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DOI: 10.1177/0957926511419930

2012 23: 69Discourse SocietyJohn Wilson and Karyn Stapleton

AssemblyDiscourse in the shadows: Discursive construction and the Northern Ireland

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Discourse & Society

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Discourse in theshadows: Discursiveconstruction and theNorthern Ireland Assembly1

John Wilson and Karyn StapletonUniversity of Ulster at Jordanstown, Northern Ireland

AbstractParliamentary discourse (PD) is shaped by pre-defined rules, which may be strategically transgressed

to achieve political goals. Here, we examine a relatively unique form of PD, the discourse of the

Shadow Assembly, which was tasked with establishing the procedures of the new Northern IrelandAssembly (1998). Using a discursive constructionist perspective, which emphasizes the intersection

between social theory and sociolinguistics, we examine how Members of the Assembly vie to

discursively establish the fundamental parameters of political behaviour within the Assembly. These

included address terms, speaking rights and, indeed, which language members should speak. Hence,

we have a rare opportunity to examine how discursive construction mediates the future forms of

interactional limits and constraints. In particular, we consider PD in a context where the rules

are notpre-established and there is, moreover, a strong history of socio-political conflict. We also

consider the role of culture in shaping and constituting PD.

Keywordsconstruction, Northern Ireland, parliamentary discourse, rules, Shadow Assembly, social theory,

transgressions

Introduction

In the general field of political language, it is not surprising that a specific importancehas been given to the study of parliamentary discourse (Bayley, 2004; Chilton, 2004;Chilton and Schffner, 2002; Ilie, 2010a; Wodak and Van Dijk, 2000). This is, of course,

Corresponding author:

John Wilson, School of Communication, University of Ulster at Jordanstown, Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim

BT37 0SR, Northern Ireland.

Email: [email protected]

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70 Discourse & Society 23(1)

one of the most obvious and central examples of political language in action, which hasbeen viewed as a specific sub-genre of political language (Chilton, 2004) and as a dis-course model in its own right (Bayley, 2004). It is also widely recognized that language

plays a constructionist role in the very constitution of parliaments themselves (see

Chilton, 2004; Ilie, 2010a). Hence, the parliamentary context itself is constituted andenacted through sets of discourse structures, practices and routines. A particular featureof such discourse is the extent to which it is shaped by pre-defined rules and constraints,such as orders of discussion, time limits on talk, legal protections on certain languageusage, reference constraints relating to oneself and others, and so on. Equally of interest,here, is the extent to which these boundaries can be negotiated and transgressed withinthe limits of acceptable or legitimate parliamentary behaviour (see De Ayala, 2001; Ilie,2004, 2010b).

In this article, we consider how a discursive constructionist perspective may provide

insight into a relatively unique form of parliamentary discourse, the discourse employedat the outset of a new legislative Assembly in Northern Ireland. Specifically, we discussthe Shadow debates, named after the Shadow Assembly, which initiated the new

Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA) and was tasked with establishing the procedures andparameters of the political institutions. Here, we view discursive interaction as bothforming and being formed by social contexts and the social roles played out in suchcontexts. As such, we operate at the intersection of social theory and sociolinguistics(see, for example, Heller [1995, 2001], who views sociolinguistics as a form of socialtheory; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Bourdieu, 1994, 1998; Wilson, 2001; Wilson and

Stapleton, 2007). Much social interaction within society functions through institutional-ized patterns of behaviour, including sociolinguistic/discursive behaviours, which are theoutcome of interactional routines exemplifying specific social contexts and institutions.This should not be misunderstood as being deterministic, however; with Bourdieu(1998), we see societal and hence sociolinguistic patterns and routines as being suscep-tible to challenge and change (as we have argued elsewhere, for example in the case ofthe sociolinguistic role of habitus and policing change in Northern Ireland; see Wilsonand Stapleton, 2007).

In the database for this study, we see an example of this as members of the newly

formed NIA vie to discursively establish the fundamental discourse parameters ofpolitical behaviour within the Assembly. This included such things as which parties arecalled, who speaks when and for how long, and indeed in which language they speak.This analysis is relatively unique, then, in that it is not often within Western Europethat one has the chance to view initial debates about such issues; for most European

parliaments, these are already well-established (Bayley, 2004; Chilton, 2004), havingbeen set up, in some cases, a number of centuries ago. Here, however, with the establish-ment of the NIA, we have one of those rare windows of opportunity to see howdiscursive construction mediates the future forms of interactional limits and constraints.

While this makes the database particularly interesting, it also creates an inbuilt poten-tial limitation. Although there are several further Shadow debates in our corpus, the factis that following the initial debate, these other debates become controlled and set by whathas been grounded in the initial debate. That is, the discursive parameters have beenestablished for Assembly discourse and parties, and members move on to concentrate on

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Wilson and Stapleton 71

core political issues, health, security, the economy, etc., rather than on how such coreissues should be introduced, at what time, by whom, for how long, and so on. While thereis much that is interesting in these other debates, consideration of the basic groundingrules is not generally repeated for further comparison, since these have been discursively

agreed. It is not that there are not opportunities for challenge or disagreement on variousissues on the procedures of the Assembly, but even such challenges would be in terms ofthe initially agreed parameters set in the first debate. For example, the issue of whichlanguage one should use arises in other places, but only in terms of the initially agreed

parameters discussed in the first debate (see later), that is that members are free to useany language of their own choice.

The potential limitations of looking at only the initial Shadow debate are thereforenatural and ecologically necessary, and hence, we would argue, not necessarily limita-tions at all, but rather a reflection of a rare and potentially unique sociolinguistic and

political context.At this point, we would also note that the parliamentary language found in the Shadow

debates is contextually unique in other ways. For example, Sinn Fein, one of the majorparties in the Assembly, had been for many years an advocate for the destruction of theNorthern Ireland (NI) state, the withdrawal of NI from the UK and the unification of NIwith the Republic of Ireland. In turn, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a strongsupporter of both NI and Britain, did not want Sinn Fein in any new NI Assembly andhad long campaigned against Sinn Feins involvement in even the democratic process.Moreover, because of the nature and structure of the NIA, all parties are effectively in

government together, that is there is no Opposition as in other parliaments and, hence, alldecisions must be arrived at in a consociational way (see The socio-political contextlater). In the Shadow debates, then, we have an Assembly of antagonistic bedfellows,thrown together against a backdrop of a long history of civil and ethnic strife, and taskedwith agreeing methods and processes for a new parliamentary way forward.

The present article focuses on the starting point of this process, the point at which theparliamentary rules and procedures are being negotiated and constructed. As notedabove, this analysis provides a rare opportunity to examine how such practices becomeestablished and, moreover, how they set the parameters of future institutional interaction.

Clearly, the Shadow Assembly is not operating in a vacuum and, to this extent, certain ofthe rules (and categories of rules) draw upon existing parliamentary models (most nota-bly Westminster). However, the content of these rules and of the emergent parliamentarydiscourse framework is here being constructed in real time and within the institutionalcontext which it will later define and constitute. Hence, through our analysis, we aim to(a) provide insights into the construction of parliamentary discourse and procedures,with a particular focus on the way in which the very lack of agreed procedure providesgrounds for contestation and conflict; and (b) examine within a social (discursive)constructionist framework the way in which such construction processes shape future

patterns of behaviour and institutional contexts.In the remainder of the article, we will, first, briefly discuss some of the structures and

features of parliamentary discourse as found in established political institutions. Thisprovides the backdrop for our own study in which the discourse processes of the NIA arebeing negotiated and defined. In light of our own analysis, we are particularly interested



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here in the role of rules, boundaries and transgressions in defining and patrolling whatis legitimate parliamentary behaviour, as well as the role of culture in shaping andconstituting the parliamentary context. Next, we will highlight the political context ofthe establishment and operation of the NIA. This is not only for descriptive reasons, but

also serves as a socio-political resource for understanding the discursive dimensions ofthe debates themselves (see Van Dijk, 2005). Thus, it will serve as a backdrop forunderstanding the discursive techniques and processes adopted in the Shadow debates,and will assist us in understanding the interaction of discursive construction andcontextual processes in the construction of political meaning. Following this, we willanalyse and discuss the Shadow debates under a number of thematic headings. Thearticle concludes with a consideration of our analysis in relation both to the study of

parliamentary discourse and to the political context more generally.

Parliamentary discourse

As noted above, parliamentary discourse has, in recent years, been the focus of sustainedempirical analysis, and has given rise to a number of book-length discussions. Mostanalysts view parliamentary discourse as a sub-genre of political discourse (e.g. Chilton,2004; Rasiah, 2010) and/or as a discourse model in its own right (Bayley, 2004). Therehas also been a focus on parliamentary institutions as communities of practice, whereinmembers must learn to engage in accepted discourse practices in order to constitutethemselves as parliamentarians (see Harris, 2001; Shaw, 2000). Language is integral to

the nature and business of parliament, comprising its key activities, and making manifestpolitical power and ideology (see Bayley, 2004; Chilton, 2004; Ilie, 2010a).

Bayley (2004) identifies three key characteristics of parliamentary discourse: (1) itreflects the culture and history of the political system in which it is located; (2) it is ritual-ized and rule-bound (see further below); and (3) it is fundamentally adversarial (2004:21), being based on a conflict between opposing parties and ideologies most notably,

between Government and the Opposition. Bayley further makes the point that althoughparliamentary discourse is essentially a series of monologues, which are intertextuallyand contratextually interwoven (2004: 24), the nature of the discourse is dialogic and

genuine dialogues do occur, albeit within the constraints of parliamentary regulations.All three of Bayleys points can be seen as relevant to the present study. The socio-political and historical backdrop of NI is ever-present in the workings of the NIA and thisleads to a particular type of adversarial discourse, based here not on the standard notionof Government versus Opposition, but, as we shall see, on interparty wrangling and,most crucially, on the traditional fault lines of Unionism versus Nationalism (despite thefact that all of these parties are ostensibly in government together). Of particular interestare the issues of ritual and rule-boundedness, since it was these very issues which occu-

pied the Shadow Assembly and which provide the focus of our analysis.

As noted, the data discussed in this article are distinctive in that they provide aninsight into how parliaments and parliamentary discourse become constituted andlegitimated in real time. Central to this process is the creation of the rules of acceptable

parliamentary behaviour, particularly as they pertain to interactional and linguisticchoices. In most other parliaments, these rules are already well established. As outlined



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by Ilie (2010a: 880), (t)the gradual ritualisation of parliamentary proceedings has beenmarked by an increasing regularisation of the collective behaviour and individual rolesof Members of Parliament (MPs), on the one hand, and by institutionalised form andstructure of their verbal interaction, on the other.

The parliamentary discourse genre is regulated in part by the prescriptive rule book ofErskine May, first published in 1844 and continually reproduced in new editions andderivative handbooks (see May, 1989). The book sets out guidelines for the form, channeland content of parliamentary proceedings, including debates, questions and speeches. Tothis extent, it can be seen to define the rules, norms and practices that constitute acceptableparliamentary language, which, in turn, is tied to notions of rationality and politeness(see Chilton, 2004; De Ayala, 2001; Ilie, 2004). Indeed, Ilie (2010b) notes that, ratherthan being purely regulative (as in non-institutional interaction), the rules of parliamen-tary interaction are constitutiveand therefore integrated with the discourse itself.

However, the rules and norms of parliamentary discourse are frequently breached;hence, the existence of these rules does not prevent their being broken (Chilton, 2004:95). In fact, in many cases, parliamentary rules are purposefully and strategically manip-ulated in order to achieve political goals, as demonstrated in analyses of, for example,

parliamentary insults (Ilie 2004, 2010b); parliamentary questions and evasions (Chilton,2004; Rasiah, 2010); and parliamentary interruptions (Bevitori, 2004). In a study specifi-cally concerned with Erskine Mays rules, De Ayala (2001) shows how the existence ofthese rules and associated politeness strategies actually provides a space for adversarial,or face-threatening, acts (FTAs), in that the latter are formed as part of a regulated, and

therefore clean, confrontation. This gives rise, according to De Ayala, to a specific formof parliamentary institutionalized hypocrisy (2001: 150). Similarly, Ilie (2004) showshow certain forms of boundary transgression, namely types of parliamentary rudeness orinsult, have, over time, acquired an acknowledged legitimacy [in] ritualised confronta-tional encounters (Ilie, 2004: 52). Hence, parliamentary rules are routinely subject tonegotiation, infringement and direct manipulation; and it is often in these moments oftransgression that the normative workings of parliament are most clearly revealed.Moreover, as noted by Bayley (2004: 16), because of the very existence of parliamentaryrules, in moments of tension, the procedures themselvesmay be the cause of conflict

and the object of discussion (emphasis added).In the present article, we are centrally concerned with the way in which the rules,procedures, form and content of parliamentary discourse are negotiated in the early daysof the Northern Ireland Assembly. Hence, in relation to the features just described, weare interested to observe both how these become established and the effects of theirabsence on parliamentary process and interaction. In this way, we also aim to provide anin situ perspective on the role of discourse in establishing the form and constraints ofinstitutional processes and interactions.

The socio-political contextThe NIA was established as part of two interrelated processes: constitutional devolutionwithin the UK, and the political peace process in Northern Ireland. From the outset, theAssembly, established under the Belfast Agreement of 1998, reflected the dual aims of



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constitutional reformand conflict resolution(Carmichael, 1999; Horowitz, 2002; Tonge,2005). After approximately 30 years of conflict (known as the Troubles), the Assemblywas welcomed as a unique opportunity for inclusive political dialogue and mutualunderstanding (see Horowitz, 2002).

On its establishment, the NIA was given full legislative authority for transferredmatters, including education, health, regional development, agriculture, trade andinvestment, culture, arts and leisure, and transport. Other issues, known as reserved mat-ters and excepted matters, continued to be dealt with by Westminster.2The Assemblymet for the first time on 1 July 1998, but existed only in shadow form until 2 December1999, when legislative powers were transferred from Westminster (see The presentstudy: Creating parliamentary discourse, below). It is unicameral and comprises 108elected Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), the vast majority of whomrepresent a designated Unionist or Nationalist party. The main unionist parties are the

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), while the twolargest nationalist parties are the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and SinnFein (SF). There are also some MLAs from the centre-ground (or cross-community)Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI). Initially (and at the time of our analysis),there were also MLAs from smaller sub-formations of unionism and from anothercentre-ground party, the Northern Ireland Womens Coalition (NIWC). However, insubsequent elections, these smaller parties were squeezed out by the main voting blocsof unionism and nationalism.3

As conceived under the Belfast Agreement, the notions ofpower-sharingand cross-

community supportare central to the NIA, and this has resulted in a number of distinc-tive features. For example, as noted earlier, under consociational principles, all of themain parties share in Government, with no provision for an Opposition. Two key mech-anisms were put in place to facilitate power-sharing: the dHondt system, throughwhich ministerial portfolios are distributed on the basis of party strength; and therequirement that all major decisions taken by the Assembly must receive cross-commu-nity support from a majority of MLAs representing each community (MLAs must des-ignate themselves unionist or nationalist prior to casting their votes). The Speaker isthe Presiding Officer and he or she must also be elected on a cross-community basis.

Despite this emphasis on dialogue and consociationalism, the Assembly has neveroperated smoothly; on the contrary, it has been beset by repeated conflicts and sus-pensions, the most recent of which ended in 2007. Moreover, while it has operatedcontinuously from 2007, unionists and nationalists (and indeed different sub-groupingsof unionism/nationalism) continue to disagree over many issues. This, together withthe operation of mutual vetoes, has increasingly led to an impression of politicaldeadlock and stalemate. In our discussion below, we will consider the current NIA inlight of the present analysis.

The present study: Creating parliamentary discourseJust as parliamentary discourse is shaped by broader cultural and social frameworks(Bayley, 2004; Chilton, 2004; Chilton and Schffner, 2002; Ilie, 2004; Shaw, 2000), itcan also provide revealing insights into the socio-political context of which it is a part.



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Given that the NIA is a new venture, will it provide the opportunity for a new form ofpolitical language suited to the changing times, or the imposing of an old style on newformats? The reality is, of course, that while the NIA is a new venture, its politics and itsstructures start from standard and available parliamentary models (Westminster and

other regional parliaments). Hence, as noted earlier, the members participating in theShadow debates were negotiating a set of already (broadly) defined practices andexpectations. The outworking of these negotiations is of particular interest when setwithin the socio-political context of conflict and conflict resolution, which characterizedthe NIA. In examining the Shadow debates, we want to demonstrate a number of charac-teristics which reveal the particular problems faced by the NIA and how these reflectedthe external and internal socio-cultural limits of debate at that time (and, to some extent,still do so today).

It is worth noting the fact, given this context, and as mentioned briefly above, that

one of the major parties in the Assembly, namely the DUP, was fundamentally opposedto working with SF until all IRA weapons were destroyed and the IRA disbanded. Tothe DUP (and to many unionists) at this time, to enter the NIA was to enter directly intogovernment with terrorists. Hence, it can be read that one party to the Assembly did notwant the Assembly to exist in either shadow or actual form. This is but one factor whichmakes the NIA significantly different from most other parliaments.4It is also one that,once again, can only be assessed initially in the first Shadow debate, since once theDUP take part, they have by this very action discursively co-constructed the Assemblyand taken part in a debate with Sinn Fein.

The Shadow Assembly was established for the purpose of organisation, withoutlegislative or executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and working practices andmake preparations for the effective functioning of the Assembly and associatedimplementation bodies.5This was seen as a necessary phase preceding full devolution,since the delegation of appropriate powers was dependent upon members working outand agreeing appropriate parliamentary procedures and the ground rules of behaviour forwhat would be the actual Assembly. The behaviours displayed at this shadow time aresignificant, then, in that they set the tone for future processes. As a form of parliamentarydiscourse, they also provide very real insights into how parliaments, and indeed parlia-

mentarians, become constituted as entities through the discourses and practices that theyemploy.

Analysis: The Shadow debates

As noted earlier, our analysis is drawn from the initial Shadow debate of 1 July 1998;here, NIA members, under the control of a Shadow Speaker, made their first attempts tomove forward Assembly organization and Assembly rules. The official agenda of thisdebate ran as follows: Assembly: Preliminary Matters; Roll of Members; Presiding

Officer and Deputy; First Minister (Designate) and Deputy; Committee on StandingOrders; Assembly Members Names; First Minister (Designate) and Deputy: Proposals;Committee to Advise the Presiding Officer; Orange Institution Parade (Drumcree). Froman initial thematic analysis of these sections, we have identified discussions related tothree key areas, which form the basis of our analysis. These are: Party Designation,



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Parliamentary Processesand theLanguage of Parliament. The extracts selected beloware not intended to give an exhaustive treatment of these topics, but rather to highlighttheir occurrence and negotiation within the debate. For the most part, the extracts that wehave selected for analysis are discussed in the order in which they occur in the OfficialReport of the debate, that is we follow the lines of the discussion as it develops withinthe text. However, on a couple of occasions, we have drawn together extracts from dif-

ferent parts of the text in order to facilitate a fuller consideration of particular themes,as identified in the initial analysis. The specific location of extracts within the debate isgiven in Table 1.

In the analysis which follows, we draw on a range of discursive and broadly sociolin-guistic tools to explain the operation of discussion and debate in relation to the keydefinitional issues, as outlined above.

Party designation: Who are we?

One of the first things to be decided in the Assembly was the registration and designationof each party. This was a basic issue, as votes in the Assembly would be presented interms of MLAs party and community designations. This would, in almost any other

place, be a seemingly straightforward process. However, as indicated above, althoughyears of conflict and struggle in NI have tended to polarize communities between union-ism and nationalism, there are also sub-formations of these groupings, as well as centrist

parties such as the Alliance Party or the Womens Coalition and a number of independentpoliticians. Hence, naming, as has been known in sociolinguistics for some time (seeWardhaugh, 2010), is more than individual or group designation, but a social act which

may indicate a range of social factors from age and gender to politeness and solidarity.In terms of allocating political designation in the NIA, it was agreed by the governmentthat there would only be three possibilities: Unionist, Nationalist and Other. Hence, theStanding Orders of the Assembly provided by the government offered little flexibility.This led to some interesting discussions. Consider the following:

Table 1.Themes and debate location

Theme Extracts Section of debate

Party designation 1 Roll of Members

2 Roll of Members 3 First Minister (Designate) and Deputy

4 First Minister (Designate) and Deputy



Parliamentary processes 7 First Minister (Designate) and Deputy

8 Committee on Standing Orders

Parliamentary language 9 Roll of Members





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Extract 1 (1 July 1998)

Mr P. Robinson (DUP)On a point of order, Mr Initial Presiding Officer. Those whose designations were not clearincluded the two representatives of the Northern Ireland Womens Coalition. They seemed tobe in some sort of political drag as other Unionist/Nationalist. If they have now satisfied you

with regard to their designation, can you satisfy us by telling us what that designation is?

The Initial Presiding OfficerThey have changed their designation to Inclusive other, the words Unionist and Nationalisthaving been deleted.

The Womens Coalition (NIWC) was formed in 1996 as a cross-community politicalparty, strongly opposed to sectarianism. In light of this, it would be assumed that party

had chosen inclusive other in an attempt not only to avoid any association with tribalpolitics, but to highlight their inclusiveness as a positive dimension of their policy andexistence. The use of the term political drag by Peter Robinson is metaphorical andimplies some form of political and/or gendered disguise. However, although drag isnormally associated with men dressing in womens clothing (the term drag queen beingassociated with such activity), the slang usage of the term allows for either sex dressingin the clothes of the other sex. With the descriptive marker political, we have a set ofinterrelated interpretations. First, Mr Robinson is clearly being pejorative in suggestingthat the NIWC MLAs are trying to disguise themselves. He is indirectly highlighting and

alluding to the male-dominated environment of most parliaments, and to the very fact thatthe NIWC is formed as a party for women. In such a context of exclusion, to renamethemselves would be to move away from such exclusion, that is being inclusive would

be contradictory without including men. Unless, that is, they dress up (in drag) as men oras something politically other than they are. Hence, paradoxically, the name WomensCoalition acts to negate inclusivity, since it indicates a single gender agenda. While thegroup may espouse an ideology of inclusivity, their name clashes with this; conse-quently, for Mr Robinson, they are confused as to who they are and what they represent.

A second issue relates to the fact that many mainstream politicians did not take the

NIWC as seriously as other core parties; the NIWC were seen in some ways as a gim-mick. In such a context, again, any attempt at re-designation could be seen as trying tojoin the mainstream, which is, as noted, not only male-dominated, but seen only as eitherUnionist or Nationalist.

Consider now a further comment on this issue.


Mr C. Wilson (Ind. Unionist)On a point of order, Mr Initial Presiding Officer. It is quite clear from initial Standing Order

3(1) that Members should designate their identity as Nationalist, Unionist or Other. Iunderstand that the two Womens Coalition Members have breached that. Indeed, I understandfrom an interview on television that the Alliance Party Members have described themselves asCentre. Surely those who claim to have assisted in putting together these Standing Orders and

this Agreement should abide by the rules and stop playing games with this Assembly.



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Here, along with Mr Robinsons more facetious comments, we get to the heart of thematter. The criticism is about bringing these other groups into line with the rules. But itis also more than this; it is about power and control (Van Dijk, 2008), about who the main

political players are (see Butler, 1990; Foucault, 1975). Only those who dont really

know who they are would be messing about with re-designation; and such groups arealso those who dont really know how politics works, even when they have been given achance to help define the rules. But, equally, what does the term other actually mean?Its definition is in terms not of itself, but as implied against something else. In this case,it says what you are not nationalist or unionist but not what you are. Hence the effortsof the Womens Coalition (and the Alliance Party) seem perfectly understandable, in thatthey seek to have an identity which belongs to them, one that reflects their beliefs and

political views. This notwithstanding, the problem is that there is no system for designa-tion of subset of Other, as is made clear by the Initial Presiding Officer (IPO) in his

response to Mr Wilson:

Initial Presiding Officer (1 July 1998)I have taken legal advice on a number of issues, including this one because the designationsmust be very clear and I have to be satisfied about them. The precise wording can be flexible,but the designation must be absolutely clear. The officials and I have checked through this, andwith regard to the Womens Coalition and the Alliance Party I am very clear that the onlypossible interpretation of their designation is Other. I can go through the designations of otherMembers if the Assembly wishes, but they are clear to me.

Here again, we see a rejection of any attempt to step outside the rules. In this case, theAlliance Party are also brought into the debate, by virtue of their attempts to use the termcentre to reflect their middle of the road position. In the scheme of things, such a dis-cussion about minor amendments to designation may seem odd, since it is hard to knowwhat damage is being done either way. On the other hand, given the various shades ofunionism and of nationalism, the Assembly might end up with a plethora of designations.In the end, therefore, the seemingly procrustean constraint of only three options may not

be so illogical. However, it is worth noting that the rules on naming parties may also bebeing used to indicate where the centre of power is in the Assembly; that is, with those

traditional unionist parties who are the majority and who stand against Sinn Fein. Otherminor parties are not only not of interest, but not really worthy of naming.

When considering party designation, of course, there is also the important issue ofwhat each party actually is, and whom/what it represents, as perceived from the differentvantage points of unionism and nationalism. This is most clearly evident in the case ofSinn Fein, who retained full links with the IRA, and were thus seen by many unionists asterrorists in government (see Extracts 35 below). However, it is also an issue for nationalist/republican perceptions of unionists, and what they stand for (as exemplified in Extract 6).

Extract 3 (1 July 1998)Mr S. Wilson (DUP)I hope that before the vote Mr Trimble will make clear where he stands on the issue of sittingin government with the representatives of IRA/Sinn Fein



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Then there are the weasel words of the leader of IRA/Sinn Fein

IRA/Sinn Fein Members talk about taking steps into a new future. They tell us to think of thepeople the very people they have been shooting and bombing for 30 years


Mr N. Dodds (DUP)It was very interesting to hear a representative of IRA/Sinn Fein chastising Mr McCartney and

others about the equality agenda and the Irish language

Through hand-written pledges on a series of issues prisoners, decommissioning and

Government positions for IRA/Sinn Fein

We in the Democratic Unionist Party are in this House not because we are afraid of anything oranybody but because we were elected in substantial numbers by the people of Northern Ireland.We made it clear that we would never negotiate with IRA/Sinn Fein


Mr P. Robinson (DUP)Ms de Brn has said that she considers todays proceedings a step in the right direction. I do notthink that any Unionist is unclear about the direction in which Sinn Fein/IRA want to take thisprovince.

We have selected Extracts 35 to demonstrate a specific linguistic device by which DUPMLAs designate a connection between Sinn Fein and the IRA, that is the explicit verballinking of Sinn Fein/IRA and IRA/Sinn Fein. Given that Sinn Fein are simultaneouslycontent to be described as the political wing of the IRA, but, on many occasions, at painsto point out that they are separate from, and unable to speak for, the IRA, the alternatingusage of this construction by unionist politicians is particularly interesting. Sinn Feinused as the title of the party is unmarked, while both Sinn Fein/IRA and IRA/Sinn Feinare marked to designate a link between the two parts: Sinn Fein and IRA. Now, in one

sense, each alternative Sinn Fein/IRA or IRA/Sinn Fein would seem to be semanti-cally equivalent. In this case, is the use of IRA/Sinn Fein as opposed to Sinn/Fein IRApurely individual and idiosyncratic? Are those designations purely random?

In terms of reference, Frege noted some time ago the distinction between two termshaving the same referent but having different modes of presentation (Frege, 1892/1980;see also, more recently, Fiengo and May, 2006). The classic example is that of morningstar versus evening star. Both have the same referent, namely the planet Venus, but theyhave different modes of presentation. Consequently, while (a), (b) and (c) are tautologies,(d), (e) and (f) present communicated information:

(a) The morning star is the morning star(b) The evening star is the evening star(c) Venus is Venus(d) The morning star is the evening star



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(e) The morning star is Venus(f) The evening star is Venus

In the case of IRA and Sinn Fein, even if these terms did refer to exactly the same refer-

ent in all respects, that referent can be presented in two different modes of presentation,namely IRA and Sinn Fein. Hence IRA/Sinn Fein removes any referential ambiguity asto how certain members of the Assembly are viewed by others in terms of their referen-tial designation. Such members are sociolinguistically marking the IRA and Sinn Fein asequivalent, and in doing this they highlight what Moscovici (2000: 45) refers to as thegenealogy of naming. They are placing the term within a specific cultural matrix ofunionist understanding, that is, the IRA as terrorists.

Now many members of Sinn Fein insisted that there was a distinction between SinnFein and the IRA, making clear in some cases that they did not speak for the IRA and

were not members of the IRA. There may be a link here between what Habermas (2000)refers to as being true and being-held-to-be-true. The first is similar to the formalsemantic view, whereas the second is linked to discursive justifiability. In this secondcase, where one has reasons to believe Sinn Fein and the IRA are the same for all intentsand purposes, then one can designate them as equivalent in terms of what is believed to

be true, where such belief is justifiably expressed and forms the basis for what Habermascalls the cooperative search for truth.

In an idealized world of communication, this seems fine, but in the case of the NIA,the DUP members do not believe that Sinn Fein have a right to be in the Chamber, nor,

therefore, to take part in rational argumentation. Consequently, using IRA/Sinn Fein andSinn Fein/IRA signals a breach in argumentation options, a talking about Sinn Fein/IRA rather than talking with Sinn Fein/IRA. This latter point applies whether it is IRA/Sinn Fein or Sinn Fein/IRA, so does the order of the conflation matter? It is difficult todecide the issue one way or the other, although the structural alternatives need not bewithout implied consequences. It has been argued by critical linguists (see Fairclough,1995; Kress and Hodge, 1979) that linguistic selections carry ideological loading. Forexample, in the case of active/passive sentences such as (a) and (b), below, it is suggestedthat (b) places the affected Patient in the subject position, thereby reducing the central

role of the Agent, that is the person or persons who actually carried out the act.

(a) The IRA shot the policeman.(b) The policeman was shot by the IRA.

Now consider the IRA/Sinn Fein versus Sinn Fein/IRA distinction. These are clearly notexamples of the active/passive construction, but a similar point may apply. Specifically,it could be suggested that in IRA/Sinn Fein, not only is IRA given prominence, butfurther its prior positioning may be an effort to map issues to the world, that is in sayingthat the IRA comes first. If this is a possible analysis, then those wishing to express theirmost vehement rejection of Sinn Fein would adopt IRA/Sinn Fein, and in the examplesabove all those who do this are members of the DUP. The argument only proceeds so farhowever, since Peter Robinson is also a member of the DUP. Nevertheless, unless there



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is a party line that only the term IRA/Sinn Fein is employed, it would give some indi-vidual freedom of selection. Further, it is interesting to note that no one outside the DUPhas employed such a designation. As a result, what we seem to have is a type of scale(Sinn Fein Sinn Fein/IRA IRA/Sinn Fein) which moves from the neutral to the

increasingly more negative associational frame of IRA/Sinn Fein.This point is evidenced, in a later debate, by at least one MLA attempting to attack

the DUP usage of IRA/Sinn Fein and Sinn Fein/IRA by posing the following questionto the Speaker: If terms like Sinn Fein/IRA are to be used, may other Members feelfree to use terms like DUP/LVF? (Mr J Kelly, 14 September 1998). Here, Mr Kellyis turning the tables on the DUP by linking them directly with the Loyalist VolunteerForce, an outlawed Protestant terrorist grouping. Given that the DUP have never beenlinked to any terrorist grouping, the incongruity of this statement may be taken as anattempt to analogously decouple Sinn Fein from the IRA at least for the purposes of

debate in the Chamber.Returning to the way in which Sinn Fein are being referenced, from the perspective

of nationalist voters and politicians, there is an important issue at stake here. Under theframework of the Belfast Agreement, the Sinn Fein Representatives are in the Assembly

because they were elected; they are there, consequently, as a political right, and theconcept of political rights is central to nationalist and republican political discourse.This is encompassed in the following example from Martin McGuinness, which alsoreflects the issue of political perceptions, that is who we (you) are.

Extract 6 (1 July 1998)Mr M. McGuinness (SF)Dia dhaoibh a chairde Having listened to the contributions of the United KingdomUnionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party, people will perhaps have a betterunderstanding of the position that we have adopted for this election. It is a very good day forus to be here together as the elected representatives of all the people of this part of the island.It is particularly important to us to meet people like Mr Cedric Wilson, who for years stoodin splendid isolation at the front of Parliament Buildings waving a placard as we moved backand forth attempting to negotiate on behalf of the people who had given us politicalresponsibility Mr McCartney laughed and smirked as someone on this side of the House

spoke Irish. What he said suggested that he is very concerned about equality and justice. Icertainly hope that he is. However, he looked very intently at the Members behindMr Trimble, as if to intimidate them.

Mr R McCartney (UKUP)The Member should not talk about intimidation.

Mr M McGuinness (SF)I hope that he will not manage to intimidate anybody in this Chamber. He certainly will notintimidate the representatives of Sinn Fein, for we are here on the back of a very substantial

electoral mandate. We are here on behalf of people who have been discriminated against sincethe foundation of the Northern state. We are here on behalf of people who want an end toinequality, discrimination, domination and injustice



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Here Mr McGuinnesss claim for the importance of individual and social rights isimplicitly and explicitly linked to the notion that, in the past, nationalists were deniedsuch rights by unionists. He also attributes such denial to present unionist MLAs such asMr Cedric Wilson and Mr Robert McCartney. In fact, he draws an explicit contrast

between people like Mr Cedric Wilson standing in splendid isolation waving aplacard and Sinn Fein, who are presented as working on behalf of their electorate toachieve these same political and social rights. In this context, he presents (present-day)unionist politicians as attempting to obstruct basic human rights; and moreover asthreatening, or intimidating, those who try to achieve them. The latter point ischallenged by Mr Robert McCartney, of the UK Unionist Party, who refers implicitly toMr McGuinnesss links with the IRA. However, Mr McGuinness counters this challenge

by returning to the notion that it is, in fact, unionists who are attempting to intimidateother Assembly members (i.e. nationalists/republicans). He then reiterates the claim that

Sinn Fein members are representing those who have traditionally been denied rights;for this reason, he states, they refuse to be intimidated by unionist politicians. Thisexchange, then, is built around a positioning and (re)positioning of nationalists andunionists, with each side casting the other as agents of intimidation both inside andoutside the political arena.

We can see in these debates that a core principle of parliamentary interaction remainsunder challenge, that is not only recognition of the various parties in the Assembly, butrecognition of their electoral right to be in the Assembly.

Parliamentary processes: What do we do?

Part of the work of the Shadow Assembly was to find appropriate mechanisms andprocedures for carrying out parliamentary business. In Extracts 7 and 8, we see exam-ples of confusion about what these procedures are/should be. It is notable that thesesituations are commonly used as an opportunity for political point scoring, either

between particular parties/individuals or between nationalism and unionism moregenerally.

Extract 7 (1 July 1998)Mr Adams (SF)On a point of order, Mr Initial Presiding Officer. In the interests of good manners and goodrelationships

Several MembersStand up.

Mr Adams (SF)Sorry: I thought I was standing up. I am certainly standing up for the rights of the people who

sent me here.Should not each party be referred to by its given title? I undertake to describe the UnitedKingdom Unionists as the United Kingdom Unionists, the Democratic Unionist Party as theDemocratic Unionist Party, and so on, and my party should be referred to as Sinn Fein.



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The Initial Presiding OfficerIt is clear that a number of issues relating to Standing Orders will have to be addressed. We needa Committee to decide, for instance, how Members should be described and how they shouldaddress each other. It would be invidious for me, as Initial Presiding Officer, to rule on issues

which go beyond the current Standing Orders.

In this extract, Mr Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, takes issue with the way inwhich many of the Unionist members link SF with the IRA when referring to the party(see earlier). His opening in the interests of good manners and good relationships isinterrupted by a number of MLAs who highlight the fact that he is not following parlia-mentary procedure, that is he is not standing up to address the IPO. However, Mr Adamsdeliberately misinterprets the phrase stand up (literally meaning to get to ones feet),taking instead its metaphorical meaning to stand up (for), meaning to defend or tospeak on behalf of. He claims that he is, in fact, standing up in this metaphorical sense,therefore countering criticism of his breach of protocol and also underlining what he seesas a central aspect of SFs political identity. Following Mr Adams point about his partystitle, the IPO states that forms of address have not, in fact, been agreed upon by the(Shadow) Assembly. Until this is done, then, members are presumably free to refer toone another in any way they please. This is an explicit example of our point above aboutthe significance of the initial Shadow debate, in that here we see again the centrality ofreference and naming at this phase, and indeed, the way it is being discursively manipu-lated for political gain.

In Extract 8, we see another example of procedural confusion and political disagreement

on the back of this, as members argue about the desirable composition of a proposedCommittee on Standing Orders.


Rev. Dr Ian Paisley (DUP)Mr Durkan seems to think that Nationalists and Republicans are badly done by. It is not so.Nationalists as a whole have 42 Assembly Members and will have seven on the Committee,whereas 48 Unionists will have only seven.

Mr Hume (SDLP)Remember the Progressive Unionist Party.

Rev. Dr Ian Paisley (DUP)I am talking about the two largest Unionist parties, which have more than one representative onthe Committee.Nationalists are always telling us that they are badly done by. Forty-two Nationalists have thesame Committee representation as 48 Unionists, yet they are arguing

Mr Hume (SDLP)

The answer to Dr Paisleys question about the Social Democratic and Labour Party is that wecan count. There are 108 Members in the Assembly, 18 of whom will be on the Committee.That works out at one Committee representative for every six Members the most democraticarrangement.



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Mr P Robinson (DUP)A party with fewer than six Members will have two

Mr Hume (SDLP)

Hold on a minute.

Rev. Dr Ian Paisley (DUP)You already subtracted three.

Mr Hume (SDLP)The three parties that are represented entirely accurately are the Alliance Party (onerepresentative for six Members), Sinn Fein (three for 18) and the Social Democratic and LabourParty (four for 24).Let us look at the Unionist parties representation. The United Kingdom Unionist Party is over-

represented, as is the Progressive Unionist Party. Together, the Unionist parties are wellrepresented

This extract clearly demonstrates both the NIAs lack of agreed protocol and membersconfusion as they attempt to negotiate this (contested) protocol. However, it is also clearthat the general confusion is exacerbated by members attempts to ensure the maximumrepresentation, not necessarily for their respective parties (although that is importanttoo), but rather for their own political side, that is unionism or nationalism. This reflectsa zero-sum approach to political interaction from both nationalists and unionists. Thisapproach is, in turn, facilitated and perpetuated by the lack of agreement on parliamen-tary protocol, which appears to be treated as a space in which either unionists ornationalists could negotiate a potentially better deal for their own side.

Part of the problem here is that minority parties of perhaps only one or two memberswill of necessity have statistical overrepresentation if the Assembly Committees are towork. Here the issue of number is not only an issue of mathematical distribution, butonce again of control and power for the largest groupings. Of course, within a powersharing arrangement, everyone who is elected has to have their position. However, ifone doesnt believe in compulsory power sharing, or is at least not supportive of it, onemay use numbers to reflect social arguments for the potential unfairness of such power

sharing by indicating its impact on political representation inside the Assembly. Thatis, number is made political. It is to be interpreted only within a standard majorityrule principle of democracy, which is of course a challenge to the very basis of theconsociational nature of the Assembly structure itself.

Parliamentary language: What do we speak?

In Extract 6 above, Mr McGuiness began his contribution in the Irish language, whichwas fairly standard practice for Sinn Fein MLAs throughout NIA debates. This is, of

course, not accidental, in that Sinn Fein use Irish as a symbol of their aspiration for aunited Ireland free from British rule. It was to be the case that members of the NIA werefree to speak in whichever language they chose. However, the link between politics and



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language is well established both in historical and contemporary terms (see e.g. Haugen,1966; Nic Craith, 2007), and in a politically contested context such as Northern Ireland,this inevitably gave rise to a linguistic disagreement in the Assembly (see Wilson andStapleton, 2003). As noted above, the Irish language has become associated with the

nationalist cause of a United Ireland, and is thus used strategically by nationalists/repub-licans in political (as well as other) contexts. Unionists, on the other hand, have, untilrecently, communicated in such contexts exclusively in English. More latterly, UlsterScots (a form of Lowland Scots spoken in Ulster) has become associated with theunionist cause (Nic Craith, 2001; Stapleton and Wilson, 2004) and therefore unionistscould, if they so wished, utilize Ulster Scots in a manner similar to the nationalist/repub-lican use of Irish.6Ironically, as noted earlier, the single identity associations of theselanguages are actually heightened under the parity of esteem principles of the BelfastAgreement an issue that is discussed elsewhere specifically in relation to arguments

for and against the use of languages other than English in the Assembly (Wilson andStapleton, 2003).

However, as demonstrated in Extract 9, the Speaker is obliged to allow the use of anylanguage that MLAs choose to use.


Initial Presiding OfficerI mentioned to the party Whips yesterday that I, for so long as I am in the Chair, will have noobjection to the use of Irish or any other language. However, we have no simultaneous

translation facilities at present, so it would be appropriate if, out of courtesy, Members were tooffer their own translation. Speeches will be reported in the language spoken. There will be notranslation other than that which is offered by the Member. That applies to any alternativelanguage, though Irish is, I expect, the one most likely to be used.

Clearly, the question of language choice in Northern Ireland raises a host of conten-tious sociolinguistic issues (bilingualism; ethnolectal variation; language planning and

policy) which it would be inappropriate to detail in the present article. Our mainpurpose in looking at the topic of language(s) here is to consider its effect on parlia-mentary proceedings. As stated in Extract 9, the NIA did not, at this point, havesimultaneous translation facilities available to it. Where different languages areemployed in an Assembly of political groupings, with diverse linguistic backgrounds,it might be expected that some translation facilities should be available, and indeedsimultaneous translation was introduced for both Ulster Scots and Irish at a later stageof the NIA. The introduction of such facilities would not negate the contentious effectsof members choosing to speak Irish or Ulster Scots; nor would it satisfy those memberswho maintain that, since all MLAs are fluent speakers of English, then the introductionof additional languages/language facilities is superfluous, divisive and wasteful.However, in the Shadow phase of the Assembly, the lack of simultaneous translation

proved inconvenient, and, notably, provides a further opportunity for parliamentarychallenge and disruption. We have chosen just two brief examples of this, presented inExtracts 10 and 11 below.



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Mr Adams (SF)First of all, let me say that I am very pleased to be here and to see so many other people withus. I mo theanga fin, caithfidh m a r gur l stairiil an l seo, agus le cuidi D beidh muid,agus t muid, i mo bharil fin, ag cur r n-aidhm stairiil ar aghaidh. As seo amach, is fidirlinn [Interruption]

The Initial Presiding OfficerLet us have order for the Member speaking.

Rev. Dr Ian Paisley (DUP)If we could understand him we might give him order.

The Initial Presiding Officer

May I have order and due respect in the Chamber, please.

As Mr Adams begins to speak Irish, we can see that this leads to an initial interruption.This clearly causes disruption to the proceedings, and leads to a call for order from theInitial Presiding Officer (IPO). However, the reason for the interruption is not imme-diately obvious. Given that proceedings are disrupted, it might be assumed that (some)members are opposed to Mr Adams use of Irish. However, we cannot be certainwhether such opposition is on political or practical grounds, that is whether MLAs areobjecting to the Irish language per se or simply that they are unable to understand the

contribution (or both). The remark from Dr Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP (If we couldunderstand him we might give him order), while clearly ironic in intent, is neverthe-less instructive in its own way. There would be few speakers of Irish among unionistMLAs; hence, not only would they not understand that part of Mr Adams speech, theywould have no way of knowing whether the translations he provided were accurate oraccommodating. The choice to use a minority language (e.g. Irish or Ulster Scots) in acontext where the majority cannot understand it, but where everybody can understandEnglish, is clearly a political one, since for all practical purposes English is the de factoworking language of the Assembly. In a direct sense, the use of Irish here, then, is an

expression of Irish nationalism, a claim to be speaking the language of the Island ofIreland.In the absence of simultaneous translation, the use of a minority language also facili-

tates disruption to the parliamentary proceedings. In Extract 11, we can see anotherexample of the parliamentary language issue.


The Initial Presiding Officer. . . Ayes and Noes are the only responses that will be noted. There is currently no provision for

noting abstentions.

Mr Shannon (DUP)Is the Ulster Scots word nah acceptable?



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The Initial Presiding OfficerAs I said earlier, where any language other than English is used, it would be courteous toprovide a translation.

Mr ShannonFor those who do not understand, let me explain that nah is the Ulster Scots for no.

The Initial Presiding OfficerI entirely understand what you are saying, and I repeat that when any language other thanEnglish is used, a translation should be given for the sake of other Members who may notunderstand it. Otherwise it will not be noted.

Mr AdamsIs there an Ulster Scots word for yes?

Here, the absence of simultaneous translation is again a source of parliamentary asides.Mr Jim Shannon asks whether he can use Ulster Scots in registering a no vote in theAssembly. Because of its similarity to the English word no, the Ulster Scots nahwould obviously be understood by all MLAs. However, following the general protocol,the IPO maintains that a translation should be provided. This then leads to a somewhatfacetious explanation of the term from Mr Shannon, after which the IPO repeats thereasons for requesting a translation of any contributions made in a language other thanEnglish. The very fact that Mr Shannon requested to use Ulster Scots may itself be seen

as making a political point, since, again, Mr Shannon speaks English and does not needto communicate in Ulster Scots. This sequence also provides another opportunity for apolitical aside, in the form of Mr Adams ironic enquiry as to whether there is an UlsterScots word for yes. In the NI context, this remark would be readily interpretable asreferring to the stereotype of the intransigent unionist (Ulster says no, etc.). Hence,Mr Adams designates Ulster Scots as belonging to the unionist community, and alsomanages to implicitly criticize the unionist politicians currently in the Assembly.

Discussion and conclusion

In this article, we have adopted a discursive constructionist perspective on the openingdebate of the Northern Ireland (Shadow) Assembly. Such an approach operates at theintersection of social theory and sociolinguistics (e.g. Heller, 2001; Wilson, 2001). Thus,we are interested in the patterns of behaviour and interaction which arise from particularsocial institutions and contexts, and through which these same institutions are con-structed and legitimated. From this perspective, we have examined some of the linguisticand interactional features being laid down by the newly established Assembly; and wehave considered the significance of these behavioural patterns for the constitution of theAssembly.

A key aim of our analysis was to provide insights into how parliamentary discourseand processes are constructed in real time. The Shadow debates can be seen as an instanceof parliamentary constitution in a context where some of the political and discourse



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issues are still open for negotiation. Moreover, to the extent that (p)olitical discoursesand parliamentary institutions are mutually constitutive through public display of mean-ing negotiation, persuasion rhetoric, and power management (Ilie, 2010a: 879), theanalysis also allows for consideration of how the NIA as an institution was being socially

constituted and legitimated through discursive frameworks and patterns. Finally, theearly debates provide a lens through which we can view the NI political and peace pro-cess as it was unfolding at this time. As Van Dijk (2005: 66) has claimed, political dis-course analysis should not be limited to structural features of text and talk, but alsoaccount for their conditions and functions in the political process. Within the Shadowdebate, the interaction of political conditions and structural features seems specificallyhighlighted.

Taking this further, and as already noted, the NI parliamentary context is distinctive ina number of ways; in particular, the socio-historical context of conflict can be seen to

pervade the debates and provide the backdrop for the ongoing antagonism and point-scoring between individuals, parties and ideologies. In addition, the make-up of the NIAitself (i.e. where all parties share power, there is no official Opposition and cross-community support is required for all decisions) reflects the nature and purpose of the

NIA which has always been as much about peace-building as about providing local orregional government. This point is in line with Bayleys (2004) claim that all parliamentsand parliamentary discourse reflect the socio-cultural context of which they are a part.Further, the intrinsically adversarial nature of parliamentary discourse is based here not onGovernment versus Opposition parties, as in most other parliaments, but between the two

main blocs which are ostensibly sharing the government of NI, that is nationalist andunionist (albeit that there is also some interparty wrangling within these competing blocs).Our analysis was centrally focused on the creation and negotiation of parliamentary

rules, specifically those surroundingparty designation(Who are we?),parliamentaryprocesses(What do we do?) and the language of parliament(What language do wespeak?), all of which are sociolinguistic in nature since they revolve around such thingsas naming and addressing, processes for speaker selection and which language should beemployed. This was revealing on at least two levels. First, the Shadow debates werespecifically about working out parliamentary process and ritual; hence they provide an

opportunity to view the way in which parliamentary rules become legitimated. Second,in these early debates we have a situation in which the procedures were notagreedand were, to some extent, open to negotiation and/or exploitation. In most established

parliaments, rules and rituals are pre-determined (usually by means of prescriptive rule-books or treatises such as that of Erskine May); and within this context, as Bayley (2004),Ilie (2010b) and others have noted, the rules may be strategically breached for political

purposes and, in certain situations, they can themselves become the focus of conflict. Inour analysis, we can observe the way in which members exploit both the lack of agreedrules and sanctions and also the opportunity to input into the final form of these struc-tures. This process is typically used as a further opportunity for power wrangling and thetrading of insults, primarily between unionist and nationalist parties. Hence, as the MLAsdebate what is (or should become) the acceptable form of parliamentary discourse and

behaviour, these very issues themselves provide an opportunity for a particular form ofpolitical antagonism based on the NI political divide.



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Therefore, throughout the debate, the members can be seen as vying to discursivelyestablish the parameters of political behaviour within an essentially antagonistic frame-work. Here, as noted, the very lack of agreed protocol engenders ongoing contestationaround classic issues of sociolinguistic power struggle and display, for example: nam-

ing, reference and address terms; individual/group speaking and participation rights;and linguistic and identity rights/recognition (see e.g. Talbot et al., 2003). Moreover,while antagonistic structures are characteristic of much, if not all, parliamentary dis-course, we would argue that the NIA exchanges analysed here are marked out in otherspecific ways: (a) a stark zero-sum approach to power and its distribution; (b) a will-ingness to use procedural uncertainty to delay and derail proceedings, particularly atthe expense of the other side; and (c) a clear and accepted division along the tradi-tional dichotomy of unionism and nationalism, which implicitly underpins the debateand the parliamentary process as a whole. In this way, the Shadow forms of discursive

construction can be seen as shaping the future forms of discourse and interactional lim-its within the Assembly, which, we would argue, are evident in the current functioningof the institutions.

In light of the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the NIA has never operatedsmoothly. Its initial progress was faltering and, as noted by Bradbury and Mitchell(2001: 257), was always threatened by interparty animosities and severe limits on thenormalization of policy-making. Its functioning was also undermined by continuing

political disagreements and by developments in wider NI society (e.g. controversiessurrounding IRA decommissioning of weapons, allegations of spying at Stormont and

disagreements over the devolution of policing and justice). Moreover, a number of writ-ers have argued that the emphasis on cross-community agreement and parity of esteem,enshrined in the Belfast Agreement, actually work to promote single-identity politicsand to entrench the very positions they are designed to dislodge (Brown and MacGinty,2003; MacGinty and Darby, 2002; Stapleton and Wilson, 2010; Tonge, 2005; Wilsonand Stapleton, 2003). As a result of these ongoing conflicts and difficulties, the NIA wassuspended on four separate occasions, during which responsibility for devolved matterswas temporarily returned to the Northern Ireland Office. In the most lengthy and seriousof these, it was suspended from October 2002 until May 2007, and was reinstated only

following lengthy discussions and the St Andrews Agreement of 2006.The reinstatement of the NIA on 7 May 2007 was hailed as a remarkable event, sinceit involved the unprecedented decision of the hard-line parties DUP and Sinn Fein (bythen the largest parties in their respective communities) to share power and entergovernment together. However, although the Assembly has operated continuously fromthat date, unionists and nationalists continue to disagree over many issues, to operatemutual vetoes on proposals and initiatives, and to focus on totemic issues (e.g. languageand parades), alongside the bread and butter politics that occupy most other regionalgovernments. To date, the DUP and Sinn Fein, which, as the two largest parties, domi-nate Ministerial posts, have remained largely in accord on social and political issues.However, it might be argued that this seeming harmony restricts the scope of topics onwhich political debate can occur. The common ground between the parties is fragile,while issues such as language rights and cultural symbols (among other things) retainstrong potential for discord between the parties. Hence, as noted earlier, the NIA isfrequently seen as operating in a context of (at least partial) deadlock and stalemate.



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We would argue that these features reflect the origins of parliamentary discourse inthe Shadow Assembly and, of course, the socio-political context of Northern Ireland.Thus, the initial discursive patterns of blocking, derailment and power protection can beseen to underpin the current forms and limits of parliamentary discourse. Indeed, the fact

that the fundamental inbuilt antagonism within the majority grouping must be masked tomaintain the existing structures further limits the scope of parliamentary discourse and

process, and thus further consolidates the patterns laid down in the initial debates. Thefuture outworking of these issues provides a fascinating arena in which to further observethe interaction of politics and discourse as they are constituted in real time.

Notes

1. We would like to thank Cornelia Ilie (rebro University, Sweden) for her helpful commentson an earlier version of this article.

2. One of these reserved matters, Policing and Criminal Justice, was subsequently devolved tothe NIA in April 2010.

3. The hard-line parties, namely the DUP and Sinn Fein, have made particularly large gainsin successive elections.

4. For example, although the devolved institutions of Scotland and Wales had Scottish and Welshnationalist members, who would have preferred independence, neither in size, representation,nor indeed inclination were they comparable to the DUP.

5. Belfast Agreement, Strand 1, paragraph 35.6. It should be noted that Ulster Scots is not embraced, nor even necessarily accepted, by all

unionists as a political/cultural marker (see McCall, 2002).

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John Wilson is Professor of Communication at the University of Ulster. His researchfocuses on political discourse and on the construction of linguistic meaning in varie-

ties of everyday talk, drawing mainly on the fields of Pragmatics, Discourse Analysis,and Sociolinguistics. He has recently co-edited two books: Devolution and Identity(with K Stapleton; Ashgate, 2006) and The Discourse of Europe(with S Millar; JohnBenjamins, 2007).

Karyn Stapleton is a Senior Lecturer in Communication at the University of Ulster. Hercore research involves the application of Discourse Analysis to issues of politics, cultureand identity, particularly in the context of Northern Ireland. Recent publications includearticles on Ulster Scots, political narratives, cognitive dissonance and public apologies.

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