STATUTORY CASES

Case Title: G.R. No. L-19650 (September 29, 1966)Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar in his capacity as The

Postmaster General

1) Facts

The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, parying “that judgment be rendered declaring its ‘Caltex Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public”.

In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest� which calls for participants to “estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.� The contest is open to all “motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivres�. There is neither a fee or consideration required nor a purchase required to be made. The forms are available upon request at each Caltex station and there is also a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.

Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about the contest, thus, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest. However, the postal authorities denied their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law), which prohibits the use of mail in conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.

Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was no consideration involved in the part of the contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their view and even threatened Caltex that if the contest was conducted, “a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representativesâ€?. This leads to Caltex’s filing of this petition for declaratory relief.

The court ruled that the “petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution or said rules by the mails�. The respondent then appealed.

2) Issue(s)

a) Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?

b) Whether or not the proposed “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest� violates the Postal Law?

3) Ruling

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

4) Ratio

Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several constitutional provisions. Based on Section 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.

Requisites for Declaratory Relief:- There is justiciable controversy- The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse- The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy- The issue is ripe for judicial determination

* The “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest� is a mere “gratuitous distribution of property by chance�. It does not qualify as a lottery due to the lack of consideration. An act to be deemed as a lottery must constitute a (1) prize, (2) chance, and (3) consideration. The participants are not required to do anything or purchase anything from Caltex in order to participate in the contest. The true test for having consideration is “whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize.�

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. EismaGR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)

En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances.  On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal

termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.

On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the union, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.

The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the

purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

Paat v. CA GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring

Facts: On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzman’s truck was seized by Department of Environment and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENRO’s Jovito Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck.  Its owner, De Guzman, failed to submit the required explanation within the reglementary period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENRO’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277. De Guzman filed for reconsideration but was denied.

The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, a suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed by De Guzman and company against Layugan and Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2), contending that the only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in the transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 68. De Guzman further contended that the seizure is illegal, as she did not use the truck in the commission of the crime (of qualified theft under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as allegedly admitted by the Regional Executive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to De Guzman.  The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court sustained the trial court’s order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal one. Hence, the petition.

Issues:

Whether construction admits that the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances belongs to the courts

Whether the truck was used in the commission of an offense under Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277

Held: The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts exclusively (pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are not mentioned nor included in the former provision. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose

projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. In the case at bar, the phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”

Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of the amendatory executive order, when it eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code “ and inserted the words “ shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,” meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

People v. MapaGR L-22301, 30 August 1967  (20 SCRA 1164)

En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur

Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm

Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms

are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.

Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San NicolasGR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)

Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring

Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant,” found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is

the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

Paras v. Comelec  (Resolution)GR 123169, 4 November 1996  (264 SCRA 49)

En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring

Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioner’s opposition. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without Comelec approval.

In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no recall can take place within one year preceding a regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the first Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, the Court in which case considered the SK election as a regular local election.

Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local election in a recall proceeding

Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a

statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in “the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth”. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this would render inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic, as the next regular elections involving the barangay office concerned were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.

Floresca v. Philex MiningGR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)

En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on leave, 2 took no part, others dissenting

Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations’ mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workman’s Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection.  The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected injuries are compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer is negligent. The heirs, however, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.

Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda, pursuant to the resolution of 26 November 1976, involving the issue whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured employee or his heirs’

action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, (2: Selective) whether an injured employee or his heirs have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees, or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici curiae are diverse.

The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is selective, i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of remedies, but that they cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further held that the petitioners who had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of judicial legislation.

Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.” Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain

instances, the court “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.

Republic v. CA and MolinaGR 108763, 13 February 1997

En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result

Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals  denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to

confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Aisporna v. CAGR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)

First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.

For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time,

her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974.  On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act

Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole.  In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.” Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

China Bank v. Ortega (J)GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)

Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest Development Corporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. The trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decision on 20 January 1970.

To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the bank’s cashier, disallowed the same invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits.  On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was

ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was directed to comply with the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered.  Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank and Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon written permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation), and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to the case, the position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforementioned provisions of law.

Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.

Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972,  with costs against the petitioners.

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. BautistaGR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)

First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring

Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans

Board, (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents.  On July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering from Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to Gasilao’s failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to complete his supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65.

Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an increase in the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. Gasilao’s monthly pension was, however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15 January 1972, more funds were released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date.

In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension, which he claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved. The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that since the section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should commence from the date of approval of the application.

Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.

Held: As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular language. In the present case, Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must

be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights, privileges, and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions in government, educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, a life pension for the incapacited, pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits. Upholding the Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be dependent upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years. Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law. Gasilao’s claim was sustained.

The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilao’s pension effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22 June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act  5753 subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.

Salvatierra v. CAGR 107797,  26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)

First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He was survived by his legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and sister Marcela, all surnamed Salvatierra. His estate consisted of three parcels of land (Cadastral Lot 25, covered by Tax Declaration 11950, Cadastral Lot 26, covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and Cadastral Lot 27, covered by Tax Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, Macario Salvatierra sold Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo Salvatierra by means of a deed of sale, and in consideration of P1,000.00. Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to Venancio. Bartolome’s share was sold by his heirs to Tomas. On 24 September 1968, an “Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale” was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs and descendants of Enrique Salvatierra. After the partition, Venancio owned 1041 square meters consisting of Lot 27 and portion of Lot 26 (which is approximately 749 square meters), Anselmo owned 405 square meters of Lot 26, while the heirs of Tomas owned 1,116 square meters, the whole of Lot 25. Thereafter on 15 June 1970, Venancio sold the whole of Lot 27 and a 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 to spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 through a relocation survey that the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 was outside Longalong’s fence as Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a title in his name (Original Certificate of Title 0-4221) covering the whole of Lot 26).

Efforts to settle the matter at the barangay level proved futile because Purita Salvatierra (widow of Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to the latter the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26.

Longalong filed a case with the Regional Trial Court for the reconveyance of the said portion of Lot 26. The court a quo dismissed the case on the grounds that Longalong failed to establish ownership of the portion of the land in question, and that the prescriptive period of four years from discovery of the alleged fraud committed by defendants’ predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs should have filed their action had already elapsed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, ruling that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized to sell; and as to the co-owner of a piece of land, he can of course sell his pro indiviso share therein to, but he cannot sell more than his share therein. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether Longalong is entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square meters in Lot 26

Held: When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article 1370 of the Civil Code (“If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.”) Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their forms maybe, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present.  In the present case, there is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition (Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale). Since Macario’s share (later Anselmo’s) is only 405 of the 749 square meters comprising Lot 26, Venancio was entitled to the remaining 344 square meters of Lot 26, 149 square meters of which was sold to Longalong. Supplemented by the holding that the prescriptive period on reconveyance is ten years and not four years, as held in Caro v. CA, Longalong is entitled to reconveyance as his complaint was filed five years after the constitution of Anselmo’s fraudulent Original Certificate of title.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for want of merit, with costs against petitioners.

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad CompanyGR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)

Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.

The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its petition for mandamus. The court determined Republic Act 2023 was

enacted only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees’ debt from the latter’s salary and turn this over to the employees’ credit union; but which does not convert the credit union’s credit into a first priority credit.

Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions.

Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. In the present case, the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. There is nothing in the provision of Republic Act 2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees’ wages and salaries.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

 

Abellana v. Marava [GR L-27760, 29 May 1974]Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concur, 1 concur based on paragraph 2 &

3 of opinio

Facts: Francisco Abellana was charged with the City Court of Ozamis City with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, namely, Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeño. Abellana was found guilty as charged, damages in favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded.

Abellana appealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, Lamason et.al. filed with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental a separate and independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving of Abellana.   In such complaint, Crispin Abellana, the alleged employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was already on appeal.  The judge in the latter CFI ordered on 28 April 1967 that the City Court judgment is vacated and a trail de novo be conducted. He noted that the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or reserved their right to institute it separately in the City Court; but which they filed in the CFI. In view of the waiver and

reservation, the Court would be precluded from judging civil damages against the accused and in favor of the offended parties. the motion to dismiss is denied. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the petition.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.

1.    Appeal of judgment in municipal trial court, new trial as if originally instituted in the CFIThe rule in the jurisdiction of the Court is that upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the CFI as if it had been originally instituted in that court (Section 7 of Rule 123, People v. Jamisola). So it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40.  An interpretation that an independent civil action is barred absent a reservation under Section 1 of Rule 111 is a non-sequitur, as the inference does not per se arise from the wordings of the rule and ignores what is explicitly provided in Section 7, Rule 123.

2.    A statute must not be construed in a manner giving rise to a constitutional doubtA court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. The grant of power to the Court, both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right.   Thus, substantive right cannot to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear when it provides that in cases of . physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

3.    Assurance of parties justice according to law must not be ignored in the pursuit of serving the interest of a client; Construction should be based on legal norm, not literalnessA counsel must not ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice according to law, in serving the interest of his client. He is not to fall prey to the vice of literalness. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.

PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor RelationsGR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring

Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes cast by employees who did not want any union. On its face therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director.

Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills

Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does not lie. The conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as 1 May  1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1 November 1974,. It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen,” a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: “The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.” There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty,” a 1918 decision: “Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.” Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions.  As was emphasized by Chief Justice Castro, “the construction placed by the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight.”

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner PAFLU.

Philippine Apparel Workers’ Union v. NLRCGR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444)First Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concurring

Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the Union submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties be assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for a three-stage wage increase for all rank and file employees, retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company.  The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the Rules Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD 1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.

On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the  complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this order, both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission (Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union filed for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the exceptions.

Held: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was already in force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April 1977. There is

nothing in the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May 1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected contract nor an actual payment of said increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong premise or representation on the part of the company. The company had declared that the parties have agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with inflation brought about by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that negotiations were still being held on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items (which were only agreed upon on 3 September 1977).

The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used in its rules implementing PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when it is based on misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law.

The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the company.

IBAA Employees Union v. InciongGR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)

Second Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner’s complaint for payment of holiday pay.  Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.

On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of

the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads as “Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of  the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing the bank’s appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution.  On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.

Held: From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: “employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void.  So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect

the provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. OpleGR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)

En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of 10 unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from 1 November 1974.

Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid employees the holiday pay and the premium or overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays.

On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner’s claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9, claiming the rule that “If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays.”

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly paid employees are not entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays are entitled to the premium or overtime pay differentials.

Held: When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. An administrative interpretation, which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of

holiday pay are clear and explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay.

While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy Instruction was declared null and void in IBAAEU v. Inciong, and thus applies in the case at bar. Since the private respondent premises its action on the invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear that the employees belonging to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment of 10 legal holidays under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their monthly salary. They are not among those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday pay

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Minister’s 7 September 1976 order, and reinstated with modification (deleting the interest payments) the  24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC affirming the 30 October 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter.

Victorias Milling v. Social Security CommissionGR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627)

En Banc, Barrera (p): 9 concurring

Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued its Circular 22 providing that “effective 1 November 1958, all employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee’s remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.” Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias Milling Company, Inc., wrote the SSC in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular 7 (7 October 1957) , and further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the SSC to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the SSC ruled that Circular 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of

general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to the Supreme Court on appeal.

Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or regulation.

Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it “makes” a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what “compensation” should mean “For the purposes of this Act”. RA1792 amended such definition by deleting some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with costs against appellant.

Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur

Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs.

1.    Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural questions set aside due to demands of public interestBecause of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test Mison’s right to the office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.

2.    Constitutional ConstructionThe fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez) The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.

3.    President’s power to appointSection 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;  (2)  all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;  (3)  those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank  4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and

third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission.

4.    Express enumeration excludes others not enumeratedIt is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

5.    Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and adopted in light of prior lawsA constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution,  the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of “horse-trading” and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a “middle ground” by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion.

6.    Construction of “also” in second sentence; consideration of different language of proximate sentences to determine meaningThe word “also” could mean “in addition; as well; besides, too” besides “in like manner” which meanings could stress that the word “also” in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent  or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word “also” as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive

significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition.

7.    Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character; Limitations construed strictlyThe power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

8.    The use of word “alone” after “President” in third sentence is a lapse in draftsmanship, a literal import deemed redundantAfter a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word “alone” after the word “President” in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship.  In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word “alone” after the word “President” in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word “alone” in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

9.    President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs; Commissioner not included with the first group of appointmentThe position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and

Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972).

10.    Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution must be read in harmony with the new oneRA 1937 and PD  34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Perfecto v. MeerGR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)

First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.

Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”. It also provides that “until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos”. When Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not “provided otherwise”, by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.

The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of the judiciary.  The latter paid the amount under protest.  He contended that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.

Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary amounts to a diminution thereof.  If said imposition would not be considered as a diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.  Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Thus, next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision

for their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege.  It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Endencia v. DavidGR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)

En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur

Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively.  The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.  Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.

Issue:  Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.

Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.

Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue  (Resolution)GR L-78780, 23 July 1987

En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other

members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987.

Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.  With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively.

Issue: Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exempt justices and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.

Held: The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.  The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the present case, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission. Thus, the debates, interpolations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.

Aglipay v. RuizGR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)

First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.

Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for

printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSISGR 122156, 3 February 1997

En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent

Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to

51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing. Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent

legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Tanada v. TuveraGR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)

En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek

a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they are proper parties for the petition. The respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-General, that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectiveness of laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus publication is not indispensable.

Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws

Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication — but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the present case, Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and that unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)

En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring

Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause “unless otherwise provided”.

Held: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

Primicias v. UrdanetaGR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)

First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.

Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136  (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) became effective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.

On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta’s Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance 3 (S. 1964), for overtaking a truck.” The policeman then asked for plaintiff’s license which he surrendered, and a temporary operator’s permit was issued to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance 3 (S. 1964).

Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal case.  On 29 June 1966, the Court of First Instance Lingayen held in its decision that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by RA 4136. The writ of preliminary injunction against Judge Soriano definite and permanent. It also restrained Perez, Suyat, and Andrada from enforcing said ordinace throughout Urdaneta, ordering them to return the plaintiff’s driver’s license, and to pay the cost of the suit. The public officials appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.

Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The ordinance’s validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the “mother statute” (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase “vehicular traffic” (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, RA 4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act. The ordinance, therefore in view of the foregoing, is void.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.

La Carlota Sugar Central v. JimenezGR L-12436, 31 May 1961 (2 SCRA 295)

En Banc, Dizon (p): 10 concurring, 1 took no part.

Facts: Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, which was under the administration of Elizalde, imported 500 short tons of ammonium sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium phosphate. When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank imposed 17% exchange tax from the Central in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 601. On 18 November 1955 the Central filed, through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a petition for the refund of the P20,872.09 paid (the 17% tax), claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned heretofore upon request and for the exclusive use of 5 haciendas owned and managed by Elizalde, and therefore the importation was exempt from the 17% exchange tax in accordance with Section  2, RA 601, as amended by RA 1375.

On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the petition. The Central requested the Auditor to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-examination of all pertinent papers the reconsideration was denied. The Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines. On 18 January 1957, the Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the ground that the importation of the fertilizers does not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of RA 601, as amended by RA 1375; and thus affirming the decision of the Auditor, Central Bank of the Philippines. The Central and Elizalde filed the petition for review in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether upon the importation of the fertilizers are covered by the exemption (provided by Section 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375).

Held: The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from the payment of the 17% tax only if the same were imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The exemption covers exclusively fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The word “directly” has been interpreted to mean “without anything intervening”. Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than his cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption.

When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law is applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes are strictly construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer. Exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through any agent other than their cooperatives, this would be rendering useless the only exception expressly established in

the case of fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through their cooperatives.

CIR v. CAGR 115349, 18 April 1997 (271 SCRA 605)

Third Division, Panganiban (p): 4 concurring

Facts: Private respondent, the Ateneo de Manila University, is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines. One auxiliary unit is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which has no legal personality separate and distinct from that of private respondent. The IPC is a Philippine unit engaged in social science studies of Philippine society and culture. Occasionally, it accepts sponsorships for its research activities from international organizations, private foundations and government agencies. On 8 July 1983, private respondent received from Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a demand letter dated 3 June 1983, assessing private respondent the sum of P174,043.97 for alleged deficiency contractor’s tax, and an assessment dated 27 June 1983 in the sum of P1,141,837 for alleged deficiency income tax, both for the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978. Denying said tax liabilities, private respondent sent petitioner a letter-protest and subsequently filed with the latter a memorandum contesting the validity of the assessments.  On 17 March 988, petitioner rendered a letter-decision canceling the assessment for deficiency income tax but modifying the assessment for deficiency contractor’s tax by increasing the amount due to P193,475.55. Unsatisfied, private respondent requested for a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the modified assessment.

At the same time, it filed in the respondent court a petition for review of the said letter-decision of the petitioner. While the petition was pending before the respondent court, petitioner issued a final decision dated 3 August 1988 reducing the assessment for deficiency contractor’s tax from P193,475.55 to P46,516.41, exclusive of surcharge and interest. On 12 July 1993, the respondent court set aside respondent’s decision, and canceling the deficiency contractor’s tax assessment in the amount of P46,516.41 exclusive of surcharge and interest for the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978. No pronouncement as to cost. On 27 April 1994, Court of Appeals, in CA-GR SP 31790, affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Not in accord with said decision, petitioner came to Supreme Court via a petition for review.

Issues:

Whether the private respondent has the burden of proof in the tax case. Whether the private respondent is taxable as an independent contractor.

Held: The Commissioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying the well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in

the imposition of taxes. It is obviously both illogical and impractical to determine who are exempted without first determining who are covered by the aforesaid provision. The Commissioner should have determined first if private respondent was covered by Section 205, applying the rule of strict interpretation of laws imposing taxes and other burdens on the populace, before asking Ateneo to prove its exemption therefrom, following the rule of construction where “the tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer”.

The doctrine in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will not be construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and unambiguously. Tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for that purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.”  In case of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are not to be imposed nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly import. In the present case, Ateneo’s Institute of Philippine Culture never sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in a business apart from and independently of the academic purposes of the university. Funds received by the Ateneo de Manila University are technically not a fee. They may however fall as gifts or donations which are “tax-exempt” as shown by private respondent’s compliance with the requirement of Section 123 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing for the exemption of such gifts to an educational institution.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the private respondent is not a contractor selling its services for a fee but an academic institution conducting these researches pursuant to its commitments to education and, ultimately, to public service. For the institute to have tenaciously continued operating for so long despite its accumulation of significant losses, we can only agree with both the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals that “education and not profit is motive for undertaking the research projects.

Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) v. MarcosGR 120082, 11 September 1996 (261 SCRA 667)

Third Division, Davide Jr. (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act 6958. Since the time of its creation, MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter.  However on 11 October 1994, the Office of the Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment of realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified. It also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing a

governmental functions, which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units. It nonetheless stands in the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its powers and functions. The City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA is a government controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), and not an instrumentality of the government but merely a government owned corporation performing proprietary functions. MCIAA paid its tax account “under protest” when City is about to issue a warrant of levy against the MCIAA’s properties.

On 29 December 1994, MCIAA filed a Petition of Declaratory Relief with the Cebu Regional Trial Court contending that the taxing power of local government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees on an instrumentality of the national government. It contends that by the nature of its powers and functions, it has the footing of an agency or instrumentality of the national government; which claim the City rejects.  On 22 March 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition, citing that close reading of the LGC provides the express cancellation and withdrawal of tax exemptions of Government Owned and Controlled Corporations. MCIAA’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in its 4 May 1995 order, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes.

Held: Tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are paid for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not apply because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by the government in the course of its operations. Further, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) is a “taxable person” under its Charter (RA 6958), and was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Since Republic Act 7160 or

the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly provides that “All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees [sic], executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part of parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” With that repealing clause in the LGC, the tax exemption provided for in RA 6958 had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the LGC. Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effective after January 1, 1992 until the present.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the challenged decision and order of the RTC Cebu; without pronouncement as to costs.

Serfino v. CAGR L-40858, 15 September 1987

Second Division, Paras (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: On 25 August  1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT 1839).  On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18 January 1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R (1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor.  On that same day, TCT 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On 15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter did not present the documents for registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of Deeds.  Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, the spouses Serfinos mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985.

The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the lower court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the payment  of the plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties appealed from this decision of the trial court.  Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in its decision setting aside the decision of the trial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the latter when they repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to the Supreme  Court.

Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.

Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from that of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the public auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way be attributed to the mortgagee’s fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled public auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land in its name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of costs.

The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit must be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.

Manahan v. ECCGR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of “Enteric Fever” while employed as classroom teacher in Las Piñas Municipal High School, Las Piñas, Rizal, on 8 May, 1975. The deceased was in perfect health when he entered government service on 20 July 1969, and that in the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter dated 19 June 1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not an occupational disease, and  that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.

The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the decision of the GSIS on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by or aggravated

by the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Workmen’s Compensation should be resolved in favor of the worker

Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses and Claims), workmen’s compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the period from 1 November 1974 up to 31 December 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued Hence, this Court applied the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioner’s claim.. The illness that claimed the life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December 1974, thus, his action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations — like the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Labor Code — should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to  pay the petitioner the amount of P6,000.00 as death compensation benefit and P600.00 as attorney’s fees, to reimburse the petitioner’s expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts, and to pay administrative fees.

Villavert v. ECCGR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA 233)

First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring

Facts: Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner, is the mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on 12 December 1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. The deceased also performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist. On 11 December 1975, the deceased reported as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center in Camp Crame. He performed his duties not only as Code Verifier but also handled administrative functions, computer operation and typing jobs due to shortage of civilian personnel. Although he was complaining of chest pain and headache late in the afternoon of said day, he was required to render overtime service until late in the day, typing voluminous classified communications, computing allowances and preparing checks for the

salary of PC-INP personnel throughout the country for distribution on or before 15 December 1975. Gasping for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling incoherent words while asleep, and when he was not able to regain consciousness, he was rushed to the University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay (UERM) Memorial Hospital where he died at 5:30 am. The NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown, although most research data agree that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease.

On 18 March 1976, she filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under PD 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).  GSIS denied the claim on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert and the nature of his employment. The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission  (ECC).  On 31 May 1978, the ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS denying the claim. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to her son’s death benefits.

Held: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis (acute inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of the pancreas) is still unknown despite extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a “bout of alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died, neither is there a showing that he used drugs; negating the association provided by Principles of Internal Medicine (by Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. Further, Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.”

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of P6,000.00.

Del Rosario & Sons v. NLRCGR L-64204, 31 May 1985 (135 SCRA 669)

First Division, Melencio-Herrera (p): 5 concurring, 1 on leave

Facts: On 1 February 1978, Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered into a “Contract of Services” with Calmar Security Agency whereby the latter undertook to supply the former with security guards at the rate of P300.00 per month for each guard. Thereafter,  Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo Borata and Silvino Tudio filed a Complaint against the Security Agency and petitioner, for underpayment of salary, non-payment of living

allowance, and 13th month pay. Thereafter, five other guards filed their complaint for the same causes of action. Petitioner contended that complainants have no cause of action against it due to absence of employer-employee relationship between them. They also denied liability alleging that due to the inadequacy of the amounts paid to it under the Contract of Services, it could not possibly comply with the payments required by labor laws.

Assigned for compulsory arbitration, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for want of employer-employee relationship. When the case was appealed to the NLRC, the decision was modified by holding that petitioner is liable to pay complainants, jointly and severally, with the Security Agency on the ground that the petitioner is an indirect employer pursuant to Articles 106 and 107.  Hence, the appeal. The petitioner contended that NLRC erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that it was not under oath and the required appeal fee was not paid; in holding it jointly and severally liable with the Security Agency; and in refusing to give due course to its Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue(s):

Whether the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency invalidate the appeal. Whether the security guards from the agency are entitled to benefits claimed from the company

Held: The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency were not fatal defects. The lack of verification could have been easily corrected by requiring an oath. The appeal fee had been paid although it was delayed. Failure to pay the docketing fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal. Dismissal is discretionary with the Appellate Court and discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice. Failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and such power must be exercised with sound discretion and with a great deal of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances.” Moreover, as provided for by Article 221 of the Labor Code “in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in Courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

Further, Articles 106 of the Labor Code provides that “in the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in

accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him,” and Article 107 provides that “the provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.” In the case at bar, petitioner became an indirect employer of respondents-complainants when petitioner entered into a Contract of Services with the Security Agency and the latter hired the complainants to work as guards for the former. However, the petitioner’s liability should be without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement against the Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants. The Security Agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that petitioner’s payments to it were inadequate. As an employer, it is charged with knowledge of labor laws and the adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any other’s.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review, without prejudice to petitioner’s right to seek reimbursement from Calmar Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants. Costs against the private respondent.

Ty v. First National SuretyGR L-16138, 29 April 1961 (1 SCRA 1324)

En Banc, Labrador (p): 8 concurring

Facts: At different times within a period of two months prior to 24 December 1953, Diosdado C. Ty, employed as operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway Cotton Factory insured himself in 18 local insurance companies, among which being the 8 above-named defendants, which issued to him personal accident policies. Plaintiff’s beneficiary was his employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, which paid the insurance premiums. On 24 December 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object. He was brought to the Manila Central University hospital, and after receiving first-aid, he went to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries (fractures in index, middle, fourth, and fifth fingers of left hand).  From 26 December 1953 to 8 February 1954, he underwent medical treatment in the hospital. The above-described physical injuries have caused temporary total disability of plaintiff’s left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the above-named defendants to recover indemnity. Defendants rejected plaintiff’s claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy.

Plaintiff sued the defendants in the Municipality Court of this City, which dismissed his complaints. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of

First Instance Manila, presided by Judge Gregorio S. Narvasa, which absolved the defendants from the complaints. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy for the disability of his left hand.

Held: The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. In the case at bar, due to the clarity of the stipulation, distinction between “temporary disability” and “total disability” need not be made in relation to one’s occupation means that the condition of the insurance is such that common prudence requires him to desist from transacting his business or renders him incapable of working. While the Court sympathizes with the plaintiff or his employer, for whose benefit the policies were issued, it can not go beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of which define partial disability as loss of either hand by a amputation through the bones of the wrist.” There was no such amputation in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

De la Cruz v. Capital InsuranceGR L-21574, 30 June 1966 (17 SCRA 559)

En Banc, Barrera (p): 8 concurring

Facts: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy. In connection with the celebration of the New Year, the insured, a non-professional boxer, participated in a boxing contest. In the course of his bout with another person, likewise a non-professional, of the same height, weight and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. The insured died with the cause of death reported as hemorrhage intracranial, left. The insurer refused to pay the proceeds of the policy on the ground that the death of the insured in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by the insurance.

Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and beneficiary under the policy, filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of indemnity under the insurance policy.  Denied, De la Cruz instituted the action in the CFI Pangasinan (Civ. Case No. U-265)) for specific performance. Defendant insurer set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance. After due hearing, the court rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff; ordering the insurance company to indemnify plaintiff for the death of the latter’s son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorney’s fees. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the death of the insured is covered by the policy.

Held: The terms “accident” and “accidental” have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. The terms mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation: an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured’s voluntary act, which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of policies insuring against the death or injury from accident. In the present case, while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is voluntary, if without the unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he could not have received that blow in the head and would not have died. Further, death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was not declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract (What was included was death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling). Failure of the defendant insurance company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against appellant.

Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock InsuranceGR L-4611, 17 December 1955 (52 OG 1982)

First Division, Reyes JBL (p): 7 concurring.

Facts: Before WWII, Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned 4 warehouses in Tabaco, Albay used for the storage of stocks of copra and of hemp in which he dealt extensively. They had been, with their contents, insured with the Insurance Company since 1937, and the lose made payable to the Philippine National Bank as mortgage of the hemp and copra, to the extent of its interest. On 21 July 1940, fire of undetermined origin that broke out and lasted almost one week, gutted and completely destroyed Bodegas Nos. 1, 3 and 4, with the merchandise stored therein. Plaintiff-appellee informed the insurer by telegram on the same date. The insurance Company resisted payment, claiming violation of warranties and conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been deliberately caused by the insured or by other persons in connivance with him. Qua Chee Gan, his brother Qua Chee Pao, and some employees of his were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of arson but were acquitted by the trial court in a final decision on 9 July 1941.

With the civil case, Qua Chee Gan instituted the action in 1940 with the Court of First Instance of Albay, seeking to recover the proceeds of certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., through its agent, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., upon certain bodegas and merchandise of the insured that were burned on 21 June 1940. The records of the original case were destroyed during the liberation of the region, and were reconstituted in 1946. After a trial that lasted several years, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the insurance company to pay Qua Chee Gan the sum of P146,394.48 (1st cause of action), P150,000 (2nd), P5,000 (3rd), P15,000 (4th) , and P40,000 (5th), each bearing 80% interest per annum in accordance with Section 91 (b) of the Insurance Act from 26 September 1940, until each is paid, with costs against the defendant. It also dismissed the complaint in intervention of PNB without costs. The Insurance Company appealed directly to the Supreme Court. It contends that a warranty in a fire insurance policy prohibited the storage in the premises of oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and their liquid products having a flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which has a flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit was stored therein.

Issue: Whether gasoline may be construed as oil to warrant the forfeiture of claims under the insurance policy.

Held: The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer speaks of “oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products having a flash point below 300° Fahrenheit”, and is decidedly ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, “Oils” mean “lubricants” and not gasoline or kerosene. By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. There is no reason why the prohibition of keeping gasoline in the premises could not be expressed clearly and unmistakably, in the language and terms that the general public can readily understand, without resort to obscure esoteric expression. If the company intended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to have been plainly expressed in the policy. Still, it is well settled that the keeping of inflammable oils on the premises, though prohibited by the policy, does not void it if such keeping is incidental to the business and according to the weight of authority, even though there are printed prohibitions against keeping certain articles on the insured premises the policy will not be avoided by a violation of these prohibitions, if the prohibited articles are necessary or in customary use in carrying on the trade or business conducted on the premises. In the present case, no gasoline was stored in the burned bodegas, and that “Bodega No. 2” which was not burned and where the gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured bodegas.

The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, thus affirming it; with costs against the appellant.

Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping LinesGR L-34382, 20 July 1983 (123 SCRA 425)

First division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 2 on leave.

Facts: On 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation, shipped on board the SS ‘Eastern Jupiter’ from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of ‘Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods.’ The vessel is owned and operated by Eastern Shipping Lines. The shipment was insured with Home Insurance against all risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06. 53 of the 2361 coils discharged from the vessel were in bad order. The Consignee ultimately received the 2,361 coils with 73 coils loose and partly cut, and 28 coils and partly cut, which had to be considered as scrap. The weight also had a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kgs, or 1,209.56 lbs. For the loss/damage suffered by the cargo, Home Insurance paid the consignee under its insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44, by virtue of which Home Insurance became subrogated to the rights and actions of the Phelps Dodge. Home Insurance made demands for payment against Eastern Shipping and the transportation company for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the same. (A case “Home insurance v. NV Nedlloyd Lijnen” consolidated with this case is of the same nature).

Filing its cases in court, Home Insurance avers that it is a foreign insurance company authorized to do business in the Philippines through its agent, Victor Bello (who holds office at Makati) in both cases. In L-34382, Eastern Shipping Lines denies the allegation of plaintiff’s capacity to sue for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, while Angel Jose Transportation admits the allegation. In L-34383, NV Nedlloyd Lijnen, Columbian Philippines, and Guacods denied plaintiff’s capacity to sue. The court dismissed the complaints in the two cases on the same ground, that the plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to sue, even if the petitioner had already secured the necessary license to conduct its insurance business in the Philippines during the filing of the case. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines initially without a license can claim indemnity through Philippine Courts.

Held: The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries. A harsh interpretation would disastrously embarrass trade, unlike if the law is given a reasonable interpretation, it would markedly help in the development of trade. The law simply means that no foreign corporation shall be permitted ‘to transact business in the Philippine Islands,’ as this phrase is known in corporation law, unless it shall have the license required by law, and, until it complies with the law, shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts. A contrary holding would bring the law to the verge of unconstitutionality, a result

which should be and can be easily avoided. In the present case, the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts was cured by the subsequent registration. Such is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these cases.The petitioner sufficiently alleged its capacity to sue when it averred in its complaints that it is a foreign insurance company, that it is authorized to do business in the Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is the Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati; as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. General denials inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue in the light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so.  Nevertheless, even if the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue was not properly raised as an issue by the answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it had the authority to engage in the insurance business at the time it filed the complaints.

The Supreme Court consolidated and granted the petitions, reversed and set aside the CFI decisions. In L-34382 (Civil Case 71923), Eastern Shipping Lines and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered to pay the Home Insurance Company the sum of P1,630.22 each with interest at the legal rate from 5 January 1968 until fully paid. Each shall also pay one-half of the costs. The Court dismissed the counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. In L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its agent Columbian Phil. Inc. was ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 with interest at the legal rate from 1 February 1968 until fully paid, the sum of P500.00 attorney’s fees, and costs. The Court dismissed the complaint against Guacods, Inc.

Co v. RepublicGR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)

First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6 concurring

Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the “Colegio” in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He has never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations like the

Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a salesman therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco business.

Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing, the court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503. The government appealed the decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of the Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered “democracy.; that he stated that his father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file his income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certificate of registration, but not the alien certificates of registration of his wife and child.

Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.

Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution, which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution. Further, Philippine law requires that an alien to conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. In the present case, in so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show that he has complied with his obligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Actl; and further failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of P1,440.00 a year and his profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the sale of the store, the total of which is more than what is required by law for one to file an income tax return.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization, without pronouncement as to costs.

Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. RepublicGR L-12408, 28 December 1959 (106 Phil 775)

En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 9 concurring

Facts: On 22 September 1907, petitioner was born in Amoy, China, of Chinese parents.  He came to the Philippines sometime in February 1921 and was given the corresponding alien certificate of residence and registration.  He settled in Cebu City (where he as continuously resided up to the present time).  Petitioner studied 1st to 7th grade in Cebu Chinese High School, a private institution recognized by the government.  He speaks and writes English and the Cebu dialect.  He, having associated with some Filipinos, engaged in the corn business in Cebu City (1921-WWII) and in the lumber business (1946-present).  He invested P5,000.00 capital in the business and at present the actual worth of his share is about P20,000.00.  Petitioner is receiving a monthly salary of P400.00 and realizes a profit share worth P10,000.00 every year.  He has no tax liability to the government.  He possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. As to his family, he married one Sy Siok Bin on 8 December 1929 with whom he had 13 children, all born in the Cebu City.  All these children had been issued the corresponding alien certificate of registration, with the exception of Lourdes Lee who married a naturalized Filipino citizen named Lim Kee Guan.  With the exception of William Lee who is not of school age, Angelita who reached 5th grade and Lourdes who stopped in 3rd year high school, the other children are at present studying in private schools and colleges recognized by the government.

Lee Cho filed a petitioner for naturalization before the Court of First Iinstance of Cebu.  On 30 August 1956, the court rendered decision finding petitioner qualified to be a Filipino citizen.  On 2 October 1957, however, the government filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which if presented may affect the qualification of petitioner, and finding the same well founded, the court entertained the motion.  After hearing, the court again rendered decision reaffirming its holding that petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen.  The government interposed an appeal.

Issue: Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for naturalization.

Held: The provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled. In the present case, the petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in

private schools recognized by the government. Angelita Lee has only reached grade five and no explanation was given why no secondary education was afforded her.  Lourdes Lee has studied only as far as 3rd year high school and then allegedly stopped allegedly because of poor health. Lourdes admitted in open court, however, that she continued her studies in a Chinese school, which employs strictly Chinese curriculum, despite her illness. This circumstance betrays the sincerity of petitioner to become a Filipino citizen for if his motive were proper he should not have tolerated such deviation from the educational requirement of the law. The petitioner, thus, has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen.

The Supreme Court ruled that appealed decision is reversed, with costs against petitioner.

Guerrero v. CAGR L-44570, 30 May 1986 (142 SCRA 136)

Second Division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 1 taking no part.

Facts: On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was taken by Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at the Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Benitez was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such other similar chores. Harvest time which usually comes every 3 months. For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.

On 10 September 1971, RA 6389 amending RA 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. Sometime in the early part of 1973, Benitez was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacañang, Manila. This led to an execution of an agreement whereby defendants agreed to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of RA 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines).

In July 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. The Guerreros assigned Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage where Benitez and his family lived, thus, making the Benitez feel

that they meant business. Hence, the case for reinstatement with damages.

Issue: Whether Benitez is a tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law to warrant reinstatement to the plantation

Held: Longstanding possession is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law, a tenant being one who has the temporary use and occupation of land or tenements belonging to another for the purpose of production. A hired laborer who built his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his dismissal or termination any time, is more consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law. Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. Cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land but also includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry.  Agreement to share the produce or harvest on a “tercio basis” that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the landowners bolsters the tenancy claim. The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of harvest. Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such relationship is extinguished according to law.  In the present case, besides these indications, the agreement made on 2 May 1973 is clear and categorical term that the Benitez is a tenant. Arguing that the intent was different, being that of a hired farmhand, the law existing at that time the agreement was made militate against the claim. Benitez did not commit any of the causes that would warrant his ejectment, and thus, was unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the CA decision. No costs.

Bello v. CAGR L-38161, 29 March 1974 (56 SCRA 509)

En Banc, Teehankee (p): 10 concurring.

Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan and Filomena Bello were charged for estafa before the City Court of Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated a lady’s ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of  Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a “petition to dismiss appeal” on the ground that since the case was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the

CFI and the trial in the city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended.  The CFI per its order of 29 October 1971 did find that the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city court “for execution of judgment.”  Thereafter, the City court denied petitioners’ motion “for having been erroneously addressed to this court” instead of to the CFI ignoring petitioners’ predicament that the CFI had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of conviction against them.

Petitioners spouses then filed on 14 January 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals against the People and City Court. The Solicitor General did not interpose any objection whichever viewpoint is adopted by the Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently conflicting or clashing principles of law, i.e..  finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition on 17 December 1973, after finding that the city court’s judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to the Court of Appeals, it held that since petitioners did not implead the CFI as principal party respondent it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities. With their motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the Court of First Instance is indispensable and the procedural infirmity of misdirecting the appeal to Court of First Instance are fatal to the appellees’ cause

Held: The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity” and therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Thus, in the construction of its own Rules of Court, the Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void by holding that Courts of First Instance are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate court.

The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be “overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication. The Court of Appeals ‘ act of dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the CFI as a nominal

party was tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the CFI itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy.

The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in lieu thereof, judgment was rendered granting the petition for prohibition against City court, enjoining it from executing its judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners’ appeal from its judgment to the CA for the latter’s disposition on the merits; without costs.

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of ManilaGR 14355, 31 October 1919 (40 Phil

First Division, Johnson (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, specifically for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue. The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation, contending that there was no necessity of taking, that it already had public character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of the dead.

The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.

Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of Manila

Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.

The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the

exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while only a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood uses the latter. Where a emetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts, which are held in good faith for future use. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In this case there is no necessity of taking since there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue may be expanded to ease the traffic situation.

The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street through the cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which answers every purpose of the City. The Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment of the lower court, with costs against the appellant.

Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)GR L-54718, 4 December 1985

En Bank, Teehankee (p): 9 concurring, 2 on leave

Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon in the 30 January 1980 local elections. Later that day, however, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy “for personal reasons.” His unsworn withdrawal had been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. Later on 25 January 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza’s withdrawal, filed his own sworn “Certificate of

Candidacy in substitution” of Mendoza’s for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, however, disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer’s opinion that petitioner’s name does not appear in the certified list of candidates. The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of Dolores.

On 21 February 1980, Comelec denied the petition of Villanueva, stating that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not under oath as required by Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code, and that his withdrawal was not made after the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy, as contemplated by Section 28, but on the same day.

Issue: Whether the informal withdrawal of Mendoza invalidates the election of Villanueva as vice mayor.

Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza’s withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Further, the will of the electorate should be respected, it should not be defeated through the invocation of formal or technical defects. The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy. The legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza’s failure to observe the requirement should be considered a harmless irregularity. The bona fides of petitioner Villanueva as a substitute candidate cannot be successfully assailed. The votes cast in his favor must be counted.

The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned Resolutions of Comelec and annuls the proclamation of Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. The resolution is made immediately executory.

In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, petitionerGR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil 100)En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10 concurring

Facts: On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested with Bonifacio Minoza to read a testament and explain its contents to her in her house in San Miguel street, municipality of Argao, province of Cebu in 19 November 1939, which he did in the presence of tree instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona Omboy. After confirming the contents of the testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name at the foot of the testament in the second page, which he did, and after which she stamped her thumbmark between her name and surname in the presence of all three instrumental witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza also signed at the foot of the testament, in the second page, in the presence of the testator and all three abovenamed witnesses. However, the testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the left margin or any part of the first page of the testament, composed of two pages. All the three instrumental witnesses signed at the foot of the acknowledgment written in the second page of the testament, and the left margin of the first and second page, in the presence of the testator, Bonifacio Minoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was executed freely and spontaneously, without having been threatened, forced and intimidated, and not having exercised on her (the testator) undue influence, being the same in full use of her mental faculties and enjoying good health.  On 22 February 1957, the testator died in here house in Argao.

On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament, Carman Aberastine died, leaving her mother, the petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a document purportedly to be the last and testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because it involves purely a question of law.

Issue: Whether the absence of the testator’s thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the will void

Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the present case, the contention that the petition for probate is unopposed, and that the three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore cannot be admitted to probate.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as to costs.

Matabuena v. CervantesGR L-28771, 31 March 1971 (38 SCRA ___)

En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between live-in partners.

Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during the marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective.  It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.

The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.

 

People v. SantayanaGR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)

Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division

Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent” by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated certification  to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol

described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms

Held: The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v. Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional release; with costs de oficio.

People v. EstenzoGR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)

First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur

Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act  931 as amended by Republic Act 6236. Aotes claim that since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to 31 December  1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until 31 December 1980.  The judge denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in

undivided interest in equal share of ¼ each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening of Cadastral Proceedings.

Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind.  If RA 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by reference to RA2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so included in RA 6236. Thus, RA 6236, the very law on which  Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents’ contention. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968, no similar provision is found in RA 6236 expressly extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for by the RA 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, RA2061, expressly did.  Truly, the extension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different from “filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.”

The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent Judge and reiterating the 28 September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court; without pronouncement as to costs.

Mutuc v. ComelecGR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)

First Division, Fernando (p):  7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion

Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers” on 22 October 1970.  Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech.  Respondent however contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for

candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase “and the like.”

Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase “and the like.”

Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.  It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.”). Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited.

The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute resolution of 3 November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without pronouncement as to costs.

People v. ManantanGR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)

En Banc, Regala (p):  7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.

Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code

Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim “casus omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.  The application of the rule of “casus omisus” does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term “judge” includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge,” including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.

The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

Lopez vs. CTAGR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850)

En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur

Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplier invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently, however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of 23 May  1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court.

From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal.

Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly appealable to the Court of Tax Appeal.

Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal mentions among others, those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. While there is really a discrepancy between the two sections, it is more reasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of Customs.  If persons affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, under the Customs Law found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code, and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision would, not only be gravely affected but even destroyed. The Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the legislature.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the Customs Law and RA 1125, the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs; with costs.

Sanciangco v. RonoGR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___)

En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 took no part

Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17 May 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to the Minister of Local Government Jose A. Roño, who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to

have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.

Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latter’s filing of  a certificate of candidacy for the Batasan.

Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more than one construction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading “any person holding public appointive office or position,” is clear.  It is a rule of statutory construction that when the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed. A statute’s clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.  The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the President as a member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for, holding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.

Capati v. Ocampo [GR L-28742, 30 April 1982]Second Division, Escolin (p): 4 concur, 2 on leave.

Facts: Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. On 23 May 1967, Capati entered into a sub-contract with the Dr. Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, whereby the latter, in consideration of the amount of P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications indicated therein. Ocampo further bound himself to complete said construction on or before 5 June 1967. Ocampo, however, was only able to finish the construction on 20 June 1967.

Due to the delay, Capati filed in the CFI Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages (Civil Case 3188) in the sum of P85,000.00 with interest, plus attorney’s fees and costs. Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss

the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract which provides that all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga. The lowe court dismissed the complaint. Hence the appeal.

The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order, and ordered the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against defendant-appellee Ocampo.

1.    Where personal actions may be filedThe rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Said section is qualified by Section 3 of the same rule, providing that by written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another.

2.    “May” only permissiveThe word “may” is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term “may be” connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. “May” is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.  In the case at bar, the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the CFI Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See related case in Nicolas v. Reparations Commission: “May” is not mandatory). Since the complaint has been filed in the CFI Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Alfon v. Republic [GR L-51201, 29 May 1980]Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur

Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was registered at the Local Civil Registrar’s Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle, Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to

college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.

She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioner’s prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of first name but not the surname.

The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon;  without costs.

1.    Principally is not equivalent to exclusivelyThe word “principally” as used in article 364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to “exclusively” so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. In the case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father.

2.    Grounds for change of nameThe following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong v. Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion, the petition of name should be granted as the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon since childhood.

Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985]Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 5 concur

Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal Case 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527.  The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on 18 August 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25 days. In each criminal case the sentence was 3 months and fifteen 15 days.

Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is disqualified for probation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1

month and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than P200). The court denied the application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.

The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due course to the petitioner’s application for probation; without costs.

1.    “Previous” applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission of a crimeThe statute relates “previous” to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime. When the accused applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application. Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the crime.

 S u n d a y , S e p t e m b e r 8 , 2 0 1 3

Statutory Construction Case DigestsGreetings, fellow law students!

Here are some of the Statutory Construction cases I digested. This subject is case-based and it demands loads of readings, and so this is why I am sharing my work. I hope this post will guide you in reading the cases. But remember, there is no better way of reading a case than reading its full text.

P.S. I also posted some other case digests and reviewers of different law subjects. Check the rest at lestatuesque.blogspot.com

ORA ET LABORA.

ANIMO!

Walter E. Olsen & Co. v. Aldanese

G.R. No. L-18740. March 29, 1922

FACTS:

The petitioners assail the validity of the Act No. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature entitled "an act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the

export trade therein”. The Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to certify to the Insular Collector of Customs that the standard tobacco exported is the growth and product of the Philippine Islands. Paragraph 5 of the petition alleges that under clause B of section 6 of the Act, the Collector of Internal Revenue promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," in which it is said:

To be classed as standard, cigars must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from good, clean, selected tobacco, properly cured and seasoned, of a crop which has been harvested at least six months, exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. The cigars must be well made, with suitable spiral wrapper and with long filler, etc.

The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin covering a consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco, and as the petitioner himself stated on making such application that the cigars sought to be exported have been manufactured from short-filler tobacco which was not the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The Collector of Internal Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual examination and inspection of said cigars in view of the fact that the cigars were not made with long-filler nor were they made from tobacco exclusively the product of any of the three mentioned provinces.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.O No. 35 and Act No. 2613, as well as the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certificate of origin, are constitutional.

HELD:

Yes. Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations." Such rules and regulations, having been promulgated by that officer, the court has a right to assume that he was acting under such rules and regulations when he refused to issue the certificate of origin. It appears from the record that the cigars in question were not long-filler cigars, and that they were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces. By the express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and the court have a right to assume that he performed his official duty as the understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal Revenue to his examined or inspected the cigars.

Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned, it is very apparent that a request thereafter made examine or inspect the cigars would also have been refused.

Salas v. Jarencio

G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972

FACTS:

On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila

rendered judgment declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a

parcel of land containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. On

various dates, the City of Manila sold portions of the parcel of land and when the

last sale was effected, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22547 covering the

residue with an area of 7,490.10 square meters, was issued in the name of the

City of Manila. On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila adopted a

resolution requesting the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the

City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets as a

patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots

to the actual occupants thereof. Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was

introduced in the House of Representatives as House Bill No. 1453, which seeks

to convert one (1) parcel of land in the district of Malate, which is reserved as

communal property into a disposable or alienable property of the State and to

provide its subdivision and sale to bona fide occupants or tenants. The bill was

passed by the Senate, approved by the President and became Republic Act No.

4118. But the City of Manila made a complete turn-about, the City Mayor of

Manila brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary

injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the appellants from further

implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for the declaration of it as

unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

(1)   Whether or not the property involved is a patrimonial property of the City of

Manila.

(2)   Whether or not Republic Act No. 4118 is constitutional.

HELD:

(1)   No. When a statute is assailed as unconstitutional the Courts have the power

and authority to inquire into the question and pass upon it. This has long ago

been settled in Marbury vs. Madison, when the United States Supreme Court

speaking thru Chief Justice Marshall held that if an act of the legislature,

repugnant to the constitution, is void, it is emphatically the province and duty of

the judicial department to say what the law is. When the courts declare a law

unconstitutional it does not mean that the judicial power is superior to the

legislative power. It simply means that the power of the people is superior to

both and that when the will of the legislature, declared in statutes, stands in

opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to

be governed by the Constitution rather than by the statutes.

The City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee

simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said

land as its private or patrimonial property. When it acquires property in its

private capacity, it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into contracts

or making transactions for the transmission of title or other real rights. When it

comes to acquisition of land, it must have done so under any of the modes

established by law for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights. In the

absence of a title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own,

showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption

is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality. It

may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or

classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those

acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is

held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for

governmental or proprietary purposes. When it comes to property of the

municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its

own funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an

agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion.

Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting social

justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the people.

(2)   Yes. The property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City

of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. The land in

question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for

the benefit of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the exercise

of its legitimate powers. Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to

expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as

communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the

National Government. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the

resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does

not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just

compensation but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with

state property. Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it

owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain

provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress the concession

it sought of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the

Courts possess no power to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does not,

therefore, suffer from any constitutional infirmity.

Morfe v. Mutuc

G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968

FACTS:

Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act  to deter public

officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the

tone of morality in public service. One of the specific provisions of the said act is

that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after

his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year

thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file

with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn

statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and

sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the

amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar."   Said provision

was challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of

police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy,

implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together

with the prohibition against self-incrimination.         

ISSUE:

Whether or not the periodical submission of statement of assets and liabilities of

an official is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights.

HELD:

No. The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all.

When a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have

voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair,

not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues

to discharge public trust. While in the attainment of such public good, no

infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing,

clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the

statute allows. The due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach.

There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power. It cannot also

be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information

which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It is only to emphasize that in

subjecting him to such compulsory revelation, there is no unconstitutional

intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not

give freedom from testimonial compulsion. It appears clear that no violation of

the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to exist

by such requirement. Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater

plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-

incrimination clause. The court stresses that it is not aware of any constitutional

provision designed to protect a man's conduct from judicial inquiry or aid him in

fleeing from justice.

Drilon v. Lim

G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice

had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance

No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-

compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances

and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a

petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the RTC declared Section 187 of

the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the

Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of

the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific

provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of

supervision over local governments. In this case, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao

declared Section 187 unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of

Justice to review tax ordinances. He cited the familiar distinction between control

and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set

aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and

to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the

power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions

in accordance with law.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional

and whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than

supervision, over the local government

HELD:

Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the

constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on

either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax

ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the

judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon

did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own

version of what the Code should be. What he found only was that it was illegal.

All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were

performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed

procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the

city government under the Local Government Code. As the court sees it, that

was an act not of control but of mere supervision. Secretary Drilon set aside the

Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of

certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure

in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not

the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.

As regards the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the

enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court has carefully examined every

one of the exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural

requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were

sent to interested parties. The minutes of the hearings are found in the exhibits

and such show that the proposed ordinances were published.

League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR

G.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court

order the following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of

1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the

People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from

exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent

Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR)

nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by

the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

ISSUES:

(1)   Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No.

7076 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control and infringing upon

the local autonomy of provinces.

(2)   Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the

small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision

and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces.

HELD:

(1)   No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the

Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the

DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-

Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the exploration,

development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control

and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to

control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation

of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining

law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the

DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s Small-Scale

Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program is to

be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned

local government agencies. The Court has clarified that the constitutional

guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the

administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of

government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the

State. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the

small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is

subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge,

subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional

mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the

country's natural resources.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate

branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence

is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This

presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon

the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for

each other's acts. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,

unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of

the Constitution, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.

(2)   No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in

accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the

resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and

Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the DENR

Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was

valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining

Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review

granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules

and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on

the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial

Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which

involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the

contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the

basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective

rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076

and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling

disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial

function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of

judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor

"control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of

the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora

G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000

FACTS:

The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols would be conducted under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling

of the Marines. Thus, it prays that this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for Marine deployment.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

HELD:

(1) Yes. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.

(2)   No. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military

assets for civilian law enforcement. The limited participation of the Marines is

evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes

and bounds of the Marines’ authority.  It is noteworthy that the local police forces

are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority

belonging to the PNP.  In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader

of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police

forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is

their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,

likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and

render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be

properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian

authority.  Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not

unmake the civilian character of the police force.  Neither does it amount to an

“insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of

Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. Considering the above

circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in

conducting the patrols.  

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

GR 148560, Nov 19, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada assails the RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),as amended by RA 7659 on the grounds that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

HELD:

No. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conducts and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The court discerns nothing in the law that is vague or ambiguous as there is obviously none that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. As regards the assailed statutory definition of the terms ”combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in the law, the court ruled that a statute is not

rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.

A facial challenge does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

Barrameda v. Moir

G.R. No. 7927. August 8, 1913

FACTS:

Petitioner relates that the he was defendant in a suit brought before a justice of

the peace to try title to a parcel of land; that the case was decided adversely to

him; that he appealed to the Court of First Instance; and that the judge of that

court, on motion of the appellee, dismissed the appeal with directions to the

justice of the peace to proceed with the enforcement of the judgment. At the

request of the petitioner, a preliminary injunction was issued by this court to stay

the execution of the judgment, and he now prays that the respondent judge be

ordered to proceed with the case on appeal. The said judge has demurred to the

complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a

cause of action. The basis of the demurrer is that Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131,

conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real state,

are inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By Act

No. 2041, section 3, it was provided:

Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of

title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in

litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds

two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the justice of the peace

shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 are unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes. In the case of Weigall vs. Shuster, it was held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance, as fixed by section 9 of the Philippine Bill, may be added but to not diminished by the Philippine Legislature. Therefore, there will be sufficient reason for declaring the disputed provisions of Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 repugnant to the Philippine Bill and, consequently void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where the title to realty is involved. The original jurisdiction of those courts extends to "all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or of any interest therein".

The concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the amount involved is more than P200 but less than P600, was meant only as supplemental and ancillary to the exclusive jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. This concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be considered as inseparable from and absolutely dependent upon the exercise of that exclusive jurisdiction which has already been declared void. The concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be declared void also. Other additional jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 is not before the court. Such other additional jurisdiction bears no relation whatever to those void provisions of the statutes which provide for jurisdiction in real-estate actions; and applying the same rules to the rest of the Act which the court has applied to the clause conferring concurrent jurisdictional in real-estate actions between the amounts of P200 and P600, said is clearly of the opinion that the validity of the remainder of the Act is not in any case dependent upon the said void provisions.

In conclusion, it seems advisable to state that the able brief of counsel for the

respondent judge is based upon the a priori assumption that original jurisdiction

of Court of First Instance in real-estate actions is, by the Organic Law, made

exclusive. The judgment of the justice of the peace which it is desired to have

the respondent judge on this action review is an absolutely nullity. The

respondent judge acquired jurisdiction of the cause only for the purpose of

dismissing the appeal, and in further directing the justice of the peace to

proceed with the execution of the void judgment, the respondent judge was in

error.

People v. Rivera

G.R. Nos. 38215 & 38216. December 22, 1933

FACTS:

Faustino Rivera was being charged of the crime of indictment of the innocent

defined and punished under Art. 363 of the Revised Penal Code. The appellant

falsely accused Domingo Vito and Felisa Morena of the crime of theft, without

any probably cause, in writing and under oath. The complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 363 of the Revised Penal Code applies in the case.

HELD:

No. As article 363 of the Revised Penal Code is new and this is the first case

before the court calling for its interpretation, a comparison of the article with

article 326 of the former Penal Code seems expedient in view of the argument of

the Government that the former "is a reproduction of both the crime of false

accusation." It is a well settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible

construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to

avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.

Comparing now article 363 of the Revised Penal Code with article 326 of the

Revised Penal Code, it will be observed that article 326 of the former Penal Code

punishes false prosecution, whereas in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code

punishes an act which "tends directly" to cause a false prosecution. It is to be

noted that article 326 of the old Penal Code contains the provision that the

accuser could be prosecuted only on the order of the court, when the court was

convinced upon the trial of the principal cause that there was sufficient basis for

a charge of false accusation. Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code contains no

such safeguard.

Commissioner of Customs v. Relunia

G.R. No. L-11860. May 29, 1959

FACTS:

The Commissioner of Customs appeals to the decision of the Court of Tax

Appeals affirming that the forfeiture of the electric range in question under

Section 1363 (g.) is illegal. The RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL"' a unit of the Philippine

Navy was dispatched to Japan to transport contingents of the 14th BCT bound for

Pusan, Korea, and carry Christmas gifts for our soldiers there. It seems that

thereafter, it was used for transportation purposes in connection with the needs

of our soldiers there and made trips between Korea and Japan, so that it did not

return to the Philippine until September 2, 1954. While in Japan, it loaded 180

cases containing various articles subject to customs duties.

In the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, all the articles were declared

forfeited by the Collector of Customs of Manila for violations of the Customs Law

pursuant to Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code as an unmanifested

cargo including the aforesaid electric.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a manifest is required of the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL"

HELD:

Yes. Section 1228 of the Administrative Code provides that “Every vessel from a

foreign port or place must have on board complete written or typewritten

manifests of all her cargo”. The court ruled that whether the vessel be engaged

in foreign trade (Section 1221 and 1225, Revised Administrative Code) or not

(Section 1228), and even when the vessel belongs to the army or the navy

(Section 1234), the universal requirement from a reading of all the foregoing

provisions is that they be provided with a manifest.

The court also believes that there was no necessity where as in the present case

the application of Section 1234 of the Revised Administrative Code to our navy

ships is so clear and manifest, considering that the reasons for requiring a

manifest for transport and supply ships of the army and navy of the United

States are and with more reason applicable to our navy ships to carry out the

policy of the government, and because we have complete control over them.  It

was therefore held that the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was required to present a

manifest upon its arrival in Manila on September 2, 1954.

In conclusion, the court holds that all vessels whether private or government

owned, including ships of the Philippine navy, coming from a foreign port, with

the possible exception of war vessels or vessels employed by any foreign

government, not engaged in the transportation of merchandise in the way of

trade, as provided for in the second paragraph of Section 1221 of the Revised

Administrative Code, are required to prepare and present a manifest to the

customs authorities upon arrival at any Philippine port.

City of Baguio v. Marcos

G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969

FACTS:

On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio

instituted the reopening of the cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. It

is not disputed that the land here involved was amongst those declared public

lands by final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922. Respondent

Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case

No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims and prayed that the land be registered in

his name.

On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G.

Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. The

petitioners questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the petition to

reopen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reopening petition was filed outside the 40 year period

preceding the approval of Republic Act 931.

HELD:

Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April

12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the

petition to reopen on July 25, 1961. It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931

authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain

claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of

judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of

this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of

land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by

virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the

approval of this Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between

title and body.

It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the

Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself.” R.A. 931 is a piece of

remedial legislation and it should receive blessings of liberal construction. The

court says that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be

permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise

be discovered. Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder

embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue

of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval

of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent

Belong Lutes to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the

cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on November 13,

1922, comes within the 40-year period.

Central Capiz v. Ramirez

G.R. No. 16197. March 12, 1920

FACTS:

The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about July 1, 1919, the

latter contracted with the petitioner to supply to it for a term of thirty years all

sugar cane produced upon her plantation. Said contract was recorded in the

Registry of Property. In the interim the execution of said contract,Act No. 2874 of

the Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land Act," became effective. The

respondent, while admitting said contract and her obligation thereunder to

execute a deed pursuant thereto, bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that

more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the petitioner is held and owned by

persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.

ISSUES:

(1)   Whether or not RA 2874 applies to agricultural lands held in private ownership.

(2)   Whether or not complies with the constitutional requirement "That no bill which

may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject

shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

HELD:

(1)   No. It is held that Act No. 2874 was intended to apply to and regulate the sale,

lease and other disposition of public lands only. The title of the Act, always

indicative of legislative intent, reads: "an Act to amend and compile the laws

relating to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes”. Said act, by

express provisions of Sections 4, 5, 67 and 105, does not apply to lands privately

owned by the government. The Act nowhere contains any direct

or express provision applying its terms to privately owned lands. The court holds,

therefore, that the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and

is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and that lands held in

private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner

whatsoever.

(2)   No. The objects of the constitutional requirement under Section 3 of the Jones

Law are first, to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; second, to

prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of

which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked

and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and , third, to fairly apprise the

people of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they

may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they

shall so desire.' (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143.) This constitutional

requirement is mandatory and not directory. In the said Act, the words "and for

other purposes" contained in its title, must be treated as non-existent, held to be

without force or effect whatsoever and have been altogether discarded in

construing the Act. That the use of the words "other purposes," can no longer be

of any avail as they express nothing and amount to nothing as a compliance with

this constitutional requirement. The phrase expresses no specific purpose and

imports indefinitely something different from that which precedes it in the title.

Ebarle v. Sucaldito,

G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987

FACTS:

The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings of his criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Principally, the petitioner relies on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," preliminary to their criminal recourses. 

ISSUE:Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling

parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the intent of the measure.

People v. Echaves

G.R. Nos. L-47757-61. January 28, 1980

FACTS:On October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate information against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information provides that “sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr.”Five of the information were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. who dismissed the five information on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

ISSUE:Whether or not by Presidential Decree No. 772 applies to agricultural lands.

HELD:No. The court agrees to the lower court that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. It should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947. The rule of ejusdem generis invoked by the trial court, however, does not apply to this case. The decree is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain. 

Aboitiz Shipping v. City of Cebu

G.R. No. L-14526. March 31, 1965

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 207 was purportedly enacted by the Municipal Board on August

14, 1956 and approved by the City Mayor on the following August 27 where

plaintiffs were made to pa wharfage charges under protest since September 1,

1956 and on May 8, 1957. The plaintiffs filed an action in the Court of First

Instance of Manila to have the said void, its enforcement enjoined in so far as the

wharves, docks and ordinance declared other landing places belonging to the

National Government were concerned, and all the amounts thus far collected by

defendants refunded to them.  Appellee’s allege that the Municipal Board's

authority to pass the ordinance is claimed by them under section 17 (w) of the

charter of the City of Cebu, which grants them the legislative power “To fix the

charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks,

levees, or landing places.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the City of Cebu, under its charter, may provide by ordinance for

the collection of wharfage from vessels that dock at the public wharves of piers

located in said city but owned by the National Government.

HELD:

No. The right to collect the wharfage belongs to the National Government. It is

unreasonable to conclude that the legislature, simply because it employed the

term "public wharves" in section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu,

thereby authorized the latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the ownership of

the wharves involved. The National Government did not surrender such

ownership to the city; and there is no justifiable ground to read into the statute

an intention to burden shipowners, such as appellants, with the obligation of

paying twice for the same purpose.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a

whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal

rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might

easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and

evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is

associated. Thus an apparently general provision may have a limited application

if viewed together with other provisions. Hence, Ordinance No. 207 of the City of

Cebu is declared null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund to appellants

all amounts collected thereunder and to refrain from making such collection.

People v. Chaves

G.R. No. L-19521. October 30, 1964

FACTS:

The accused, Esteban Chaves has been found guilty of a violation of Republic Act

No. 145, in that he had collected a claim of Marcela Rambuyon for death benefits

in the sum of $4,252.20 due her for the demise of her son. The corresponding

check was cashed by Chaves, who later delivered only P3,202.20 to the claimant,

and retained P5,362.20 for himself. Chaves was sentenced to undergo one year

imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P5,362.20 and to

pay the costs.  The indemnity not having been paid, the offended party obtained

a writ of execution and the Sheriff accordingly levied on a residential lot and

building of the accused, but desisted from proceeding further when the accused

exhibit proof that the property had been extrajudicially constituted and recorded

as a family home, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Appellant

takes the position that the indemnity due to the complainant became a debt

within the purview of Article 243 of the Civil Code, hence exempted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the family home extrajudicially constituted is entitled to

exemption pursuant to Article 243 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

HELD:

No. The court sees no merit in the appeal. The word "debt", as used in

subdivision (2) of Article 243, "is not qualified and must, therefore, be taken in its

generic sense" (Montoya vs. Ignacio, 54 Off. Gaz. 978-979). The duty of Chaves

to reimburse the amount of the veteran's benefits improperly retained by him

certainly arose and came into existence from the date of his misappropriation

(January, 1948), and the judgment of 1961 merely established the fact of the

misappropriation beyond controversy and reasonable doubt. The judgment

sentencing Chaves to indemnify complainant was not the source of his duty to

return.

That a judgment is not necessary to clothe a preexisting debt with the privileged

character of being enforceable against the family home extrajudicially

established at a later date is apparent by comparison with Article 247 of the Civil

Code. Certainly, the "humane considerations," for which the law surrounded the

home with immunities from levy, did not include the intent to enable a debtor to

thwart the just claims of his creditors. If in the case of a judicially established

family home the law requires that the petitioning debtor should first give

sufficient security for his unsecured debts before the family home is authorized

(Art. 231), there is no reason why in the case of the extrajudicial constitution,

that creditors have no opportunity to oppose or protest, the constituting debtor

should be enabled to escape payment of his just debts, and leave the creditors

holding an empty bag.

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds

G.R. No. L-630. November 15, 1947

FACTS:

Alenxander A. Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena

Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by

the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied

by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot

acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth

branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and that court rendered judgment

sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to

this Court. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of

the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for

registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the phrase “pubic agricultural land” in Section 1 of Article XII

(now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential lands for

purposes of their disposition.

HELD:

No. Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional embraces all lands of any kind of

the public. Therefore this provision means that all lands of the public domain are

classified into three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. With

respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral

nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. If a word

has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will

be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution.

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the

exception of public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to

public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. Filipino

citizens who alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens is prevented under

section 5, Article XIII. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they

have the same purpose and the same subject matter namely, the non-

transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under

section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be

attached to "agricultural land under section 5. The only difference between

"agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter

private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The

lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national

patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of

whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales

G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992

FACTS:

Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly income tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of P6,156,525.00. On July 9, 1982, TMX Sales filed with the Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the ground that "granting, without admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner is already barred from claiming the same considering that more than two years had already elapsed between the payment and the filing of the claim in Court.

ISSUE:

Does the two-year period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 or the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date the filing of the Final Adjustment Return?

HELD: 

Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax. The Court states that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. Section 292 should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.

In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its Adjustment Return required in Section 87, is equivalent to the tax paid during the first quarter. A literal application of Section 292 would thus pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax was paid can be easily determined. However, if the quarter in which the overpayment is made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal application of Section 292 would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.

The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time of filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, when it can be finally ascertained if the taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax.

Agcaoili v. Suguitan

G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926

FACTS:

Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag,

of the Province of Ilocos Norte on the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to

have and to hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments

thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions prescribed by

law. The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at

the time of his appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 which

provides that "All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office

during good behavior . . . ."

On the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature adopted Act No. 3107.

Said Act in section 203 provides for “ That justices and auxiliary justices of the

peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five

years."

On the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent a to Agcaoili

which provides that the former has the honor to advise the latter that he has

ceased to be a justice of the peace by operation of said amendment of the

Administrative Code.

ISSUES:

(1)   Whether or not Act. 3107 applies to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace

who were appointed prior to the passage of said act.

(2)   Whether or not Sec. 216 applies to public officers.

HELD:

(1)   No. Attention is called to one of the provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law

"That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one

subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Considering

that there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the slightest

degree that said Act contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of

the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-

five years”, the court is forced to the conclusions that, that provision is illegal,

void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law, and that said law

cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were

appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili was

forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as

justice of the peace, he was forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and

should therefore be restored to his position as justice of the peace of the

municipality of Laoag, without delay.

(2)   No. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language,

to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that

expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must have relation to

the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of

introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the

expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere

comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma

and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences

and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes

the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used in a

law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning

of a doubtful statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions

of said section 216 which precede the semicolon refer to corporations only, that

which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject matter, or to

officers of a corporation.

The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was

appointed in accordance with the law to the judiciary to serve "during good

behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly served the Government for a

number of years the legislature adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without

giving any reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to be such when he

should reach the age of 65 years. Said law contained no express provision or

method for its enforcement. The Executive Department, through its

Undersecretary of Justice, without any authority given in said law, notified the

said officer that he was no longer an officer in the judicial department of the

Government and must vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who

was designated by said Undersecretary. When the officer protested against such

arbitrary action, giving reasons therefor, and without answering said protest, he

was threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not immediately vacate his

office.

Nera v. Garcia

G.R. No. L-13160. January 30, 1960

FACTS:

Petitioner Nera was at the time of his suspension, serving as clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital. In the course of his employment, he served as manager and cashier of the Maternity Employer's Cooperative Association, Inc. On May 11, 1956, he was charged with malversation for allegedly misappropriating the sum of P12,636.21 belonging to the association. Simplicio Balcos, husband of the suspended administrative officer and cashier of the Maternity and Children's Hospital, named Gregoria Balcos, filed an administrative complaint case then pending against him. On December 19, 1956, Nera received a communication from respondent Director of Hospital suspending him from office as clerk of the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This suspension carried the approval of respondent Garcia, Secretary of Health. Petitioner sought for the annulment of the order of suspension on the ground that assuming for a moment that petitioner were guilty of malversation or misappropriation of the funds of the association, nevertheless, said irregularity had no connection with his duly as clerk of the Maternity and Children's Hospital.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not suspension on the ground of dishonesty or misconduct under Section 694 of the Revised Penal Code need have to be in relation to the performance of duty.

HELD:

No.  As to the holding of the trial court about dishonesty or misconduct in office

having connection with one's duties and functions in order to warrant

punishment, this involves an interpretation of Section 694 of the Revised

Administrative Code. SEC. 694. Removal or suspension. — No officer or employee

in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided

by law. The President of the Philippines may suspend any chief or assistant chief

of a bureau or office and in the absence of special provision, any other officer

appointed by him, pending an investigation of his bureau or office. With the

approval of the proper head of department, the chief of a bureau in his bureau or

under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such

subordinate or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct

or neglect in the performance of duty.

It will be observed that there is a comma after the words dishonesty and oppression, thereby warranting the conclusion that only the phrase "grave misconduct or neglect "is qualified by the words "in the performance of duty". In other words, dishonesty and oppression to warrant punishment or dismissal, need not be committed in the course of them performance of duty by the person charged. If a Government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his force, they affect his right to continue in office. As the Solicitor General well pointed out in his brief, "the private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morals of the service."

Florentino v. PNB

G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956

FACTS:

The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine

National Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner

Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured by

real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt incurred on January 2, 1953, which

is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No.

1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic

Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953. Petitioners offered to pay their loan with

the respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on

December 29, 1953, refused to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under

section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, respondent-appellee contends that the

qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the appellant's

contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for

settlement” refers to all antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2

of Republic Act No. 879.

HELD:

No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that

is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized

under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma

before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the

preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction, to make

the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen,

association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or

controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897

unconstitutional for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of

contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note

payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current

or even the legal one. It was also found out in the Congressional Record that the

amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was made which permits the use of backpay

certificates as payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the

government. Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many

officials and employees of the Philippine Government, who had served during the

Japanese Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates and used

them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and its entities for

debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304.

Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the obligation

was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently,

the present case falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of

the Amendatory Act No. 897.

Cornejo v. Naval

G.R. No. 33648. July 30, 1930

FACTS:

Miguel R. Cornejo was until recently occupying the position of municipal

president of Pasay, Rizal. Eligio Naval, Jose M. Perez, and Celestino de Dios

constitute the provincial board of Rizal, the first named being the provincial

governor of that province Cornejo was found guilty of the crime of falsification of

a private document and sentenced him therefor to one year, eight months, and

twenty-one days' imprisonment, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, with subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to suffer the accessory penalties

provided by law.

Immediately after the conviction  in the trial court, the provincial governor of

Rizal filed with the provincial board of that province and administrative complaint

against Cornejo for corruption and improper conduct unbecoming a public

officer. Thereafter, the provincial governor suspended Cornejo as president of

Pasay pending action by the provincial board on the administrative charges

preferred against Cornejo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provincial governor and a provincial board have the power to

suspend a municipal president who has been convicted of the crime of

falsification of a private document.

HELD:

No. Where the removal is to be for official misconduct or for misfeasance or mal-

administration in office, the misconduct which shall warrant a removal of the

officer must be such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not

such only as affect his character as a private individual.

It is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction and of the law of public

officers that a statute prescribing the grounds for which an officer may be

suspended is penal in nature, and should be strictly construed. Making this

principle the basis of our investigation, it is not possible to reach any other

conclusion than that the prepositional phrase "in office" qualifies the various

grounds for legal suspension. The law says "or other form of maladministration in

office". By the maxim Ejusdem generis, the scope of the word "other" is limited

to that which is of the same kind as its antecedent. Corruption, therefore, refers

to corruption in office.

The holding of the court is that the provincial board and the provincial governor

of Rizal acted in excess of jurisdiction in suspending the petitioner as municipal

president of Pasay. Where the power of suspension is limited to specific causes,

the suspending authority may not suspend for any cause not so specified.

People v. Subido

G.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975.

FACTS:

On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion praying that (1) the court enter of record that the judgment of the Court of Appeals has been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be cancelled. Accused-appellant argued that although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could not be required to serve the amount of fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment because said judgment did not expressly and specifically provide that he should serve the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its opposition to accused-appellant's motion for cancellation of appeal bond and asked the lower court to require accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the indemnity of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The lower court issued an order denying the accused-appellant's motion and declared in accordance with the terms of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the accused-appellant has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he could not

pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision. 

ISSUE:Whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 

HELD:No. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means of writing, printing, litography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party". It is evident from the foregoing provision that the court is given the discretion to impose the penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be noted that the lower court chose to impose upon the accused: three months ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00; subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its discretion decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.

A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" is separated by a comma from the preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months ofarresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a comma in the part of the sentence is to make "the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.

Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of

Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465

which exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency to pay his civil liability. 

It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be strictly

construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.   In the

interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny, and

to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the

defendant. Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is

favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should be made applicable to

him. Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to the

accused-appellant, he cannot also be required to serve his civil liability to the

offended party in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because

this is no longer required by the aforesaid article.

In re Estate of Johnson

G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918

FACTS:

On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized

citizen of the United States, left a will. Said document is a holographic instrument

signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by

section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A petition was presented in the Court

of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground

that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United

States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of

that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of

the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that “A will made within the Philippine

Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in

accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or

subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or

country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and

shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order admitting the will to probate was beyond the

jurisdiction of the court and void because made without notice to the petitioner.

HELD:

No. It is apparent from an inspection of the record of the proceedings in the court

below that all the steps prescribed by law as prerequisites to the probate of a will

were complied with in every respect and that the probate was effected in

external conformity with all legal requirements. The proceedings for the probate

of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the court

jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated. The

question of the jurisdiction of the court relates to the interpretation to be placed

upon section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The position is taken by the

appellant that this section is applicable only to wills of liens; this is directed to

the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an

alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section is not

capitalized. From this it is argued that section 636 is not applicable to the will of

a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands. The most reasonable

interpretation of the language used in the statute, the words "another state or

country" include the United States and the States of the American Union, and

that the operation of the statute is not limited to wills of aliens.

Kare v. Platon

G.R. No. 35902. October 28, 1931

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a motion of protest contesting the election of the respondent

Francisco Perfecto, upon the grounds that the respondent Judge of the Court of

First Instance of Albay entered an order requiring the petitioner to give a

personal bond for P3,000 and a cash bond of P2,000 to be deposited with the

provincial treasurer of Albay in order that proper proceedings might be taken on

his motion of protest. These sums were later changed so that the cash bond was

for P1,500 and the personal bond for P3,500.

The petitioner invoked section 482 of the Election Law in support of his

contention. The respondent judge bases his action upon the same section and

also upon section 479 as lately amended by Act No. 3699. Section 482 provides:

          Bond or cash deposit required of contestants. — Before the court shall

entertain any such contest or counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party filing

the contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed by the

court with two sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all

expenses and costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in

court in lieu of such bond. . . .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court may require the petitioner either a bond or a cash

deposit.

HELD:

Yes. Said section is preceded by the heading, "Bond or cash deposit required of

contestants," which apparently indicates that the court taking cognizance of the

election contest may require the contestant either to give a bond or to make a

cash deposit. But the petitioner contends that the right to choose between giving

a personal bond and depositing a sum of money in lieu thereof is granted only to

the contestant or appellant. If there be any conflict between the heading of the

section under question and the body, it must be settled according to the canons

of statutory construction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 181, says:

"Headings prefixed to the titled, chapters, and sections of a statute or code may

be consulted in aid of the interpretation, in case of doubt or ambiguity; but

inferences drawn from such headings are entitled to very little weight, and they

can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses." The rule accepted by

most of the authorities is that if the chapter or section heading has been inserted

merely for convenience of reference, and not as an integral part of the statute, it

should not be allowed to control the interpretation. Applying this rule to the case

at bar, it will be seen that the present section provides that before the court

entertain any contest or counter-contest or admits an appeal, the party filing the

contest, counter-contest or appeal shall give bond with two sureties to the

satisfaction of the court, or deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond. The court

holds that the court may only require a personal bond, and that the contestant

may make a cash deposit in lieu thereof.

There is no question as to the court's discretionary power to demand of a

contestant a certain sum of money in advance to meet the initial expenses

arising from the contest, such as the production of ballot boxes in court, etc. It is

true that the bond obliges the contestant or his sureties to pay all the costs

arising from the contest, should he be defeated, but the bond is not to be

executed until the final determination of the protest. And it is well known that

certain services are required in the course of election contests which must be

paid for immediately, because it would be unjust to delay their payment until the

termination of the contest.

The court ruled that although it does not adhere strictly to legal technical

phraseology, there is in it no excess of jurisdiction or abuse of judicial discretion

to be rectified by means of the writ applied for. Hence the petition was

dismissed.

People v. Yabut

G.R. No. 39085. September 27, 1933.

FACTS:

On or about the 1st day of August, 1932, the accused Antonio Yabut, then a

prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously

and treacherously, assault, beat and use personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo,

another prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by then and there hitting the

said Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly from behind with a wooden club,

without any just cause, thereby causing the death of the latter. Yabut was a

recidivist, he having previously been convicted twice of the crime of homicide

and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by

competent tribunals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the case at bar.

HELD:

Yes. Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code, translated in English, provides that:

Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another

previous offense — Penalty. — Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any

person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,

before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be

punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new

felony.

The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the

English translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his

deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new

crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is different from

the crime for which he is serving sentence. The language is plain and

unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that

said article applies only in cases where the new offense is different in character

from the former offense for which the defendant is serving the penalty.

It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and

unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the

preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text,

especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or

reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows. A mere

glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code will reveal that they

were not intended by the Legislature to be used as anything more than

catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each

article. Being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the

articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying or

limiting the unambiguous words of the text.

Baranda v. Gustilo

G.R. No. 81163. September 26, 1988

FACTS:

This case involves a parcel of land known covered by Original Certificate of Title

No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, said was cancelled and

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso

Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda. The Court issued a writ of possession which

Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground

that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court finds

that TCT No. 25772 was fraudulently acquired and ordered that the writ of

possession be carried out. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and

prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The motion for reconsideration was denied

and the judgment became final. The petitioners contend that Civil Case No.

00827 was filed only to delay the implementation of the writ.

The TCT No. T-25772 was declared null and void and TCT No. T-106098 was declared valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of Baranda and Hitalia. A motion for reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved. A notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. 

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court.

(2) Whether or not the Register of Deeds has the duty to annotate or annul the notice oflis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title.

HELD:

(1) No. Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the private respondents, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517. Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof. The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. It was once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant.Respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571 cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals.

(2)   No. Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of

the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for

registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the

requisites for registration…”

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of

the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from

the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it

says. The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register

instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for

construction. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English

Language — the word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used to express

a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to express

what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to

the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in

nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing

to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him

to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the

petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step

to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he

should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now,

the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration

Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. V. IAC

G.R. No. 74851. December 9, 1999

FACTS:

On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a "Petition for Rehabilitation and for

Declaration of Suspension of Payments with the Securities and Exchange

Commission. RCBC, one of the creditors, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal

to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF

Homes. A notice of extra-judicial foreclosure sale was issued by the Sheriff. On

motion of BF Homes, the SEC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining

RCBC and the sheriff from proceeding with the public auction sale. The SEC

ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's filing of

a bond. However, petitioner did not file a bond until the very day of the auction

sale, so no writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the SEC. Presumably,

unaware of the filing of the bond, the sheriffs proceeded with the public auction

sale in which RCBC was the highest bidder for the properties auctioned. BF

Homes filed in the SEC a consolidated motion to annul the auction sale and filed

an original complaint praying for the annulment of the judgment, premised on

the fact that even before RCBC asked the sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose its

mortgage on petitioner's properties, the SEC had already assumed exclusive

jurisdiction over those assets.

ISSUE:

(1)   Whether or not the issue on preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand

on equal footing with all other creditors gains relevance and materiality only

upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver,

board, or body in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-

A.

(2)   Whether or not RCBC has rightfully moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of its

mortgage pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A.

HELD:

(1)   Yes. The Court held that whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for

rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer

assert such preference, but stand on equal footing with other creditors.

Foreclosure shall be disallowed so as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause

discrimination among them. The holding that suspension of actions for claims

against a corporation under rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application

or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC — may, to some, be more

logical and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of

the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble, would be to

encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law — plainly

judicial legislation. In other words, once a management committee, rehabilitation

receiver, board or body is appointed pursuant to P.D. 902-A, all actions for claims

against a distressed corporation pending before any court, tribunal, board or

body shall be suspended accordingly.

Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret

or construe its true intent. Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more

meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or

more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or

more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to exercise one

of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.

(2)   Yes. Insofar as petitioner RCBC is concerned, the provisions of Presidential

Decree No. 902-A are not yet applicable and it may still be allowed to assert its

preferred status because it foreclosed on the mortgage prior to the appointment

of the management committee. Suspension of claims against a corporation

under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a

management committee or a rehabilitation receiver. As relevantly pointed out, a

petition for rehabilitation does not always result in the appointment of a receiver

or the creation of a management committee. Petitioner RCBC, therefore, could

have rightfully, as it did, moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgage

on October 26, 1984 because a management committee was not appointed by

the SEC until March 18, 1985.

National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson

G.R. No. L-29131. August 27, 1969

FACTS:

On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment,

in Civil Case No. 20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs.

Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.," The National

Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and

choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation filed a complaint against

the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No.

20520.  Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of this

Court became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on

December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of

365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so

that when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the

statute of limitations.

HELD:

Yes. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must

be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in

the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences from the time the

judgment sought to be revived has become final." Plaintiff-appellant insists that

the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar year (Statutory

Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is

being computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as

the basis of computation. There is no question that when it is not a leap year,

December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. Certainly, the

extra day in a leap year must belong to the year where it falls and, therefore,

that the 366 days constitute one year." 

Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court held

that when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or "solar"

month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Hence, the same

Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months

... are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30

days," not the "natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are

"designated by name," in which case "they shall be computed by the actual

number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in the Philippines, by

Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall

be understood to refer to a calendar month." However, the court has reverted to

the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to

be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month,"

with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned

"months, days or nights," ours has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly

ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five

days."

Aguila v. CFI of Batangas

G.R. No. L-48335. April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession, namely, Escolastico Alabastro

and, after his death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is claiming the disputed

property as the only surviving child of the second marriage. The private

respondents are resisting this claim as the children of Maria Alabastro, the sole

offspring of the first marriage and had sued for partition and damages against

the petitioner, alleging that some properties held by them pertained to the first

marriage as Juliana and her second husband had not acquired anything during

their marriage.

On motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court then issued a writ of execution

pursuant to which the properties held by the defendants were levied upon and

sold at public auction to the plaintiffs as the highest bidders. The defendants

filed a complaint for reconveyance of the properties acquired by the defendants

in the earlier action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. In

their answer, the defendants alleged res judicata as one of their affirmative

defenses.

ISSUE:

(1)   Whether or not the petitioner may rightfully alleged res judicata in this case.

(2)   Whether or not the Court should allow reconveyance of the properties in the

exercise of its equity jurisdiction.

HELD:

(1)   No since the petitioner does not seek to do away with the rule of res

judicata but merely proposes to undo a grave and serious wrong perpetuated in

the name of justice. As a matter of fact, he was not denied the opportunity to

submit evidence  which the due process guarantees. Records show that he did

not have the ooprtunity to be heard because of the gross ineptitude of

petitioner’s original counsel.

(3)   No. The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-settled.

This remedy is available in cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud, property

is registered in the name of a person not its owner. However, it cannot be

employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a court of justice

determining the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties in an appropriate

proceeding, as in Civil Case No. 1562. The decision in that case was a valid

resolution of the question of ownership over the disputed properties and cannot

be reversed now through the remedy of reconveyance.

Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot

supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. All abstract

arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt

and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may

wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law

as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim is "aequetas nunquam

contravenit legis.

Manila Jockey Club v. Games and Amusements Board

G.R. No. L-12727. February 29, 1960

FACTS:

As stated, Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to twelve, but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, the GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested, contending that the said increased should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or should be assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and legal holiday. They also hold that respondent PCSO does not have the right or power to appropriate or use the race tracks and equipment of petitioner without its consent, nor can respondents compel petitioner to so allow such use of its race tracks and equipment under pain of having its license revoked.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not there was a proper placement of the six additional racing days given to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502.

(2) Whether or not legislative debates and explanatory statements by members of the legislature may be resorted to in the interpretation of statutes.

HELD:

(1) Yes. It is clear from Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No. 983, that appellants have no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except, perhaps, on the holidays), because their holding of races on these days is merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races, but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did, from among the only available racing days unreserved by any law — the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination by the GAB.

The law does not authorize the holding of horse races with betting on week days. Secondly, sweepstakes races have always been held on Sundays. It is not possible to hold them on Saturday afternoons as, it is claimed, a whole day is necessary for the mixing of the sweepstakes balls, the drawing of winning sweepstakes numbers, and the running of the sweepstakes races. The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. The conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races.

(2) No. Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other.The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements — an internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat the former.

Santiago v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997

FACTS:

Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative”. Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition on the ground that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented but law to be passed by Congress. There is no law passed yet and RA 6735 provides only for initiative on statutes and local legislation but not initiative on the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and whether the act adequately covers such initiative.

HELD:

RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right”. This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis, it is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The delegation of the power to the Comelec being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held t be that of revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional

guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by initiative.

Tañada v. Cuenco

G.R. No. L-10520. February 28, 1957

FACTS:

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and

President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a

member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the

official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate. The Senate, upon

nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party,

chose Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens

Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal.

Upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the

Senate, the Senate choose respondents Cuenco and Delgado as members of the

same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1)

Cruz and Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to

Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his

recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Serapio and Reyes, as technical

assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed

member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.

Respondents allegethat the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory;

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory.

HELD:

No. The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall". The language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; The adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution. Senators and Delgado, having been elected by the Committee on Rules of the Senate and not by the party having the second largest votes in the Senate for which Senator Tañada has the exclusive right, have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

Torres v. Limjap

G.R. No. 34385. September 21, 1931

FACTS:

These two actions were commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila on

April 16, 1930, for the purpose of securing from the defendant the possession of

two drug stores located in the City of Manila, covered by two chattel mortgages

executed by the deceased Jose B. Henson in favor of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs

alleged that the defendant violated the terms of the mortgage and in

consequence thereof they became entitled to the possession of the chattels and

to foreclose their mortgages thereon. The defendant appealed alleging that the

lower court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to introduce evidence

tending to show that the stock of merchandise found in the two drug stores was

not in existence or owned by the mortgagor at the time of the execution of the

mortgages in question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stipulation authorizing the disposal and substitution of the

chattel mortgage is in contravention of the express provision of the last

paragraph of section 7 Act No. 1508.

HELD:

No. The last paragraph of section 7 Act No. 1508 states that:

A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described therein

and not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and

placed in the same depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in

the mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding.

In order to give a correct construction to the above-quoted provision of our

Chattel Mortgage Law, the spirit and intent of the law must first be ascertained.

The primary aim of that law-making body was undoubtedly to promote business

and trade in these Islands and to give impetus to the economic development of

the country. In the interpretation and construction of a statute the intent of the

law-maker should always be ascertained and given effect, and courts will not

follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose

of the Legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the spirit of the Act. A

stipulation in the mortgage, extending its scope and effect to after-acquired

property, is valid and binding. Cobbey, a well-known authority on Chattel

Mortgages, recognizes the validity of stipulations relating to after-acquired and

substituted chattels. Hence, the court held that the provision of the last

paragraph of section 7 of Act No. 1508 is not applicable to drug stores, bazaars

and all other stores in the nature of a revolving and floating business and that

the stipulation in the chattel mortgages in question, extending their effect to

after-acquired property, is valid and binding.

Sarcos v. Castillo

G.R. No. L-29755. January 31, 1969

FACTS:

Petitioner Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur,

was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by respondent Recaredo

Castillo, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur.  It was on the basis of the

above administrative complaint that respondent Governor ordered the

immediate suspension of petitioner from his position as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao

del Sur, in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, of Republic Act No. 5185,

otherwise known as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967'.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Provincial Governor is vested with power to order

such preventive suspension under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967.

HELD:

No. Under the former law then in force which stands repealed by virtue of the

Decentralization Act,  the provincial governor, if the charge against a municipal

official was one affecting his official integrity could order his preventive

suspension. At present, no such authority is vested in the provincial governor.

Instead, the statutory scheme, complete on its face, would locate such power in

the provincial board. There would be no support for the view, then, that the

action taken by the provincial governor in issuing the order of preventive

suspension in this case was in accordance with law. "The purpose of Congress is

a dominant factor in determining meaning." The purpose of the Decentralization

Act of 1967 is to grant to local governments greater freedom and ampler means

to respond to the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and

happiness and to effect a more equitable and systematic distribution of

governmental powers and resources. The absence of power on the part of

provincial governors to suspend preventively a municipal mayor is buttressed by

the avoidance of undesirable consequences flowing from a different doctrine.

People v. Almuete

G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976

FACTS:

Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were

charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was

alleged in the information that the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando

in her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a

portion of their respective harvests of five cavans of palay each to her damage.

The lower held that the information is basically deficient because it does not

describe the circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in the

possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for

the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the

tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last

normal harvest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice

to the landlord is punishable pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law.

HELD:

No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of

the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice

share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the

landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. Thus, the

legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law

ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.

Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy

throughout the country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted

it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire

country "as a land reform area".

The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and

pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that the

Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy

Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing

clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.

As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice

to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had

ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian

Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is

already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that

Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore

pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.

Matabuena v. Cervantes

G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

FACTS:

Appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. After the death of Feliz, Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. Cornelia cites Art. 133 which provides that “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.” The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

HELD:

Yes. While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the

marriage is too prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reasn why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.

Fariñas v. Barba

G.R. No. 116763. April 19, 1996

FACTS:

Carlito B. Domingo, a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos

Norte, resigned after going without leave to the United States. To fill the vacancy

created by his resignation, the mayor, respondent Angelo M. Barba,

recommended to the Governor of the province, petitioner Rodolfo C. Fariñas, the

appointment of respondent Edward Palafox. A similar recommendation for the

appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San

Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution,

containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with §56 of the Local

Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the

Local Government Code, disapproved the resolution “for the reason that the

authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the

Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the

Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino.

The trial court upheld the appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent

Mayor Barba stating that the law applicable is sub-section “C” of Section 45 of

Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power to fill a vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan, which is

created as a result of the cessation from office of a member who does not belong

to a political party, is vested in the provincial governor upon recommendation of

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD:

Yes. The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs. Where the vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian Member not belonging to a Political Party, the Governor, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan, has the power to appoint. Where there is no political party to make a nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs, must be considered the appropriate authority for making the recommendation.

The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor

respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the

preceding discussion, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of

San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. For while, petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the

provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San

Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by

the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor

who appointed him.

Largado v. Masaganda

G.R. No. L-17624. June 30, 1962

FACTS:

On January 7, 1960, Angelo de los Reyes filed a petition before the Justice of the

Peace court of Unisan, Quezon, praying that he be appointed guardian of the

persons and properties of certain minors. Aquilina Largado, mother of the

minors, because of the failure of her counsel to appear, was declared in default.

Two hours later, the counsel appeared and moved for the reconsideration of the

order default, but the same was denied. Thereupon, the justice of the peace

court issued an order appointing Angelo de los Reyes guardian as prayed for.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said justice of the peace court has jurisdiction to appoint a

guardian under Republic Act No. 2613.

HELD:

No. The court a quo answered the question in the negative relying on Section 10

of Republic Act No. 2613, which provides that the jurisdiction of the justice of the

peace courts shall not extend, among others, to the appointment of guardians

even if the Secretary of Justice has ruled otherwise in an opinion rendered in

1959. The provisions of said Act are clear.

The contention that the insertion of the term "guardian" in said Section 10 was

only due to an oversight as opined by the Secretary of Justice may have some

basis, considering the intent of Congress in approving Republic Act 2613;

nevertheless, the court is of the opinion that the mistake cannot be corrected by

executive fiat, but by legislation. This is what Congress in effect did when on

June 17, 1961 it approved Republic Act No. 3090 rectifying the mistake

committed. However, since said Act does not contain any saving clause, its

provisions cannot be given retroactive effect.

U.S. v. Paguirigan

G.R. No. 5348. November 16, 1909

FACTS:

The defendant Paguirigan, charged with having threatened to kill Sotero Pascua,

Vicente Marquez, and Maximo Lopez, was convicted and sentenced under the

second part of article 494 of the Penal Code. The offense was not a serious one,

and there is nothing in the evidence to show that the defendant ever really

contemplated carrying his threat into effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 589 may be invoked against the respondent.

HELD:

Yes. Upon the facts, the defendant should have been convicted under the third

subdivision of article 589, instead of article 494 of the Penal Code. The threats

referred to in article 494 consist in formally threatening a private person with

some injury to himself or his family which would amount to a crime. A threat

made in jest or in the heat of anger is a misdemeanor only under article 589.

Subdivision 3 of article 589 provides that "Those who shall threaten another, by

words and in the heat of anger, with an injury that would constitute a crime, and

who by their subsequent actions show that they persisted in the intention which

they gave utterance to in their threat; provided that, in view of the

circumstances of the deed, it should not be included in Book II of this code,"

The fact that the threat was made in the heat of anger, and that the subsequent

actions of the party show that he did not seriously intend to carry the threat into

execution, reduce the offense from a crime to a misdemeanor, and is punishable

under article 589, instead of article 494, of the Penal Code. A literal adherence to

this language of the law in question would produce the absurd result of making

persistence in an illegal purpose operate in mitigation of the offense. The power

of the court to supply or omit words from a statute in order to prevent an absurd

result which the legislature will not be supposed to have intended, is well

established.

People v. Duque

G.R. No. 100285. August 13, 1992

FACTS:

Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of violating Section

38 in relation to Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, known as The Labor

Code of the Philippines. The charge of illegal recruitment was set out in the

information where the accused well knowing that he is not licensed nor

authorized by the proper government agency (POEA) to engage in recruitment of

workers abroad, exacted and actually received money from the victims, to their

damage and prejudice.Duque contends that the offense of illegal recruitment

had accordingly prescribed by May 1990.

ISSUE:

(1)   Whether or not the criminal offense for which appellant was convicted has

already prescribed.

(2)   Whether or not a literal reading of Section 2 is practicable in the case at bar.

HELD:

(1)   No. The recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary

recruiting permit or authority form the POEA constitutes a crime penalized, not

by the Revised Penal Code, but rather by a special law, i.e., Article 38 in relation

to Article 290 of the Labor Code. Article 290 of the Labor Code provides, in

relevant part, that:

Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations

issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.

The Court agrees with the statement of the Solicitor General that Act No. 3326

supplied the applicable norm.  Section 2 of Act No. 3326, provides that

“Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of

the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof

and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.”

The court holds that the applicable prescriptive period in the case at bar began

to run from the time the recruitment activities of appellant Duque were

ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out

without any license or authority from the government. The discovery by the

complainants and by the POEA was simultaneous in character and occurred

sometime in December 1989 when the complainants went to the POEA with the

complaint for recovery of the placement fees and expenses they had paid to

appellant Duque, and the POEA, acting upon that complaint, discovered and

informed the private complainants that Duque had operated as a recruiter

without the essential government license or authority. Accordingly, the offense

of illegal recruitment had not prescribed when the complaint was filed with the

Provincial Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when the information was filed in

court in May 1990.

(2)   No. It should be noted, firstly, that the literal reading that appellant suggests,

does not benefit appellant, for the prescriptive period in the case at bar had not

in any case been exhausted since prosecution of appellant commenced only a

few months after the POEA and the complainants had discovered that appellant

had no governmental authority to recruit for overseas work and was merely

pretending to recruit workers for overseas employment and to receive money

therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt to locate employment abroad

for complainants. Secondly, the court does not think there is any real need for

such a literal reading of Section 2. As is well-known, initiation of proceedings for

preliminary investigation of the offense normally marks the interruption of the

period of prescription. Under appellant Duque's literal reading, the prescription

period would both begin and be interrupted by the same occurrence; the net

effect would be that the prescription period would not have effectively begun,

having been rendered academic by the simultaneous interruption of that same

period. A statute providing for prescription of defined criminal offenses is more

than a statute of repose and constitutes an act of grace by which the State, after

the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute

the criminal act. A statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the

part of the State in favor of the offender. The applicable well-known principles of

statutory interpretation are that statutes must be construed in such a way as to

give effect to the intention of the legislative authority, and so as to give a

sensible meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or

absurd results, departing to the extent unavoidable from the literal language of

the statute. Appellant's literal reading would make nonsense of Section 2 of Act

No. 3326.

Amatan v. Aujero

A.M. No. RTJ-93-956. September 27, 1995

FACTS:

A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" of the crime of

murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed. After preliminary

investigation by the office of the provincial fiscal, an information charged Umpad

with the crime of Homicide.

Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the Public

Prosecutor and the consent of the offended party, entered into plea bargaining

where it was agreed that the accused would plead guilty to the lesser offense

of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as originally charged in the

information. Respondent judge found the accused guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted Homicide exactly in accordance with the

plea bargaining agreement. 

A letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S. Amatan,

a brother-in-law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross

incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct wherein he

contended that the sentence of respondent judge finding the accused guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide and not

Homicide as charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in finding

the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted

Homicide.

HELD:

Yes. While it is true that Sec. 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to

lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime

charged", the fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad

was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be

reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide.

In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to

injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and

everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes

judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent

is to promote right and justice.  The fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of

frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a

possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such

principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and

reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the

performance of his duties.

Salvacion v. Central Bank

G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and

lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his

apartment.  Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days and

was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on

February 5, 6, and 7, 1989.  On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people

living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the

Makati Municipal Jail.  The policemen recovered from Bartelli a Dollar Account in

China Banking Corp.

The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking

Corporation. China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of Central Bank

Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli

are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any

court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,

whatsoever.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of

R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency

Deposit Act can be made applicable to a foreign transient.

HELD:

No. The foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encourage by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. “Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377) It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are inapplicable to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.

Demafiles v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-28396. December 29, 1967

FACTS:

The petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for

the mayoralty in the general elections. On November 21 the respondent Galido

asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to

section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously

manufactured", the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that the said

return shows that 195 voters were registered, of whom 188 voted, when,

according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had

registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1997. At its session on the following

day, November 22, the board, over the objection of one member, voted to reject

the return from precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns

from the other precints. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844

for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the

municipality of Sebaste.

On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the

board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent

proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito

Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists.

The  COMELEC resolved to annul the canvass and proclamation of the local

officials of the new municipality of Sebaste, Antique, which was made by the

Provincial Board of Antique and to constitute the Board of Canvassers by

appointing the substitutes pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the

Revised Election Code, which shall canvass anew the results of the election for

local offices.

ISSUES:

(1)   Whether or not the case is moot because respondent Galido had taken his oath

and assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870.

(2)   Whether or not the canvassing board may pass upon the validity of the election

return in this case.

(3)   Whether or not the canvass and proclamation should be annulled.

HELD:

(1)   No. In the court’s view, the last portion of the provision — "and shall have

qualified" — is devoid of any meaning and does not warrant the respondent's

reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins

immediately after their proclamation. Here is a clear case of a failure to express

a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from

assuming and, consequently, from supplying. The court agreed by the general

rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of

January following their election, and so the assumption of office by the

respondent Galido in no way affected the basic issues in this case.

(2)   Yes. A canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function — that of

compiling and adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to it.

However, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much less

exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct

from whence it came are illegal. But the exclusion of the return in this case is

sought to be justified on the ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because,

contrary to the statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of

whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states that only

182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967.

(3)   Yes. The canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four

members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they

being candidates for reelection. The statement of respondent Galido that

reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under section 28

only when the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them

from canvassing their own votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of

canvassers, is branded as obiter dictum

The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a

provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal

canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the

maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.

People v. Gutierrez

G.R. No. L-32282-83. November 26, 1970

FACTS:

Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by

the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of

Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent

herein), denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos.

47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.,"

to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District; to direct the

respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the

cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital

of the province.

The Secretary issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario

Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal

Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as

implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of

Justice. The Administrative Orders were issued at the instance of the witnesses

seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or

Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety.

ISSUES:

(1)   Whether or not Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below,

but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit

Criminal Court.

(2)   Whether or not the cases should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court.

HELD:

(1)   Yes. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts

nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases

to the circuit courts. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226 relied upon

by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and

Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second

Judicial District. Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing

Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the

limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders

heretofore mentioned.

(2)   Yes. It is unfortunate that in refusing to consider Department Administrative

Order No. 226 as mandatory, respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the

contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases should be transferred

because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the

prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where

they felt their lives would be endangered.  There is an imperious necessity of

transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be

judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the

State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.

Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a),

would result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts

of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the

general rule relied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional

exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of

the law would become the highest injustice — "summum jus, summa in juria."

Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 191618. June 7, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Atty. Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,

Article VII of the Constitution. While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court

is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation

of a purportedly "separate tribunal". Petitioner avers that the designation of the

Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section

12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of

the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency

performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this

Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12,

Article VIII of the Constitution.

HELD:

No. On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the

establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit,

otherwise. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution should be read with other

related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the

Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Contrary to

petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole

judge of election contests involving our country’s highest public officials, and its

rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all

necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.

Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of the court’s power to

judge presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rule-

making power adjunct thereto, is plenary. The court reiterate that the

establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the

1987 Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme

Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all

courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests,

with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a

derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly

provided in the Constitution.

The court had previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which

Members of the Court were designated. The PET, as intended by the framers of

the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the

judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. The vehicle for the exercise of this

power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the

Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to

this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner’s, should not

constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.

Chua v. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits

for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as

well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to

avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:

Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the

National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with

original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits

authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency

employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive

years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the

coverage of this Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the

program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National

Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same. The NIA and the

Civil Service contend that petitioner is excluded from the benefits of Republic Act

No. 6683 because petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per

appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA,

and said project was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's

position became functus officio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s application for ealy retirement benefits under

Republic Act No. 6683 should be granted.

HELD:

Yes. The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim

the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon

early/voluntary retirement of their occupants.Co-terminous or project personnel,

on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be

included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their

application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with

CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA

and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act

No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an

application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is

entitled to the benefits of said law.

COA v. Province of Cebu

G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001;

FACTS:

In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the

Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of

the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged

against the provincial SEF.  Likewise charged to the SEF were the college

scholarship grants of the province.  Consequently, the COA issued Notices of

Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of

teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school

teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the

establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses for

college scholarship grants, may be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF)

of the local government unit concerned.

HELD:

Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the

compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Under the doctrine of

necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and

maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who

should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services.  Every statute is

understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to

effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges

or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary

consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.  Ex

necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of

these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and

maintenance of extension classes.

Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged principally

with the DECS. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-

related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection

with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. With respect,

however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the

Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects for

which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated.  

Shioji v. Harvey

G.R. No. L-18940. April 27, 1922

FACTS:

In cause No. 19471 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein S. Shioji was

plaintiff, and the Toyo Kisen Kaisah and the Pacific Mail Steamship Co., were

defendants, judgment was rendered on October 31, 1920, by Judge Concepcion

presiding in the second branch of the court, in favor of the plaintiff and against

the defendants. Thereafter, the defendants duly perfected an appeal by way of

bill of exceptions, to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands filed on

February 16, 1922.

The countermove of the respondents in the injunction proceedings pending the

Court of First Instance was to file a complaint in prohibition in the Supreme

Court, to compel the respondent Judge of First Instance to desist from interfering

with the execution of the judgment in case No. 19471 of the Court of First

Instance of Manila and to issue an order revoking the previously promulgated by

him. The preliminary injunction prayed for as an incident to the complaint in

prohibition was immediately issued by the Supreme Court, and has been

complied with by the respondents herein. Counsel Petitioner herein moves for

judgment on the pleadings.

ISSUE:

(1)   Whether or not the Judge of First Instance may assume the jurisdiction to

interpret and review judgment and order of the Supreme Court, and to obstruct

the enforcement of the decisions of the appellate court.

(2)   Whether or not Rule 24 (a) is in conflict with any law of the United States or of

the Philippine Islands.

HELD:

(1)   No. The only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a high court is

returned, is the ministerial one, the issuing of the order of execution, and that

lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the

judgment of the higher court as it would seem to be superfluous. A judge of a

lower court cannot enforce different decrees than those rendered by the superior

court. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Island is expressly authorized by

statute to make rules for regulation of its practice and the conduct of its

business. Section 28 of the Judiciary Act (No. 136), grants to the members of the

Supreme Court the power to "make all necessary rules for orderly procedure in

Supreme Court . . . in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil

Procedure, which rules shall be . . . binding upon the several courts."

(2)   No, Rule 24 (a) is not in conflict with any law of the United States or of the

Philippines, but is a necessary rule for orderly procedure and for regulating the

conduct of business in Supreme Court. It is a rule which relates to a matter of

practice and procedure over which the Legislature has not exercised its power. It

is a rule which does not operate to deprive a party of any statutory right. It is a

rule in harmony with judicial practice and procedure over which the Legislature

has not exercised its power. It is a rule which does not operate to deprive a party

of any statutory right. It is a rule in harmony with judicial practice and procedure

and essential to the existence of the courts. And, finally, it is a rule which must

be enforced according to the discretion of the court. Independent of any

statutory provision, the court asserts that every court has inherent power to do

all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope

of its jurisdiction.

Luciano v. Provincial Governor

G.R. No. 30306. June 20, 1969

FACTS:

The petition now before us, originally for mandamus filed by Jose C. Luciano,

Councilor of Makati, Rizal, who received the highest number of votes in the last

general elections of 1967, to compel the Provincial Governor and/or the

Provincial Board of Rizal under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act to suspend Makati Mayor Maximo Estrella and others, soon branched out to

include quo warranto to have petitioner declared to be entitled to act as Mayor of

Makati, Rizal and, thereafter, further expanded to add a prayer for injunction

against newly named party respondents, Judges Delfin B. Flores and Herminio C.

Mariano, both of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the Court of Appeals,

because said judges and the Court of Appeals have restrained or enjoined the

suspension of Mayor Estrella and others.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise the mandatory act of suspension under Section 13 of the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

HELD:

It is true to say that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act grants with specifity upon the Court of First Instance the power to suspend

an official charged with a violation thereof. The plain import of the last sentence

of Section 13, which says that if acquitted, is that a defendant in an Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices case "shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries

and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the

meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him."   And so,

there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is filed in court, all

other acts connected with the discharge of court functions — which here include

suspension — should be left to the Court of First Instance. Section 13 requires as

a pre-condition of the power to suspend that there be a valid information.

          Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed

from one who should logically do so, and considering that in the operation of a

given statute fairness must have in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside

needless refinements, and rule that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid information upon the provisions thereof is

lodged with the Court of First Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to

suspend the public official indicted there under.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936

FACTS:

Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of

Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the

only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and

praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member

of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of

said position be nullified. Petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in

the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss

the Protest", alleging that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed

period. Petitioner, in seeking for the issuance of the writ prayed for, contends

that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral

Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National

Assembly.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its

jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the

election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation

thereof by the National Assembly.

HELD:

No. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating

to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,

is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in

the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is

an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And

this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express

prohibition in the Constitution.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the

power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its

cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a

general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary

for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred

(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence

of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in

filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power

to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power

to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of

members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to

have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents

G.R. 26803, Oct. 14, 1975

FACTS:

In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners challenge

the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine

Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of

Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter

partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining

the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director

and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the

registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the

purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-

mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-

mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Director of Patents may be compelled to personally hear the

cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

HELD:

No. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain

the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of

other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the

Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the

Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter

submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act.

Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval

of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations,

not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office."

It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which

the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders

as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and

provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular

function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been

withheld.  There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing

the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is

concerned. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of

Patents suggests that the aforecited laws should be construed so as to give the

aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and

expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. It could

hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him

to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave

him little time to attend to his other duties. For him to do so and at the same

time attend personally to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility

imposed upon his Office by law would not further the development of orderly and

responsible administration. The remedy is a far wider range of delegations to

subordinate officers. This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound

principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to

concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of

policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the

consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail." 

People v. Concepcion

G.R. No. 19190. November 29, 1922

FACTS:

By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of

the Philippine National Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine

National Bank, between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an

extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of

P300,000. "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership. Venancio

Concepcion is a member of the board of directors of this bank and was charged

with a violation of Section 35 of Act No. 2747. Section 35 of Act No. 2747,

provides that "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to

any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the

branch banks."         

ISSUE:

Whether or not the granting of a credit to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion,

S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an

"indirect loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747 hence violative

of said law.

HELD:

Yes. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim

that no man may serve two masters — that where personal interest clashes with

fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the

husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business

venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls

within the prohibition. A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a

director of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such director. The court is

of the opinion that the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well

as to himself directly. The loan was made indirectly to him through his firm.

Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo

G.R. No. 96422. February 28, 1994

FACTS:

On January 26, 1980, petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on

Audit (COA) to serve a term of seven years expiring on January 26, 1987.

Petitioner had discharged the functions of Chairman of the COA in an acting

capacity since 1975. On December 31, 1985, petitioner applied for clearance

from all money, property and other accountabilities in preparation for his

retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for, which covered the period from

1976 to December 31, 1985. Petitioner sought a second clearance to cover the

period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. All the signatures necessary to

complete the second clearance, except that of Chairman Guingona, were

obtained.

In a letter dated December 21, 1989, a copy of which was received by petitioner

on December 27, 1989, respondent Chairman informed petitioner of the approval

of his application for retirement under R.A. No. 1568, effective as of March 9,

1986. However, respondent Chairman added that in view of the audit findings

and inventory report adverted, payment of only one-half (½) of the money value

of the benefits due petitioner by reason of such retirement will be allowed,

subject to the availability of funds and the usual accounting and auditing rules.

Payment of the balance of said retirement benefits shall be subject to the final

results of the audit concerning petitioner’s fiscal responsibility and/or

accountability as former Chairman of this Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the withholding of one-half of petitioner’s retirement pay is valid.

HELD:

No. Respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits due petitioner under the

retirement laws. In said case, where petitioner herein was one of the

respondents, we found that the employee had been cleared by the National

Treasurer from all money and property responsibility, and held that the

retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied to

his indebtedness to the government. Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws

are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide

for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of

earning his livelihood (Profeta vs. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]). The petition is

granted insofar as it seeks to compel respondent Chairman of the COA to pay

petitioner's retirement benefits in full and his monthly pensions beginning in

March 1991.

Matuguina Integrated Wood Products v. CA

G.R. No. 98310 October 24, 1996

FACTS:

Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. (MIWPI) filed this action for prohibition,

Damages and Injunction, in order to prevent the respondent Minister of Natural

Resources from enforcing its Order of Execution against it, for liability arising

from an alleged encroachment of the petitioner over the timber concession of

respondent DAVENCOR located in Mati, Davao Oriental. The Court of Appeals in

its decision found MIWPI as an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina and/or Matuguina

Logging Enterprises (MLE), to be liable to DAVENCOR for illegal encroachment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a transferee of a forest concession is liable for obligations arising

from the transferor’s illegal encroachment into another forest concessionaire

committed prior to the transfer.

HELD:

No. Section 61 of P.D. 705 provides that “Unless authorized by the Department

Head, no licensee, lessee, or permittee may transfer, exchange, sell, or convey

his license agreement, license, lease or permit, or any of his rights or interest

therein, or any of his assets used in connection therewith.

The licensee, lessee, or permittee shall be allowed to transfer or convey his

license agreement, license, lease, or permit only if he has not violated any

forestry law, rule or regulation; has been faithfully complying with the terms and

conditions of the license agreement, license, lease or permit; the transferee has

all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to hold a license

agreement, license, lease or permit; there is no evidence that such transfer or

conveyance is being made for purposes of speculation; and the transferee shall

assume all the obligations of the transferor.”

In construing statutes, the terms used therein are generally to be given their

ordinary meaning, that is, such meaning which is ascribed to them when they

are commonly used, to the end that absurdity in the law must be avoided. The

term “obligations” as used in the final clause of the second paragraph of Section

61 of P.D. 705 is construed to mean those obligations incurred by the transferor

in the ordinary course of business.  It cannot be construed to mean those

obligations or liabilities incurred by the transferor as a result of transgressions of

the law, as these are personal obligations of the transferor, and could not have

been included in the term “obligations” absent any modifying provision to that

effect.

Ernesto v. CA

GR 52178, Sep 28, 1982

FACTS:

Petitioner for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-

08166-R, Demetrio Ernesto, et. al. vs. San Carlos Milling Co., et al., which

affirmed the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch III, City of San

Carlos dismissing the complaint of petitioners seeking the payment of their 60%

share of the alleged contractual increase in the share of the planters in the

proceeds of sugarcane milled in respondent's sugar mill during the crop years

1958-59 to 1967-68 and all subsequent crop years to which they maintain they

are entitled under the Sugar Act of 1952 (R.A. 809).

Petitioners insist that in the San Carlos Milling district, there was no such majority during all the times materials hereto, which contention is denied by respondents. And the issue revolves solely around the point of whether or not so-called emergency, non-quota and non-district or accommodation planters should be counted in determining the majority contemplated in the law. The determination of the issue is decisive because the record indicates that if the emergency, or non-quota, non-district and "accommodation" planters are to be considered in ascertaining how many "planters" with written milling contracts with the sugar mill", the result would be that the planters in the San Carlos Milling district with such written contracts would be in the minority, in which case Section 9 of Republic Act 809 would be applicable, not in relation to any contractual increase in the share of the planters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not so-called emergency, non-quota and non-district or

accommodation planters should be counted in determining the majority of

planters contemplated in the law.

HELD:

Yes. The court believes that there is no valid reason why the statutory definition

of planters under Act 4166 and Executive Orders 900 and 901 should still be

adhered to after the factual situation to which they were addressed had already

changed. The limitation to sugar quotas, whether export, domestic or reserve

among all the mills continued only until 1955. From that year, emergency, non-

quota, non-district or accommodation planters came into being with the

blessings of the Sugar Quota Administration. With such a change in situation, it

would not be logical to continue adhering to the previous definitions that had

already lost their legal effect. Consequently, the court is of the considered

opinion that after the quota system ceased, the definition of planters within the

district for the purposes of Section 1 of the Sugar Act should be all planters who

delivered their sugarcane to the respondent Central who milled the same. Hence,

as such, they should all be counted in determining the total number of planters

in the sugar district in ascertaining whether or not a majority of them have

written milling contracts with the respondent Central.

Amadora v. CA

G.R. No. L-47745 Apr. 15, 1988

FACTS:

While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-

Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo,

ending all his expectations and his life as well. Daffon was convicted of homicide

thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's

parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code

against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal,

the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other

students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students

was later dropped. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was

reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. The respondent court

found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos

was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 2180 of the Civil Code applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.

HELD:

Yes. The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should

apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is

academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort

committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,

following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of

establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall

be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in

general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is

technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.

Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the

words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to

the word "apprentices."

Carandang v. Santiago

G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the

Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173,

entitled Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial

of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First

Instance of Batangas. In this criminal case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty

of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the person of Cesar

Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the

Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission itself

states that the civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort

for libel or slander and assault and battery under American law. But respondents

argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime

defined in the Revised Penal Code.

In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of

frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound

was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar

Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical

injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is

attended by the intent to kill.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the criminal action for frustrated homicide.

HELD:

Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical

injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there

are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means

of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must

have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the

Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind,

it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its

specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to

believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article —

some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term

"physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of

physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945

FACTS:

This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge

of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012

of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of

the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these

Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the

proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October

23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and

nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines

under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines

established during the Japanese military occupation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General

Douglas MacArthur, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and

processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said

Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the

Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," affects the proceedings in civil

cases pending in court under the so-called Republic of the Philippines established

during the Japanese military occupation.

HELD:

No. The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not

only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as

constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental

agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. It should be

presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General

Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in

said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of principles of

international law. The court ruled that the term “processes” does not refer to

judicial processes but to executive orders of the Chairman of the Philippine

Executive Committee, ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called

Republic of the Philippines and the constitution itself of said Republic, and others

that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the word

“processes” is associated.

Escribano v. Avila

G.R. No. L-30375, Sep. 12, 1978

FACTS:

On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governor-elect

of Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of First Instance of that province a

complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong, Cotabato. In that

complaint Escribano was charged with having said in a speech, which was

broadcasted on a radio station, that "Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever

live in this province.” Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the

preliminary investigation of the offense. Judge Avila in his orders of March 5, 20

and 27, 1969 ruled that he had the power to conduct the preliminary

investigation. On April 1, 1969 Escribano filed in this Court against Judge Avila

and Pendatun the instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition,

praying that the said orders of Judge Avila be set aside. On April 18 Escribano

filed a supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila's order of March 29, 1969. In

that order he found that Pendatun's evidence had "established a probable cause

to believe that" libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano "probably

committed the same". The city fiscal filed an information for libel against

Escribano. Petitioner invokes the provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal

Code, which were inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, which do not empower the

Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of written

defamations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority

to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by

means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is lodged exclusively in

the city attorney of that city.

HELD:

Yes. The lawmaking body, by means of that amendment of Art. 360, never

intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance to

conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely sought

to strip the ordinary municipal court of its power to hold a preliminary

investigation of written defamations. The fact that the Court of First Instance is

not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct the preliminary

investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it cannot conduct such

preliminary investigation, following the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio

alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another or the enumeration

of particular things excludes the Idea of something else not mentioned.)

However, the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in this

case because, as shown above, the fact that the Court of First Instance is not

mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a preliminary

investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to do with the purpose

of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a law, the court must

look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be

remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it should give the law a

reasonable or liberal construction which win best effect its purpose rather than

one which win defeat it. The silence of article 360 on the power of a judge of the

Court of First Instance to conduct an investigation of criminal actions for written

defamations does not preclude a judge of that court from holding such

investigation.

People v. Tamani

G.R. No. 22160, Jan 21, 1974

FACTS:

After the appellant had filed his brief, the Solicitor General filed a motion to

dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was forty-seven days

late. The lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was promulgated

on February 14, 1963. He filed his notice of appeal only on September 10, 1963

or forty eight days from July 24th.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 15-day period within which to appeal a judgment of conviction in a criminal action is counted from the date of promulgation of judgment.

HELD:

Yes. Section 22, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of judgment or order appealed from.” The court held that the 15-day period should be counted from the promulgation and not from receipt of copy of judgment. The word "promulgation" in Section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" under Section 6 of Rule 120, while the word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis. Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which to file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was fifty-eight days late.

People v. Purisima

G.R. No. L-42050, Nov. 20, 1978

FACTS:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the

Philippines charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly

weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by

the accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the

Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts

which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it

failed to state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under PD No. 9.

HELD:

No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of

the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that

the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an

Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are

incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the

accusation is in order.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is

to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is

the controlling factor, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the

statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in

absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem of determining

what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into

the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the

preamble or, “whereas" clauses.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid

presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative

measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is

favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful,

evil, and injurious consequences. 

Quibuyen v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-16854, Dec 26, 1963

FACTS:

In this case, the defendants filed three motions but they were denied. On August

15, 1958, judgment was rendered. On September 29, 1958, they filed a pleading

entitled "Petition for Relief from Judgment", which was denied by the trial judge

on January 5, 1959. On January 10 and 29, 1959 they filed their notice of appeal

and appeal bond, respectively; but the record on appeal was not registered until

February 4, 1959. On February 12, 1959, the plaintiff filed their opposition to the

approval of the defendants' appeal, on the ground that the order of January

5,1958 and the judgment on the merits of August 15, 1958 are not appealable

the latter having already become final and executory. On April 27, 1959, the

Judge issued an Order denying the defendants' appeal, for the reasons stated in

plaintiffs' opposition dated February 12, 1959 and granted the issuance a writ of

execution.

Petitioners, in contending that their petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was sufficient invokes Rule 67 which provides that petition is issued only if the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process. But the Court of Appeals found that the petition was fatally defective, in the sense that the necessary supporting papers were not attached with the petition, and most important, the precise order dated January 5, 1959, which petitioners sought to annul through said petition. Petitioners contended that the order of January 5, 1959, the order of the trial judge denying the petition for relief mentioned or designated in the prayer of the petition, was not the order which was being assailed, but the order of April 27, 1959, which was attached as Annex A, to the petition for certiorari and this was the one refusing to give due course to the appeal from the order denying the petition for relief filed by the petitioners. Petitioners submit that Annex A, order of the trial court under date of April 27, 1959, having been actually attached to the petition, it was no longer necessary for petitioners to attach the other supporting papers, such as the petition for relief, the opposition thereto, the order denying the said petition for relief and so forth.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals is sufficient in form and substance, such that a dismissal by said Court of said petition on the ground that is "fatally defective” is invalid.

(2)   Whether or not it is necessary petitioners to attach still "other supporting

papers" since a copy of the order sought be annulled was actually attached to

the certiorari petition, as Annex A. 

HELD:

(1) No. The court is satisfied that it is a case of lapsus calami. The mistake consists in mentioning in the prayer of the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that the writ be issued "annulling the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge of January 5, 1959, and directing the respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal interposed by the herein petitioners", without a attaching a copy of said order, but accompanying the said petition, as Annex A, with a copy of the order of the court dated April 27, 1959. The order of January 5, 1959 was one denying the petition for relief "for lack of merit" while order of April 27, 1959 was an order denying the defendants' appeal and granting the issuance of a writ of execution. The petition mentioned the order of January 5, 1959 as the order assailed, instead of designating that April 27, 1959, as the order appealed from. It is seen, therefore, that the designation of the order by date, in the petition was a mistake.

(2)   No. The query invites a negative answer, because it being a special action

of certiorari, Rule 67 governs, at least, in matter of form of petition. All that the

Rules require is that the petition be verified, the facts be alleged with certainty

and it must pray for the annulment of the judgment order complained of (sec. 1,

Rule 67). These requisites were met by the petitioner with the respondent Court.

Granting for the sake of argument, that section 2, Rule 49 is applicable, the

same was also substantially complied with. The copy of the order of April 27,

1959 was filed as (Annex A with the petition, on the date the petition was

presented, and the other pleadings such as the Petition for Relief from Judgment

Annex B), opposition to petition for relief (Annex C) order of the respondent court

denying petition for relief (Annex D), Notice of Appeal (Annex E), Opposition to

Defendants' appeal, and Motion for Execution (Annex F), with the motion for

reconsideration, dated March 14, 1960, of the order of dismissal of the petition,

which served to cure the alleged defect, in form and substance, of the petition in

question. If at all, petitioners were guilty of a technical violation of procedural

requirements, a technicality which does not seem to be of much moment

presently, since the reason for its existence had been satisfied.

Ferrer v. Pecson

G.R. No. L-5221. October 27, 1952

FACTS:

On March 1, 1949, the petitioner Benito Ferrer Y Rodriguez was accused before

the municipal court of Manila of serious physical injuries through reckless

imprudence in the said court. After trial, the Municipal Court of Manila found him

guilty and sentenced him to three (3) months of arresto mayor. Defendant

appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila. Petitioner through

counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Municipal Court

of Manila had no jurisdiction over the offense and, consequently, the Court of

First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Municipal Court of Manila had jurisdiction over the offense.

HELD:

No. The jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the

law at the time of the institution of the action. Sec. 67 of the Revised Motor

Vehicle Law and not under the Revised Penal Code. The criminal jurisdiction of a

justice of the peace or a municipal court as defined in the Judiciary Act of 1948 is

confined to offenses in which the penalty is not more than six (6) months. From

this it is clear that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over this case

where a maximum penalty of six (6) years may be imposed; and if it had no

original jurisdiction, the Court of First Instance presided over by Judge Pecson

had likewise no appellate jurisdiction.

It is true that section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law was amended by

section 16 of Republic Act No. 587, in the sense that acts of negligence or

reckless or unreasonably fast driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury

upon any person shall be prosecuted and punished under the provisions of the

Revised Penal Code. But this act may not be given retroactive effect so as to

confer on the municipal court jurisdiction which it did not have when it tried and

decided the case against petitioner. It may be true that the provisions of the

penal code are more favorable to the petitioner in this case as regards the

penalty, but when the very accused, herein petitioner, far from invoking the

benefits of said Republic Act No. 587, disregards it and instead, invokes the

Revised Motor Vehicle Law which was in force at the time that the acts imputed

to him were committed, at least for that reason alone the question of

retroactivity cannot and will not be considered.