Dissemination of Combat Information 20 March 1953

8/3/2019 Dissemination of Combat Information 20 March 1953

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- _ . ' SblElIE; (I - . flED. Sst;s:m ",. . s '''rC8' UNClASSIOFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES

For t Monroe, Virginia A TTNG-26 350. OS/3(nOCI)(C)(20 M ar 53) 20 March 1953SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat I n f o r m a t i o ~ __ --.. LlBRAi-UARY.Y WAR CX..LCGP E R I O ~ l C A L S SECTIONTO: See distribution Mt.R 31 1953

IOpy .................. 1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat Infor

mation, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded for evaluation and necessaryact ion. I t may be appropriate, in certain cases, to take actionupon a single extracted i tem; in others, i t may be desirable to developa cross-section of accumulated extracts on a part icular subject before-initiating action; and, often, the extracted i tem serves to reaff irm ourdoctrines and techniques.

2. C.opies are. furnished to other mili tary agencies to keep theminformed concerning theater problems from th e front Hne through th elogist ical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which a re class i fied SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user , this Office assigns each ex tracted i tem th e lowest classification compatible with secu


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U N C l A S ~-'m 7 iU$2

DISTRIBUTION: Copy No

1- 3 DACOIS , G--l, 100-101 Executive for Reserve4- 6 ACOFS, G-2, DA and ROTC Affairs7-21 ACOFS. G-3, DA 102-111 Chie f Signal Office r

22-41 ACOFS. G-4, DA 112-121 The Surgeon General42-43 The Adjutant General 122-125 Chief of Transp.ortation44-45 Chief of Chaplains OCAFF46-55 Chief Chemical Officer 126 Gl56-65 Chief of Engineers 127 G266-67 Chief of Finance 128- 147 G368-69 Chief of'Information 148-149 G470-71 The Inspector General 150-154 RD72-73 The Judge Advocate 155 Chaplain

General 156 Cml 74-75 Chief of Military 157 Compt

History 15 8 Engr 76-77 Chief. National Guard 159 Info Bureau 160 Med

78-87 Chief of Ordnance 161 Ord 88-89 The Provost Marshal 162 PM General 163 QM 90-99 The Quar termaster 164 Sig General 165 Trans

I Copies furnished:166-299 TA G (40 CG, US Army Forces , Far Eas t (Main); 44 CINC.


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UNCLASSlFlO~ , : 20 March 1953ATTNG-26 350. 05/3(DOCI)(C)(20 M ar 53)Subject: Dissemination of combat Information

C opie s furnis hed: (C ont)335-33633 7

338-339340-341

34 2343-344345- 346347- 348349-350351-352353-354355-356357-358359- 360361- 362363-364365-366

.367368

Chief of Naval Operations, Dept of the NavyCO, Mountain &: Cold Weather Tng CommandChief, Army Advisory Gp, A ir Command and Staff

School, A ir UniversityComdt of Cadets, US Military AcademyComdtArmed Forces Staff College. NOB

Marine Corps School USAF Air-Ground Operations School CQunter Intelligence Corps School The Provost Marshal General 's School Army War College CGSC Army G eneral School The Armored School The Artil lery School The Infantry School Asst Comdt, The Art i l lery SchoolAA&:GM Branch

Chief, Army Security Agency Officer in Charge, Atlantic Fleet Intelligence Cen,

Attn: Ground Forces OfficerDirector , Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Secy of


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UNCLASS'S i ! ; :....Rea", 5 5 un bAl.'1$

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Div, ArtyDATE: October 1952 Source No 66 6

(RESTRICTED)RADIO AND OBSERVATION INSTRUMENT REQUIREMENT FOR

UNITS OCCUPYING THE DEFENSE LINE. - In the presen t stat ic defensive situation of this division it has been necessary to supply forwardobservers with two radios and to increase the number of available observers , for the following reasons :

a. Most enemy attacks are accompanied by violent mor ta r andart i l lery f i re result ing in immediate loss of wire communicat ion.

b. This fire normal ly makes rapid replacement of communicat ionequipment impossible .

c. Although a single company usually occupie s a single hill 'mass ,the configurat ion of the ground is frequently such as to requi re m o r ethan one forward observer in order to insure adequate coverage.

As a resu l t of the above. this organization has found i t necessaryto i ssue instruct ions to the effect that each forward observer will havetwo radios and that l iaison officers have extra spares , and fur ther findsi tse lf manning 29 OP's , all with two radio sets .

The addit ional ground observation posts necessi tated by pecul ia r


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6 :Sib2

SOURCE: Command Report - 204th FA BnDATE: October 1952 Source No 667

(RESTRICTED),FLASH REDUCER FOR l55-MM GUN. - Recent difficulties ex

perienced by this battalion with flash reducers when firing charge superin the lSS-mm gun has resulted in suspension of the use of flash reducerswith charge super.

The flash of the charge supe r is of such magnitude that it can readilybe located by th e most primit ive flash locator methods. In view of theimproved enemy counterbattery capabil i t ies, i t is necessary that all prac t icable means of concealment be utilized. Therefore, i t is imperativethat some type of flash reducer be utilized during night firing.

It is recommended that necessary action be taken at th e ear l iestpracticable date to provide a usable flash reducer for the 1SS-mm gun.

SOURCE: .Command Repprt - 45th Div ArtyDATE: August 1952 Source No 668

(RESTRICTED)SHORTAGES OF FA NCO'S AND OFFICERS. - Critical shortages


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a I : ;Z""UNCLASSIFIED.".",; '.6"."'0"In a normal defense situation, the mortars are placed we!l to the

r ea r of the MLR so that fires may be placed not only in defense of theMLR but, without displacement, on the MLR and to its r ea r in order tol imit a:ny possible enemy penetration. In the presen t situation, i t hasbeen found that the mortars a re best employed direct ly behind the MLR.This enables the mor ta r s to engage more targets along the enemy OPLRand MLR. With the mor ta r s employed in this manner , it is also possi ble to mass the f i res of the entire company in defense of any port ion ofthe OPLR. Other posit ions have been selected and prepared 1000 to1500 yards behind the MLR so that, in the event of a withdrawal of theOPLR, the mor ta r platoons may be quickly displaced for defensive f i resforward of the MLR.

In some instances the mortar platoons have been employed directlybehind the outposts in order to fire close supporting fires in conjunctionwith the ar t i l lery for a far ranging patrol or raiding party; this hasproven part icularly successful .

Detailed prior planning and co-ordination must be made betweenthe patrol leaders of friendly patrols and the heavy mor ta r forward obse rver . Detai ls which should be considered are patrol routes , suspected enemy posit ions which may fire on th e patrol , prearranged concentrations to be fired on cal l and well establ ished methods of communication. Al1 patrol leaders should be well versed in the adjustment ofmor ta r fire, in the event these supporting fires need to be brought inclose to the patrol or adjusted on targets of opportunity spotted by thepatrol . .


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----- ---- - - - - - - - - - ~ UNCLASSIFIED

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co- ordinates so that the impact can be rec orded on the sound tape. Bysound \ntersect ion precise adjustment can be rapidly made. This procedur,e has been found to be accurate for fixing exact ranges to unobserved points within the sector .

Although th e regiment is in a static situation, a system has beenset up \n the company to allow the platoons to pract ice displacement. Aplatoon is ordered to move to an al ternate position on short notice.Once the platoon is in posit ion, ' h a r a ~ s i n g and interdiction fires a replaced on enemy posi t ions during the night and the unit moves backthe pr imary position the following morning; this also serves to concealthe platoon's pr imary posit ion and lessens hostile countermor tar fire.

Recommendat ions:1. Employ th e mortars directly behind the MLR to enable fire

to be placed on the enemy OPLR and MLR positigns and at the same t imeto mass f i res of the entire company in defense of any position of theOPLR.

2. Select other posi t ions 1000-1500 yards to the rea r of the MLRso that in the event of a withdrawal of the OPLR, th e mor ta r platoonsmay be displaced for defensive fires forward of th e MLR.

3. Initiate detailed prior p l ~ : m n i n g and co-ordinat ion between pat rol leaders and forward observers to include briefings on suspectedenemy posit ions which may fire on the patrol , prearranged concentra


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SOURCE: Command Report - l60th Inf RegtDATE: October 1952 Source No 67 0

(RESTRICTED)COMMUNICATIONS. '- This subject is mentioned merely to re

emphasize the known principle that several means of communicationmust be provided. In each .of. three engagements wire communicationswithin companies and from companies to.battalion were disrupted or destroyed in the ear ly phases by enemy ar t i l lery and mortar f i res. Greaterreliance mus t be placed on radio and visual means of communication.

SOURCE: Command Report - 279th In f RegtDATE: August 1952 Source No 671

(CONFIDENTIAL)INTEGRATION OF KATUSA PERSONNEL. - On 23 August four

hundred ninety-four Korean Augmentation Troops, United States Army,(KATUSA) were assigned to th e organization. In accordance with cur ren t directives, KATUSA personnel were reassigned to organic unitsand integrated on the basis of two men per squad in the combat units.These new m en presented a soldierly appearance, demonstrated a knowledge of the M lr i f l e , keen in teres t in mil i tary subjects an d a willingnessto learn. The difference in language constituted a bar r ier ; however,training progressed steadily.


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UNCLASSIFIED 6

Napalm mines were successful ly used to reveal enemy patrols nearfriendly positions. One such incident occurred on the night of 23 September when member s of a friendly combat post heard noises that indicatedthe possibility of approaching enemy. One of the men immediately detonated one of the mines forward of the combat post . The mine functionedperfect ly and i l luminated the area disclosing the posit ion of ten enemy.

SOURCE: Command Report - I CorpsDATE: August 1952 Source No 673

(RESTRICTED)PANEL VIOLATIONS. - Fif ty- three panel violations were reported

by mosquito a i rc ra f t and f ighter-bomber pilots across the Eighth Armyfront during the period 1 July through 6 August. Severa l incidents revealed that improper displays and lack of panels had contributed to mi s str ikes on friendly posit ions. Eighth Army ordered al l commanders toinsure that units habitual ly display air-ground recognition panels .

SOURCE: Command Report - 49th FA BnDATE: August 1952 Source No 674

, (CONFIDENTIAL)PROBLEMS OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT IN LAST 100 YARDS OF


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6S@KEf' U N C L A S ~ l f I E D lk 2m 5 5 "OJ 6".U'(CONFIDENTIAL)

FUSES FOR SMOKE SHELLS. - Recently there have been m oreand mor e smoke miss ion reques ts by the infantry. The two fusesavailable in Korea for smoke are, the M54 and M67. The M54 is an accura te fuse but is very limited because of the shor t burning t ime . TheM67 fuse, when used with base ejection pro jec t i les , mus t be used without the booster . There has been no problem obtaining M67 fuses withboos te r s , but deboosterized fuses have been difficult to obtain. Thehigh dispersion obtained with this fuse has somet imes reduced the effect iveness of smoke projecti les fired.

I t is recommended that t ime fuses for smoke shel ls be given fur ther study.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Div, ArtyDATE: September 1952 Source No 675

(CONFIDENTIAL)SYSTEM FOR CONDUCT OF AIR OBSERVED MISSIONS. - The

ini t ial rounds in adjustment will be called "ranging rounds" and will befired by the center two pieces of the adjust ing battery. Shell HE will beused and the pieces will be fired a t an in terval of 10 seconds with a 400yard range spread. The shor t round will be fired f i rst , and adjustmentwill be continued from the round falling neares t to the target . Reasonsfor adoption of the "ranging round" sys tem are :


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SOURCE: Command Report - 213th FA BnDATE: September 1952 Source No 676

(RESTRICTED)REMOTE CONTROL RADIO EQUIPMENT. - It was impossible to

mainta in wire communicat ion with the three observat ion posts due to theextremely heavy shel l ing. Radio communicat ion was used throughoutthe operat ion and proved to be sat isfactory. F or maximum resu l t s , i twas necessary to locate th e radios outside and at the rea r ent rance tothe bunkers so the antenna would be in a posit ion to operate at maximumefficiency. In placing the radio in this exposed posit ion, the operat ingpersonnel were , of necess i ty , vulnerable to enemy art i l lery f ire .

This unit los t three radios due to enemy shel l f i re on HillTwo of the operating personnel received minor wounds.Operating under cur ren t T /O&E, this unit is not


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t f N ' C L A S ~ n t F T E ' 5 " P Ihcaused malfunctions. This was t rue even when burs t were l imited totwenty-five to forty rounds and the barrel removed af ter two to threehundred rounds. The l iner separated from the tube and caused incor.rectheadspace - the resulting malfunction ruined t h e . 50 cal iber machinegun.

I t is recommended that:a. A solenoid cable be developed which will have the approxi

mate strength of the modified cable discussed above.b. Reclaimed tubes be provided with a more permanent l iner .

SOURCE: Command Report - 780th FA BnDATE: October 1952 Source No 678

(RESTRICTED)NEED FOR HEAVIER TRACTOR, FA BATTALION. - It is r ec

ommended that a heavier cargo t rac tor be issued in l ieu of the M4.tracto r as the lat ter is too l ight to negotiate the mountain roads while towin g an 8-inch howitzer . On numerous occasions while maneuver ing thehowitzers into firing posit ion the pintle plate on the M4 has been completely snapped off.

SOURCE: Command Report - 623d FA Bn


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eeF5g::,;! 5 &UNCLASSIFIED 10

b. Sturdy b u n k ~ r s offer good protect ion against even directhits with th e common cal ibers and fuses present ly being used by theenemy.

c. Howitzer pits of curren t design are effect ive in reducingda,mage to a minimum. Likewise, revetments are desirable for t r ac tors an d t rucks .

d. The morale and efficiency of battery personnel are lessl ikely to s lump during a shelling i f th e m en have confidence in theirbunkers. The casual t ies suffered were all caused by a direct hit on atwo- layer sandbag bunker, one of th e less substant ial ones in the areaat the t ime.

SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Tank Bn (M) DATE: September 1952 Source No 680

(RESTRIC TED)EVACUATING DISABLED TANKS UNDER FIRE. - A method of

evacuating disabled tanks u nder f i re was evolved which holds exposureof th e recovery crew to a minimum. Pr io r to entering the exposed areathe crew mus t be thoroughly briefed on the action to follow. A cable is. la id over the deck of. the tank so that one end of the cable hangs downwithin reach of a man under th e tank; the tank is moved ei ther forwardor backward, up against the disabled tank. At this t ime the bow gunner


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resulting in the loss of petroleum products an d interruption in ra i l se rv ice . The following factors are considered primari ly responsible for thebreaks:

a. Tamper ing an d associated pilferage because of insufficientsecurity along the l ine.

b. Inadequate maintenance resulting from using the engineerpipeline company as securi ty forces.

c. Breaks caused by excessive expansion of the pipelines inhot weather.

In view of the serious si tuation that could resul t f rom frequent andprolonged interruption of rai l service and/or pipeline delivery, i t is essential that all pipeline personnel available in the vicinity be used onlyon construction or maintenance of POL facilities.

The following s teps have been taken regarding pipeline breaksalong the ra i lroad:

a. All crossings on railroad bridges are being made of weldedpipe.

b. All pipes crossing ra i lroad bridges or supported by themare constructed so that pipe is six feet from the bridge.


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UNCLASSiFIED12

SOURCE: Command Report - I Corps, ArtyDATE: September 1952 Source No 68 2

(RESTRICTED)ENEMY TACTICS. - During the month, th e enemy employed a

very simple idea in an attempt to confuse or delay our counterbatteryintelligence section. On th e night of 17 Septemb er, num erous flasheswere seen in enemy terr i tory; however. th e normal "Bang" was notforthcoming. In the heat of battle this ruse could conceivably impairthe effectiveness of our counterbat tery effort by causing us to fire onone or tw o individuals who are sitting back in a bunker setting off theseflashes. In the past several months, there have been indications that theenemy has fired time fire; however, there was rio positive proof of this.In the la t ter par t of September air bursts were actually observed byforward observers during on e period of enemy firing.(RESTRICTED)

USE OF FLASH REDUCER WITH SUPER CHARGE. - In th e pas tmonth the 204th FA Bn (155-mm gun) reported a number of instances offiring locks being blown from th e guns when the super charge was firedwith flash reducer . An ordnance team was called in and th e followingdata were obtained:

a. Maximum allowable working pressure in chamber is :


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""SW'" 5MbA." .UNCLASSIFIED

individual in a combat unit. The importance of this job can not be over .emphasized in the training of both officers and enlisted men alike. Ins t ructor personnel in the continental United States are not impressingthis subject too well on their stud'ents. The t ime for shell reporting isimmediately a f t ~ r a roUnd lands. not an hour or a day la ter . I f thefront-line soldier will send in a shel l repor t immediately af ter the in coming round, corps ar t i l lery can effectively deliver counterbatte,ry fireon the weapon fir ing. Corps arti l lery. has the capability of neutralizingany weapon which can fire on our front- l ine t roops. However. we cannot accurately fire without shell reports from the troops themselves .

It is recommended that service schools . replacement trainingcenters and training divisions place more emphasis on the subject ofshell repor ts .

SOURCE: Eighth Army Armor Bulletin No 1DATE: November 1952 Source No 683

(SECRET)USE OF TANK MOUNTED FIGHTING LIGHTS AND AUTOMATIC COUPLING AND TOWING DEVICE IN A COMBAT

OPERATION1. INTRODUCTION. - The seizure of Hill BH involved the em

ployment of experimental i tems of tank equipment. and the use of tanks


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14(2 ) An attack by an infantry company to seize Hill BHfollowing the divers ionary attack. Stealth was to be employed in this

action insofar as possible.b. The diversional'Y attack plan was as follows:

(1 ) At 2030, two M46 medium tanks. each equipped with atank mounted fighting-light. were to proceed from an attack posit ion atM along the road to posit ion X; tw o additional M46 medium tanks mount ing tank f ighting-l ights were to proceed by the same route to posit ion Yfollowing th e f i r s t tw o tanks at an in terval of about 100 yards .

(a ) The miss ion of this tank platoon was to placeheavy f ire on areas to the front and flanks in order to crea te the impress ion of a lnain effor t in that area; to c:over and support the f lametanks and infantry in their assaul t on Hill R; and to draw enemy ar t i l leryand mor ta r fire away from the main effor t on Hill BH.

(b ) Since this route had not been comp letely swept ofAT mines . the lead tank would be equipped with special towing hooksby which the second tank in column, equipped with an automat ic couplingtowing device, could re tr ieve the lead tank without expo sure of personn.el .

(c ) The tank platoon leader and an ar t i l lery forwardobserver were located in the second tank.(d) As soon as the las t of the four M4 medium tanks
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& 3!tRE}O@caWk;;' ""6.'IbNUNCLASSIFIEDd. Eight M46 medium tanks and one armored communica

t ions and control vehicle (Porcupine) were posi t ioned in hull defiladeposit ions on the MLR to furnish direct fire support to the


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UNCLASSIFIED ::M::16

in a cr i sscross fashion with their bow machine guns to discourage theenemy flushed from their positions by the f lame.(1) Enough flame fuel was conserved to l ight the wq.y

down from the cres t of Hill R. When they reached the junction at Z, tw oother fLame tanks standing by a t that point were dispatched to th e ob-

I'jective to continue the at tack. Conduct of this attack was identical tothat of the f i rst section.' All f ~ a m e tanks had returned to their assemblyarea by 2330.

(2) Enemy react ion to the flame attack on Hill R was moreintense than that experienced by the M46 mediwn tanks on th e road, and

consisted of modera te to heavy concentrations of mixed mor tar an d a rt i l lery fire and small arms f i re.

c. The infantry.assault on Hill BH commenced at 2305 whenthe diversionary action was most intense.(1) Tanks of the 2d and 3d Platoons of Company C and

the Tank Platoon, AT Company, 1s t Marine s, unde r operat ional cont ro l of CGmpany C, 1st Tank Battalion, furnished direct fire suppor tfrom positions' on the MLR as indicated on the sketch (pg 20). The 3dplatoon placed tank f i res on enemy firing points on T, V, W and XXithe objective i tself was masked by th e MLR.

(2) The 2d Platoon fired on targets to their direct frontand in support of th e assault on Hill BH. The tank platoon, AT Com


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23!@!JlPJiiill I 2Af,rC!.]" UNC!ASSIFIEDb. Although no infantry accompanied the tanks as they moved

out on the road, intelligence indicates that th e enemy thought this' forceto include a company of infantry. Movement of tanks between per iods .of fighting-light illumination created the impression that more tankswere presen t than were actually committed. Considerable art i l lery andmor ta r f ire- was directed against th e tanks. The combined effectivenessof the flame tanks and the gu n tanks with fighting-lights in neutralizingenemy opposition permit ted th e infantry platoon to move over Hill S,and onto Hill R with a minimum of casual t ies . Two of the casualt ies ofthis platoon resulted from enemy fire on the MLR. The only other casualty was suffered as the platoon withdrew from i ts objective.

c. Although the enemy reacted strongly to th e tank diversion,he failed to react to the main effort until th e objective was almost com pletely occupied. His reaction was weak and ineffective. Intelligenceindicates that the enemy thought this force to be of platoon strength,ra ther than of company size as it actually was.

I5. CONCLUSIONS. a .. Flame tanks. - The psychological and

casualty effect of the flame tank'seemed a tremendous factor in thesuccess of the operation. I t destroyed or drove th e enemy from Hill R.

b. Armored communication and control vehicle. - Throughthe use of this vehicle as a radio relay station, the tank company commander was able to control a ll his units effectively and, at the samet ime, maintain close l iaison with the infantry units.

c. Searchlights.


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. ." 9&&1/ I* ' .1UNCLASSIFIEDit I F If ,

18the same as on a foggy or rainy day. I i there is a grea t deal of art i l leryfb e on the lighted target , sInoke cuts the observation by about 7S percent; therefore, i t is best to o b s ~ r v e the objective with the l ights beforeany support ing f ires COInInence. This enables the tank cOInInander tobecoPle faIni l iar with the t er ra in , and to pick out bunkers , avenue ofapproach and other suitable targets .

(3) Once the l ight lens is broken, the Inuzzle blast fromthe Inain arInaInent will shatte r the bulb and will also blow dust andsInall rock and sand part icles to the rea r thus chipping the ref lector .The eneInY did not place fire close enough to the tanks to damage theirl ights.

(4) MaxiInunl effectiveness of the machine guns when usedin conjunction with the lights was achieved by a coordinate.d sweepingmethod. Parallel and cr isscross sweeping methods were used, theparal lel method being used when the adjacent tank wished to sweep the.target area together and the cr isscross method being used when the tankswished to cross their fire throughout the t a rge t area.

d. Automatic coupling device. - This device worked ext remely well, and is a definite improvement over the manual hookup withcables. However, the spring arrangement causes the ~ a r to bounceup and down and at t imes to dig into the ground. Also, i t decreasesthe tanks maneuverabili ty in close places.


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UNCLASSIFIEDJ"8:6Ef'dilLS'" 'MbA.....(2) That the flame gun range be increased.

b. Tank mounted fighting-lights. That range of th e light beincreased from 1200 to 2000 yard's to match the f irs t rOWld accuracyof the 90 -mm gun.

c. Automatic coupling device. - That a skid of some type beaffixed to the towing bar so that the bar will not dig in when i t touchesthe ground.

j


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UNCLASSIFIED

)..,. \I, ; , : ~ __ SEARCHUGHT TANK-I --.-..-Bt COMMUNICATION TANK,

I LO=MLR IN ZONE OF ACTIONI

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III,

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I \CI=II :M( .- ..I IFWD CP _ TANK - M46,

__ FLAME TANK ...M4A3

I20I NOT TO SCALE

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6EC!NET UNClASSlFlED I

Dissemination of Combat Information 20 March 1953

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Transcript of Dissemination of Combat Information 20 March 1953