‘An investigation into safety, security and w

ellbeing in the urban residential environm

ent’By Sam

Westbrook, 2012

A dissertation submitted to the Manchester School of Archi-tecture for the degree of Bachelor of Architecture.

Manchester School of ArchitectureUniversity of Manchester

Manchester Metropolitan University

‘An investigation into safety, security and wellbeing in the urban residential environment’

By Sam Westbrook, 2012

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor, Alan Lewis for his help and guidance. I would also like to acknowledge Rachel Armitage for assistance and co-operation.

Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the dissertation has been submitted in support of an ap-plication for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

Copyright Statement

(1) Copyright in text of this thesis rests with the author. Copies (by any process) either in full, or of extracts, may be made only in accordance with instructions given by the Author and lodged in the John Rylands Library of Manchester. Details may be obtained from the Librarian. This page must form part of any such copies made. Further copies (by any process) of copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the permission (in writing) of the Author.(2) The ownership of any intellectual property rights which may be described in this thesis is vested in the Manchester School of Architecture, subject to any prior agreement to the contrary, and may not be made available for use by third parties without the written permission of the University, which will prescribe the terms and conditions of any such agreement.(3) Further information on the conditions under which disclosures and exploitation may take place is available from the Head of Department of the School of Environment and Development.

Abstract.

‘The past 10 years have witnessed an increasing shift towards the return of city centre living, as large numbers of people moved back into our cities to live and work.

As a result many cities have seen a rapid increase in the number of residential developments located in close proximity to their centres.

With this influx of both population and urban development, major concerns have been aired over the impact this is having on criminal activity and the safety of residents. One such concern is over the quality of the environments created to house this increasing population, and whether the correct or appropriate precautions are employed to provide residents with safest accom-modation possible, accommodation that makes them feel secure, without heightening feelings of vulnerability and paranoia.

A review of literature highlighted a current debate over the police lead initiative ‘secured by design’, which since its introduction in the late 90’s has faced stiff criticism, particularly from architects and writers, with many criticising the scheme for the creation of ugly and lifeless environments. The criticisms, in some cases go beyond a concern purely for aesthetics, but question the effectiveness of the initiative itself, and its efficiency in creating safer environments.

The results from the research conducted, showed a level of misunderstanding when it came to the police organised initiative, and proved its usefulness and successfulness as tool in the fight against crime. Whilst at the same time highlighting inconsistencies within the initiative itself, outlining where individual interpretations of its principles risk negatively impacting the effectiveness of the scheme when implemented in practice. Theories were expressed through the analysis of two selected case studies, chosen from Manchester’s city centre. Findings showed the failings in the design of environments that did not seek the guidance of the police force, whilst also highlighting areas of contention in buildings constructed inline with ‘secured by design’ standards, and provided reasons for why. The research reflects on the difficulties faced by private developers and the police force, in the successful application of such initiatives in the design of residential architecture’.

Contents

List of Figures 05

Chapter One: Introduction 071.1 Introduction 07

Chapter Two: Literature Review 082.1 Introduction 082.2 Defensible Space 082.3 Locations, Design and Criminal Activity 112.4 ‘Secured by Design’ 142.5 Natural Surveillance, in or out? 182.6 Space Syntax 182.7 Virtual Community 192.8 Formula for Urban Safety 202.9 Environmental verses Configurational 222.10 Gated Isolation verses Connected Integration 232.11 Conclusion 24 Chapter Three: Methodology 253.1 Research Question 253.2 Approach 253.3 Interview/s 263.4 Case Study Selection 26 Chapter Four: Interpreting ‘Secured by Design’ 274.1 Interpreting ‘Secured by Design’ 27

Chapter Five: Case Studies 325.1 Introduction 325.2 Express Networks Phase III 335.3 ‘Secured by Design’? 335.4 Natural Surveillance 345.5 Albion Works 385.6 Gated Communities 39

Chapter Six Conclusions 426.1 Introduction 426.2 Key Findings 426.2.1 ‘Secured by Design’ 426.2.2 Interpretations 436.3 Limitations and recommendations 446.4 Conclusion 44

Bibliography 45

Appendices 46 Appendix A Figures 46Appendix B Interview with Rachel Armitage 52Appendix C Case Study A: Express Networks Phase III 55Appendix D Express Networks Analysis 59Appendix E Case Study B: Albion Works 66

List of FiguresAppendix A Figures from body textFigure A1. Brownsville and Van Dyke Houses site plan Figure A2. Housing mode described by Newman as “a disasterFigure A3. Dilapidated elevator lobbyFigure A4. Vandalised communal lobby and mailbox room Figure A5. Exploded drawing illustrating a typical scissor stair configu rationFigure A6. Statistics produced by Newman explaining the increase in crime in relation to building heightsFigure A7. Table highlighting principles of ‘secured by design’ and their effect on criminal activityFigure A8. Table comparing incidents of criminal activity between none ‘secured by design’ and ‘secured by design’ developments Figure A9. Albion Works above, Express Networks belowFigure A10. Express Networks site planFigure A11. Express Networks elevationFigure A12. Express Networks typical floor planFigure A13. Table of crimes committed, type and volume

All photos:

O. Newman, Defensible Space: People and design in the violent city, (Architectural Press: Lon-don 1973)

All plans and elevations sourced from: http://pa.manchester.gov.uk/online-applications/

Appendix B Interview with Rachel Armitage

Appendix C Case Study A Express Networks Phase IIIFigure C1. Express Networks Phase III, View from Oldham RoadFigure C2. Express Networks Phase III, security gate to Phase II from side StreetFigure C3. Glass walkway connecting the development at floors 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th.Figure C4. View from Oldham StreetFigure C5. Google maps satellite view (http://maps.google.co.uk/) Figure C6. Rear view of glass link from Henry StreetFigure C7. Internal view of typical corridor and elevator lobbyFigure C8. Internal view from within glass walkwayFigure C9. Letter issued by Greater Manchester Police Department

All plans and elevations sourced from: http://pa.manchester.gov.uk/online-applications/All photos are the author’s own original material.

10. List of figures

Appendix D Express Networks Phase III Analysis Figure D1. Express Networks site plan Figure D2. Express Networks site plan: Access and programFigure D3. Express Networks site plan: Pedestrian movementFigure D4. Express Networks site plan: Lines of visionFigure D5. View 1: Residential entrance door, Henry StreetFigure D6. View 2: Residential entrance door, Henry StreetFigure D7. Rear elevation Figure D8. Front elevationFigure D9. Facade analysis Figure D10. Analysis of typical floor planFigure D11. Elevation analysis: Windows Figure D12. View of stair wellFigure D13. View of lift lobby and corridorFigure D14. Internal view of glass walk way linkFigure D15. Window and balcony analysis

All plans and elevations sourced from: http://pa.manchester.gov.uk/online-applications/All photos are the author’s own original material.

Appendix E Case Study B Albion WorksFigure E1. View of Albion works through automatic security gate Figure E2. View of Albion works from neighbouring car parkFigure E3. View of interstitial space between developmentsFigure E4. View of pedestrian security gateFigure E5. View of perimeter wall and car parkFigure E6. Satellite aerial view of site, Google Maps. (http://maps.google.co.uk/)Figure E7. Photo of Will Alsop’s Chip’s Figure E8. Photo of surrounding streetsFigure E9. View into neighbouring development, through security gate. Figure E10. View of surrounding streets

All plans and elevations sourced from: http://pa.manchester.gov.uk/online-applications/ All photos are the author’s own original material.

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

T he past 10 years have witnessed an increasing shift towards the return of city centre living, as large numbers of people moved back into our cities to live and

work. As a result many have seen a rapid increase in the number of residential devel-opments located in close proximity to their centres.

With this rapid influx of both population and urban development, major concerns have been aired over the impact this has had on criminal activity and the safety of residents. One such concern is over the quality of the environments created to house this increasing population, and whether the correct or appropriate precautions are em-ployed to provide residents with safest accommodation possible, accommodation that makes them feel secure, without heightening feelings of vulnerability and paranoia.

Interest in topic steamed from the authors first hand experience and observations of living in a number of apartment blocks in Manchester’s city centre. Such as the extreme feeling of isolation and separation from the outside world, rarely interacting with other residents of the same development, and only ever seeing people within narrow confined corridors or cramped stair and lift cores. The aim of the research is to explore the design approach adopted in many new resi-dential developments and attempt to understand how they affect residents directly, focusing particular on their sense of isolation, vulnerability and fear of crime.

A review of literature revealed a strong and current debate over the appropriate meas-ures required to provide the safest environments, and highlighted the police lead ini-tiative ‘secured by design’, an initiative designed to reduce criminal activity within new urban developments.

The empirical chapters focus largely on the debate over the appropriateness of ‘se-cured by design’ and its application, particularly in the design of residential archi-tecture, with the aim of questioning criticisms of the initiative that emerged during a review of literature. Whilst also attempting to evaluate the design approaches em-ployed in two case studies, both based with Manchester’s city centre. The chapters also consider how ‘secured by design’ can be interpreted, negatively and positively, and the affect these interpretations have on the safety of the environments they create, and ultimately, on the residents who live there.

12. Chapter One

Chapter Two: Literature review

2.1 Introduction

W hen it comes to the subject of architectural design and its effect on criminal activity, it can be extremely difficult to establish a set of criteria or design

intentions that will provide the safest environments for people to live. Criminologists would argue that factors outside of architectural design, such as socio-demographic factors, affect the level and type of crime committed in an area, whereas architects and town planners may argue that the design of the built environment can largely effect how criminals operate, and through the clever and well thought out design and planning of schemes, architects can ‘design out’ crime. With the introduction of initiatives such as ‘Secured by design’ in the late 90’s it is interesting to consider the affect it has had on architectural design, and how crime is considered from the outset.

Through this review of literature I will consider the theories of a number of authors who have conducted research in areas relating to the correlation between design and crime. Through considering contrasting theories, past and present, and analysing pub-lications that provide critic of each, I will be able to establish a greater understanding of how architectural design may effect the likelihood of and peoples vulnerability to crime.

2.2 Defensible Space

A key text on designing out crime in the subject residential architecture is Oscar Newman’s seminal text ‘Defensible Space: People and design in the violent city’. First published by the Architectural Press in 1973, Newman’s book has become a well read and commonly accepted planning aid, recognized by city planners in both Europe and America, and can be seen to influence the vast majority of multi-story developments found in our cities today . The extent of is influence is emphasized through its believed underpinning of ‘Secured By Design’, a police-lead initiative aimed at preventing criminal activity through the design of buildings, where Plan-ners, Architects and developers follow a set of guidelines issued by the police in the hope of ‘designing out crime’, the foundations of which are built on Newman’s principles of defensible space . ‘Secured by Design’ will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters.

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Newman, when looking at ways of reducing crime in public housing in New York in the 1960’s and early 70’s developed the concept of ‘defensible space’. The start-ing point for Newman’s research was urban America and its apparent breakdown in society as crime spiralled out control. Newman felt the a key solution to the problem was a new form of urban design based on the principle that the design of the environ-ment, rather than social problems, influenced behaviour, and the only way to change behaviour was to change the environment .

Having researched three neighbourhoods within the deprived regions of New York, Newman’s key finding was that territoriality creates space which defends itself. He suggested that by marking boundaries, clearly defining space and function, residents would gain a sense of ownership over places, encouraging them to actively police and defend their ‘territories’ and discouraging entry by potential criminals, with the aim of creating safer environments .

In his introductory chapter to ‘Defensible Space’, Newman outlines how he believes the arrangement of spaces from building grounds to interior groupings of apartments can have an effect on how residents perceive space and their responsibility for it. By increasing an individual’s sense of responsibility beyond their own dwelling into more public realms, they gain increased sense of responsibility for these spaces, en-couraging users to actively take control of the activities within . As previously mention, part of Newman’s research involved analysing a number of projects within the deprived areas of New York. In his findings he makes reference to two housing projects separated by a single road, Brownsville and Van Dyke House (Figure A1: Appendix A). He goes on to explain the differences between the projects and what effect they have on the level and types of crime the buildings and their ground were subjected to.

One is described as “freely roamed and ruled by criminals”, where criminals use the circulation zones such as elevators, fire stairs, hallways and roofs to carry out their activities. This is in stark contrast to a project across the street, housing people of the same social order at the same density, where the building’s form does not allow for such criminal activities to take place. It appears the first project was designed with no consideration of how a building’s form might affect and attract criminal activity, whereas the form and organisation of space of the second helps to deter criminal activity .

“An architect armed with an understanding of the structure of criminal encounters can simply avoid providing space which supports it”

In New York in the early 70’s, it was extremely common to see middle class housing complexes or apartment blocks with a doorman and security staff; this however was not a luxury available to the lower classes. Although an effective way of preventing

14. Chapter Two

crime, Newman believed it to have a negative effect on its residents and the surround-ing areas. By closing off a building from the street, residents could suffer from mental and physical withdrawal from the social order.

The problems associated with such an arrangement are two fold:

1. Residents become indifferent to the activities outside and help in no way to reduce them.2. Residents withdraw from urban life.

For a building to be secured by a doorman, access to the building is often restricted to one location. As a result it is necessary to wall or fence off the perimeter of the build-ing, and by doing so thousands of feet of street are removed from any form of social or visual contact, which is a natural form of surveillance and control, a concept at the heart of Newman’s theories.

Newman describes how the withdrawal and barricade approach may not be neces-sary, suggesting that designers can use the building’s form and the positioning of architectural elements to provide security to a project. Such methods include care-fully locating individual units, windows and points of entry and expressing paths of movement and areas of activity so as to provide inhabitants with opportunities for continuous natural surveillance of the street and building grounds.

Although the paragraphs above hint towards suggestions of an open an inclusive approach to environmental design, where pedestrian movement is free, later in De-fensible Space Newman goes on to contradict him-self. Within his description of ‘territoriality’ a principle at the foundations of his defensible space theory, he sug-gested the best way of achieving ‘territoriality’ was by placing fences or walls around private zones, so as to provide a hierarchy of spaces and distinction between public and private areas. It is these basic principles that have been taken up in initiatives such as ‘Secured by Design’ in the UK and Crime Prevention Through Environmen-tal Design (CPTED) in the US. It is in this selective adoption of Newman’s principles were ‘secured by design’ comes under criticism by Anna Minton, in her book Ground Control, Fear and Happiness in the twenty-first-century city. Minton holds principles of ‘defensible space’ and ‘secured by design’ responsible for the increasing numbers of gated communities found in all major cities of the UK.

Minton criticises ‘defensible space theory’ for creating an understanding amongst residents that strangers are a source of danger and should be considered a risk to their environment. According to Minton, by creating barriers both physical and symbolic, territoriality removes levels of trust between communities, leaving residents feeling vulnerable and fearful of crime should these barriers be removed or stop functioning effectively.

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16. Chapter Two

Author of online blog ‘In Secure by Design’ and practicing Architect, John Gilbert, also believes that ‘Defensible Space’ theory helps promote fear rather than safety. Ar-guing that current practitioners of ‘Defensible Space’ like to see high-level lighting, secured fences, car parks, a lack of vegetation, high security locks, smaller windows and CCTV systems. Although these systems and methods go towards providing se-cure spaces, what they do not do is create welcoming places or friendly environments.

Gilbert then goes on to suggest that

“The creation of environments that do not encourage social contact and freedom of movement remove people’s trust and creates an environments of fear and paranoia against intrusion”.

“The sum of public contacts at a local level should be encouraged, as the trust it produces is what reduces the fear of crime. Instead we are being blindly driven to create environments which discourage strangers and di- versity, where people retreat inside their homes, shutter up their shops and rely more on the police than each other.”

2.3 Location, design and criminal activity

Newman as discussed in the previous chapter, highlights how certain spaces within a development can attract criminal activities, including, robbery, muggings, vandalism, burglary, rape, and almost all other serious crimes.

Within his Chapter, ‘The Problem’, Newman explains how the design and physi-cal characteristics of many high-rise residential buildings in America, in particular New York, in the later 50’s helped facilitated crime, providing little discouragement through their building’s form.

In his description of a typical high-rise apartment block, with double loaded corridors and elevator-serviced floors, he concludes that this particular model for design is a “disaster” (Figure 2: Appendix A), describing in some detail the particular zones in these types of building that are most venerable and susceptible to criminal activity, and provides and explanation as to why (Figure A3, A4 & A5: Appendix A).

Newman’s description highlighted four zones in particular that are most susceptible to miss use and un-lawful behavior; elevator shafts, building entrance and lift lobbies, staircases (escape stairs included), and corridors. Highlighted due to their lack of surveillance opportunities, these areas tend to be located in zones most often screened off from the exterior, almost completely removing them from visual contact.

All four of these ‘zones’ facilitate movement within a building, and provide the tran-sition between the public outdoor space and the security of individual private dwell-ings. It is their removal from visual contact that makes these areas particularly dan-gerous, and leaves residents feeling vulnerable and fearful of crime.

As a result of Newman’s research into criminal activity and the statistical relationship between crime and location, both internally and externally, it was possible to calcu-late that 79% of all criminal activity had occurred on this inside, with the remaining 21% occurring in the outside (Figure A6: Appendix A).

This allowed Newman to come to conclusion that, a criminal perceives a resident or victim to be most vulnerable within the interiors spaces of a development, this is most likely down to the minimal risk of detection or apprehension.

“The interior of a project building suffers from the unique distinction of being public in nature, yet hidden from public view. Consequently, they are unable to benefit from the continual surveillance of the city”

A buildings design and its spatial configuration can itself affect how a criminal may choose to operate and how they interpret the level of risk. It has been suggested that high rise apartment blocks with elevator serviced floors and double loaded corridors, can through their nature provide opportunities for concealment, creating a maze of corridors and stairwells, in which it becomes increasingly difficult to detain a suspectThe following descriptions explain the characteristics of the zones discussed.

Elevator Banks and Lobbies:1. Often required to be centrally located within a typical floor plan, creating corridors at ground level removing them from public view.2. Public in nature but screened from all observation. Entrance Lobbies:1. Due to central location of lift lobbies, labyrinth like corridors are required to provide transition between entrance and lobby often including double turns, and in so removing visual contact from the exterior.2. Public in nature but screened from all observation.

Fire Stairs:1. Fire stairs, due to regulations, require concrete construction and limit the opportunity for openings, and visual contact.2. Quantity and location of fire stairs provide means of escape or refuge for wrong doers, hidden from view. 3. Public in nature but screened from all observation.

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When the descriptions above are compared against models found in many UK cit-ies today (Figure A12: Appendix A), there is a surprising level of similarity, and are not dissimilar to the model defined by Newman as a “disaster”. Modern day models will be explored in more detail later through the analysis of two selected case studies (Appendix C,D & E) .

2.4 Secured by Design

‘Secured by Design’ (SBD) is a police backed initiative based on Newman’s princi-ples of ‘Defensible Space’ and is organised by the Association of Chief Police Offic-ers (ACPO). First implemented regionally in 1998 ‘secured by design’ is now prac-ticed nationally. A similar initiative exists in the United States, ‘Crime Prevention through Environmental Design’ and is again written by police.

The key concept of ‘secured by design’, as outlined in the guidance provided by regional police departments and the ACPO, is to assist in achieving the new coalition governments key objective of providing high quality sustainable places where people will choose to live, in which community safety is a key concern.

“One of the most important things each generation can do for the next is to build high quality homes that will stand the test of time”

“High quality homes in high quality natural environments will support out plans for growth and are necessary for social, environmental and eco- nomic sustainability”

The guidance is aimed specifically at the construction industry and is to provide encouragement in adopting crime prevention measures in scheme design. Regional architectural liaison officers (ALO’s) are available to provide guidance during the design process.

Anna Minton within her criticisms of ‘secured by design’ highlights a concern with regards to the police-led initiatives and the quality of the environments it helps create.

“ This leaves us in the strange position of having police officers, rather than architects, responsible for the way places look and feel, which can create bizarre places”.

A comment posted in response to an online article provides further criticism.

18. Chapter Two

“Secured by Design has NEVER promoted good design, and in many areas recommends things which are inherently poor urban design. A good designer will understand the principles of designing to reduce the risk of crime”

Despite the scepticism of Minton and others, the majority of the architectural profes-sion are able to see the benefit of the inclusion of police departments and specialist liaison officers at the design stage.

“Architects are generally in agreement that consulting with the police from the outset of a scheme is a good idea. They know better than anyone the real crime hotspots and where factors such as poor lighting make it easier for criminals to hide”

However even with the support of architectural professionals the major criticism of ‘secured by design’ is that it proves difficult to implement its principles effectively in practice. This could potentially be due to external pressures and influences.

Much reference by authors such as Minton and Gilbert has been made to the influ-ence of Newman’s ‘Defensible Space’ on the principles of ‘Secured by Design’ and as a result it has come under scrutiny and criticism, namely for the way in which modern day developments are designed. It may also be argued that third party actors such as security and Insurance companies, who are in favour of Secured by Design’s high security approach, encourage the use of security devices, to increase sales and profits. Similarly, developers are enticed by the opportunity to market property with low insurance premiums, making it a more attractive proposition to potential tenants.

“Besides the debate over the controversial police initiative Secured by design, it would now seem sbd is big business and can be financially beneficial for a number of parties, for example, developers can market their schemes with lower insurance premiums, and the companies who provide the technology required in the approach outlined by secure by design are also in it to make a tidy profit.”

A project proposal for the refurbishment of Coronation Court in the Fazakerley sub-urb of north Liverpool by Norwegian architect Hans Van der Heijden provides a good example of how factors such as low insurance premiums can have a negative effect on positive design intentions. The initial design proposal for Coronation Court was to provide an open design where free movement would be promoted through an open layout of space, a design concept which had been agreed with the resident, who had responded positively to the idea. However due to the attraction of low insurance premiums and the financial benefit for the developer, the design concepts were aban-doned and replaced by those in favour of a design based around ‘Secure by Design’ principles.

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“ The first design change was directed towards this sequential concept. Client, residents and, in particular, through their ‘secured by design’ pro- gramme, the advisory police service insisted on a radical privatization of the grounds. The perimeter of the entire site had to be closed off, prefer able by a solid wall”.

Heijden blames the changes on what he described as ‘current practice’ in English cit-ies, where new residential developments are isolated from through routes in both its immediate and wider contexts, and the urban fabric as a whole, isolating its residents.

It’s clear that Newman’s ‘Defensible Space’ has to some extent influenced ‘Secured by Design’. To understand the level of its influence it is useful to compare principles from each theory and see how they relate to each other.

  Defensible Space Secured by Design Accesses and Movement: Hierarchy of movement extending from street level to individual apartments, with common entry and circulation paths. Delineating paths of movement, defining areas of activity through proximity and juxtaposition of internal living areas  

   

Yes  

   

Yes  

Structure: The careful arrangement of Architectural elements and spaces to create opportunities of natural surveillance.

   

Yes  

   

Yes  

Surveillance: Productive use of residents and building form providing residents with the ability to improve combined surveillance of the grounds.

   

Yes  

   

Yes  

Ownership: Creation of environments where a sense of community exists in which residents actively control due to a sense of ownership and responsibility.

   

Yes  

   

Yes  

Physical Protection: Protection from potential criminal activity through physical and symbolic barriers.

 Yes  

 Yes  

Activity: Places of increased resident responsibility, including space beyond individual dwellings into public realms, encourage a sense of community, which in turn helps residents to take control of activities within and around.

   

Yes  

   

Yes  

Management and Maintenance: Increased resident sense of territoriality, ownership and responsibility encourages residents to maintain and control their own environments.

   

Yes  

   

Yes  

 

20. Chapter Two

By comparison it’s clear that there are strong similarities between ‘Defensible Space’ and ‘Secured by Design’ and the influence of Newman’s theories can be easily detect-ed. However to fully understand the similarities it is important to analyses a practical example of a ‘secured by design’ accredited building and consider how Newman’s principles were adopted in reality. It is equally important to fully understand the prin-ciples of ‘secured by design’, by doing so criticisms such as those made by Minton and Gilbert can be evaluated.

2.5 Natural Surveillance, In or Out?

A key question when considering ‘Defensible Space’ theory is whether natural sur-veillance, a concept at the heart of Newman’s theoretical standpoint, is achieved via residents within the building or via people on the streets, as argued by Gilbert. In a recent study by University College London, research suggested increased footfall and social inclusion proved to be safer than the popular model of confinement and barricade, where buildings are located behind security gates and coded entry panels, as it is believed gated communities become more vulnerable due to their isolation.

Hillier, when talking about formulas of urban safety, suggests that traditional street patterns and configurations promote free movement, and can be safer than quiet poor-ly used spaces.

However it is thought that results of such studies will have little influence on develop-ers who are under increasing pressures to provide residential developments that can be accredited to ‘Secured By Design’ standards .

2.6 Space Syntax

In Ben Hillier’s, Space is the Machine, chapter 5, Can Architecture Cause Social Malaise, he argues against the theory that architecture and the design of buildings, alone, has an effect on the behavioural characteristic of the people who work, live and pass through them. Although it is widely believed architecture does have a direct effect on people’s behaviour, some find it hard to believe that characteristics such as depression, stress and fear of crime can be affected by architecture and its design.

Hillier criticises past research exploring the effects of building design on people’s behaviour, for not being detailed enough to prove any direct affect. He criticise the methodologies for their failure. The biggest challenge in identifying or proving the effects of architecture on people’s behaviour is separating the building and its resi-

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dents from the influences of the buildings location and social situation.

“Housing is inevitably a social process as well as a physical product”

The previous quote highlights that factors outside of the design of architecture have an impact on the quality of housing provided. This makes it difficult to extract the effects, if any, that architectural design is having on its residents, when the process of social disadvantages are already in play and operating within architecture as a variable.

Past attempts at analysing the effects of architecture on people’s behaviour, including Newman’s studies into defensible space in the early 70’s, have looked at building design at the gross level often analysing whole projects. The problem of operating at such a large scale is that, as previously mentioned, it becomes difficult to separate the effects of social situation from the effect of architectural design. As a result, informa-tion and data gathered is not purely a reflection of one parameter, architectural design, but of many variables operating within the context, culturally and socially.

“The gross level at which the architectural variable are handled makes it easier and proper to argue that studies have failed to distinguish architectural effects from social process effects convincingly, because it is exactly at this gross level that the social processes are most manifest and easiest to point out”

As a result, Hillier believes it necessary to look at effects of design at a much smaller scale. Rather than considering a housing estate or apartment block as a whole, but by breaking it down into individual elements such as, doorways, sections of walkway, courtyards or similar, in particular elements pertaining to movement and circulation. By doing so, you are able to remove the influences of social processes, which exist in the wider context.

2.7 Virtual Community

“A building is the creation of a physical and special milieu. If we are to believe that this physical milieu can somehow invade people’s minds and have effects that are stronger and systematic enough to influence behaviour, then we must have some conception of a plausible chain of sensorial or mental events, through which this could come about.”

A key concept as described by Bill Hillier, is the importance of, and the effects spa-tial configuration has on movement between and within spaces. The organisation of space can be seen to define patterns of movement between groups of people. It is

22. Chapter Two

these patterns of movement that forms the roots of Hillier’s concepts of ‘co-presence’ and ‘co-awareness’.

Similar to some principles of Newman’s ‘defensible space theory’, which relies on the combined use of residents to actively defend and protect their environment through ‘natural surveillance’, Hillier’s concepts of co-presence also uses individu-als, but not in the same territorial and collective manner. Within the concept of ‘co-presence’, individuals may not know or acknowledge each other, that however is not to say co-presence is not a useful social resource.

Essentially the concept of ‘co-presence’ is one where individual’s benefit from a sense of reassurance and security purely from the presence of other people, and ‘co-awareness’. A by-product of increased co-presence and co-awareness is what Hillier describes as a ‘Virtual Community’. A ‘virtual community’, unlike those created within ‘defensible space’ or ‘secured by design’ protected by virtual and physical barriers, is one where movement and activity is encouraged and makes reference to traditional street configurations.

A ‘virtual community’ is directly affected by architecture, through the design of spa-tial configurations and through patterns of movement. An environmental design that encourages ‘co-presence’ and ‘co-awareness’ is argued by Hillier, to be safer than one that does not.

“If space is design wrongly, the natural pattern of social co-presence in a space is not achieved. In such circumstance, space is at best empty and at worst abused”

The use of people individually and collectively for surveillance is an essential ele-ment of both Newman’s ‘defensible space’ and Hillier’s ‘virtual community’, how-ever they are achieved in different ways and circumstances.

2.8 Formula for Urban Safety

Hillier, in his sub-chapter, ‘formula for urban safety’, page 189, attempts to explain the scientific benefit behind concepts of co-presence and co-awareness, with the aim of proving the effects spatial design has on an individuals or a communities collective behaviour, in particular people’s fear of, and vulnerability to crime.

Essentially the ‘formula for urban safety’ is concerned with three variables:

1. Pedestrian Speed: The speed at which pedestrians move through space.

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2. Movement Rates: The number of pedestrians present over a period of time.3. And Sight lines: The length of sight available along a line.

Using these variables its possible to calculate the probability of ‘co-presence’ over a period of time in a given location.

Benefits of environments where pedestrian movement rates are high and lines of sight are extensive include increased visual contact with other pedestrians, and increased probabilities of co-presence, purely due to the increased number of people passing through. Long and straight lines of vision are also useful in detecting potential con-flict or threats, and allow more time for evasive action.

To highlight the effects a building’s form and special configuration can have on its users, Hillier conducted a simple comparison of the same scenario within different contrasting spatial environments, with localised differences. One environment ben-efited from long open views along straight lines, the other shorter lines of sight and blind corners with sharp changes in direction, however both had the same rates of movement and the same volume of residents.

In scenario one, an individual leaves the dwelling and enters an environment were co-presence is achieved, a number of individuals are within visible lines of sight, the individual in question feels safe and reassured due to the presence of other people.

In scenario two, an individual leaves their dwelling and enters into a narrow elevated corridor with short lines of sight, as they leave no other people are in view. Any encounters if any will be sudden and likely to be with one other person only. This environment makes the individual feel nervous and vulnerable to conflict.

Within Hillier’s descriptions there are clear behavioural and attitudinal differences in the individuals’ perception of space, and how they behave in accordance. The individual in the second scenario is likely to behave in a manner in which they would not in a normal situation, possibly confronting a stranger, or retreating to the safety of their own home.

From these descriptions it seems clear that localised environments and their design can influence individuals behaviour and perceptions. The existence of co-presence and awareness or absence of, changes peoples expectations of individuals and as a result changes their behaviour towards them.

Hillier’s formula of urban safety is as much reliant on strangers as it is on in its inhab-itants. This reliance on, and acceptance of strangers, is where the theories of Hillier and Newman differ. In ‘defensible space’ a stranger is to be considered a threat to the security of communities environment, a position still employed by practitioners

24. Chapter Two

today, most often in the form of ‘secured by design’.

Where ‘defensible space’ provides natural surveillance only from its static residents, monitoring the grounds from internal positions, windows and doors, ‘co-presence’ and ‘co-awareness’ also rely on movement on the street by both inhabitant and stranger. As a result a combination of both static and moving surveillance can be achieved. Despite their differences, both defensible space and co-presence are dependent on spatial configurations and patterns of movement, as certain spatial conditions need to be in place for either theory to be effective.In the opening description of ‘defensible space’, reference was made to John Gilbert’s criticisms of both ‘defensible space’ and ‘secured by design’, posted on online blog ‘In-secured by design’. Within Gilbert’s article he criticises the continuing shift away from traditional street patterns, towards high security gated communities, where physical barriers are used to separate residents and stran-gers, highlighting the benefits that come from people on the street and the sense of safety it provides. He is not alone in his opinion, as Hillier also promotes the benefits of traditional street systems, and is enforced by his principles of surveil-lance by strangers.

“The public place of cities is not kept primarily by the police... it is kept primarily by intricate almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by people them selves”

2.9 Environmental verses Configurational

As presented so far, there seem to be two clear perspectives when it comes to the creation and design of residential environments within an urban context, the environmental perspective and the configurational perspective.

The ‘environmental’ perspective focuses on the design of the environment to de-ter anti social behaviour or criminal activity. This could be through the erection of fences and gates or the shifting of levels in certain zones creating a hierarch of space, defining public from private.

The ‘Configurational’ perspective, focuses more on the spatial layout and con-figurational design of a scheme, designing the spaces between buildings in an at-tempt to create a safer environments through the careful positioning of buildings in relation to their immediate context. These two perspectives can also be seen to relate to the two key theories explored

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so far in the research. It is possible categorise Newman’s theories of ‘Defensible Space’ and to some extend ‘secured by design’ as being an environmental design approaches, focusing on the erection and creation of barriers. Whereas Bill Hillier’s theories on Space Syntax can be more easily associated with the configurational per-spective, focusing on integration into context and the connection of spaces.

2.10 Gated Isolation verses Connected Integration

A debate in its self, and one that has come through in the research so far and evi-denced by statements by Minton, Gilbert and Hillier, is the question of whether a closed approach to urban residential design as advocated by Newman is safer than an open approach, supported by members of the space syntax group and many critics of ‘secured by design’, including, Gilbert, Minton and Jane Jacobs in her landmark publication ‘The Death and Life of Great American Cities’.

In her 1962 book, published 10 years prior to Newman’s defensible space in 72, Jacobs expresses her belief in street based networks, and encouraging free movement through permeable residential developments, by both resident and stranger. This ear-ly publication can be seen to share concepts present in more recent works by Hillier’s and the space syntax group, in particular ideas around ‘natural surveillance’ at street level, maintaining urban safety through the use of the public, and discouraging crime. Jacobs’s theories are based around integration and connection, again an idea sup-ported by Hillier. She believes a building should be designed so that the surrounding streets support and work with the building.

“A city sidewalk by itself is nothing. It is an abstraction. It means some thing only in conjunction with the building and other uses that border it”

“To keep the city safe is the fundamental task of a cities streets and side walks” Cul-de-sacs and gated communities are seen to be a result of ‘defensible space’, de-signed with the premise of keeping the residents in, and the public out, a design philosophy that has been extensively employed with out much question until recently.

A recent study carried out by CABE into crime and urban design, funded by the home office, and in conjunction with the Applied Criminology Centre at the University of Huddersfield, looked into how design can help create safer places for people to live. The research focused on six schemes, two taken from three selected police force areas, Kent, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester. The chosen schemes had to have achieved a Building for Life standard of 14 points or above, or have achieved

26. Chapter Two

a ‘Good’ rating in CABE housing audit, and were a mixture of from city centre and suburban, an a variety of scales.

As a result of site visits and a detailed analysis of each schemes, from the macro scale, the spatial site layout, to the micro scale, the design of each individual dwell-ing, CABE researchers were able to outline a set of key areas to focus on in the way of a set of guidelines for the construction industry. Most notable of the results and amongst issues such as, Design quality, Management and Maintenance and parking was ‘Gating’. The conclusion of the study was that the closed approach was in many cases not a positive design decision, as quite often schemes had no integration into local networks of movement, and movement within the schemes was unrestricted, leaving dwellings isolated and vulnerable.

Integrating a building into its surrounding networks can be seen to create safe urban environments usable by both the public and the resident this is an approach encour-aged by Hillier and Sahbaz. However they are carful to highlight that the integration must be handled carefully, and must facilitate ‘good’ movement connections in all directions. It is when a ‘bad’ connection, be it a footpath or a vehicular road that is not well used and poorly inhabited is when the risk of crime or vulnerability is increased. “Since integration reflects all round permeability, it is safe to infer that well structured areas with enough permeability to link them in all direc- tions can indeed be safe”

2.11 Conclusion

The literature reviewed has considered a wide range of authors and has highlighted a number of theories relating to the design of safe residential environments. Most of the studies are concerned with either, the compositional arrangement, or, physical de-sign of buildings, and their effectiveness in deterring crime. All of the theories show an interest in the impact on residents, largely relating to their perception and fear of crime. Some have discussed how to create communities, both real and virtual, whilst others have focused on criminals, considering how they might perceive the security of a development. One of the key findings from the review is the debate that exists around the appropri-ateness of the police initiative ‘Secured by Design’, which has been largely criticised, as highlight in the previous chapters.

Given the scope of ‘secured by design’ and the sheer volume of its principles and literature, further research is required to attempt to evaluate any criticisms made, and challenge people’s perceptions.

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Chapter Three: Methodology

3.1 Research Question

T he literature review has discussed a number of approaches when it comes to the design of the safest residential environments, and has highlighted the various

debates over how this can be achieved. The most apparent of these debates is with regards to people’s perceptions of ‘secured by design’, and its apparent failings in providing safe and sustainable environments, as highlighted by criticism of Minton and Gilbert. The police lead initiative backed by the current coalition government, seeks to create residential environments that are both safe and secure. The aim of this research was to evaluate the design approach adopted in a sample of residential apartment blocks within the close proximity of Manchester’s city centre, examining and evaluating their effectiveness in preventing criminal activity and in providing residents with appropriate levels of reassurance. Whilst at the same time evaluating ‘secured by design’ and its principles, uncovering any misinterpretations, or miscon-ceptions.

3.2 Approach

The research approach adopted in this dissertation included a strong review of rel-evant literature, which examined both theoretical positions and government-backed initiatives. An extended literature review was necessary to allow the author to fully understand and exhaust the past material published on the topic.

For the selected case studies further research was conducted through the detailed analysis of architectural drawings and associated planning documentation. The anal-ysis of such material helped to establish a clear understanding of the individual ap-proaches adopted in their design. Analysis of documents and plans against the prin-ciples outlined in the review literature was then used consider the effectiveness of their design.

Unfortunately due to the practicalities of conducting interviews with residents, this was not possible. An alternative method in gaining an understanding of the issues residents felt most strongly about, was to analyse comments posted on a resident’s

28. Chapter Three

blog. The blog, created especially for resident’s living in case study B, allows resi-dents to leave anonymous commentary regarding concerns with their development, from issues such as cleaning and maintenance, to security. The blog proved to be extremely useful in understanding residents concerns and vulnerabilities, and made it possible to associate them with specific elements of the buildings designs.

Site visits and photography formed an important part in the analysis of the buildings and was conducted for all case studies.

3.3 Interview/s

Considering the vast amount of literature regarding the ‘secured by design’ initiative and the limited time and resources available, to fully get to grips with the initiative and its principles it was important for the research, to conduct an interview with Rachel Armitage BSc, PhD, Reader and Deputy Director of applied criminology at Huddersfield University, and expert in the topic of ‘secured by design’.

Who’s past research topics include:

• The Role of Crime Reduction Advisors in Greater Manchester• Residential Design and Crime - Home Office and CABE• Security Versus Sustainability• National Police Crime Prevention Service Evaluation

The interview aimed to challenge the criticisms of the initiative as presented dur-ing the literature review. Based on Armitage’s past research projects into ‘secure by design’, including an evaluation of the initiative’s success over its 10 years, since its launch in the late 90’s, and her expertise on the topic, Armitage was able to answer any questions posed with authority, and confidence. The interview was conducted via email, the benefit of which was a set of clear concise and personally worded responses, which strongly represented Armitage’s opinion, no information was lost in translation.

3.4 Case Study Selection

The selection of case studies was equally important in constructing the argument of the research. The case studies chosen comprised of one ‘secured by design’ accred-ited and one ‘non-accredited’ residential development, both either privately owned or rented and managed externally. The reason for the choice was to provide opportunity

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for comparison. The design strategies adopted for each were quite different and as a result the environments created were also varied in comparison. Through their de-tailed analysis it was possible to examine the strengths and weaknesses of each and come to a conclusion as to why they operate in the way they do. Additional buildings were considered, however not analysed to the same extent, but did provided another strand for comparison.

30. Chapter Three

Chapter Four: Interpreting ‘Secured by Design’

4.1 Interpreting ‘Secured by design’

T hrough the literature review a number of issues and theories had been explored, such as how does a building’s physical form and design affect people’s fear of

crime, and to what extent does a building’s design deter criminal activity?

When discussing ‘secure by design’ and considering its principles, it was clear that the initiative had come under some scrutiny since being introduced in the late 90’s, namely through architects, and authors such as Anna Minton, who criticise the scheme for its creation of ugly, lifeless and in some cases socially damaging environments.

Whilst taking into account individuals positions and criticisms of ‘secure by design’ it would have been unfair to come to a conclusion without exploring the initiatives per-formance in dealing with crime. To do so a further review of literature was required, in particular literature produced by Rachel Armitage BSc, PhD, Reader and Deputy Director of Applied Criminology at Huddersfield University. Armitage has conducted a number of research programs in the past 10 years, and has focused heavily on ‘se-cured by design’, working alongside local police forces to evaluate its performance as design guidance tool.

Much of the research conducted by Armitage focused on how the principles of ‘se-cured by design’ such as physical design, management and maintenance, security measures, communal space, surveillance and visibility, territoriality, car parking and connectivity/through movement affect the levels of crime experienced within a de-velopment. Her research has also focused on evaluating ‘secured by design’ as an initiative itself, confirming its effectiveness as a tool to be used in the fight against crime . On both counts Armitage’s research has proved to be in favour of ‘secured by design’.

Results of research into the effectiveness of implementing ‘Secured by Design’ prin-ciples showed that their correct application could positively affect the levels of crime experienced by developments or individual properties .

The following table shows some examples of the results of Armitage’s research .

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These principles similar to those of Newman, are physical characteristics and if used effectively can be beneficial in protecting a development and ultimately its residents.

The second table shows a simple comparison of police recorded crimes committed in a ‘non-secured by design’ scheme against a ‘secured by design’ scheme. The results have been simplified from those of Armitage’s study to provide easier comparison. The results are based on a two separate developments of the same size and in the same urban environment and were recorded between August 2007 and July 2008 .

Design Feature Impact on crime

Property with poor visual access to neighbouring properties, public areas

and local amenities.

More attractive to offenders and/or more likely to have experience a

burglary

Isolated properties More likely to experience burglary

Properties showing signs of

territoriality

Perceived by potential criminals to be

less vulnerable

Properties with real or symbolic

barriers

Less likely to have experienced crime

Well maintained housing design Perceived as less vulnerable

 

Crime Type Non Secured by design

No. Of incidents

Secured by design

No. Of incidents Assault 24 0

Criminal Damage 12 4

Burglary other 7 2

Burglary Dwelling 5 0

Theft from Vehicle 7 0

Theft of vehicle 3 0

Other 33 6

 

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It is clear from the results that there is a significant different between the numbers of crimes committed between the two developments. This difference is enough to suggest that ‘secured by design’ does positively affect the level of crime experienced within a development. Furthermore when evaluating the performance of ‘secured by design’ over the 10 year since its introduction, Armitage comes to the conclusion that crime rates relating to burglary’s committed in 1999 compared to those of 2009 showed that the number of offences committed were almost four times higher than those experienced in 2009. Her evidence also suggested that total crime rates were also considerably less in 2009 compared.

This simple comparison of crime rate shows the positive effect ‘secured by design’ has had on the safety of the environments it creates.

“The re-evaluation of SBD has shown that SBD has continued to reduce crime and fear, SBD developments have sustained their crime reduction benefits and continue to experience less crime than their non-SBD coun terparts. Further more, the effectiveness of SBD developments built more recently has exceeded that shown in the original evaluation, with SBD de velopments outperforming their non-SBD counterparts in terms of crime reduction, visual signs of disorder and levels of fear among residents”

With the evidence that ‘secured by design’ does create safer environments for people to live, the criticisms of the initiative can only really relate to the quality of the spaces created. It is widely believed, as discussed in the previous chapters, that adopting principles of ‘secured by design’ and ‘defensible space’, go towards creating environ-ments that are heavily gated or barricaded, and largely reliant on technology.

In and interview conducted with Rachel Armitage, the understanding that ‘secured by design’ creates developments which rely on gates and barricades comes into ques-tion. When asked whether she believes ‘secured by design’ advocates a high security and barricade approach to residential design, Armitage was adamant in her response that it does not.

“I do not believe that Secured by Design does involve a high security or barricade approach. To the contrary, my research has taken me to many estates in high crime areas were design standards appear less forti fied because security was ‘designed in’ at the outset, there is no reason for it to appear more fortified. SBD standard windows and doors do not appear any more ‘secure/fortified’ than those that do not meet this stand ard. Ensuring that an estate allows unobstructed sightlines does not create a fortress mentality, or does avoiding rear access footpaths. Much of the SBD principles are about common sense good design and not about fortification or high security”

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This statement goes against the criticisms made of ‘secured by design’. This perhaps suggest those who cast criticism on the initiative do not fully understand the prin-ciples outlined by the scheme or have misinterpreted the guidance provided by the Association of Chief Police Officers.

Armitage further negates the criticism of people such as Minton in her answers to some of the further questions posed. For example, when asked if she believes initia-tives such as ‘secured by design’ stifle creativity, she again responded, with some authority, that she does not believe this to be the case.

“I believe that prescriptive design standards do risk stifling creativity but I do not believe that SBD falls within this category. SBD is based around principles, which can be met whilst retaining flexibility and creativity. Paul Ekblom discusses this in several of his publications and suggests that this can be resolved within guidance by careful con sideration of the discourse in which recommendations are expressed. Functional discourses, such as stating a crime reduction purpose/consid eration or mechanistic discourses such as ‘facilitating surveillance’ or ‘en courage through-movement’ allow more design freedom than technical discourses such as ‘foliage must be no higher than two meters’. I think that creativity does not need to be stifled if there is close consultation be tween the designers and police ALO/CPDA at an early stage. If you study the SBD guidelines, you will see that they are based upon principles and not strictly technical standards (with the exception of windows and doors)”

With the success of ‘secured by design’ as presented by Armitage, and the criticisms posed by others, there is a clear level of dispute around the topic. As suggested earlier in the chapter, this may be a result of miss, or varying, interpretations of the initia-tive. It would seem the true principles of ‘secured by design’ can be difficult to get to grips with, as there are so many strands of guidance, from technical specifications for elements such as windows and doors, to physical and spatial design, as suggested by Armitage. It would also appear there are levels of varying interpretation between the practitioners themselves. Armitage in response to a question regarding the archi-tectural industries opinion on the initiative suggests that the possible weakness of the police programme can be attributed to differences in understanding between regional police forces and planning departments, and that these numerous interpretations may contribute to the inconsistencies in the way guidance is implemented.

“I believe that there are weaknesses in the police approach to designing out crime but that this can often relate either to the process employed within that specific police force, or the individual personalities”.

34. Chapter Four

It is perhaps due to the various ways in which ‘secured by design’ can be interpreted, that is responsible for the inconsistencies found within the design of our cities apart-ment blocks, including those of Manchester. It may also be argued that, developers choose not to seek the advice of architectural liaison officers because they feel they can simply solve the problems of security by erecting fences/gates, as they believe this to be the basic principle of ‘secured by design’; arguably, in doing so they are only further adding to the problem of crime activity. This theory can be evaluated through the analysis of some selected case studies.

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Chapter Five: Case Studies

5.1 Introduction

T o explore the various interpretations of what constitutes as ‘security’, it was useful to consider some case studies, analysing projects both ‘secured by de-

sign’ and ‘non-secured by design’, and evaluating the environments created.

Case Study A: Express Networks Phase III

Express Networks is an inner city, mixed use development on the edge of Manches-ter’s city centre. The development comprises of a mix of office and retail space across ground and first floor, with private residential accommodation above. The project was granted approval by the local police departments and is ‘secured by design’ accred-ited. For full case study refer to Appendix C and D.

Case Study B: Albion Works

Albion works is a development close to the much-discussed area of New Islington, again located on the fringe of Manchester’s city centre. The development, unlike Express networks, comprises of four separate blocks, offering a mix of residential accommodation and retail/office space. The development is ‘non-secured by design’ accredited. For full case study refer to Appendix E.

5.2 Express Networks Phase III

Constructed in 2007/8, Express Networks Phase III forms the third stage in a devel-opment project by the Manchester based, Artisan Property Group Ltd. Phase I, saw the renovation and extension of Ancoats iconic grade II listed Daily Ex-press building originally constructed in 1939, providing a mix of office space, exhibi-tion space, and new residential accommodation. Phase II, involved further restoration and conversion of the once print shed, providing workspace, and a selection of 1 and 2 bed apartments. The three Phases collectively provide a distinctive environment,

38. Chapter Five

stretching between George Leigh Street and Oldham Road, and in total comprises of 124 apartments.

A formal planning application was submitted to Manchester City Council for the construction of the seven-storied mixed-use new-build development on the 13th of July 2007. Located within the Ancoats conservation area, the proposed development had to make reference to the historical and urban context of the district. Within a plan-ning statement submitted to the local authority, Snook architects outlined their de-sign intentions. The document focused on topics such as, historical and architectural context, urban design objectives, design responses, internal arrangement, circulation, security and public realm works.

5.3 Secured by design?

During the projects design process the architect was assisted by an architectural liai-son officer (ALO) from the Greater Manchester Police Department, who was in at-tendance during design stages meetings, and provided written guidance outlining the security measure required in order for the project to gain accreditation .

In the interview conducted with Rachel Armitage, she suggested that principles of ‘secured by design’ are less concerned with the specification of devices or elements, and are increasingly more focused on the physical design of a development.

“If you study the SBD guidelines, you will see that they are based upon design principles and not strictly technical standards (with the exception of windows and doors)”

Her comments on individual interpretations within the police department in the pre-vious chapter, seem to be supported by the guidance provided by the architectural liaison officer involved within this project, who in their recommendations failed to mention any requirements regarding the physical design of the building and focused solely on specification (Figure C9: Appendix C).

Whilst the supporting documentation issued along side the planning application made reference to principles, similar to those expressed in Newman’s ‘defensible space the-ory’, including ‘natural surveillance’, and concepts around public and private space, when analysing the building in some detail, it is possible to see how the its design has failed to successfully implement those principles in its practical completion.

5.4 Natural Surveillance

Concepts of natural surveillance have been considered in some depth throughout the earlier review of literature, with various authors suggesting the best ways in which

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it can be achieved. Within the planning statement produced by Snook Architects, ‘natural surveillance’ is highlighted as one of the key driver in the design of project. The architect’s description explains how the spatial configuration of the building in-creases opportunities for natural surveillance.

“The building allows for casual surveillance by the nature of the arrange ment of habitable spaces”

This theme is further extended to the use of a glass walkway that provides the connec-tion between the two separate buildings, which make up the development as a whole (Figure C3: Appendix C).

“The glazed link also adds 24 hour passive surveillance as it is used as a bridge to connect the main access core to the adjacent accommodation by the buildings residents”

Whilst the architects description heavily emphasis the use of ‘natural surveillance’, and its benefits, a simple analysis of the plans shows how the overall design does not allow the building to benefit to the extent suggested (Appendix D).

When evaluating the buildings plans and elevations against the principles of Oscar Newman’s ‘defensible space’, and those of ‘secured by design’, it is possible to detect areas of the buildings form that reduce opportunities for natural surveillance rather than facilitate it (Figure D10 & D11: Appendix D).

Some of the key areas of contention are discussed under the following headings.

Building Entrance

Newman suggests that defined points of entry, visible from main external pedestrian routs, provided the safest forms of access to a building. This is due to the benefits of continuous visual connection from both the exterior and interior, and it is when this visual connection is lost that the level of security decreases and the resident’s vulner-ability increases. The plan (Figure A10) shows the composition of Express Networks III located alongside Oldham road to the south, and has been annotated to show the entry and exit points for the residential accommodation, including the main entrance, A, and escape doors, B.

The plan clearly shows the location of the residential access, located at point A, and its removal from the main pedestrian footpath, and its central positioning within the floor plan, reducing its the visual connection with the main footpath and zones of

40. Chapter Five

activity. This visual connection is further reduced by the physical design of the door, which allows for little to no view into or out of the lobby (Figure D2, D3, D4, D5 & D6: Appendix D).

Casual surveillance from habitable spaces?

Another area of contention in the architect’s proposal is the positioning of habitable space in locations where casual surveillance can be achieved. Whilst casual surveil-lance from the ground floor retail and office spaces may be possible during the day, due to their location along the main road (Figure D2: Appendix D) and the use of glazing in the façade (Figure D9: Appendix D), roughly between the hours of 0800-1800, however after opening hours they provide no surveillance to the buildings grounds what so ever. For the building to benefit form causal surveillance during the hours of the evening and night, it has to rely purely on passing pedestrians and the residents them selves. Again as outlined in Newman’s theory of ‘defensible space’, the best protection by natural surveillance is when the public spaces within a build-ing allow for high levels of visual contact, both internally and externally, and where private space allows for opportunities of surveillance out.

Again the simple analysis of plans and elevations highlights areas where the build-ing’s design fails to facilitate natural surveillance as proposed (Figure D10, D11, D13 & D14: Appendix D).

In elevation, you can see the level of separation between pedestrians at ground level, and the residents in the apartments above (Figure D7, D8 & D9: Appendix D). This separation of around, approximately 9meters, is enough to remove the residents from any activity on the ground floor, and opportunities for surveillance are further im-paired by the use of recessed balconies. For surveillance to be achieved, residents would be required to physically lean over the balcony edge to gain a view of activity below. This automatically reduces opportunities of ‘casual surveillance’ as outlined by the Architect. Not only does it reduce opportunities of surveillance, it also goes towards isolating the residents within.

In plan it is possible to see how the positioning of individual apartments and habit-able spaces, provides little in the way opportunity for surveillance, as argued by the architect.

“ some living rooms overlook the entrance points, others overlook the streets to the front and the rear, thus creating passive surveillance at each core entrance, providing good accessibility for all people in a safe and se cure environment”

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This is partly due to physical features such as the size, and poor positioning of win-dows and balconies, a fundamental concept of both ‘secured by design’ and ‘defensi-ble space’ (Figure D10 & D11: Appendix D).

The location and position of elevator lobbies, corridors and escape stairs, if compared against Newman’s principles, also do little in providing security to the development or in reducing the residents feelings of isolation, as the internal public spaces benefit from almost no external surveillance, except from the glass link, with makes up only a small percentage of the internal circulation space, with less than 30% of residents who requiring its use. Interestingly when compared against the model as described by Newman, as a “disaster’ (Figure A2: Appendix A) certain comparisons can be seen. Both plans have concealed main entrances, centrally located lift cores, double loaded corridors, escape stairs located at opposite ends off the corridors and little in the way of visual connections between interior public space and exterior public space. Whilst it may be unfair to blame these feature on a designer’s choice alone, ignoring regulations, statutory approvals, and site constraints, it could be argued that increased guidance from the architectural liaison officer on the design of the physical form, may well have offered alternative suggestions and a more innovative design solutions. The only real difference between the two models is that Express Networks III relies on technology through the use of locks and electronic devices to provide its security, an approach which has its own risks, as considered in case study B, whilst Newman’s did not.

This case study provides a good example of where one persons/bodies’ understanding of ‘secured by design’ may differ from another’s, contributing to the inconsistencies and misinterpretations of the initiative, as discussed in the previous chapter.

5.5 Albion Works

Albion works is located in Ancoats, adjacent to the inner city regeneration area of New Islington (Figure E6: Appendix E), the regeneration of which has been in dis-cussion and planning for many years. Heavily affected by the economic downturn, much of the proposed master plan has not been realised. Architects involved in the project include, Will Alsop, who’s Chips (Figure E7: Appendix E), part of a wider master plan, is one of the few schemes to be realised.

Comprising of Albion Works, Advent 1 & 2 and Vulcan Mill, Albion Works is a unique urban environment. The complex is heavily gated, with gates surrounding the majority of the site (Figure E4 & E5: Appendix E). Within the boundaries of develop-ment, the individual blocks are evenly distributed with spaces between used for car

42. Chapter Five

parking and communal outdoor recreation space (Figure E3 & E5: Appendix E). The development is not ‘secured by design’ accredited, and as a whole relies on a barri-cade approach, removing the interior spaces form the surrounding public streets, this is achieved through the use of fences and electronically operated gates.

A Crime Impact Statement produced by Design for Security, a Manchester based, design-lead crime prevention consultancy, in association with Greater Manchester Police, for a new mixed-use development, outlines the type and levels of crime expe-rienced in the particular area of the city.

Highlighted by the graph below, the area is particularly vulnerable to car related crime, and is also affected by burglary and high levels of criminal damage. Based on this information it is easy to see why a developer may wish to take precautions to prevent criminal activity, in this case, and for many of the surrounding developments, the developer/architect has opted for security gates to provide the interior spaces with the protection required for the residents to feel safe (Figure 1E: Appendix E).

In explaining the reasons for the high levels of criminal activity, highlighted in Fig-ure A13, the crime impact statement blames the physical nature of the surrounding environment. With so many of the developments opting for the introverted barricade approach to urban design, the surround streets are suffering. Removal of activity, and the transient movement on the streets means they are much quieter, and without the principles of Newman and ‘Secured by Design’ employed in surrounding develop-ments they suffer from a lack of opportunity for natural surveillance.

“Many of the streets have little in the way of natural surveillance from overlooking property”

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“Canal-side footpaths are commonly used by offenders to access the area, as these offer limited natural surveillance from neighbouring properties, facilitating a rapid escape without fear of detection”

Within the guidance outlined in the document produced by Design for Security, one of their recommendations is that habitable interior zones, should provide opportu-nity for casual surveillance, and overlook the exterior public spaces. This is a design feature that can be seen to be missing from the developments within, and those sur-rounding Albion Works.

The problems associated with the introverted barricade approach discussed above, don’t relate only to the external environments created, but have a significant effect on the interior space, and resident’s perception and fear of crime.

5.6 Gated Community

Its widely believed, as discussed within the review of literature, that ‘gated communi-ties’ are fundamentally poor design, which create a fear of crime amongst residents rather than providing the sense of reassurance hoped through the erection of physical barriers. This fear of crime can be seen and measured through the analysis of com-ments left by residents on a forum specially created to provide residents with a voice, where they can air their concerns between one another.

Albionworks.myfastforum.org provides a discussion forum for the residents of Albi-on Works, Advent & Vulcan Mill. Within the forum residents are free to start threads on various topics, the most widely discussed topics are ones relating to the security of the developments. Largely the issues discussed relate to maintenance of the equip-ment that the developments rely on for ensuring the security of the interior grounds. A sample of the discussion titles and comments follow.

Discussion Title 1: No wonder people can stroll in!

“I came back to Advent 1 after work to find that someone had stuck the A4 letter, that was posted to us, detailing the change of pass code today, on the glass next to the entrance!!! How Stupid!!!!!! I ripped it down straight away, but I don’t know when it was posted up and how many peo ple could have seen it that shouldn’t. The police are right when they say some blame must lie with the residents when it comes to all the robberies,

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especially with idiots like this around! A little bit of common sense please!”

Discussion Title 2: Who’s giving out the door code! “On Wednesday a girl from Block E gave out the door code to somebody who doesn’t live here. I have lived here for 3 years and didn’t even know it and now we have some stranger who can access our buildings and enter through the gate a lot more easily. I don’t appreciate somebody giving out the number to just any old people. We have security for a reason. Is there anyway we can have the code changed?” Discussion Title 3: Very Important! “To all residents in advent one! I have just caught a couple of kids robbing our post boxes. The closer on the side door, which opens onto the building site, is broken. So the door will not close behind you and leaves the whole block open for anyone to come in”

Discussion Title 4: Canal path mugging!

“Some distressing news I’m afraid. Tonight my flat mate was walking home from the metro down the canal path home when two lads in hoods jumped him pointing a gun in his face. They demanded he give them everything he had which he did.. Then they hit him in the face and told him to turn around and said “we’re gonna kill you” and hit him in the back of the head.. Ambulance/Police came.. at the time he was on the phone to family who heard him scream out as they grabbed him.. Then the line went dead.. They rang me here and I went looking for him but the police called to say he was on his way to hospital. Anyways it’s pretty serious. He’s been discharged and gone home for a while ..but I would SERIOUSLY advice not to walk down there.. I’d even told him multiple times not too..”

From the sample of comments, and the topics discussed, there is a clear concern amongst resident with regards to their safety. Paranoia over the effective use of gate doors and entrances seems to be the main concern, highlighting and validating the criticisms over the safety of gated communities.

In defence of criticisms blaming gated communities on ‘secured by design’, the re-sults of an interview with Rachel Armitage, suggested other wise.

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“I do not believe that gated communities are a positive design. I would not advocate them at all. From a crime perspective, I recently conducted a study in Manchester, which included a gated community, and this development had high levels of crime. The problem was that although the boundary of the development was gated, once inside the development had not been designed with consideration for crime prevention. It was as if the developers felt that the gate was enough and they could forget any crime issues once inside”

It could be argued that had the development sought the advice and guidance of the lo-cal police force from the outset, the design of the environment might be much differ-ent to that in reality. In cases where the developers feel they have solved the problem of crime through the erection of gates and fences, they are quite possibly contributing to the problem. ‘Secured by design’ would not advocate such design solutions.

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Chapter Six: Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This section will present the key findings of the research project first, and then discuss the limitations of the study and make suggestions for further research.

6.2 Key Findings

6.2.1 Secured by Design

The main, and key finding of this study is with regards to peoples understanding of the police organised initiative ‘secured by design’.

Through the review of literature it had been presented that ‘secured by design’ was to some extent criticised by architects and authors, who blamed the initiative for the creation of environments lacking in character and architectural merit. In some cases it had even been suggested that ‘secured by design’ rather than creating safe environments for people to live, was quite possibly responsible for environments that heightened residents fear of crime, and enhanced feelings of isolation and vulnerabil-ity. An example is the ‘gated community’, blamed by Anna Minton and John Gilbert on the principles of ‘secured by design’. Through this study, analysing the principles of ‘secured by design’, and conducting interviews with experts in the field, findings proved otherwise.

Were it had been believed ‘secured by design’ advocated the use of gates and fences, this turned out not to be true, in fact it had been suggested that ‘secured by design’ would never recommend such measures as they are understood to be inherently poor design, and do little to protect a development and its residents once breached.

An interview with Rachel Armitage, a specialist in ‘secured by design’, and a review of her past literature was able to prove the successfulness of the initiative in the crea-tion of safer environments, and showed reductions in the levels of crime experienced in projects that meet ‘secured by design’ standards. These findings lay to rest criti-cisms around the effectiveness of the initiative, and validated its usefulness as a tool in the prevention of crime.

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6.2.2 Interpretation

The second key finding to come from the study relates to inconsistencies found within individual’s interpretations of ‘secured by design’. Whilst research proved the potential effectiveness of the initiative when implemented positively, it did however raised questions over various individuals’ interpretations of its principles, including those within the police force, and the potential risks posed by a lack of consistency.

Analysis of the precautions employed within the chosen case studies, when compared against the principles outlined in the official documentation, and those suggested by Armitage, revealed a degree of variation between people’s understandings of the initiative.

Armitage’s response to a number of questions highlighted her personal concerns over the efficiency of the program, which she associated with the level of self-interpreta-tion, explaining how regional police forces and individual architectural liaison of-ficers may adopt principles differently, and that one individuals solution may differ from another’s. When analysing case study A, Express Networks Phase III, it became apparent that the approach employed was not the physical design approach recom-mended by Armitage in the previous chapter, but a specification lead approach, as outlined in a letter issued to the architect by the architectural liaison officer assigned to the project.

Like wise case study B, Albion Works, showed an example of a developer’s own interpretation of what constitutes security. The gated barricade approach employed may well have been the result of misinterpreting the principles of ‘secured by design’, as it seems to be widely believed ‘secured by design’ promotes the use of gates, walls and fence, when actually it does not.

It could be argued that, in going it alone, and not seeking the advise of the local authority, the design decisions employed in case study B, were ones that promoted a fear and paranoia towards crime, rather than a sense of reassurance and security, as suggested through the numerous comments left on a residents blog, and only further adding to residents feelings of isolation and vulnerability.

6.3 Limitations and Recommendations

Whilst it is possible to analyse a case study or a building against a set of principles, defined through an initiative or a theory, and come to a conclusion over its success at meeting those principles. It is not so easy to analyse resident’s emotional responses

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and feelings towards their environment, not without conducting detailed and thor-ough analysis of interviews and focus groups. This study, due to lack of resources, time constraints and access to interviewees, was unfortunately un-able to do so. I would recommend further research to be carried out on the direct impact an environ-ments has on its residents emotional feelings, through conducting interviews and/or focus groups were possible. The study was further limited due to a lack of crime figures. Unfortunately due to the sensitive nature of the topic, developers and architects were reluctant to discuses the impact their projects had had on crimes experienced. This form of data would have provided an element of evidence that is otherwise missing from the study. However, it could be argued that the developer’s reluctance in providing such information may well be a sign of the level of success the projects have had in defending against crime.

Although people such as Armitage have conducted a large amount of research in the past, exploring the effectiveness of ‘secured by design’, their studies have largely focused on social housing schemes. It is suggested that it further research into the application of ‘secured by design’ in the design of private developments may be ap-propriate. Analysis of ‘secured by design’ accredited case study A, Express Networks Phase III, proved to be unsuccessful in its application of ‘secure by design’ principles, and when analyses revealed areas of contention in its schematic design. A wider and more extensive research would be more conclusive, and could be used to further highlight the varying levels of interpretation within the police forces itself, regionally and nationally.

6.4 Conclusion

This study has proved the effectiveness of ‘secured by design’ as a tool to be used in the fight against crime, silencing a number of critics, but has also questioned the ef-ficiency of the initiative when left up to the interpretations of individuals.

The study revealed some of the poor decisions employed by developers, constructing projects without the involvement of the police force, exploring the effect this is have on resident’s sense of safety, paranoia, vulnerability and feelings of isolation. Equally the research has examined projects accredited with ‘secured by design’ status, and has found the same issues, this is argued to be as a result of personal interpretation on the behalf of the architectural liaison offices, and planning departments involved in the projects.

Whilst the study has considered the above, it is extremely difficult to remove a build-ing from its location, and can be equally difficult to remove the design and construc-tion process form the influences of third party actors and bureaucracy such as gaining

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regulatory approval, individuals personal interests, money and the maximisation of profits.

“Unfortunately, the process of development, from a projects inception to its completion, involves a series of low level, compartmentalised decisions which may each represent the best solution to a particular problem, but together produce a very banal and bleak reality”

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‘The past 10 years have witnessed an increasing shift towards the return of city centre living, as large numbers of people

moved back into our cities to live and work. As a result many cities have seen a rapid increase in the number of residential developments located in close proximity to their centres.

With this influx of both population and urban development, major con-cerns have been aired over the impact this is having on criminal activity and the safety of residents. One such concern is over the quality of the environments created to house this increasing population, and whether the correct or appropriate precautions are employed to provide residents with safest accommodation possible, accommodation that makes them feel secure, without heightening feelings of vulnerability and paranoia.

A review of literature highlighted a current debate over the police lead initiative ‘secured by design’, which since its introduction in the late 90’s has faced stiff criticism, particularly from architects and writers, with many criticising the scheme for the creation of ugly and lifeless envi-ronments. The criticisms, in some cases go beyond a concern purely for aesthetics, but question the effectiveness of the initiative itself, and its efficiency in creating safer environments.

The results from the research conducted, showed a level of misunder-standing when it came to the police organised initiative, and proved its usefulness and successfulness as tool in the fight against crime. Whilst at the same time highlighting inconsistencies within the initiative itself, outlining where individual interpretations of its principles risk negatively impacting the effectiveness of the scheme when implemented in practice. Theories were expressed through the analysis of two selected case stud-ies, chosen from Manchester’s city centre. Findings showed the failings in the design of environments that did not seek the guidance of the police force, whilst also highlighting areas of contention in buildings construct-ed inline with ‘secured by design’ standards, and provided reasons for why. The research reflects on the difficulties faced by private developers and the police force, in the successful application of such initiatives in the design of residential architecture’.