FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest

Facts: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Ruling: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest. This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate ore chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government. The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

SIlverio Vs Ca. FACTS : On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings The Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988. ISSUE : WON Silverios Constitutional Right has been violated HELD : Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processesValmonte Vs Belmonte FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties. HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744

FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?

HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

Legaspi Vs Civil Serv. Comm. FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.

Facts: On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held: Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.NERI VS. SENATECOMMITTEE

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the Republic of China. Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.ISSUES: Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege; Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.RULING: The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege. Despite the revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the said information may impair the countrys diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Republic of China.The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information and full public disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is subject to limitation. These include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential. The information subject to this case belongs to such kind. The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.

Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union 59 SCRA 54 (1974)

Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde RopeWorkersUnion who later resigned from his affiliation to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to become affiliated with any labor organization. The union has subsisting closed shopagreementin their collective bargainingagreementwith their employer that all permanent employees of the company must be a member of the union and later was amended byRepublic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating "but suchagreementshall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the union wrote a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the serviceafterwhich he was informed by the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in providingexemptionto be affiliated with any labor unions.

Issue:WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.

Held:The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations which involves two broad notions, namely: first,libertyor freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented bylaw; and second, power, whereby an employee may join or refrain from joining an association. Therefore the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.The exceptions provided by the assailed Republic Actis that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shopagreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus this exception does not infringe upon the constitutional provision on freedom of association but instead reinforces it.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) vs. THE COURT OF APPEALSFacts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.FLORENTINA A. LOZANO v. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZFACTS: This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist the following ground: 1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.RULING: No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions