Digests for Absolute Community of Property
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Transcript of Digests for Absolute Community of Property
MULLER VS MULLER
Gr 149615 08.29.06
FACTS
Petition for review on certiorari which
terminated the regime of absolute community
of property between petitioner and respondent
P and R (German) were married in Germany
and resided there in a house owned by R’s
parents but later permanently resided in the
Ph.
R had inherited the house in Germany from his
parents which he sold and used the proceeds
for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo
and in the construction of a house. The
Antipolo property was registered in the name
of P.
After they separated, R filed a motion for
separation of properties
RTC DECISION:
- terminated the regime of absolute
community of property
- It also decreed the separation of
properties between them and ordered
the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding
those acquired by gratuitous title during
the marriage.
- Re Antipolo property, R cannot recover
his funds coz it was a violation of Section
7, Article XII of the Constitution which
prohibited aliens from procuring private
lands.
CA DECISION: there is nothing in the
Constitution preventing R from procuring land
then ordered P to reimburse him said amount.
ISSUE
WON respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property?
RATIO
NO. respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondent’s disqualification from owning
lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even
an ownership in trust is allowed. W
Where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, no trust can result in favor of the
party who is guilty of the fraud.
R cannot seek reimbursement on the ground
of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the
constitutional prohibition.
HELD
Granted.
PACIFIC ACE VS YANAGISAWA
GR 175303 04.11.12
FACTS
R (Japanese) and Evelyn married. Evelyn then
bought a townhouse unit which was registered
in her name.
R filed a PDN against Evelyn on the ground of
bigamy. During the pendency of the case, R filed
a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order
against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin her from
disposing or encumbering all of the properties
registered in her name.
R’s petition became moot coz Evelyn committed
in open court that she will not dispose of the
property during the pendency of the case.
Evelyn obtained a loan from P (PAFIN) and
executed a REM (real estate mortgage) in favor
of P over the townhouse unit. R filed for an
annulment of the REM.
MAKATI RTC DECISION: (at the time of the
mortgage) dissolved the marriage between R
and Evelyn and ordered the liquidation of their
properties.
PQUE RTC DECISION:
- a foreign national, cannot possibly own the
mortgaged property.
- Without ownership, or any other law or
contract binding the defendants to him, Eiji has
no cause of action that may be asserted against
Evelyn and P.
CA DECISION: annulled the REM executed by
Evelyn in favor of PAFIN.
ISSUE
WON pque rtc’s decision was improper
RATIO
YES. The issue of ownership and liquidation of
properties acquired during the cohabitation
of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the
resolution of the Makati RTC, and is
pending[41] appeal before the CA. The
doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference dictates that the assumption by
the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an
“insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent
assumption by the Parañaque RTC.
.Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in
violation of a standing injunction order are
voidable as to the party enjoined and third
parties who are not in good faith. The party,
in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a
cause of action to seek the annulment of the
offending actions
HELD
Denied for lack of merit.
ABRENICA VS ABRENICA
GR 180572 06.18.12
FACTS
P and R were law firm partners. R filed a case
against P d to return partnership funds
representing profits from the sale of a parcel of
land and sought to recover from petitioner
retainer fees that he received from two clients
of the firm and the balance of the cash advance
that he obtained.
P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that
the sheriff had levied on properties belonging
to his children and petitioner Joena. Joena filed
an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and
her stepchildren owned a number of the
personal properties sought to be levied and that
it was under their ACP.
A Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued on 3
January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the P’s
properties.
*P has been previously married to another woman
but their marriage has already been dissolved.
ISSUE
WON Joena had the right to the claim?
RATIO
NO. Two of these stepchildren were already of
legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to
one of the children, parental authority over him
belongs to his parents. Absent any special
power of attorney authorizing Joena to
represent Erlando’s children, her claim cannot
be sustained.
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes
from the community property the property
acquired before the marriage of a spouse who
has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any,
of that property. Thus, neither these two
vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the
second marriage.
HELD
Petition denied.
LUZON SURETY CO VS DE GARCIA 30 SCRA 111 FACTS
Luzon Surety granted a crop loan1to Chavez
based on a surety bond executed in favor of
Philippine National Bank where Garcia was one
of the guarantors of the indemnity agreement.
On April 1957, PNB filed complaint against
Luzon Surety which subsequently prompted
Luzon Surety to file a complaint against the
guarantors (one of which was Garcia). The
lower court ruled in favor of PNB in the first
case and ordered the guarantors in the second
case to pay Luzon Surety.
CFI DECISION: issued a writ of execution for
Garcia to pay the amount of P3,839. On August,
the sheriff levied his sugar quedans which were
conjugal property of the Garcia spouses.
The Garcias filed a suit of injunction which the
lower court found in their favor based on Art.
161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed to the CA
which affirmed the lower court’s decision..
ISSUE
WON a conjugal partnership, in the absence of
any showing of benefits received, could be held
liable on an indemnity agreement executed by
the husband to accommodate a third party in
favor of a surety company?
RATIO
NO. Art. 163 of the New Civil Code states that
as such administrator the only obligations
incurred by the husband that are chargeable
against the conjugal property are those incurred
in the legitimate pursuit of his career,
profession or business with the honest belief
that he is doing right for the benefit of the
family. This is not true in the case at bar for we
believe that the husband in acting as guarantor
or surety for another in an indemnity
agreement as that involved in this case did not
act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Such inference is more emphatic in this case,
when no proof is presented that Vicente Garcia
in acting as surety or guarantor received
consideration therefor, which may redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
In Article 161 of the CC, a conjugal partnership
under that provision is liable only for such
"debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." There must be the requisite
showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is
none in this case.
HELD
CA’s decision affirmed.
GELANO VS CA
103 SCRA 90
FACTS
Insular Sawmill, Inc. leased the paraphernal
property of Guillermina M. Gelano (wife)
Carlos Gelano (husband) obtained cash
advances but refused to pay his unpaid
balances. Guillermina M. Gelano refused to pay
on the ground that said amount was for the
personal account of her husband asked for by,
and given to him, without her knowledge and
consent and did not benefit the family.
Spouses Gelanos purchased lumber materials
on credit for the repair and improvement of
their residence, leaving unpaid amounts.
Joseph Tan Yoc Su, as accomodating party,
executed a joint and several promissory note
with Carlos Gelano in favor of China Banking
Corporation bank payable in 60 days to help
renew the previous loan of the spouses but
Carlos only paid a fraction of it. Guillermina
refused to pay on the ground that she had no
knowledge of such accommodation.
Insular filed a complaint for collection against
the spouses before the CFI.
CFI DECISION: held Carlos liable.
CA DECISION: held spouses jointly and severally
liable.
ISSUE
WON the couple’s conjugal property is liable?
RATIO
YES. Pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 1408,
Civil Code of 1889 which provision incidentally
can still be found in paragraph 1, Article 161 of
the New Civil Code, The obligation/debt
contracted by petitioner-husband Carlos Gelano
redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence,
the conjugal property is liable for his debt.
G TRACTORS INC VS CA
135 SCRA 192
FACTS
Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. He operates a logging concession,
Luis Narciso entered into Contract o Hire of heavey Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors where G-tractors leased former tractors. Co tract stipulated payment for rental. However Luis wasn‘t able to pay.
Property of Luis was sold to pay for his debt, one of which was conjugal property of land.
WIFE’S CONTENTIONS: -whatever transpired in the civil case against them could be binding only on the husband Luis R. Narciso and could not affect or bind the plaintiff-wife Josefina Salak Narciso who was not a party to that case that the nature of the Sheriff's sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy the money judgment against him that the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be made liable for the satisfaction of the judgment in the civil caseconsidering that the subject matter of said case was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family
ISSUE
WON the judgment debt of private respondent Luis R. Narciso is a conjugal debt for which the conjugal partnership property can be held answerable?
RATIO
YES. Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for “all the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.”
There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership.
The obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership.
The debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
FRANCISCO VS GONZALES GR 177667 09.17.08 FACTS
Coz of a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Cleodualdo and Michele have voluntarily agreed to set forth their obligations, rights and responsibilities on matters relating to their children's support, custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains in a compromise agreement.
Ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old.
Respondent ordered Michele and her partner Matrai to vacate the premises leased to them and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bill, and attorney's fees.
Real property donated to Cleodia and Ceamantha were used as payment.
CA DECISION: Michele's obligation was not proven to be a personal debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded to the benefit of the family, and hence, the property may be held answerable for it.
ISSUE
WON the conjugal property of the former spouses may be held accountable?
RATIO
NO. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone, in the present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai.
*Cleodualdo and Michele married prior to the affectivity of the FC thus their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership of gains.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she -purchases things necessary for the support of the family
- when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum -when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband -or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.
In this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai. Michele, who was then already living separately from Cleodualdo rented the house in Lanka Drive for her and Matrai's own benefit. In fact, when they entered into the lease agreement, Michele and Matrai purported themselves to be husband and wife.
Both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of legal basis.
BUADO VS CA GR 145222 02.24.09 FACTS
Civil case for damages that arose from slander
filed by spouses Buado against Erlinda Nicol
RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her
to pay for damages, which was affirmed by CA
and SC
court issued writ of execution, directing the
sheriff to collect the indemnification from
Erlinda
Finding Erlinda’s personal properties
insufficient, sheriff deigned to issue a notice of
levy on real property on execution, and
thereafter, a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued
Two days prior to the bidding, a Third Party
Claim was received at the sheriff’s office from
one Arnulfo Fulo, prompting spouses Buado to
put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. Sale
proceeded with the spouses Buado emerging as
the highest bidder
A year after the sale, Romulo Nicol, husband of
Erlinda, filed a complaint for annulment of
certificate of sale and damages with preliminary
injunction against petitioners and the deputy
sheriff, and alleged that the property was
directly levied upon without exhausting the
personal properties of Erlinda.
ISSUE
WON wife’s criminal liability is chargeable to
the conjugal partnership?
RATIO
NO. There is no dispute that contested
property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of
the Family Code explicitly provides that
payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded
to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community
where liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable
to the absolute community of property, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive
property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make
advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse.
By no stretch of imagination can it be
concluded that the civil obligation arising
from the crime of slander committed by
Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
YU BUN GUAN VS ONG 36 SCRA 559 FACTS
* Paraphernal property refers to property over which the wife has complete control. This property is not part
Yu Bun Guan and Ong are married since 1961 and
lived together until she and her children were abandoned by him in 1992, because of his incurable promiscuity, volcanic temper, and other vicious vices.
In 1968, out of her personal funds, Ong purchased a parcel of land (Rizal Property) from Aurora Seneris. Also, during their marriage, they purchased a house and lot out of their conjugal funds.
Before their separation in 1992, she reluctantly agreed to execute a Deed of Sale of the Rizal Property on the promise that Yu Bun Guan would construct a commercial building for the benefit of the children. He suggested that the property should be in his name alone so that she would not be involved in any obligation. The consideration for the sale was the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor their children and the payment of the loan he obtained from Allied Bank.
However, when the Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Yu Bun Guan, he did not pay the consideration of P200K, supposedly the "ostensible" valuable consideration.
Because of this, the new title was issued in his name was not delivered to him by Ong. Yu Bun Guan then filed for a Petition for Replacement of the TCT, with an Affidavit of Loss attached. Ong, on the other hand, executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and asked that the sale be declared null and void .
RTC ruled in favor of Ong that the lot was her paraphernal property since she purchased it with her personal funds. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
WON the lot in question was paraphernal property?
RATIO
YES. The property was the paraphernal property of respondent, because (1) the title
had been issued in her name; (2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the property was in her name; (3) petitioner was estopped from claiming otherwise, since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale that stated that she was the “absolute and registered owner”; and (4) she had paid the real property taxes. It was also sufficiently proven that she had means to do so.
The testimony of petitioner as to the source of the money he had supposedly used to purchase the property was at best vague and unclear. At first he maintained that the money came from his own personal funds. Then he said that it came from his mother; and next, from his father.
* A deed of sale, in which the stated consideration had not in fact been paid, is null and void:
DAR VS LEGASTO GR 143016 08.30.00 FACTS
Private respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners where they were sued as “Mr. and Mrs.” in the said case.
Petitioners were found guilty of failure to comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping coz while petitioners Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, their respective spouses did not sign the same.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: since what is involved in the instant case is their common rights and interest to abode under the the system of absolute community of property, either of the spouses can sign the petition.
* Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping.
ISSUE
WON The signing of one of the spouses in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping?
RATIO
YES. The petitioners were sued jointly, or as “Mr. and Mrs.” over a property in which they have a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping.
MATTHEWS VS TAYLOR GR 164584 06.22.09 FACTS
Respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought a lot Boracay property. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property
Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
RTC DECISION: considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
WON Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same?
RATIO
NO. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto.
By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses.
HEIRS OF GO VS SERVACIO GR 157537 09.07.11 FACTS
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
Marta Barola Go died (wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners).
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio).
The petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. They sued Servacio.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
RTC DECISION: affirmed the validity of the sale - declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina) - that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta - that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife
ISSUE
WON the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation?
RATIO
NO. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the
Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share.
NONETHELESS, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
Also, it should not impair vested rights.
UGALDE VS YSASI GR 130623 02.29.08 FACTS
P and R married and got separated after 6 years. They had a son.
Respondent allegedly married another.
Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with the RTC against respondent but respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement to CFI.
R also said that P already obtained a divorce from him in Mexico.
RTC DECISION: dismissed and CA affirmed. - the existence of a conjugal partnership of
gains is predicated on a valid marriage. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, the marriage was null and void, and no community of property was formed between them.
ISSUE
WON P and R’s conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved?
RATIO
YES. P and R were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Under ART 175 (4), conjugal partnership terminates in the case of Judicial Separation of Property.
The finality of the Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties’ separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.
* A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it. HELD
CA decision affirmed.