acts. In this way, both social control and social learning

theories are not limited by their explanandum to explaining criminal behavior in modern

societies with formal legal systems.

Types of Crime

Differential association, social learning, and general strain theories are all capable

136

of explaining the type of crime an individual might commit. Differential association

theory explains specifi c types of crimes as being a function of the defi nitions of the situ-

ation one learns regarding a specifi c act as a result of the values to which one is exposed.

Likewise, social learning theory can predict specifi c acts based upon the degree to which

a behavior has been directly reinforced or vicariously learned. General strain theory also

can predict specifi c types of criminal behaviors as a function of the type of negative affect

one is experiencing, one’s dispositions favorable to criminal coping, ability to legally

cope, and costs of criminal coping associated with the behavior.

Social control theory is unable to explain specifi c types of criminal behavior

because of the theory’s assertion that motivation is constant across all actors. Since social

control theory is really explaining the absence of criminal behavior, it not interested in

why an individual engages in a criminal act. Social control theory only explains criminal

behavior as the inverse of the absence of criminal behavior, and therefore cannot explain

specifi c behavioral outcomes.

Conclusion

In summarizing this discussion of explanatory power of the formalized theories,

several conclusions can be drawn. First, among those theories formalized, social learning

theory provides the most powerful explanation of criminal behavior at the microlevel. Its

explanatory power is among the least restricted of all of the formalized theories in terms

of theoretical scope conditions. Its explanan are capable of subsuming the predictions

of the explanan of all of the theories with the exception general strain theory’s explanan

relating to intelligence, self-esteem, and self-effi cacy. Additionally, social learning theo-

ry’s explanandum of deviance and criminal behavior do not limit the theory to explain-

ing criminal or deviant behavior to societies that contain formalized laws. Social control

137

theory is distinct from other theories in that its explanandum is the absence of criminal

behavior. As a result of this distinction, the superior explanatory power of other theories

maybe limited to those theoretical tests that attempt to explain the number or types of

criminal behaviors. If an empirical assessment of these theories were to attempt compare

these theories when explaining the absence of criminal behavior, the limited scope of

the explanandum may neutralize the added explanatory power of explanans within dif-

ferential association, social learning, and general strain theories that are intended to help

explain the direction of criminal behavior.

Criminologists have long used statistical measures of model fi t as a means of

empirically assessing the explanatory power of criminological theories (e.g., Elliot et al.

1979). Such a view is rather limited because empirical tests are but one way to evaluate

the explanatory power of a scientifi c theory (see Gibbs 1972). Comparisons of theoretical

components related to scope conditions and the explanatory power of explanan can also

be utilized evaluated the explanatory power of a given theory (Cohen 1989). Akers (2009)

has pointed out that social learning theory typically yields the highest levels of model fi t

of any criminological theories when attempting to explain criminal behavior. While mea-

surement error or methodological issues could potentially explain the lower model fi ts of

the empirical tests of other theories, it is likely that social learning theory yields stronger

empirical support because its explanans can subsume the explanans of other criminologi-

cal theories and other theories have less explanatory power because they cannot account

for all of the predictions of social learning theory. As an elaboration of differential asso-

ciation theory, social learning theory has more explanatory power than differential as-

sociation theory. Social control theory simply cannot account for individuals learning to

engage in criminal behaviors or criminal motivation. Likewise, general strain theory only

emphasizes strains (or punishments within social learning theory) and is also limited in

its ability to explain how criminal behavior can be learned through negative rewards. As

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a result of social learning theory’s ability to almost completely subsume the explanans

of the other formalized theories, it currently provides the most powerful explanation of

criminal behavior.

Endnotes

1 Within social learning theory, the criminal behaviors of those with learning defi cits could potentially be explained in terms of situational reinforcements. Despite this poten-tial, social learning theory’s failure to specify a situational theory of criminal behavior through its use of the matching function and its reliance on previous learning history results in the theory’s overall inability to explain how situational reinforcements, in the absence of a previous learning history, might result in criminal behavior. As result of the theory’s reliance on learning histories to predict criminal behavior, the criminal behaviors of individuals possessing learning defi cits remain beyond the scope of the theory.

2 General strain theory does state that individuals can develop dispositions for criminal coping as a result of exposure to behavior models; however, the theory fails to articulate what is involved in behavioral modeling.

3 With the exception of social control theory, although the formalize theories have includ-ed some discussion of how macrolevel phenomenon corresponds to individual criminal outcomes. Sutherland (1947) specifi ed that modernization processes created differentia-tion as result of cultural confl ict and anomic forces. The dynamics of this process or not clearly articulated as ultimately it was one’s actual associations and not the demographic composition of the community that was theorized to predict criminal behavior. Social learning theory has recently been articulated to discuss how distributions of reinforce-ments within the environment relate to criminal behavior (Akers 2009). Likewise, general strain theory has been elaborated to discuss how social structural location be exposed individuals differentially to strains (Agnew 19xx). Despite these elaborations of the link-ages between macro and micro levels, these theories remain focused on individual level explanations of criminal behavior and are only concerned with macrolevel forces insofar as they relate to individual differences in criminal behavior. The precise macrolevel dy-namics that can affect the macrolevel forces theorized to infl uence microlevel correlates of criminal behavior are not explicated.

4 Social control theory (Hirschi [1969] 2005) also includes the concept of intelligence. Within social control theory, intelligence increases the likelihood an individual will achieve academic success and therefore can potentially infl uence an individual’s level of commitment.

139

Chapter 7

Conclusion

At the heart of the integration/elaboration debate (see Messner, Krohn, and

Liska 1989) was the issue of whether theory development in criminology was to pro-

ceed through theoretical integration, conceptual integration, or elaboration. Within

criminology, integration was seen as emerging in the form of end-to-end, side-by-side,

and up-and-down integrations (Hirschi 1979). End-to-end integrations sought to link

explananda from one theory to the explanans of another theory in order to demonstrate

how the theories were complementary (e.g., Elliot et al. 1979, Elliot et al. 1985). These

integrations were often organized with theories that provide more remote explanations of

criminal behavior linking to theories that provide more proximate explanations (Messner,

Krohn, and Liska 1979). In Chapter 5, general strain theory similarly tried to elaborate

how processes within general strain theory related to processes within social control and

social learning theories (ibid). Side-by-side integrations were not really integrations at all

and specifi ed that certain crimes were explained better by certain criminological theories

(ibid.). Under this view, certain theories are better at predicting crime under certain situa-

tions. Up-and-down integrations attempted to abstract elements from multiple theories in

order to arrive at a newly formed theory (Hirschi 1979), or attempt to subsume the predic-

tions of a second theory within the predictions of a more general theory.

Theoretical elaboration represents a second means of theory development that in-

volves adding knowledge claims to an existing theory rather than attempting to integrate

existing theories. Elaborations can be the result of the interplay between theory construc-

tion and research, the imagination of the theorist, or borrowing knowledge claims or

insights from other theories that are logically incorporated into an existing theory (Thorn-

berry 1989).

140

Regardless of the theoretical development strategy, it is diffi cult to integrate or

elaborate existing theories if these theories are not clearly articulated. This dissertation

has utilized theoretical formalization as a means of more clearly stating microlevel theo-

ries in the hopes that clearly articulating the four formalized theories will allow for a bet-

ter evaluation of how these theories can be further developed to foster cumulative theory

development within criminology. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to attempt to

integrate these theories, but each of the theories will be discussed in terms of how they

may be integrated or elaborated in order to foster further theory development.

End-to-End Integration

Despite arguments for theoretical integration employing an end-to-end technique

(e.g., Eliot et al. 1979; Elliot et al. 1985), general strain theory serves as a dire warning

against such efforts. As discussed in Chapter 5, general strain theory’s effort to integrate

with social control and social learning theories resulted in numerous tautologies that

undermined the logical integrity of the theory. Unlike previous criticisms of this mode

of integration that held disparate theoretical assumptions among integrated theories leads

to logical inconsistentencies (Hirschi 1979, 1989), this integrative effort was logically

inconsistent as a result of theoretically overlapping concepts.

Akers (1989) discusses the potential of conceptual overlap between competing

theories and observes that most criminological theories contain concepts that are similar

to concepts in other theories. Akers advocates that this overlap can serve as a basis for

conceptual integration as concepts subsume similar concepts, or are abstracted to form

a new broader concept. In the case of general strain theory, no such conceptual integra-

tion was attempted. As result, tautologies were generated within the theory once it was

integrated with social control and social learning theories.

141

Another problem that has not been discussed in regard to end-to-end integrations

is that theories contain different explananda. The integration/elaboration debate assumed

each theory was explaining criminal behavior or deviance, but this was not the case. Dif-

ferential association theory was solely attempting to explain criminal behavior as defi ned

by the legal code. Social learning theory was attempting to explain criminal and deviant

behavior. Social control theory was only attempting to explain why individuals do not

commit delinquent acts, and delinquent acts were acts that was punishable by a conven-

tional members of society. Lastly, general strain theory only attempted to explain those

criminal behaviors, as legally defi ned, that were positively motivated by strains. These

different explananda reveal that both differential association and general strain theories

are more limited in their explananda than social learning theory, and social control theory

is trying to explain something different all together. Since social control theory holds

motivation constant, it is only capable of explaining the absence of delinquent behavior

and not its form should it occur. The absence of criminal behavior is dichotomous: either

someone did not commit a crime or they did commit a crime. While Elliot (1985) has

noted the assumption of constant motivation within social control theory is unnecessary

and could be dropped by integrationists, this assumption is actually crucial to the theory’s

explanandum of why individuals do not engage in criminal behavior. Stated another way:

Since social control theory does not explain motivation, motivation serves as a scope

condition that is necessary to hold constant in order to predict that the presence of social

bonds leads to the absence of criminal behavior. Thus, another problem integrating crimi-

nological theories is that many theories differ in their explananda.

The logical problems encountered by general strain theory’s integration with

social control and social learning theories is somewhat different than the logical problems

of integration in Eliot’s work with his colleagues (Elliot et al. 1979; Elliot et al. 1985).

Whereas Elliot’s efforts linked concepts within theories together explicitly, Agnew (2006)

142

instead linked concepts within general strain theory to entire theories. This outsourcing of

explanation had the unintended consequence of producing tautologies within the theory.

As a result of the formalization of general strain theory, and it addition to prior

critiques of this method, end-to-end approaches can be identifi ed to be problematic in-

sofar as: (1) theories contain different underlying assumptions (Hirschi 1979, 1989); (2)

theoretical concepts overlap and result in tautological relationships with the integrated

theory; and (3) theories contain different explananda.

Side-by-Side Integrations

Side-by-side integrations are not really integration at all and instead are merely

statements that some theories are better at explaining specifi c types of crimes depending

upon a theory’s scope conditions (Messner, Krohn, and Liska 1979). This formalization

effort has identifi ed several instances in which a specifi c criminological theory may be

better at explaining criminal behavior than another theory.

First, social control theory (Hirschi [1969] 2005) is not capable of explaining why

an individual engages in a specifi c crime. Its assumption of human nature that motivation

is constant across all actors produces within the theory a scope condition that limits its

ability to predict specifi c types of crimes.

Second, a society’s level of differentiation can dictate which theory is better at ex-

plaining the occurrence of criminal behavior. Differential association theory (Sutherland

1947) is limited to explaining criminal behavior in those differentiated societies where

value-consensus is not present. In such societies, it is possible to have rival defi nitions

of the situation to the conventional order that can favor criminal outcomes. Social con-

trol theory (Hirsch [1969] 2005) is limited to explaining crime in those societies that are

undifferentiated and culturally homogenous. Since the theory assumes value-consensus

is present, and motivation is constant, one’s bond to society is the sole force infl uenc-

143

ing criminal behavior and the absence of bonds leads to the occurrence of crime. Social

learning and general strain theories are not limited in this regard.

Third, not all theories are identical in their explananda and therefore in some situ-

ations are explaining different things. Social learning theory (Akers 2009) is concerned

with explaining deviance and criminal behavior as a subset of deviance. General strain

theory (Agnew 2006) is only concerned with explaining those crimes that are the result

of positive motivations that have resulted from the negative emotional states one experi-

ences when exposed to strains. Social control theory (Hirsch [1969] 2005) is attempt-

ing to explain the absence of punishable behavior. Lastly, differential association theory

(Sutherland 1947) is primarily concerned with violations of the criminal code. While

overlap is present within these theories’ explananda, enough differences can be observed

where one could expect a particular theory, such as general strain theory, to better explain

than other theories when explaining a spontaneous crime that results from anger.

As a result of these differences within theories, each theory has a unique set of

explanans that attempt to explain their unique explananda. As such, it is reasonable to

assume certain theories are better at explaining certain phenomena insofar as those phe-

nomena are consistent with a theory’s scope conditions and defi ned explanandum.

Up-and-Down Integration

As discussed in the previous chapter, social learning theory (Akers 2009) can po-

tentially subsume the explanan that are present in all of the formalized theories. This co-

incides with previous observations (see Akers 1989) that there is a great deal of conceptu-

al overlap present among criminological theories, particularly between social learning and

social control theories. This conceptual overlap suggests that it is possible to integrate

theories using an up-and-down approach that subsumes the concept of one theory within a

more abstract concept in another theory (ibid.). But as Thornberry (1989) cogently points

144

out, such integration does not address the propositional relationships within a theory.

Even if two concepts, such as defi nitions and beliefs, are demonstrated to overlap, the

utilization of the concepts differs depending upon the theory. In comparing social control

theory to differential association theory, for example, Hirschi ([1969] 2005) observes:

“…if the ‘defi nitions favorable to law violation’ upon which the theory [dif-ferential association] rests are taken as defi nitions that free the actor to commit delinquent acts, the theory is falsifi able (and the distinction between differential association theory and social control theory is easily lost)” (15).

In arriving at this statement, Hirschi cites Sykes and Matza (1957) and Burgess

and Akers (1966) who elaborate differential association theory to more clearly articulate

that individuals do learn neutralizations that free an individuals to engage in criminal be-

havior. Even if such a statement were to be interpreted as indicating that differential as-

sociation theory could make similar predictions to social control theory, and subsume so-

cial control theory’s concept of belief, what benefi t is it to differential association theory

to do so? It already has a concept of defi nitions capable of making the same prediction,

and adding the concept of beliefs can introduce the problem of whether motivations need

to be held constant for the concept of belief to predict criminal behavior.

Subsuming one concept is just one way to arrange at an up-and-down integration,

it is also possible to decompose key elements from overlapping concepts present within

numerous theories and develop a new theory from the ashes; however, this strategy has

not been employed in criminology.

Elaboration

Theoretical elaboration represents another mode of theory development. Under

elaboration, existing theories are further developed by: (1) examining sources of variation

within a theory’s explanans; (2) attempting to indentify intervening phenomena between

145

an explanans and explanandum; and (3) examining the possibility of feedback loops

within the theory (Thornberry 1989). The benefi t of elaboration is it allows for theory

development that does not encounter the logical problems inherent to theory integration

efforts.

This formalization effort has clarifi ed some of these potential sources of elabora-

tion for all of the formalized theories, as each scope condition that has been identifi ed

potentially serves as a source of elaboration within each theory. These will be discussed

in more detail for each of the formalized theories.

Differential Association Theory/Social Learning Theory

As differential association and social learning theories share a common frame-

work, their potential for elaboration will be discussed together. Both theories contain

scope conditions that limit their explanatory power at the microlevel. For differential

association theory, it is unable to account for behavioral innovation. For social learning

theory, it is unable to account for learning that occurs when individuals rely on inductive

techniques when engaging in behaviors for which they have no reinforcement histories.

Both of these problems are tied to the question of how do individuals act in novel situa-

tions. In order to answer this question, the cognitive concepts within these theories would

need to be further elaborated in order to account for the mental operations that inductive

processes inevitably entail. Cognitions relating to attitudes, motives, neutralizations, and

skills within these theories are insuffi cient for this task, and prior to tackling the problem

of induction, these theories would need to better conceptualize the cognitive components

of the theories. Developments in cognitive psychology pertaining to schemata (Ger-

rig 1988), scripts (Abelson 1976), and working models (Bowlby 1982) could be applied

to differential association and social learning theories in order to further elaborate these

theories’ conception of defi nitions. Once this elaboration occurs, the subject of induction

146

could be explored as schemata, scripts, and working models all allow individuals to make

inferences within situations. One step in this direction has been the work of Proctor, Wil-

liams, and Guerra (2009) to specify a situational elaboration of differential association

and social learning theories that draws upon social information processing theory (Crick

and Dodge 1994; Dodge et al. 1986) and the previously noted cognitive concepts in order

to provide a situational explanation of criminal behavior.

A second area of elaboration for these theories could be to articulate the macrolev-

el forces affecting the learning process. Since differential association theory is no longer

actively developed as a stand-alone theory, there is little chance such a development will

occur. Such an elaboration could attempt to explore whether differential association the-

ory might be able to explain criminal behavior in cultural homogenous societies. Social

learning theory has already moved towards being elaborated in a macrolevel direction,

as Akers (2009) has developed social-structure-social learning theory that sees learning

as the primary process linking the microlevel and macrolevel of society. It proposes that

variations in social location expose individuals to differences in associations, reinforce-

ments, behavioral models, and defi nitions.

Other areas for elaboration pertain to social learning theory’s failure to specify

how punishments can positively motivate criminal behavior, and possible feedback

relationships within the theory. The possibility that punishments can motivate criminal

behavior has been a major insight by general strain theory, and it has been previously dis-

cussed that social learning theory already contains the concepts necessary for such an ex-

planation; however, the theory has not emphasized this possibility and could be improved

should it do so. Additionally, it is possible to elaborate social learning theory in terms of

feedback relationships. Akers (2009) has noted that such relationships are present, and

147

the formalization of social learning theory in Chapter 3 has attempted to further clarify

these relationships.

Social Control Theory

Social control theory could also be elaborated. It is unlikely the theory could

discard its assumption that human motivation is constant, or that society is marked by

value-consensus. These assumptions are too deeply rooted with the theory to be dis-

carded. It could, however, change its explanandum from being the absence of criminal

behavior to being actual criminal behavior. In doing so, it could potentially attempt to

explain specifi c crimes as being caused by variations in social control for specifi c activi-

ties. This would allow the theory to preserve its value-consensus assumption, as well

as its assumption that human nature is constant. While social control theory maintains

that parents do not share their criminal behaviors with their children, it would be logi-

cal consistent within the theory to say variations may exist in the degree to which social

controls are present for specifi c behaviors. Variations in specifi c criminal behaviors could

be explained in terms of variations in social control, and not motivation, and therefore the

logical consistency of the theory could be preserved.

Feedback relationships have also been elaborated within social control theory as

a result of the formalization presented in Chapter 4. Within social control theory, com-

mitments to conventional society lead individuals to become involved in conventional

activities, which in turn strengthen one’s commitments to society.

General Strain Theory

Identifying potential paths of elaboration is far more diffi cult for general strain

theory because of the problems in logical consistency it faces. Prior to exploring sources

of variation within its explanans, attempting to identify intervening concepts between

148

its explanans and explanandum, or identifying potential feedback loops, it is crucial that

concepts within the theory be more clearly defi ned and purged of tautological problems.

It was beyond this formalization to resolve such problems; however, the identifi cation of

the defi nitional problems itself can potentially improve the prospects of theoretical devel-

opment for general strain theory.

It is clear that there is also one fundamental limitation when elaborating general

strain theory. Since the theory focuses solely on how strains can generate negative af-

fective states that result in criminal behavior, the theory seems limited in its capacity to

explain other types of crimes and will always have less explanatory power than the other

formalized theories in this regard.

Like all microlevel theories, general strain theory can be elaborated to specify the

macrolevel forces that infl uence the strains one experiences. Agnew (1999, 2006) has

theorized about how one’s structural location might affect the strains to which he or she is

exposed.

Conclusion

This dissertation proposed formalization as another mode of theory development

within criminology. Formalization itself is not an end, but rather its serves to produce

more clearly defi ned theoretical statements that foster a greater ability to integrate and

elaborate theories, as well as provide clearer statements from which one can derive better

empirical tests of theories. By identifying scope conditions, articulating conceptual defi -

nitions, and specifying theoretical knowledge claims it has been the intent of this disserta-

tion to demonstrate the possible benefi ts of formalization for cumulative theory develop-

ment.

Formalization also allowed for a more straightforward comparison between

theories in terms of theoretical scope conditions, explanans, and explananda. In doing

149

so, areas of overlap and difference between theories could be identifi ed. All theories

were demonstrated to hold that human behavior is fundamentally hedonistic, while social

control and general strain theories were more limited in their conceptions of plasticity.

All theories also saw learning as an important element of predicting criminal behavior,

though social learning theory was the only theory to articulate a learning process. Theo-

ries also differed in several ways relating to their assumption of cultural differentiation or

the degree to which they saw individuals as pragmatic innovators.

The identifi cation and clarifi cation of scope conditions also potentially provides an

answer as to why theoretical competition has primarily failed within criminology. Elliot

(1985) observed:

“Classical theories of crime and delinquency rarely provided competing hypoth-eses that were testable, theories with very different assumptions and causal propo-sitions frequently predicted similar outcomes, and in those instances where such tests were possible the results were seldom defi nitive” (125).

The problem with theory competition is that if scope conditions are not being

taken into account, the theories cannot compete on a level playing fi eld. Scope condi-

tions imply that propositions are conditional and only hold, or are more likely to hold,

when scope conditions are met (see Cohen 1989). Should theoretical competitions fail

to incorporate scope conditions into empirical assessments of a theory, ambiguous fi nd-

ings may result from the failure to account methodologically for scope conditions rather

than be due to the actual shortcomings of a theory’s predictions. This formalization effort

potentially opens up the possibility of theoretical competitions that are informed by scope

conditions. Such competitions could give criminologists a better reading of the explana-

tory power of criminological theories.

Priori to concluding this dissertation, it is important to note that the formalizations

presented have not been intended to provide defi nitive statements of the formalized theo-

150

ries. The intent was simply to demonstrate the possible benefi ts of theory formalization

for cumulative theory development. One benefi t of formalization is that it can objectify

a particular theory and serve as a basis of inter-subjective agreement as to a theory’s

predictions and limitations. Once a theory is formalized, individuals can contest scope

conditions, propositions, or defi nitions in order to arrive at a more aggreed upon state-

ment of the theory. And once these conceptual components have been isolated and iden-

tifi ed, they can come into focus for future theory development. As such, this dissertation

should be seen as a starting point advocating theory formalization and not as an effort to

utilize formalization as a means to declare the statements of the theories presented here as

defi nitive.

151

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