Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]

15AUG

Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and

humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and

personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private respondent filed a criminal case

before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit

and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private

respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to

the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the

trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the

petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private

conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

HELD:

NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.

RATIO:

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted

deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent

court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law

makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not

include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of

absurdity.

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

CONFLICT OF LAWS - CASE DIGEST

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

Gerbert R. Corpuz, Petitioner

Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General, Respondents

Ponente: BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD:

Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal

interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

San Luis vs. San LuisShort Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on this.FactsFELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:

1. VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 19632. MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian courts which was granted in 19733. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang residence

-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:

1. Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death)2. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)

---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of the ff: Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper venue Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue

RTC Makati: Dismissed petitionCA: reversed and set aside

Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was properly filed Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine law

1. WON Venue properly laid? YES-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.2. WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES

As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse.

-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC

Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both stating that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void.

Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals

No. 1

Case Digests: Statutory Construction

Director of Lands vs. CA276 SCRA 276G. R. No. 102858 July 28 1997

Facts: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title under P. D. No. 1529. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence his heirs represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The Land Registration Court in its decision dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction.” However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. The trial court dismissed the petition for the reason that the applicants failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Private Respondents appealed to CA, which set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General, brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:W/N newspaper publication of the notice of Initial Hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory.

Held:It is mandatory. The word “shall” denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for Initial Hearing. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.

Pascual vs. pascual-BautistaOLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.G.R. No. 84240March 25, 1992

PARAS, J.:FACTS:Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that the term “illegitimate children” as described in art 992 should be construed as “spurious children”). 

ISSUE:Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

People vs. Mario Mapulong [G.R. No. L-22301. August 30, 1967]

15AUG

Ponente: FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner was found to be in violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised

Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act

No. 4. Petitioner willfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one

home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without

first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. The

lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime of illegal possession of firearms The

only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to [the Supreme] Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor

would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and

ammunition.

HELD:

NO. The judgment appealed from was affirmed.

RATIO:

The law (Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code) is explicit that

except as thereafter specifically allowed:

“it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition

therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,

parts of firearms, or ammunition.”

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision was made for a secret agent. The first and fundamental duty

of courts is to apply the law. “Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated

that application is impossible or inadequate without them.” (Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24

Phil. 504, 513). The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

People v. Patricio46 PHIL 875

FACTS: On December 17, 1922, Jose Malgana and Domingo Bestro went to

the house of spouses Bonifactio Malgana and Antonia Patricio. Her mother,

Antonina Manangan was also there with the spouses. When night came,

Bonifacio went to sleep but the other four remained awake. At about

midnight, his wife began the deadly work by slipping a muffle around his

neck. Jose violently pulled and mashed the testicles of Bonifacio. While

Antonina and Domingo held his feet and head respectively. The body was

buried in a sitting position.

ISSUE: Whether or not all who participated in killing Bonifacio be

sentenced to death.

RULING: The crime committed by Antonia Patricio is parricide, with

aggravating circumstance of premeditation, treachery, nocturnity and the

abuse of superior strength and to undergo reclusion perpetua. Jose Malgana

and Antonina Manangan to be merely accomplices in the crime of simple

homicide and are declared guilty of murder. Jose Malgana, Antonia’s

paramour, will be sentenced to cadena perpetua and Antonina Manangan to

undergo the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Domingo Bestro, who was used

as a witness for the prosecution, and against whom the information was

dimissed upon the motion of the fiscal in order that he might be thus used,

naturally minimizes the extent of his own participation in the crime. But the

court is not concerned with his case.

GLOBE- MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION VS. NLRCG.R. NO. 82511. MARCH 3, 1992.ROMERO, J.

FACTS1.Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities.2.The report prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended bySaldivar.3.The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The air conditioner was recovered only after

petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.4.Moreover, it appeared in the investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company’s interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnershipbetween Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of theloss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.5.Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, GMCR placed private respondentSalazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984,thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to explain her side. But instead ofsubmitting an explanation, three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984, Salazar fileda complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequentlyamended to include illegal dismissal, after petitioner notified her in writing thateffective November 8,1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inabilityto refute and disprove these findings."6.After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter ordered GMCR to reinstate private respondent toher former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefitsshe would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was alsoordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00.7.On appeal, the NLRC in its resolution affirmed the said decision with respect to thereinstatement of Salazar but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years anddeleted the award for moral damages.

ISSUES1.Whether or not the suspension of Salazar was illegal.2.Whether or not Salazar was entitled to reinstatement and two (2) years' backwageswith respect to her subsequent dismissal.

HELD1.YES. The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar'sacts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitatedimmediate and decisive action on any employee closely associated with Saldivar.The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by the discovery of the missingairconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar.Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourseavailable to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventivesuspension does not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty ofthe charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure isresorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation of anyalleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. Thus, it is notcorrect to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due processwhen she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault lay with private respondentwhen she ignored petitioner's memorandum "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Departmentand filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance toevaluate her side of the controversy.2.YES. Under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended: “Security of Tenure.-In casesof regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employeeexcept for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustlydismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rightsand other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to hisother benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensationwas withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement."In the case at bar, there was no evidence which clearly showed an authorized, muchless a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, notonly to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages. The intendmentof the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment ofbackwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status beforeshe lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate is "to restore to astate, condition, position, etc. from which one had been removed" and in the latter, togive

her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies,looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."The Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissedfrom work shall be entitled to reinstatement ... and to his full backwages . . ." Neitherdoes the provision admit of any qualification. An exception to the rule is when thereinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between theemployer and the employee. In such cases, it should be proved that the employeeconcerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of hisemployer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy andantagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivityof the employee concerned.The principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise,reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariablyengendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of assertingone's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easilyseparated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext thathis relationship with his employer had already become strained.Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systemsanalyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence suchthat if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer andemployee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rulemandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed. As asystem analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving theprocurement of supplies.In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss ofconfidence. As has been held before, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is avalid ground for termination, it must rest on some basis which must be convincinglyestablished. An employee may not be dismissed on mere presumptions andsuppositions. While the Court should not condone the acts of disloyalty of anemployee, neither should it dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived fromspeculative inferences. To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar'sdismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centeredprincipally Saldivar’s alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technicaloperations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar'sspecial relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge ofSaldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent iswanting from the records. Thus, she was illegally dismissed.

CASE DIGEST:Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of JusticeCase No.G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)

FACTS: RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA, Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-in-law was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309.

HELD:No, he is not. For one to be “unjustly accused” one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309

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CASE DIGEST: Cynthia S. Bolos vs Danilo T. BolosPublished by Paul Nikko Degollado on January 3, 2014 | Leave a response

Mendoza, J.

Facts : Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage

invoking Article 36 of the Family Code on July 10, 2003. The RTC granted

her petition on August 2, 2006. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for

reconsideration after respondent received the decision of the lower court.

The decision as declared final after a motion to reconsider denial of appeal

was denied.

Respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and

hereby granted. The appellate court ruled that AM no 02-11-10-SC did not

apply to the case at bar as their marriage was solemnized Feb 14 1980

before the family code took effect. The said court procedure required a

motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal cases on declaration

of absolute nullity on void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages.

Petitioner filed her manifestation and a motion for partial reconsideration

but was denied by the appellate court as the 15-day reglementary period to

file is not extendable.

Petitioner filed this said petition to the Supreme Court contending that the

appellate court erred in ruling that their case is not covered by the Family

Code; that AM no 02-11-10-SC covers/pertains to the word “petitions”

instead of “marriages”; if the Family code covers the case then a motion of

reconsideration is a precondition for an appeal; and, since the respondent

refused to comply with the precondition of filing a motion for

reconsideration, a relaxation on the rules of appeal is not proper.

Issue: Whether or not AM no 02-11-10 SC “Rules on Declaration of Absolute

Nullity of void marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” is

applicable to the case.

Held: No. the court ruled that AM 02-11-10-SC is strict in its scope wherein

section 1 of the rule reads:

“Section 1. Scope – This rule shall govern petitions for declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and annulment of voidable marriages

under the Family Code of the Philippines.” Applying the rule verba legis, the

said section leaves no room for interpretation and is very clear that it would

only cover marriages under the Family Code. Also it would only be applied

to “marriages” not to “petitions.”

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. (PLDT) vs. CITY OF DAVAO and ADELAIDA B. BARCELONA, in her capacity as City Treasurer of DavaoGR. No. 143867, March 25, 2003

Facts: PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three percent (3%) of its gross receipts. The franchise tax was paid “in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof” pursuant to RA 7082. The exemption from “all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof” was subsequently withdrawn by RA 7160 (LGC), which at the same time gave local government units the power to tax businesses enjoying a franchise on the basis of income received or earned by them within their territorial jurisdiction. The LGC took effect on January 1, 1992.The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 519, Series of 1992, which in pertinent part provides: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by law or other special laws, there is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, a rate of seventy-five percent (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the income receipts realized within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City.Subsequently, Congress granted in favor of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (Globe) and Smart Information Technologies, Inc. (Smart) franchises which contained “in

leiu of all taxes” provisos.In 1995, it enacted RA 7925, or the Public Telecommunication Policy of the Philippines, Sec. 23 of which provides that any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises. The law took effect on March 16, 1995.In January 1999, when PLDT applied for a mayor’s permit to operate its Davao Metro exchange, it was required to pay the local franchise tax which then had amounted to P3,681,985.72. PLDT challenged the power of the city government to collect the local franchise tax and demanded a refund of what had been paid as a local franchise tax for the year 1997 and for the first to the third quarters of 1998.

Issue: Whether or not by virtue of RA 7925, Sec. 23, PLDT is again entitled to the exemption from payment of the local franchise tax in view of the grant of tax exemption to Globe and Smart.

Held: Petitioner contends that because their existing franchises contain “in lieu of all taxes” clauses, the same grant of tax exemption must be deemed to have become ipso facto part of its previously granted telecommunications franchise. But the rule is that tax exemptions should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law “expressed in a language too plain to be mistaken” and assuming for the nonce that the charters of Globe and of Smart grant tax exemptions, then this runabout way of granting tax exemption to PLDT is not a direct, “clear and unequivocal” way of communicating the legislative intent.Nor does the term “exemption” in Sec. 23 of RA 7925 mean tax exemption. The term refers to exemption from regulations and requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). For instance, RA 7925, Sec. 17 provides: The Commission shall exempt any specific telecommunications service from its rate or tariff regulations if the service has sufficient competition to ensure fair and reasonable rates of tariffs. Another exemption granted by the law in line with its policy of deregulation is the exemption from the requirement of securing permits from the NTC every time a telecommunications company imports equipment.Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis of language too plain to be mistaken.

JMM v NLRC (1993)JMM Promotions & Management, Inc., petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations

Commission and Ulpiano L. De Los Santos, respondents.

Ponente: Cruz, J.

Facts:

1.       Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a recruiting

agency, made the following:

a.       Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)

b.      Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)

c.       Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. 17)

2.       The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

(POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because of failure of the

petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules.  The

decision being appealed involved a monetary award.

3.       The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and surety bond,

and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is unnecessary.  According

to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the

conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of

employment.  On the other hand, according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid and legal

claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.

4.       Sec. 6 reads:

“In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer

shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond…”

The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has posted

bonds of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before?

Held:

Yes.  It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of

350,000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for such is that

overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will be used to insure

more care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the worker will

be sent.

Doctrine: Construction:

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),

care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an

integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.  Ut res magis valeat quam

pereat.  “That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.”

The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,

apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated

and harmonious whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can be applied when the Court

found that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.

In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and the escrow required in

Sec. 17 Rule 2, Book 2 have different purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule

5 Book 7.

The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is not limited to

monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated.

The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the employer.

On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary

award.  Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary

award.  Also, it is possible that the monetary award may exceed the bonds posted previously and

the money placed in escrow.  If such a case happens, where will the excess be sourced?  To solve

such a dilemma, an appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is required by Sec.

6.

Radiola Toshiba Philippines Inc. vs. The Intermediate Apellate CourtG.R. No. 75222, July 18, 1991

Facts:

            The petitioner obtained a levy on the attachment against the properties of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan un Civil case o. 35946 for collection of sum of money before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila. A few months later three creditors filed another petition against Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan for involuntary insolvency, docketed as special proceedings No. 1548 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles city.

            A favorable judgment was obtained of by the petitioner in Civil case No. 35946. The court ordered for the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said property but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final ceritificate of sale because of the pending insolvency proceedings.

            Court of First Instance of Angeles City and Intermediate Appellate Court rules against petitioner

Issue:

            Whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of petitioner in dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondents commenced for months after the said attachment.

Held:

            Section 32 (of the Insolvency Law). As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of court shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal property, estate and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books and papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate and effects in the assignee, although the same is then attached in mesne process, as the property of debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolved any attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings

and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior to commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

            Section 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and in keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.  

There is no conflicts between the two provisions.

Statutory Construction; where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. – but even granting that such conflicts exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of the statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word, hence when a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.    

Read the Statute as a WholeAlpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (AISA) vs. NLRCFacts:AISA is a private corporation engaged in providing security services and the Don MarianoMarcos State University is their client. The private respondents were as security guards by ASIAfor DMMSU. Five months after, private respondents filed a complaint against AISA and thenincluded DMMSU for non compliance with the current minimum wage order. The agreementwas that they will be paid 1,200php every month but was only paid 900php as their monthlysalary. AISA made representations for an increase in the contract rates to make up for themandated minimum wage rates. DMMSU replied that it cannot grant said request due tobudgetary constraints. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding AISA and DMMSU solidaryliable and ordering them to pay each of the complainant Php41,459.51 representing salarydifferential from Feb 16, 1990-Sept 30, 1991. NLRC affirmed this decision. Only AISA filed amotion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC. The judgment against DMMSU is finaland executor since no motion for certiorari was filed while AISA filed a motion to the SC.AISA’s arguments:- They argue that the payment of wage increases under the current minimum wage ordershould be borne exclusively by DMMSU citing Section 6 of RA 6727 which states that “Incase of contracts for construction projects and security...the prescribed increases in thewage rates of the workers shall be borne by the principals or clients...” (see p.656and p.657 for full text)- Articles 106, 107 and 109 generally refer to the failure of the contract or sub-contractorto pay wages in accordance with the labor code with a mandate that failure to pay suchwages would make the employer and contractor jointly and severally liable.- AISA insists that the matter involved in this case hinges on WAGE DIFFERENTIALS orWAGE INCREASES NOT WAGES IN GENERAL as provided by the Labor Code.NLRC:- Cited Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.- 106: ...In the event the contractor or sub contractor fails to pay the pages of hisemployees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severallyliable with his contractor or sub-contractor...(see p. 657 and p.658)- 107: the provisions shall apply to any person, partnership, corporation, which not beingan employer,

contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work,task , job or project.- 108: every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor orsub-contractor for any violation of any provision of this Code.SC Held:Wage orders cannot be waived since it is mandatory and statutory. AISA cannot escape liabilitysince the law provides for a joint and solidary liability of the principal (DMMSU) and thecontractor (AISA).Section 6 of RA 6727 merely provides that in the case of wage increase resulting in a salarydifferential, the liability of the principal and contractor shall be joint and several. Same goes withthe liability attached in Articles 106, 107 and 109 which refer to the standard minimum wage.

The NLRC decision is AFFIRMED. No grave abuse of discretion on their part.The Petition is DISMISSED.Statutory Construction:Cardinal Rule: In interpreting the meaning and scope of term used in the law, a careful review of the whole lawinvolved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must beascertained from a consideration of the statute as whole, and not of an isolated part or aparticular provision alone. AISA only referred to Sec 6 of RA6727 and some parts of Articles 106, 107 and 109failing to see the bigger picture re: Wage Differentials, Wage increases and WAGES INGENERAL. Considering bits and pieces instead of the statute as a whole

De Guia v Comelec

GR no. 104712, May 6, 1992

Facts:

A petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and enforcement of Comelec’s

Resolution No. 2313, adopting the rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the

number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the provinces with only 1

legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the

preparation of the project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and

Election Registrars. Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment

submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution Und. 92-010, holding that

paragraphs in Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections.

A petitioner is an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of

Paranaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local elections. He prays,

for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paranaque and

all other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi to raise the question.

Ratio Decidendi:

The petitioner has no locus standi since the petitioner lacked personal or substantial interest

and did not allege any legal right that has been violated by the respondent. In his petition, he did

not state that he is running for re-election, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by

district, in Paranaque. As such, the Court ruled that petitioner does not appear to have a locus

standi, a personal or substantial interest.

However, the Court resolved that they would brush aside the question of procedural

technicalities due to the importance of the issue. The issue being brought upon the Court is

important since it concerns the general public, specifically the political exercise of qualified

voters affected by the apportionment. Despite the lack of legal standing of the petitioner, the

Court decided to tackle the issues presented because issues presented concerns matters of

public interest.

Finding no abuse of discretion much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit,

the instant petition is dismissed was dismissed by the Supreme Court. No cost.

Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992]Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the

government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail

of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is

qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation

Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits

equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost

fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil

Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project

which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC

Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to

the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.

HELD:

YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:

Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant,

like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are

extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act

No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,

casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of

the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the

applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is

implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”.

[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s

application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive,

as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled

to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all

she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law but for

almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

Peope v. Manantan

Full Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1962/jul1962/gr_l-14129_1962.php

Facts:Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.".Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.

Issue:Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?

Held: Yes, it is included in Section 54.  Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the

Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace".

JM Tuason and Co. Inc. et. al. vs. Mariano et. al. [G.R. No. L-33140. October 23, 1978]

15AUG

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court

of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a

parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 8943. They alleged that

sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered

that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.

They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to J. M.

Tuason & Co., Inc., et.al. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of

jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion.

The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in

the answer of Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on

those defenses. The Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and

prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from

proceeding in the said case, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by

respondents Aquial and Cordova.

HELD:

NO. The trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case 8943 with prejudice and without costs.

RATIO:

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and

do not disturb what has been settled), respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in

Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and

no longer open to attack.It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated

again and again, consuming the court’s time and energies at the expense of other litigants.

Nancy ty vs banco Filipino

(Author’s Note: A convoluted case in remedial law on the aspect of res judicata.  It

may be wise for the reader to read all the G.R. Nos indicated in the case digest for a

better understanding of the substantive aspect of the case.  This digest was done to

explain the court ruling on the use of stare decisis.)

In 1979, the Board of Directors of Banco Filipino “warehoused” some of its existing

properties to allow more flexibility in the opening of branches, to enable it to acquire

more branches, and to circumvent the General Banking Act which limits a bank’s real

estate holdings to not more  than 50% of its capital assets.

To go about the warehousing scheme, Nancy, a major stockholder and director of the

bank, persuaded two other stockholders, brothers Tomas and Pedro to organise and

incorporate Tala Realty to hold and purchase real properties in trust for respondent.

Thus it came to be that Remedios, another sibling of Tomas, Pedro and Nancy

controlled Tala Realty through their respective nominees.

To execute their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some of the

properties; Tala Realty simultaneously leased to the bank the properties for 20 years,

renewable for another 20 years and with a right of repurchase should Tala Realty

decides to sell them. However, in 1992, Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the

titles for itself, and demanded that the bank pay rentals, deposits and goodwill, with a

threat to eject the bank.

From 1995 to 1998, Banco Filipino filed 17 complaints against Tala Realty, Nancy and

the other nominees and stockholders of Tala Realty, including this case which was

filed before the Malabon City RTC. Nancy and her co-defendants moved to dismiss

this case, citing forum shopping and lis pendencia citing the 16 other cases filed in

other courts involving the same issues, same parties and same causes of action.

The Regional Trial Court of Malabon denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the

motions for reconsideration and suspension of proceedings. After they filed their

answers, Nancy and her co-defendants moved to suspend proceedings, citing the

pendency of G.R. No. 127611, which was a petition for certiori questioning the denial

of their motion to dismiss in the RTC of Batangas City, and praying for a writ of

prohibition to stop the RTC judges hearing the other cases and the CA. The Malabon

RTC granted the suspension of the proceedings which the bank appealed to the CA.

The certiorari was eventually granted by the CA after the Supreme Court dismissed

Gr. No. 127611 for late filing.

The bank then moved for pre-trial, which Tala Realty again opposed due to pendency

of G.R. No. 132703 which assailed the CA’s affirmance of the denial of the motion to

dismiss, this time in Iloilo City (Civil Case No. 22493). Nancy also filed her own

opposition, citing two cases, G.R. No. 132703, and G.R. No. 130184, this time the CA’s

reversal of the dismissal of the Quezon City case.

The RTC suspended the proceedings. After six years, the RTC issued an order

directing the counsels to inform it of the status of the pending cases.

Nancy filed her manifestation, informing the RTC of the Supreme Court’s rulings in

the consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130184 and 139166, and in G.R. No. 132703, and

reported on the other cases involving the same parties decided by this Court, such

as G.R. Nos. 129887, 137980, 132051, 137533, 143263, and 142672, as well as the

other related cases decided by the Supreme Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 144700, 147997,

167255, and 144705.

The bank also filed its own manifestation with motion to revive proceedings, citing

the rulings in consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130184 and 139166, and the

decisions in G.R. Nos. 144700, 167255, and 144705, commonly holding that there

existed no forum shopping, litis pendentia and res judicata among the respondent’s

reconveyance cases pending in the other courts of justice.

In her comment/opposition to the motion to revive, Nancy held that the case should

not be revived, as it involves the same issue of implied trust which the Court in G. R

No. 137533 ruled that was void for being in contravention of the limitation imposed

by the General Banking Act on the bank (the 50% rule)

The RTC ordered the revival of the proceedings, citing that there is no res judicata in

this case because there are other independent causes for each of the parties to

sought be recovered.

The Court of Appeals denied her petition for certiorari, holding that res judicata does

not apply in this case since the Supreme Court ruled in G.R. No. 144705 that G.R. No.

137533 does not put to rest all pending litigations involving the issues of ownership

between the parties since it involved only an issue of de facto possession. In this

case, the trust agreement was only raised in an ejectment case, not an issue

involving ownership.

Nancy elevated her case to the Supreme Court. According to her, G.R. No. 137533 is

controlling in this case and therefore, this case should not be revived in accordance

with the doctrine of res judicata.

“G.R. No. 137533, as reiterated in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and

166608, is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine

of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means “to adhere to precedents, and

not to unsettle things which are established.” Under the doctrine, when this Court

has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will

adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially

the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. The doctrine

of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the

judgment, which results therefrom. In this particular sense, stare decisis differs from

res judicata, which is based upon the judgment.

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing

certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial

practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain

state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which

the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the

decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the

sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that

follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be

different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful

countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the

same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties

similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court,

the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same [issue]. (italics

supplied)”

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 188302, June 27, 2012, NANCY L. TY, PETITIONER, VS.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

Tala Realty Services Corporation, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals and Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank G. R. No. 130088, 7 April 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) 

No right is created where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision. 

FACTS: Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) filed before 17 Regional Trial Courts (RTC) 17 complaints for reconveyance of different properties against Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala Realty) et al. Banco Filipino‘s complaints commonly alleged that in 1979, expansion of its operations required the purchase of real properties for the purpose of acquiring sites for more branches; that as Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act limit a bank‘s allowable investments in real estate to 50% of its capital assets, its board of directors decided to warehouse some of its existing properties and branch sites. Thus, Nancy L. Ty, a major stockholder and director, persuaded Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas Aguirre, both major stockholders of Banco Filipino, to organize and incorporate Tala Realty to hold and purchase real properties in trust for Banco Filipino; that after the transfer of Banco Filipino properties to Tala Realty, the Aguirres‘ sister Remedios prodded her brother Tomas to, as he did, endorse to her his shares in Tala Realty and registered them in the name of her controlled corporation, Add International. 

Thus, Nancy, Remedios, and Pedro Aguirre controlled Tala Realty, with Nancy exercising control through her nominees Pilar, Cynthia, and Dolly, while Remedios exercised control through Add International and her nominee Elizabeth. Pedro Aguirre exercised control through his own nominees, the latest being Tala Realty‘s president, Rubencito del Mundo. 

In the course of the implementation of their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some of its properties. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to Banco Filipino the properties for 20 years, renewable for another 20 years at the option of Banco Filipino with a right of first refusal in the event Tala Realty decided to sell them. 

Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded payment of rentals, deposits, and goodwill, with a threat to eject Banco Filipino. 

Thus arose Banco Filipino‘s 17 complaints for reconveyance against Tala Realty. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the trust agreement is void 

HELD: In Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, the Court, by Decision dated November 22, 2002, ruling on one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against Banco Filipino arising from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance cases subject of the present petitions, held that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced. 

An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as the Court has held that "where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud." 

The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act which it had already reached. 

Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same transfer price." This agreement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus, while the Court finds the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and binding upon the parties, the Court cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the parties intended to create it. In the words of the Court in the Ramos case, "the courts will not assist the payor in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the ‗clean hands‘ doctrine." The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust relationship with Tala.