Krivenko vs Register of Deeds

GR No. L-630, November 15, 1947; 79 Phil 461

(Land Titles and Deeds – Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts: An alien bought a residential lot and its registration was denied by the Register of Deeds on the ground that being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. When the former brought the case to the CFI, the court rendered judgement sustaining the refusal of the Register of Deeds.

Issue: WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Held. No. ―Public agricultural lands‖ mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court stated: ;Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,‘ and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens.

Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides:Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

Halili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113539, 12 March 1998

First Division, J. Panganiban. Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who

subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is deemed cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

If the rationale of the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve the nation's landsfor future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved bymaking lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who subsequently become Filipino citizensby naturalization, or the transfer to Filipino citizens.

HALILI vs. CA

GR # 113539, MARCH 23, 1998

FACTS: Private respondents, both American Citizens, inherited real properties

from Simeon de Guzman, who died intestate, located in the Philippines. His wife, Helen, executed a deed of quit claim assigning, transferring and conveying to their son, David Rey, all her rights, titles and interests in and over 6 parcels of land which the 2 of them inherited from Simeon who himself was an AMCIT. David thereafter sold the land to private respondent Emiliano Cataniag. Petitioners, the adjoining lot‘s owners, questioned the validity and constitutionality of the 2 conveyances, i.e. from Helen to David and between David and Emiliano. They also claimed ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art.1621, NCC.

HELD: The SC ruled that although Helen‘s deed of quit claim -in which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to David all her rights, titles, and interests over the property she had inherited from her husband- collided with Sec.7, Art. XII of the 87 Constitution. Since the disputed land is now owned by Cataniag, a FILCIT, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our land in Filipino hands has been served. Non Filipinos can not acquire or hold

title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. However, if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

 LLANTINO V. CO LIONG CHONG (1990)

F a c t s :Co Liong Chong entered a contract with Llantino Sps for a lease of land for a period of 60 years.Note that Co Liong Chong was naturalized as a Filipino citizen (changed name to JuanMolina).Llantino sps wanted to recover the property from Co Liong Chong.

I s s u e :WON the lease contract is INvalid because at the time of its execution, he was a Chinese?

H e l d :NO. it was VALID. Lease contracts with Aliens allowed since an alien's stay in RP is temporary,they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not prohibited by theConstitution-the lease contract is valid as long as there are no circumstances attendant to its executionwhich are used to circumvent the constitutional prohibition such as an option to buy the contractor a lease for more than 50 years. An exception to this exception is when the alien subsequentlyacquires Philippine Citizenship.

Llantino vs. Co Liong Chong (1990): Capacity of the person to transfer or acquire real property is governed by law of the place

where property is located: Constitution allows an alien to use lands for residential purposes for a reasonable period (i.e. through lease); so is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. LRC

(1957)G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957FACTS: October 4, 1954:

Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.

• The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a previous resolution of the CFI in Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60% of the members of their corp. were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of their congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit a similar affidavit declaring the same.

• June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to submit an affidavit but not in the same tenor as the Carmelite Nuns because it had five incorporators while as a corporation sole it has only one and it was ownership through donation and this was purchased

• As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) : Deeds has some doubts as to the registerability, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution (section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151)

• LRC:o In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizeno ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition• action for mandamus was instituted by Roman alleging the land is held in true for the benefit of the Catholic population of a place

ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution

HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale• A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had.

o In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters• corporation sole

1. composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever

2. only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole and such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole

3. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.

• Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)

• undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizenso presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution

• fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against the revitalization of religious landholdings.

• as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in

position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust

 REGISTER OF DEEDS vs UNG SIU SI TEMPLEGR. No. L-6776 May 21,1955FACTS:A Filipino citizen executed a deed of donation in favor of the Ung Siu Si Temple, an unregistered religiousorganization that operated through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The Register of Deeds refused torecord the deed of donation executed in due form arguing that the Consitution provides that acquisition of landis limited to Filipino citizens, or to corporations or associations at least 60% of which is owned by suchcitizens.ISSUE:Whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious organization whose founder,trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not.RULING:Sec. 5, Art. 13 of the Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associationsqualified to hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The Constitution does not make any exception in favor of religious associations. The fact that appellant has no capital stock does not exempt it from the Constitutional inhibition, since itsmember are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the 60% requirement is to ensure that corporations or  associations allowed to acquire agricultural lands or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled byFilipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. As to the complaint that the disqualification under Art. 13 of the Constitution violated the freedom of religion, the Court was not convinced that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship.G.R. No. L-31956 April 30, 1984

FILOMENA GERONA DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs.JOAQUIN TENG QUEEN TAN, TAN TENG BIO, DOLORES TAN, ROSARIO TAN HUA ING, and TO O. HIAP, respondents.

FACTS:

Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing petitioner's action for annulment of contract with damages.In 1938, petitioner Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m. residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving herein respondents — his widow, To O. Hiap, and children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing. Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of his sons, Joaquin, became a naturalized Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on November 18, 1962, his heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale, whereby the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to Joaquin.

On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.

ISSUE: Whether the heirs are not allowed to inherit the land owned by Tan Tai because the sale of the land to him violated the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.

HELD: Except for respondent Tan Teng Bio who filed an answer to the complaint, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of (a) lack of cause of action, the plaintiff being in pari delicto with the vendee, and the land being already owned by a Philippine citizen; (b) laches; and (c) acquisitive prescription. The court a quo dismissed the complaint, sustaining the first two grounds invoked by the movants.Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the sale annulled and recover the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property, of respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is constitutionally qualified to own land. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Laches also militates against petitioner's cause. She sold the disputed lot in 1938. She instituted the action to annul the sale only on July 15, 1968. What the Court said in the cited Sarsosa case applies with equal force to the petitioner.... it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction of inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property. Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.The appealed order is affirmed.

REPUBLIC VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the 1) decision * of the FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated May 13, 1986, in AC G.R. No. 01410 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez,

applicant-appellee vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al., Oppositors-appellants, affirming the decision ** of the then Court of FIRST INSTANCE of Quezon, 9th Judicial District, Branch 1, dated November 4, 1980 in Land Registration Case No. N-1106 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of Forest Development , oppositors, ordering the registration of title to the parcel of land designated, as lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and its technical descriptions, and the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592 and its technical description, together with whatever improvements existing thereon, in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena and 2) its resolution Dated June 19,1986, denying appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit." On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of said parcels, denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592 is located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, the Solicitor General filed an Opposition on April 20, 1979, alleging therein among others, that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being applied for. At the initial hearing held on November 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal in representation of the Solicitor General appeared to interpose personal objection to the application. Hence, an Order of General Default against the whole world was issued by the Court a quo except for the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development. For his part, the Fiscal in a Manifestation dated July 22, 1980, said 'the State will not adduce evidence in support of its opposition and will submit the instant case for decision.’ Accordingly, the court ordered the registration of the four parcels together with the improvements thereon "in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole duly registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines." A reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was sought by Appellant Republic of the Philippines, but for lack of merit, its motion for reconsideration was denied on June 19, 1986, by Resolution of the First Civil Case Division, Intermediate Appellate Court which resolution reads in full: Considering appellant Republic of the Philippines "Motion for reconsideration" filed on June 4, 1986; the Court RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit, grounds raised therein having all been considered in the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case.

HELD: In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time the application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision and Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

RELLOSA VS. GAW CHEE HUN

FACTS: On 1944, Dionisio Rellosa, a Filipino, sold to Gaw Chee Hun, a Chinese, a parcel of land with a house erected on it, located in Manila. Both parties entered into a lease contract, whereby Rellosa, the vendor, occupied the land under the condition that Gaw Chee obtain the approval of the sale by the Japanese Administration. Gaw Chee did not obtain such approval. Rellosa now seeks to annul the sale and the lease. Gaw Chee, meanwhile, contends that such sale was absolute and conditional, the same not being contrary to law, morals and public order. He further states that Rellosa is estopped from asserting his ownership over the land, after having leased the same from Gaw Chee, and thus, recognizing Gaw Chee’s title over the property.

ISSUES: WON Rellosa can have the sale declared null and void and recover the property considering the effect of the law governing rescission of contracts.

HELD: The sale in question is null and void, but plaintiff is barred from taking the present action under the principle of pari delicto.

RATIO: A party to an illegal contract cannot come into court to have his illegal objects carried out. This is the doctrine of In Pari Delicto. Rellosa’s sale of the land to Gaw Chee, an alien is against the Constitution and is thus illegal. The Commonwealth Act provided that such sale is not only unlawful but also null and void ab initio, that such will effect the annulling and cancelling of the title originally issued, and reverting the property and its improvements to the State.PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINIA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

LUI SHE, in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng, deceased,defendant-appellant.

FACTS: This is the second motion that the defendant-appellant has filed relative to this Court's decision of September 12, 1967. Accepting the nullity of the other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7), the defendant-appellant nevertheless contended that

the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3) is so separable from the rest of the contracts that it should be saved from invalidation.

In denying the motion, we pointed to the circumstances — that on November 15, 1957, the parties entered into the lease contract (in favor of Wong Heng) for 50 years: that ten days after, they amended the contract so as to make it cover the entire property of Justina Santos; less than a month after, they entered into another contract giving Wong Heng the option to buy the leased premises should his pending petition for naturalization be granted; that on November 18, 1958, after failing to secure naturalization and after finding that adoption does not confer the citizenship of the adopting parent on the adopted, the parties entered into two other contracts extending the lease to 99 years and fixing the period of the option to buy at 50 years which indubitably demonstrate that each of the contracts in question was designed to carry out Justina Santos' expressed wish to give the land to Wong and thereby in effect place its ownership in alien hands, that "as the lease contract was part of a scheme to violate the Constitution it suffers from the same infirmity that renders the other contracts void and can no more be saved from illegality than the rest of the contracts."

The present motion is for a new trial and is based on three documents (1 Codicil and 2 wills) executed by Justina Santos which, so it is claimed, constitute newly- discovered material evidence: Codicil- Justina Santos not only named Tita Yaptinchay LaO the administratrix of her estate with the right to buy the properties of the estate, but also provided that if the said LaO was legally disqualified from buying she was to be her sole heir.

Wills- Justina Santos enjoined her heirs to respect the lease contract made, and the conditional option given, in favor of Wong.

ISSUE: WON the lease contract executed by Santos is valid.

HELD: This is a misrepresentation of the grossest sort. The documents were known to the defendant-appellant and her counsel even before the death of Justina

Santos. Nor is there anything in the documents that is likely to alter the result we have already reached in this case. With respect to the 1957 codicil, it is claimed that Justina Santos could not have intended by the 99-year lease to give Wong the ownership of the land considering that she had earlier devised the property to Tita Yaptinchay LaO.

Without passing on the validity of her testamentary disposition since the issue is one pending before the probate court, it suffices to state here that even granting that Justina Santos had devised the land in dispute to LaO, Justina Santos was not thereby barred or precluded from subsequently giving the land to Wong. The execution of the lease contract which, together with the other contracts, amount

to a transfer of ownership to Wong, constitutes an implied revocation of her codicil, at least insofar as the disposition of the land is concerned.

As for the 1959 wills, it is said that they manifest a desire to abide by the law, as is evident from the statement therein that Wong's right to buy the land be allowed "anytime he or his children should be entitled to buy lands in the Philippines (i.e., upon becoming Filipino citizens)". It seems obvious, however, that this is nothing but a reiteration of the substance of the lease contract and conditional option to buy which in compensation, as our decision demonstrates, amount to a conveyance, the protestation of compliance with the law notwithstanding. In cases like the one at bar, motives are seldom avowed and avowals are not always candid. The problem is not, however, insuperable, especially as in this case the very witnesses for the defendant-appellant testified that —

Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is just natural when she said. "This is what I want and this will be done." In particular reference to this contract of lease, when I said "This is not proper, she said — 'you just go ahead, you prepare that, I am the owner, and if there is illegality, I am the only one that can question the illegality.'"

The ambition of the old woman before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that these properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Dona Justina told me that she did not have any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog. She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and she told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties. That is why we thought of adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Heng might acquired Filipino citizenship, being the adopted child of a Filipino citizen.

The other points raised in the motion for new trial either have already been disposed of in our decision or are so insubstantial to merit any attention. ACCORDINGLY, the motion for new trial is denied.

(lease contract not valid)