E. L. R..

A DIGESTOF THE

ELECTION LAW REPORTSVOLS. XI TO XXII

1955—60

Editor:A. N. AIYAR, B.A., B.L.,

Senior Advocate, Supreme Court.

Published under the authority of the Election Commission of Indiaby the Manager of Publications, Civil Lines, Delhi

andPrinted by the Company Law Institute Press, Madras.

All Rights Reserved.

©Government of India.1961

CONTENTS

I. Table of Headings ... i—ii

I I . Table of Cases Digested ... iii—xx

III. Table of Cases overruled, followed etc. ... xxi—lxxix

IV. Digest ... 1—376

V. Index to Statutes referred to ... 377—430

TABLE OF HEADINGS

PAGE

AgencyAppeals (to High Court)

Ballot papers

Corrupt practicei. General principles2. Appeal on grounds of religion etc.3. Bribery4. Publishing false statements5. Hiring or procuring vehicles6. Incurring unauthorised expenses7. Procuring assistance of Government servants8. Undue influence

^Q- Use of national or religious symbols10. Miscellaneous

Council of States

Disqualification of candidates1. Age2. Citizenship3. Corrupt practice

•/ 4. Conviction5. Interest in contract with Government6. Holding office of profit

Double-member constituencies

Election agentsElection circularsElection CommissionElection expenses

'Election petition1. General principles2. Who may present3. Alternative reliefs4. Amendment of petition5. Deposit of security6. Limitation7. Notice to respondents8. Parties to the petition

1

1

12

237892

102

117123144!57166

174

175177181184

185186208

222

231

232

233236

243

244244245258270271271

U ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

PAGE

9. Naming of guilty parties 28110. Withdrawal of petition 28411. Grounds for setting aside election 28612. Miscellaneous matters 292

Election Tribunal1. Constitution 2962. Powers 2993. Contempt of Tribunal 304

Electoral Roll 304

High Courts 311

Interpretation of statutes 314

Legislative Councils 315

Nomination of candidates 319

Offences 347

Poll 3 4 7

Polling agents 348President 350

Recrimination 35!Reorganisation of States 353Res judicata 354Retirement of candidate 355Returning officer 357

Scheduled Castes and Tribes 358Supreme Court 367Symbols 3 6 9

U. P. Panchayat Raj Rules, 1947 374

Voting 374

Words and phrases 374

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTEDE.L.R. VOLS. XI TO XXII

Abdul Hamid Choudhury v. Nani Gopal Swami andOthers (S.C.) 22 E.L.R. 358 io, 27, 369

Abdul Rahiman Khan v. Radha Krushna Biswas Roy(Orissa H.C.) 19 E.L.R. 278 88

Adityan, S.B. v. S. Kandaswami (Madras H.C.) 13 E.L.R.246 101,249, 280

Adityan, S.B. v. S. Kandaswami and Others (S.C.)14 E.L.R. 394 102, 278, 280

Ahmedmiya Sherumiya Shaikh v. Chhippa IbrahimNuraji and Others (Bombay H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 218 52, 99, 185

Akshaya Narayan Praharaj v. Maheswar Bag (OrissaH.C.) 16 E.L.R. 337 96, 129, 196

Allah Bux v. Ratan Lai Jain (Allahabad H.C.) 15 E.L.R.407 194, 295

Amar Singh v. Balbir Singh and Others (Punjab H.C.)19 E.L.R. 457 105, 151

Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani (Election Tribunal,Delhi) 18 E.L.R. 209 63

Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani (Punjab H.C.) 21E.L.R. 286 51, 69, 165, 166

Amjad Ali v. B. C. Barua and Others (Assam H.C.) 13E.L.R. 285 282

Amjad Ali v. Nazmul Haque : Jahanuddin Ahmed andAnother v. Nazmul Haque (Assam H.C.) 21 E.L.R.345 48' 84

Anjaneya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy and Others (Mysore 24, 68,103,106,H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 247 135

Ashfaq Ali Khan v. Darshan Singh and Others(Allahabad H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 136 82, 91, 116, 290

Ashraf Ali Khan v. Tika Ram and Others (AllahabadH.C.) 20 E.L.R. 470 43, 273, 375

Aslam Khan v. Fazal Haque Khan and Others (AllahabadH.C.) 16 E.L.R 34 182

Babulal Sharma v. Brijnarayan Brajesh and Others(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 72 249

Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney (Nagpur Election Tribunal)22 E.L.R. 105 . 38, 40, 76, 272

Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney (Bombay H.C.) 22 E.L.R. 321 76, 86, 257, 272,

369

iv ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh andAnother: Kamdeo Prasad Singh v. Badri NarainSingh (Patna H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 64 n o , 123, 210

Badrivishal Pittie v. J. V. Narsingh Rao (AndhraPradesh H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 183 195, 34^

Baleshwar Ram v. Rampadarath Mahton and Others :Mishri Sinha v. Rampadarath Mahton and Others(Patna H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 390 203

Balwan Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, and Others(Allahabad H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 199 36, 154, 303

Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain and Others (S.C.)22 E.L.R. 273 26, 27, 119, 368

Balwant Rai Tayal v. Bishan Saroop and Another(Punjab H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 101 25, 52, 98

Banerji, S.M. v. Sri Krishna Agarwal (S.C.) 22 E.L.R.64 256

Baru Ram v. Shrimati Prasanni and Another(Punjab H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 127 326

Baru Ram v. Shrimati Prasanni and Others (S.C.) 9, 11, 149, 327,16 E.L.R. 450 350, 367

Basaviah v. Bachiah and Others (Mysore H.C.) 17E.L.R. 293 20, 358

Basawaraj K. Nagur v. B. R. Shidlingappa (Election 47, 158, 220, 293,Tribunal, Bijapur) 12 E.L.R. 168 338, 344

Bhagwan Datt Shastri v. Ram Ratan Gupta andOthers : Bhagwan Datt Shastri v. Badri NarayanSingh and Others (S.C.) 11 E.L.R. 448 31, 70, 122

Bhagwan Singh v. Rameshwar Prasad Sastri andOthers (S.C.) 21 E.L.R. 126 203

Bhairon Lai v. Dungarsi Das and Another (ElectionTribunal, Jaipur) 15 E.L.R. 115 213

Bhaironlal v. Doongarsidas and Another (RajasthanH.C.) 20 E.L.R. 157 209

Bhawani Prasad Tiwari v. Jagdish Narayan Awasthiand Others (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 143 309, 354

Bhikaji Keshav Joshi and Another v. Brijlal NandlalBiyani and Others (No. 4) (Election Tribunal,Akola) 11 E.L.R. 301 188, 189

Bhim Rao v. Ankush Rao (Bombay H.C.) 22 E.L.R.385 92, 106, 117, 292

Bhim Sen v. Chhattar Singh and Others (AllahabadH.C.) 15 E.L.R. 175 249, 250, 302

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED V

Bhim Sen v. Gopali and Others (S.C.) 22 E.L.R. 288 253, 257, 289Bhola Manjhi v. Das Guru Ram and Others (Patna H.C.)

13 E.L.R. 486 259Bhudhar Lai v. Bansidhar Shukla and Another, and

Godawari v. Sheo Prasad Nagar (Allahabad H.C.)13 E.L.R. 399 3

Biren Ray v. Bejayes Mukherjee and Others (CalcuttaH.C.) 14 E.L.R. 83 260

Biren Roy v. Bejoyesh Mukherjee and Others (CalcuttaH.C.) 17 E.L.R. 466 266

Biresh Misra v. Ram Nath Sarma and Others (Assam 97, 129, 137, 140,H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 243 146, 150, 158,164,

265, 376Bishen Chand Seth v. Election Tribunal, Shahjahanpur

and Others (Allahabad H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 196 35Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das and Others (Assam 2, 25, 58, 76, 107

H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 405 158, 265Braj Bhushan and Another v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah

and Others (Allahabad H.C.) 22 E.L.R. 225 24, 47, 99Brij Behari v. Mirza Ahmad AH (Election Tribunal,

Delhi) 22 E.L.R. 455 335Brijendralal Gupta and Another v. Jwalaprasad and

Others (S.C.) 22 E.L.R. 366 305, 324Brijendra Swarup, Dr. v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow,

and Others (Allahabad H.C.) 11 E.L.R. 188 322, 343Brij Sundar Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, and

Others (Rajasthan H.C.) 12 E.L.R. 216 159, 238, 303, 330,375

Brojagopal Das v. Kalipada Banerjee and Others(Calcutta H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 325 206, 291

Budhi Nath Jha v. Manilal jadav (S.C.) 22 E.L.R. 86 269Buggaveti Krishnayya v. Lakshmikantamma and

Another (Mysore H.C.) 18 E.L.R, 476 347

Chakradeo, L. M. v. M. S. Aney (Nagpur ElectionTribunal) 21 E.L.R. 376 222

-Chakradeo, L.M. v. M.S. Aney (Bombay H.C.) 22 E.L.R.95 240

Chakrapani v. Chandoo and Another (Madhya PradeshH.C.) 15 E.L.R. 271 7, 356, 376

Champa Devi v. Jamuna Prasad and Others (Madhya 7, 16, 17, 18, 20,Pradesh H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 443 _ 286

VI ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Chandra Shekhar Prasad and Another v. Jai PrakashSingh (Patna H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 126 227, 310

Chandra Shekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh andAnother (Election Tribunal, Patna) 19 E.L.R. 490 307

Chandrashekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh andAnother (Patna H.C.) 22 E.L.R. 206 26, 133, 147, 153

Chandrika Prasad Tripathi v. Shiv Prasad Chanpuriaand Others (S.C.) 21 E.L.R. 172 5, 268

Chand Singh v. Shankarlal (Rajasthan H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 63 327Chattanatha Karayalar v. Ramachandra Iyer and

Another (S.C.) 11 E.L.R. 216 187,368Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, and Another

(Allahabad H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 301 274, 275, 300, 375Chenna Byre Gowda v. S. R. Ramiah and Another :

H. V. Nanjiah v. Rukmaniamma (Mysore H.C.) 20E.L.R. 37 121

Chhattar Singh v. Kewal Singh and Others(Allahabad H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 162 34, 70, 78, 79

Chheda Lai Gupta v. Niranjan Singh Deo and Others(Allahabad H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 97 244

Chief Commissioner, Ajmer v. Radhey Shyam Dani(S.C.) 12 E.L.R. 443 307

Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyricherla ChandraChudamani Dev (Election Tribunal, Rajahmundry) i n , 124, 140,190,13 E.L.R. 66 216

Chiranji Lai v. Lahri Singh (Punjab H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 397 323Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan and Others (Madhya

Pradesh H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 93 301Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan Sharma and Others

(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 320 40, 69, 166, 289Chunnilal Ken v. Shyamlal Sukhram and Others

(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 483 304Chunnilal Ken v. Shyamlal Sukhram and Others

(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 103 314

Dahu Sao v. Ranglal Chaudhary and Others (Patna 319, 320, 334, 335,H.C.) 22 E.L.R. 299 341

Dalip Singh v. Surendra Nath and Others (Election 227, 234, 293, 321,Tribunal, Patiala) 11 E.L.R. 120 342

Datla Suryanarayana Raju v. Ammanna Raja andOthers (Andhra H.C.) 12 E.L.R. 156 43, 245

Deorao Lakshman Anande v. Keshav Lakshman Borkar(Bombay H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 334 8, 22, 219,314, 376

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED VII

Deshpande, R. v. Muttam Reddy and Others(Andhra Pradesh H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 314 206

Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath and Others(Assam H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 66 223, 331

Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath and Others(S.C.) 21 E.L.R. 459 334

Dhananjoy Mahto v. R. K. Singh and Others (PatnaH.C.) 16 E.L.R. 99 270

Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Yadav Tamaskarand Others (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 260 8, 331, 340

Dharanidhar Mohapatra v. Pradipta Kishore Das and 53, 58, 74, 93 102,Others (Orissa H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 427 n o , 164, 288

Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble and Others(Election Tribunal, Nagpur) 15 E.L.R. 41 363, 376

Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble and Others(Bombay H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 187 227

Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble (S.C.) 21E.L.R. 213 230

Din Dayal v. Beni Prasadand Another (Allahabad H.C.)15 E.L.R. 131 37, 38, 97,120,121

Dippala Suri Dora v. V. V. Giri and Others (Andhra 223, 225, 288, 302,Pradesh H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 1 364

Durga Prasad Chowdhary v. Mukat Behari Lai Bhar-gava and Another (Rajasthan H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 471 4, 102

Gadipalli Parayya v. Boyina Rajayya and Others(Election Tribunal, Elluru) 12 E.L.R. 83 245, 293, 360, 365

Gangadhar Maithani v. Narendra Singh Bhandari(Allahabad H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 124 101, 151

Ganga Prasad Pathak v. Saligram Jaiswal and Another(Election Tribunal, Allahabad) n E.L.R. 415 53, 154, 237

Gangi Reddy, T. K. v. M. C. Anjaneya Reddy and Others(S.C.) 22 E.L.R. 261 8, 54, 112, 245

Ganpatsingh v. Brij Mohan Lai Sharma (Rajasthan H.C.)20 E.L.R. 374 2

Gaurishankar v. Mayadhardas and Others (MadhyaPradesh H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 441 197

Ghayur Ali Khan v. Keshav Gupta (Allahabad H.C.) 9, 73, 89, 129, 14416 E.L.R. 154 166, 171

Gian Chand Puran Chand v. Om Prabha Jain andAnother (Punjab H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 384 4, 264, 375

Gian Chand Puran Chand v. Smt. Om Prabha Jain andAnother (Punjab H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 136 267

VIU ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Giani Kartar Singh v. Election Tribunal, Chandigarhand Another (Punjab H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 148 251, 313

Girdharilal v. Thakur Kahan Singh and Others(Rajasthan H.C.) 19 E.L.R. 352 271

Giri V. V. v. Dippala Suri Dora and Others (ElectionTribunal, Hyderabad) 15 E.L.R. 1 224, 225, 302

Giri V. V. v. D. Suri Dora and Others (S.C.) 21E.L.R. 188 230

Gokulananda Praharaj v. Jogesh Chandra Rout andAnother (Orissa H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 76 101

Gopalan v. Kannan (Kerala H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 458 19, 180, 288Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur, and

Others (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 13 4Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur and

Others (No. 2) (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 69 6Gurbanta Singh v. Piara Ram and Others (Punjab H.C.)

20 E.L.R. 350 93, 204, 231, 293Gurbhajnik Singh S. and Another v. S. Bhagwant Singh

and Others (Election Tribunal, Patiala) 11 E.L.R.272 232

Habibur Rehman v. Shiva Gopal Tewari and Others(Allahabad H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 377 32, 312

Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow,and Others (Allahabad H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 262 147, 283

Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar and Others(Allahabad H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 393 264

Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar and Another(Allahabad H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 409 46, 85, 147

Harish Chandra Bajpai and Another v. Triloki Singh(S.C.) 12 E.L.R. 461 36, 172,173

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, Jabalpur,and Another (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 147 24, 30, 311

Heersingh and Others v. Veerka and Another (RajasthanH.C.) 15 E.L.R. 92 1, 2, 285

Hoti Lai v. Raj Bahadur (Rajasthan H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 55 212, 356, 376Inamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa

and Others (S.C.) 14 E.L.R. 296 353Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan and Others 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16,

(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 219 18, 20, 194, 346,37i. 374

Jagadananda Roy v. Rabindranath Sikdar and Others(Calcutta H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 99 22, 180

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED IX

Jagannath Dalai v. Ramachandra Nahak and Others(Orissa H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 305 268

Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal(Allahabad H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 443 46, 55, 67, 117,

u8 , 120, 130,162Jahanuddin Ahmed and Another v. Nazmul Haque

(Assam H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 345 48, 84Jamuna Prasad Singh v. Shri Ramnivas and Others

(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 145 9, 115, 119, 248Janardhanam, C.G. v. Joseph (Kerala H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 88 193,374Jangaldhari Rai v. Sheopujan Rai (Election Tribunal,

Shahabad) 18 E.L.R. 86 208Jayalakshmi Devamma v. Janardhan Reddi (Andhra

Pradesh H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 302 9, 52, 153, 288,310

Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao and Others (MadhyaPradesh H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 477 173, 308, 364

John, V. K. v. Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes,Madras, and Others and John, V. K. v. Vasantha 24, 77, 185, 232Pai (Madras H.C.) 12 E.L.R. 329 375

John, V. K. v. Chairman, Madras Legislative Council,and Others (Madras H.C.) 12 E.L.R. 345 319, 353

Jwala Prasad v. Brijendra Gupta and Others (MadhyaPradesh H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 485 323

Kamala Singh v. S. B. Malik and Others (AllahabadH.C.) 15 E.L.R. 456 248, 275

Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar and Others(Election Tribunal, 24 Parganas) 13 E.L.R. 139 279

Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar (Calcutta H.C.)15 E.L.R. 292 274, 367, 375

Kamaraj Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and Others (MadrasH.C.) 13 E.L.R. 159 280, 285, 375

Kamaraj Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and Others (S.C.) 14E.L.R. 270 258, 262, 277, 375

Kamdeo Prasad Singh v. Badri Narain Singh and Ano-ther (Election Tribunal, Santhal Parganas) 18E.L.R. 59 115,210

Kamdeo Prasad Singh v. Badri Narain Singh andAnother (Patna H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 64 n o

Kandaswami S. v. S. B. Adityan (Madras H.C.) 19 E.L.R.260 27,29

X ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Kandaswami S. v. S. B. Adityan (Election Tribunal,Tirunelveli) 20 E.L.R. 410 48, 130

Kandaswami, S. v. S. B. Adityan and Others (MadrasH.C.) 21 E.L.R. 435 128

Kanhaiyalal Tiwari v. Shyamsunder Narayan Mush-ran (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 284 104, 374

Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh and Others(Patna H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 475 270, 273

Karam Bapanna Dora v. Syamala Seetharamayya and 21, 22, 179, 322Another (Election Tribunal, Eluru) 11 E.L.R. 463 358

Karan Singh v. Jamuna Singh (Allahabad H.C.) 15E.L.R. 370 128, 144, 170, 376

Kariamanickam Ambalam, KR. RM. v. RamakrishnaThevar (Madras H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 275 191, 376

Kariyappa, K. P. v. H. M. Channabasappa VenkateGowda and Others (Election Tribunal, Mysore) 11E.L.R. 484 185, 244, 343

Karu Lall and Another v. Fida Hussain and Another(Patna H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 169 209

Kashi Nath Pandey v. Shibban Lai Saxena and Others(Allahabad H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 389 285

Kataria Takandas Hemraj v. Pinto Frederick Michael 44, 51, 64, 80, 91,(Election Tribunal, Surat);i8 E.L.R. 403 100,141,157, 162,

165, 166Kaushalendra Prasad Narain Singh v. Nand Kishore

Prasad Singh and Others (S.C.) 22 F-.L.R. 484 269Kaushalendra Prasad Narayan Singh v. R.P. Singh and

Others (Patna H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 385 352Keshav Lakshman Borkar v. Dr. Deorao Lakshman

Anande (S.C.) 21 E.L.R. 466 290Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder and Others 45, 75, 241, 242,

(S.C.) 11 E.L.R. 208 368Khagendranath Nath and Another v. Umesh Chandra

Nath and Others (Assam H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 207 74, 185, 186, 321Khare, N. B. v. Election Commission of India (S.C.) 13

E.L.R. 318 ' 351Khilumal Topandas v. Arjundas Tulsidas (Rajasthan

H.C) 22 E.L.R. 404 92, 113Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra and

Another (Assam H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 65 10, 368Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra and

Others (S.C.) 19 E.L.R. 1 145, 155

23,

244

22,

178,

H7.

375

156.

237. 242, 34S

10,

210

54.294ii,

293

187,1

49- 55. 135.

132,

n8,, 320

133.

171.

145,

233.

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED xi

Krishna Murthy, B. M. v. R. Subbanna and Others(Mysore H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 123 14, 245

Krishna Rao Maharu Patil v. Onkar Narayan Wagh(Bombay H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 386

Kshatrapal Singh v. F. S. Chisti and Others (AllahabadH.C.) 16 E.L.R. 70

Kushwaqt Rai v. Karan Singh and Others (ElectionTribunal, Lucknow) 11 E.L.R. 1

Lachhman Singh v. Harparkash Kaur (Punjab H.C.)19 E.L.R. 417

Lachhman Singh Gill v. Harparkash Kaur (Punjab H.C.)22 E.L.R. 249

Lakshmi Narain v. Balwan Singh and Others (AllahabadH.C.) 20 E.L.R. 76

Lakshmi Shankar Yadav v. Kunwar Sripal Singh andOthers (Allahabad H.C.) 22 E.L.R. 47 351

Lai Chandrabhan Shah v. C. B. Kekre, Member, Elec-tion Tribunal and Others (Madhya Pradesh H.C.)15 E.L.R. 125

Lai Shyam Shah v. V. N. Swami (Bombay H.C.) 16E.L.R. 74

Madan Lai v. Syed Zargham Haider and Others (Allaha-bad H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 456

Madan Mohan Upadhya v. Hari Datt Kandpal (AllahabadH.C.) 15 E.L.R. 331

Madan Singh v. Ladhu Ram Chaudhary and Others(Election Tribunal, Jaipur) 11 E.L.R. 99

Maganlal Bagdi v. Hari Vishnu Kamath (MadhyaPradesh H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 205

Maharani Vijaya Raje Scindia, H. H. v. Motilal (MadhyaPradesh H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 251

Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi (Punjab H.C.) 17 E.L.R.263

Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai (Patna H.C.) 16 E.L.R.470

Mariappan v. V. R. Nedunchezhiyan and Others (S.C.)14 E.L.R. 270

Mariswamy Hirematha Gangadharaswamy v. B. Chik-kannaswamy and Others (Mysore H.C.) 20 E.L.R.114 316

12972, ]

300,t77. :340

32, 35. 8f168,120,

168,

106,

375146,

375

151.8, 46, 70,

114,

284,

183,

308,

262.

164,

375

376

369

277

[95. 294,

B, 118,

148, 151,

, 244, 296

97. in.243

Xii ELECTION LAW REPORTS tiiGESt

Masani, M.R. v. Election Tribunal, Ranchi, and Others(S.C.) 14 E.L.R. 270 262, 277

Mast Ram v. S. Iqbal Singh and Others (Election 47, 94, 108, 152,Tribunal, Amritsar) 12 E.L.R. 34 174. 232, 237, 375

Matadin Chaurasia v. Mahendra Kumar Manav (ElectionTribunal, Rewa) 12 E.L.R. 144 271, 281, 321,338

Maulana Abdul Jalil Choudhury v. Rathindra Nath Sen(Assam H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 290 53, 158, 164

Maulana Abdul Shakoor v. Rikhab Chand and Another(S.C.) 13 E.L.R. 149 218

Md. Ibrahim Ansari v. M. R. Masani and Others(Election Tribunal, Ranchi) 18 E.L.R. 160 79, 120, 129, 257

Mishri Sinha v. Ramapadarath Mahton and Others(Patna H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 390 203

Mohan Reddy v. Neelagiri Muralidhar Rao (AndhraPradesh H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 167 325, 375

Mohan Singh v. Bhanwarlal Natha and Others (Madhya 'Pradesh H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 1 5, 265, 286

Motilal v. Mangla Prasad (Allahabad H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 17, 72, 145, 229,425 233, 376

Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji and Another (Allaha-bad H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 310 33, 312, 376

Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji (Allahabad H.C.) 13E.L.R. 328 298, 375, 376

Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur (Allahabad H.C.) 20 131,138, 287, 305,E.L.R. 176 307, 357, 373

Muthiah, M. v. A. S. Subbaraj (Madras H.C.) 18 E.L.R.73 141

Muthiah Chettiar, M. A. v. Sa. Ganesan and Another(No. 2) (Madras H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 432 32, 296, 313, 375

Muthiah Chettiar, M. A. v. Saw. Ganesan and Another(Madras H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 201 246, 248

Muthiah Chettiar, M. A. v. Saw. Ganesan (Madras H.C.)21 E.L.R. 215 54, 132, 143

Muthyal Rao v. Bhoomaji and Another (AndhraPradesh H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 207 121, 198, 228

Muti Ahmed Jafari v. Virendra Singh and Others(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 241 260

Nagappa, T. v. T. C. Basappa and Others (S.C.) 11E.L.R. 203 75, 123, 368

Nand Kishore Prasad Singh v. Election Tribunal, Patna,and Others (Patna H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 246 261

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED Xlll

Nani Gopal Swami v. Abdul Hamid Choudhury andAnother (Assam H.C.) 19 E.L.R. 175 50, 57, 61, 113

Narasimhan, C. R. v. Election Tribunal, Madurai, andOthers (Madras H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 327 250, 301

Narasimhan, C. R. v. M. G. Natesan Chettiar (MadrasH.C.) 20 E.L.R. 1 44, 132

Narasimha Rao, N. V. L. v. Rao Bahadur TellakulaJalayya and Others (No. 2) (Andhra Pradesh H.C.)11 E.L.R. 402 296, 297, 311

Narasimha Rao, N. V. L. v. Tellakula Jalaiah andOthers (Election Tribunal, Eluru) 11 E.L.R. 321 298, 299

Narasimha Reddy v. Bhoomaji and Another ; MuthyalRao v. Bhoomaji (Andhra Pradesh H.C.) 17 E.L.R.207 121, 198, 228

Narayan Bhaskar Khare v. Election Commission ofIndia and P. T. Ram Nath Kalia v. Election Com-mission of India and Another (S.C.) 13 E.L.R. 112 243,350,369,375

Narayan Rao Waktu Karwade v. Punjab Rao HukamShambharkar and Another (Bombay H.C.) 14E.L.R. 1 362, 376

Narayana Gowda v. B. L. Narayanaswamy and Others(Mysore H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 485 177, 287

Narayanaswamy Naidu, G. v. C. Krishnamurthi andAnother (Madras H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 21 216

Narayan Yeshwant Nene v. Govind Sonu Katkari andAnother (Bombay H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 168 11

Naunihal Singh v. Kishorilal Paliwal and Others(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 21 E.L.R. ^3 i°6, 132, 347, 367

Nazmul Haque v. Amjad AH and Others (ElectionTribunal, Gauhati) 18 E.L.R. 253 50, 80

Netram v. Lakshman Prasad and Others (Madhya Pra-desh H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 266 333

Nikunja Behari Singh v. Duryodan Pradhan andAnother (Orissa H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 37 200

Nirbhayadas v. Gulab Bai and Others (Madhya PradeshH.C.) 14 E.L.R. 186 30

Nirbhayadas Gangaram v. Rameshwar Agnibhoj(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 493 314

Norata Singh, S. v. S. Dharam Singh and Others(Election Tribunal, Bhatinda) 11 E.L.R. 57 173, 180, 228, 237,

375Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand and Another (S.C.)

21 E.L.R. 54 5

38,

4i,

128

77,241

72,148,

82, 130,

159

XIV ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand and Another (PunjabH.C.) 22 E.L.R. 242 176

Pabbar Ram v. Rameshwar Rai and Others (AllahabadH.C.) 22 E.L.R. 14 201

Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v. Hem Raj and Another (PunjabH.C.) 21 E.L.R. 161 236

Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v Paul Singh (Punjab H.C.) 17E.L.R. 282 258

Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur,and Others (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 15 E.L.R. i n

Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Krishi Pandit Rishabkumar andOthers (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 401

Parmar, Y. S. v. Hira Singh Pal and Another (JudicialCommissioner's Court, Himachal Pradesh) 16E.L.R. 45

Parmar, Y. S. v. Hira Singh Paul and Another (S. C.)16 E.L.R. 483 349

Parmeshwar Kumar v. Lahtan Chaudhary (Patna H.C.)14 E.L.R. 444 320, 340

Parshottamdas Talshibhai Patel v. Lilubhai KishorebhaiPatel and Others (Bombay H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 403 283

Partap Singh Kairon v. S. Gurmej Singh (Punjab H.C.)14 E.L.R. 412 294, 295,311

Partap Singh Kairon v. Kartar Singh Chadha andOthers (Punjab H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 236 282, 312

Partap Singh Khairon v. Rama Prasad Mookerjee andAnother (Punjab H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 46 151

Parthasarathy, K. v. Nataraja Odayar and Others(Madras H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 201

Patnaik, S.N., In re (Election Commission) 13 E.L.R.58

Pottekkat Krishnan Sukumaran v. Kunjuvareed JosephMundasseri (Kerala H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 313

Prabhu Charan v. Shiv Dutt (Madhya Pradesh H.C.)14 E.L.R. 108

Prabhudas v. Jorsang (Bombay H.C.) 18 E.L.R. n oPrabhunath Tiwari v. Janardhan Singh and Others

(Election Tribunal, Muzaffarpur) 18 E.L.R. 1Prananath Patnaik v. Banamali Patnaik (Orissa H.C.)

16 E.L.R. 357Pratap Rao Deorao Bhcnsale v. Shivram Sawant Bhon-

sale (Bombay H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 37 125, 168

336

189,

78,:

371136,

199

52,

235,

113. :

- 137

107,

375

262

112,

, 376

374

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED XV

Pritam Singh v. Kartar Singh (Election Tribunal,Chandigarh) 17 E.L.R. TI 38.302

Pyari Mohan Das v. Durga Sankar Das and Another(Orissa H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 338 95. 125, 194, 375

Radhakanta Mishra v. Nityananda Mahapatra andAnother (Orissa H.C.) 19 E.L.R. 203 161

Radha Kishan v. Election Tribunal, Amritsar, andOthers (Punjab H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 321 5

Radhakrishnan v. Muthukumaraswami Naidu andOthers (Madras H.C.) 19 E.L.R. 481 13

Radha Krishna Shukla and Another v. Tara ChandMaheshwar and Others (Election Tribunal, 36, 94, 164, 174,Lucknow) 12 E.L.R. 378 223, 228, 307

Radha Mohan Rai v. Sumitra Devi and Another (PatnaH.C.) 17 E.L.R. 162 198, 375

Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj and 7, 31, 94, 96, 114,Others (Orissa H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 321 155, 185, 211, 287,

346, 374Raja Bahadur Kishori Raman Singh v. G. C. Agarwala

and Another (Allahabad H.C.) 19 E.L.R. 164 303Raja Harinder Singh, H. H. v. S. Karnail Singh and

Others (S.C.) 12 E.L.R. 421 172, 242, 270, 376Raja Nainar v. Velusami Thevar and Others (Madras

H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 231 312, 339Raja Vijay Kumar Tripathi and Another v. Ram Saran

Yadav and Others (Allahabad H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 289 90,170Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra 17, 70, 148, 165,

(Election Tribunal, Bhagalpur) 11 E.L.R. 222 231, 240, 241Raju, V. B. v. Ramachandra Rao and Others (Andhra

Pradesh H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 1 10,40,48,121,139Ram Abhilakh Tewari v. Election Tribunal, Gonda, and

Others (Allahabad H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 375 126Ramachandra Rao, V. v. V. B. Raju and Others 29, 49, 65, 100,

(Election Tribunal, Hyderabad) 19 E.L.R. 358 119, 138, 142, 253Ramappa, M. v. Sangappa and Others (S.C.) 15 E.L.R.

475 214Ramayan Shukla v. Rajendra Prasad Singh and Another

(Patna H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 491 333Ram Binode Singh v. Sheobachan Singh and Others

(Patna H. C.) 22 E.L.R. 53 116, 170

ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Ram Chandra Shukla v. Election Commission, India(Punjab H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 105 372

Ramdayal Ayodyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil andOthers (Election Tribunal, Nagpur) 18 E.L.R. 378 210, 293, 308, 318

Ramdayal Ayodhyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil andOthers (Bombay H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 13 305, 317

Ram Dial v. Sant Lai and Another (Punjab H.C.) 19E.L.R. 430 82, 115, 246

Ram Dial v. Sant Lai (S.C.) 20 E.L.R. 482 157, 162Rameshwar Prasad Shastri v. Bhagwan Singh and

Another (Patna H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 45 207Ramakant Kesheorao Huldurkar v. Bhikulal Laxmi-

chand Chandak (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 15 E.L.R.467 1. 213. 358

Ramkishun Singh and Another v. Tribeni Singh andOthers (Patna H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 81 310, 311, 340, 370

Ramnarain v. Ramchandra (Bombay H.C.) 15 E.L.R.100 177, 213, 305, 336

Ram Narain Prasad Yadav v. Subnath Deogam andOthers (Patna H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 108 169

Ram Sahai v. Gajja and Another (Rajasthan H.C.) 20E.L.R. 301 209

Ramswaroop Prasad Yadav v. Jagat Kishore PrasadNarain Singh (Patna H.C.) 17 E.L.R. n o 305, 310, 370

Ram Swarup and Another v. G. D. Sahgal and Others(Allahabad H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 42 12

Ranbir Singh v. Beant Singh and Others (ElectionTribunal, Patiala) 11 E.L.R. 182 338

Randhir Singh v. Suraj Bhan (Election Tribunal,Rhotak) 15 E.L.R. 146 345, 355

Ratan Shukla v. Dr. Brijendra Swarup and Others(Election Tribunal, Lucknow) 11 E.L.R. 332 19, 163, 343

Rattan Singh v. Davindar Singh and Others (No. 2)(Election Tribunal, Ferozepore) 11 E.L.R. 67 292, 336, 359

Rattan Singh v. Ram Kishan Gupta (Election Tribunal,Hissar) 13 E.L.R. 135 279

Rawal Narendra Singh v. Smt. Kamla Beniwal (Rajas-than H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 28 in

Returning Officer, Atmakur v. G. C. Kondiah (ElectionTribunal, Nellore) 22 E.L.R. 45 281

Rosamma Punnose v. K. Balakrishnan Nair andAnother (Kerala H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 210 326, 330, 375

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED xvii

Rukmini Raman Pratap Singh v. Srinivas Tiwari(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 22 E.L.R. 37 25, 41

Rulya Ram v. Chaudhri Multan Singh and Another(Punjab H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 6 266

Rup Lai v. Jugraj Singh (Punjab H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 484 332Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand and Others 66,83,84,91,117,

(Allahabad H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 221 150, 153, 17!

Sadasheo Jagannath Barpatre v. Hemaji Hiraman Bakde(Bombay H.C.) 18 E.L.R. 20 221

Sangappa and Others v. Ramappa (Mysore H.C.) 14E.L.R. 229 216

Sangappa v. Shivamurti Swami and Another : ShankarGowda Basan Gowda v. Election Tribunal, Raichur(Mysore H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 365 3 4 ) 3?6

Sanjeevi Reddi v. Kondayya and Another (AndhraPradesh H.C.) 22 E.L.R. 92 3 I 3

Sankara Reddi, N. v. Yashoda Reddi and Others 14, 159, x§0 248(Election Tribunal, Rajahmundry) 13 E.L.R. 34 3™

Sardar Dayal Singh v. Sardar Surjit Singh Majithia(Election Tribunal, Chandigarh) 19 E.L.R. 305 i42> I 4 9 > I 5 5

Sardar Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon(S.C.) 21 E.L.R. 471 I 5 0

Sardar Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad andOthers (Patna H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 478 3# 2 ^ g

Sarla Devi Pathak v. Birendra Singh and Others 1 8 67 QQ(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 20 E.L.R. 275 Z o 5 ' 4<

Sasivarna Thevar v. V. Arunagiri and Others (MadrasH.C.) 17 E.L.R. 313 2 5 2

Sasivarna Thevar, T. L. v. Arunagiri and Others (No 2)(Madras H.C.) 19 E.L.R. 200 ' _

Savitri Devi v. Prabhawati Misra and Another (Allahabad H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 358 " ^

Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar (Election « ' 60 'Tribunal, Madurai) 19 E.L.R. 16 ^ ^ &' I 3

Shah Alim Uddin v. Satish Chandra Agarwal and 'Others (Rajasthari H.C.) 14 E.L R. 199 4> 2 7 &

Shah Sankalchand Motilal v. Shukla Damubhai Chhagan-lal (Election Tribunal, Ahmedabad) 12 E.L.R. 184 i7> 2o, 358

Shanmuga Udayar, M. v. V. P. Sarangapani Gounder(Madras H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 490 zg2>

Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain (S.C.) 22 E.L.R. 469 JS? ' j § 4 6

i n

XV111 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra (Rajasthan H.C.) 16 33, 72, 102, 124,E.L.R. 103 I 4 o, 156, 236, 286,

287, 376Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra and Another (S.C.)

16 E.L.R. 435 122Shirur Veerabhadrappa Veerappa v. Shankaragouda

Basangouda (Election Tribunal, Mysore & Raichur)17 E.L.R. 117 211

Shivaprasad Chandpuria v. Chandrika Prasad and

Others (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 328 4, 262Shivram Sawant Bhonsale v. Pratap Rao Deo Rao

Bhonsale (Bombay H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 37 125, 168Shridhar Mahadeo Joshi v. Rajbhoj Pandurang Nathoji

(Bombay H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 430 175, 286Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh and Others (Election 33, 43, 47, 75, 94,

Tribunal, Bareilly) 12 E.L.R. 1 153,154, 243, 287,

293. 374Shriniwas v. Rukmini Raman Pratap Singh and

Another (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 190 276, 374Shubnath Deogam v. Ram Narain Prasad Yadav and

Others (S.C.) 22 E.L.R. 1 85, 170Shyamsunder, B. v. Shankar Deo Vedalankar (Mysore

H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 303 365Singheshwar Prasad Varma v. Kamalnath Tiwari (Patna

H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 95 300Singheshwar Prasad Varma v. Kamalnath Tiwari (Patna

H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 121 23Sita Ram Khemka v. K. K. Banerji and Others

(Allahabad H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 301 299, 311Sita Ram Khemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru and Another

(Election Tribunal, Allahabad) 13 E.L.R. 126 278, 376Sita Ram Khemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru and Othe rs

(Allahabad H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 322 281Siya Ram v. Pertap Bahadur and Others (Allahabad

H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 128 3 I 2

Soowalal v. P. K. Chaudhary and Others (MadhyaPradesh H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 137 9 6 , Il6> Z02> 2 g i

Sourimuthu Udayar, M. S. and Another v. K. Pandiaraj(Election Tribunal, Madurai) 20 E.L.R. 256 131, 13c ^ o

Sreenivasan, A. v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and CAnother : V. K. John v. Vasantha Pai (Madras H.C.)

11 E.L.R. 278 76,243,284 ~

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED XIX .

Sri Krishna Agarwal v. S. M. Banerji (Allahabad H.C.)19 E.L.R. 466 338

Srinivasan, A. v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others (MadrasH.C.) 12 E.L.R. 453 355

Subbanna, R. v. S. R. Guru and Others (ElectionTribunal, Bangalore) 12 E.L.R. 201 14, 18, 150

Subbaraya Gounder, A. K. v. K. G. Palanisami Gounderand Others (Election Tribunal, Coimbatore) 11 16,21,173,E.L.R. 251 234, 245,271

Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat and Others (S.C.) 11E.L.R. 175 238

, Sudhansu Sekhar Panda v. Narendra Nath Das andAnother (Calcutta H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 223 260

Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange and Others 45, 59, 64, 74, 89,(Bombay H.C.) 17 E.L.R. 373 90, 97, 108, 113,

114, 165, 236, 348,374.375.376.

Sunder Lai v. Nandramdas Dwarkadas and Others(Madhya Pradesh H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 68 292

Suraj Bhan v. Randhir Singh (Punjab H.C.) 15 E.L.R.

4 6 ° 356, 357, 376Surendra Nath KhosJa and Another v. Dalip Singh and

Others (S.C.) 12 E.L.R. 370 345

Tajuddin Ahmed v. Dhaniram Talukdar (Assam H.C.)18 E.L.R. 193 292, 348

Tej Pal Singh v. Jagbir Singh and Others (AllahabadH.C.) 15 E.L.R. 349 31,154,167,171

Thangavelu v. Krishnamoorthi Gounder and Others(Madras H.C.) 16 E.L.R. 319 296

Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh and Others (S.C.) 11E.L.R. 192 3Oj 234, 271,282

Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru & Others (Election 15, 44, 46, 55, 74,Tribunal, Lucknow) 16 E.L.R. 234 145, X52, 288 301]

374Trivedi, U. M. v. Manaldal and Others (Madhya Pradesh

H.C.) 15 E.L.R. 88 4 , 263

Udal v. Lai Bhadur (Allahabad H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 1S0 39

Vasantha Pai v. Dr. V. K. John and Others (Election 47, 115, i 4 0 , 174,Tribunal, Madras) 12 E.L.R. 107 233, 239, 375

Vasantha Pai, G. v. A. Srinivasan and Others (MadrasH.C.) 22 E.L.R. 221 I 4 4

XX ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Velusami Thevar, N. P. v. G. Raja Nainar and Others(Madras H.C.) 21 E.L.R. 338 201, 328

Veluswami Thevar v. Raja Nainar and Others (S.C.) 17E.L.R.181

Venkataramiah, D. v. E. Narayana Gowda (MysoreH.C.) 20 E.L.R. 101

Verma, N. L. v. Muni Lai and Others (Punjab H.C.) 15E.L.R. 495

Vinaya Kumar Diwan v. Raghunathsingh Kiledar(Election Tribunal, Hoshangabad) 22 E.L.R. 425

Virendra Pati Yadav v. Jai Deo Singh and Others(Allahabad H.C.) 13 E.L.R. 476 3

Wilson Reade v. C. S. Booth and Others (Assam H.C.) 361.37614 E.L.R. 480

Yadvendra Singh, M.L.A. Vindhya Pradesh, In re:(Election Commission) 12 E.L.R. 162 178, 220, 235

Yamuna Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad Khare and Others(S.C.) 13 E L.R. 1 246, 320, 345

Yeshavantrao Balwantrao Chavan v. K. T. Mangalmurtiand Another (Bombay H.C.) 14 E.L.R. 122 275, 375

313;

I 3 i

88,

17.

, 3 i 5 .

, 142,

124

328

34i

i 7 i

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED,REFERRED TO, ETC.

Abdul Gani and Co. v. Trustees, Bombay Fort (A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 310)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 207

Abdul Jalil Choudhury Maulana v. Rathindra Nath Sen (13 E.L.R. 290)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 175, 203 ; 20 E.L.R. 410 ; 21 E.L.R. 345, 409—relied on 18 E.L.R. 160

Abdul Rauf v. Govind Ballabh Pant (8 E.L.R. 240)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 1; 18 E.L.R. 378—relied on 16 E.L.R. 234

Abdul Rouf v. Mukhtar Ali (2 E.L.R. 340)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415 ; 16 E.L.R. 324; 17 E.L.R. 321—distinguished 17 E.L.R. 427

Abdulshakur (Maulana) v. Rikhab Chand (13 E.L.R. 149)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21, 229; 15 E.L.R. 55—distinguished 17 E.L.R. 321

Abdul Wali Khan and Habib-ur-Rahman v. Ehtisham Mahmood Ali(Sen & Poddar 468; 1 Doabia 149)(See also Lucknow and Unao Districts Mohammadan Rural

Constituency Case)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34, 107—distinguished 11 E.L.R, 222

Abraham v. Abraham ([1863] 9 M.I.A. 195)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 1

Adityan, S.B. v. S. Kandaswami (13 E.L.R. 246)-—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16, 260—affirmed 14 E.L.R. 394

Adityan v. Kandaswami (14 E.L.R. 394)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 103 ; 19 E.L.R. 260; 21 E.L.R. 435—relied on 22 E.L.R. 45

Advocate-General, Burma v. Maung Chit Maung (1940) Rang. L.R. 188;A.I.R. 1940 Rang. 68)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 103

Ajayab Singh v. Karnail Singh (6 E.L.R. 368)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120 ; 12 E.L.R. 216 ; 14 E.L.R. 210;16 E.L.R. 491—relied on 22 E.L.R. 299

Akshaya Narayan Praharaj v. Maheswar Bag (16 E.L.R. 337)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16; 20 E.L.R. 45—explained and distinguished 20 E.L.R. 1

Akyab (Indian Urban), 1928 (Hammond 47)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

XXU ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Alagappa Chettiar v. Chockalingam Chettiar (I.L.R. [1918] 41 Mad. 904)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

Alcott v. Emden ([1904] 68 J.P. 434 D.C.)—distinguished 12 E.L.R. 329

Aldridge v. Hurst ([1876] 1 C.P.D. 410)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67 ; 13 E.L.R. 126; 14 E.L.R. 296

Amar Singh v. Balbir Singh (19 E.L.R. 457)—followed 21 E.L.R. 46

Ambika Sahi v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1948 All. 80)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 164

Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani (18 E.L.R. 209)—affirmed 21 E.L.R. 286

Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha (TO E.L.R. 57)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234—relied on 12 E.L.R. 34—followed 20 E.L.R 101

Amjad AH v. B. C. Barua (13 E.L.R. 285)—commented upon 17 E.L.R. 236—relied on 22 E.L.R. 45

Amritsar City (H) 1924 (Hammond 85)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Amritsar City (M) 1924 (Hammond 83)ref. 12 E.L.R. 34 ; 19 E.L.R. 16—distinguished 12 E.L.R. 421

Amritsar City Case (Sen & Poddar 28)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Amritsar City Mohammadan Constituency Case (Mohammad Zakaria Kitch-lew v. Sheikh Mohammad Sadiq) (Sen & Poddar 34)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Amritsar South (Sikh) Constituency Case (Babu Gurdit Singh v. SardarPartap Singh Kairon) (1 Doabia 92)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Anglo-Indian Constituency (Bengal) Case (T. E. Martin v. L. T. Macquire)(Sen & Poddar 61)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Anirudha Singh v. The Chief Election Commissioner (Misc. Judicial CaseNo. 523 of 1957 decided on January 8, 1958)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 86

An janeya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy (21 E.L.R. 247)—affirmed 22 E.L.R. 261

Anokhmal v. Chief Panchayat Officer (A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 388)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 146, 271

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XxiH

Antonio Dias Calderia v. Frederick Augustus Gray (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 154)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 137

Appleton v. Lord Braybrook (105 E.R. 1155)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 167

Armstrong v. Crooks ([1871] H.L.C. 97)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 338

Arunachalam, A. J. v. Election Tribunal, Vellore (9 E.L.R. 471)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 301; 13 E.L.R. 66; 18 E.L.R. 37

Asa Nand v. Gian Chand (A.I.R. 1936 Lah. 598)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 34

Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche ((1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 81

Asrar Ahmad v. Nihal Uddin (3 E.L.R. 81)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Assam Case (13 E.L.R. 290)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 203

Athlone Case (3 O'M. & H. 57)—distinguished 11 E.L.R. 251

Attorney-General v. Sillem (10 H.L. Cas. 704 ; 11 E.R. 1200)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461

Awadhesh Pratap Singh v. Brij Naiain (9 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 1

Awadesh Prasad Sinha v. Prabhavathi Gupta (8 E.L.R. 45)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126 ; 21 E.L.R. 376

Babulal Sharma v. Brijnarain Brajesh (14 E.L.R. 72)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16— distinguished 15 E.L.R. 111—relied on 20 E.L.R. 401; 21 E.L.R. 1—dissented from 19 E.L.R. 260

Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney (22 E.L.R. 105)—affirmed 22 E.L.R. 321

Baddrudjja Syed v. Mohammad Khoda Buksh (2 E.L.R. 189)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Badrivishal Pittie v. J. V. Narsingh Rao (16 E.L.R. 183)—approved 17 E.L.R. 181

Baga Mai v. Shib Parshad ([1929] 120 I.C. 686)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Baijnath Prasad Verma v. Chandreshwar Narain (2 E.L.R. 88)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Baijnath Singh v. Kunwar Rananjaya Singh (Gazette of India,dated 29th December, 1954)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

XXIV ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Bailey v. Edmunds, Byron and Marshall ([1895] 11 T.L.R. 537)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 357

Bai Shri Manharba Champrajwala v. Dhadal Raning Amrabha (A.I.R. 1955N.U.C. (Saurashtra) 4092 V. 42)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412.

Balasubramanyan v. Election Tribunal, Vellore (7 E.L.R. 496)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216 ; 14 E.L.R. 167, 210; 15 E.L.R. 66, 484; 16E.L.R. 491; 21 E.L.R. 459 ; 22 E.L.R. 229, 366, 455—not followed 22 E.L.R. 242.

Balasubramanyan, P. N. v. C. R. Narasimhan (1 E.L.R. 461)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216; 17 E.L.R. 126 ; 21 E.L.R. 376

Baldwin v. Ellis ( [1929] 1 K.B. 273)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216 ; 14 E.L.R. 210 ; 15 E.L.R. 66; 16 E.L.R. 491; 21E.L.R. 459 ; 22 E.L.R. 299, 366

Balling Vithaling Sakharpekar v. Shri Devasthan Fund Gondhale (A.I.R.1931 Bom. 232)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Balmukand v. King Emperor (A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 29)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 207

Balsore South Case (Hammond 101)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34 '

Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain (22 E.L.R. 273)—relied on 22 E.L.R. 358

Balwant Rai Tayal v. Bishan Saroop (17 E.L.R. 101)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 430 ; 20 E.L.R. 350 ; 21 E.L.R. 435

Balwant Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur (15 E.L.R. 199)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 76

Banbihari Mukherji v. Bhejnath Singh Mahapatra (A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 448)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 249

Banerjee, S. M. v. Shri Krishna Agarwal (22 E.L.R. 64)—relied on 22 E.L.R. 288, 299

Bankat Lai v. Madan Mohan (3 E.L.R. 375)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart v. Administrator of Hungarian Property([1954] A.C. 584) & y

—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21.Bank Voor Handel v. Slatford ( [1952] 1 All E.R. 314)

—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21Banwarlal Sogani v. Dadar Lai Vyas (7 E.L.R. 407)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120Bareilly City (N.M.U.) 1924 (Hammond 127)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67 ; 12 E.L.R. 34

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXV

Barnstaple ( [1874] 2 O'M. & H. 105)—ref 21 E.L.R. 1.

Barril v. Parnell (10 Ch. App. 512)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 207

Barrow-in-Furness (4 O'M. & H. 78)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16, 305

Barrow-in-Furness (1886) 4 O'M. & H. 82)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Baru Ram v. Smt. Prasanni (16 E.L.R. 450)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 1, 137, 345. 435 ; 22 E.L.R. 425, 455 -—applied 20 E.L.R. 63

Basak S.C. v. Chairman, Dacca M. Board (24 C.W.N. 189)—relied on 16 E.L.R. 234

Basappa v. Ayyappa (14 E.L.R. 296)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 260

Basappa, T. C. v. T. Nagappa (3 E.L.R. 197)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34 ; 168, 216 ; 18 E.L.R. 160, 209 ; 19 E.L.R. 16—affirmed 11 E.L.R. 203

Basappa, T.C. v. Nagappa (10 E.L.R. 14)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67, 203 ; 12 E.L.R. 216 ; 16 E.L.R. 1, 393 ; 18 E.L.R305 ; 19 E.L.R. 203, 278 ; 21 E.L.R. 64—applied 18 E.L.R. 476—relied on 20 E.L.R. 136

Basdeo v. John Smid ([1900] I.L.R. 22 All. 55)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 1

Basti District (West Muhammadan Rural Constituency (Sen & Poddar 112—relied on 11 E.L.R. 251

Batala Muhammadan Constituency (Sen & Poddar 897)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 251

Bater v. Bater (25 T.L.R. 612 ; [1951] P. 35)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

Bayley v. Edmunds, Byron and Marshall ( (1895) T.L.R. 537)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 373

Bazlul Basit v. Sahadat Ali (E.P. No. 26 of 1957)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 253

Beal v. Smith (1869) L.R. 4 C.P. 145—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461

Behari Lai v. M. M. Gobardhan Lai (A.I.R.J948 All. 353)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Bellary Mohammadan (Rural) Constituency Case (S. Abdul Razak SahibBahadur v. Hajee Mohammad Ismali Sahib Bahadur) (1 Doabia 169Sen & Poddar 136)

XXvi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

—ref. I I E.L.R. 251 ; 16 E.L.R. 234; 19 E.L.R. 203• Benarsi Das v. Lekh Ram and Others (2 E.L.R. 136)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1Bengarimmunity Co. v. State of Bihar ( [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603)

—ref. 15 E.L.R. 1; 16 E.L.R. 1Bengal Legislative Assembly Constituency (Sen & Poddar 188)

—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy v. Commissioner of Income-tax (A.I.R. 1954 Cal.

225)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 46

Beresford-Hope v. Lady Sandhurst ((1889) 23 Q.B D. 79)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1 ; 14 E.L.R. 99

Berwick-on-Tweed Case (7 O'M. & H. 1)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 215

Berwick-upon-Tweed (7 O'M. & H. 20)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Bewdley Case (1 O'M. & H. 16)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234 ; 19 E.L.R. 358

Bhagchand v. Secretary of State ( [1927] 29 Bom. L.R. 1227)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 122

Bhagwan Dutt Shastri v. Ram Ratan Gupta (11 E.L R. 448)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 103 ; 17 E.L.R. 427 ; 18 E.L.R. 59 ; 19 E.L.R. 203, 358 ;21 E.L.R. 1, 409 ; 22 E.L.R. 37—applied 20 E.L.R. 136—distinguished 17 E.L.R. 207—relied on 17 E.L.R. 321—followed 20 E.L.R. 76

Bhaiya Saheb Dajibabhan Kumbi v. Pandit Ramnath Ram Pratap (A.I.R.1938 Nag. 358)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Bherusingh v. Prabhu Dayal Chaubey (2 E.L.R. 325)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 115 ; 17 E.L.R. 321

Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani [No. 2] (6 E.L.R. 53)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 301

Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani (10 E.L.R. 357)-ref. 11 E.L.R. 301; 12 E.L.R. 34, 83, I o 7 ; 13 E.L.R. 34, 139, i59,231, 310, 322, 377; 14 E.L.R. 122, 147, 251; 16 E.L.R. 74, 183- 17E.L.R. 101, 181; 18 E.L.R. 145 ; i9 E.L.R, 26 ; 20 E.L.R. 76 27s' 22E.L.R. 37. /D>

—applied 20 E.L.R. 136 ; 21 E.L.R. 121—distinguished 19 E.L.R. 417

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. XXVU

—explained n E.L.R. 448relied on 12 E.L.R. 1; 17 E.L.R. 321; 19 E.L.R.ji6

Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani [No. 4] (11 E.L.R. 301)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 162; 19 E.L.R. 358

Bhim Sen v. Chhattar Singh (15 E.L.R. 175)—reversed 22 E.L.R 288.

Bhola Nath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta (6 E.L.R. 104)—followed 11 E.L.R. 1

Bhudhar Lai v. Bansidhar Shukla (13 E.L.R. 399)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 456—followed 13 E.L.R. 476

Bhuvanesh Bhushan Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Farrukhabad (A.I.R.1958 All. 587)

—ref. 19 E.L.R. 260—followed 16 E.L.R. 393

Bibhuti Bhusan v. Damodar Valley Corporation (A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 581)—ref 14 E.L.R. 21

Bidi Supply Company v. The Union of India ([1956] S.C.R. 267)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 1

Bijay Singh v. Narbada Charan Lai (2 E.L.R. 426)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332

Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh (42 I.A. 202)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 357 ; 20 E.L.R. 325

Bilas Singh v. Emperor ([1925] 23 A.L.J. 845)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 164

Birbeck v. Billard ((1885-86) 2 T.L.R. 273)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461; 13 E.L.R. 201; 17 E.L.R. 148

Birch v. Wigan Corporation ([1953] 1 K.B. 136)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 34

Biren Ray v. Bejayes Mukherjee (14 E.L.R. 83)—distinguished 14 E.L.R. 223—affirmed 17 E.L.R. 466

Biresh Misra v. Ram Nath Sarma (17 E.L.R. 243)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 249

Biseswar Misra v. The King (A.I.R. 1949 Orissa 22)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 463

Bishwanath Khemka v. The King Emperor (A.I.R. 1945 F-C. 67)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126

Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das (16 E.L.R. 405)- ref. 18 E.L.R. 209 ; 19 E.L.R. 175 ; 21 E.L.R. 64, 247 ; 22 E.L R <3

Blackburn ((1869) 1 O'M. & H. 202)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 373

XXVlil ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Blackpool Corporation v. Locker ([1948] 1 All E.R. 85)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 108

Bolton Case (2 O'M. & H. 141)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 286

Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Company v. Motilal Shivlal ((1915) I.L.R. 39Bom. 386)—explained 22 E.L.R. 261

Boppana Venkataratnam v. Kamalakara Hanumantha Rao (A.I.R. 1935Mad. 145)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 337

Borough of Kingston-upon-Hull (6 O'M. & H. 372)- —ref. 22 E.L.R. 225

Borough of Oxford Case (7 O'M. & H. 49)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 421; 21 E.L.R. 215— distinguished 12 E.L.R. 329

Borough of Sunderland Case ((1910) 5 O'M. & H. 53)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 373

Borough of Westbury (3 O'M. & H. 78)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Bose v. Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta (A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 720)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Boston Case ((1874) 2 O'M. & H. 161)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 373 ; 20 E.L.R. 275

Bradford Case (1 O'M. & H. 35)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 305

Bradford Navigation Company, In re ((1870) 5 App. Cas. 600)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 374

Braja Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Gobinda Pradhana (Sen & Poddar 82)—dissented from 16 E.L.R. 207

Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 66)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 103; 20 E.L.R. 493

Brij Bhushan v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah (Election Petition No. 366 of1957)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 42

Brijendra Swarup v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow (10 E.L.R. 191)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332 ; 12 E.L.R. 374; 13 E.L.R. 310—not followed 13 E.L.R. 123

Brijendra Swarup v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow (11 E.L.R. 188)—not followed 13 E.L.R. 123 • •

Brij Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh (2 E.L.R. 266)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120; 14 E.L.R. 167

Brij Sunder Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur {j.2 E.L.R.\ 216)— ref. 14 E.L.R. 210 ; 15 E.L.R. 484; 21 E.L.R. 549 ; 22 E.L.R. 366,455

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXIX

Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Seetharam (5 E.L.R. 48)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 117

Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 1

Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd. ([1936] 1 K.B. 697)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 147; 19 E.L.R. 260

Brunner Mercantile Co. v. Rodgin ([1912] 130 L.D. 358)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Buckrose Division Case (4 O'M. & H. 115)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 251

Budhi Mai, L. v. Seth Achal Singh (1 Hammond 9; 3 Jagat Narain 145)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234 ; 17 E.L.R. 321

Bulandshahar District (West) (N.M.R.) (1931 Hammond 231)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Bulandshahar East (2 Doabia 180)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Bulandshahar East, 1921 (Hammond 219)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Burjore and Bhawani Parshad v. Mussamat Bhagana ((1883-84) 11 LA. 7)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 251

Burns v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. ((1925) 89 J. P. 205)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107

Calcutta North (N.H.R.) 1924 (Hammond 225)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Carrickfergus Case ((1869) 1 O'M. & H. 264)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461; 13 E.L.R. 365

Chajju Ram v. Naki ((1922) 49 LA. 144)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 271; 17 E.L.R. 11

Chakradeo, L.M. v. M.S. Aney (21 E.L.R. 376)—affirmed 22 E.L.R. 95

Chakreswar Kumar Jain v. Madandhari Singh (Sen & Poddar 129)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209

Chander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant Singh (3 E.L.R. 147)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120; 18 E.L.R. 1

Chandiprasad v. Pandit Jugal Kishore (I.L.R. [1948] Nag. 340)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

Chandra Shekar v. Jai Prakash (17 E.L.R. 126)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 242

Chandreshwar Narain Prasad Sinha v. Shri Basu Prasad (M.J.C. No. 36 of1954 dated 12-4-1955)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 121; 22 E.L.R. 206

XXX ELECTION LAW REPORTS DiGESf

Chandrika Prasad Tripathi v. Shiv Prasad Chanpuria (21 E.L.R. 172)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 105—followed 22 E.L.R. 86, 321

Chappan v. Moidin Kutti ((1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 68)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 275

CharanDas v. Amir Khan ((1920) L.R. 47 LA. 255)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461; 13 E.L.R. 201; 22 E.L.R. 64

Charles Bright & Co. v. Sellar ([1904] 1 K.B. 6)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur (15 E.L.R. 301)—followed 15 E.L.R. 456 ; 22 E.L.R. 105, 321

Chaturbhuj Sahai v. The Chairman, Board of Directors, Bihar StateCo-operative Bank Ltd., Patna (A.I.R. 1955 Pat. 223)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415; 13 E.L.R. 334 ; 14 E.L.R. 21

Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram (9 E.L.R. 301)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1, 301; 12 E.L.R. 83, 370; 13 E.L.R. 66, 275 ; 14 E.L.R.

88, 338, 480; 15 E.L.R. 1, 146, 219, 407 ; 16 E.L.R. 1, 74, 183, 337,441; 17 E.L.R. 162, 207 ; 18 E.L.R. 37,1485; 20 E.L.R. 325, 350,390; 21 E.L.R. 126, 303

—followed 20 E.L.R. 45—distinguished 22 E.L.R. 14

Chavan, Y.B. v. K. T. Mangalmurti (14 E.L.R. 122)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 105, 321

Cheltenham ((1869) 1 O'M. & H. 62)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 482

Chenna Reddi v. Pedda Obi Reddi (I.L.R. 32 Mad. 416)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Chhattar Singh v. Kewal Singh (15 E.L.R. 162)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 45

Chia Gee v. Martin (3 C.L.R. 649)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 469

Chief Commissioner, Ajmer v. Radhey Shyam Dani ([1957] S.C.R. 68)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 13

Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyricherla Chandra Chudamani Dev (13E.L.R. 66)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 403 ; 19 E.L.R. 358 ; 20 E.L.R. 410

Chingleput Case (Hammond's Election Cases 305)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Chingleput Case (Hammond's Election Cases 307)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 293

Chingleput Case (1 Doabia 332)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXXI

Chinnappa Reddi v. Official Receiver, Guntur ((1936) I.L.R. 59 Mad. 62)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 453

Chiranji Lai v. Lahri Singh (15 E.L.R. 397)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 485—explained 17 E.L.R. 181—disapproved 22 E.L.R. 366

Chiranjit Singh v. Mam Raj (7 E.L.R. 1)—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 390

Chotey Lai v. Dulip Narain ((1938) I.L.R. 17 Pat. 386)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 216

Choudhari Amar Singh v. Pandit Nanak Chand (Hammond 219)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Chunku v. Bhabani (A.I.R. 1946 Patna 218)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 1

Chunnilal v. Radhacharan (16 E.L.R. 93)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 320

Chunnilal v. Shyamlal ([1958] M.P.L.J. 820)—followed 20 E.L.R. 493

Cirencester Division Case (4 O'M. & H. 194)—relied on 11 E.L.R. 251

Claridge v. Evelyn ([1821] 5 B. & Aid. 81)•—ref. 14 E.L.R. 99

Clark v. Wallond ((1883) 52 L.J.Q.B. 321)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67; 12E.L.R. 461; 13 E.L.R. 201; 17 E.L.R, 148

Clay v. Yates (25 L.J. Ex. 287)—distinguished 16 E.L.R. 183

Clifford and O'Sullivan's Case ([1921] 2 A.C. 570)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 345

Cochrane v. Moore ((1890) 25 Q.B.D. 57)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 246

Cockermouth ([1853] 2 P.R. & D. 166)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 205

Collins v. Hertfordshire ([1947] K.B. 598)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bombay Trust Corporation Ltd ((1930)I.L.R. 54 Bom. 216; A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 54)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 105

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ekbal and Co. (A.I.R. 1945 Bom 316)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 176

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vazir Sultan and Sons ([1959] Supp (2)S.C.R. 375)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 321

XXX11 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Coomber v. Berks ((1883) 9 A.C. 61)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Cooper v. Slade ((1858) 6 H.L.C. 746)—ref. 20 E L.R. 410

Corporation of Calcutta v. Chandoolal (A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 773)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305

Counties of Elgin and Nairn Case ((1895) 5 O'M. & H. 1)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 338

Court Fees, In re (A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 257)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126

Cowan v. Seymour ([1920] 1 K.B. 500)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 334

Crown v. V. B. Kolte (I.L.R. [1942] Nag. 506)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 493

Cubison v. Mayo ([1896] 1 Q.B. 246)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 260

Cumberland (Cockermouth Division) Case ((1901) 5 O'M. & H. 155)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107; 15 E.L.R. 284 ; 16 E.L.R. 357 ; 17 E.L.R. 321,373, 427; 18 E.L.R. 28 ; 19 E.L.R. 16, 278 ; 20 E.L.R. 275; 21 E.L.R.215—distinguished 12 E.L.R 329

Dacca West M.R. Case (3 Jagat Narain 175)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 430

Dalip Singh v. Surendra Nath (ri E.L.R. 120)—affirmed 12 E.L.R. 370

Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 193)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Damodar Goswami v. Narnarayan Goswami (10 E.L.R. 272)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 222 ; 14 E.L.R. 444

Daspalla Case (17 E.L.R. 65)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 427

Datla Suryanarayana Raju v. Shrimati Chodagam Ammanna Raja (Gazetteof India, dated 3rd March, 1958)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209

Dattatraya Motiram More v. State of Bombay (A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 311)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415

Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The State of Bombay ([1952] S C R612)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 83

Daulat Ram v. Maharajah Anand Chand (6 E.L.R. 87)•—ref. 12 E.L.R. 421

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXXlli

Davies v. Ward ((1910) Times, Jan. 18)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 373

De Dohse Y- Reg. (66 L.J.Q.B. 42211)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 475

Delane v. Hillcoat ((1829) 9 B. & C. 310; 109 E.R. 115)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 334-

Deo, T. M. v. State (I.L.R. 34 Pat. 57)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64

Deo Chand v. Vashist Narain (6 E.L.R. 138)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415 ; 19 E.L.R. 305—followed 12 E.L.R. 1

Deorao Lakshman Anande v. Keshav Lakshman Borkar (13 E.L.R. 334)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 386 ; 18 E.L.R. 378, 403 ; 20 E.L.R. 157

Deputy Commissioner, Goalpara v. Upendra Saran (A.I.R. 1950 Assam 25)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 493

Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansab (4 E.L.R. 380)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415 ; 12 E.L.R. 34; 15 E.L.R. 370; 16 E.L.R. 154, 234;17 E.L.R. 321; 18 E.L.R. 160 ; 19 E.L.R. 278, 358

Devarapalli Ramalinga Reddi v. Srigiriraju Kotayya ((1918) I.L.R. 41Mad. 20)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 463

Devasharan Sinha v. Sheo Mahadev Prasad (10 E.L.R. 461)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415 ; 16 E.L.R. 234; 18 E.L.R. 160 ; 20 E.L.R. 37—considered 17 E.L.R. 321—relied on 12 E.L.R. 1

Dev Chandra v. Election Tribunal, Dharbhanga (M.J.C. No. 618 of 1957)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 99

Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath (15 E.L.R. 66 on appeal 21 E.L.R.459)—distinguished 22 E.L.R. 299

Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Yadav Tamaskar (15 E.L.R. 260)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 485—approved 17 E.L.R. 181

Dharam Vir v. Bhalaram (7 E.L.R. 64)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra ([1957] S.C.R.152)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461; 15 E.L.R. 331; 20 E.L.R. 221

Dharanidhar Mohapatra v. Pradipta Kishore Das (17 E.L.R. 427)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 278

Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble (15 E.L.R. 41)— affirmed 15 E.L.R. 187 (H.C.); 21 E.L.R. 188 (S.C.)

XXXIV ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble (15 E.L.R. 187)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 477

Dinabhandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj (9 E.L.R. 485)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 322 ; 14 E.L.R. 199—followed 12 E.L.R. 144

Dippala Suri Dora v. V. V. Giri (16 E.L.R. 1)—affirmed 21 E.L.R. 188

Dominion of India v. R. B. Seth Bhikraj Jaipuria (1957 P.L.R. 158)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 162

Dominion Press v. Minister of Customs and Excise ([1928] A.C. 340)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 183

Dorsetshire Eastern Division Case (5 O'M. & H. 27)—considered 17 E.L.R. 427

Down Case (3 O'M. & H. 115)— ref. 21 E.L.R. 409

Drinkwater v. Deakin ([1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 626)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 99

Drogheda Case (2 O'M. & H. 201)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Dublin Case (1 O'M. & H. 270)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461

Dudh Nath Prasad v. Mulchand (A.I.R. 1958 All. 7)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 444

Duffia v. Field ([1925] 208 Ky. 543 ; 271 S.W. 596)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Dunbar v. Guardians of Ardee Union ([1897] 2 Ir. Rep. 76)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. ([1942] A.C. 624)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Dunn v. Reg. ([1896] 1 Q.B. 116)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 475

Durga Prasad v. Mukat Behari Lai (14 E.L.R. 471)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 103

Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh (9 E.L.R. 494)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120, 188, 332, 463; 13 E.L.R. 231, 399; 14 E.L.R. 412 ;

15 E.L.R. 484 ; 17 E.L.R. 65, 81, 181, 321; 18 E.L.R. 1; 20 E.L.R.13; 21 E.L.R. 376, 485; 22 E.L.R. 299

—explained 14 E.L.R. 444; 22 E.L.R. 64—followed 11 E.L.R. 57—relied on 16 E.L.R. 74, 183—distinguished 22 E.L.R. 366

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXXV

Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. v. Minister of Town and CountryPlanning ([1951] 1 K.B. 203)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

East Cork (6 O'M. & H. 339, 369)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 358

East Dorset Case (6 O'M. & H. 22)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107

East Nottingham (6 O'M. & H. 262)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 225

Eastern Division of Manchester Case ((1892) 4 O'M. & H. 120)—distinguished 14 E.L.R. 432

Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi([1952] S.C.R. 696)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 374; 22 E.L.R. 105

Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao (2 E.L.R. 499)—followed 12 E.L.R. 162

Elections of County Councillors, In re ([1888-89] 5 T.L.R. 220)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 477

Ellis v. National Union of Conservatives, etc. ([1900] 44 Sol. Jour. 750)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 284 ; 17 E.L.R. 373; 20 E.L.R. 275

Emperor v. Haji Shaik Mohomed Shustari (I.L.R. 32 Bom. 10)—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 443

Emperor v. Hemendra Prasad Gosh (I.L.R. [1939] 2 Cal. 411)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Emperor v. Osman Chotani (A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 289)—ref. 15 E.L.R 407

Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji (1945 P.C. 156)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Empress v. Burah (3 A.C. 889)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 345

England v. Inglis ([1920] 2 K.B.D. 636)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 490; 16 E.L.R. 337; 17 E.L.R. 162; 20 E.L.R. 325

Eshenchunder Singh v. Shamachurn Bhutto (11 M.I.A. 7)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 350

Eugene Fernandez v. The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India ([1954]1 L.L.J. 623)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 184

Everett v. Griffiths ([1924] 1 K.B. 941)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India (A I.R. 1958 S.C. 578)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

XXXvi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Fakrunisa v. Moulvi-Isarus Sadik ([1921] 17 N.L.R. 72)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

Farrukhabad Case (3 Ham. E.P. 126)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 148

Farrukhabad District N.M.R. 1927 (Hammond 349 ; Jagat Narain 22)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34 ; 19 E.L.R. 16—distinguished 12 E.L.R. 421

Fateh Singh v. Chauduri Suraj Mai (Sen & Poddar 337)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Fauntleroy v. Beebe ([1911] 2 Ch. 257)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 81

Fermanagh and South Tyrone Division Case ([1955] cited in 105 L. Jo. 594)ref. 14 E.L.R. 99

Few, E. v. C. E. Gibbon (1 Doabia 247)ref. 12 E.L.R. 83

Finsbury Central Division Case (4 O'M. & H. 171)relied on 11 E.L.R. 251

Ford v. Newth, In re ([1901] Q.B. 683)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 183 ; 18 E.L.R. 485

Fraser, D.R. & Co. v. Minister of National Revenue ([1949] A.C. 24)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 147 ; 19 E.L.R. 260

Gairola, K.N. v. Gangadhar Maithani (8 E.L.R. 105)rej, I 2 E.L.R. 107, 168ref. 18 E.L.R. 403

Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa ([1954] S.C.R. 1)ref. 15 E.L.R. 1

Gajendra Chaudhuri, B. v. P. C. Dutta Bahadur (Hammond 367)ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Galway Case (1 O' M. & H. 307)ref. 18 E.L.R. 209

Gambhirji Odharaj v. Bind Basni Prasad (A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 369)——ref. 21 E.L.R. 46

Ganapathia Pillai v. Somasundaram Pillai (A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 213)ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Ganda Singh v. Sampuran Singh (3 E.L.R. 17)dissented from 16 E.L.R. 207

Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay (A.I.R XQ<ABom. 202) ' ' ' D*—ref. 16 E.L.R. 393)

Ganeshi Lai Krishna Lai v. Seth Mool Chand Nemi Chand (A I RAH. 435) • • •

ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXXVii

Ganeshprasad v. Damayanti (I.L.R. [1946] Nag. 1)ref. 14 E.L.R. 1

Gangadar v. Election Tribunal, V.P. (10 E.L.R. 183)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67 ; 12 E.L.R. 34

Ganga Prasad Pathak v. Saligram Jaiswal (11 E.L.R. 415)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 305—distinguished 17 E.L.R. 321

Ganga Prasad Sastri v. Pannalal Jain (3 E.L.R. 393)—relied on 11 E.L.R. 67

Gangulee v. Kadhuri Devi (A.I.R. 1952 Pat. 281)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Garland, A. H., In re (18 Lawyer's Edition 366)—distinguished 16 E.L.R. 207

Gauri Sankar Bhargava v. Jagatnarain Shahgal (I.L.R. 56 All. 608)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Gauri Shankar v. Manki Kunwar ((1923) I.L.R. 45 All. 624)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 1

Gauri Shankar Shastri v. Mayadardas (15 E.L.R. 441)—relied on 22 E.L.R. 14

Gaya Prasad v. Krishna Chandra Sharma (10 E.L.R. 6)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 378

Ghansham Dass Thirani v. Partap Keshev Deo (Gazette of India, datedApril 28, 1958)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209

Ghasi Ram v. Ram Singh (4 E.L.R. 124)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 45

Ghayur AH Khan v. Keshav Gupta (16 E.L.R. 154)—followed 18 E.L.R. 289 ; 21 E.L.R. 215, 345—dissented from 21 E.L.R. 247

Ghosh, S. S. v. S. N. Basu (4 E.L.R. 73)—relied on 16 E.L.R. 234

Gian Chand v. Om Prabha Jain (16 E.L.R. 384)—affirmed 21 E.L.R. 54

Gian Chand v. Om Prabha Jain (18 E.L.R. 136)—followed 20 E.L.R. 321

Gian Chand v. Sriram Bansal (2 E.L.R. 136)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 390

Gilbert v. Trinity House Corporation ([1886] 17 Q.B.D. 795)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Girdharlal v. Md. Hanif (A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 399)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

XXXV111 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Giri, V.V. v. Dippala Suri Dora (15 E.L.R. 1)—dissented from 15 E.L.R. 41—reversed 16 E.L.R. 1

Giri, V.V. v. Dippala Suri Dora (21 E.L.R. 188)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 213

Gloucester Municipal Election Petition, 1900, Ford v. Newth ([1901]1 K.B. 683)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 485

Gobind Ram v. Chunni Lai ([1929] 119 I.C. 330)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Godavari v. Sheo Prasad Nagar (13 E.L.R. 399)-ref. 13 E.L.R. 456

Goesart v. Cleary (335 U.S. 464 ; 93 Law Edn. 163)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 345

Gokulananda Praharaj v. Jogesh Chandra Rout (18 E.L.R. 76)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 345—relied on 22 E.L.R. 225

Goodwin's Case (2 St. Tr. 91)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 373

Goolabai Motabhai Shroff v. Pestonji Cowasji Bhandari (A.I.R. 1934Bom. 339)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415

Goolabai Motabhai Shroff v. Pestonji Cowasji ((1935) 37 Bom. L.R. 410)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Gopala Iyengar v. Mohomed Ibrahim Rowther ((1925) 90 Ind. Cas. 759)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 463

Gopalan v. State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 88)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Gosling v. Veley ([1847] 7 Q.B. 409)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 99

Gothard v. Clarke ([1879-80] L.R. 5 C.P.D. 253 ; 49 L.J.C.P. 474)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216; 14 E.L.R. 210 ; 21 E.L.R. 459

Gould v. Stuart ([1896] A.C. 575)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 475

Government Advocate, Bihar and Orissa v. Gopabandu Dass (I.L.R. [1922]1 Patna 414)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 404

Governor-General in Council v. H. Peer Mohd. Khoda Bux (A.I.R. 1950E.P. 228)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Govind Prasad v. Bala Kunwari (A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 12)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXXIX

Govind S hanbhag v. Alva Joachim Bladad (Gazette of India, 23rd January,1958)—re}. 18 E.L.R. 209

Grant v. Pagham, Overseer (3 C.P.D. 80)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 484

Great Western Rly. Co. v. Bater ([1922] 2 A.C. 1)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 334

Great Yarmouth (5 O'M. & H. 89)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Grey v. Charusila Dasi (I.L.R. 38 Cal. 53)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 81

Gulab Chand Chordia v. Thakur Narain Singh (6 E.L.R. 397)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 115

Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhattarpur (14 E.L.R. 13)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 88; 18 E.L.R. 69 ; 21 E.L.R. 172—followed 14 E.L.R. 328; 17 E.L.R. 1

Gurbaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh (32 C.W.N. 119)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Gurdial Singh v. Manmohan Kaur (10 E.L.R. 450)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 272—followed 11 E.L.R. 182

Gurnam Singh v. Partap Singh (7 E.L.R. 338)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120, 415 ; 12 E.L.R. 34, 216; 22 E.L.R. 53, 455

Guru Dayal Das v. Feroz Gandhi (Gazette of India, Extraordinary, dated16th October, 1957)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305

Habibganj South Case (Hammond, Vol. II, 141)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 275

Habibganj South N.M.R. 1924 (Hammond 387)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34; 16 E.L.R. 234

Habibur Rehman v. Shiva Gopal Tewari (13 E.L.R. 377)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 128

Hackney Case ((1874) 2 O'M. & H. 77)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow(i3 E.L.R. 262)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 236

Haji Abdul Wahid v. Dr. B. V. Keskar (16 E.L.R. 393)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305

Hakikatullah v. Nathu Singh (6 E.L.R. 10)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 321

xl ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. Indubhai B. Amin (r E.L.R. 171)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 334 ; 15 E.L.R. 115 ; 17 E.L.R. 321; 18 E.L.R. 59

Hanskumar Kishanchand v. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 947)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 493

Hans Raj v. Ram Singh (2 E.L.R. 12)— ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Hanuman Prasad Misra v. Tara Chand (5 E.L.R. 446)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1, 332 ; 17 E.L.R. 162 ; 18 E.L.R. 37

Hanumat Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1952S.C. 344)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 345

Harford v. Linskey ((1899) 1 Q.B.D. 852; 2 O'M. & H. 77)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 99 ; 16 E.L.R. 183; 21 E.L.R. 376

Haria v. Manakchand (27 Ind. Cas. 866)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 337

Hari Charan v. Kaushi Charan (A.I.R. 1940 Cal. 286)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 493

Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad (13 E.L.R. 478)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 6, 466—not followed 16 E.L.R. 384 ; 18 E.L.R. 136

Harinder Singh v. Karnail Singh (12 E.L.R. 421)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 146, 271, 460 ; 19 E.L.R. 16—applied 13 E.L.R. 385

Hariprasad Shivshankar v. A. D. Divelkar ([1957] 59 Bom. L.R. 384)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 122

Hari Shanker v. Shibban Lai (10 E.L.R. 126)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1, 415

Hari Shankar v. Sukhdeo Prasad (8 E.L.R. 341)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 321

Hari Shanker Bagla v. Kishan Chand Puri (1 Doabia 127)(See also U.P. Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants ChamberConstituency)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 99 ; 16 E.L.R. 234

Hari Shankar Prasad v. Shibban Lai Saksena (10 E.L.R. 126)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 305

Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 310, 365, 399, 456 ; 14 E.L.R. 13, 72,147. 328, 375, 432,

471 ; 15 E.L.R. i n , 131, 199, 205, 301, 349, 443 ; 16 E.L.R. 45, 95;17 E.L.R. 111, 37, 65, 148, 302, 313; 18 E.L.R. 69, 76, 136, 145, 305,403 ; 19 E.L.R. 260, 278, 466; 20 E.L.R. 275,374, 401; 21 E.L.R. i,172, 286, 320, 345, 435 ; 22 E.L.R. 37, 105

—distinguished 16 E.L.R. 327; 22 E.L.R. 288

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. x l i

—explained 21 E.L'R. 54 ; 22 E.L.R. 64—explained and applied 13 E.L.R. 201—followed 16 E.L.R. 384—relied on 15 E.L.R. 175 ; 19 E.L.R. 16 ; 20 E.L.R. 443 ; 22 E.L.R. 225

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (10 E.L.R. 216)—re}. 11 E.L.R. 222, 332 ; 12 E.L.R. 144, 156, 201, 216, 370, 378 ; 13

E.L.R. 123, 231, 377 ; 14 E.L.R. 251, 444, 458 ; 15 E.L.R. 66, 425 ;17 E.L.R. 65 ; 19 E.L.R. 481; 20 E.L.R. 176, 470; 21 E.L.R. 376

—explained 17 E.L.R. 181; 19 E.L.R. 164—distinguished 18 E.L.R. 193—relied on 16 E.L.R. 234

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, Jabalpur (14 E.L.R. 147)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 72 ; 16 E.L.R. 384, 393 ; 18 E.L.R. 136; 21 E.L.R. 320 ;

22 E.L.R. 37, 105—dissented from 19 E.L.R. 260—distinguished 17 E.L.R. 101—followed 14 E.L.R. 186—relied on 16 E.L.R. 93

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed (5 E.L.R. 248)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 167

Harnam Singh v. Jwala Prasad (8 E.L.R. 332)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Harnam Singh v. S. Kripal Singh (Gazette of India, Extraordinary,September 26, 1955)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Har Prasad v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1947 All. 139)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 164

Harprasad Ghashiram Gupta v. State (A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 184)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 403

Hartlepools Case (6 O'M. & H. 1)—distinguished 12 E.L.R. 421

Hartlepools (6 O'M. & H. 4)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16, 358

Harwich (3 O'M. & H. 70)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Hasluck, Ex parte ([1895] 2 Q.B. 264)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126

Hay v. Justices of the Tower of London (24 Q.B.D. 561)—distinguished 16 E.L.R. 207

Hayat Ali v. Nem Chand (A.I.R. 1945 Lah. 169)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 216

v»

xlii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Hector Whaling Limited, In re ([T936] 1 Ch. 208)—rej. 15 E.L.R. 146

Heersingh v. Veerka (15 E.L.R. 92)—rej. 20 E L.R. 374

Henry Greer Robinson v. The State of South Australia ((1931) 35 C.W.N.1121)

—rej. 20 E.L.R. 325Heydon's Case ((1584) 3 Rep. 7B)

—rej. 17 E.L.R. 373 ; 19 E.L.R. 358Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. ([1942] A.C. 336)

—rej. 16 E.L.R. 441Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 362)

—rej. 21 E.L.R. 33Hirday Narain Singh v. Jang Bahadur Singh (A.I.R. 1952 Pat. 265)

—rej. 18 E.L.R. 305Hobbs v. Morey ([1904] 1 K.B. 74)

—rej. 13 E.L.R. 334 ; 14 E.L.R. 99Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal ([1921] 48 Cal. 499)

—rej. 12 E.L.R. 453Hoossain Bhoy v. Ahmed Ibrahim Haroon Jaffar (1 Doabia 225)

—rej. 18 E.L.R. 209Horen Jones v. Mohan Singh (2 E.L.R. 147)

—rej. 11 E.L.R. 1Hornol v. Neuberger Products Ltd. ([1957] 1 Q.B. 247)

—rej. 20 E.L.R. 410 ; 21 E.L.R. 435Hoshiarpur West General Constituency Case, 1946 (Sen & Poddar 945)

—rej. 17 E.L.R. 321Hoshiarpur West Muhammadan Constituency Case, 1937 (Sen & Poddar

399 ; 1 Doabia 267)•—rej. 12 E.L.R. 34

Hoshiarpur West Muhammadan Constituency Case (Sen & Poddar 955)( —rej. 11 E.L.R. 251Hotilal v. Shri Raj Bahadur (15 E.L.R. 55)

—rej. 20 E.L.R. 157Howe v. Smith ((1884) 27 Ch. D. 89)

—rej. 17 E.L.R. 207Hrishikesh Sanval v. A. P. Bagchi (A.I.R. 1940 All. 497)

—rej. 20 E.L.R. 493Hunnings v. Williamson ([1882-83] 11 Q.B.D. 553)

—rej. 13 E.L.R. 490Hyett v. Mekin ((1884) 25 Ch. D. 735)

—rej. 17 E.L.R. 81

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. xKU

Ijjetali Talukdar v. Empress ((1943) 47 C.W.N. 928)—re}.. 20 E.L.R. 325

Imrat Khan v. Ch. Mehtab Khan (Sen & Poddar 768)—re}. 11 E.L.R. 222, 332

Inamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa (14 E.L.R. 296)—re}. 14 E.L.R. 270 ; 17 E.L.R. 252 ; 19 E.L.R. 305 ; 20 E.L.R. 374, 410 ;22 E.L.R. 105, 225—applied 21 E.L.R. 180—relied on 17 E.L.R. 475

Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan (15 E.L.R. 219)—re}. 20 E.L.R. 275 ; 21 E.L.R. 137, 320, 435—}ollowed 15 E.L.R. 443—distinguished 22 E.L.R. 45

Income-tax Commissioner, Bombay Presidency v. Bombay Trust Corporation(57 LA. 49)—re}. 20 E.L.R. 13

International Ry. Co. v. Niagara Parks Commission ([1941] 2 All E.R. 462)—re}. 14 E.L.R. 21

Irrawaddy Flotilla Company Ltd. v. Bugwandass ([1891] 18 LA. 121)—re}. 14 E.L.R. 72

Irwin v. Reid ((1921) I.L.R. 48 Cal. 304)—re}. 20 E.L.R. 325

Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder Singh (7 E.L.R. 90)—re}. 11 E.L.R. 182

Islington, West Division Case ((1901) 5 O'M. & H. 120)—re}. 17 E.L.R. 373

Item Co. v. Nu-Crape Bottling Co. ([1926] La. 631; 107 S.O. 471)—re}. 14 E.L.R. 412

J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India (A.I.R.1953 All. 624)— re}. 14 E.L.R. 147

Jackson Standfield and Sons v. Butterworth ([1948] 2 All E.R. 558)—re}. 14 E.L.R. 108

Jadumani Mangraj v. Dinabandhu Sahu (8 E.L.R. 480)—re}. 18 E.L.R. 305

Jagajeevandas Shetty v. Sanjeeva Shetty (3 E.L.R. 358)—dissented jrom 19 E.L.R. 430

Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh (9 E.L.R. 231)—re}. 11 E.L.R. 120, 484 ; 12 E.L.R. 34, 461; 13 E.L.R. 34, 139, 246,399. 478 ; 14 E.L.R. 83,122, 223, 241, 251, 270, 296, 328, 444 ; 15 E.L.R.92, 146, 205, 219, 301, 443 ; 16 E.L.R. 45, 234, 384, 450, 491; 17 E.L.R.

xliv ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

65, 282, 313, 373 ; 18 E.L.R. 76, 136, 305 ; 19 E . L ; R . 3 O 5 , 358 ; 20 E.L.R.176, 275,325, 374; 21 E.L.R. 286; 22 E.L.R. 37, 425, 455—followed 12 E.L.R. 144—relied on 19 E.L.R. 16

Jagannath v. Motiram (A.I.R. 1951 Punj. 377)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 34

Jagannath Agarwalla v. State of Orissa (I.L.R. [1957] Cuttack 27)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 65

Jagannath Rao Dani v. Rambharosa (A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 33)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Jagannath Sharma v. S. C. Gupta (2 E.L.R. 8)—ref. 11 E.L.R, 120

Jagdish Chandra v. Prakash Narain (A.I.R. 1953 V.P. 51)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 321

Jagdish Singh v. Rudra Deolal (8 E.L.R. 311)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120, 332

Jaikrishna v. Sawatram (A.I.R. 1940 Nag. 292)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhi Ram (10 E.L.R. 120)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 203 ; 12 E.L.R. 107, 329 ; 16 E.L.R. 1; 17 E.L.R. 32118 E.L.R. 160, 253; 19 E.L.R. 203, 278, 466—relied on 20 E.L.R. 136

Janki Das v. Kalu Ram ( (1936) 162 I.C. 486)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Jankiram Co. v. Chunilal Shriram (I.L.R. [1945] Bom. 40)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Jaswant Singh v. Jagan Nath (10 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Jaswant Singh v. Mangal Das (9 E.L.R. 385)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirdaya Narain Singh (3 E.L.R. 397)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332 ; 12 E.L.R. 378

Jhumuklal v. Ambikasao (16 E.L.R. 477)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 33

Joginder Singh v. Raghbir Singh (5 E.L.R. 81)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Dr. John, V. K. v. Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras (12 E.L.R.329)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 453 ; 22 E.L.R. 221

John, Dr. V. K. v. G. Vasanta Pai (10 E.L.R. 345)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 278 ; 12 E.L.R. 83, 107, 329, 378, 453 ; 22 E.L.R. 221—distinguished 19 E.L.R. 16—followed 13 E.L.R. 123

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. xlv

John Pritchard v. Mayor & Co. of Bangor ( (1888) 13 A.C. 241)—re/. 13 E.L.R. 334

Joseph Forster Wilson v. Christopher Furness (6 O'M. & H. 1)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 305

Joseph Forster Wilson v. Sir Christopher Furness (6 O'M. & H. 6)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 215

Jugalkishore v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 376)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 376

Jujhar Singh v. Bhairon Lai (7 E.L.R. 457)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 378—distinguished 12 E.L.R. 378 ; 19 E.L.R. 203

Julius v. Bishop of Oxford ( [1879-80] 5 App. Cas. 214)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 251; 18 E.L.R. 305

Jwala Prasad v. Briendra Gupta (21 E.L.R. 485)—reversed 22 E.L.R. 366

Jwala Prasad Misra v. Mahadeo (3 E.L.R. 473)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 378; 17 E.L.R. 11—distinguished 13 E.L.R. 126

Jyostna Chandra v. Mehrabali (3 E.L.R. 488)•—ref. 19 E.L.R. 203

Kalaram S. Bhag Singh v. Fazal Bari Khan (A.I.R. 1941 Pesh. 38)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 34

Kalavagunta Sreeramarao v. Kalavakunta Suryanarayanamurthy (A.I.R.1954 Mad. 340)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 321

Kalipada Das Karmarkar v. Sashi Bhusan Majhi (A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 636)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 463

Kalyan Singh v. Election Tribunal, Ajmer (8 E.L.R. 207)—not followed 11 E.L.R. 120—relied on 12 E.L.R. 1

Kamraja Nadar v. KunjuThevar (13 E.L.R. 159)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305—followed 14 E.L.R. 313—overruled in part and affirmed in part 14 E.L.R. 270

Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar (14 E.L.R. 270)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 296 ; 16 E.L.R. 99 ; 17 E.L.R. 65 ; 18 E.L.R. 97, 136,305 ; 19 E.L.R. 305 ; 20 E.L.R. 114; 21 E.L.R. 54, 64 ; 22 E.L.R. 105,

321—applied 21 E.L.R. 172—distinguished 17 E.L.R. 475—explained and followed 15 E.L.R. 292 ; 17 E.L.R. 466

xlv i ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

—followed, 15 E.L.R. 456 ; 16 E.L.R. 384, 393 ; 22 E.L.R. 86, 484—relied on 17 E.L.R. 6

Kamdeo Prasad Singh v. Badri Narain Singh (18 E.L.R. 59)—reversed 21 E.L.R. 64

Kanauji Lai Shukla v. Bhagwan Din (3 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 167

Kanda v. Waghu (A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 68)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 350

Kandaswami, S. v. S. B. Adityan (19 E.L.R. 260)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

Kanglu v. Chief Executive Officer, Janapada Sabha, Drug (I.L.R. [1954]Nag. 875)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 13

Kanhaiyalal Tiwari v. S. S. Narayan Mushram (15 E.L.R. 284)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 275 ; 21 E.L.R. 33

Kapildeo Singh v. Surajnarayan Singh (17 E.L.R. 475)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64—dissented, from 22 E.L.R. 105, 321

Karan Singh v. Jamuna Singh (15 E.L.R. 370)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 221—followed 16 E.L.R. 154 ; 18 E.L.R. 289

Karnail Singh v. Election Tribunal, Hissar (10 E.L.R. 189)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216, 370 ; 14 E.L.R. 210; 15 E.L.R. 66, 146, 484 ; 16E.L.R. 491; 21 E.L.R. 459; 22 E.L.R. 366—relied on 22 E.L.R. 299

Karnal Mohammadan Constituency Case (2 Doabia 235) (Sen & Poadar 428)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34; 17 E.L.R. 293

Karnal South General Constituency Case (2 Doabia 80)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 293

Kartar Singh v. Baluram (3 E.L.R. 71)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332

Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami (A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 500)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 1

Katherine Yale v. The King ([1721] E.R. 910)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 83, 223

Kedarnath Bhattacharjee v. Gorie Mahomed ((1886) I.L.R. i4Cal. 64)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 337

Keiffe v. La. Salle Realty Co. ([1927] 162 La. 824; 53 American LawReports 82)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Kennington Case (4 O'M. & H. 93)—commented upon 11 E.L.R. 208

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. xlvii

Kesab Chandra Patwari v. Gouri Shankar Bhattacharya (2 E.L.R. 215)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 37

Kesho Ram v. Hazura Singh (8 E.L.R. 320)—overruled 11 E.L.R. 192

Keshav Lakshman Borkar v. Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anancie (13 E.L.R. 334)—affirmed 21 E.L.R. 466

Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder (11 E.L.R. 208)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34 ; 15 E.L.R. 205 ; 16 E.L.R. 477 ; 17 E.L.R. 37; 20E.L.R. 410, 443 ; 21 E.L.R. 137, 409—followed 17 E.L.R. 427

Khagendranath Nath v. Umesh Chandra Nath (16 E.L.R. 207)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 175

Khan Bahadur Haji Badi Ahmed Chaudhury v. Muhammad Anwarul Azim(Sen & Poddar 261)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34—explained and distinguished 20 E.L.R. 101—relied on 12 E.L.R. 107

Khan Bahadur Syed Hifazat Ali v. Mohammad Ashgar (Sen & Poddar 625)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Kharak Singh v. Bhup Chand (27 P.R. 1874)—ref. 17 E.L.R 126

Khare, N. B. v. Election Commission (13 E.L.R. 112)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 378

Khawja Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 434)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Khuda Buksh v. Alia Ditta (I.L.R. 1 Lah. 342)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Khushwaqt Rai v. Karan Singh (5 E.L.R. 93)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1, 120

King against the Mayor &c. of Bridgewater ((1837) A. & E. Reports 339)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 334

Kingston Case (6 O'M. & H. 372)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107

Kingston Case (6 O'M. & H. 374)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 208; 21 E.L.R. 137

Kishenlal Lamror v. Madan Singh (10 E.L.R. 49)—dissented from 13 E.L.R. 334

Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra (19 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 206

Kistna (N.H.R.) 1928 (Hammond 447)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Komaraswami Pillai v. Venkataramana Rao ([1956] 1 M.L.J. 40)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 331

xlviii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Kotch v. River Port Pilot Commissioners (330 U.S. 552 ; 91 Law Edn. 1093)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 345

Krishnagiri Election Case (E.P. No. 149 of 1957)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Krishnaji Bhimrao Antrolikar v. Shankar Shantaram More (7 E.L.R. 100)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107 ; 15 E.L.R. 205; 16 E.L.R. 234, 357 ; 21 E.L.R. 247—followed 17 E.L.R. 321

Krishnamurthi v. The Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board ((1935)69 M.L.J. 384)—distinguished 11 E.L.R. 402

Krishnappa v. Narayan Singh (7 E.L.R. 294)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 115 ; 17 E.L.R. 321

Krishnaswami Iyer, K. V. v. A. Ramaswami Mudaliar and Muthiah Mudaliar(2 Hammond 94)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 184

Krishnaswami, K. V. v. A. Ramaswami Mudaliar (Hammond 305)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 391)—ref. 19 E X R. 164

Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Rai Bahadur Har Swarup (A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 1)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 207

Kunwar Muhammad Abdus Salam Khan v. M. Akhtar Muhammad Khan(Sen & Poddar 243)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur v. Rajeshwar Bali (A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 276)—relied on 18 E.L.R. 69

Kusharam Nath v. Dev Kanta Barooah (15 E.L.R. 66)—affirmed 21 E.L.R. 459

Kutoor Vengayil Rayarappan Nayanar v. Kutoor Vengayil Valia MadhaviAmma (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 140)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

L. H. Sugar Factory v. Moti (A.I.R. 1941 All. 243)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107

Lachhiram v. Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya (9 E.L.R. 149; 10 E.L.R. 122)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 401—distinguished 12 E.L.R. 107

Lachmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Corporation of Madras (I.L.R. 50Mad, 130; A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 130)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 147

Lachmi Narain v. Rupe Narain ([1925] 85 I.C. 29)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. xlix

Lahani v. Bala (A.I.R. 1922 Nag. 227)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 337

Lahore City Case (Hammond 467)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 430

Lakhamgouda Basavprabhu Sardesai v, Baswantrao (A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 157)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 115 ; 20 E.L.R. 157

Lakshmana Pillai v. Chengam Pillai (2 E.L.R. 103)—relied on 11 E.L.R. 67—followed 17 E.L.R. 20r

Lakshmanayya v. Rajam Aiyar (58 M.L.J. 118)—ref. xy E.L.R. 293

Lakshmi Chand v. Ladhu Ram Choudhri (4 E.L.R. 200)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Lakshmi Narain v. Balwan Singh (20 E.L.R. 76)—affirmed 22 E.L.R. 273

Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal & Son Ltd. v. Government of Hyderabad([1955] 1 S.C.R. 393)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 331; 16 E.L.R. 337 ; 20 E.L.R. 221

Lala Hemchand v. Lala Pearey Lai (A.I.R. 1942 P.C. 64)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 53

Lala Khazanchi Shah v. Niaz AH (A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 438)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

Lala Sohan Lai v. Lala Binda Saran (1 Doabia 19)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 115

Lai Chandrabhan Shah v. B. C. Kekre (15 E.L.R. 125)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

Lallu Chand v. Tej Singh (8 E.L.R. 28)—ref. 11 E.L.R, 120

Lancaster Division Election Case (5 O'M. & H, 39)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 201

Lane v. Cotton ([1701] 1 Raymond 646)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Lapish v. Braithwaite ([1925] 1 K.B.D. 474)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 490

Laxman Rao v. Laxminivas Ganerival (No. 2) (2 E.L.R. 20)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Laxmidatta v. Madanlal Dhupar (7 E.L.R. 398)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 378

Lester v. Garland ([1808] 15 Ves. 248(F))—ref. 15 E.L.R. 146

Lichfield Division Case (1 O'M. & H. 22)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 427 ; 20 E.L.R. 275

vii

1 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Lichfield Division Case ([1895] 5 O'M. & H. 27)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 208 ; 14 E.L.K. 338

Linga Gowda, M. C. v. Shivananjappa (2 E.L.R. 163)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67

Linga Gowda v. Shivananjappa (6 E.L.R. 288)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 378 ; 16 E.L.R. 45, 234

London County Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Association v. Nichols([1949] 1 K.B. 35)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Londonderry Case (1 O'M. & H. 274)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 405 ; 18 E.L.R. 209

Longford Case (2 O'M. & H. 6)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209 ; 19 E.L.R. 203

Louis, A.M., Phelan, In re (274 N.W. 411)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Louth Northern Division Case ((1911) 6 O'M. & H. 103)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 275

Louth Northern Division Case (6 O'M. & H. 143)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 409

Lucknow and Unao Districts Mohammadan Rural Constituency Case (AbdulWali Khan and Habibur Rahman v. Ehtishan Mahmood AH) (Sen &Poddar 468)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234; 17 E.L.R. 427

Lyallpur Case (Sen & Poddar 504)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332

Lyons, In re (55 I.L.T. 35)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 251

M. & S. M. Railway Co. v. Bezwada Municipality ([1945] 47 Bom. L.R. 587)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 402

Mackenzie-Kennedy v. Air Council ([1927] 2 K.B. 517)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Madan Lai v. Syed Zargham Haider (13 E.L.R. 456)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 160, 403 ; 19 E.L.R. 278, 358 ; 22 E.L.R. 273—explained and distinguished 20 E.L.R. 76

Madan Mohan v. Bankatlal (8 E.L.R. 119)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 321, 402

Madan Mohan Lai v. Om Prakash (A.I.R. 1957 All. 384)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Madan Mohan Upadhya v. Hari Datt Kandpal (15 E.L.R. 331)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 124

Madan Pal v. Rajdeo Upadhya (6 E.L.R. 28)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 305

TABLE OF1 CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. li

—followed 12 E.L.R. iMaddela Yerra Channugadu, In re (I.L.R. [1955] Mad. 92)

—ref. 16 E.L.R. 207Madhai Mandal v. Pran Krishna Biswas (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 139)

—ref. 13 E.L.R. 1Maganlal Bagdi v. H.V. Kamath (15 E.L.R. 205)

—ref. 15 E.L.R. 284; 21 E.L.R. 33, 247, 286Magee v. Mark (11 Ir. Com. Law Rep. 449)

—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410Mahabaleswarappa v. Gopalaswami (A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 673)

—ref. 20 E.L.R. 493Mahadeosa v. Deputy Commissioner, Amravati (I.L.R. [1945] Nag. 341)

—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219Maharaja of Jeypore v. Gunupuram D. Patnaick ([1905] I.L.R. 28 Mad. 42)

—ref. 12 E L.R. 453Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Iyer (A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 497)

—ref. 16 E.L.R. 1Maharaja of Parlakimedi v. Bijai Chandra Das (4 E.L.R. 101)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1Maharaj Singh v. Ratan Anmol Singh (7 E.L.R. 320)

—ref. 12 E.L.R. 378 ; 17 E.L.R. 321Maharani Vijaya Raje Scindia v. Moti Lai (14 E.L.R. 251)

— ref. 18 E.L.R. 209Mahendra Kumar v. Vidyavathi (10 E.L.R. 214)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1; 16 E.L.R. 183—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 45

Mahendra Pal Singh v. Shri Mohan Lai Gautam (U. P. Gazetta, Extra-ordinary, dated 8th November, 1957)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 160

Mahendra Sahu v. Dutia Raul (3 E.L.R. 117)—dissented from 17 E.L.R. 321

Mahesh Datta v. Murlidhar (7 E.L.R. 154)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 378

Mahomed Solaiman v. Birendra Chandra Singh ([1923] 74 I. C. 906;I.L.R. 50 Cal. 253)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Malchand Agarwala v. Santolal Agarwala (A.I.R. 1954 Assam 177)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 1

Malcolm v. Parry and Ingram ((1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 610)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 246; 19 E.L.R. 278

Malik Barkat AH v. Moulvi Moharamali Chisti (Hammond 469)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Hi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Malkarjun v. Narhari (27 I. A. 216)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 490

Mallikarjuna Dugget v. Secretary of State for India in Council ( (1912) 14Ind. Cas. 401)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 463

Mandalay Town Constituency Case, 1953 (U Ba Pe and Abdul Razak v.U Ba Shwe) (A.I.R. 1933 Rang. 41)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 203

Maneklal Amolakchand v. Thete Gopal Ramji (9 E.L.R. 36)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi (17 E.L.R. 263)—affirmed 22 E.L.R. 469

Mangal Sain v. The State of Punjab (A.I.R 1952 Punj. 58)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415 ; 14 E.L.R. 21, 229; 15 E.L.R. 475

Mangal Singh v. M.M. Lai Atal & Seth Mahendra Singh (D.B.C. Writ Appli-cation No. 166 of 1957, decided on 14th January, 1958)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 471

Manmohani Sehgal v. Sucheta Kirpalani (3 E.L.R. 347)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Manshera North M.R. Constituency, 1946 (Sen & Poddar 1017)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 427

Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai (16 E.L.R. 470)ref. 17 E.L.R. 81

Maqboolan v. Ahmad Hussain ([1904] 31 I.A. 38)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 407

Marakanda Sahu v. Lai Sadananda (A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 279)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126

Mariappan v. V. R. Neduncheziyan (14 E.L.R. 270)—ref. 16 E.L.R 384; 18 E.L.R. 97, 136, 305; 19 E.L.R. 305

Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 79)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Masani, M.R. v. Election Tribunal, Ranchi (14 E.L.R. 270)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126; 18 E.L.R. 97, 136, 305; 19 E.L.R. 305

Mast Ram v. Harnam Singh Sathe (7 E.L.R. 301)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415 ; 12 E.L.R. 34—followed 11 E.L.R. 57

Mast Ram v. Iqbal Singh (12 E.L.R. 34)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 427 ; 18 E.L.R. 160; 19 E.L.R. 16, 278 ; 20 E.L.R. 37—considered 17 E.L.R. 321

Mathai Mathew Manjuran v. K. C. Abraham (10 E.L.R. 376)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 1; 16 E.L.R. 405; 18 E.L.R. 209; 19 E.L.R. 430; 21

E.L.R. 286

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. Hii

Mather v. Brown ([1876] 1 C.P.D. 596)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 246, 444

Mathra Das v. Dara Singh (4 E.L.R. 441)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Maude v. Lowley ([1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 165)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67 ; 12 E.L.R. 461; 13 E.L.R. 201; 17 E.L.R. 313

Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of West Ham v. Grant (40 Ch. D. 331)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

McMillan v. Guest ([1942] A.C. 561)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 334

Md. Ibrahim Ansari v. M. R. Masani (18 E.L.R. 160)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 153)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. Commissioner of Income-tax ([1956] S.C.R. 691)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 345

Meganathan, M. R. v. K. T. Kosalram (9 E.L.R. 242)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34 ; 15 E.L.R. 284 ; 18 E.L.R. 403 ; 19 E.L.R. 16; 20

E.L.R. 275—considered 17 E.L.R. 321—not followed 19 E.L.R. 305

Mehnga Ram v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow (A.I.R. 1956All. 644)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 393

Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chawada Akbar Dalumiyan (7 E.L.R. 374)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415-—considered 17 E.L.R. 321—relied on 12 E.L.R. 34 ; 18 E.L.R. 378

Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas (2 E.L.R. 301)—approved 17 E.L.R. 181

Mersey Docks v. Cameron ([1865] 11 H.L. Cas. 464)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd.([1947] A.C. 1)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Trustees v. Gibbs ([1866] L.R. 1 H.L. 93)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownwell (294 U.S. 580; 79 LawEdn. 1070)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 345

Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v. Sheedy ([1927] A.C. 899)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Hv ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Mewar Textile Mills v. Industrial Tribunal (A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 161)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 402

Moffitt v. United States (128 Federal Reports 375)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 469

Mohammad Hassan v. Safdar Mirza (A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 601; 144 I.C. 45)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 34

Mohammad Sadiq v. Dr. Shaifuddin Kitchlew (2 Doabia 117)(See also Amritsar City Case)—distinguished and doubted 11 E.L.R. 67

Mohammad Zakria Kitchlew v. Sheik Mohammad Sadiq (Sen & Poddar 34)(See also Amritsar City Muhammadan Constituency Case)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34, 216

Mohanlal v. Benoy Kishna (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 65)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 453

Mohan Reddy v. Neelagiri Muralidhar Rao (14 E.L.R. 167)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 450; 22 E.L.R. 425

Mohan Singh v. P. and E. P. States Union (A.I.R. 1954 Pepsu 136)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Mohd. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow (A.I.R. 1957 All. 292)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 45 ; 21 E.L.R. 409—not approved 17 E.L.R. 236

Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi (3 E.L.R. 248)—ref. iz E.L.R. 120; 12 E.L.R. 34; 18 E.L.R. 160—dissented from 18 E.L.R. 253—doubted 19 E.L.R. 430

Monghyr North Muhammadan Rural Constituency (1937) (Sen & Poddar549)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 430

Monks v. Jackson ((1875-76) C.P. 683)—distinguished 11 E.L.R. 99

Monmouth (Boroughs) Case ([1901] 5 O'M. & H. 166)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 247

Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin ([1947] A.C. 170 ; A.I.R. 1917P.C. 142)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 251; 17 E.L.R. 126

Moorhouse v. Lihney; Thorpe v. Linney ([1885] 15 Q.B.D. 273)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 159 ; 14 E.L.R. 210, 313

Moreshwar Parashram v. Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani (7 E.L.R. 428J—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120 ; 18 E.L.R. 37

Morris v. Francis Burdett ([1813] 105 E.R. 361)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 301; 22 E.L.R. 105

Moti Lai v. Mangla Prasad (15 E.L.R. 425)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 45, 154; 17 E.L.R. 243 ; 22 E.L.R. 249

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lv

Motiram v. Ramchandar Chowdhary (7 E.L.R. 135)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120; 12 E.L.R. 216

Motisinghji, Maharamansinghji Mahida v. Chawda Ishwarbhai Khodabhai(1 E.L.R. 330)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji (13 E.L.R. 310)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 128; 20 E.L.R. 176—distinguished 13 E.L.R. 377

Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji (13 E.L.R. 328)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 301; 22 E.L.R. 105, 273

Mula Singh, S. v. Ch. Mangu Ram (2 Doabia 268)(See also Hoshiarpur West General Constituency 1946)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 83

Munrunjun Singh v. Lalanund Singh ((1865) 3 W.R. 85)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64

Munuswami Gounder v. Khader Shariff (3 E.L.R. 74)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305

Munuswami Gounder v. Khader Shariff (No. 2) (4 E.L.R. 283)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410—affirmed 11 E.L.R. 208—not followed 12 E.L.R. 107

Murugesam Pillai v. Gnana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi (I.L.R. 40 Mad.402)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 357

Murugesam Pillai v. Manickavasaka Pandaram (44 I.A. 98)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Mussammat Lai Kunwar v. Chiranji Lai (37 LA. 1)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Muthiah v. Subbaraj (7 E.L.R. 165)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 168, 378—followed 11 E.L.R. 120

Muthiah v. Subbaraj (18 E.L.R. 73)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 256

Muthiah Chettiar v. Sa. Ganesan (14 E.L.R. 432)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16, 278 ; 20 E.L.R. 410•—dissented from 21 E.L.R. 247

Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan (13 E.L.R. 201)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 231; 14 E.L.R. 432 ; 17 E.L.R. 313; 19 E.L.R. 16 ; 21

E.L.R. 435—followed 16 E.L.R. 327

Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan (21 E.L.R. 215)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 435—followed 22 E.L.R. 221

lvi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Muthuswami Mudaliar v. Masilamani ([1910] I.L.R. 33 Mad. 342)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 83; 14 E.L.R. 480

Muti Ahmed Jafari v. Virendra Singh (14 E.L.R. 241)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 328 ; 15 E.L.R. 88, 260 ; 17 E.L.R. 1

Nagappa, T. v. Basappa (9 E.L.R. 216)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67, 203 ; 20 E.L.R. 136 ; 21 E.L.R. 64

Nagappa, T. v. T. C. Basappa (10 E.L.R. 14)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 203

Nagappa, T. v. T. C. Basappa (11 E.L.R. 203)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216 ; 19 E.L.R. 16, 278 ; 21 E.L.R. 64—relied on 20 E.L.R. 136

Nagendra Kumar v. Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta (A.I.R. 1955Cal. 56)— ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 165)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305

Nairn Singh v. Tikam Singh (A.I.R. 1955 All. 388)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 407

Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar ([1953] S.C.R. 533)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 253

Nanagram v. Ghinsi Lai (I.L.R. 1 Raj. 639)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Nand Kishore Prasad Singh v. Member, Election Tribunal, Patna (14E.L.R. 246)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 6 ; 18 E.L.R. 160—reversed 22 E.L.R. 484

Nanhak Lai v. Baijnath Agarwala (A.I.R. 1935 Pat. 474)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 34

Nani Gopal Swami v. Abdul Hamid Choudhury (19 E.L.R. 175)—affirmed 22 E.L.R. 358

Narain Yaswant Nene v. Raja Ram (E.P. No. 346 of 1957)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209, 403

Naranjan Singh v. Brish Bhan (3 E.L.R. 179)—followed 11 E.L.R 120

Narantakath Avullah v. Parakkal Mammu ([1922] I.L.R. 45 Mad. 986)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 480

Narasimhan, C. R. v. Election Tribunal, Madurai (16 E.L.R. 327)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 313

Narasimhan, C. R. v. M. G. Natesan Chettiar (20 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 435—followed 20 E.L.R. 101; 21 E.L.R. 215 ; 22 E.L.R. 221

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lvii

Narasimha Reddy v. Bhoomaji (17 E.L.R. 207)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 435

Narasinha Govind Shanbhag v. Alva Joachim Pladad (Published in theGazette of India, dated 23rd January, 1958, No. E.P. 295 of 1957)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209

Narayanan Chettyar, A.L.N. v. Official Assignee, High Court, Rangoon(A.I.R. 1941 P.C. 93)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64

Narayanaswami Chettiar v. Subbarathnam Aiyar (57 M.L.J. 551)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

Narayanlal v. Maneck Phiroze (A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 320)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 321

Narayan Purusottam v. Laxmibai (I.L.R. 38 Bom. 416)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Nariman, K. F. v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay ([1923] I.L.R. 47Bom. 809)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 301; 17 E.L.R. 162

Narotam Singh v. Des Raj (4 E.L.R. 309)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Narsima Rao v. Shri Ralla Kula Jallaya (Gazette of India dated 3rdMarch, 1958)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209

Nasiruddin Ahmed v. Haji Mahomed Yusuf (40 C.W.N. 701; 165 I.C. 489)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34; 17 E.L.R. 321

Natesa Aiyar v. Appavu Padayachi (I.L.R. 38 Mad. 178)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 207

Nattu Ram Chaudhri v. Lai Chand (2 Doabia 246)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209

Natwar Lai v. Bharatendra Singh (5 E.L.R. 408)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 467

Nawab Sir K.G.M. Faroqui v. Maulvi Mohammad Habib Ullah (2 Doabia24)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 463

Nawab Faroqui's Case : North Muhammadan Rural Constituency Case (1939)(Sen & Poddar 802)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 203

Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 251

Nazmul Haque v. Amjad Aji (18 E.L.R. 253)—reversed 21 E.L.R. 345

Neelanund Singh v. Surwan Singh ([1866] 5 W.R. 292)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64yiii

lviii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Netela Muhammadan Constituency Case (Sen & Poddar 897)—relied on 11 E.L.R. 251

Netramv. Lakshman Prasad (15 E.L.R. 266)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 260 ; 21 E.L.R. 485

New Piece Goods Bazar Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax ([1950]S.C.R. 553)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 253

Niranjan Das Mohan v. Ena Mohan (I.L.R. [1943] 1 Cal. 340)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 1

Norfolk (Northern) Case (1 O'M. & H. 236)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16—followed 12 E.L.R. 378

North Durham ([1874] 2 ° ' M - & H. 152)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 482

North Louth Case ([1911] 6 O'M. & H. 102)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 357 ; 17 E.L.R. 373, 427 ; 19 E.L.R. 278—considered 17 E.L.R. 321

North Louth (6 O'M. & H. 129)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 205

Norton v. Taylor ([1906] A.C. 378)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Nottingham (Borough) Case ((1869) 1 O'M. & H. 245)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 373, 427; 19 E.L.R. 278; 20 E.L.R. 482

Nrisinha Kumar Sinha v. Satyendra Chandra Ghosh (2 E.L.R. 121)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Nutton v. Wilson ((1889) 22 Q.B.D. 744)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 490 ; 20 E.L.R. 325

Nyalchand Virchand Sheth v. Election Tribunal, Ahmedabad(8 E.L.R. 417)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 192 ; 12 E.L.R. 107

O'Carroll v. Hastings ([1905] 2 I.R. 590)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand (21 E.L.R. 54)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 105—followed 22 E.L.R. 321

Oxford City Case ([1857] Wolf & D. 106)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 338

Oxford Case (7 O'M. & H. 67)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Oxford (Borough) (7 O'M. & H. 76)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 358; 20 E.L.R. IOJ

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lix

Padmanabha Menon v. A. M. Thomas (i E.L.R. 404)—ref. 19 E.L.R 16

Palmer v. Palmer ([1892] 1 Q.B. 319; 61 L.J.Q.B. 236)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 147

Pandia Raj, V. v. M. S. Sourimuthu Udayar (71 L.W. 64)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 313

Pandit Harish Chandra v. Raja Man Singh (5 E.L.R. 129)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 390

Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Rishabkumar (20 E.L.R. 401)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 320

Pandyan Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Khambatta (A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 241)— ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Parmar, Y. S. v. Hira Singh Pal (16 E.L.R. 45)—affirmed 16 E.L.R. 483

Parmar, Y. S. v. Hira Singh Paul (16 E.L.R. 483)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 305 ; 21 E.L.R. 409

Parmatma Singh v. Deo Saran Sinha (5 E.L.R. 353)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 162

Parmeshwar Kumar v. Lahtan Chaudhary (14 E.L.R. 444)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 491; 17 E.L.R. 81—followed 22 E.L.R. 299

Partap Singh Khairon v. Rama Prasad Mookerjee (21 E.L.R. 46)—affirmed 21 E.L.R. 471

Parthasarathy v. Elaya Pillai (4 E.L.R. 188)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34, 107; 22 E.L.R. 249

Parthasarathy v. Nataraja (17 E.L.R. 201)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 485

Parthasarathy v. Ramachandra Rao ([1955] 2 A.L.T. 766)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 83 ; 16 E.L.R. 1

Patnaik, S. N. In re (13 E.L.R. 58)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 162

Patna University Case (2 Doabia 18)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 47

Payser v. Miors ((1881) 7 Q.B.D. 333)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461

Pearey Lai v. Nanak Chand (A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 108)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 485

Penryn'Case ([1869] 1 O'M. & H. 127)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 338

People's Own Provident & General Insurance Co. v. Guracharya (47 Bom.L.R. 852)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 321

ix ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGESf

Phakkar v. Pragi (A.I.R. 1935 Oudh 268)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 463

Phani Bhusan Sen v. Sanat Kumar Maitra (40 C.W.N.,124 ; A.I.R. 1935 Cal.773)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Philipps v. Philipps( [1878] 4 Q.B.D. 127 ; 48 L.J.Q.B. 153)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 147

Phoenix Mills Limited v. M.H. Dinshaw and Co. (A.I.R. 1946 Bom. 469)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 338

Pickus v. Perry ( [1931] 59 S.D. 350)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., In re ( [1910] 143 Wis. 282)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Pillai v. Dangali (A.I.R. 1942 Rang. 52)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 338

Pitman's Shorthand Academy v. Lilaram and Sons (A.I.R. 1950 E. P. 181)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 321

Plassey v. Fergusson (163 U.S. 537)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 1

Polaki Kotesam v. S. M. Patnaik (8 E.L.R. 159)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 1 ; 18 E.L.R. 378

Ponnalagu Ammal v. State of Madras (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 485)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 92

Ponnuswami, N. P. v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency ( [1952]S.C.R. 218; 1 E.L.R. 133)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 478 ; 14 E.L.R. 444 ; 17 E.L.R. 65 ; 19 E.L.R. 16 ; 20E.L.R. 470 ; 21 E.L.R. 286 ; 22 E.L.R. 105—relied on 13 E.L.R. 112

Ponnuswamy Goundan v. Kalyanasundara Ayyar (A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 770)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 337

Powell and Wife v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home ( [1935] A.C. 243)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 137

Prabhu Charan v. Shiv Dutt (14 E.L.R. 108)—ref. ig E.L.R. 16

Prabhudas v. Jorsang (18 E.L.R. no)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 403 ; 20 E.L.R. 410—followed- 18 E.L.R. 160; 20 E.L.R. 1—relied on 20 E.L.R. 176

Prabhudayal v. Chief Panchayat Officer, Jaipur (A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 95)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 146

Prakasam v. U. Krishna Rao (2 E.L.R. 54)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305

tABLE OF CASES OVERULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxi

Prananath Patnaik v. Banamali Patnaik (16 E.L.R. 357)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 321; 20 E.L.R. 410—considered 17 E.L.R. 321—followed 17 E.L.R. 427

Pranlal Thakorlal Munshi v. Indubhai Bhailalbhai Amin (1 E.L.R. 182)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216 ; 22 E.L.R. 366

Prataparao Bhonsale of Sawantwadi v. Shri Shivram Sawant Bhonsale (17E.L.R. 37)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 403

Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 140)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216; 14 E.L.R. 167; 15 E.L.R. 66, 484 ; 17 E.L.R.126 ; 22 E.L.R. 455—distinguished 22 E.L.R. 366

Prem Nath v. Ram Kishan (1 E.L.R. 271)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Pritam Singh v. Kartar Singh (17 E.L.R. 11)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 148

Probodh Misra v. Uma Charan Patnaik (Sen & Poddar 93)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Promode Lai Moitra v. Additional District Magistrate (A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 164)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 74; 17 E.L.R. 162

Province of Bombay v. Western India Automobile Association (A.I.R. 1949Bom. 141)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 92

Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Income-tax Commissioner,Lahore (L.R. 67 LA. 464)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 223; 17 E.L.R. 126

Punjab North Case (Hammond's Election Cases 569)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 293

Puran Chand v. Mohd. Din (A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 291)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126

Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel v. Shantilal Girdharilal Parikh (1E.L.R, 223)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305

Pyarey Lai v. Motilal (Civil Writ Petition No. 247 of 1953)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Pyari Mohan v. Kalu Khan (I.L.R. 44 Cal. ion)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Pyari Mohan Das v. Durga Sankar Das (14 E.L.R. 338)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 321; 18 E.L.R. 160; 19 E.L.R. 358—explained and distinguished 20 E.L.R. 1—explained 22 E.L.R. 206

lxii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Queen v. Governor and Guardians of the Poor of Kingston-on-Hull (22 Q.B.

324)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Queen v. Joseph Jonathan Dighton ( [1844] 13 L.J.Q.B. 241)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 246, 444

Queen v. Tugwell ( [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 704)— ref. 12 E.L.R. 216 ; 15 E.L.R. 66; 16 E.L.R. 491 ; 21 E.L.R. 459 ; 22E.L.R. 299, 366

Queen's County and Prince County (P.E. 1) Election Cases ([1891] 20 CanadaS.C.R. 26)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 223

R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal: Ex purte Shaw([1951] 1 All E.R. 268)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw ([1952]1 All E.R. 122)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

R. v. Tonbridge Overseers ( (1884) 13 Q.B.D. 339)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 345

Rabyinka Norton v. Shakey ([1886] 118 U.S. 425)ref. 15 E.L.R 1

Radhakanta Mishra v. Shri Nithyananda Mahapatra (19 E.L.R. 203)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 278

Radhakrishna Iyer, A. S. v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 511)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 66

Radhamohan Rai v. Sumitra Devi (17 E.L.R. 162)—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 45

Radhelal v. Niranjannath (A.I.R. 1941 All. 95)

—ref. 20 E.L.R. 493Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Chandra Bhanu Gupta (16 E.L.R. 123)

—ref. 18 E.L.R. 378Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra (17 E.L.R. 321)

—ref. 17 E.L.R. 427 ; 19 E.L.R. 278; 20 E.L.R. 410 ; 21 E.L.R. 345;22 E.L.R. 206—applied 20 E.L.R. 136—reversed 19 E.L.R. 1—relied on 22 E.L.R. 225

Raghunath Singh v. Kampta Prasad Saxena (8 E.L.R. 424)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34 ; 18 E.L.R. 403—relied on 12 E.L.R. 1

Rahman v. Ahmad Din (A.I.R 1926 Lah. 571)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 282

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. Ixiii

Rahmat AH v. Nurullah (i Doabia 121)—re]. 16 E.L.R. 234

Railway Sleepers Supply Company, In re ([1885] 29 Ch. D. 204)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 146; 17 E.L.R. 126 ; 20 E.L.R. 176

Raipur North Case (1 Hammond 231)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Raja Bahadur Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra (19 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 46, 471

Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh (12 E.L.R. 421)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126; 20 E.L.R. 410

Rajah Janaki Nath Roy v. Jyotish Chandra Acharya Chowdhry (I.L.R.[1941] Cal. 234)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 34

Rajah Kotagiri Madhava Rao Bahadur v. Papayya Rao (I.L.R. [1946] Mad.760 ; [1946] 1 M.L. J. 287)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 453

Raja Lalanund Singh Bahadur v. The Government of Bengal (6 Moore'sIndian Appeals 101)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64

Raja Nainar v. Veluswami Thevar (13 E.L.R. 231)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 484 ; 16 E.L.R. 1; 17 E.L.R. 81—dissented from 16 E.L.R. 183—reversed 17 E.L.R. 181

Raja Singh v. Chaichoo Singh (A.I.R. 1940 Pat. 201)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64

Rajbenbach v. Mamon ([1955] 1 All E.R. 12)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1

Rajendra Singh v. Umaprasad (I.L.R. 57 All. 573)—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 493

Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo (9 E.L.R. 294)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 278 ; 12 E.L.R. 378 ; 13 E.L.R. 262; 14 E.L.R. 403 ;16 E.L.R. 234; 18 E.L.R. 305 ; 21 E.L.R. 409 ; 22 E.L.R. 105, 249—explained and distinguished 12 E.L.R. 329—relied on 12 E.L.R. 144

Raj Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur (A.I.R. 1953 R a j . 204)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 321

Ram Abhilakh Tewari v. Election Tribunal, Gonda (14 E.L.R. 375)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 175 ; 17 E.L.R. 243 ; 19 E.L.R. 16, 278, 358; 20 E.L.R.256, 410—followed 15 E.L.R. 358 ; 20 E.L.R. 1

Ramachandra Chowduri v. Sadasiva Tripathy (5 E.L.R. 401)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 378; 16 E.L.R. 234

lxiv ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju (19 E.L.R. 358)—dissented from on one point, but affirmed on other grounds 21 E.L.R. 1

Ramakrishna Reddy v. Kamaladevi (5 E.L.R. 173)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Raman and Raman Ltd. v. Government of Madras (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 463)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 231

Ramappa v. Sangappa (15 E.L.R. 475)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 117 ; 21 E.L.R. 64—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 157

Ramappa Bin Dareppa v. Bharma Bin Rama ((1906) I.L.R. 30 Bom. 625)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya (I.L.R. [1940] Mad. 969)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 407

Rama Reddy v. Chidanandam (1 E.L.R. 373)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67

Ramasray Singh v. Bibhisan Sinha (A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 372)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

Ramaswami, V. V. v. Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli (8 E.L.R. 233)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 66 ; 17 E.L.R. 162

Ramayan Sharan Singh v. Rameshwar Yadav (5 E.L.R. 296)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126

Ramayan Shukla v. Rajendra Prasad Singh (16 E.L.R. 491)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 366—followed and distinguished 22 E.L.R. 299

Ram Baksh v. Rajeshwari Kunwar ((1948) A.L.J. 114)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Ram Chand v. Wadhawa Ram (5 E.L.R. 386)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 376

Ram Chandra Govind Unvne v. Laxman Savleram Ronghe (A.I.R. 1938Bom. 447)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126

Ram Chandra Shukla v. Election Commission (13 E.L.R. 105)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Ram Chandra Singh Ghatwal v. Rajah Mohomed Jeehurusama Khan (23W.R. 376)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64

Ramdayal Ayodhyaprasad v. K. R. Patil (18 E.L.R. 378)—affirmed but on slightly different grounds 20 E.L.R. 13

Ram Dial v. Sant Lai (19 E.L.R. 430)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 435—affirmed 20 E.L.R. 482

Rameshwar Bhartia v. The State of Assam (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 405)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 328

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxV

Rameshwar Prasad Shastri v. Bhagwan Singh (20 E.L.R. 45)—reversed 21 E.L.R. 126

Rameshwar Prasad Singh v. Krishna Gopal Das (4 E.L.R. 112)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Ramkanth Kesheorao Huldurkar v. Bhikulal Laxmichand Chandak (15E.L.R. 467)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 275

Ramkishun Singh v. Tribeni Singh (17 E.L.R. 81)—ref. 17 E.L.R. n o

Ram Kripal v. Rup Kuari ([1884] 6 All. 269)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 453

Ram Krishna v. The State ([1956] S.C.R. 182)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Ram Murti v. Sumba Sadar (2 E.L.R. 330)•—ref. 20 E.L.R. 301

Ram Nandan Prasad Narayan Singh v. Kapildeo Ramjee ([1951] S.C.R. 138)—ref. n E.L.R. 67

Ram Narayan Prasad Yadav v. Subnath Deogam (21 E.L.R. 108)—affirmed 22 E.L.R. 1

Ram Narain Singh v. Ramoon Pearey (23 W.R. 76)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64

Ramnarayan Maluram v. Vishnu Krishnarao (A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 20)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 146

Ram Nath v. Chiranji Lai [1934] (I.L.R. 57 All. 605)—ref. n E.L.R. 216

Ram Singh v. Hazari Lai (6 E.L.R. 224)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120; 18 E.L.R. 378

Ramsingh v. Indersingh (1 Doabia 341)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107

Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh (10 E.L.R. 129)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 1, 216 ; 18 E.L.R. 403; 19 E.L.R. 16, 358 ; 20 E.L.R.

410 ; 21 E.L.R. 1—distinguished 12 E.L.R. 107—followed 19 E.L.R. 305 ; 20 E.L.R. 37 ; 21 E.L.R. 215—relied on 16 E.L.R. 103 ; 17 E.L.R. 243

Ranchodlal Liladhar Vayeda v. Election Tribunal, Ahmedabad (8 E.L.R. 59)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Ranchhodlal Liladar Vayeda v. Sanjalia Mohanlal Virjibhai (4 E.L.R. 493)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Randhir Singh v. Suraj Bhan (15 E.L.R. 146)—reversed 15 E.L.R. 460

lxvi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Rangnath Misra v. Chairman, District Board (A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 333)•—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Rangoon West (G.U.) 1926 (Hammond 605)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67 ; 12 E.L.R. 34

Rao Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Writ Petition No. 159 of 1953decided on August 23,1955)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 115; 20 E.L.R. 157

Ratan Shukla v. Brijendra Swarup (5 E.L.R. 116)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332

Rattan Anmol Singh v. Atma Ram (10 E.L.R. 41)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216; 13 E.L.R. 1; 14 E.L.R. 210, 444 ; 15 E.L.R. 66,

484; 16 E.L.R. 127, 450; 21 E.L.R. 485 ; 22 E.L.R. 242, 366, 425,455

—distinguished 14 E.L.R. 167 ; 22 E.L.R. 299—followed 16 E.L.R. 207

Rattan Singh v. Devendar Singh (7 E.L.R. 234)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 378

Ravanna Subanna v. G. S. Kaggeerappa (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 653)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 334; 15 E.L.R. 100, 467 ; 17 E.L.R. 321 ; 18 E.L.R. 1;

20 E.L.R. 169Rawat Man Singh v. Roop Chand Sogani (A.I.R. 1954 Raj. 158)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 321,402Ray Nicholas Lines v. All India Spinners' Association (A.I.R, 1947 Pat. 185)

—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412Reg. v. Demers ([1900] A.C. 103)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1Reg. v. Income-tax Commissioners ((1888) 21 Q.B. 313)

—ref. 22 E.L.R. 105Reg. v. Mayor of Tewkesbury ([1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 629)

—ref. 14 E.L.R. 99Rehmat Ali v. Noorullah and Noor Mohammed v. Pir Naziruddin (1 Doabia

121

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415Rikhab Das v. Ridichand Palliwal (9 E.L.R. 115)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 99 : 12 E.L.R. 378; 22 E.L.R. 249Robertson v. Day ((1S79) 5 A.C. 63)

—ref. 22 E.L.R. 404Robinson v. Graves ([1935] 1 K.B. 579)

—distinguished 16 E.L.R. 183Robinson v. The State of South Australia ((1931) 35 C.W.N. 1121)

—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325Rohtak Case (1 [1921] Hammond E.P. 183)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxvil

Roop Chandra Sogani v. Rawat Man Singh (5 E.L.R. 327)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 374

Roop Chandra Sogani v. Rawat Man Singh (No. 3) (9 E.L.R. 21)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Rosamma Punnose v. Balakrishnan Nair (14 E.L.R. 210)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 425, 455—relied on 22 E.L.R. 299

Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson ([1892] 1 Q.B. 431)ref. 18 E.L.R. 103

Rowell v. Pratt ([1936] 2 K.B. 226)ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Royse v. Birley ((1869 4 C.P. 296)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 325

Rup Lai v. Jugraj Singh (15 E.L.R. 484)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 299, 366, 455

Sahdeo Narain Dev v. Kusum Kumari (A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 21)ref. 16 E.L.R. 1

Sahib Khan v. Muhammad Abbas Khan (Sen & Poddar 417){See also Manshera North M. R. Constituency, 1946)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107

Saligram Jaiswal v. Sheo Kumar Pande (9 E.L.R. 67)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415 ; 12 E.L.R. 34, 216

Sambandam v. Election Tribunal (5 E.L.R. 341)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 210 ; 22 E.L.R. 425

Sambunath Mahanti v. Gobinda Prasad Singh (Sen & Poddar 649)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Sangappa v. Ramappa (14 E.L.R. 229)—reversed 15 E.L.R. 475

Sangappa v. Shivamurti Swami (13 E.L.R. 365)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16—relied on 21 E.L.R. 1

Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah (A.I.R. 1954 Ra j . 129)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 321, 402

Sankara Pandia Nadar v. V. V. Ramaswami (5 E.L.R. 417) '—ref. 13 E.L.R. 66 ; 17 E.L.R. 162

Sardar Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad (13 E.L.R. 47S)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 444, 471; 18 E.L.R. 305—followed 13 E.L.R. 489 ; 14 E.L.R. 246—not followed 20 E.L.R. 321—overruled 21 E.L.R. 54—dissented from 22 E.L.R. 86—disapproved 22 E.L.R. 484

lxVlii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Sardarni Parkash Kaur v. Rai Bahadur Wasakha Singh (Sen & Poddar 15)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

Sardar Singh v. Relu (A.I.R. 1944Lah. 266)- ref. 18 E.L.R. 253

Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. Hukam Singh (6 E.L.R. 316)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 160; 19 E.L.R. 203—distinguished 21 E.L.R. 345—followed 18 E.L.R. 253

Sarju Prasad v. Jaleshwari (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 120)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 205 ; 21 E.L.R. 286, 345—distinguished 16 E.L.R. 154

Sasivarna Thevar v. Arunagiri (17 E.L.R. 313)—affirmed 19 E.L.R. 200

Satdeo v. Baba Ragavdas (A.I.R. 1953 All. 419)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 493

Sat Narain v. Hanuman Prasad (A.I.R. 1945 Lah. 85)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 112

Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev (10 E.L.R. 103)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1, 415; 16 E.L.R. 45 ; 21 E.L.R. 409

Satya Narayan Singh v. Satya Niranjan Chakravarti (I.L.R. 3 Pat. 183)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 59 ; 21 E.L.R. 64

Satya Narayan Transport Co. Ltd. v. Secretary, State Transport Authority,West Bengal (A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 638)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 393

Satyanathan v. Subramanyam (9 E.L.R. 394)—ref. 1 - E.L.R. 1

Satyanathan, N. v. K. Subramanyan (10 E.L.R. 311)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 338 ; 17 E.L.R. 162; 18 E.L.R. 37—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 390

Satyavadi, V. K. v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 138)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107

Satyendra Kumar Das v. Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners of Dacca(A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 288)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 66 ; 16 E.L.R. 74, 183

Savitri Devi v. Prabhawati Misra (15 E.L R. 358)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd. v. Vishnu (I.L.R. [1949] Nag. 905)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 321

Saw. Ganesan v. Muthiah Chettiar (19 E.L.R. 16)—reversed 21 E.L.R. 215—not followed 20 E.L.R. 101

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. ixix

Scott v. Uxbridge and Rickmansworth Railway Co. ((1866) 1 C. P. 596)—re}. 13 E.L.R. 159; H E.L.R. 313

Seaford Court Estates, Ltd. v. Asher ([1949] 2 K.B. 481)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 247

Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (I.L.R. (1916) 39 Mad.

617)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

Senanayake v. Navaratne ([1954] A. C. 640)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461; 20 E.L.R. 401; 21 E.L.R. 320

Seshaiah v. Koti Reddi (3 E.L.R. 39)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 293

Seth Surajmal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 103)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 441

Shah Alim Uddin v. Satish Chandra Agarwal (14 E.L.R. 199)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 374—followed 14 E.L.R. 471

Shah Mohammad Umair v. Ram Charan Singh (8 E.L.R. 179)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 159; 14 E.L.R. 122, 251—relied on 13 E.L.R. 34

Shaik Muhammad Mansoor v. Moulvi Muhammad Shafi. Daudi (Hammond677)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Shakti Prashad Shukla v. Balwant Singh (4 E.L.R. 301)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Shankare Gowda v. S. M. Mariyappa (9 E.L.R. 101)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Shankar Nanasaheb Karpe v. Returning Officer, Kolaba (1 E.L.R. 13)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120 ; 14 E.L.R. 122 ; 20 E.L.R. 470

Shankar Rao v. Dr. K. N. Katju (Unreported)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 66

Shankar Rao Ramaji v. State of Madhya Bharat (1 E.L.R. 34)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 146

Shankar Tripathi v. Returning Officer, Mirzapur (2 E.L.R. 315)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 160

Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Bashir Husain Zaidi (3 E.L.R. 280)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332

Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Bashir Husain Zaidi (8 E.L.R. 300)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 1

Shanta Nand Gir v. Basudeva Nand Gir (A.I.R. 1934 All. 986)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Shantilal Choudhary v. Raghuraj Singh (9 E.L.R. 93)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 222

lxX ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Sharma, K. C. v. The Election Tribunal, Chhattarpur (15 E.L.R. 111)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 358; 20 E.L.R. 401, 410; 21 E.L.R. 33—dissented from 19 E.L.R. 16—distinguished 17 E.L.R. 101—followed 15 E.L.R. 125 ; 20 E.L.R. 1

Shell Co., Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation ([1931] A.C.275)— ref. 11 E.L.R. 321

Sheokaran Singh Ch. v. Ch. Sahab Ram (Sen & Poddar 374)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Sheo Kumar Pandey v. V. G. Oak (5 E.L.R. 103)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332; 13 E.L.R. 159 ; 14 E.L.R. 122,251; 15 E.L.R.

301 ; 22 E.L.R. 105Sheo Mahadeo Prasad v. Deva Sharan Sinha (10 E.L.R. 144)

—ref. 12 E.L.R. 461Sheonarayan Vaidya v. Sardarmal Lalwani (4 E.L.R. 401)

—ref. 14 E.L.R. 83; 18 E.L.R. 305, 403—relied on 12 E.L.R. 1

Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra (16 E.L.R. 103)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 256 ; 21 E.L.R. 215—dissented from 19 E.L.R. 16 ; 21 E.L.R. 247—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 37—followed 20 E.L.R. i, 101—relied on 17 E.L.R. 243

Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra (16 E.L.R. 103 on appeal 16 E.L.R. 435)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

Sher Singh Khan Singh v. Ajmer Singh (A.I.R. 1954 Pep.su 9)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Shibban Lai Saxena v. Hari Shanker Prasad (9 E.L.R. 403)—ref. 11 E.L.R, 415 ; 19 E.L.R. 305—followed 12 E.L.R. 1

Shib Lall Singh v. Moorad Khan ((1868) 9 W.R. 126)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64

Shiek Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew (Sen & Poddar 28)(See also Amritsar City case)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Shiusingh v. Hajiram (A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 39)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Shiva Das v. Sheikh Mohd. Abdul Samad (8 E.L.R. 265)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332; 12 E.L.R. 34 ; 18 E.L.R. 209 ; 19 E.L.R. 16

Shivaprasad Chandpuria v. Chandrika Prasad (14 E.L.R. 328)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 88, 260 ; 17 E.L.R. 1

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC.

Shiv Dutt v. Bansidar Dhangar (No. 2) (9 E.L.R. 324)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216 ; 18 E.L.R. 403

Shivnandan Sharma v. The Punjab National Bank Ltd. ([1955] 1S.C.R. 1427)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 149 ; 14 E.L.R. 338 ; 15 E.L.R. 467; 16 E.L.R.

234. 337Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay ([1955]

1 S.C.R. 1177)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 28

Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh (12 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 403 ; 19 E.L.R. 16

Shri Maha Deo Singh v. Shri Baleshvari Prasad Singh (E.P. No. 206of 1957)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305

Shriniwasv. Rukmini Raman Pratap Singh (14 E.L.R. 190)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 284 ; 22 E.L.R. 37, 321

Siddalingaiya, T., In re (7 E.L.R. 416)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 338

Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran (A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 57)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34; 20 E.L.R. 350 ; 22 E.L.R. 53

Singheswar Prasad Varma v. Kamalnath Tiwari (21 E.L.R. 121)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 206

Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkot ((1893-94) L.R. 21 LA. 171)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 421

Sir John Bowin's Case (Cro. Eliz. 497)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 404

Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh Shanker Singh Parihar(2 E.L.R. 283)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67; 12 E.L.R. 461; 13 E.L.R. 139, 159; 14 E.L.R.122, 251; 15 E.L.R. 301; 18 E.L.R. 305 ; 22 E.L.R. 105, 321—relied on 13 E.L.R. 1

Sitaram Khemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru (13 E.L.R. 126)—affirmed 13 E.L.R. 322

Sitaram Khemka v, Jawaharlal Nehru (13 E.L.R. 322)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 305

Sivathanu Pillai v. Nesamony (1 E.L.R. 312)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 332 ; 19 E.L.R. 203; 21 E.L.R. 286

Smith, In re ([1896] 2 Ch. 590)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh (No. 2) (3 E.L.R. 102)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Sohanlal v. Abinash Chander (4 E.L.R. 55)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 184

lxxii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Southern Towns (Mohammadan) Constituency Case, (Syed Mahmood Shahv. Kh. Ghuiam Samad) (2 Doabia 310)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

South Indian Bank Ltd. v. T. D. Pichuthayappan ([1954] 1 L.L.J. 289)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 184

South Meath Case (4 O'M. & H. 134)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209

South Saran Case (2 Hammond E.P. 250)—distinguished 12 E.L.R. 34

Sprague v. Booth ([1909] A.C. 576)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 207

Sreenivasan, A. v. Vasantha Pai (10 E.L.R. 345)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 453

Sri Krishna Agarwal v. S. M. Banerji (19 E.L.R. 466)—reversed 22 E.L.R. 64

Sri Krishna Agarwala v. S. N. Banerji (Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 2045 of1957)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 128

Srinivas v. Collector, Sarvai Jaipur (I.L.R. 1 Raj. 724)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Srinivasalu v. Kuppuswami (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 253)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 112

Srinivasan, A. v. Election Tribunal, Madras (11 E.L.R. 278)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 107, 329, 453 ; 14 E.L.R. 270, 296 ; 17 E.L.R. 65, 282

Srinivasan, A. v. Vasantha Pai (10 E.L.R. 245)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 278; 12 E.L.R. 107, 329, 378.

Srinivasan, A. v. G. Vasantha Pai (12 E.L.R. 453)—affirmed 22 E.L.R. 221

Sri Ram v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi (8 E.L.R. 139)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 168, 378; 16 E.L.R. 234—relied, on 22 E.L.R. 225

St. Andrews Case (4 O'M. & H. 32)—relied on 11 E.L.R. 251

St. George's Division Case (5 O'M. & H. 89)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16 ; 20 E.L.R. 275; 21 E.L.R. 215

St. George's ((1886) 5 O'M. & H. 115)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 10 r

St. James Evening Post Case ((1742) 1 Atk. 469)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 103

State v. Grime (243 N.W. 763)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

State ex rel. Helena v. Helena Water Works Co. ((1911) 43 Mont. 169)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxxiii

State ex rel. North American L. Ins. Co. v. District Court ([1934] 97 Mont.

523)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

State ex rel. Red River Brick Corporation v. District Courts ([1912] 24N.D. 28 ; 138 N.W. 988)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

State ex rel. Regis v. District Court ([1930] 102 Mont. 74)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

State ex rel. Spinazza v. District Court ([1929] 8^ Mont. 511)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

State of Bihar v. M. Homi ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 78)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 328

State of Punjab v. Prem Parkash (A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 219)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lai Srivastava (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 912)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 126

State of West Bengal v. Anwar AH Sarkar ([1952] S.C.R. 284)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 176

Stepney (1892 Day's Election Cases, 99)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Stepney Case (4 O'M. & H. 34)—relied on 11 E.L.R. 251

Stepney Case (4 O'M. & H. 43)—distinguished 11 E.L.R. 251

Stroud Case ( [1874] 2 O'M. & H. 179)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 338

Subbaraj, A. S. v. Muthia (No. 2) (9'E.L.R. 290)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 67 ; 12 E.L.R. 83 ; 13 E.L.R. 1

Subba Rao v. Perumal Reddi ([1918] I.L.R. 41 Mad. 988)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 453

Subodh Ranjan v. S. F. & Chemicals Ltd. (A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 10)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 334; 14 E.L.R. 21

Subrahmanyam, K. v. Abdul Hameed Khan (1 E.L.R. 432)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat (9 E.L.R. 145)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216 ; 20 E.L.R. 410—affirmed 11 E.L.R. 175

Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat (11 E.L.R. 175)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 278 ; 19 E.L.R. 16, 358—explained and distinguished 12 E.L.R. 329

Sudarsana Rao v. Christian Pillai (A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 396)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 338

lxxiv ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Sudhansu Sekhar Ghose v. Satyendra Nath Basu (4 E.L.R. 73)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34 ; 17 E.L.R. 321

Sudhanshu Sekhar Panda v. Narendra Nath Das (14 E.L.R. 223)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 405 ; 17 E.L.R. 466

Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. Sripat Amrit Dange (17 E.L.R. 373)—dissented from 21 E.L.R. 247

Sundar Singh v. Election Tribunal (M.J.C. No. 686 of 1957)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 99—followed 14 E.L.R. 246 ••—disapproved 22 E.L.R. 484

Surain Singh v. Waryam Singh (6 E.L.R. 90)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Suraj Bhan v. Hemchand Jain (2 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Suraj Mall Mohta & Co. v. Viswanatha Sastri ([1954] S.C.J. 611)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 345

Suraj Narain v. Jhabbu Lai (A.I.R. 1944 All. 114)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 407

Suraj Narain v. Ram Nath (3 E.L.R. 305)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120.

Suraj Narain of Rajmundry, In re (E.P. No. 9 of 1955)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209

Surendra Narayan Sinha v. Babu Amulyadhone Roy (2 Doabia 368) (See alsoBengal Legislative Assembly Constituency Case)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Surendranath Banerjee v. Judges of High Court, Calcutta; (I.L.R. 10Cal. 109)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 103

Surendra Nath Khosla v. Dalip Singh (12 E.L.R. 370)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 251,444, 458; 15 E.L.R. 146 ; 17 E.L.R. 126 ; 19 E.L.R.16 ; 21 E.L.R. 320—distinguished 17 E.L.R. 207

Surpat Singh v. Sheo Prasad Gupta (A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 300)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 64

Suryaji Rama Rao v. Bhika Trimbak Pawar (2 E.L.R. 205)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 378

Swaminatha Mercondar v. S. Ramalingam (2 E.L.R. 51)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 293—relied on 12 E.L.R. 184

Swaminatha Merkondar v. Ramalingam (2 E.L.R. 390)-ref. 12 E.L.R. 34, 378

Syed Hifazat Ali v. Mohammad Asghar (1 Doabia 276)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 99 ; 17 E.L.R. 373 ; 20 E.L.R. 410

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxxv

Syed Mohamed, V. M. v. State, of Madras (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 105)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 1; 16 E.L.R. 1

Syed Mohammad Yousuf Hussain v. Syed Wilayat Hussain ((1928) 113 I.C.785)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Syed Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 156)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 176

Tamlin v. Hannaford ([1950] 1 K.B. 18)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 334 ; 14 E.L.R. 21

Tamworth (1 O'M. & H. 84)—relied on 20 E.L.R. 443

Tamworth Case (1 O'M. & H. 75)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 405 ; 19 E.L.R. 358

Tanjore, N. M. R. (Hammond's Election Cases 673)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 293

Tansukhrai v. Chatar Bhuj (A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. [Ajmer] 4781 v. 42)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Taunton Case (1 O'M. & H. 181)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 234

Taunton Borough Case ((1874) 2 O'M. & H. 66)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 405 ; 17 E.L.R. 373; 18 E.L.R. 209 ; 21 E.L.R. 286

Tehra Cotton Ginning Co.'s Case (I.L.R. [1940] All. 710)—distinguished 20 E.L.R. 493

Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur (9 E.L.R. 193)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 402 ; 13 E.L.R. 231 ; 15 E.L.R. 260—approved 17 E.L.R. 181—followed 16 E.L.R. 183

Tennekoon v. Duraiswamy ([1958] 2 W.L.R. 994)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 65

Thakar Das Singh v. Shri Ram Krishan Rathor (Gazette of India, datedSth December, 1954)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34

Thakur Daoosingh v. Ramkrishna Rathor (4 E.L.R. 34)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 115; 17 E.L.R. 321

Thakur Man Mohan Deo's Case (I.L.R. 34 Patna 57)—commented upon 18 E.L.R. 59

Thakur Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 1029)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 450

Theberge v. Laudry ((1876) App. Cas. 102)- ref. 13 E.L.R. 478

Thomas v. Doughty ([1927] 163 La. 213)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

lxxvi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Thomas v. Kelly ([1888] 13 A.C. 506)—re]. 13 E.L.R. 159 ; 14 E.L.R. 313

Thompson v. Pearce (129 E.R. 632)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 37

Thorpe v. Linney ([1885] 15 Q.B.D. 273)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 159

Tikait Hargobind Prasad Singh v. Paldani Kumari (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 38)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 59 ; 21 E.L.R. 64

TJkaram Sharma v. Lalit Bahadur Kharga (1 E.L.R. 252)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 216

Tillett v Stracey (Norwich Case) ((1869) 1 O'M. & H. 8)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 321

Tipperah North Muhammadan Rural Constituency, Nawab Farcqui's Case(Sen & Poddar 802)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 34; 19 E.L.R. 203

Tipperary Case (2 O'M. & H. 31)—ref. 18 E.L.R. 209; 19 E.L.R. 16, 305

Tipperary Case ((1875) 3 O'M. & H. 19)—ref. 14 E.L R. 270, 296; 17 E.L.R. 65, 282

Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh (9 E.L.R. 163)—affirmed 11 E.L.R. 192—followed 20 E.L.R. 76

Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh (11 E.L.R. 192)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 484 ; 12 E.L.R. 34, 216 ; 19 E.L.R. 358—followed 11 E.L.R. 203. 208

Tirhut Division Case (Hammond 677)

—ref. 12 E.L.K. 34 ; 59 E.L.R. 430Triloki Singh v. Haribh Chandra Bajpai (E.P. No. 320 of 1952)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 1Trambaklal Mani&hankar v. Prabhulal Bhimji (2 E.L.R. 245)

—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120Tranton v. Astor (33 T.L.R. 383)

—ref. 18 E.L.R. 37

Tricum DasDwarkaDas v. Sri VassentaRao A. Daiholkar (4 Jagat Narain 40)—ref. 12 E.L R. 34

T rojan and Co. v. KM. N. N. Nagappa CLettiar (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 235)— ref. 20 E.L.R. 350

Tunnicliffe v. Birkdale Overseers ([1888] 20 Q.B.D. 450)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 21

Tunu gantla China "Venkataprayya v. Chilankuri Punnayya (A.I.R. 1933Mad. 631)—ref. 17 E.L.R. 11

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxxvii

U.P. Chamber of Comme rce and the Merchant's Chamber Constituency Case

(i Doabia 127)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 415

Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh (3 E.L.R. 26)—ref. 16 E.L.R. 207

Udal v. Lai Bahadur (21 E.L.R. 180)—followed 22 E.L.R. 225

Udmi Ram-Ram Sarup v. Ghasi Ram-Sakhan Lai (A.LR. 1933 All. 753)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Ugam Singh v. Hari Singh (6 E.L.R. 470)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Union Bank and Trust Co. of Helena v. State Bank of Townsend (103Mont. 260)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

Union of India v. Commercial Tax Officer, West Bengal ([1955] 2 S.C.R.1076)—•ref. 18 E.L.R. 485

Union of India v. Govind Ram (A.LR. 1956 Hyd. 62)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 412

United States v. Atlantic Fruit Co. (212 Federal Reports 711)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 469

United States v. Burke (99 Federal Reports 895)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 469

Van Gaggen v. Balines ([1854] 9 Ex. 523)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 176

Vasantha Pai v. Dr. V. K. John (12 E.L.R. 107)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 329, 453; 16 E.L.R. 45; 18 E.L.R. 403; 19 E.L.R. 16—explained & distinguished 20 E.L.R. 101

Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chand (10 E.L.R. 30)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120, 332 ; 12 E.L.R. 83, 144, 216, 370, 378 ; 13 E.L.R.1,231; 14 E.L.R. 108, 458; 15 E.L.R. 219, 425,443; 16 E.L.R. 450;17 E.L.R. 81, 181, 321, 427; 18 E.L.R. 209; 19 E.L.R. 16,278,466;20 E.L.R. 13, 169, 256, 350, 410; 21 E.L.R. 33, 137, 320, 435— applied 12 E.L.R. 168; 18 E.L.R. 476—distinguished 18 E.L.R. 193—relied on 16 E.L.R. 234

Veeraswami v. Narayya (A.LR. 1949 P.C. 32)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 485

Veluswami Thevar v. Raja Nainar (17 E.L.R. 181)—ref. 21 E.L.R. 46 ; 22 E.L.R. 92, 95—explained 22 E.L.R. 64—relied on 22 E.L.R. 299

lxxvili ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Velusami Thevar v. Raja Nainar (21 E.L.R. 338)—ref. 22 E.L.R. 425, 455

Venkataramiah v. Narayana Gowda (20 E.L.R. 101)—followed 21 E.L.R. 247

Venkatarao v. Secretary of State for India (L.R. (1936) 64 LA. 55)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 475

Venkata Subbayya v. Negendrudu ([1955] An. W.R. 688)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

Venkatesh Yeswant Deshpande v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 513)—explained 16 E.L.R. 207

Venkateswarlu v. Ramamma (A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 379)—ref. 15 E.L.R. 219

Venkayya, In re (I.L.R. 53 Mad. 444)—distinguished 11 E.L.R. 251

Verma, N. L. v. Muni Lai (15 E.L.R. 495)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 410

Vice-Chancellor, Utkal University v. S. K. Ghosh ( [1954] S.C.R. 883)—ref. 14 E.L.R. 83

Vijay Mohan Reddy v. Paga Pulla Reddy (2 E.L.R. 414)—ref. 11 E.L.R. 120

Vinayak Vasudeo v. Gopal Chimnaji (A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 377)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 13

Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members, In re (4 E.L.R. 422)—ref. 13 E.L.R, 334; 17 E.L.R. 321 ; 20 E.L.R. 169—relied on 18 E.L.R. 378

Virendar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab ( [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1013)—ref. 13 E.L.R. 231; 14 E.L.R. 444; 15 E.L.R. 467; 17 E.L.R. 8 1 ; 18E.L.R. 103; 19 E.L.R. 164; 20 E.L.R. 493

Visakapatnam Co-operative Motor Transports Ltd. v. Bangaruraju ( [1953]1 M.L.J. 533)—ref. 12 E.L.R. 345

Vithaldas v. Sadanand (A.I.R. 1957 Nag. 63)—ref. 20 E.L.R. 13

Waghela Rajsanji v. Sheikh Masludin (I.L.R. 11 Bom. 551)—ref. 19 E.L.R. 16

Wakefield ((1874) 2 O'M. & H. 103)—ref. 17 E.L.R, 373

Walsall (Borough) Case (4 O'M. & H. 123)—considered 17 E.L.R. 427

Warburton v. Loveland ( (1831) 2 D. & C.L. 480J—ref. 12 E.L.R. 345

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxXlX

Warrington Case (i O'M. & H. 42)—rej. 19 E.L.R. 358

Waryam Singh v. Amarnath (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 215)—rej. 14 E.L.R. 412

Westbury Case (1 O'M. & H. 47)—rej. 20 E.L.R. 221

Western Towns (Sikh) Urban Constituency (2 Doabia 211; Sen & Poddar854)—rej. 19 E.L.R. 16

Wigan Case (4 O'M. & H. 1)—rej. 12 E.L.R. 107 ; 16 E.L.R. 234; 20 E.L.R. 221 ; 21 E.L.R. 137

Wigan Case (4 O'M. & H. 13)—rej. 11 E.L.R. 208; 15 E.L.R. 205

Williams v. East India Company (3 East 1952)—rej. 20 E.L.R. 275

Windsor Case (1 O'M. & H. 3)—rej. 16 E.L.R. 405 ; 18 E.L.R. 209

Worcester (4 O'M. & H. 153)—rej. 16 E.L.R. 234

Yamuna Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad Khare (13 E.L.R. 1)—rej. 21 E.L.R. 320

Yasin Khan v. M. Ahmed Jan (Sen & Poddar 655)—rej. 17 E.L.R. 11

Yeshawantrao Balwantrao Chavan v. Mangalmurti (14 E.L.R. 122)—rej. 14 E.L.R. 251 ; 17 E.L.R. 373 ; 20 E.L.R. 470

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 U. S. 356; 30 Law Edn. 220)—rej. 12 E.L.R. 345

Yograjsing v. Sitaram Hirchand Birla (3 E.L.R. 439)—rej. 13 E.L.R. 334

Youghal Case ( [1869] 1 O'M. & H. 291)—rej. 14 E.L.R. 338

Young & Co. v. Mayor & Corporation of Royal Leamington Spa ( [1883]8 App. Cas. 517)—rej. 14 E.L.R. 251

Zahid Hussain v. Khairati Lai (A.I.R. 1954 All. 419)—rej. 15 E.L.R. 219

A DIGEST

OF THE

ELECTION LAW REPORTSVOLS. XI TO XXII

AGENCYSee i. CORRUPT PRACTICE (I . GENERAL PRINCIPLES).

2. ELECTION AGENTS.3. NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES.

APPEALS (to High Court).[For Appeals to Supreme Court, see SUPREME COURT.]

Sec. 116A of Representation of the People Act, ig^i not ultravires.—The words " in such manner'as may be provided by or under anylaw made by the appropriate Legislature " in article 329(6) of the Con-stitution are governed by the word " except" which precedes them,and, therefore, Parliament was competent to provide an appeal fordecision of election disputes. Section 116A of the Representationof the People Act, 1951, which provides for an appeal from the decisionof Election Tribunals is not, therefore, ultra vires.—RAMAKANTKESHEORAO HULDURKAR v. BHIKULAL LAXMICHAND CHANDAK, 15E.L.R. 467.

Sec. 116 A which provides for appeal not ultra vires.—Section 116Aof the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which provides for anappeal to the High Court of the State from orders made by the ElectionTribunal under section 98 or 99 of the Act, does not offend article 329(&)of the Constitution, and is not ultra vires. Ramakant KesheoraoHuldurkar v. Bhikulal Laxmichand Chandak (15 E.L.R. 467) referredto.—SARLA DEVI PATHAK V. BIRENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R.275-

Who may prefer an appeal—Application by voters not partiesto petition, for leave to appeal—Granting of leave—Guiding principles.—As a rule, it is only a party to the proceeding in the primary court orTribunal who has the right to prefer an appeal against the order ofthat Tribunal; if any other person happens to feel aggrieved by thatorder and his interests are affected thereby, he can file an appeal againstit only by leave of the court of appeal but not otherwise. Whethersuch leave should be granted or not is a matter which lies in thediscretion of the court of appeal. No hard and fast rule can be laiddown to crystallise the exercise of such discretion, and the decision ineach case is bound to depend upon its own facts and circumstances.—•HEERSINGH AND OTHERS V. VEERKA AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 92.

2 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

The High Court would be extremely loath to allow voterswho were not parties to an election petition to file an appeal againstan order of the Election Tribunal, except perhaps under rare and mostexceptional circumstances. Leave to file an appeal to voters who had notmade the election petition themselves and who were, therefore, not aparty before the Tribunal may be fraught with the gravest danger, andmay lead to untold harassment of the successful candidate or candidates,and occasion unnecessary prolongation of enquiries into matters relatedto their election.—HEERSINGH AND OTHERS V. VEERKA AND ANOTHER,15 E.L.R. 92.

Bv co-respondent on the ground that petitioner had colluded.—Anunsuccessful candidate who is impleaded as a co-respondent to anelection petition cannot be said to be a person aggrieved by an orderof the Tribunal dismissing the election petition under section 90(3) ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, for non-compliance withthe provisions of section 117 of the Act, and he is not, therefore,entitled to prefer an appeal under section 116A, or a writ petition, tothe High Court against that order. A respondent gets a right tosupport the election petition, only if the petition is found to have beenvalidly presented, and not dismissed under section 90(3).—GANPAT-SINGH v. BRIJ MOHAN LAL SHARMA, 20 E.L.R. 374.

By person against whom an order under sec. gg is made.—Anorder under section 99 is appealable under section 116A, and undersection 116A the appellant has to deposit security along with theappeal. A person aggrieved by an order under section 99, cannot,therefore, be allowed to circumvent this provision by applying to bemade a party to an appeal preferred from the order made under sec-tion 98. Even if he is allowed to be added as a party to an appealagainst the order under section 98, he can only support that order oroppose it; he is not entitled to get any relief in his favour by way ofsetting aside the order passed against him in the proceeding undersection 99.—BISWANATH UPADHAYA V. HARALAL DAS AND OTHERS, 16E.L.R. 405.

Order under sec. 90(3) dismissing election petition in limine fornon-compliance with sec. ny—Whether appealable.—Held, PerMOOTHAM, C.J., and MUKERJI, J. (TANDON, J. dissenting).—The dis-missal of an election petition by an Election Tribunal in pursuance ofthe provisions of section 90(3) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, for non-compliance with the provisions of section 117 of theAct, before the issues were framed in the case, is not an order undersection 98(0) of the Act and is not therefore appealable under sec-tion 116A of the Act, Per TANDON, J.—An order dismissing an

APPEALS 3

election petition in exercise of the powers vested in the Tribunal bysection 90(3), for non-compliance with the provisions of sections 81,82 or 117, is an order falling under section 98, and is, appealable.—Per MOOTHAM, C.J.—An order under section 98 is an order madeafter a hearing which has proceeded on the basis that the Tribunal hashad before it a competent petition, that is to say, a petition not liableto rejection at the outset on the ground that it does not comply withthe provisions of section 81, 82 or 117. If the petition does notcomply with the provisions of these sections there is no valid petitionbefore the Tribunal and if in the exercise of its powers under sec-tion 90(3) the Tribunal dismisses such a petition in limine that orderof dismissal, is not an order at the conclusion of the hearing as thosewords are used in section 98. Section 98 contemplates a trial followedby an order, whereas section 90(3) envisages the making of an orderprior to the trial in the sense in which that word is used in section 98;a distinction is drawn between an order made at the conclusion of atrial and an order which itself concludes the trial.—BHUDHAR LAL V.BANSIDHAR SHUKLA AND ANOTHER and GODAVARI V. SHEO PRASAD

NAGAR, 13 E.L.R. 399.*

Order dismissing election petition in limine for non-compliancewith sec. ny — Whether appealable—Expression of opinion on other prelimi-nary objections.—An order dismissing an election petition for non-compliance with section 117 of the Representation of the People Act,1951, which specifically purports to be made under section 90(3) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, is not an order made under sec-tion 98 of the Act, and is not, therefore, appealable under section 116Aof the Act. The fact that in its order the Tribunal had consideredanother preliminary objection also and expressed its opinion that ithad no force, cannot make the order appealable as an order made undeisection 98. Bhudhar Lal v. Bansidhar Shukla and Another (13 E.L.R. 399)followed.—VIRENDRA PATI YADAV v. JAI DEO SINGH AND OTHERS, 13

E.L.R. 476.

An order of an Election Tribunal dismissing an election petitionunder section 90(3) for non-compliance with the provisions of section117 is not an order made under section 98 or section 99 and no appeallies from such an order under section 116A of the Act.—SARDARHARIHAR SINGH V. SINGH GANGA PRASAD AND OTHERS, 13. E.L.R. 478.

An order of an Election Tribunal dismissing an election petitionin exercise of the powers conferred on it by section 90(3) of the Represen-tation of the People Act, 1951, for non-compliance with the provisionsof section 82 of the Act (non-joinder of necessary parties) is an ordermade under section 98 of the Act within the meaning of section 116A

*See footnote to p. 5 infra.

4 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

of the Act and is appealable to the High Court under section 116A.—GULSHER AHMAD V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, CHHATARPUR AND OTHERS,14 E.L.R. 13.

-An order of an Election Tribunal dismissing an election peti-tion in exercise of the powers vested in the Tribunal by section 90(3)of the Act, for non-compliance with section 8z(a) is an order madeunder section 98 of the Act and is, therefore, appealable under sec-tion 116A. Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadhumoni Mangaraj (9 E.L.R. 485)referred to.—SHAH ALIM UDDIN V. SATISH CHANDRA AGARWAL ANDOTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 199.

An order made by an Election Tribunal dismissing a petitionunder section 90(3) for non-compliance with the provisions of section 117of the Act is an order made under section 98 and is appealable undersection 116A. Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur (14E.L.R. 13) followed.—SHIVAPRASAD CHANDPURIA V. CHANDRIKA PRASADAND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 328.

An order dismissing an election petition in the exercise of thepowers conferred on the Tribunal under section 90(3) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951, for non-compliance with the provisionsof section 82(&) of the Act, is an order made under section 98 and isappealable. Shah Alim Uddin v. S. C. Agarwal (14 E.L.R. 199) followed.—DURGA PRASAD CHOWDHARY V. MUKAT BEHARI LAL BHARGAVA ANDANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 471.

An order dismissing an election petition summarily undersection 90(3) for non-compliance with section 117 is an order undersection 98 and is appealable to the High Court under section 116A.—U. M. TRIVEDI v. MANAKLAL AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 88.

An order of an Election Tribunal dismissing an election peti-tion under section 90(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,for non-compliance with the provisions of section 117 of the Actwithout going into the merits of the petition, is an order made " atthe conclusion of the trial of the election petition " under section 98of the Act and an appeal lies against such an order under section 116Aof the Act. Sardar Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad and Others(13 E.L.R. 478) not followed. Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh12 E.L.R. 461) followed.—GIAN CHAND V. OM PRABHA JAJN AND

ANOTHER, 16 E.L.R. 384.An order under section 90(3) of the Representation of the

People Act, 1951, dismissing an election petition summarily for non-compliance with the provisions of section 82 (joinder of parties) or sec-tion 117 (deposit of security) is " an order made under section 98 of

APPEALS 5

the Act " within the meaning of section 116A, and an appeal, there-fore, lies from such an order to the High Court. Gulshcr Ahmad, v.Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur (14 E.L.R. 13) followed.—MOHAN SINGHv. BHANWAKLAL NATHA AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 1.

An order of an Election Tribunal, dismissing an election peti-tion in exercise of its powers under section 90(3) of the Representationof the People Act, 1951, for non-compliance with the provisions ofsection 82 or section 117 of the Act is an order made under section 98of the Act within the meaning of section 116A and is, therefore, anorder from which an appeal lies to the High Court of the State.* GianChand v. Om Prabha Jain (18 E.L.R. 136) followed. Sardar HariharSingh v. Singh Ganga Prasad (13 E.L.R. 478) not followed.—RADHAKISHAN v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, AMRITSAR, AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R.321.

An order dismissing an election petition under section 90(3)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for non-compliancewith the provisions of section 117, is an order under section 98 of theAct, and is appealable under section 116A. The word " t r ia l" isused in section 98 in its wider meaning including the entire proceed-ings before the Tribunal from the reference to it by the Election Com-mission to the conclusion, and the trial of the petition concludes whena petition is dismissed under section 90(3). Sardar Harihar Singh v.Singh Ganga Prasad (13 E.L.R. 478) overruled. Harish ChandraBajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461) explained. The judgment ofthe Punjab High Court in Gian Chand v. Om Prabha Jain (16 E.L.R.384) affirmed.—OM PRABHA JAIN V. GIAN CHAND AND ANOTHER, 21E.L.R. 54.

An order dismissing an election petition under the provisionsof sub-section (3) of section 90 of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, for non-compliance with the provisions of section 117, is insubstance and law an order made at the conclusion of the trial undersection 98 of the Act and is consequently, appealable to the High Courtunder section 116A. Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12E.L.R. 461) and Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur andOthers (14 E.L.R. 13) referred to.—CHANDRIKA PRASAD TRIPATHI V.SHIV PRASAD CHANDPURIA AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 172.

* Act 58 of 1958 has made the matter clear by adding an Explanation tosection 90(3) that " An order of the Tribunal dismissing an election petitionunder this sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) ofsection 98."

6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Limitation Power of High Court to excuse delay in preferringappeal—Wrong advice of counsel—W hether sufficient cause—Order dismis-sing petition under sec. 90(3)—Whether appealable.—Though there is nogeneral rule that wrong advice of counsel can always be a sufficientcause, there may be cases in which wrong advice bona fide givenwithout negligence or carelessness may amount to sufficient cause fordelay in preferring an appeal. Where an election petition filed by theappellant was dismissed under section 90(3) and the appellant, actingon the advice of a senior lawyer applied to the High Court underarticle 226 of the Constitution for a writ quashing the order dismissingthe election petition, but this application was dismissed by the HighCourt on the ground that the order under section 90(3) was appealable,and the appellant filed the present appeal with an application undersection n6A(3) for excusing the delay in presenting the appeal: Held,that, as the question whether an order dismissing an election petitionunder section 90(3) was appealable under section 116A was a debatableone and there was a conflict of opinion between the High Courts on thepoint*, and the appellant had acted on the advice of a senior lawyer inpreferring the application under article 226, there was sufficient causefor not preferring the appeal in time, and the case was a fit one forexcusing the delay under section n6A(3).—GULSHER AHMAD V.ELECTION TRIBUNAL, CHHATARPUR, AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 18 E.L.R. 69.

——Right to file cross-objections.—Inasmuch as the High Court isenjoined in an appeal under section 116A of the Representation of thePeople Act to exercise the same powers, jurisdiction and authorityand to follow the same procedure as it would have exercised or follow-ed in respect of a civil appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure,the right to file a cross-objection against the decision is available toa respondent, who otherwise would have felt satisfied with the resultof the case and would not have moved for an appeal of his own.—INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIWANCHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS, 15E.L.R. 219.

Under section n6A(2) of the Representation of the People Act,the High Court can entertain a cross-objection by a respondent againstthat part of a Tribunal's decision which is adverse to him; but this issubject to the provisions of section 119 A as regards deposit of securityfor costs. Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan and Others (15

* Act 58 of 1958 has since added an Explanation to section 90(3) whichprovides that " an order of the Tribunal dismissing an election petition underthis sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) of sec-tion 98.

APPEALS 7

E.L.R. 219) followed.—CHAMPA DEVI V. JAMUNA PEASAD AND OTHERS,15 E.L.R. 443.

The High Court has power to entertain cross-objections, buta cross-objection in an appeal under section 116A can be treated asvalidly presented only if it is accompanied by the security which ispayable for an appeal.—CHAKRAPANI V. CHNADOO AND ANOTHER, 15E.L.R. 271.

Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,does not expressly provide for the filing of any memorandum ofcross-objections by the respondent, and even assuming that by virtueof clause (2) of section 116A, Order XLI, rule 22, of the Civil Pro-cedure Code is applicable to election appeals and a respondent couldfile cross-objections, the memorandum of cross-objections should befiled within one month from the date of service of notice on therespondents, as required by Order XLI, rule 22. Misconception oflaw is not a sufficient ground to condone the delay in filing cross-objections.—RAGHUNATH MISRA v. KISHORE CHANDRA DEO BHANJ

AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 321.

Since the making of a security deposit for the purposes ofcosts of the opposite party is a condition for an appeal, it must betaken to be a condition for the cross-objection also. This is more soif the cross-objection did not bring only the parties already beforethe court, but attempted to join other candidates for whose costs nodeposit had been made by the appellant.—INAYATULLAH KHAN V.

DlWANCHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 2 ig .

Power to take further evidence.—In view of the provisions con-tained in sub-section (2) of section 116A of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, a High Court hearing an appeal under section 116Afrom an order made by an Election Tribunal has power to call foradditional evidence in the circumstances and subject to the conditionslaid down in Order XLI, rule 27, of the Civil Procedure Code.—CHAKRAPANI V. CHANDOO AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 271.

Deposit of security for costs.—The intendment of the provisioncontained in section 119A that the deposit of Rs. 500 as security forcosts of an appeal under section 116A must be made in favour of theSecretary to the Election Commission, is that the money depositedmust go out of the control of the appellant and should be available tothe Secretary to the Election Commission. The requirement that thedeposit must be made in favour of the Secretary to the Election Com-mission, is therefore of a mandatory nature and omission to do so is a

8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

substantial non-compliance with section 119A. But, inasmuch as sub-section (3) of section 116A gives the High Court power to condonedelay in the filing of an appeal if there is sufficient cause, the HighCourt has power to permit the appellant to rectify the defect in makingthe deposit, and treat the appeal as duly presented, after condoningthe delay.—DHANRAJ DESHLEHARA V. VISHWANATH YADAV TAMASKARAND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 260.

Whether whole case is re-opened.—The jurisdiction of the HighCourt in appeals under section 116A of the Act is similar to that ithas in the case of appeals from original decrees and the entire case isrc-opcned in the appellate court. Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Companyv. Motilal Shivlal [(1915) I.L.R. 39 Bom. 386] explained.—T. K. GANGIREDDY v. M. C. ANJANEYA REDDY AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 261.

Respondent's right to re-open grounds decided against him.—In anappeal under section 116A, from the judgment of a Tribunal, the res-pondent is entitled to re-open the grounds in respect of which theTribunal had found against him and to support the judgment of theTribunal on such grounds. Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan(15 E.L.R. 219) referred to.—SARLA DEVI PATHAK V. BIRENDRA SINGHAND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 275.

New pleas, whether can be raised.—A pure question of law arisingon the established facts can be raised before the High Court eventhough it was not raised before the Tribunal.—DR. DEORAO LAKSHMANANANDE v. KESHAV LAKSHMAN BORKAR, 13 E.L.R. 334.

Interference with findings of fact.—The appellate court is enti-tled to interfere if the Tribunal judges the credibility of the witnesses ona consideration of probabilities, but is not open to the appellate courtto reach a different conclusion if the trial court has acted upon thedemeanour of the witnesses or has commented upon their truthful-ness.—INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIWANCHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS,15 E.L.R. 219.

Appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal should not be lightlyinterfered with on appeal as the Tribunal has the benefit of having thewitnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they deposed.—MAGANLAL BAGDI v. HARI VISHNU KAMATH, 15 E.L.R. 205.

Even though a decision hinges upon the credibility of wit-nesses, if there is some special feature about the evidence of a particularwitness which has escaped the trial judge's notice or there is a sufficientbalance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credi-bility lies, the appellate court can interfere with the finding of thetrial judge on a question of fact. Sarju Prasad v. Jwaleshwari (A.I.R.

APPEALS 9

1951 S.C. 120) distinguished.—GHAYUR ALI KHAN V. KESHAV GUPTA,16 E.L.R. 154.

In dealing with an appeal under section 116A of the Act, HighCourts should normally attach importance to .the findings of factrecorded by the Tribunal when the said findings rest solely on theappreciation of oral evidence,—BARU RAM V. PRASANNI AND OTHERS,16 E.L.R. 450.

In an appeal under section 116A of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, all findings of fact are open to review as in an appealunder section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code.—JAYALAKSHMI DEVAMMAv. JANARDHAN REDDI, 17 E.L.R. 302.

An appellate court should be slow to interfere with a findingunless the appellant can demonstrate that the finding is erroneous. Bymerely pointing out that a possible contrary view of the evidence couldbe taken, the appellant does not discharge the burden which he bearsas an appellant. Where the testimony of a witness is accepted orrejected on a consideration of the probabilities, the appellate courtmay be in as good a position as the trial court to re-examine the pro-babilities and to accept or reject the testimony anew ; but where thedecision of the trial court, which had the opportunity of seeing thewitnesses in the box and watching their demeanour, and which hadalso the chance of comparing one testimony against another, is basedon the credibility of such witnesses, the appellate court should beexceedingly slow to reach a different conclusion even if that differentconclusion may appear possible. It is an accepted proposition of lawthat an appellate court does not start by re-writing a judgment accord-ing to its own wishes simply because it has the power of reviewing theevidence again. What the appellate court does is to see whether theview taken by the trial court is reasonably open in the circumstancesof the case and in the light of the evidence. That another view wasalso possible is not the test or the criterion. The appellant in discharg-ing the burden has to show that when all is said and done there is asubstantial balance in his favour on which the appraisal of the evidenceshould be reversed.—JAMUNA PRASAD SINGH V. SHRI RAMNIVAS ANDOTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 145.

An election appeal is like a criminal appeal, and if theappellant is a successful candidate against whom an election petitionhas been decided, the appeal is like an ordinary criminal appeal filedby a convict accused; but if the election petition has been dismissedand the appellant is the unsuccessful petitioner, the same principleswould apply as in an appeal filed by the State against an acquittal, in

ELD—2

10 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

other words, the burden is thrown most strongly on the appellant toupset the findings of the Tribunal acquitting the successful candidatesof the charges of corrupt practices.—LACHHMAN SINGH V. HAEPARKASHKAUR, 19 E.L.R. 417.

In dealing with an appeal under section 116A of the Repre-sentation of the People Act, the High Court should normally attachimportance to the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal when thesaid findings rest solely on the appreciation of oral evidence.—V. B.RAJU v. V. RAMACHANDRA RAO AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 1.

An appeal to the High Court against the decision of theTribunal under section 116A of the Act is competent on questions offact as well as law, and so, if, on considering the evidence, the HighCourt is satisfied that the appreciation of the evidence by the Tribunalis wholly unsatisfactory, or that the reasons given by the Tribunal inaccepting or rejecting certain evidence are open to serious objection,then it would be competent to the High Court to inteifere with theconclusions of the Tribunal even on questions of fact.—ABDUL HAMIDCHOUDHURY V. NANI GOPAL SWAMI AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 358.

Appeal under sec. 116A, whether a "civil proceeding."—Leave toappeal to Supreme Court.—(per BARMAN, J., dubitante)—An appeal undersection 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, from anorder of an Election Tribunal is " a civil proceeding" within themeaning of article 133(1) of the Constitution and an application to theHigh Court for a certificate under article i33(i)(c) in respect of thejudgment or order of the High Court that the case is a fit one forappeal to the Supreme Court is, therefore, maintainable; and the HighCourt has jurisdiction to grant such certificate if in its opinion thecase is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Held, (per DAS, J.and BARMAN, J.) that article 329(6) of the Constitution does not barthe jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain an appeal from ajudgment pf the High Court in an appeal under section 116A of theRepresentation of the People Act. Article 329 only prohibits theinitiation of proceedings for setting aside an election otherwise thanby an election petition. [Their Lordships granted a certificate underarticle i33(i)(c) of the Constitution in regard to the judgment of theHigh Court of Assam in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 194 of 1957, thatthe case was a fit one for appeal as the appeal involved a substantialquestion of law relating to the interpretation of section 123(7) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951.]—KISHORE CHANDRA DEOBHANJ v. RAGHUNATH MISRA AND ANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 65.

Even assuming that an application to the High Court underarticle 133 of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court

APPEALS II

from a decision of the High Court in an appeal tinder section 116-A ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, is not maintainable, thefact that the appellant before the Supreme Court had applied to theHigh Court under article 133 for leave to appeal and the High Courthad considered the application though it finally rejected it, is a groundon which the Supreme Court can excuse the delay in filing an applica-tion to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal under article 136 of theConstitution.—BAKU RAM V. PRASANNI AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 450.

——Powers of High Court, to set aside orders passed on writ petitions.—An order passed by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdictionto issue writs setting aside an interlocutory order of the Tribunalcannot be set aside by the High Court in an appeal against the finalorder of the Election Tribunal.—LAKSHMI NARAIK V. BALVAN SINGH

AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 76.

Withdrawal of appeal—Whether new party can be substitutedas appellant on review—Power to review.—The High Court has nopower to review its decision in an appeal under section 116A of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951. Where, in an appeal undersection 116A from the order of an Election Tribunal, the appellant waspermitted to withdraw the appeal and the High Court passed an orderon the 17th June, 1958, that the "appeal is allowed to be withdrawn,"and a third person applied on the 4th August, 1958, to be substitutedas the appellant and for prosecuting the appeal: Held, that the orderpassed by the High Court on the 17th June, 1958, was "a decision of theHigh Court on appeal" within the meaning of section 116B of theAct, even though the order merely allowed the appellant to withdrawthe appeal, and was final arid conclusive under the said section : theHigh Court had no power to review that order, and allow a thirdperson to be substituted as the appellant and permit him to prosecutethe appeal. Quaere: Whether the provisions relating to withdrawal andabatement of election petitions apply also to appeals under section116A.—NARAYAN YESHWANT NENE v. GOVIND SONU KATKARI &ANOTHER, 21 E.L.R. 168.

——Case remanded by High Court—Whether Election Commissionshould constitute Tribunal afresh.—If, in a writ petition or an appeal,the order of an Election Tribunal dismissing an,election petition is setaside by the High Court and the High Court further orders that thepetition shall be deemed to be pending and that the Tribunal shallproceed to decide it in accordance with law, the Election Commissionis not bound to proceed afresh in accordance with section 86 of theRepresentation of the People Act. If the person appointed as Election

12 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Tribunal is transferred from one district to another or is not availablefor any other reason the Election Commission may constitute anotherElection Tribunal. But there is nothing in sections 86 and 89 to suggestthat if the person appointed as the Election Tribunal is still available,the matter should again be referred to the Election Commission. Theparticular individual who has been appointed by the Commission totry the election petition has jurisdiction to continue the trial andto conclude it according to law.—RAM SWARUP AND ANOTHER V.G. D. SAHGAL AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 42.

BALLOT PAPERS[See also POLL and VOTING]

Ballot papers without proper marks—Validity—Power of ElectionCommission to issue instruction to returning officer to treat them as valid—Whether power can be exercised ex post facto — General instructions toreturning officers to treat such papers as valid and to declare result andapply for approval of Commission later—Validity.—The petitioner filedan election petition challenging the election of the respondent on theground that certain ballot papers which were in favour of therespondent should have been rejected under rule 57(2)(e) of theRepresentation of the People (Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions) Rules, inasmuch as they did not bear the marks mentionedin rule 27(2). Under the proviso to rule 57(2), which conferred poweron the Ejection Commission to overlook such defects in certain cases atits discretion, the Election Commission had issued a general orderthat in every case where a returning officer was satisfied that suchdefect was due to the mistake or failure of the presiding officer or thepolling officer, such ballot paper shall not be rejected, but treated asvalid, but the officer shall seek the approval of the Commission inevery case where the defect was overlooked. The order, however,made it clear that the result of the election was not to be withhelduntil such approval was obtained. In pursuance of these instructionsthe returning officer counted several ballot papers with defects asvalid and on that basis declared the respondent as duly elected, andthe approval by the Election Commission was obtained after theresults were announced : Held, that the proviso to rule 57(2) con-templates the previous satisfaction of the Election Commission as thebasis of curing of the defect and that the order of the Election Com-mission, which was in the nature of advance approval of the action ofthe returning officer, was contrary to rule 57(2); the power conferredby that rule cannot be exercised ex post facto after the declaration ofthe results of the election. Where the distinguishing mark of a ballotpaper prescribed by the Election Commission includes the number of the

BALLOT PAPERS 13

polling station, a mistake in the number of the polling station wouldrender the ballot paper defective and would invalidate the ballotpaper unless the Election Commission directs that the defect may beoverlooked under rule 57(2)(e) before the corfimencement of the poll.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (10 E.L.R. 216) referredtO.—RADHAKRISHNAN V. MUTHUKUMARASWAMI NAIDU AND OTHERS,

19 E.L.R. 481.

Ballot papers without distinguishing marks.—Under the provi-sions of rule 57(2) and rule 27(2) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, a ballot paper which does not bear a distinguishing mark asdirected by the Election Commission has to be rejected. The provisoto rule 27(2)(e) will apply and save such ballot papers only if theElection Commission had validated such papers on a reference beingmade to it by the returning officer. Where votes on ballot papers notbearing a distinguishing mark have been cast both in favour of theelection petitioner and the respondent whose election is sought to beset aside, and the Tribunal finds that it has to reject the votes onunmarked ballot papers given for the respondent, the respondentcannot claim that votes on unmarked ballot papers given in favourof the election petitioner should also be rejected in counting thevotes unless he has, within the prescribed period, filed a statementof recrimination as required by section 97 of the Act. The specialprovisions of section 97 must prevail over the general provisions ofsection IOO(I)(^) to this extent in this connection. But if the electionpetitioner claims that the should be declared elected, he has, underthe provisions of section 101, to show that he has received a majorityof the valid votes and in this context the question whether the votescast in favour of the election petitioner were valid arises, and votescast on unmarked ballot papers in favour of the petitioner must alsobe rejected in determining who has obtained a majority of votes.—INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIWANCHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS, 15

E.L.R. 219.

Omission of returning officer to affix official mark—Validityoj election.—Under rule 20 of the Representation of the People(Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, it is onlywhen the Election Commission has issued a direction to the returningofficer to mark the ballot papers with an official mark that thereturning officer has to stamp the ballot paper with such officialmark as may have been specified under rule 20 before delivering theballot paper to the elector. Where no such direction has been issuedan election cannot be declared void merely because the returning

14 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

officer had not affixed any official mark on the ballot papers.—N. SANKARA REDDI V. YASHODA REDDI AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 34.

-Numbers of ballot papers not same as those on envelopes—Validity of votes.—If the numbers entered on the- envelopes in whichthe ballot papers are enclosed do not agree with the numbers of therespective ballot papers, the votes are invalid and must be rejected.Section 92(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, applies tosuch cases even though the mistake is that of the returning officerand not that of the voter. As the votes are invalid the question ofthe intention of the voter does not arise.—B. M. KRISHNA MURTHY V.

R. SUBBANNA AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 123.Discrepancy between number of ballot paper and number entered

on envelope—Validity of rule—Rule 92(1) and (2), whether mandatory.—The provision contained in rule o,2(2)(&) is also mandatory, and apostal ballot paper would, therefore, be invalid if the number thereofdoes not agree with the number of the ballot paper entered on theenvelope in which it is placed. The fact that the discrepancy betweenthe numbers was caused by a mistake of the officers engaged in con-ducting the elections would not render such votes valid. Where thereis such discrepancy between the numbers in all the votes polled at theelection, the result of the election must be deemed to have beenmaterially affected within the meaning of section ioo(2)(c) and theelection must be set aside, though there was no prejudice to anyparticular candidate.—R. SUBBANNA V. S. R. GURU AND OTHERS,12 E.L.R. 201.

Counting—Duty to keep ballot papers in separate boxes—Duty tokeep ballot papers under seal during intervals—Counting by assistantreturning officers—Filling Form 16 before declaring result—Legality ofprocedure.—Under clause (viii) of sub-rule (1) of rule 46 of the Rules,after the counting of all ballot papers contained in each ballot box hasbeen completed by the returning officer and an account of such ballotpapers has been recorded in Form 14 the returning officer shall causeall such ballot papers to be kept in a separate packet on which shallbe indicated such particulars as will identify the ballot box in whichsuch ballot papers were found, the name of the candidate to whomsuch ballot box was allotted and the name of the polling station andthe number of the polling booth, if any, where such ballot box wasused. Wrapping up the bundles of ballot papers in check slips andtying them with strings is not a sufficient compliance with this rule.The provision contained in sub-rule (2) of rule 46 that during intervalswhen the counting has to be suspended, the ballot papers and other

BALLOT PAPERS , 15

papers should be kept under the seal of the returning officer and thecandidates, has been made to ensure safe custody and should bestrictly complied with. The mere fact that the papers were under thepersonal custody of the returning officer is no ground for not comply-ing with this rule. During the absence of the returning officer forlunch or other official business the counting cannot be carried on bythe assistant returning officer; it must be stopped in view of theprovision contained in the proviso to section 22 of the Representationof the People Act. The return in Form 16 should not be preparedbefore declaring the result as required in rule 48, as the candidatesare entitled to claim a recount after counting has been completed andbefore result is declared and the form is filled. The amendment madeto rule 46(1;) in 1952 substitutes the polling-station-wise method ofcounting for the candidate-wise method. Rule 46(1;), as amended,expressly requires that the ballot boxes used at one polling stationshould be opened and the counting of ballot papers proceeded with atthe same time. The words "as far as practicable" in rule 46(11) do notgive a discretion to the returning officer to adopt the candidate-wisemethod. These words are meant only to provide for those contingen-cies in which it is not possible for one reason or another to open allboxes or to proceed with the counting of the ballot papers of allcandidates at the same time. The fact that a candidate did not raiseany objection at the time of counting would not prevent him fromraising it in an election petition.—TRILOKI SINGH V. SHIVRAJWATINEHRU AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 234.

Papers scattered near boxes whether can be put inside and counted.—If there is no evidence that the voting paper had at all been inserted,that is to say, if the voting paper was partly inside and partlyoutside, however small the part which was inside may be, the presidingofficer is bound to cancel that paper under the provisions of rule 31 ofthe rules. Ballot papers lying upon or near ballot boxes cannot beput inside the boxes by the presiding officer.—INAYATULLAH KHAN V.

DlWANCHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 2IQ,.

Proper procedure.-—It will appear from rule 3 that as eachpolling station is taken up the ballot papers have to be taken out,sorted, checked, counted, and the result entered in Form 22 andannounced. There is nothing to show that the result as declaredshould immediately be finalised by signing and nothing further toshow that if any recount is asked at that stage it should be refused orgranted. [Dictum: "The rules on this subject, though they areelaborate, should be made more stringent and the penalty for thisshould be visited not upon the candidates who have run the elections

16 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

but upon the officers whose duty it is to see that these rules are obeyed.We cannot do better than voice a caution to all officers connectedwith the running of elections that they act in breach of these rules attheir own peril and that if sufficient cause is found for suspecting theirbona fides this court will never hesitate to report against them to theirsuperior officers."]—INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIWANCHAND MAHAJANAND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 219.

Loss of ballot papers.—The fact that all ballot papers that hadbeen issued to voters have not been accounted for, does not bringthe case within the purview of section ioo(i)(d){iii) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, as it is possible that the voters who had takenthem might not have made use of it.—CHAMPA DEVI V. JAMUNA PKASADAND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 443.

False personation—Bona fide voting by wrong person—Validityof tendered vote.—The real voter cannot be deprived of his vote merelybecause the person who had wrongly voted in his name had acted bonafide. So, tendered votes have to be counted if the tenderer is the realvoter even though false personation is not proved. Cirencester DivisionCase (4 O'M & H. 194) and St. Andrews Case (4 O'M. & H. 32) relied •on.—A. K. SUBBARAYA GOUNDER v. K. G. PALANISAMI GOUNDER ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 251.

Interchange of ballot papers - Wrong papers issued at one pollingstation—Power of Election Commission to order re-poll—Counting of votesat other polling stations before re-poll, whether legal.—Polling at allpolling stations for an election took place on the 25th February. Itwas discovered that wrong ballot papers had been issued at a certainpolling station and the Election Commission directed taking of freshpolls in that station and 7th of March was fixed for the poll. Thecounting in respect of the other polling stations took place on ist and2nd March. It was contended that the counting of votes could bedone only after the re-poll fixed for the 7th March was also finishedand the counting of votes at the other stations before the re-poll ofthe 7th was over, was therefore contrary to the rules: Held, (i) thedirection contained in section 57(2) applied only to the cases wherethe polling had to be adjourned, and the procedure adopted in thiscase did not, therefore, contravene section 57; (ii) section 58 alsowas not contravened as there is no provision in section 58, or in sec-tion 57, that the counting of votes in cases covered by section 58should take place only after the polling at all the centres had beenfinished : Held further, that, though the case did not fall under sec-tion 57 or section 58, the Election Commission had power underarticle 324(1) of the Constitution to order that a re-poll should be

BALLOT PAPERS 17

held in the circumstances of this case and the votes cast on re-pollcould not be held to be invalid.—MOTILAL V. MANGLA PRASAD,15 E.L.R. 425.

Presiding officer issuing wrong ballot papers—Mistake condonedby Election Commission—Validity of votes.—Votes cannot be rejectedon the ground that ballot papers for the Parliamentary constituencywere given to voters for the State Assembly by a mistake of the presid-ing officer, if the Election Commission has directed that the defectmay be overlooked.— CHAMPA DEVI V. JAMUNA PRASAD AND OTHERS,15 E.L.R. 443.

Interchange of ballot papers of different polling stations—Validity of votes.—Where the ballot papers authorised to be used at aparticular polling station A were wrongly issued by the presidingofficer to the voters at polling station B and the ballot papers forvoters at B were issued to voters at A: Held, that, as the ballotpapers used at A as well as at B, bore wrong marks, all of them hadto be rejected under rule 47(0) of the Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions Rules, 1951. Damodar Goswami v. Narain Goswami and Others(10 E.L.R. 272) and Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others(10 E.L.R. 216) referred to.—RAJENDRA PRASAD YADAV V. SURESHCHANDRA MISRA, I I E.L.R. 222.

Marking of ballot papers—Rules as to marking of votes—Whethermandatory.—Rule 92 of the Representation of the People (Conduct ofElections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, is mandatory and a ballotpaper which does not comply with the said rule is invalid. Ballotpapers in which a cross mark is put against the name of the candidatefor whom the vote is given instead of the .figure " I" as required byrule 92(0) are invalid. The word " figure " in the different clauses ofrule 92 and also in rule 91 means the numerical figure and not any mark.Putting a cross mark " X " in addition to the figure " I " against acandidate's name will not therefore render the ballot paper invalidunder rule 92(e). Where the figure " I " written in Gujrati com-menced from the column of one candidate but extended to the columnof another candidate so as almost to be equally divided between thetwo columns, it was held that the ballot paper was invalid underrule 92(6).—SHAH SANKALCHAND MOTILAL V. SHUKLA DAMUBHAICHHAGANLAL, 12 E.L.R. 184.

New system of casting votes by marking—Validity.—Rules 41Ato 41J of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections andElection Petitions) Rules, which have introduced the system of cast-ing votes by marking the ballot papers, are not ultra vires.— VINAYAKUMAR DIWAN V. RAGHUNATHSINGH KILEDAR, 22 E.L.R. 404.

ELD-3

l8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Postal ballot papers—Attestation.—A postal ballot paper in whichthe declaration of the elector in Form 18-A is not signed in thepresence of a stipendiary magistrate or gazetted officer or otherperson authorised to attest such declaration under under rule 47(2) ofthe Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions) Rules, 1956, is invalid and should be rejected. Though aTahsildar is not a gazetted officer, he is empowered to attest a declara-tion in a postal ballot paper in his capacity as a stipendiary magis-trate. An amendment to the Representation of the People (Conductof Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, published by the CentralGovernment in the Official Gazette must be presumed to have beenplaced before both the Houses of Parliament as required by section169(3) of the Representation of the People Act, unless the contrary isproved. Where a postal ballot paper signed by a member of theArmed Forces is attested by an officer of the Army, it must be pre-sumed that that officer was duly authorised in this behalf by theCommanding Officer of the unit as required by rule 47(2)(«).—CHAMPADEVI V. JAMUNA PRASAD AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 443.

Rule 92(i)(e) of the Representation of the People (Conduct ofElections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, is mandatory, and apostal ballot paper, the signature of the elector on which is not dulyattested as required by the rules and notifications issued thereunderwith regard to attestation, is invalid. A postal ballot paper which isnot attested by a Gazetted Officer or any of the other persons authorisedto attest postal ballot papers by the rules and notifications, should,therefore, be rejected as invalid.—R. SUBBANNA V. S. R. GURU AND

OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 201.

Papers issued without demand by voter or order of returning officer.—The condition precedent to the issue of a postal ballot paper is themaking of an application by the voter himself. Unless a voter demandsa postal ballot paper, the rules do not contemplate the issuance of apostal ballot paper to him. Where the evidence showed that the postalballot paper record had not been properly maintained, that the ruleswith regard to their issue had been broken, that they had been issuedon the 26th February when the voting had to be completed on the 25th,that as many as 23 ballot papers were handed over to one person, thatone of the forms of the application was not signed by the applicantand there were no orders engrossed upon the applications for the issu-ance of postal ballot papers to the applicants except in a very fewcases: Held, that the postal ballot papers must be disregarded fromthe count.—INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIWANCHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS,

15 E.L.R. 219.

BALLOT PAPERS 19

Collecting ballot papers from voters and filling them as candidatedesires—Whether undue influence.—Where an election, which wasconducted on the system of single transferable votes by postal ballot,was sought to be declared wholly void in an election petition on thefollowing grounds, namely : (i) that the first respondent was guilty ofundue influence as he was a man of very great influence and hadcollected a very large number of ballot papers from persons over whomhe had influence, unattested and unmarked, and had got them markedand attested by others subsequently, and (ii) that the nomination of hisson was improperly accepted as he was at the time of election belowthe qualifying age of 30 years, and the result of the election had beenmaterially affected thereby: Held, per RAGHUNANDAN SARAN and FARQUI(SANYAL dissenting) that the evidence in the case, though it createdsome suspicion was not sufficient to establish beyond doubt that thefirst respondent had collected the ballot papers as alleged in this peti-tion, and it was not therefore necessary to decide whether collection ofballot papers from the voters before they are marked and attestedwould by itself amount to undue influence under section 123(2) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951. Per SANYAL.—The evidenceclearly established that the first respondent had collected large numbersof ballot papers from persons over whom he had great influence and hadgot them filled in as he desired, and attested by his friends; that thisact clearly interfered with the free exercise of the electoral right of thevoters on an extensive scale and constituted undue influence within themeaning of section 123(2) of the Act.—RATAN SHUKLA V. DR. BRIJENDRASWARUP AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 332.

Discretion to supply postal ballot papers after time.—Under sub-rule (2) of rule 44 the returning officer has a discretion to supply postalballot papers even in cases where the applications were made less thanseven days before the date or the first of the dates fixed for the poll,but if he chooses not to exercise that discretion in favour of an applic-ant it cannot be said that he should have done so or that his refusal todo so contravenes the statutory provisions on the subject.—GOPALANv. KANNAN, 14 E.L.R. 458.

— —Rules as to preservation.—Under rule 50(2) the returning officeris required to note on the cover in which postal ballot papers are 'enclosed the date and time of its receipt only when it is received afterthe expiry of the time fixed by him in that behalf. No such note isrequired to be made on any cover which is received in time. It cannotbe assumed from the fact that the covers containing certain postalballot papers have not been preserved, that they were not received intime, for, there is no provision in the rules that covers containing postal

20 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

ballot papers which are received in time should be preserved. Obiter :It is desirable that a rule is made requiring the returning officer tonote on each cover in Form 18-C the date and time of its receipt, ir-respective of whether or not it is received in time, and also to preserveeach such cover. Acceptance of postal ballot papers cannot be assailedon the mere ground that they were not shown to the candidates ortheir agents after the covers were opened.—CHAMPA DEVI V. JAMUNAPRASAD AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 443.

Recount of ballot papers—When recount will be ordered.—Arecount of ballot papers is not granted as a matter of right; it will begranted only if there is evidence or facts to show that the countingwas not accurate and that a recount and scrutiny are necessary in theinterests of justice. Swaminatha Merkondar v. Ramalingam (No. 1) (2E.L.R. 51) relied on.—SHAH SANKALCHAND MOTILAL V. SHUKLA DAMU-BHAI CHHAGANLAL, 12 E.L.R. 184.

Claim for recount of votes—Duty to make out prima facie case.A candidate who seeks a declaration that the election of the return-

ed candidate was void and that he (the petitioner) was duly elected,on the ground that if the votes had been properly counted, he wouldhave got a majority of votes, is not entitled to have a recount of thevotes as a matter of absolute right. A recount can be ordered only ifhe makes out a prima facie case that if the votes had been properlyscrutinised and counted he would have got a majority of the votes.Tanjore, N.M.R. (Hammond's Election Cases 673), Punjab North Case(Hammond's Election Cases 569), Karnal Mohammadan ConstituencyCase (2 Doabia 235), Karnal (South) General Constituency Case (2 Doabia80), Chingleput Case (Hammond's Election Cases 307), R. Swaminath'sCase (2 E.L.R. 5), Seshaiah v. Koti Reddi (3 E.L.R. 39) and Lakshuma-nayya v. Rajam Aiyar (58 M.L.J. 118) referred to.—BASAVIAH V.13ACHIAH AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 293.

Proper time for claiming recount.—A recount need not beclaimed under rule 64 as soon as the result of each polling station wasannounced, but may be claimed after the completion of the countingof all the polling stations.—INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIWANCHANDMAHAJAN AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 219.

Proper stage for claiming recount.—Under rule 64(6) of theRepresentation of the People (Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions) Rules, 1956, an application for recount cannot be entertain-ed after the result sheet has been completed and signed.—CHAMPADEVI V. JAMUNA PRASAD AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 443.

BALLOT PAPERS 21

Tendered votes—Validity of tendered votes—Necessity of signa-ture or thumb-impression—The requirements of the signature or thethumb-impression of the voter in the case of a tendered vote is amandatory provision as it is a necessary safeguard to prevent fraud ;and the absence of such signature or thumb-impression would vitiatethe vote. Buckrose Division case (4 O'M. & H. 115) and In re Lyons(551 L.T. 35) referred to. Stepney case (4 O'M. & H. 43) distinguished.— A . K. SUBBARAYA GOUNDER V. K . G. PALANISAMI GOUNDER ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 251.

Bona fide voting by wrong person—Validity of tendered votes.—•The real voter cannot be deprived of his vote merely because theperson who had wrongly voted in his name had acted bona fide. So,tendered votes have to be counted if the tenderer is the real voter eventhough false personation is not proved. Cirencester Division case (4O'M. & H. 194) and St. Andrews case (4 O'M. & H. 32) relied on.—A. K . SUBBARAYA GOUNDER V. K . G. PALANISAMI GOUNDER ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 251.

Validity of tendered vote.—A respondent who has not pleadedwith regard to any of the tendered votes that they should be treatedas valid votes, cannot be allowed to give evidence with regard to thetendered votes found in the petitioner's list but given up by the peti-tioner and claim that they should be counted as valid votes in hisfavour. Finsbury case (4 O'M. & H. 170) referred to.—A. K. SUBBA-

RAYA GOUNDER V. K. G. PALANISAMI GOUNDER AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R.

251.Votes for disqualified persons—Casting votes in favour of dis-

qualified candidate—Whether votes "thrown away " and invalid.—Wherea person who is in fact disqualified for being chosen as a member of aLegislative Assembly under the Constitution, being below the minimumage prescribed by the Constitution, is elected as a candidate, there isa non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution and theresult of the election must be deemed to have been materially affected,and his election should be set aside. But the votes obtained by himcannot be deemed to have been " thrown away " and the next candi-date cannot be declared to have been duly elected, merely because hewas in fact under age and this fact was published in a newspaper atthe time of election; for, several voters might not have read thenewspaper at all, particularly in the case of hilly areas inhabited byilliterate persons.—KARAM BAPANNA DORA V. SYAMALA SEETHA-RAMAYYA AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 463.

Per SANYAL.—Votes given to a candidate whose election is setaside on the ground that he was disqualified must be deemed to be

22 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

" invalid votes " within the meaning of section 101 of the Act, andshould not be taken into consideration in determining whether thenext candidate can be declared as having been duly elected.—KUSHWAQT RAI v. KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. I .

Votes in favour of a person who was really disqualified underthe Constitution can be treated as "votes thrown away " only if it isproved that notice of the disqualification was given to the votersand the circumstances in which the voters voted even after noticewere such as to lead to the fair inference of wilful perverseness on theirpart; it will not do if on the position notified to the voters, there wasroom for any ambiguity or doubt as to whether the candidate wasreally disqualified or not.—KARAM BAPANNA DORA V. SYAMALASEETHARAMAYYA AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 463.

Where no objection was taken to the nomination of a candi-date on the ground that he was disqualified to be chosen as a memberat the time of his nomination and his nomination paper was acceptedby the returning officer, and the election took place on the basis thathis nomination was valid, but it is subsequently found that he wasdisqualified, the votes given at the election in his favour cannot be heldto be " invalid votes" for the purposes of section 100(1) and rule 58.Where a successful candidate who was so found to be disqualified got29,214 votes and the next candidate got 14,885 votes: Held, that thelatter cannot be deemed to have received a majority of valid voteswithin the meaning of section 100(1) and cannot be declared to havebeen duly elected under that section. Hobbs v. Morey [1904] 1 K.B.74referred to. Kishenlal Lamror v. Madan Singh and Others (10 E.L.R.49) dissented from.—DR. DEORAO LAKSHMAN ANANDE V. KESHAVLAKSHMAN BORKAR, 13 E.L.R. 334.

The question of " thrown away " votes would not and cannotarise unless the votes were cast in favour of the disqualified candidatewith notice or knowledge of the disqualification or of the facts creatingthe same. Such notice or knowledge may be actual or constructiveand may arise from the notoriety of the fact on which the disqualifi-cation is based, or otherwise. But, where the votes are cast withoutnotice or knowledge of the basic fact of the particular disqualification,they would be good votes and cannot be treated as votes thrown away.Where the disqualification depends upon a fact which may be unknownto the elector he is entitled to notice, for, without that, the inferenceof assent, which is essential for inferring wilful perverseness on thepart of the elector, could not be fairly drawn nor would theconsequence as to the vote, that is, of its being thrown away, bejust.—JAGADANANDA ROY V. RABINDKANATH SIKDAR AND OTHERS,14 E.L.R, 99.

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 23

Votes cast in favour of a candidate who was elected but whois subsequently held to have been under 25 years of age on the date ofthe election cannot be regarded as " invalid " votes, and the candi-date with the next highest number of votes cannot be declared electedon this ground.—KRISHNA RAO MAHARU PATIL V. ONKAR NARAYANWAGH, 14 E.L.R. 386.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (1. General Principles)

Necessity of full particulars—Necessity of giving full particulars—Omission to supply particulars until late stage—Tower to strike offallegations.—The requirement of full particulars is one that has gotto be complied with, with sufficient fullness and clarification so asto enable the opposite party fairly to meet them- and they mustbe such as not to turn the enquiry before the Tribunal into a ramblingand roving inquisition. Under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 83of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the election petitioneris required to supply full particulars, and the word "including" showsthat the election petitioner must also supply, and not that he mustonly supply, the names of the parties alleged to have committed suchcorrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each suchpractice. Where names of the person or persons who actually carriedthe voters on the trailer drawn by the tractor of the petitioner (res-pondent in the election petition) were not given, the date of thecommission of the corrupt practice was also not given, and the namesof the villages from which the voters were brought to the polling sta-tion were further omitted: Held, that the petitioner's allegationsrelating to the corrupt practice as mentioned in the election petitionwere not supported by the supply of full particulars and the allegationscould be struck off. Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani (10E.L.R. 357) applied. Where the petitioner had ample opportunity toget his petition amended for supplying full particulars of a corruptpractice alleged in the petition and has not taken advantage of thatopportunity, the Tribunal would be justified in striking off the allega-tions relating to such corrupt practice.—SINGHESWAR PRASAD VARMA V.KAMALNATH TIWARI, 21 E.L.R. 121.

Difference between " material facts " and " particulars "—Mate-rial facts alleged—Particulars indefinite.—Under section 83 of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, as amended in 1956, the partyfiling an election petition has to state therein two things, namely, firsta concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner reliesand, secondly, full particulars of any corrupt practice that the peti-tioner alleges. A distinction is made between a statement of the

24 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

material facts, and particulars of any corrupt practice. The word" material " in the expression " material facts " means, necessary forthe purpose of formulating a complete cause of action, and if any" material fact " is omitted the statement of claim is bad. The func-tion of " particulars " is different. The use of particulars is intendedto meet a further and quite separate requirement of pleading, imposedin fairness and justice to the defendant. Their function is to fill in thepicture of the plaintiff's cause of action with information sufficientlydetailed to put the defendant on his guard as to the case he has tomeet and to enable him to prepare for trial. Where all the materialfacts are stated in an election petition and the particulars on which thematerial facts are to be sustained are also stated in the petition, theparticulars cannot be struck off merely because they are vague.—HARIVISHNU KAMATH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR, AND ANOTHER, 14E.L.R. 147.

—•—Necessity of full particulars.—The particulars of the state-ments of facts required by section 83(i)(6) are subject to the qualifica-tion " as full as possible". Pleadings relating to a corrupt practice undersection 123(4) could not, therefore, be thrown out for want of parti-culars on the ground that the petitioner has not given the names ofthe persons who published the statements, where the circumstances ofthe case are such that the petitioner could not have had knowledge asregards the persons who published them, and the respondent haddeliberately suppressed the relevant information from the petitioner.—ANJANEYA REDDY v. GANGI REDDY AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 247.

Sub-section (2) of section 83 of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, should not be so construed as to justify the inclusionin an election petition, of any corrupt or illegal practice which mayhave no relation to the relief claimed by the petitioner ; the sub-section only means that if and when any corrupt or illegal practiceis alleged among the material facts necessary to enable the petitionerto obtain the relief sought by him, the petition must set forth the fullparticulars thereof.—DR. V. K. JOHN V. CHIEF JUDGE, COURT OFSMALL CAUSES, MADRAS AND OTHERS : DR. V. K. JOHN V. VASANTHA PAIAND ANOTHER, 12 E.L.R. 329.

Particulars—Examination of petitioner.—An Election Tribunalhas no power to permit the petitioner to supply better particulars ofalleged corrupt practices by examining the petitioner under Order X,rule 2, of the Civil Procedure Code. Vial v. Lai Bahadur (21 E.L.R.180) followed.—BRAJ BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER V. RAJA ANAND BRAHMASHAH AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 225.

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 25

Supply of better particulars.—Where, in an election petition itwas alleged that the returned candidate published false stories andallegations against another candidate in a newspaper, and the Tribunalallowed the petitioner to file a copy of the newspaper after the filingof the petition : Held, that the filing of the newspaper only amountedto supply of more and better particulars and want of such particularsin the petition itself could be no ground for dismissing the petition.—BlSWANATH UPADHAYA V. HARALAL DAS AND OTHERS, l 6 E.L.R. 405.

Supply of better particulars.—Even though under section 90(5)of the Act, as amended in 1956, the Tribunal has no power to makean order calling upon the petitioner to furnish further or better parti-culars against his wish, there is nothing in the Act which prevents theTribunal from making an order for furnishing further or betterparticulars when the petitioner admits that the particulars stated inthe petition are insufficient and expresses his willingness to supplyfurther particulars. An order for furnishing further or better parti-culars cannot be impugned by the respondent in such a case on theground that the petitioner had not made a formal application to beallowed to furnish such particulars. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. ElectionTribunal, Jabalpur, and, Another (14 E.L.R. 147) and K. C. Sharma v.The Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur, and Others (15 E.L.R. i n ) distin-guished.—BALWANT RAI TAYAL V. BISHAN SAROOP AND ANOTHER, 17E.L.R. 101.

Omission to give full particulars—Issue raised and evidencetaken by trial court—Power of appellate court to strike off issue or reversefinding for want of full particulars—Value of evidence given on particularsnot pleaded.—Though the Tribunal cannot ask for better particularsto be supplied, it has the power to hold that the particulars do not leadto an issue and if it finds that a particular allegation is indefinite andvague, it is entitled to say that it shall not form the subject-matter ofthe trial. This, however, can only be done by an Election Tribunalwhen the parties do not enter the stage of trial and tender evidence intheir possession and power. The issue on the disputed point cannot bestruck off and the finding reversed on appeal merely because full parti-culars were not given in respect of the alleged practice.—RUKMINIRAMAN PRATAP SINGH V. SRINIVAS TIWARI, 22 E.L.R. 37.

"Full particulars" meaning of.—The use of the word "includ-ing" in section 83(i)(6) of the Act indicates that the names of the partiesalleged to have committed the corrupt practice should be deemed tobe one of the particulars required to be given, but that does not mean

ELD—4

26 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

that it exhausts the list of the names of parties to be given ; it onlyexplains and specifies some of them.—CHANDHASHEKHAK SINGH V.SARJOO PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER, 22 E.L.R. 206.

—-—Under section 123(2) if any candidate or his agent threatensany elector with injury of any kind, he will be deemed to have inter-fered with the free exercise of the electoral right and he would beguilty of a corrupt practice. The particulars of such corrupt practicenecessarily include the names of the electors alleged to have beensubjected to such threat and, if the names of such electors are notgiven in the election petition, it would suffer from an incurable infir-mity in this regard, and the charge would be bad on this ground alone.—CHANDRASHEKHAR SINGH V. SARJOO PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER,22 E.L.R. 206.

——Insufficient particulars—Procedure to be followed—Powers ojappellate court—(1) The practice to be followed in cases where insufficientparticulars of a corrupt practice are set forth in an election petition isthis:—(i) An election petition is not liable to be dismissed in liminemerely because full particulars of a corrupt practice alleged in the peti-tion, are not set out. (ii) Where an objection is raised by the respondentthat a petition is defective, because full particulars of an allegedcorrupt practice are not set out, the Tribunal is bound to decide whe-ther the objection is well founded. If the Tribunal upholds theobjection, it should give an opportunity to the petitioner to apply forleave to amend or amplify the particulars of the corrupt practicealleged; and in the event of non-compliance with that order theTribunal may strike out the charges which remain vague, (iii) Thoughinsistence upon full particulars of corrupt practices is of paramountimportance in the trial of an election petition, if the parties go to trialdespite the absence of full particulars of the corrupt practices alleged,and evidence of the contesting parties is led on the plea raised by thepetition, the petition cannot thereafter be dismissed for want of parti-culars, because the defect is one of procedure and not one of jurisdictionof the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the plea in the absence of parti-culars, (iv) The appellate court may, however, be justified in settingaside the judgment of the Tribunal if it is satisfied that by reason ofthe absence of full particulars, material prejudice has resulted; and inconsidering whether material prejudice has resulted, failure to raiseand press the objection about the absence of particulars before goingto trial must be given due weight.—BALWAN SINGH V. LAKSHMI NARAINAND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 273. [S.C.I

(2) In the written statement to an election petition as originallyfiled it was not expressly contended that because of the absence of

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( I . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 27

particulars as to the names of the persons between whom the contractof hiring took place, and the date and place of the contract, the appel-lant was unable to meet the charges made against him. Even afterthe petition was amended, no such objection was raised by the appel-lant. Before the Tribunal, at the hearing of the argument, a plea thatthe petition was defective because of lack of particulars relating to thenames of the persons who entered into the contract of hiring, and thetime and place thereof, was raised. But all the evidence relating tothe hiring and the time and place thereof, was without objectionadmitted on the record. It was not even suggested that because of theabsence of the particulars, the appellant was embarrassed in makinghis defence, or that he could not lead evidence relevant to the plea ofcorrupt practice set up by the first respondent: Held, (by themajority)—that even assuming that the petition was defective becauseparticulars as to the persons between whom the contract of hiring wasentered into and the date and place thereof had not been set out in theelection petition, the High Court was right in holding that no materialprejudice was occasioned thereby and the election petition was notliable to be rejected for want of full particulars.—BALWAN SINGH D.LAKSHMI NARAIN AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 273. is.c]

Parties going to trial without objection—Whether petition canbe dismissed in appeal for 'want of particulars.—If the parties to anelection petition go to trial despite the absence of full particularsof the corrupt practices alleged in the petition, and evidence of thecontesting parties is led on the plea raised by the petition, the petitioncannot thereafter on appeal be dismissed for want of particulars,because the defect is one of procedure and not one of jurisdiction ofthe Tribunal to adjudicate upon the plea in the absence of particulars.Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain and Others (22 E.L.R. 273) relied on.—ABDUL HAMID CHOUDHURY V. NANI GOPAL SWAMI AND OTHERS, 22E.L.R. 358. [S.C.I

Insufficient particulars—Powers of the Tribunal.—Both onauthority and on principle, the Election Tribunal has power to orderbetter particulars and in default of compliance with that order tostrike out the pleadings. Therefore, if the respondent or the Tribunalfinds that the petition was defective for want or any particulars, thepetitioner should be directed to furnish the same within the specifiedtime. The Tribunal cannot strike out the pleadings when there hasbeen no previous order directing furnishing of further particulars.Hari Vishnu Katnath v. Election Tribunal (14 E.L.R. 147) and BabulalSharma v. Brijnarzin Brajesh (14 E.L.R. 72) dissented from.—S. KANDASWAMI v. S. B. ADITYAN, 19 E.L.R 260.

28 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Necessity of particulars—Difference between material facts andparticulars—Object of giving particulars—Power of Tribunal to orderfurther particulars—Striking out petition for vagueness without orderingfurther particulars—Legality—Bribery and conveyance of voters—Natureof particulars required.—(i) Section 83(1) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, makes a distinction between material facts and parti-culars. Material facts are those which will go to make out thepetitioner's case from the charge against the respondent. If thematerial facts constitute a corrupt practice, further particulars ordetails would be necessary to ensure clearness. (2) Particulars shouldserve a double purpose namely, first, to enable the respondent to knowwhat exactly he has got to meet, and secondly, to enable the court toexclude irrelevant matters and concentrate upon the real point in con-troversy. A power to call for particulars in respect of any pleadingis, therefore, necessary for and incidental to a fair trial. (3) On principlethere is no justification for the view that while the petitioner couldfurnish particulars at any time, the respondent could have no corres-ponding right to call for them, especially when particulars are intendedonly for his benefit. The language of section 90(5) of the Act is wideenough to cover a power to order particulars of an opponent's pleading.(4) If Order VI, rule 5, of the Civil Procedure Code, is taken to regu-late the trial of election petitions by virtue of section 90(1), there wouldbe really no need for any special power under the Act to direct parti-culars and the deletion of the clause in section 83(3) when it wasre-enacted in section 90(5) would have no significance. In any eventthe right of a party to obtain particulars of an opponent's pleading isan incident of fair trial and cannot be deemed to be taken away byimplication. (5) The particulars required under section 83(i)(&) of theAct would necessarily vary according to the nature of the corruptpractice alleged in the petition. The section itself contemplates thatparticulars regarding names, etc., should be specified only as far aspossible; for, in particular circumstances it may not be possible tofurnish some of the particulars enumerated in section 83(1), and if it isinsisted that the names, dates and places of commission of the corruptpractice should be given in all cases, several election offences whichwould be committed in secret could never come before the Tribunalsand the purity of the elections could not be maintained. (6) When thecharge is that bribes were given at or about the time of election tocandidates for election for withdrawing from election, the mere factthat the dates of paying bribes are not given would not make theparticulars vague. The charge being that the respondent and his elec-tion agent paid the bribes, the allegation if ti ^J would be a matter

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 20,

within the exclusive knowledge of the respondent and it would beputting too great a burden upon the petitioner in such cases to expecthim to specify a matter which would have been done in secret.(7) Where the charge for corrupt practice falling within section 123(5)specifies the motor vehicles which were alleged to have been hired forthe carriage of voters with reference to their registration numbers, andalso particularises the villages where they were used, the particularscannot be held to be insufficient merely because the names of the voterswho were conveyed by the vehicles were not given. Where a largenumber of voters are taken from the villages, it would be almostimpossible to give their names. The principle of the case in regard togeneral charge of bribery would also apply to this corrupt practice.—S. KANDASWAMI v. S. B. ADITYAN, 19 E.L.R. 260.

Particulars—Evidence taken.—Where, notwithstanding theabsence of particulars, evidence was allowed to be given and taken, thequestion would not be one of absence of jurisdiction but whether therehas been any material prejudice occasioned by the absence of particulars.—V. RAMACHANDRA RAO V.\ V. B. RAJU AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R. 358.

Power to strike off allegations.—In view of the powers given tothe Tribunal to amend an election petition, if there is an applicationfor amendment offering to give further particulars of a corruptpractice already alleged in the petition and also in view of thegeneral powers of amendment possessed by Election Tribunals underthe Civil Procedure Code, it is not proper to strike off allegationsin a petition merely for want of full purticulars.—V. RAMACHANDRARAO v. V. B. RAJU, 19 E.L.R. 358.

Power of Tribunal to call for further particulars—Law afterAmendment Act—Application for amendment—Powers of Tribunal—Particulars insufficient—Amendment not allowed—Duty of court to refrainfrom framing issue.—Under the Representation of the People Act (43 of1951), as amended by Act XXVII of 1956, the Election Tribunal doesnot possess the power of ordering suo motu the supply of further orany particulars of a corrupt practice mentioned in the electionpetition; the law requires these particulars to be supplied with asmuch detail and circumspection as is possible at the very start andgives the petitioner a chance to apply for amendment if there hasbeen some omission, subject, however, that the amendment must berelated to some particulars alleged in the petition or some corruptpractice which is the subject-matter of the controversy. Short ofthis, there is no other means of getting an original petition before theElection Tribunal 1 nended or amplified. If an election petition issought to be amended the Tribunal should see whether the amend-ments could be properly allowed under the general law as well as the

30 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

special provisions of the Act. If the amendment is not allowed andthe Election Tribunal is of the opinion that there is no proper issuepossible to be raised on the allegations contained in the petition, it isits duty to say that no issue shall be framed on that part of thecontroversy.—Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur (14E.L.R. 147) followed.—NIRBHAYADAS V. GULAB BAT AND OTHERS, 14E.L.R. 186.

—•—Power to call for further particulars and strike off for non-compliance—Law after Amendment Act of ig^6—Power to decline to frameissue- if particulars arc vague.—The power of the Tribunal to make anorder for further particulars has been deleted by the Amending Actof 1956 and, the Tribunal is not now empowered to order further andbetter perticulars, and necessarily there is to be no dismissal of theelection petition as a result of disobedience. But, even though theTribunal cannot now order better particulars to be supplied, it hasthe power to say that the particulars do not lead to an issue. Inother words, the Tribunal, if it finds that a particular allegation isindefinite and vague, is entitled to say that it shall not form thesubject-matter of the trial. It cannot order that the averment becorrected or additional pleas be made ; but it can leave it out afterexpressing its opinion that it is indefinite and shall not be tried. Theparty who has to suffer by such an opinion has the option of supply-ing better particulars even under the law as it now stands, but ifhe does not do so, it has to bear the consequences. In section 90(1)of the Act the word " trial" covers the entire process of litigationfrom the acceptance of the election petition for trial to its disposal.—HARI VISHNU KAMATH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, JUBBALPORE, ANDANOTHER, 14 P1L.R. 147.

Insufficient particulars—Duty of respondent to call for furtherparticulars—Failure to call for further particulars—No proof of prejudiceto respondent—Petition not liable to be dismissed for want of fullparticulars.—Where the particulars of a corrupt practice are not fullystated in an election petition it is open to the respondent to call forfurther particulars; and if he does not call for such particulars and hasnot been misled or prejudiced in his defence, the petition cannot bedismissed for non-compliance with the provisions,.!^ section 83 of theAct, after the evidence on both sides has been adduced and theTribunal has come to a finding on the point.- TIRATH SINGH V.BACHITAR SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 192. IS.C

-Insufficient particulars—Evidence adduced oy both sides—Find-ing of Tribunal cannot be set aside on the ground thi full particulars werenot given unless respondent was prejudiced.—Though the requirement

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 31

of full particulars of corrupt practices is of paramount importance,where, notwithstanding the absence of particulars, the evidence onboth sides is allowed to be given and taken, the petition cannot bedismissed for want of full particulars, inasmuch as the question in sucha case is not one of absence of jurisdiction but as to whether there hasbeen any material prejudice occasioned by the absence of particulars.—Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani (10 E.L.R. 357)explained.—BHAGWAN DATT SHASTRI V. RAM RATAN GUPTA ANDOTHERS : BHAGWAN DATT SHASTRI V. BADRI NARAYAN SINGH ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 448. [S.C.]

•—•—Want of particulars—Summary dismissal after evidence on bothsides adduced—Legality.—Though full particulars of a corrupt prac-tice are not given in the election petition, if both sides adduceevidence in spite of this defect and no prejudice is shown to have beencaused to the respondent by the defect, the petition cannot be dismis-sed on the ground of vagueness or want of particulars.—BhikajiKeshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal (10 E.L.R. 357) and Bhagwan DattShastri v. Ram Ratan Gupta (11 E.L.R. 448) relied on.—RAGHUNATHMlSRA V. KlSHORE CHANDRA DEO BHANJ AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 32T.

Pleadings of corrupt practice—Necessity of precision.—Chargesof corrupt practice are quasi-criminal in character and allegationsrelating thereto must be sufficiently clear and precise to bring homethe charges to the candidates. —TEJ PAL SINGH V. JAGBIR SINGH ANDOTHERS, 15 E.L R. 349.

Sufficiency of averments—Averments not sufficient to constitutecharge —Investigation of charge—Jurisdiction of Tribunal—Power of HighCourt to issue writ—Sufficiency of averments—Matter for Tribunal todecide.—If there are no averments in the election petition from whicha charge of corrupt practice could be spelled out, but the Tribunaldecides to investigate the truth of an allegation advanced at the stageof the trial that the returned candidate had committed a corruptpractice, e.g., bribery, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction toembark on such an investigation, and on that basis a writ of prohibi-tion could issue to restrain the Tribunal from exercising a jurisdictionit had no right at all to assume. Similarly, if facts are alleged in anelection petition, but the facts, even if proved, could never amount toa charge of the corrupt practice of bribery, despite even a categoricalassertion in the el action petition that these alleged acts constituted thecorrupt practice of bribery, the Tribunal would have no jurisdictionto investigate the tr ith of those facts. It is for the Tribunal todecide in the first instance whether the averments in the petition aresufficient to disclose a triable issue, and then it has to decide whether

32 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

those avernments have been proved. The quantum of evidence orthe sufficiency thereof is wholly for the Tribunal to determine in thefirst instance. Next the Tribunal will have to decide whether theproved facts established the charge of the commission of the parti-cular corrupt practice alleged. All these will be within the jurisdic-tion of the Tribunal. In judging the sufficiency or otherwise of theaverments in the petition to justify an investigation into the truthof the facts alleged by the petitioner and denied by the respondent,the pleadings should not be too strictly construed and regard shouldbe had to the substance of the matter and not to the form, and itshould also be remembered that charges of corrupt practice are quasi-criminal in character and the allegations relating thereto must besufficiently clear and precise to bring home the charges to the candi-date, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Bajpai v.Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461).—M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR V. SA.GANESAN AND ANOTHER (NO. 2), 14 E.L.R. 432.

Power to strike off pleadings.—Under the Representation ofthe People Act, 1951, as amended in 1956 it is not obligatory on theTribunal to call upon the petitioner to give further and better parti-culars in all cases in which it decides that the particulars alleged arevague. If the petitioner had ample opportunities to apply foramendment after the objection was raised and did not avail himselfof such opportunities, the Tribunal can order the vague particulars tobe struck off without giving any further opportunity. MubarakMazdoor v. K. K. Banerji (13 E.L.R. 310) distinguished. Bhikaji KeshaoJoshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani (A.I.R. 1955 S. C. 610 ; 10 E L.R. 357)referred to.—HABIBUR REHMAN V. SHIVAGOPAL TEWARI AND OTHERS,13 E.L.R. 377.

Order striking off allegations as vague and dismissing petition—Whether appealable.—Where, in an election petition, the questionwhether the allegations of corrupt practices contained in the petitionwere vague and liable to be struck off, was heard as a preliminaryissue and the Tribunal, finding that the allegations were vague, madean order striking off the allegations and dismissed the petition by thesame order on the ground that the petition did not disclose any causeof action : Held, that the order was one made under section 98 ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, and was appealable undersection 116A of the Act. It was an order made ' at the conclusionof the trial " even though no evidence was adduced at the trial.—

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( l . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 33

word " trial " in section 90(1) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, means the entire proceedings before the Tribunal from the timewhen the petition is referred to it until the pronouncement of theaward. The Election Tribunal can therefore in exercise of its powersunder Order VI, rule 16, of the Civil Procedure Code, make an orderstriking out from the election petition allegations of corrupt practiceswhich are of a vague or general nature, even before it proceeds toframe the issues. Where the respondent to an election petition raisesan objection that certain allegations of corrupt practice made in theelection petition are vague and should therefore be struck out, theTribunal is bound to decide whether the objection is well founded.But even if the Tribunal finds that the objection is well founded itshould not strike off the offending paragraphs without giving anopportunity to the petitioner to apply for leave to amend or amplifythe petition. Common justice requires that such an opportunity mustbe given even though there is no specific provision in the Act to thateffect.—MUBARAK MAZDOOK V. K. K. BANERJI AND ANOTHER, 13 E.L.R.310.

Power of Tribunal to call for better particulars.—The ElectionTribunal is not bound to dismiss an election petition merely becauseit does not give full particulars of the corrupt practices but the Tribu-nal should exercise its power under section 83(3) to order further andbetter particulars to be furnished, whenever it thinks it necessary.The opposite party can also ask for further and better particulars. Iffurther particulars are not furnished as ordered by the Tribunal, itmay strike off such of the charges in respect of which better parti-culars are not furnished and proceed with the trial of the othercharges.—Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and Another v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyaniand Others (10 E.L.R. 357) relied on.—SHRI KRISHNA V. RAJESHWARSINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 1.

Want of particulars of corrupt practice—Whether petition can bedismissed.—Though the requirement of full particulars of corruptpractices is of paramount importance, where, notwithstanding theabsence of particulars, the evidence of both sides is allowed to begiven and taken, the petition cannot be dismissed for want of fullparticulars, unless the want of full particulars has caused materialprejudice.—SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA, 16 E.L.R. 103.

Evidence—Particulars of corrupt practice not mentioning appel-lant— Evidence to prove that appellant committed the corrupt practice —Admissibility.—Where, in the particulars of a corrupt practice undersection 123(3) given in an election petition, the names of ten persons

ELD—5

34 ELECTIPN LAW REPORTS DIGEST

who were alleged to have published the pamphlet were given and itwas not stated that the appellant had also published the pamphlet, butduring the trial the Tribunal allowed evidence to be let in to provethat the appellant had distributed the pamphlets at public meetings:Held, that the Tribunal acted improperly in permitting such evidenceto be adduced, as there was no averment in the particulars that hehad done so.—CHHATTAR SINGH V. KEWAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 15E.L.R. 162.

Amendment of petition to add fresh instances of corrupt practice—Effect of Amendment Act of igs6.—The true effect of section 90(5) ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amended in 1956 is thatif a corrupt practice has been alleged in an election petition, furtherinstances of such corrupt practice can be allowed to be given evenafter the time prescribed for filing the petition has expired, but if acorrupt practice has not been alleged in the petition, the petitionercannot be allowed to add such corrupt practice also under the guise ofgiving further particulars of the corrupt practice alleged in the peti-tion. The word " particulars" in section 83 includes instances ofcorrupt practice, and the same meaning should be given to the wordin section 90(5). There is no substantial difference between the provi-sions of the old section 83 and the provisions of the new sections 83and 90(5) in this respect and the principles laid down by the SupremeCourt in Harish Chandra Bajpai's case in this connection apply evenafter the amendment of sections 83 and 90(5). by Act 27 of 1956.Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 444; 12E.L.R. 461) and Cerrickfergns case (1869) 1 C.'M. & H. 264 referred to.—SANGAPPA v. SHIVAMURTI SWAMY AND ANOTHER : and SHANKAR-

GOUDA BASANGOUDA V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, RAICHUR, AND ANOTHER,

13 E.L.R. 365.Amendment to clarify or amplify allegations of corrupt practice

—New particulars.—Under section 90(5) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, a Tribunal is empowered to allow the particulars ofany corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or ampli-fied in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring afair and effective trial of the petition. This power of the Tribunal ishowever, confined to permitting an amendment or amplification. Therecan,_be an amendment or amplification of any particular, only if theparticular is first mentioned but it is either not a full particular orthere has been some omission or accidental error in mentioning theparticular. In a case where no particular at all is given, it cannot besaid that this provision would permit the particulars to be suppliedsubsequently at, any stage when the petitioner might choose to move

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( I . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 35

the Tribunal to exercise its powers under this provision of law.—MADAN LAL v. SYED ZARGHAM HAIDER AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 456.

Amendment—Amendment for giving further particulars which wereknown to petitioner when petition was filed—Whether permissible—Discre-tion of Tribunal—Interference by writ.—As there is no clear provisionin the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amended in 1956,authorising the dismissal of an election petition on the ground that thepetition did not contain the particulars required by section 83(i)(b),sub-section (5) of section 90 must be interpreted as authorising theElection Tribunal to permit such particulars to be included in theelection petition by way of amendment or amplification even if theywere known to the petitioner when the election petition was filed.The Tribunal has a discretion to allow an application for amendment,even though it has been filed at a late stage of the proceedings, and inproceedings under article 226, the High Court cannot go into the ques-tion whether the discretion was properly exercised or not.— BISHENCHAND SETH v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL (SHAHJAHANPUR), AND OTHERS, 17E.L.R. 196.

Amendment introducing fresh instances of corrupt practice—Whether permissible.—The allegation in an election petition withregard to corrupt practice (para. 7(c) of the petition) was that " res-pondents Nos. 1 and 2 could in furtherance of their election enlist thesupport of Government servants", and after the respondents had filedtheir written statements the petitioner made an application that hemay be " allowed to amend the details of para. 7(c) of the petition byadding the word " Village Headmen " with their names and the factthat they worked and issued appeal and subsequently they became thepolling agents of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 ", and for the first timementioned the name of 4 mukhias whose assistance the respondentswere, alleged to have obtained. The Tribunal, by a majority, allowedthe amendment holding that the matters sought to be introduced wereffisrely particulars in respect of the charge set out in para. 7(c) ofthe petition. On appeal by special leave : Held, that charges ofcorrupt practice being quasi-criminal jn character, the allegationsrelating thereto must be sufficiently clear and precise to bring homethe charges to the candidates, and, judged by this standard, the alle-gation in para. 7(c) of the petition did not contain a charge of a corruptpractice under section 123(8) of the Representation of the People Act;the amendment, by introducing charges of corrupt practice undersection 123(8) for the first time, altered the character of the petitionas originally framed so radically as to make it practically a newpetition, and as the Tribunal had no power to allow an amendment

36 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

of this kind, the finding based on that amendment that the respon-dents had committed a corrupt practice under section 123(8) could notbe sustained.—HARISH CHANDRA BAJPAI AND ANOTHER V. TRILOKISINGH, 12 E.L.R. 461. [s.c.]

Amendment—Election Tribunal's power to amend generally—Amendment introducing new grounds or charges.— Under section 83(3) ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Election Tribunal haspower to allow particulars in respect of illegal or corrupt practices tobe amended, provided the petition itself specifies the grounds orcharges, and this power extends to permitting new instances to begiven. The Tribunal has also power under Order VI, rule 17, of theCivil Procedure Code, to order amendment of an election petition, butthat power cannot be exercised so as to permit new grounds or chargesto be raised or to so alter its character as to make it in substance anewpetition, if a fresh petition on those allegations will then be time-barred.—HARISH CHANDRA BAJPAI AND ANOTHER V. TRILOKI SINGH,12 E.L.R. 461. [S.C.1

Amendment—Addition of new instances.—Adding fresh instancesof a corrupt practice cannot be regarded as mere amendment of theparticulars of such practice ; each single instance of a corrupt practiceis a substantial charge in itself, and has to be alleged in the originalpetition.—RADHA KRISHNA SHUKLA AND ANOTHER V. TARA CHANDMAHESHWAR AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 378.

Power to allow amendment—New charges.—The power of anElection Tribunal to allow amendments is limited by the principlethat no new ground can be introduced by amendment after the periodof limitation for a fresh petition has expired. Where the particularsgiven in an annexure to an election petition, were that A and B hadappealed to the electors to vote on the ground of caste, and an applica-tion was made by the petitioner after the period of limitation for filingthe petition had expired, to substitute for this annexure anotherannexure in which it was stated that C and D had made S'JCn appeal,and this amendment was allowed by the Tribunal: Held, that theorder of the Tribunal allowing the aEefidffient to the extent of sub-stituting the new annexure had the result that a new ground, whichdid not exist in the petition, was allowed to be put forward at a timewhen the period of limitation for a fresh election petition on thatground had already expired, and the Tribunal acted in excess of itspowers in allowing the amendment. Harish Chandra Bajpai v. TrilokiSingh1 (12 E.L.R. 461) referred to.—BALWAN SINGH V. ELECTIONTRIBUNAL, KANPUR, AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 199.

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( I . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 37

Amendment altering nature of charge—Whether permissible.—The matter of pleadings in an election petition relating to the corruptpractice of hiring vehicles for the conveyance of voters is an importantone, inasmuch as the Representation of the People Act distinguishesbetween the various kinds of hiring by various persons. If the hiringof vehicles for the purposes of conveying voters to a polling station isdone by a candidate himself or his election agent or by any otherperson with his consent, the ground based on the commission of thecorrupt practice falls under section ioo(i)(6)of the Act and the electionhas to be declared void as soon as the commission of the corruptpractice is proved. On the other hand, if the hiring of vehicles is byany person other than the candidate himself or his election agent orany person with his consent, then the ground falls under section ioo(i)(d)(ii) of the Act and the election is not liable to be set aside unlessthere is the further allegation and proof that the result of the electionhas been materially affected by the commission of the corrupt practice.Where the petition alleged hiring of vehicles by the candidate himselfbut the particulars supplied mentioned only hiring of vehicles by otherpersons and there was no allegation that the vehicles were hired withthe consent of the candidate : Held, that the original pleading thatthe candidate hired vehicles could not have been altered into a chargeof hiring of vehicles by third persons with the candidate's consent;the supply of the particulars nullified the pleading in the petition,and at the same time did not constitute a ground on which thepetition was based.—DIN DAYAL V. BENI PRASAD AND ANOTHER,15 E.L.R. 131.

Amendment of pleading by adding that other persons acted withconsent of candidate.—Where the particulars given in regard to acorrupt practice referred to acts committed by the candidate himselfand his agents and workers and there was no averment that theagents and workers had committed the acts with the consent of thecandidate but by an application for amplification of particulars, anaverment that the workers and agents had committed such acts withthe consent of the candidate was also introduced for the first time :Held, such an introduction was not permissible under any of the pro-visions of the Act or the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedurewhich could be applied to the Act. The effect of permitting suchamplification was to introduce an entirely new ground falling undersection IOO(I)(&) of the Act in addition to the ground that was basedon the allegation of the commission of corrupt practice by thecandidate himself. Such a new ground could not be permitted to beintroduced by an amendment application, as laid down by the

38 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Supreme Court in the case of Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh(12 E.L.R. 461). The Tribunal had no power to allow the whole ofthe amplification which was sought but could allow the amendmentonly to the extent to which the acts of corrupt practice committed bythe candidate were amplified in the amendment sought.—DIN DAYALv. BENI PRASAD AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 131.

Amendment to add particulars—Order disallowing amendment—Interference by writ.—If the Election Tribunal has, in the exercise ofits discretion, disallowed an amendment for adding particulars on theground that sufficient cause was not shown why the details sought tobe introduced were not given in the election petition itself, the HighCourt will not interfere with its order by way of a writ underarticle 226 of the Constitution. The matter is one to be agitated inan appeal from the final decision of the Tribunal. Babulal Sharma v.Brijnarain Brajesh (14 E.L.R. 72) distinguished.—PANDIT K. C. SHARMAv. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, CHHATARPUR, AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. i n .

Amendment for adding particulars—New corrupt practicescannot be added.—To support the inclusion of particulars undersection 90(5), those particulars must be in respect of a corrupt practicealready pleaded and not in respect of a new corrupt practice.—PRITAMSINGH V. KARTAR SINGH, 17 E.L.R. 11.

Amendment—New charges.—Sub-section (5) of section 90 of theamended Act deals with two classes of amendments. If the amend-ment sought is to allow the particulars of any corrupt practice allegedin the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may, inthe opinion of the Tribunal, be necessary for ensuring a fair andeffective trial of the petition, the Tribunal has been given discretionto allow such amendments upon such terms as to costs and otherwise,as it may deem fit. If the amendment is in effect for introducingparticulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition,the Tribunal has to disallow such amendment. Section 90(5) does nothowever, mean that only amendments introducing particulars of acorrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition can be dis-allowed and that the other amendments should be allowed. If theamendment sought to be made is an amendment referred to in thefirst category, the Tribunal has got to see whether such an amendmentshould be allowed, and can allow the particulars to be amended oramplified in such manner as may, in its opinion, be necessary forensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition.—BABU RAO V.M. S. ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 105.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (r . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 39

Amending or amplifying particulars—Proper procedure—Ampli-fication by examination of petitioner under Or.X, r. 2, C.P.C.—Legality—Schedule of particulars—Method of verification.—The particulars of acorrupt practice alleged in an election petition can be amended oramplified only in the manner prescribed in section 90, sub-section (5),of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Election Tribunalhas no power to amend or amplify such particulars by examining thepetitioner under Order X, rule 2, of the Civil Procedure Code. Parti-culars obtained by the examination of the petitioner under Order X,rule 2, cannot, therefore, be regarded as forming part of the petitionand are liable to be completely excluded from consideration; and theexclusion of those particulars may result in the relevant paragraphs ofthe petition dealing with the corrupt practice to which those parti-culars relate, being struck off for non-compliance with the mandatoryprovisions of section 83(i)(6) of the Act. Inamati Mallappa Basappa v.Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa (14 E.L.R. 296) applied. Where a number ofcorrupt practices were alleged in an election petition and tlie parti-culars relating thereto were not given in separate schedules but weregiven in a single schedule annexed to the petition and the petitioneradded only one verification at the end of this schedule : Held, that theverification could not be said to be improper and the petition could notbe dismissed on this ground merely because the particulars relating toeach corrupt practice were not given in a separate schedule andseparately verified.—UDAL V. LAL BAHADUR, 21 E.L.R. 180.

Power to allow amendment—Act of J956.—The first part ofsub-section (5) of section 90 is in pari materia with section 83(3) as itstood before the amendment of 1956, and the second part of thesub-section embodies in a statutory form the construction whichsection 83(3) of the original Act received from the Supreme Court inHarish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461); in other wordsthe clause " allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged inthe petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in itsopinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial " in sec-tion 90(5) means nothing more and nothing less than the clause whichoccurred in the old section 83(3), namely, " allow the particularsincluded in the said list to be amended or order such further andbetter particulars in regard to any matter referred to therein to befurnished as may in its opinion be necessary for the purpose of ensur-ing a fair and effectual trial of the petition. The view that after theamending Act of 1956 the power of the Tribunal to allow amendmentof particulars is confined to amending or amplifying of particularsalready supplied and does not extend to allowing further or better

40 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

particulars is not correct. Babulal Sharma v. Brijnarayan Brajesh (14E.L.R. 72) and Sangappa v. Shivamurti Swamy (13 E.L.R. 365) reliedon.—V. B. RAJU v, RAMACHANDRA RAO AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 1.

Particulars—Power to amend—Difference between Acts of 1951and 1956.—The material difference between sub-section (3) of section 83of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as it stood before it wasamended in 1956 and the corresponding sub-section (5) of section 90 ofthe amended Act, is that under section 83(3) the Tribunal was clothedwith power to order the petitioner to file further and better parti-culars and to dismiss the election petition on non-compliance with itand this power has been taken away by the amendment. But evenafter the amendment the petitioner can apply for amending theelection petition for giving fuller particulars, if they are necessary fora fair and effectual trial of the petition.—BABU RAO V. M. S. ANEY, 22E.L.R. 105.

Amendment—Effect of delay.—A petitioner who has not setforth full particulars of a corrupt practice alleged in the petition inaccordance with the provisions of section 83(i)(6) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951, has no right to supply the particulars ata later stage. Sub-section (5) of section 90 of the Act, however, vestsin the Election Tribunal a discretion to allow or not to allow anamendment of the particulars given in the original petition, and thisdiscretion has to be exercised by the Tribunal judicially for ensuringa fair and effective trial of the petition : Hari Vishnu Kamath v.Election Tribunal (14 E.L.R. 147), Chunnilal v. Radhacharan and Others(16 E.L.R. 93), Pandit K. C. Sharma v. RishabUumar and Others (20E.L.R. 401) and Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461)referred to. An election petition was filed on the 30th April, 1957.Written statements were filed by the respondents on the 17th August,in which the objection that the allegations of corrupt practices werevague and particulars were insufficient was raised. The petitioner didnot accept this position and issues were framed on 22nd August, 1957,and an order striking off certain paragraphs for vagueness and wantof particulars was passed on the 30th September, 1957. Thereafterthe petitioner applied for amendment for introducing further parti-culars, and the application was rejected by the Tribunal: Held, thatunder the circumstances, the Tribunal exercised its discretion properlyin dismissing the application.—CHUNNILAL KEN V. RADHACHARANSHARMA AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 320.

Amendment—Fresh instances.—Where, in an election petition,a corrupt practice has been alleged, but no particulars at all are furnish-ed, the Election Tribunal has, under section 90(5) of the Act, power to

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( I . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 4 I

allow such particulars or instances to be given on showing good causeand in accordance with the law of procedure ; and that being so, theview that where no particulars were initially given, fresh instancescould not be introduced at all, is not correct. Babulal Sharma v. Brij-narain Brajesh (14 E.L.R. 72) relied on.—PANDIT K. C. SHARMA V.KRISHI PANDIT RISHABKUMAR AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 401.

-It is in the discretion of the Election Tribunal to allow or notto allow an amendment and that discretion has to be exercised judiciallyfor ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition. Where no parti-culars at all were given of certain corrupt practices as required bysection 83(i)(i) of the Act, it is a sound exercise of judicial discretionnot to give leave to introduce the particulars for the first time at alate stage of the trial.—PANDIT K. C. SHARMAI>. KRISHI PANDIT RISHAB-KUMAR AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 401.

——Want of particulars—No ground for dismissing petition—Pro-cedure.—Though a petition cannot be dismissed for want of full parti-culars, as was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court inBhagwan Datt Shastri v. R. R. Gupta (11 E.L.R. 448) and Harish ChandraBajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461) still the requirement of fullparticulars of a corrupt practice being of paramount importance, aslaid down in Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. B. N. Biyani (10 E.L.R. 357), theevidence that is led without duly notifying the full particulars wouldlend little assurance to the case that the petitioner seeks to establishthereby. Further, the evidence would be evaluated from the viewpoint of any prejudice that might be occasioned to the opposite partyby the absence of full particulars.—RUKMINI RAMAN PRATAP SINGH V.SRINIVAS TIWARI, 22 E.L.R. 37.

Personation—Separate lists of dead persons, persons impersonated,fictitious persons etc., whether necessary—Application for amend-ment giving separate lists—Maintainability—Effect of delay—Rejectionof application—Petition for writ—Interference—Principles—Petitioner'sright to give evidence of further particulars.—The petitioner filed anelection petition with a list of particulars of corrupt practices givingin Schedule I, the names of dead persons and in Schedule II, the namesof fictitious persons, in whose names votes were cast. Subsequently hefiled an application for amendment of the list of particulars and alongwith the application filed separate lists of particulars of personsimpersonated, viz., (i) a list of dead persons, (ii) a list of fictitiouspersons, (iii) a list of persons who were absent and did not consequentlyvote, (iv) a list of persons whose names appeared twice in the electoralroll, (v) a list of voters whose names appeared in two different

ELD—6

42 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

villages in the same constituency, and (vi) a list of dead voters inwhose names the petitioner had reasons to believe that other personsapplied for ballot papers, obtained them and polled at the election.By means of the amendment, the petitioner sought to re-shuffle theentire schedules by adding new instances, by deleting certain instancesalready mentioned and by transposing the names given in one scheduleinto another schedule. It was vaguely stated in the affidavit filed insupport of the application for amendment that owing to clericalmistakes and accidental slips and omissions, errors had crept into theschedules and that the errors were not due to any wilful act, negligenceor other laches on his part. But no special or convincing reasons weregiven in the affidavit to show how the mistakes crept in. The firstrespondent objected to the application on the ground that if theamendment was allowed, it would amount to allowing the petitioner tofile a new list and that the application was belated and the first respond-ent would be prejudiced, if the amendment was ordered. The ElectionTribunal dismissed the application and the petitioner applied for awrit to the High Court : Held, (i) that though there was delay in thefiling of the application, under terms of section 83(3) the applicationcould be entertained at any time provided it was bona fide andthere were sufficient reasons to allow the amendment; (ii) thesecond reason given by the Tribunal for rejecting the applicationthat if the application for amendment was allowed, there may notbe an end to such petitions was not sound; (iii) the third reasongiven by the Tribunal that great strictness ought to be enforced inthe matter of allowing amendments in election petitions was notwarranted by the terms of section 83(3) ; each case must be judged onits own facts ; (iv) yet, as the Tribunal had not acted without juris-diction or in excess of it or failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested init by law, and there was also no error apparent on the face of therecord, the High Court would not interfere under article 226 of theConstitution : Held further, that sub-section (2) of section 83 of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, only provides that the listshould contain full particulars of the corrupt or illegal practices.It does not in terms prescribe that the petitioner shold file separatelists of dead persons, fictitious persons and absent persons etc. whowere impersonated at the election. Under the terms of sub-section (3)it was open to the respondent to call for further and better particularsin regard to the details of impersonation and the court might ordersuch particulars, and in the above view, if the petitioner was able tosatisfy the Tribunal that, in addition to the list of dead persons givenby him in Schedule I, there were a number of other dead persons

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 43

mentioned by mistake in the other schedules who were impersonatedor on whose behalf votes were cast in favour of the first respondent,the Tribunal might permit such evidence to be adduced in the case.Similarly, if there were fictitious" persons mentioned in schedulesother than Schedule II, it was open to him to adduce evidence in thatbehalf. Any mistakes in the lists by reason of which there was falseimpersonation such as the names of the voters appearing twice in theelectoral list or" the voters exercising votes in two different villagesin the same constituency, might also be allowed to be proved in thecourse of the evidence. The application for amendment was thereforeunnecessary and misconceived.—DATLA SURYANARAYANA RAJU V.AMMANNA RAJA AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 156.

Amendments have retrospective effect.—-Where further parti-culars or clarifications are allowed to be given in respect of chargesalready made in an election petition, the averments contained in theseparticulars or clarifications must be deemed to be part of the petitionand relate back to the date of the petition. They cannot be regardedas amendments which have effect only from the date on which theamendments are made.—ASHRAF ALI KHAN V. TIKA RAM AND OTHERS,20 E.L.R. 470.

2. Admissions in pleadings.— Corrupt practice not set up in plead-ings but disclosed in admissions or evidence during trial—Whether theTribunal can consider.—Even though a corrupt practice has not beenset up in the petition, if any corrupt practice comes to the notice ofthe Tribunal or appears from the admissions of the respondent duringthe course of the trial, the Tribunal is not debarred from consideringit in the interests of the public.—Devasharan Sinha v. Sheo Mahadevand Others (10 E.L.R. 461), Raghunath Singh v. Kampta Prasad Saxena(8 E.L.R. 424), Sheonarayan Vaidya v. Sardarmal Lalwani (4 E.L.R.401) and Kalyan Singh v. Election Tribunal, Ajmer, and Others (8E.L.R. 207) relied on.—SRI KRISHNA V. RAJESWAR SINGH AND OTHERS,12 E.L.R. 1.

Assuming that the Tribunal can come to a finding that acorrupt practice has been committed on facts not alleged in the petitionbut admitted by the respondent, it is well settled that the admissionof the respondent must be taken as a whole. Where a party had madecertain statements in his cross-examination, but had explained them inhis re-examination on the next day, and the Tribunal held that theexplanation given in the re-examination on the next day cannot betacked on to the admission made on the previous day : Held, that thestatements made in the cross-examination and the re-examinationmust be taken as a whole, and the Tribunal acted wrongly in making

44 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

an artificial division of the respondent's deposition according to thedays on which the deposition was recorded, and refusing to take thestatements made in re-examination as part of the admission madeon the previous day in cross-examination.—C. R. NARASIMHAN V.M. G. NATESAN CHETTIAR, 20 E.L.R. 1.

If any corrupt practice comes to the notice of the Tribunalout of the admitted facts in record, though not pleaded by any party,the Tribunal has power to consider it in public interest in view of thefact that it is not a private wrong and the election has to be both freeand fair inasmuch as it affects the entire electorate of the constituency.Though this principle is quite reasonable in the interests of the

•electorate as a whole, it would work great hardship if charges ofcorrupt practice are allowed to be raised out of some facts elicited incross-examination for the first time which have no basis or connectionwith the pleadings, especially when the election would be liable to beset aside for such corrupt practice under section 100 of the Act. Inany event, it is clear that no party can agitate such a point, though itmay be permissible for the Tribunal to consider the same and haveit decided after hearing the parties ; and when the points are to beconsidered on grounds of public policy the Tribunal should not onlyfeel satisfied that the alleged admitted facts per se constitute a corruptpractice but also that such facts deserve to be considered in theinterests of the public—KATARIA TAKANDAS HEMRAJ V. PINTOFREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

In deciding whether a corrupt practice under section 123(8)has been committed, the Tribunal has to take into account not onlythe allegations made, but the evidence produced, the admissions madeby the parties concerned and the circumstances and probabilities ofthe case, in fact the entire material present on the record. If on thosematerials the Tribunal feels that it is proved to its satisfaction thatthe alleged corrupt practice has been committed, it must record afinding to that effect, even if in some respects or about some detailsthe allegations made in the petition are not found to be correct tothe letter.—TRILOKI SINGH V. SHIVRAJWATI NEHRU AND OTHERS,16 E.L.R. 234.

3. Candidate.—"Candidate" meaning of—When person becomes a" candidate "—Determining factor.—When a question arises under sec-tion 79(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, whether aperson had become a candidate at a given point of time, what has to beseen is whether at that time he had clearly and unambiguously declaredhis intention to stand as a candidate, so that it could be said of himthat he held himself out as a prospective candidate. That he has merely

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 45

formed an intention to stand for election is not sufficient to make hima prospective candidate, because it is of the essence of the matter thathe should hold himself out as a prospective candidate and that canonly be if he communicates that intention to the outside world bydeclaration or conduct from which it could be inferred that he intendsto stand as a candidate. As soon as a person makes his choice anddeclares unambiguously that he intends to stand for election andexpresses this declaration through an overt act (e.g., an applicationto a political association for a party ticket), he becomes a prospectivecandidate. He does not cease to be a prospective candidate until theparty accepts him as a candidate and gives him a ticket. The deter-mining factor is the decision of the candidate himself, not the act ofother persons or bodies adopting him as their candidate. Assumingthat the holding out which is contemplated by section 79(6) is to theconstituency itself, if it is the Central Committee of the partyorganisation that has to decide who shall be adopted for election fromthe concerned constituency, any declaration made to the Committeeis, in effect, addressed to the constituency through its accreditedrepresentative. The question when a candidature commences is oneof fact, and a decision of the Tribunal on this question is not liable tobe reviewed by the Supreme Court in special appeal.—KHADERSHERIFF V. MUNNUSWAMY GOUNDER AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 208. [s.c]

" Candidature "—Connotation of—In section 123(4) the term" candidature " must be construed as having reference to the candi-date's qualifications for being nominated as a candidate in a consti-tuency and to his being so nominated in fact. It cannot be read in sucha wide sense as to include any false statements made about a personafter he has announced his candidature.-—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V.S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

The respondent, who was a Union Minister, purchased nomi-nation papers and copies of voters' lists on the 9th January. Somepublic meetings were arranged by Government officials on the 15thand 16th January, in the area of a constituency and the respondentattended those meetings and was also moving about in that consti-tuency on those days in official cars with Ashoka Chakra and Flag. Hewas officially selected by his party as a candidate for that constituencyonly on the 22nd January. The question being whether he had heldhimself out as a candidate on the 15th and 16th January, and attend-ing the meetings arranged by Government officials and the use of theAshoka Chakra and Flag amounted to a corrupt practice : Held, (i) thatthe purchase of the nomination forms and voters' lists, could notamount to holding out as a candidate; (ii) the arranging of public

% ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

meetings by the officials and the respondent's moving about in theconstituency on the 15th and 16th could not by themselves amount toa holding out by the respondent as a prospective candidate on thosedays in the absence of evidence to show that the respondent hadutilised those meetings and tours for the purpose of making utterancesof an electioneering character.—HAJI ABDUL WAHID V. B. V. KESKARAND ANOTHER, 21 E.L.R. 409.

When a question arises under section 79(6) of the Act whe-ther a person had become a candidate at a given point of time, whathas to be seen is whether at that time he had clearly and unambi-guously declared his intention to stand as a candidate, so that it couldbe said of him that he held himself out as a prospective candidate.That he has merely formed an intention to stand for election is notsufficient to make him a prospective candidate, because it is of theessence of the matter that he should hold himself out as a prospectivecandidate, and that can only be if he communicates that intention tothe outside world by declaration or conduct from which it could beinferred that he intends to stand as a candidate. The determiningfactor is the decision of the candidate himself, not the act of otherpersons or bodies adopting him as their candidate. Khader Sheriff v.Munnuswami Gounder (11 E.L.R. 208) referred to.—JAGAN PRASADRAWAT v. KRISHNA DUTT PALIWAL, 20 E.L.R. 443.

4. Standard of proof.—Necessity of clear- allegations and strictproof.—The charges of corrupt practices are quasi-criminal in characterand allegations relating thereto must be sufficiently clear and preciseto bring home the charges to the candidates. Harish Chandra Bajpaiv. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461) referred to.—MAGANLAL BAGDI V.HARI VISHNU RAMATH, 15 E.L.R. 205.

An allegation about a major corrupt practice is more or lessthat of a criminal charge and strict proof is needed to bring home thecharge. Even though strict proof of corrupt practice is necessary,the purity of the elections has to be maintained and persons shouldnot be allowed to get elected by flagrant breaches of the law.—TRILOKI SINGH V. SHIVRAJWATI NEHRU AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 234.

Quasi-criminal nature—Standard of proof.—Purity of electionshas got to be maintained at all costs and under all circumstances andany attempt to secure success at election by unfair or foul meansshould be ruthlessly suppressed. Crooked and illegal methods employedby any candidate, his workers or agents must be suitably dealt withand sternly put down by enforcing strictly the law of election. Allega-tions about commission of corrupt practices like those enumerated in

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( I . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 47

sections 123 and 124 of the Act, are, however, of a quasi-criminalnature and to prove those allegations almost the same standard ofproof will be required as in a criminal case against the accused. Further,the burden of proof, which never shifts, lies on the petitioner and incase of doubt the benefit should go to the respondent as it goes to anaccused in a criminal case. As in the case of criminal charges astatement of an accomplice will need corroboration before it canbe the basis of a finding in favour of any corrupt practice.—SHRIKRISHNA V. RAJESHWAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 1.

Though an election petition has to be tried in accordance withthe procedure applicable to civil suits, the standard of proof required inrespect of corrupt practices alleged in the petition, is the standardapplicable to criminal cases, that is to say, the corrupt practices mustbe proved beyond any reasonable doubt and the benefit of the doubtshould go to the respondent. When a corrupt practice of hiring andprocuring of vehicles for the conveyance of voters to or from any poll-ing station is alleged in a petition the particulars of the date of hiringor procuring and the names of the persons who hired or procured andother particulars thereof must also be given. It is not sufficient to givethe dates of carrying the voters and the particulars of persons whocarried them. In an election petition the petitioner cannot be permit-ted to rely on a ground not taken in the petition.—MAST RAM V.S. IQBAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 34.

An election petition is in the nature of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding and the burden is on the petitioner to prove thecharges alleged against the respondents, the burden never shifts, theproof must, as in a criminal case, be beyond reasonable doubt, and thebenefit of the doubt should go 'to the respondent.—VASANTHA PAI V.Dr. V. K. JOHN AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 107.

The standard of proof required to prove a corrupt practice inan election petition is the standard required to establish an offence ina criminal trial.—BASAWARAJ K. NAGUR V. B. R. SHIDLINGAPPA, 12E.L.R. 168.

It is now settled law that charges of corrupt practices are inthe nature of criminal charges and that the standard of proof requiredis the standard applicable to criminal cases, that is, the corrupt practicesmust be proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Sri Ram v. MohammedTaqi Hadi (8 E.L.R. 139), Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12E.L.R. 461), Raghunath v. Kishore Chandra (17 E.L.R. 321) and Gokula-nanda v. Jogesh Chandra (18 E.L.R. 76) relied on.—BRAJ BHTJSHAN ANDANOTHER V. RAJA ANAND BRAHMA SHAH AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 225.

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Section 83(i)(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.which directs that all necessary particulars should be stated in regardto the allegations of corrupt practices ascribed to the defendants impliesthat there should be categorical findings in regard to the charges, i.e.,as to how far they are substantiated. A mere finding that the defend-ants must have committed the corrupt practice alleged by itself is notenough. The Tribunal must show where, and when, and by whom,and on what material the finding is based. The standard of proofnecessary for the purpose of finding a man guilty of any offence ofcorrupt practice under Part VI of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, must be the same as for the purpose of finding him guilty orconvicting him under the Indian Penal Code, which would mean thatin case of reasonable doubt the accused should be given the benefit.Section 90 of the Act provides that the procedure to be followed in anelection case should be that applicable to a civil suit. That section,however, does not indicate or lay down what should be the standardof proof necessary to hold a charge of corruption to be substantiated.Procedure is something different from standard of proof. In criminaltrials there is no onus on the accused to prove his innocence and thesame principle will apply to an election case where quasi-criminalcharges of corrupt practice are brought.—AMJAD ALI V. NAZMULHAQUE : JAHANUDDIN AHMED AND ANOTHER V. NAZMUL HAQUE, 21

E.L.R. 345.

Charges of corrupt practice are quasi-criminal in character,and the allegations thereto must be sufficiently clear and precise, andmust be proved by evidence of a conclusive nature in view of the factthat penal consequences flow from a disqualification arising out of afinding that a corrupt practice has been committed.—V. B. RAJU V.

V. RAMACHANDRA RAO AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 1.

With regard to the question whether a charge of a corruptpractice {e.g., bribery) is in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge andthe accusation must be proved as if it were a. criminal charge, itis not appropriate to apply decisions rendered in England and Irelandwholesale, for, every principle of law decided with reference toelections there has not been adopted in the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, and the rules made thereunder, which contain thelaw relating to the conduct of elections and election disputes in India.[English, Irish and Indian cases on the subject reviewed].—S. KANDA-

SWAMY v. S. B. ADITYAN, 20 E.L.R. 410.

Charges of corrupt practices levelled in election petitionsagainst the respondent are on the same basis as criminal charges, andthe onus of establishing the charges is always on the petitioner, and if

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 49

any matters are to be decided against the respondent who is in theposition of an accused, on the basis of presumptions, these must bestrictly confined to such limited presumptions against the accusedpersons as are provided by the Evidence Act or any other statute. Acharge of giving free meals to potential voters cannot possibly befound to be established after the evidence as a whole produced insupport of it has been rejected as unreliable, simply on the basis of apresumption that every candidate must run some sort of establishmentfor the refreshment of his potential voters.—LACHHMAN SINGH V.HARPARKASH KAUR, 19 E.L.R. 417.

Proceedings in an election petition are of a quasi-criminalnature and the burden of proof is upon the petitioner who comes tocourt to establish the commission of the corrupt practices as a result ofwhich he seeks to avoid the election. The evidence must be satis-factory, reliable and sufficient and the benefit of doubt should alwaysgo to the elected candidate. The proceeding is however not a criminalproceeding but only quasi-criminal in nature as it is contrary to therules governing the trial of criminal cases to give a right to the peti-tioner to cross-examine the respondent on oath; and eventually thefinding that may be arrived would be based on the evidence of therespondent and his witnesses which also have to be scrutinised, bearingin mind the extent of the proof adduced in this behalf by the peti-tioner. Though the burden of proof is on the petitioner, yet when thewhole evidence is adduced the burden of proof becomes of secondaryimportance and the court has to consider whether a particular allega-tion has been established on the evidence on record. The Tribunalmay also draw presumptions of the existence of any fact which it islikely to happen in relation to the facts of the particular case undersection 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, as for instance, that if anyevidence which has to be produced by a party is not produced, apresumption may be drawn that if produced it would be unfavourableto the person who withheld it. This rule of evidence cannot be totallyexcluded from application to an election proceeding though a findingas to corrupt practices could not be solely based on the mere presump-tion under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. The standard ofproof, therefore, that is required in the case of allegations as to corruptpractices must be such that on the evidence adduced a reasonable mindcould come to a definite conclusion beyond any reasonable doubt.—V. RAMACHANDRA RAO V. V. B. RAJU AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R. 358.

When a party alleges corrupt practice, it is the duty of thatparty to prove the elements of the corrupt practice alleged. TheTribunal cannot be asked to go on a roving enquiry to ascertain the

ELD-7

50 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

facts thereof, when the person alleging it is himself unable to provethe same. This, however, does not mean that in all such cases, theTribunal should refuse to assist the petitioner and when on the faceof the record itself, it appears to be quite necessary that certainpersons should be examined in order to prove certain facts disclosed,especially when those persons may be unwilling to appear at theinstance of the petitioner. The proper conduct of an election is amatter of serious concern to the entire electorate and no rigid doctrineof estoppel or onus of proof can be imported into election proceedings.In appropriate cases, the Tribunal has jurisdiction suo motu to enquireinto allegations of corruption made in an election petition and even arespondent can bring to the notice of the Tribunal illegalities andirregularities not alleged in the election petition itself and support thepetitioner by proving them. The elaborate machinery which thestatute has devised to ensure fair and free election in a democraticState would be defeated if the Tribunal stands upon the abstractdoctrine of onus of proof and does not insist upon the respondent todepose about facts within his knowledge or to produce evidence underhis possession or control to explain the materials placed on record toenable the Court to arrive at the truth. Though the burden of proofis initially and almost entirely on the petitioner, the respondent is notaltogether absolved of his responsibility to assist the Court by produc-ing the best evidence available. On his failure to do so, the Court maydraw such inference against him as may appear to be just andreasonable.—NANI GOPAL SWAMY V. ABDUL HAMID CHOUDHURY AND

ANOTHER, 19 E.L.R. 175.

In election cases, particularly where corrupt practices likebribery and undue influence are alleged, very strict proof ought to bedemanded. It is for the petitioner to establish the corrupt practice byreliable evidence and in the matter of onus the proceeding may besimilar to a criminal proceeding in which the burden is on the prose-cution to establish the charge. But in regard to the standard of proofa rigid rule placing the respondent in an election case on a level withthe accused in a criminal trial in all respects is not necessary or desir-able, and the view that an enquiry into a corrupt practice being in thenature of a criminal case the respondent is in the position of anaccused person and is thus absolved from all responsibility to adduceevidence or to rebut the case of the petitioner is not correct.—NAZMULHAQUE v. AMJAD ALI & OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 253.

The allegations relating to a corrupt practice must be suffici-ently clear and precise to bring home the charges against thecandidate. Charges of corrupt practice are quasi-criminal in character

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 51

and the standard of proof with regard to such corrupt practices shouldbe as strict as is required for holding a criminal charge establishedbeyond any reasonable doubt against any one. The burden of proofcannot shift, and suspicion however strong is not enough and cannottake the place of proof. It is also a salutary principle of criminaljurisprudence that though 99 guilty persons may escape, yet oneinnocent person must not suffer. But this maxim, only means that in acriminal trial the decree of probability of guilt has got to be verymuch higher—almost amounting to a certainty—than in a civil pro-ceeding, and if there is a slightest reasonable or probable chance ofinnocence of an accused, the benefit of it must be given to the accused.It does not mean that even where the burden of proof is on theaccused, the term " proved " should be differently and more liberallyconstrued than when the burden of proof is on the prosecution ; forthe Indian Evidence Act does not contemplate and does not lay downthat the satisfaction which is required to be caused in the mind of aprudent man before acting on or accepting the prosecution story is tobe of a different kind or degree from the satisfaction which is requiredwhen the accused has to discharge the burden which is cast upon himby law. In either case, whether proof of the case for the prosecutionor proof of the case set up by the accused, the test is the estimate ofprobabilities arrived by a prudent man, and it is from that point ofview that the question of proof and other ancillary considerationshave to be applied to the facts sought to be established in a case.—KATARIA TAKANDAS HEMRAJ v. PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R.4«3-

Charges of corrupt practice are quasi-criminal in nature andthe allegations thereto must not be vague and general, but mustbe clear and precise, and if full particulars are not furnished, theTribunal would be justified in refusing to allow the petitioner tofurnish particulars after the expiry of the period of limitationprescribed for filing the election petition. As charges of corruptpractice are quasi-criminal, the petitioner must prove beyond reason-able doubt all the ingredients of the particular corrupt practicealleged as laid down in the Act and at no stage does the burden fallon the returned candidate to disprove any of the ingredients thereof.It further follows that on appeal the appreciation of evidence by theTribunal should not be interfered with, particularly when it has heldthat the corrupt practice alleged has not been proved. It must bepresumed that the returned candidate is not guilty of corrupt practiceunless the contrary is shown and this presumption is reinforced at thestage of appeal by the finding of the Tribunal.—AMIR CHAND V.SMT. SUCHETA KRIPLANI, 21 E.L.R. 286.

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Where, in an election petition the respondent denied that heor his party had printed a certain pamphlet containing false allega-tions against the petitioner and had distributed them at a meeting buthis own evidence showed that his party and its officers had maintainedproceedings of all work done such as printing and publishing of leaf-lets, holding of meetings, etc. Held,, that it was the duty of therespondent to prove his denial by producing the proceedings inevidence, and if he did not produce them the Election Tribunal wouldbe justified in drawing an adverse inference against him.—PRANANATHPATNAIK v. BANAMALI PATNAIK, 16 E.L.R. 357.

In election petitions, so far as they relate to charges ofcorrupt practice, there is a very great similarity to a criminal trial, andwhere a long list of witnesses is given as being the persons who willsupport a particular charge, witnesses produced thereafter whosenames are not on such list are more or less in the same position aswitnesses produced in criminal trials whose names have not beenrevealed in the first information report. Their evidence must notautomatically be excluded from consideration, but such witnesses arealways regarded by the courts with some suspicion unless somereason is established for the omission of their names in the firstlist.—BALWANT RAI TAYAL V. BISHAN SAROOP AND ANOTHER, 17

E.L.R. 101.

Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,must be strictly construed in favour of the person against whom thecharge is preferred; charges of corrupt practice must be strictlyproved; and if there is any reasonable doubt, the benefit of thatdoubt must be given to the person against whom the charge ispreferred.—AHMEDMIYA SHERUMIYA SHAIKH V. CHHIPPA IBRAHIM

NURAJI AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 218.

Charges of corrupt practice are quasi-criminal in character,and allegations relating thereto must be sufficiently clear and preciseand must be proved by evidence of a conclusive nature. HarishChandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461) referred to.—JAYALAKSHMI DEVAMMA v. JANARDHAN REDDI, 17 E.L.R. 302.

When a candidate for election either to the State Legislatureor Parliament, is charged with the commission of any corrupt practice,the charge is in almost all respects similar to a criminal charge, and,therefore, the petitioner must establish the charge conclusively beyondall reasonable doubt. The case for the petitioner must stand or fall onits own legs and can derive little sustenance from the weakness in thedefence set up by the respondent. If the evidence adduced in the case

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( l . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 53

is not sufficient to prove the charge, or establishes a charge which isdifferent from the charge levelled against the respondent, the case ofthe petitioner cannot be said to be proved, and the election cannot beset aside on such evidence.

-Before a respondent can be found guilty of a corrupt practicein an election petition strict proof of the allegations must be requiredfrom the petitioner.—GANGA PRASAD PATHAK V. SALIGRAM JAISWALAND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 415.

Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not applicable to theproof of corrupt practices under the Representation of the PeopleAct. The provision that applies is the proviso to section 103 whichlays-down that the burden of proof of any particular fact lies on thatperson who wishes the court to believe in its existence. Therefore, inan election petition, the burden of proving that a statement, thepublication of which is alleged to constitute a corrupt practice wasfalse to the knowledge of the successful candidate or not believed byhim to be true, is on the petitioner. It cannot be thrown on therespondent on the ground that the facts are especially within hisknowledge. Prananath Patnaik v. Banamali Patnaik (16 E.L.R. 357)followed. Abdul Rouf v. Makhtar AH and Others (2 E.L.R. 340)distinguished.—DHARNIDHAR MOHAPATRA V. PRADIPTA KISHORE DASAND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 427.

Though, in an election petition the burden of proving that therespondent is guilty of a corrupt practice is on the petitioner as in thecase of a prosecution for an offence, if both the parties have ledevidence before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has based its conclusionson the evidence, the question of burden of proof is not of much value.It is open to the Appellate Court to examine the evidence produced bythe parties and come to its own conclusion as to whether the evidenceproduced by the petitioner has or has not established the chargeagainst the returned candidate.—MAULANA ABDUL JALIL CHOUDHURY V.RATHINDRA NATH SEN, 13 E.L.R. 290.

Burden of proof has two distinct meanings, viz., (i) theburden of proof as a matter of law and pleading, and (ii) the burdenof proof as a matter of adducing evidence. Section 101 of theEvidence Act deals with the former and section 102 with the latter.The first remains constant and the second shifts. In an electionpetition the burden of proving that certain statements alleged tohave been published by the respondent were false and that therespondent believed them to be false or did not believe them tobe true is in the first sense, on the petitioner, but if the petitioner

54 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

examines himself and states that he has not committed the allegedacts and proves circumstances indicating a motive on the part ofthe respondent to make false allegations against him, the court isentitled to accept his evidence, and if it does so, the onus wouldshift to the respondent to prove the circumstances if any to dislodgethe assertions made by the petitioner ; and if the respondent hasfailed to put before the court any facts to establish either that thepetitioner did in fact commit the alleged acts of violence in the pastor to give any other circumstances which made him bona fide believethat he was so guilty the court is entitled to say that the burden ofproving the necessary facts had been discharged by the petitioner.—T. K. GANGI REDDY V. M. C. ANJANEYA REDDY AND OTHERS, 22

E.L.R. 261. [S.C]

The onus of proving corrupt practices lies on those whoassert their commission, and they have to be established beyondthe possibility of a reasonable doubt. The evidence in their supportneed not necessarily be direct, but it is well settled that circum-stantial evidence and the inference deducible therefrom must besuch as to lead to the only reasonable conclusion of the commissionof the corrupt practices alleged. No conjecture or surmise, howeverattractive or even plausible can take the place of proof, and if twoequally reasonable inferences or conclusions are possible, one innocentand the other guilty, the former should normally prevail. Thereis no rule of law that the testimony of a witness must either bebelieved in its entirety or not at all. It is really a matter to beconsidered on the facts and circumstances of each case, and it is fullycompetent for a court, for good and cogent reasons, to accept onepart of the statement of a witness and reject another.—LACHHMANSINGH GILL V. HARPARKASH KAUR, 22 E.L.R. 249.

An election enquiry, as has often been pointed out, is in thenature of quasi-criminal trial and the election petitioner is virtuallyin the position of a prosecutor and it is an elementary rule of lawthat the prosecution should make out its case by positive proof andnot by mere conjecture. Nor can the prosecution succeed on analternative case not put forward. Saw Ganesan v. Muthiah Chettiar(19 E.L.R. 16) reversed.—M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR V. SAW GANESAN,

21 E.L.R. 215.

If an election is sought to be set aside on the ground ofcorrupt practice, it is the duty of the petitioner to prove that groundaffirmatively and for that purpose he has to rely, first and last, onthe strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness in theevidence of the respondent. Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERA! PRINCIPLES) 55

(12 E.L.R. 461) and Tamworth (1 O'M. & H. 84) relied on—JAGANPRASAD RAW AT V. KRISHNA DUTT PALIWAL, 20 E.L.R. 443.

Wholesale desertion of a candidate by his devoted supportersand active workers during the election campaign, and their appearanceen masse as witnesses for the rival candidate who is seeking to unseathim, is sufficient in itself to arouse the strongest suspicions as to thebona fides of the witnesses. It has been only on very rare occasionsthat anyone has voluntarily come forward and given evidence againstanyone to whom he was genuinely well-disposed.—LACHHMAN SINGH V.HARPARKASH KAUR, 19 E.L.R. 417.

Though under sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act, theburden of proof is upon the petitioner to prove the grounds reliedupon by him to sustain his application he is entitled to depend uponthe exception to the sections provided by section 106 which enactsthat when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person,the burden of proving that fact is upon him.—SAW GANESAN V. M. A.MUTHIAH CHETTIAR, 19 E.L.R. 16.

5. Liability for acts of third persons—Agency—Doctrines of agencyin election law—Actual appointment not necessary—Party which setsup candidate and members thereof, whether agents of candidates.—Thedoctrines of agency as applied to election law are much wider thanthose of common law agency ; and under the doctrine of constructiveagency which is recognised in election law every person who worksor canvasses for a candidate with his knowledge or consent and whoseactions have not been repudiated by the candidate must be deemed tohave been adopted as his agent even without direct proof of actualappointment. Taunton case (1 O'M. & H. 181), Bewdleys' case (1 O'M.& H. 16), Borough of Westbury (3 O'M. & H. 78), Wigan's case (4 O'M.& H. 1) referred to. It is a well established principle of the lawof agency in elections that if a candidate has been set up by a party,the party itself as well as its prominent members must be held to behis agents because by agreeing to stand as a candidate of the partyhe must be deemed to have agreed to the party and its prominentmembers working to promote his election. It is not necessary in suchcases to show that the party organisation or its members were appointedby the candidate or that any privity existed between the candidateand the organisation or the member who worked for the candidate.It is sufficient to show the relation and the recognition by the candi-date of the acts of such person or even the absence of prohibitionof such acts on his part. Harwich (3 O'M. & H. 70), Great Yarmouth(5 O'M. & H. 89), Worcester (4 O'M. & H. 153) referred to.—TRILOKI SINGH V, SHIVRAJWATI NEHRU AND Others, 16 E.L.R. 234.

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Agency in election law—Wider meaning of "agent"—Proof ofconsent—Party organisation and members thereof—Strangers.—For thepurposes of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the expres-sion " agent" has a much wider connotation than it is ordinarily under-stood to have under the law of contract. Anybody who acts in further-ance of the prospects of the candidate's election may be said to be anagent of the candidate concerned, provided he does so with the consentof the candidate. This consent need pot be necessarily an expressconsent and no written document is necessary but may be gatheredand implied from the circumstances of the case. An " agent" includesnot only a person, who has been specifically engaged by the candidateor his election agent to work for him in the election, but also a person,who does in fact work for him and whose services have been acceptedby the candidate. An association of persons or a society or a politicalparty and its prominent members, who set up the candidate, sponsorhis cause and work to promote his election, may be aptly called the" agent " of the candidate for election purposes. Direct evidence ofconsent of the candidate to a corrupt act done by his agent may not beavailable in most cases; and for obvious reasons it would be unwise toinsist upon the production of direct evidence in every case. Here alsothe consent of the candidate to the act complained of or to his accept-ance thereof has to be inferred from the facts and circumstancesproved in the case. Where the corrupt practice is attributed to an" agent" and not to " any other person " as provided in sub-section (1),clause (b), of section 100, the case strictly falls under sub-section (2) ofthe section. Strangers taking interest but who have directly no concernwith the candidates or their election agents and have never been askedto do anything on their behalf in furtherance of their election are inthe position of mere intermeddlers or sympathisers, and the candidateor his election agent will have no responsibility for anything done bythem even if the act is done with a view to advance the prospects ofthe candidate's election or results in some advantage to him, unless itis shown that the candidate or his election agent had given his expressor implied consent to the act in question or had knowingly taken thebenefit of their conduct at the time. The case, however, of an "agent",who has been proved to be regularly working for the candidate duringthe election, stands on a somewhat different footing. In his case,approval or consent to any act done by him to promote the candidate'selection is implied. Where, therefore, corrupt practice in the courseof the election proceedings is attributed to an " agent ", it raises astrong presumption that it was done at the instance or with theexpress or implied consent of the candidate himself and the candidate

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is himself vicariously responsible for the act and conduct of his "agent"during the election. Sub-section (2) of section 100 assumes that thereturned candidate himself is guilty of the corrupt practice done byan " agent" unless he satisfies the Tribunal about the conditionsmentioned in any of the clauses of that sub-section, in order to escapethe guilt, in which case the Tribunal may decide that the election wasnot void. One of the conditions in sub-section (2) is that the candidateis to satisfy the Tribunal that the questionable practice of his agentwas contrary to his orders and without his consent or that of his elec-tion agent. In such a case, the burden is thrown on the candidate toprove the want of consent and the act being done by the agent contraryto orders ; in the case of an isolated act done by any other person, theburden lies on the person alleging corrupt practice to prove that it wasdone with the candidate's consent or that of his election agent.—NANIGOPAL SWAMI v. ABDUL HAMID CHOUDHURY AND ANOTHER, 19E.L.R. 175.

In order to constitute a person an agent for the purposes ofsection 123(4), it is essential that the person must be proved to haveacted as an agent in connection with the election with the consent ofthe candidate. Under section 100 read with section 123, if a personacts in connection with election as an agent with the consent of thecandidate, he will be deemed to be an agent for the purposes of section123, with the result that any publication done by such a person willconstitute a corrupt practice. But before the petitioner could get anyrelief under section 100, he must prove not only that a corrupt practicehas been committed by any person but also that it has been done withthe consent of the returned candidate. Consent has to be inferredfrom the circumstances, and it may be direct or indirect, and is aquestion of fact which must be established by the petitioner. If it canbe established from the circumstances that the candidate had know-ledge of the fact that an article was going to be published in a news-paper which is the organ of his party and that the article containedcertain imputations against the personal conduct of another candidateand if he did not take any steps to stop publication his consent to thepublication may be inferred. But knowledge of the contents subsequentto its publication does not impose a duty on a candidate to publishsome repudiation of the allegations contained in the publication, orlead to an inference that he had consented to the act prior to thepublication. In order to fasten the liability for a newspaper editor'sacts on a candidate it is necessary to establish that the editor was act-ing as an agent of the candidate in connection with the election andthat too with his consent. Mere action of the editor beneficial to the

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candidate is not enough to prove that he was acting as an agent inconnection with the candidate's election, and even if it is proved thathe was acting as an agent, for invalidating the election under sec-tion ioo it has further to be proved that he was doing so with thecandidate's consent. The fact that occasionally articles appealed in anewspaper in support of the candidates of a particular party and inopposition cf the Congress cardidate, by itself cannot lead to an infer-ence thnt the paper was either the agent of the party which had setup that candidate or that the particular publication which is allegedto constitute corrupt practice was published with the consent of thatcandidate. The question of agency depends upon the facts and circum-stances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down whichwill conclusively prove agency.—BISWANATH UPADHAYA V, HARALALDAS AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 405.

Agency, under the election law, has a wider meaning thanagency in the law of contracts, and may be inferred even fromthe conduct of the person who acts for and on behalf of a candidate ;but there is no justification for giving a meaning to the word " agent "which will make the returned candidate liable for the acts of anyperson who may be a mere sympathiser of the candidate.—BISWANATHUPADHAYA V. HARALAL DAS AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 405.

Under section 100(1) clauses (b) and (d)(ii) of the Repre-sentation of the People Act, 1951, as amended in 1956, wherea corrupt practice has not been committed by the candidatehimself or his election agent, but by any other person (including anagent other than an election agent) it must be proved that that personhad acted with the consent of the candidate or his election agent. [Thedifference between the provisions of sections 100 and 123 of the Act,before they were amended and after amendment in 1956, pointed out.]—DHARANIDHAR MOHAPATRA v. PRADIPTA KISHORE DAS AND OTHERS,17 E.L.R. 427.

Though the law of agency as applied to election petitions hasbeen differently expressed by different judges, all agree that therelation is not the common law one of principal and agent, but thecandidate may be responsible for the acts of a person acting on hisbehalf, though such acts are beyond the scope of the authority given,or indeed in violation of express injunction. [Principles of the law ofagency in election law discussed.] D. was the Chairman of the Sam-yukta Maharashtra Election Samiti of which A. was a member. TheSamiti consisted of various political parties of Maharashtra, and theCommunist Party of which D. was a member, was one such consti-tutent party. M. was a member of the Scheduled Castes Federation, and

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stood for a reserved seat on behalf of that party in the same consti-tuency. The Samiti had a joint office for propaganda on behalf of thecandidates. Propaganda was carried on in the Maratha of whichA. was the sole proprietor, on behalf of the Samiti candidates includingD. and M. Held, that under the circumstances A. was an agent ofD. and M. with regard to election propaganda but their election couldnot be declared void under section IOO(I)(6) as there was no evidenceto prove that the impugned statements were published in the news-paper with the implied or express consent of D. and M. or theirelection agents.—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE ANDOTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

Corrupt practice by agents—Candidate's liability—Law afterig$6—Anomalies—General principles.—Under section 100(1), before itsamendment in 1956, a corrupt practice committed by any agent wouldhave come within the mischief of this section. If it was not committedby either the returned candidate or his agent but by any other person,then before it could affect the election, it had to be with the conniv-ance of the returned candidate or his agent. The amendment Act hassubstituted for the expression "agent" the expression "electionagent", so that a corrupt practice has to be committed by a returnedcandidate or his election agent, and then no question of consentnaturally arises. But if it is a corrupt practice, which has not beencommitted by a candidate or his election agent, then before it affectsthe election, it has to be proved that it has been committed byany other person with the consent of the returned candidate or hisagent.—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17E.L.R. 373.

——Though the provisions of section IOO(I)(&) and section ioo(i)(d)are mutually exclusive, relief under section ioo{i)(b) and section 100(i)(d) may be asked for alternatively, as evidence which is notsufficient to support a charge under section IOO(I)(6), may besufficient to prove a charge under section ioo(i)(d). Where two ormore reliefs are claimed, they can be treated as alternative reliefs ifthey cannot co-exist and be granted at the same time. MuthiahChettiar v. Saw. Ganesan (13 E.L.R. 201) referred to. Corrupt practicescommitted by a candidate directly, including acts done personallyand through others, are outside the operation of section ioo(x)(d)(ii)and there is no scope for an alternative plea under this clause. But inthe case of acts done by persons acting with the consent of the candi-date or his election agent, the averment is that the doers were agents.If the proof tendered at the trial establishes the agency, then the casewould come under section IOO(I)(6). If the proof falls short of it, the

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case would come under section ioo(i)(d)(ii), inasmuch as the plea thatthose acts were done " in the interests of the returned candidate " isimplicit in the expression "agents" and no separate averment in thatbehalf is necessary. The result is that in such cases the scope ofenquiry is limited to considering whether in the case of acts alleged tohave been done by the agents of the respondent, and even amongthose in cases where the agency has been proved at the trial, the scopeof enquiry is limited to considering whether such acts affected theresult of the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate.—SAW. GANESAN V. M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR, 19 E.L.R. 16.

The view that the consequence of the substitution of " elec-tion agent" for " agent" in section IOO(I)(&), by the Amendment Actof 1956 is that " agency " has been abrogated is not correct. Whathas been done is merely to limit the scope of the authority of theagent, that is to say, whereas under section ioo(2)(&) of the old Act,any act committed by the returned candidate or his agent or by anyother persons with the connivance of the returned candidate or agent,would be a corrupt practice, under section IOO(I)(6) of the section asamended, the agent has no power to give consent to another person toact. The expression " any other person with the connivance of areturned candidate or his agent " in section ioo(2)(6) of the old Actcould not comprise the agent, but refers to any person other than theagent. But the expression " any other person with the consent of areturned candidate or his election agent in section IOO(I)(6) is wideenough to comprise an agent, and a corrupt practice committed by anagent will be a corrupt practice within the meaning of that expressionin section IOO(I)(6). Under the old Act, " the act of an agent or ofany other person with the connivance of the candidate or agent"would have been a corrupt practice proprio vigorc avoiding the election.This capacity of a mere agent to give consent to another person tocommit a corrupt practice and render the candidate responsible there-for, is now taken away by section IOO(I)(6) because the consentthereunder must be of the returned candidate or his election agent.This is the only effect of the change in language of this section in theold Act and the Act as amended in 1956. Consequently, an avermentof a corrupt practice by an agent, in the petition amounts to an aver-ment of a corrupt practice " by any other person with the consent ofthe returned candidate " within the meaning of section IOO(I)(6). Theexpression "agent" used in the pleadings in an election case must beconstrued as having the connotation which the law gives to an agentunder the election law.—SAW. GANESAN V. M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR,19 E.L.R. 16.

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Liability of candidate for editor's acts—Article in newspaper ofparty organisation.—In order to fasten the liability of the editor's acton a candidate, it is necessary to establish that the editor was actingas an agent of the candidate in connection with the election and thattoo, with his consent. Mere action of the editor beneficial to thecandidate would not be enough to prove that he was acting as an agentin connection with the candidate's election ; further it should also beproved that he was doing the alleged act with the consent of thecandidate. [In this case their Lordships held that the evidence on therecord satisfied all these requirements; and that in the circumstancesone would be justified in holding that the publication was with theconsent of the candidate by a paper which was a Congress organ andwhich publication the candidate himself had been utilising to facilitatehis election prospects.] Navashakti was an organ of the CongressParty. There was a District Congress Committee at Karimganj ofwhich the editor of Navashakti was the paid organiser, appointed bythe Congress for the election. A person who was found to be agent ofthe respondent was its printer and publisher. The office of theNavashakti was in the same building as the office of the KarimganjCongress, and the Congress Committee and the paper had a commontelephone. The paper and its editor made propaganda for theCongress candidate. In one of its issues it published a statement thatif the members of the Leftist party won the elections, their plan toconstruct the country included the driving of Muslims from India andcreating hostilities with neighbouring States. In an election petitionagainst the Congress candidate who was successful in the elections, oneof the grounds was that in publishing this statement the respondentwas guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Representa-tion of the People Act: Held, (i) that the publication of this articleconstituted a corrupt practice under section 123(3) °f the Representa-tion of the People Act, as it interfered with the free exercise of theelectoral right and was a systematic appeal to intimidate and influencevoters of the Muslim community on false grounds to support therespondent's candidature ; (ii) the evidence and circumstances clearlyshowed that the article was published with the consent of the respond-ent and the respondent was making use of the article to further hiselection prospects ; (iii) that the respondent was therefore guilty of acorrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Act. Held further, thatthe mere fact that the Provincial Congress Committee had issueddirections advising the voters to vote without fear or intimidation wasnot sufficient to bring the case under section 100(2) of the Act, andexempt the respondent from liability.—NANI GOPAL SWAMI V. ABDULHAMID CHOUDHURY AND ANOTHER, 19 E.L.R. 175.

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Doctrine of agency in election law—Liability for acts done bythird persons—Effect of amendment of 1956—Proof of consent—Liabilityfor editor's acts—Candidate's liability for acts of agents—Effect of amen-ding Act of 1956—Necessity of consent of candidate—Publication of falsestatements in news-paper—Candidate's liablity. -Section ioo(2)(6) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, has been materially amendedin 1956. Under the old Act, any corrupt practice specified in sec-tion 123 committed by a returned candidate or his agent or by anyother person with the connivance of the returned candidate or hisagent rendered the election void. The new provision is that such acorrupt practice to make the election void would have to be commit-ted by the candidate or his election agent. For the word " agent" inthe old Act " election agent " has been substituted and for the word"connivance" the word "consent" has been substituted and theeffect of this amendment is that the Legislature has excluded agentsother than election agents, from the mischief of the old section 100(2)(b) and also made it clear that mere connivance of the candidatewould not be sufficient to make him responsible for corrupt practiceby a third person and that the consent of the candidate is necessary.The new definition of "agency " in section 123 of the Representationof the People Act, shows that a person can act as an agent only withthe consent of the candidate, and section 100 (i)(6) which now corres-ponds to section ioo(2)(6) further makes it clear that even though aperson is an agent of the candidate (other than an election agent)corrupt practice committed by him cannot come within that sub-sectionunless that corrupt practice was committed by such agent with theconsent of the candidate. Though a wider meaning has been given tothe word "agent" in election law for maintaining the purity of elections,there is no justification for giving a meaning to the word " agent "which will make the candidate liable for the acts of any person whomay be a mere sympathiser of the candidate. Consequently, in orderto make a candidate responsible for the act of the editor of a news-paper it is essential to establish that the editor was acting as an agentwith the consent of the candidate; mere writing editorials or any suchaction of an editor beneficial to a certain candidate does not make himan agent, much less when the paper is not an organ of the party whichhas set up the candidate. Four candidates, Maharani Gurcharan Kaur(Independent), Mrs. Kriplani (Congress), Balraj (Jan Sangh) and Mrs.Sehgal (Independent) filed nominations for an election. A falsestatement that the Maharani had withdrawn her candidature waspublished in a daily newspaper on the day before the polling, and thisstatement was retracted in the next issue of the paper. This news-paper published articles advocating the policy of the Congress in

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general, but there was no evidence to show that the paper was run bythe Congress or out of Congress funds or that the editor hadpersonally canvassed for the respondent (the Congress candidate) withthe respondent's consent though he had addressed Congress meetings,or that the respondent had given her consent to the publication ofsuch a statement. Mrs. Sehgal was an old member of the Congress,and disciplinary action was taken against her by the CongressCommittee for having filed her nomination as an Independent. Shewas suspended from the Congress and then expelled for six years.An interview was arranged between her and the Prime Minister,who was the most influential member of the Congress, and after thisinterview Mrs. Sehgal withdrew her candidature and the disciplinaryaction against her was cancelled by the Congress Committee. TheCongress candidate (the respondent) was declared elected. An electionpetition was filed to set aside the election of the Congress candidateinfer alia on the grounds (i) that the publication of the false statementas to the withdrawal of the Maharani's candidature in the paperconstituted a corrupt practice under section 123(4) °f the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951, and (ii) undue influence was exercisedon Mrs. Sehgal to compel her to withdraw her candidature, and acorrupt practice under section 123(2) was thereby committed. Held,(i) that, as there was no evidence or circumstance to show that theeditor of the newspaper was acting as an agent of the Congresscandidate, or to show that the false statement was published withthe consent of the latter, the publication of the statement did notamount to a corrupt practice under section 123(4); (ii) there was notsufficient evidence to prove that the withdrawal by Mrs. Sehgal of hercandidature was due to any coercion or undue influence exercised onher ; and the election was not, therefore, liable to be set aside on theground that a corrupt practice under section 123(4) o r section 123(2)had been committed. Fraudulent devices e.g., spreading false rumourswhich may influence the voters in the selection of the candidate forwhom they should vote would not amount to corrupt practice undersection 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, unlessall the conditions of section 123(2) are satisfied.—AMIR CHAND V. SMT.SUCHETA KRIPLANI, 18 E.L.R. 209.

Editor of newspaper—Whether liable for statements containedin letters to the editor.—Ii letters are published in a newspaper contain-ing statements which are derogatory to persons mentioned in thoseletters, the editor cannot escape responsibility for what is containedin those letters. If the letters contain the views of the readers and ifit is made clear, as is generally done, that the views expressed in the

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readers' letters are not necessarily the views of the paper, then suchletters may stand en a somewhat different footing, but if the letterscontain statements of facts which are false, the editor would beresponsible for what is stated in those letters.—SUDHIR LAXMANHENDRE v. S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

——Acts committed by persons other than agents.—Where a corruptpractice is committed in the interests of the returned candidate by aperson who does not come within the three categories of personscontemplated in section IOO(I)(&) of the Act, there is no reason tomake a difference between an act of an agent (other than an electionagent), and that of a person who is not an agent. The words " by aperson other than that candidate or his election agent or a personacting with the consent of such candidate " are wide enough toinclude an agent. Consequently, whenever an agent (other than anelection agent) is alleged to have committed any corrupt practice, thecase would fall under section ioo(i)(d)(ii), of the Act, and it must beestablished that it was committed in the interests of the candidateand that on that account, the result of the election was materiallyaffected. The term " agent" as used in section 123 of the Act, has tobe understood as stated in Explanation (1) thereto, and a person whowas neither an election agent nor a polling agent can be regarded as anagent only if he comes under the third category, viz., " a person whocan be held, as having acted as an agent in connection with theelection with the consent of the candidate." Consent may be eitherexpressed or implied and an act can even be presumed to be the actof the principal on the latter ratifying the same. But clear andunequivocal proof in that respect is essential and the mere fact thata candidate did not disown an act is not sufficient to prove that hehad ratified or given consent to the same. When an agent commits acorrupt practice without the consent of the candidate it would not fallwithin section 100(1 )(6) of the Act and the election cannot be setaside on the ground of any such corrupt practice, unless it is furthershown that the result of the election had been materially affected ascontemplated by section 100 (i)(d)(ii) of the Act.—KATARIA TAKANDASHEMRAJ v. PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

Acts of workers appointed by candidate or his agents—Officers ofparty organisations—Whether agents.—Prima facie a person who workedfor a candidate in the elections, such a worker having been appointedby him directly or by any one acting on his behalf, would be an agentwho has acted in connection with the elections. The consent of thecandidate for his employment as agent could, in the circumstances, beinferred. It is not necessary in order to prove agency to show that

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the person was actually appointed by the candidate or that he waspaid. The crucial test is whether there has been employment orauthorisation of the person by the candidate to do some election workor the adoption of his work when done. The candidate, however, isliable not only for the acts of the agent whom he has himself appoint-ed or authorised, but also for the acts of agents employed by hiselection agent or by any other agent having authority to employothers. Where the conduct of the elections in a constituency onbehalf of the Congress candidates, including the respondent, was leftto two main offices by the Congress City Election Committee and thepersons in charge of these offices appointed their workers andmaintained a list of the workers (about 3,000 to 4,000 in number):Held, that the persons in charge of the offices must be held to haveacted in connection with the election as agents with the consent of therespondent with authority to appoint workers and all the workersmust be deemed to have acted as agents of the respondent within thedefinition of the instance, that if any evidence which has to be pro-duced by a party is not produced, a presumption may be drawn thatif produced it would be unfavourable to the person who withheld it.This rule of evidence cannot be totally excluded from application toan election proceeding though a finding as to corrupt practices couldnot be solely based on the mere presumption under section 114 of theIndian Evidence Act. The standard of proof, therefore, that is requiredin the case of allegations as to corrupt practices must be such that on theevidence adduced a reasonable mind could come to a definite conclusionbeyond any reasonable doubt. Where the respondent, the Congresscandidate, had knowledge of the conveyance of voters by rickshawsand cars by workers appointed by the City Election Committee of theCongress and he did not object to the commission of these corruptpractices but on the other hand, allowed the hiring and procuring ofrickshaws and cars by the workers in order to facilitate his success inelections : Held, that the workers were his agents and the hiring andprocuring of rickshaws and cars must be deemed to have been donewith the consent of the candidate, and he was guilty of a corruptpractice coming within the scope of section IOO(I)(&) and section 123(5).—V. RAMACHANDRA RAO V. V. B. RAJU AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R. 358.

Corrupt practice—Agents.—With regard to workers appointedas such by a candidate himself or his election agent, even though thecandidate (or his election agent) might have consented to their canvas-sing and working for him and he had also knowledge thereof, and suchgeneral consent and knowledge may make such persons " agents " ofthe candidate for the purposes of section 123 of the Act in view of the

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Explanation I thereof, this would not be sufficient to have the electionset aside unless it is further alleged and proved that the corruptpractices complained of were themselves committed with the consentor knowledge of the candidate, in view of the provisions contained insection IOO(I)(6) and ioo(i)(i)(ii). So far as the election law in thiscountry is concerned it is a creation of statute and as such has to beinterpreted in accordance with (he provisions of that statute. Sec-tion ico of the Act clearly refers to the corrupt practices committedby four classes of persons only, viz., the candidate, his election agent,persons acting with the consent of the candidate or his election agent,and those acting without such consent. The corrupt practicescommitted by the first three classes of persons are covered bv sec-tion ioo(i )(b) while those committed by persons falling in the fourthclass are provided against in section ioo(j)(d)(ii). The language ofsection ioo is clear and unequivocal and, therefore, whatever theposition in English law as regards the liability of candidate for theacts of his agent may be, that position cannot be held to obtain in thiscountry. Election workers of a candidate can be classified eitherunder the category of persons who acted with the consent of thecandidate or under the category of persons who acted without suchconsent. If they or any one or more of them fall in the lattercategory, then the Act makes it imperative on the petitioner tofurther allege and prove that the result of the election so far as itconcerned the respondent was materially affected by the corruptpractices committed by such persons in the interests of the returnedcandidate. Therefore, so far as acts committed by election workersare concerned the petitioner has to allege and prove either that theycommitted these acts with the consent of the candidate or his electionagent, or that, though the workers did not act with the consent theresult, of the election was materially affected thereby. He must specifywhich of the workers acted with such consent and which without suchconsent and if the allegations are not specific in this regard theTribunal must either obtain clarification or strike off the pleadings onthe ground of vagueness.—RUSTOM SATIN V. DR. SAMPOORNANANDAND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

Acts of third persons—Proof of consent.—Under the definitionof agent in section 123(7), if a person is not an election agent or a poll-ing agent, then, acting with the consent of the candidate is necessaryto constitute him an agent of the candidate ; and under section IOO(I)(6)if the election of a candidate is to be avoided on the ground of acorrupt practice committed by a person other than the candidate orhis election agent, the candidate's consent or the consent of his election

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agent for the act must be established. Consent is a question of fact inevery case. It may be expressed or implied. It may be inferred fromthe acts and conduct of the returned candidate or from other facts andcircumstances established in the case. But the mere fact that the actsof other persons helped and supported the election campaign of thereturned candidate would not be enough. Even non-interference withthe activities of persons who may be acting in support of his canvasswill not, without something more, be sufficient to saddle the returnedcandidate with the liability for the corrupt practices committed bythem.—SARLA DEVI PATHAK V. BIRENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS, 20E.L.R. 275.

Liability for acts of others—Proof of consent.—The general lawrelating to master and servant cannot be applied in determining acandidate's liability for corrupt practice under the Representation ofthe People Act, as, under that Act even in the case of admittedworkers, in whose case also general consent to work for the candidatemay be implied, the consent of the returned candidate to the corruptpractice or practices complained against, has to be separately proved,and reliance upon general consent, express or implied, to work legiti-mately for the candidate is not sufficient: Emperor v. Haji ShaikMahomed Shustari (I.L.R. 32 Bom. 10) distinguished.—JAGAN PRASADRAW AT v. KRISHNA DUTT PALIWAL, 20 E.L.R. 443.

——Liability for matters appearing in newspaper owned by candidate.—The fact that a person was the founder and managing trustee of anewspaper and was in charge of the general policy of that paper, andhad also the power to appoint and dismiss the staff of the paperincluding the editor would not render him vicariously liable for thearticles and news-items which appear in the paper even though he wasnot directly concerned with them and the publications were madeunder the authority and supervision of the editor working within thescope of his employment.—JAGAN PRASAD RAWAT V. KRISHNA DUTTPALIWAL, 20 E.L.R. 443.

Liability for acts of agents and of other persons—-Law explained—Proof of consent—Scope of sec. ioo(i)(b), ioo(i)(d), 100(2).—Under sections100 and 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amendedin 1956, corrupt practices committed by agents of the candidate (otherthan election agents) do not stand on the same footing as corruptpractices committed by "other persons". The words "any otherperson with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent"in section IOO(I)(6) should be held to comprehend two classes of persons,viz., (i) an "agent," whose actions are deemed to have been con-sented to by a candidate, and (ii) other persons whose actions are in

68 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

fact consented to by a candidate or his election agent; for, once aperson has acted as an " agent" in an election, he must be deemed tohave acted with the consent of the candidate, and such an interpreta-tion alone attach some meaning to section 100(2) which has beenretained by the Amendment Act of 1956. Sub-section (2) of section 100is a proviso to section IOO(I)(6) and not to section ioo(i)(d)(ii), and itseffect is that if a corrupt practice is committed by an agent (who mustbe deemed to have acted with the consent of the candidate) the electionneed not be set aside if the conditions mentioned in section 100(2) areproved. It is not proper to regard section 100(2) as having beenretained in the statute by an oversight of the Legislature : Ghayur AHKhan v. Keshav Gupta (16 E.L.R. 154), Sudhir Laxman Hendre v.Sripat Amrit Dange (17 E.L.R. 373), M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v.Sa. Ganesan (14 E.L.R. 432) and Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra (16E.L.R. 103) dissented from. The Amendment Act 58 of 1958 has notmerely clarified the meaning of section 100(1) and (2) as amended in1956, but has materially altered the law with respect to corrupt practicecommitted by agents other than election agents. Under the Act asamended in 1958, if a "corrupt practice " is committed by the candi-date or his election agent or by any other person with the consent ofthe candidate or his election agent, then it would fall within the mis-chief of section ioo(i)(b) and if it is committed by an agent of thereturned candidate other than his election agent, then it would comewithin the ambit of section ioo(i){d)(ii); but even if the result of theelection of the returned candidate has been materially affected by anycorrupt practice (in ordinary parlance) committed in the interests ofthe returned candidate, the election cannot be set aside, if it is com-mitted by persons, other than those mentioned in sections IOO(I)(6) andioo(i)(d){ii). The amendment of 1958 has not however removed all theanomalies that exist. The Tribunal may from all the facts andcircumstances of the case and the close association between a candidateand the persons who had published certain false statements against thepetitioner, come to finding that they did so as "agents" of therespondent, even though there is no specific allegation in the petitionthat the statements were published by those persons, or that they hadmade those statements as agents of the respondent.—ANJANEYA REDDYv. GANGI REDDY AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 247.

Acts of mere volunteers—Proof of agency or consent of candidate—Matters appearing in newspapers.—The definition of the expression" agent" in section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,is a wide one, but, however widely it may be construed, it cannotinclude a mere volunteer who canvasses for a candidate without any

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 69

authority from him. To establish agency for which the candidate wouldbe responsible, he must be proved, by himself or by his authorisedagent, to have employed the persons whose conduct is impugned, toact on his behalf, or to have to some extent put himself in their hands,or to have made common cause with them, for the purpose of promotinghis election. Mere non-interference with persons, who, feeling interestedin the success of the candidate, may act in support of his canvass, isnot sufficient to saddle the candidate with any unlawful acts of theirs,of which the Tribunal is satisfied he or his authorised agent is ignorant:Bolton Case (2 O'M. & H. 14), Taunton Case (2 O'M. & H. 66) andMathai Mathew Manjuran v. K. C. Abraham (10E.L.R. 376) referred to.A person wrote articles in a newspaper in favour of Congress candi-dates and occasionally in favour of the respondent, a Congress candidateand also addressed a meeting held to support her candidature. Butthere was no suggestion that the newspaper was run by Congress Partynor was there evidence of any political or social relation between therespondent and that person. There was also no other evidence thatthey were associated in the conduct of the election 01 of interchange ofelection information between them, or that the respondent gave anyauthority, express or implied, to that person to support her candidaturein that newspaper. Held, that the evidence was not sufficient to makethat person an agent of the respondent. [Their Lordships left openthe question whether consent, express or implied, of the returnedcandidate or his election agent is to be proved for the particularcorrupt practice when committed by an agent under the election law].—AMIR CHAND V. SMT. SUCHETA KRIPLANI, 21 E.L R. 286.

For editor's Acts.—The editor of a newspaper who publishes aspeech made by another person supporting a particular candidate doesnot thereby become an agent of that candidate.—Inayatullah Khan v.Diwanchand Mahajan (15 E.L.R. 219), Senanayake v. Navaratne ([1954]A.C. 640), Surendra Nath v. Dalip Singh (12 E.L.R. 370), Vashist NarainSharma v. Dev Chand (10 E.L.R. 30) and Yamuna Prasad v. JagdishPrasad Khare (13 E.L.R. 1) referred to.—CHUNNILAL KEN V. RADHA-CHARAN SHARMA AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 320.

Political party and workers of party organisation, whether agents0/ candidate.—In certain circumstances a political party which sets up acandidate may be deemed to be his agent and the candidate may beheld responsible for the corrupt practices committed by the workers ofthe said political party. In such cases, however, the crucial test iswhether there has been an employment or authorisation of the agentby the candidate to do some election work or the adoption of his workwhen done. Where the evidence showed that a Socialist worker had

70 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

an altercation with the police and asked the voters to come out of thepolling booth and some of the voters thereupon came out, and thequestion was whether this amounted to undue influence by the respon-dent, who was a candidate set up by the Socialist party : Held, thatthe facts were not sufficient to make that worker an agent of therespondent and to amount to undue influence on the part of A. AbdulWali Khan v. Ehtisham Mahmood AH (i D.I.E.C. 149) distinguished.—RAJENDRA PRASAD YADAV v. SURESH CHANDRA MISHRA, I I E.L.R. 222.

Party or ganisations\and its workers—Whaher agents—Obiter.—Thequestions as to the limits of the doctrine of agency in election mattersand the exact scope and effect of the statutory definition of "agent "may require to be carefully considered by the court when they becomenecessary in a proper case as these important questions bearing on thewhole structure of elections run on party lines.—BHAGWAN DATTSHASTRI v. RAM RATAN GUPTA AND OTHERS ; BHAGWAN DATT SHASTRIv. BADRI NARAYAN SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 448 [S.C.].

Corrupt practice committed by persons other than the candidate orhis agents and without their consent—Necessity 0} proof thai result of elec-tion was affected—Difference between s. ioo(i)(b) and s. ioo(i)(d)(ii).—There is a difference between the grounds mentioned in section IOO(I)(6)and section ioo(i){d){ii) of the Representation of the People Act.Under section ioo(i)(b) an election of a returned candidate is to bedeclared void if it is proved that any corrupt practice has been com-mitted by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any otherperson with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent.Section ioo(i)(d){ii) refers to corrupt practices committed in the interestof a returned candidate by a person other than that candidate or hiselection agent, or a person acting with the consent of such canditate orelection agent, and in the case of such corrupt practices the election isto be declared void only if the result of the election in so far as itconcerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected by thecommission of the corrupt practice.—CHHATTAR SINGH V. KEWAL SINGHAND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 162.

Corrupt practice by agent—Burden of proof of consent.—Sincesub-section (1) of section 100 is subject to the provisions of sub-sec-tion (2), the question whether in the case of an agent, it is for theopposite party to prove the consent of the returned candidate or forthe returned candidate to prove want of consent on his part, woulddepend upon the effect of sub-section (2) on sub-section (1).—MAGANLALBAGDI v. HARI VISHNU KAMATH, 15 E.L.R. 205.

Publication of false statements by agents.—Section n o ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amended, draws

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 71

a distinction between the actions of a candidate, his election agent andother persons acting with his consent or that of his election agent, and

the actions of other persons, which would include agents other thanelection agent, acting without the consent of the candidate or hiselection agent. The first type of action falls under section IOO(I)(&) andthe second, under section ioo(i)(d)(ii). If the case falls under sectionioo(i)(d)(ii), the Tribunal can declare the election of the returnedcandidate void only on the ground that, on account of that action, theresult of the election had been materially affected in so far as it con-cerned the returned candidate. An action of an agent other than anelection agent or of some other persons acting without the consent ofthe candidate or his election agent does not clearly come within theambit of section IOO(I)(&). Whatever the position in English law withrespect to the liability of the candidate for the acts of his agents maybe, the position, as far as India is concerned is that laid down insection 100, and the language of this section in this respect is clear andunambiguous. Consequently, where there is no allegation in an elec-tion petition that the statements published were false to the knowledgeof the candidate or not believed by him to be true, but the allegationis that the statements were false to the knowledge of his agents, thecandidate could not be held guilty of a corrupt practice under sectionIOO(I)(&), though the case may come under section ioo(i)(d)(ii) if thereis a further allegation that the result of the election was materiallyaffected thereby.—SAVITRI DEVI V. PRABHAWATI MISRA AND ANOTHER,15 E.L.R. 358.

Liability of candidates for wrongful acts of agents—General princi-ples.—The scheme of section 100 of the Representation of the PeopleAct is that if the corrupt practice has been committed by a returnedcandidate or his election agent, or by any other person with the consentof a returned candidate or his election agent, the case would fall undersection IOO(I)(6) and the commission of the corrupt practice by itselfwould be sufficient for declaring his election to be void; but if thecorrupt practice has been committed by a person other than the personsmentioned above, the election of the returned candidate is not to bedeclared void unless the commission of the corrupt practice has materi-ally affected the result of the election in so far as it concerns thereturned candidate. All agents other than the election agents wouldfall within the expression "any other person " so that even if a corruptpractice is committed by an agent, as defined in Explanation 2 attachedto sub-section (7) of section 123, the case would not fall under sectionIOO(I)(Z>), unless it is further proved that the said agent committed (hecorrupt practice with the consent of the retmred candidate or rf his

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election agent. The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 100 willapply only to a case where, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a returnedcandidate is held to be guilty because of some act of his agent, and thiscan never happen under sub-section (1) unless it has been establishedthat the returned candidate had consented to his agent committing thecorrupt practice. Sub-section (2) does not override sub-section (1).Dictum.—After the amendment of section TOO by Act 27 of 1956, sub-section (2) of section 100 appears to be a wholly superfluous and mean-ingless piece of legislation. No case falling under sub-section (2) canever fall within the ambit of sub-section (1) of section 100. A casewhich fulfils all the requirements of clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (2)will never fall under section IOO(I)(5) or section ioo(i){d)(ii) of the Act.—MOTILAL v. MANGLA PRASAD, 15 E.L.R. 425.

Candidate s liability for acts dons by agents in contravention ofgeneral instructions.—The common law notions of relations betweenprincipal and agent could not be invoked in a case like this and thecandidate cannot escape liability on the ground that his agent hadexceeded or disobeyed his instructions.—DR. Y. S. PARMAR V. HIRASINGH PAL AND ANOTHER, 16 E.L.R. 45.

Corrupt practice by candidate or agent, and by third persons—Difference.—Under section IOO(I)(6) and section 100(1) (d) (ii) if thepetitioner is able to establish that the respondent or his election agentor any other person with their consent has committed a corrupt prac-tice, then that itself is sufficient to set aside his election. But if thatis not established and it is established that the corrupt practicehas been committed in respondent's interest by a person other thanthe respondent or his election agent or a person acting with theirconsent, then the appellant must further establish that the result ofthe election has been materially affected by that corrupt practice.—LAL SHYAM SHAH V. V. N. SWAMI, 16 E.L.R. 74.

—•—Difference between " consent " and "connivance "—Effect ofsubstitution of " consent " for "connivance".—It cannot be said that theword " consent " used in the Act after its amendment in 1956 is inany way stronger than the word ' connivance ' used before its amend-ment. The term " consent " is, however, of wider import as it includesboth express and implied consent and the Legislature, therefore, musthave preferred to use it in place of the term " connivance ", as " conni-vance " did not fully express its intention and was not apt to includeexpress consent of the candidate.— SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA,

16 E.L.R. 103.

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 73

Liability for acts of agent—Scope of sec. ioo(i)(b), ioo(i)(d)(ii)and 100(2).—Sub-section (1) of section 100 is a self-contained sectionproviding for all cases of commission of corrupt practice by any personwhatsoever. If such a corrupt practice has been committed by areturned candidate or his election agent or by any other person,including an ordinary agent, with the consent of a returned candidateor his election agent, the Election Tribunal is bound to declare theelection to be void irrespective of the fact whether the commissionof the corrupt practice materially affected the result of the electionor not. In other cases, if a corrupt practice has been committed byany person other than those mentioned in section IOO(I)(&), the elec-tion is to be declared void only if the commission of the corruptpractice has materially affected the result of the election. The viewthat if any agent of a candidate committed any corrupt practice, thecandidate would be responsible for it and the case would come undersection IOO(I)(6) of the Representation of the People Act, quiteirrespective of whether the appellant had consented to the commissionof the corrupt practice by the agent or not, is not correct. Dicta:" While re-drafting section 100 of the Act the Legislature omitted totake into consideration the fact that a case which fulfils all therequirements of clauses (a) to {d) of sub-section (2) would never fallunder sub-section (1), and that according to sub-section (1), itself theelection cannot be declared to be void by the Tribunal if all theconditions enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (2) have beenfulfilled. In the Act, before its amendment in 1956, under sub-section(2)(&) the Tribunal could set aside any election if a corrupt practicewas committed by any ordinary agent with the connivance of thereturned candidate. Sub-section (3), which was word by word thesame as the present sub-section (2) excepting for an insignificantdifference had in that setting a meaning because it provided anexception to clause (b) of sub-section (2); but after the amendment,sub-section (2) of section 100 appears to be an entirely superfluous andmeaningless piece of legislation."—GHAYUR ALI KHAN V. KESHAVGUPTA, 16 E.L.R. 154.

Commission by agent other than election agent without consent ofcandidate or election agent—Validity of election.— An election can be setaside under section IOO(I)(6) on the ground of commission of a corruptpractice by a person other than the candidate or his election agent,only if the corrupt practice was committed with the consent of thecandidate or his election agent. The consent of the candidate or hiselection agent must, therefore, be proved even if the person commit-ting the corrupt practice was an agent of the candidate, if he was not

ELD—10

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the election agent.—KHAGENDRANATH NATH AND ANOTHER V. UMESHCHANDRA NATH AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 207.

Political organisation, when agent of candidate.— A politicalassociation existing for the purpose of a political party, advocating thecause of a particular candidate, and largely contributing to his success,yet in no privity with the candidate or his agents and an independentagency acting on its own behalf would not be one for whose acts thecandidate would be responsible. But a political association advocat-ing the view of a candidate would be an agent of that candidate eventhough that candidate is not a member, he does not subscribe to itsfunds and he personally is not ostensibly connected with it, if theassociation is in intimate relationship with the candidate's agentsrespecting the canvassing of voters and the conduct of the election andlargely contributes to the result. [On the facts of the case it was heldthat the publisher and printer of the pamphlet in question who wasthe Secretary of the Praja Socialist Party was not acting as a politicalassociate or agent of the candidates set up by that Party.]—DHARANI-DHAR MOHAPATRA V. PRADIPTA KlSHORE DAS AND OTHERS, 1J E.L.R.427.

Party forming Election Committee for propaganda—Members ofCommittee, whether agents of candidate.—Per PATEL, J.—If an electioncommittee is constituted by a party and if it authorised its membersto carry on propaganda, the propaganda that was carried on by aparticular member either in his own proprietory paper or in any otherpaper must be as agent of the candidate put up by the election com-mittee. [The anomalies arising from the provisions of section IOO(I)(&)and section ioo{i){d)(ii) in regard to corrupt practices committed byagents other than election agents and the necessity of amending theAct in this regard pointed out.]—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A.DANGE AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

Minister—Whether agent of candidate.—If a Minister who is aprominent member of the Congress Party works actively for thesuccess of the candidate set up by the party, with the knowledge andapproval of the candidate, he can be treated as an agent of the candi-date.— TRILOKI SINGH V. SHIVRAJWATI NEHRU AND OTHERS, 16 EX.R.234.

6. Naming of guilty persons.—Naming of guilty party—Necessityof fresh notice.—No notice under the proviso to section gg(i)(a)(ii) needbe given to a party to an election petition before naming him as aguilty person under section 99, where the corrupt practices whichhave been found to entail the disqualifications under sections 140 and

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( l . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 75

143 are matters which formed the subject-matter of the election peti-tion, in respect of which the party had ample opportunity to defendhimself during the trial of the petition. In making recommendationsunder sections 141 to 143 of the Act the Election Tribunal exercisesan advisory jurisdiction and the proviso to section gg(i)(a)(ii) has noapplication.—Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh and Others (11 E.L.R. 192)followed.—T. NAGAPPA V. T. C. BASAPPA AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 203[S.C.]

Naming of guilty persons—Notice to parties to election petition,whether necessary.—If a party had opportunity given to him in thehearing of an election petition to meet the very charge in respect ofwhich a finding of guilty persons is to be recorded under sec-tion 99(i)(a), he is not entitled to further notice in respect of the samematter, under the proviso to the said clause. Tirath Singh v. BachitarSingh and Others (11 E.L.R. 192) followed. Munuswami Gounder v.Khader Shariff and Others (No. 2) (4 E.L.R. 283) affirmed.—KHADERSHERIFF V. MUNNUSWAMI GOUNDER AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 208 Is.c]

Fresh notice to respondent whether necessary.—Where a respond-ent to a petition is found guilty of the corrupt practices alleged againsthim in the election, after giving him due notice of the charges and afull opportunity to defend himself it is not necessary to issue a freshnotice to him under the proviso to section gg(i)(a)(ii) of the Act beforenaming him as a guilty person.— SHRI KRISHNA V. RAJESHWAR SINGHAND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 1.

Duty of Tribunal to investigate and record findings on corruptpractices alleged against respondents.—An election petition which con-tained allegations of various corrupt, practices against the respondentsprayed for the following reliefs: (a) declaring the election to bewholly void, (b) declaring the election of both the respondents void.It was also prayed that a finding that the respondents were guilty ofthe corrupt and illegal practices specified in the petition, may berecorded. In an application for a writ, the High Court held that theelection petition, so far as it related to relief (b), i.e., for declaring theelection of the respondents void, was barred by limitation, and issued awrit " prohibiting the Election Tribunal from proceeding with thetrial of the petition so far as relief (b) was concerned." When thecase went back to the Tribunal it was contended on behalf of therespondents that in view of the above^aid writ the Tribunal wasprecluded from considering allegations which were germane to relief(b), and that the trial should be confined to matter necessary forgiving relief (a) and to such practices as had a bearing on this relief.Held, overruling this objection, that under section 99 the Tribunal

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had a duty to investigate and record a finding on all the corrupt andillegal practices alleged in the petition, and the writ issued by theHigh Court did not preclude it from doing so. Raj Krushna Bose v.Binod Kanungo (9 E.L.R. 294) referred to. The decision of the SupremeCourt in Sucheta Kripalani's case (11 E.L.R. 175) does not in any waymodify the view expressed by that court in Raj Krushna Bose's case(9 E.L.R. 294).—A. SREENIVASAN V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, MADRAS, ANDANOTHER : DR. V. K. JOHN V. VASANTHA PAI AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R.278.

The notice to show cause why a person should not be namedunder section 99 has to be given under the proviso to section 99, onlyif on the materials at the conclusion of the trial, the Tribunal hasformed an opinion that the corrupt practice has been committed by aperson other than the candidate himself. Any evidence, therefore,produced by the person who has been called upon to show cause why heshould not be named, cannot be relied upon by the Tribunal toestablish the consent of the returned candidate to the commission of acorrupt practice by an agent or worker.—BISWANATH UPADHAYA V,HARALAL DAS AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 405.

Summary dismissal of petition—Whether guilty parties shouldbe named.—Where an election petition has to be dismissed under sec-tion 90(3) for non-compliance with the provisions of section 82 of theAct, the Tribunal is not bound to proceed under section 99 and recordfindings on the corrupt practices alleged and the names of the personswho had committed such practices.—BABU RAO V. M. S. ANEY, 22E.L.R. 105.

Where an election petition is dismissed under section 90(3)for non-compliance with section 82(6), the provisions of section 99 arenot attracted and the Tribunal is not bound to record any finding as towhether any corrupt practice has been committed, or the names of theparties who have committed it. Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney (22 E.L.R.105) affirmed. Chandrika Prasad v. Shiv Prasad (21 E.L.R. 172) andOmPrabhaJainv. Gian Chand (21 E.L R. 54) followed. Even obiterdicta of the Supieme Court are binding on the High Courts.—BABU

RAO v. M. S. ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 321.7. Withdrawal of charges.—Withdrawal of charges of corrupt

practice against the respondent does not stand on the same footing aswithdrawal of the petition itself. It is open to the Election Tribunalto allow the petitioner not to press one or more instances of corruptpractice, especially when he had not given full particulars of theinstances as contemplated by section 83(i)(6) of the Act; and the

CORRUPT PRACTICE ( l . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 77

instances of corrupt practice abandoned in the circumstances beforethe Tribunal cannot be allowed to be urged in appeal.—PANDITK. C. SHARMA v. KRISHI PANDIT RISHABKUMAR AND OTHERS, 20E.L.R. 401.

8. Miscellaneous matters.—When investigation not necessary—Thereliefs claimed in an election petition were: (a) for a declaration thatthe election was wholly void, (b) for a declaration that the election ofboth the returned candidates was void, and (c) for a finding thatcertain corrupt and illegal practices had been committed by thecandidates. The High Court held on a writ appeal that relief (b), i.e.,the relief for declaration that the election of both the returned candi-dates was void, was time-barred, and issued a writ prohibiting theElection Tribunal from proceeding with the trial of the petition so faras that relief was concerned. When the case came up again before theTribunal, it was contended that the order of the High Court precludedthe Tribunal from enquiring into the allegations of corrupt and illegalpractices made in the petition. The Tribunal held that notwithstand-ing the order of the High Court, it was bound to record a finding onthe question of the commission of such practices, and recorded afinding that the petitioner (first respondent in the election petition)committed an illegal practice under section 125(3), and this view wasupheld by a single judge of the High Court: Held, that the Tribunalhad no jurisdiction to investigate into the commission of any illegalpractice under section 125(3) and to record a finding that such illegalpractice had been committed by the petitioner as the relief (b) wastime-barred and the High Court had issued a writ prohibiting theTribunal from trying the petition so far as that relief was concernedand such investigation was not necessary in order to ascertain whetherthe election should be declared to be wholly void on any of the threegrounds on which only such a declaration can be made under sec-tion 100(1) of the Representation of the People Act.—Sucheta Kripalaniv. Dulat and Others (11 E.L.R. 175 S.C.) and Raj Krushna Bose v.Binod Kanungo (9 E.L.R. 294 S.C), explained and distinguished.—DR. V. K. JOHN V. CHIEF JUDGE, COURT OF SMALL CAUSES, MADRAS,AND OTHERS : DR. V. K. JOHN V. VASANTHA PAI AND ANOTHER,12 E.L.R. 329.

Not committed by candidate or his agent—Necessity of proof thatresult of election was materially affected.—Under section ioo(i)(d)(ii) ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, the election of a returnedcandidate can be declared void on the ground that a corrupt practicewas committed by a person other than that candidate or his electionagent or a person acting with their consent, only if the corrupt practice

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was committed in the interests of the returned candidate, and theresult of the election, in so far as it concerned the returned candidate,has been materially affected by the commission of the corruptpractice.—POTTEKKAT KRISHNAN SUKUMARAN V. KUNJUVAREED JOSEPH

MUNDASSERI, 14 E.L.R. 313.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (2. Appeal on grounds of religion etc.)Appeal on grounds of religion, caste or community—Appeal on

grounds of religion, caste or community—Scope of sec. 123(3).—It is notpossible to lay down what types of statements or appeals fall withinthe ambit of section 123(3). Each case has to be decided on its ownfacts. Section 123(3) is not concerned with the truth or falsity of theallegations made.—CHHATTAR SINGH V. KEWAL SINGH AND OTHERS,

15 E.L.R. 162.Publication of " advice " by Maulana to Muslim voters—State-

ment containing severe criticism of Congress Party—No direction to votefor, or reference to, any particular candidate—Whether falls unders. 123(3) or s-I23(4)-—A person published a statement which was saidto contain the advice of a Maulana who was Vice-President of theJamaiyat Ulma, to Muslims. The advice did not direct the Muslimsto vote, or not to vote, for any particular candidate but containednumerous aspersions against the Congress Party in general and theharm it was doing to Muslims. The Congress Government was accusedof communalism, bribery, casteism, tyranny, interference with thereligion of Muslims, etc. The advice stated that it was the personalopinion of the Maulana and that under these conditions it was difficultfor him to support tyranny and oppression and advice any one to votefor the Congress candidates. His advice was " to vote for only suchcandidates who are better in their personal capacity." In an electionpetition by the Congress candidate to set aside the election of thesuccessful candidate: Held, that the publication of the statement didnot constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(4) of the Re-presentation of the People Act, 1951, as it did not relate to thepersonal character or conduct of the petitioner; it did not fall undersection 123(3) a s it did not contain any systematic appeal to Muslimsto vote on the ground of religion, caste, race or community. Bygiving advice to vote for only such candidates who are better in theirpersonal capacity, the Maulana left the Muslim voters to their choiceto vote for the best candidate whosoever he might be, and to which-soever party he belonged. The statement contained an expression of thefeelings of the Maulana in his personal capacity which he was quitecompetent to express under the rights guaranteed by the Constitution

CORRUPT PRACTICE (2. APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF RELIGION) 79

of India and it cannot be said that the statement amounted to anappeal to vote or refrain from voting for the furtherance of theprospects of the election of any particular candidate or in oppositionto the petitioner, and the statements did not, therefore, offend theprovisions of section 123(3) 0 I the Act. In any event the respondentcould not be held liable in the absence of evidence to prove that he orhis agents or others with his consent had published or distributed thestatement.—MD. IBRAHIM ANSARI V. M. R. MASANI AND OTHERS,18 E.L.R. 160.

Appeal on grounds of community or religion—Language contro-versies—Creating communal riots—A language controversy cannot besaid to be a controversy which is either communal or religious. Astatement in an appeal that the Congress Party crushed Urdu is notan appeal on the ground of community or religion, as there are manyHindus also in favour of retaining Urdu as one of the languages of theState. A statement that the Congress Party created communaldisturbances and riots is not an appeal on the ground of religion orcommunity, as creating communal riots and disturbances is a wrongfulact affecting both communities.—CHHATTAR SINGH V. KEWAL SINGHAND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 162.

Standard oj proof—Propaganda that if Congress is voted topower Islam is in danger.—The petitioner, who was a candidateset up by the Congress Party and who was defeated in the election,filed an election petition against the respondent, who was a candidateset up by the Praja Socialist Party, alleging inter alia that therespondent had committed a corrupt practice under section 123(3)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It was alleged thatthe respondent and his supporters had in several meetings, at severalplaces, and on several dates carried on a propaganda that the CongressGovernment was anti-Muslim and that Islam would be in danger ifthe Congress was voted to power inasmuch as the Congress was forbanning cow-slaughter, for enforcing cremation of dead bodies, forenforcing the compulsory singing of Ramdhun by Muslim teachersand pupils in all schools and advocated other policies which areagainst the tenets of Islam : Held, that carrying on such propagandaconstituted a systematic appeal not to vote for the Congress candidateon the grounds of community and religion and the respondent hadcommitted a corrupt practice under section 123(3) > it did not,however, constitute " undue influence" under section 123(2). Sec-tion 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, should beconstrued according to the natural meaning of the words used in thesub-section, The view that the sub-section should be interpreted in a

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narrow sense as if the words used were " only on the grounds of caste,race, community or religion " is not correct. Moinudin B. Harris v.B. P. Divgi (3 E.L.R. 248) dissented from. Sardul Singh Caveeshar v.Hukam Singh and Others (6 E.L.R. 316) followed. Jamuna Prasad v.Lachi Ram and Others (10 E.L.R. 120) referred to.—NAZMUL HAQUE V.AMJAD ALI AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 253.

"Systematic appeal" meaning of.—An appeal cannot be a "syste-matic appeal" within the meaning of section 123(3) if it is n ° t a n appealmade methodically and according to a plan but is only of a sporadic orcasual nature, e.g., as a reply to a pamphlet issued by the other party.The proof of the fact that a pamphlet was printed and published is notsufficient to prove that there was a systematic appeal. The pamphletmust also be proved to have been published in pursuance of a plan andactually distributed and circulated amongst the voters.—KATARIATAKANDAS HEMRAJ v. PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

Appeal on grounds of religion—Essentials of.—The supremereligious head and Satguru of the Namdhari sect to whose orders hisfollowers attached the greatest religious sanctity, and whose orderswere even treated as religious commands, addressed several meetingsof his followers and preached that it was the primary dharma of allhis followers to help the candidature of the respondent. Respondentalso got printed and published thousands of posters in Hindi andGurmukhi containing a farman head as a "Hukam" of the Satguruunder the signature of the Satguru's son in which it was stated thatit was the primary dharma of every Namdhari of the constituency togive his vote to the respondent and to canvass votes for him : Held,(i) the language of the mandate and the general background andcircumstances of this case, including the obvious consciousness of theSatguru and the respondent, of the probable and likely effect of suchcommands on the illiterate, ignorant and credulous followers of theGuru can lead only to one conclusion, viz., that it was intended toconvey to them the threat of divine displeasure and spiritual censureif they dared to disobey the farman of their supreme spiritual andreligious head ; the appeals at the meetings and the publication of theposters constituted a corrupt practice of undue influence under sec-tion 123(2); (ii) the fact that the motive which induced the Guru toissue such a farman was purely personal, was immaterial. Held also(but with some doubt), that the appeals did not constitute the corruptpractice of making a systematic appeal on the ground of religion or sectcontemplated by section 123(3). As to how far and in what circum-stances interference with the election process in this country byreligious heads on grounds of religion, caste or community can be

CORRUPT PRACTICE (2. APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF RELIGION ETC.) 8 l

considered to be due or undue interference under the law as laid downin section 123, sub-sections (2), (3), of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, is a question which has to be considered uninfluenced by theobservations made in the English cases. An appeal from a religioushead issuing a command to his followers to vote in a particular way byinducement of picus hopes of reward and by promising spiritualbenefits, divine pleasures, etc., has implicit in it a suggestion that thefollowers disobeying such a command are likely to incur divine dis-pleasure and spiritual censure. The view that mere holding out of aninducement of pious hopes, spiritual benefits and divine pleasureswould not, in the absence of spiritual threats or censure fall withinsection 123(2) is not correct. Jagajeevandas Shetly v. Sanjeeva Shettyand Others (3 E.L.R. 358), dissented from. The view expressed inMoinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi (3 E.L.R. 248) that section 123(3)applies only to cases where the appeal is made only on the ground ofreligion, doubted. A farman by a religious head would not by itselffall within section 123(2). The question in such cases is how far thereligious dignitary has kept himself within the bounds of legitimateuse of his character, power and position, with particular reference tothe class of voters sought to be influenced. If a religious head issuesa farman to his followers, then the effect of such a farman cannot bewhittled down merely because the religious head has been inspired notby a religious but by a personal grievance. Motive in such circum-stances is wholly immaterial. If the influence exercised by thereligious and spiritual head has the effect of creating in the minds ofthe voters a feeling of divine displeasure or spiritual censure then,whatever the motive, the influence would amount to undue influence.DUA, J. (Obiter).—There are two ways of looking at the questionwhether an appeal is one made on the ground of religion or sect. Oneis that the appeal to the voters should induce them to cast their voteson grounds of religion, etc.; in other words, the appeal should directthem to vote for their co-religionists or to vote or refrain from votingfor a candidate on the ground that he does or does not profess aparticular religious faith ; and the other is that the appeal to vote orto refrain from voting should be based on, or supported by, or shouldnecessarily imply, religious or communal sanctions. The latter viewappears to be more in consonance with the spirit of secularism whichpervades throughout the entire fabric of the Constitution of India andthis view is also calculated to promote and effectively carry out thebasic principles of elimination of racial, religious or communal pas-sions, prejudices and notions from the conduct or practical workingof the Government as it would purify and secularise the process of

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electing the citizens' representatives to the Parliament and the StateLegislatures and render it completely free from forces which derivesanction from appeals based on religious and communal emotions andpassions and the former view appears to be supported by the plaingrammatical construction of sub-section (3) of section 123. It is, how-ever, hoped that if the Parliament considers that appeals based onreligious and communal influences, or prejudices or supported andbacked by religious sanctions and which are calculated to induce andinfluence voters on account of pressure of such sanctions to vote or torefrain from voting, are also intended to fall within the ambit ofsection 123(3) °f -^ct 43 of 1951, then necessary steps would be takento make its intention more explicit.—RAM DIAL V. SANT LAL AND

ANOTHER, 19 E.L.R. 430.

—•—Appeal on the grounds of religion—Systematic appeal—Distri-bution of pamphlets—Particulars to be given.—As regards the place orplaces where an offensive pamphlet was distributed, it is not enoughto allege that it was distributed " throughout the constituency ". Thiswould not be sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 83(6)of the Act, as this really does not amount to mentioning any place atall. But, notwithstanding such a defect in the pleadings, if evidencewith respect to the distribution of the pamphlet at particular placeshas been led before the Tribunal by both the parties, the pleadingscannot be struck off for this defect. The question to be decided insuch a case is whether the opposite party was prejudiced in anymanner by the omission of the petitioner to specify the places wherethe distribution of the pamphlet took place —Bhagwan Datt Shastri v.Ram Ralan Gupta (11 E.L.R. 448), Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. BrijtalNandlal Biyani (10 E.L.R. 357), and Raghunath Misra v. KishoreChandra Deo Bhanj (17 E.L.R. 321) applied.—ASHFAQ ALI KHAN V.DARSAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 136.

Appeal for protection of mother cow—Whether appeal on theground of religion.—An appeal to vote for the appellant to protect themother cow is not an appeal on the ground of religion.—Lachhiram v.Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya (9 E.L.R. 149) referred to.—PANDIT K. C.SHARMA v. KRISHI PANDIT RISHABKUMAR AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 401.

-Appeal to religious minded people in general.—An appeal madeto religious minded people generally, and not merely to the followersof a particular religion, to vote for a particular candidate to protecttheir religion is not an appeal to vote on the ground of religion—PANDIT K. C. SHARMA V. KRISHI PANDIT RISHABKUMAR AND OTHERS,

20 E.L.R. 401.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (2. APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF RELIGION ETC.) 83

Appeal on the ground of religion to religious people generally.—A pamphlet, after giving a resume of the achievements of the respon-dent contained an appeal to all religious-minded people of Kashi tovote for the respondent to save the glory of Kashi, and because thecountry's position is shaky in the international sphere : Held, therewas no appeal in the pamphlet on the ground of caste, religion orcommunity.—RUSTOM SATIN V. DR. SAMPOORNANAND AND OTHERS,20 E.L.R. 221.

Appeal not to vote jor Communists as they deny God.—-A pamph-let contained an appeal to Muslims not to vote for the Communistcandidate, as Communists are enemies of the conception of God, theydeny the existence of God, have disowned every faith and religion,and have turned out lakhs of Muslims from their homes: Held, thatthe pamphlet contained an appeal on the ground of religion to refrainfrom voting for a candidate.—RUSTOM SATIN V. DR. SAMPOORNANANDAND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

An appeal by a number of Hindus to a section of the Hindus(the Agarwals) to vote for the respondent after drawing their attentionto the respondent's devotion to the Hindu religion and culture and notto vote for his rival candidate as he was a Communist, who was oppos-ed to culture, dharma and God, is an appeal on the ground of religion.—RUSTOM SATIN V. DR. SAMPOORNANAND AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

An appeal by a Samaj of Viswakarmas and Kalakars to votefor the respondent because of the services he had rendered to theirprofessions is not an appeal on the ground of caste, religion or com-munity, even though it is an appeal to a caste or community.—RUSTOM SATIN V. DR. SAMPOORNANAND AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

Appeal to religion—Appeal to prevent Muslim becoming a minister.—A Hindi daily published a news item that there was an alliance bet-ween the Communists and Muslim League to make a Muslim the ChiefMinister of the State and that if the Hindus did not vote for the res-pondent (who was a Hindu), a Muslim would become the Chief Minister:Held, that this was an appeal to the Hindus to vote for the respondentand to refrain from voting for the appellant (the Communist candidate)on the ground of religion and community.—RUSTOM SATIN V.DR. SAMPOORNANAND AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

Invoking help of God {Bhagwan Viswanath).—The respondent,the Congress candidate, published a pamphlet in which, after re-count-ing the achievements of the Congress and expressing the hope that theelectors would give their support to the Congress in the elections, hesaid " May Bhagwan Viswanath give all of us strength and wisdom to

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do our duty " : Held, that the last sentence was not an appeal to a reli-gious symbol within section 123(3).—RUSTOM SATIN V. DR. SAMPOORNA-

NAND AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

——Where a pamphlet published by a Hindu leader called uponthe Hindus to unite and support the respondent (a Hindu), and said thatthe defeat of the respondent would be the defeat of Hinduism, and thehonour of Kashi: Held, that there was a direct appeal to the electorsto vote for the respondent on the grounds of religion.—RUSTOM SATINv. DR. SAMFOORNANAND AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

Appeal to religion—Meaning of " systematic appeal"—Criticisingmeasures passed against Muslims—Systematic appeal on grounds of religionor community—"Systematic," meaning of—Criticism of policy of CongressGovernment in enacting legislative measures prejudicial to Muslims—Whether appeal on ground of religion or community.—Criticism of theCongress Government in public meetings for its administrative policyin the matter of its enforcing or passing legal measures or adoptingmethods prejudicial to Muslims (e.g., the passing of the Cattle Preserv-ation Act which prohibits cow-slaughter, singing of Ramdhun in schools,banning burial of dead bodies etc.), does not by itself amount to anappeal to Muslims to vote or refrain from voting on the ground ofcaste, race.icommunity or religion, within the meaning of section 123(3).Where both the rival candidates were Muslims and there was no evidenceas to the actual statements that were made at such meetings and it wasnot possible to find definitely whether only the policy of the CongressGovernment in the matter of passing or enforcing legislation prejudi-cial to Muslims was criticised, or an appeal was made to vote or refrainfrom voting on the ground of religion or community under the garb ofdiscussing such measures : Held, that the respondent cannot be heldguilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(3): Ghayur AH Khan v.Keshav Gupta (16 E.L.R. 154) followed. Sardul Singh Caveeshar v.Hukam Singh and Others (6 E.L.R. 316) distinguished. The Representa-tion of the People Act does not describe what is a systematic appeal onthe ground of community or religion but the word "systematic" itselfsignifies that the propaganda or appeal should not be casual a perfunc-tory in its nature but should be followed as a system or as part of aplan to carry on such communal propaganda or impeachment of aparty or an individual on the ground of religion or community. NazmulHaque v. Amjad AH and Others (18 E.L.R. 253) reversed.—AMJAD ALIv. NAZMUL HAQUE : JAHANUDDIN AHMED AND ANOTHER V. NAZMULHAQUE, 21 E.L.R. 345.

Appeal to prevent cow slaughter and selling of cow's bones.—A

pamphlet contained the following statements, namely: " The Pakistanis

CORRUPT PRACTICE (2. APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF RELIGION ETC.) 85

are threatening war by invading Kashmir and are adopting variousways to dismember the unity of India by sending secret agents andspies. Under such circumstances it becomes the unavoidable duty ofevery patriot to strengthen the hands of the Government. Exceptingthe Congress there is no other party which has got candidates enoughto form the Government. Hence it is indisputable that people canserve the country best by casting their votes in the ballot boxes of ' apair of bullocks with a yoke on '. Of course it can give pleasure tothe Pakistanis if people cast their votes in ballot boxes bearing othersymbols, because it will appear a treason to our country Bharat. Thepublic should not be deceived by anybody. The bone contractor, ShriHaji Abdul Wahid was defeated in the last election and lost hissecurity even." The pamphlet linked up the petitioner with anotherHindu candidate: Held, that the statements did not constitute anappeal on the ground of community within section 123(4) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951. Another pamphlet containeda statement that the petitioner was a Pakistani, that he was a bonecontractor and would help cow-slaughter, and that whosoever willvote for him will be visited with the sin of cow-slaughter and treasonto Bharata Mata and will become an object of divine displeasure andwill have to undergo the sufferings of hell: Held, that the statementcontained serious imputations on the personal character of the peti-tioner within section 123(4) a nd was also an attempt to exercise undueinfluence within section 123(2), and an appeal of a communal characterwithin section 123(3).—HAJI ABDUL WAHID V. B. V. KESKAR ANDANOTHER, 21 E.L.R. 409.

General appeal to religion.—An appeal that to vote in a certainmanner would be a religious act and failure to vote in that mannerwould be against religion is an appeal on the ground of religion.—SHUBNATH DEOGAM v. RAM NARAIN PRASAD YADAV AND OTHERS, 22E.L.R. 1. [S.C.]

——Meaning of " for the furtherance of the prospects of that candi-date's election. ".—The words " for the furtherance of the prospects ofthat candidate's election " in the concluding portion of section 123(3)of the Act can only apply in the context of the sub-section to thethird category mentioned in the sub-section, namely, " by any otherperson with the consent of a candidate or his election agent ". Theword " candidate " is here used in contradistinction with his electionagent and any other person, and, therefore, the use of the words " thatcandidate's election " refers to the candidate who has given his consentto another person. There is also no reason why a candidate shouldnot come in the third category of " any other person with the consent

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of a candidate or his election agent ", simply because he is also acandidate. Where it was alleged that A and B, who were candidates,made a systematic appeal on the grounds of religion for the further-ance of the prospects of C, another candidate, with the consent of C :Held, that there was an allegation of a corrupt practice within sec-tion 123(3) of the Act and A and B were necessary parties.—BABURAO v. M. S. ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 321.

Circulating booklet containing threats, systematic appeal toreligion, false statements as to character—Candidate's liability for acts ofsupporters—Inference of consent from knowledge and not prohibitingcirculation—Undue influence—Threatening interested persons—Religiousappeal—Appealing for votes for Congress on the ground that their symbol" bullock " is Siva's vahan and a deity of Hindus.—(1) The respondentwho was a candidate set up by the Congress Party, and the petitionerwho was set up by the Ganatantra Party, contested at an election,and, as the respondent was declared elected, the petitioner filed anelection petition for having the election of the respondent declaredvoid on the ground that the respondent had committed the corruptpractices of undue influence by threat and intimidation, systematicappeal in the name of religion, use of religious symbols, publishingfalse statements as to character and conduct, etc. The allegation inthe petition was that the respondent and his supporters (whose nameswere given) published a booklet containing the following statements :" Without any consideration for your own and others, you acted as adevil. Would anybody now be able to save you if you are beatenmercilessly. Having done all the above mischiefs, now you are appeal-ing to the electors for their vote as a shameless person. If there werea grain of shame left in you, you would not have progressed at all.You are a thief and a badamas and you should not remain in our land.You who belong to the Ganatantra Party are only fit for the gallows.The leader of your party was making money by selling widows is well-known to the raiyats. Since there is not a bit of sense left in you, youare now seeking votes of these raiyats of Koraput. They will no longerbe dissuaded by your words. The raiyats of the constituency are boundto take revenge on you." It was admitted by the respondent that thebooklet was published with his previous knowledge and that he didnot ask his supporters to stop its circulation even after the book wasshown to him, and the evidence showed that it was circulated at meet-ings at which he had addressed : Held, that the publication of thebooklet amounted to commission of the corrupt practice of undueinfluence as denned in section i23(2)(a)(i), and the evidence in the caseand the admissions of the respondent were sufficient to show that the

CORRUPT PRACTICE (2. APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF RELIGION ETC.) 87

corrupt practice was committed by the respondent's supporters withhis consent; and even though there was no express allegation andproof of consent of the respondent, the election was liable to be setaside under section IOO(I)(6). (2) The booklet contained a statementthat the bullock which was the symbol of the Congress Party was theVahan of Lord Shiva and a deity of the Hindus and therefore all mustvote for the Congress: Held, that the circulation of the bookletamounted to the corrupt practice of systematic appeal on the groundof religion and the use of a religious symbol, within the meaning ofsection 123(3). (3) The booklet contained statements to the effect thatthe petitioner had been sucking the blood of raiyats by employing bethilabour and that he had aligned with Pakistan to create disturbances,which statements were found to be false and not believed to be true :Held, that the statements related to the personal character and conductof the petitioner and the respondent was guilty of a corrupt practiceunder section 123(4). (4) Where there was a difference of 511 votesbetween the respondent who was declared elected and the petitioner,and the respondent was found guilty of several corrupt practices:Held, that though the respondent's election could be set aside, thepetitioner could not be declared elected unless there was sufficientevidence to show that at least 255 votes would have gone to the peti-tioner if the corrupt practices had not been committed. (5) In order toconstitute undue influence, a threat must be serious and deliberatelyuttered with the intention of carrying it into effect. The definitionof " undue influence " in the Representation of the People Act israther wide in its terms and contemplates four distinct forms of inter-ference with the free exercise of any electoral right, viz., directinterference, indirect interference, direct attempt at interference andindirect attempt at interference. There is nothing in the definitionthat such interference or attempt at interference should be by anymethod of compulsion and it definitely includes methods of induce-ment wherein there may not be any compulsion at all. The induce-ment again must be of such powerful type as would leave no free willto the voter in the exercise of his electoral right. Section 123 of theAct is wider in its connotation than section 101 of the English Act.While the English Act contemplates coercion and fraudulent device,the Indian Act under sub-section (2) of section 123 intends to coverboth coercion and undue influence as understood by the statute law,that is, the Indian Contract Act (Act 9 of 1872). Thus, the questionfor consideration in cases of undue influence is whether there was anydirect or indirect interference or attempt at interference on the partof the returned candidate or his agent or on the part of any other

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person with the free exercise of the electoral right of the voters.While under the English practice, the petitioner is not obliged tostate particulars of corrupt practices in his petition, under section 83(2)

a statement of those particulars must be made in the petition in aseparate list annexed thereto. But this difference is more a matter ofform than of substance, as section 83(3) provides for particulars beingcalled for and furnished in the course of the proceedings, and doesnot affect the power of the Tribunal to allow new instances to thepleadings.—ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN V. RADHA KRUSHNA BISWAS ROY,19 E.L.R. 278.

Systematic appeal on grounds of religion and community—Nature of particulars required.—A charge that the respondent had madesystematic appeals to persons to vote and to refrain from voting onthe grounds of community and religion cannot be struck off as vaguemerely because the exact words used in the appeal are not given,provided other particulars such as the persons who made the appeal,the dates and places in which the appeals were made, etc., are given.Such particulars could moreover be amplified or clarified and theactual words used could be proved at the trial.—MADAN LAL V. SYEDZARGHAM HAIDER AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 456.

Systematic appeal on ground of community—Paharis, whether a" community "—Though the customs and ceremonies of Paharis (peopleliving in the hills) are different from those living in the plains, Paharisdo not constitute a " community " within the meaning of section 123(3).An appeal to Pahari electors to vote in favour of a Pahari who wasborn and bred up in the hills and would work zealously for. theamelioration of the economic conditions and educational backwardnessof Paharis, does not constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(3).—N. L. VERMA v. MUNI LAL AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 495.

Appeal on grounds of religion or community—Construction ofappeal—Criticisms of political party to be distinguished—Appeal tomembers of caste or community—Not necessarily appeal on the ground ofcaste or community.—Even if an appeal is made to the members of areligion or community it will come within the mischief of section 123(3)of the Representation of the People Act only if the appeal is made onthe ground of religion, or community and not merely on the ground ofthe commission of misdeeds or supposed misdeeds by the members of aparticular political party. There may be cases where, in the garb ofcriticism of the acts or supposed acts of a political party, an attemptis made to make an appeal on the ground of religion. If such is thecase, the appeal may be held to fall within the mischief of section 123

CORRUPT PRACTICE (2. APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF RELIGION ETC.) 89

of the Act. The contents of the particular document have, there-fore, to be taken as a whole and, after consideration of the entiredocument, a decision has to be arrived at whether the document con-tains merely a criticism of the actions of a political party or it is reallyan appeal on ground of religion or community.—GHAYUR ALI KHAN V.KESHAV GUPTA,16 E.L.R. 154.

Appeal on grounds of community.—Where a statement readthus : " Brother workers, in the name of Maharashtra and 105 martyrsdo not go out on n t h without giving votes and do not betray Sam-yukta Maharashtra : " Held, that such an appeal was neither an appealto the voters to vote on grounds of community, nor did it amount toundue influence.—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS,17 E.L.R. 373-

Appeal on grounds of religion, caste or community—Marathaswhether a caste—" Systematic ", " community " meanings of.—An appealin a newspaper over the signature of the respondent contained thefollowing statements: " Lions of Maharashtra, make the Congressbullocks bolt away. " " Saints and warriors of Maharashtra, give usyour blessings, " " Worship the Shivashakti (power of Shivaji) of Maha-rashtra with the bel leaves of your votes. " This was followed by thephotographs of persons who were killed in the Bombay firing with aheading " Marathas of Bombay, take revenge of this devilish murder,"and the words " the Congress ballot box is besmeared with the blood ofthe martyrs—It is smeared with the blood of the Marathas. " Held,(i) that though these statements and pictures were meant to be anappeal to the sentiments of the voters, the publication of these state-ments and pictures in the issue of the newspaper and the publicationof the poster on the voting day did not amount to undue influence asthey did not involve any direct or indirect interference with theelectors' right to freely exercise their power to vote ; (ii) that in con-struing the word " community " in section 123(3) the word must begiven its natural meaning and it cannot, in the context, be confined toa religious community only and an appeal to the " Marathas " as acaste, would fall within the mischief of this clause, but these appealswere not intended to be addressed to the caste and community of Mara-thas or intended to be an appeal to the Marathi speaking electors tovote on the ground of their being a separate community, and the findingof the Election Tribunal that these publications did not fall withinsection 123(3) °f the Act was correct. Held, further, that the expression"systematic" in section 123(3) involves an element of planning, of methodof some continuity or persistence and statements published on the day

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of the election only, could not constitute a systematic appeal.—SUDHIRLAXMAN HENDRE v. S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

Appeal on grounds of caste or community—-Appeal to particularcaste or community not to vote for candidate of Congress Party on the groundof misdeeds of Congress against that caste or community—Whether corruptpractice—Appeals by caste associations—When candidate liMe—Falsepropaganda that rival party has been defeated, effect of.—(1) Section 123(3)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, only prohibits asystematic appeal to vote or refrain from voting on grounds ofcaste, race, community or religion. It does not prohibit an appealto vote or refrain from voting on the grounds of misdeeds orsupposed misdeeds of a political party {e.g., Congress Party) eventhough the appeal may be directed to the members of a parti-cular caste or community, and is based on the alleged misdeedsof that party against that particular caste or community. GhayurAH Khan v. Keshav Gupta (16 E.L.R. 154) followed. (2) Speechesin meetings of a federation of backward castes including Hindus,Muslims and members of other castes, who are economically and sociallybackward, criticising the Congress for not having fairly treated suchcastes and helped the members of such castes, in which no appeal ismade to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate do notcome within section 123(3). (3) A candidate belonging to a particularcaste cannot be held guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(3)and his election declared void under section ioo(i)(i) merely becausean association or sabha of that caste issued pamphlets containing anappeal to the members of that caste not to vote for the candidate setup by another party if there is nothing to show that the candidatehimself or his election agent or any other person with their consenthad printed or circulated such pamphlets or made such an appeal.(4) The election cannot be set aside under section ioo{i){d){ii), if thereare no averments in the petition and proof that other persons had madesuch appeal without the candidate's consent, and that the result of theelection was materially affected thereby. (5) Carrying on a propagandathat a particular party has been defeated in the elections and that thereis no use voting for that party, does not amount to a corrupt practiceunder any of the clauses of section 123, even though such propagandais false and believed to be false.—RAJA VIJAY KUMAR TRIPATHI AND

ANOTHER V. RAM SARAN YADAV AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 289.

Appeal to community—Maharashtrians whether a community——Meaning of " community ".—An appeal to " Maharashtrians " is notan appeal on the ground of race, caste or community, as Maharash-trians include all people residing in Maharashtra, whatever their race,

CORRUPT PRACTICE (2. APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF RELIGION ETC.) 0,1

caste, community or religion may be. The word " community " insection 123(3) must be given a narrower meaning than the dictionarymeaning of a body of persons having a common interest. " Maharashtrians " are not a distinct community within section 123(3).—KATARIA TAKANDAS HEMRAJ v. PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18E.L.R. 403.

Appeal on grounds of religion or community—Meaning of"community"—Muslims, whether a "community"—Appeal to vote forMuslim candidate on the ground that he is a Muslim—-Nature of the corruptpractice. (1) Where systematic appeals were made by the appellant(who was a Muslim) and other Muslims at meetings at which theappellant was also present, requesting the people who had assembled(who were mostly Muslims) to vote for the appellant on the groundof his religion or on the ground of his belonging to the Muslim com-munity, and on the ground of his services to the Muslim community :Held, that the appellant was guilty of the corrupt practice undersection 123(3) 0 I the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Theexpression "Muslim community " signifies that the constitution of thecommunity is based on the ground of there being a common religionand if an appeal is made to the members of the Muslim community tovote on the ground of their being Muslims, the appeal is really anappeal on the ground of religion, the community itself having beenconstituted on the ground of religion. Though usually the word" community " in section 123(3) would refer to communities formedon the basis of common interest other than religion like residence in aparticular locality {e.g., the Bengali community or the Punjabi com-munity), in India persons belonging to the same religion are alsoreferred to as being members of a community. ASHFAQ ALI KHAN V.DARSHAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 136.

Appeal to caste and appeal on the ground of caste—Difference.—Though an appeal by a prominent Yadava to his " Yadava brethren "to do their duty to the country by voting for the Congress is anappeal to a caste or community, it is not an appeal on the ground ofreligion, caste or community.—RUSTOM SATIN V. DR. SAMPOORNANANDAND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

Appeal on the ground of community—Meaning of " community"—Appeal to Sindhies to vote for Sindhies.—Having regard to theintention of the Legislature and to the association of the words "caste,race and religion " with the word " community," the meaning of theword "community" must be restricted, and it should be read asmeaning a body which has been formed, organised or has come intoexistence on the basis of caste, race or religion or any other factor

g2 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

contributing or leading to the division of the nation. It is only whenthe organisation of the community is such as aims to divide thecitizens of the country and releases forces antagonistic to the unity ofthe country that it comes within the purview of section 123(3).—KHILUMAL TOPANDAS v. ARJUNDAS TULSIDAS, 22 E.L.R. 404.

Where refugees from Sind who were mostly Sindhies formedthemselves into a party called the Pursharthi Panchayat and wasrecognised as a political party by the Election Commission : Held, thatan appeal by a member of the party to the other members of theparty to vote for him, was not appeal to Sindhies on the ground of"community" within the meaning of section 123(3) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951.—KHILUMAL TOPANDAS V. ARJUNDASTULSIDAS, 22 E.L.R. 404.

Merely bringing out that a candidate belongs to a particularcommunity.—From the mere fact that an appeal brings out the factthat a person belongs to a particular community to the notice of thepublic, it cannot be inferred that votes were being solicited on com-munal grounds.—BHIM RAO V. ANKUSH RAO, 22 E.L.R. 385.

Appeals decrying Congress as a religious and communal organi-sation—Systematic appeal on the ground of community or caste—Publish-ing statement that Congres is a communal organisation and the publicshould not vote for the Congress candidate—Whether appeal on the groundof community—Appeal on the ground of caste—Essentials.—Where, in anelection petition filed by an unsuccessful Congress candidate it wasalleged that, with the concurrence of the respondent and in hisinterests, it was published in a newspaper that the Congress was acommunal organisation and that the Marathwada Congress had fallena prey to rank communalism, and that the respondent had therefore,committed the corrupt practice of having made a systematic appealon the ground of community, within section 123(3) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951: Held, that, though the appeal was madein the interests of the respondent on the ground that the petitioner wascommunal-minded and the organisation which had put him up was acommunal organisation, it was not an appeal on the ground of com-munity or caste ; on the other hand, its object was to decry communalismand to appeal to the voters not to vote for one who has been put up bya communal organisation, and the allegation did not therefore fallwithin section 123(3).—BHIM RAO V. ANKUSH RAO, 22 E.L.R. 385.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (3. Bribery)

Bribery.—Burden of proof—Necessity of strict proof—In electionpetitions there is, so far as they relate to charges of corrupt

CORRUPT PRACTICE (3. BRIBERY) 0,3

practices, a very great similarity of a criminal trial and consequently,the burden lies fairly heavy on the petitioner to prove the chargeof a corrupt practice more or less with the same amount of certaintyas would be required from the prosecution <to prove a criminal chargeof bribery :—GURBANTA SINGH V. PIARA RAM AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R.350.

Necessity of clear proof.—Clear and unequivocal proof isrequired before a case of bribery will be held to have been established.It was alleged in an election petition that the respondent had, inpursuance of a demand made by Harijans at a meeting addressed byher, attended the auspicious digging ceremony of a well for Harijans,and while performing the ceremony, promised to have a well construct-ed for Harijans at the village, after the elections were over. Therewas no specific allegation that there was a promise to give any financialhelp or that the promise was made for inducing the Harijans to votefor her : Held, (i) that the allegations were not sufficient to establisha case of bribery and the Tribunal should have called for further andbetter particulars; (ii) that, as there was no evidence to show thecommission of a corrupt practice as pleaded in the petition, viz., that apromise was made at the time of the ceremony of digging the well, theTribunal should have found this issue against the petitioner: Held,further (on the facts), that even assuming that the parties had under-stood that the allegation in the petition was that the promise wasmade at the meeting addressed by the respondent, there was no evid-ence to substantiate this case.—SARLA DEVI PATHAK V. BIRENDRA

SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 275.Essentials of the charge—Necessity of clear evidence—Giving

money for voting.—Giving money for voting, or for not voting for acandidate is bribery, but to constitute bribery the inducement to voteor refrain from voting must be for a particular person. The fact ofbribery must also be proved by clear and unequivocal evidence by thepetitioner who wants to avoid the election.—DHARANIDHAR MOHAPATRA

v. PRADIPTA KISHORE DAS AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R.. 427.Burden of proof of bribery—Duty to adduce evidence in rebuttal—

Failure of petitioner to examine himself.—Proof of bribery in an electionproceeding should be of the standard required in a criminal case, andit is necessary that the petitioner himself should prove beyond pos-sibility of reasonable doubt that the respondent was guilty of suchcorrupt practice. It may be advisable and sometimes even necessaryfor the respondent against whom a corrupt practice of bribery is allegedto adduce evidence in rebuttal or to examine himself, but failure toexamine himself can be taken into consideration in weighing the

94 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

evidence only. It cannot, as in a civil case, be implied therefrom thatthe charge of bribery has been established against the respondent.—RAGHUNATH MISRA v. KISHORE CHANDRA DEO BHANJ AND OTHERS.

17 E.L.R. 321.

Trifling and customary modes oj entertainment.—Trifling andcustomary modes of entertainment and courtesy as the offer of bidis orcigarettes or a handful of gur or gram "by a mere volunteer to a workeror a voter do not amount to bribery.—SHRI KRISHNA V. RAJESHWAR

SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 1.

• Gift of land to Bhoodan Samiti, whether bribery.— Gift of landby a candidate to the Bhoodan Samiti does not amount to " bribery "within the meaning of section 123(1) of the Representation of thePeople Act.—MAST RAM V. S. IQBAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 34.

Promise to redress grievances if votes are cast for particular candi-date—Whether bribery or undue influence.—General promises by theagents and workers of a candidate or by the Ministers or DeputyMinisters, to redress certain public grievances or to erect certainpublic amenities like hospitals, if the electors voted for the candidatewho has been put up by that party, do not amount to bribery or undueinfluence within the meaning of section 123(2) of the Representationof the People Act; such promises are promises of public action withinthe meaning of the proviso to section 123(2). It is the right and pri-vilege of every candidate and every party setting up a candidate toput before the electorate his or its views and programme so that theelectorate may decide which of the rival candidates to prefer, and theobject of the proviso to clause (6) of section 123(2) is to protect thisright.—RADHA KRISHNA SHUKLA AND ANOTHER V. TARA CHAND

MAHESHWAR AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 378.

• " Extensive prevalence "—Proof of a few instances, whethersufficient.—The extensive prevalence of bribery and undue influencecannot be established by proving a few instances only ; they must havebeen so general and indiscriminate as to deprive the electorate of thefreedom of election.—RADHA KRISHNA SHUKLA AND ANOTHER V. TARACHAND MAHESHWAR AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 378.

Payments to voters, engaged as workers—When amounts tobribery—Payments reasonable and shown in accounts.—Employment ofvoters as workers and payments to them would be bribery only if suchemployment is a colourable one. If the payment is commensuratewith the work done, and the number of voters engaged as workers iscommensurate with the work to be done in the constituency, thenpayment to such workers cannot be bribery. Even under the law in

CORRUPT PRACTICE (3. BRIBERY) 95

India, payment of legal expenses such as maintenance and travellingexpenses to workers who are voters cannot be said to constitutebribery. If a voter is doing the work of putting up posters, etc, andhe is paid a reasonable labour charges for the said work and if moneyis paid towards that labour styling it as parisramika (labour charges) itcannot be held that it is a remuneration paid to a canvassing agent.Per NARASIMHAM, C.J.—If a candidate engages a canvasser and payshim remuneration for the purpose of inducing the voters to vote forhim, such engagement is made with the object of indirectly inducingthe electors to vote as described in section 123(1) and the paymentmay amount to bribery. But under the Explanation to section 123(1)the payment of any expense bona fide incurred at or for the purpose ofthe election and duly entered in the accounts of election expenseswould not be bribery. BALAKRISHNA RAO, J.—Where there is noevidence that the workers of a candidate induced any of the voters tovote for him, it cannot be said that paying the worker, even assumingthat it is a remuneration to the said worker, is an indirect inducementto the elector other than the worker to vote for him. The expression" directly or indirectly " only refers to the person who is the recipientof the gratification.—PYARI MOHAN DAS V. DURGA SANKAR DAS

AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 338.

•" Inducing to vote "—Mere propaganda whether inducement.—" Inducing " to vote is something different from merely doing pro-paganda work to vote for a candidate. To come under section 123,clause (1) the act done by the person who was paid the gratification,directly or indirectly, must be something more than mere asking theelectors to vote for the candidate. There must be some influencebrought to bear upon the will of the voter.—PYARI MOHAN DAS V.

DURGA SANKAR DAS AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 338.

Government granting relief to voters to induce them to votefor candidate set up by ruling party—Whether corrupt practice.—Theact of a Government in giving relief or special benefits to the voters ofa particular locality or section of the public may amount to corruptpractice within section 123(1) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, if that act is done with the motive of inducing them to votefor the candidate set up by the ruling party or in pursuance of abargain that they should vote for that candidate in consideration ofthe relief or benefit given by the Government. The mere fact, how-ever, that the relief or benefit was given on the eve of, or during,elections does not raise any presumption that the reliefer benefit wasgiven for the purpose of inducing the voters to vote for the candidateset up by the ruling party. A Minister of a State addressed a meeting

96 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

at which he canvassed support for the respondent, the candidate setup by the Congress Party. The salt traders of the locality brought tohis notice the deterioration of salt trade in the locality. The quota ofsalt for the locality was raised from 20 to 50 per cent, one week beforethe date fixed for the polling and a pamphlet stating that the quotahad been increased to 50 per cent, by the Congress Government waswidely circulated before the election by the salt traders and workersof the respondent: Held, that, as the evidence did not prove that thequota was increased at the request of the respondent or for thepurpose of inducing the salt traders to vote for the respondent or asconsideration for getting their votes, the act of the Government inincreasing the quota did not amount to a corrupt practice undersection 123(1). Held also, that, as a candidate is entitled to makea propaganda about the achievements of his party and to publish thebenefits conferred by his party, in order to secure votes in his favour,the publication of the pamphlet also did not amount to a corruptpractice. Wigan case (4 O'M. & H. 1), Kingston case (6 O'M & H. 374)and Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder and Others (11 E.L.R. 208)referred to.—SOOWALAL V. P. K. CHAUDHARY AND OTHERS,21 E.L.R. 137.

Engaging paid canvassers—Giving rewards to canvassers—English and Indian law.—Payments of sums of money to canvassersamount to "bribery" within section 123(1) of the Representation ofthe People Act, only if there is material to show that these paymentswere not made to meet the expenses of the canvassers, but as gratifica-tion for inducing the electors to vote for the candidate. Under theEnglish law, the employment of a paid canvasser is expresslyprohibited by section 96 of the U. K. Representation of the PeopleAct, 1949, whereas under the Indian law, such prohibition has to beimplied from the language of section 123(1) of the Act. In any event,in the absence of direct evidence either of persons who received thesums of money from the candidate or of persons who had personalknowledge that such payments were made as rewards and not towardsexpenses, it cannot beheld from the mere entries in the account booksthat the sums were paid by way of rewards to the workers of theappellant.—AKSHAYA NARAYAN PRAHARAJ V. MAHESWAR BAG,16 E.L.R. 337.

Feeding of workers.—Feeding of workers does not amount tothe corrupt practice of bribery.—RAGHUNATH MISRA V. KISHORECHANDRA DEO BHANJ AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 321.

Feeding of electors—When constitutes bribery—Burden of proofthat persons fed were electors of the constituency.'—Evidence which

CORRUPT PRACTICE (3 . BRIBERY) 97

merely shows that certain persons were fed by a candidate at certainplaces is not sufficient to bring home a corrupt practice of briberyunder section I23(i)(i), against that candidate; there must further beevidence to show that the persons fed were electors in the constituencyfor which the candidate was standing. If workers also happened tobe the electors in the same constituency, the burden may lie on thecandidate to show that the feeding was purely and simply becausethose electors were his workers and not for the purpose of inducingthose persons to vote in his favour. On the other hand, if the personsfed are not electors in the constituency at all, their feeding by thecandidate cannot be held to be for the purpose of influencing thevoting by the electors, as contemplated by section i23(i)(6) of the Act.The burden is on the election petitioner to prove that the personswho were entertained by the successful candidate were electors in thesense that their names were on the electoral roll of the constituency.It cannot be presumed that the persons fed were electors in theconstituency concerned.—DIN DAYAL V. BENI PRASAD AND ANOTHER,15 E.L.R. 131.

Promise to construct a well.—A promise by a candidate toconstruct a well in a village for the use of the villagers if they wouldvote for him and not for his rival, comes within the definition of" bribery " in section 123(1) of the Act.—MAGANLAL BAGDI V. HARIVISHNU KAMATH, 15 E.L.R. 205.

Chairman of Local Board sanctioning construction of wells.—The respondent who was the Chairman of a Local Board, on the eveof his election, sanctioned the construction of wells and tube wells,and gave financial help to primary schools, but the evidence showedthat these works were duly sanctioned by the Board in the normalcourse of business: Held, that it cannot be said that the respondenthad given any illegal gratification to the residents of the Local Boardfor obtaining their votes and he was not guilty of the corrupt practiceof bribery.—BIRESH MISRA V. RAM NATH SARMA AND OTHERS,17 E.L.R. 243.

Publishing photos in newspaper.—The publication of a person'sphotograph in a newspaper does not amount to any reward or gratifi-cation to the person at all, and would not amount to a corrupt practiceof bribery within section 123(1) of the Act.—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDREv. S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

Promise of help to retain old mosque as temple and for gettinglands.—A promise to the Harijans of a locality by a candidate whenhe is canvassing for votes, that he would do his best to help them in

ELD-13

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the matter of retaining an old mosque as a temple and for getting landsfor building houses does not amount to " bribery". It is a kind ofpromise which any candidate is entitled to give to any section of hiselectors.—BALWANT RAI TAYAL V. BISHAN SAROOP AND ANOTHER,

17 E.L.R. 101.

Offer of gratification for withdrawal.—Where a candidate whowithdraws his candidature receives any gratification or offer ofgratification from another candidate, the question whether the candi-date who offered or gave the gratification is guilty of the corruptpractice of bribery depends on the state of mind of the candidate whomade the offer or gave the gratification. He would be guilty of thecorrupt practice of bribery only if the offer or payment was madewith the object, directly or indirectly, of inducing the other candi-date not to stand. There were three candidates for an election, viz.,the first respondent who was the official candidate of the Maha GujaratParishad, the second respondent who was the Congress nominee, and thethird respondent another Maha Gujarat candidate. In order to avoid asplitting up of the votes for Maha Gujarat the first and third respond-ents agreed to refer the matter as to who should withdraw to the arbitra-tion of three persons and they also agreed that the candidate who hadto withdraw in accordance with the award of the arbitrators shouldbe paid by the other candidate, Rs. 3,500 towards his election expenses.In pursuance of this agreement the matter was referred to arbitrationand the first respondent who was permitted by the arbitrators to stand,gave a cheque for Rs. 3,500 to the third respondent. The first respon-dent was successful in the election, and the second respondent, thedefeated candidate, presented an election petition for declaring theelection of the first respondent void on the ground that by giving thecheque for Rs. 3,500 to the third respondent, the first respondent hadcommitted the corrupt practice of bribery : Held, (i) that, since thepayment of Rs. 3,500 to the withdrawing candidate was also one ofthe conditions upon which the parties agreed that one of them shouldwithdraw and the matter should be referred to arbitration, the agree-ment to pay Rs. 3,500 cannot be regarded as an independent contractwhich had nothing to do with the withdrawal in pursuance of theaward ; on the other hand, it was an inducement for the withdrawingcandidate, whoever that might be, to withdraw his candidature, andthe candidate who made the offer and carried it out was guilty of thecorrupt practice of bribery. Held, also, that the fact that, under theagreement the offer of either party to the other was a contingent oneand depended upon the result of the award, was immaterial because theoffer became operative and unconditional as soon as the award was

CORRUPT PRACTICE (3. BRIBERY) 99

made.—AHMEDMIYA SHERUMIYA SHAIKH V. CHHIPPA IBRAHIM NURAJI

AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 218.——Rival candidate induced to withdraw by bribery—Votes obtained

by returned candidate whether obtained by corrupt practice.—In an elec-tion the respondent got 19,322 votes and the petitioner got 17,642votes. The election of the respondent was declared void on theground that he had induced another candidate to withdraw by com-mitting a corrupt practice : Held, (i) that the votes obtained by therespondent could not be held to have been obtained by him by acorrupt practice, though he had induced the other candidate to with-draw by committing a corrupt practice; (ii) it could not be presumed,in the absence of evidence to that effect, that if the candidate whohad withdrawn had not done so, more than 1,680 voters would havevoted for him and thereby the petitioner would have obtained amajority; (iii) unless it was established as a fact that 1,680 votes outof the votes which went to the first respondent would not have gone tohim but would have gone to the candidate who had withdrawn, if hehad stood, the petitioner could not be declared to be duly elected.—AHMEDMIYA SHERUMIYA SHAIKH V. CHHIPPA IBRAHIM NURAJI AND

OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 218.Charitable acts—Distribution of sweets.—Mere distribution of

sweets by a candidate to children who participated in processions andraising slogans in his favour would not by itself amount to the corruptpractice of bribery, even though such acts may increase the popularityof the candidate amongst his electors and might result in indirectpropaganda for him, and the candidate might even have knowledge ofthis fact.—BRAJ BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER V. RAJA ANAND BRAHMA

SHAH AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 225.Charitable acts—English and Indian law.—Whatever may be

the position in England, under section I23(i)(a) of the Representationof the People Act of India it is the object of the act which determineswhether it amounts to bribery and unless the object is to induce anelector to vote or refrain from voting or to reward him for havingdone so, acts of charity would not amount to bribery.—BRAJ BHUSHAN

AND ANOTHER V. RAJA ANAND BRAHMA SHAH AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R.225.

Offer to renovate Dargah.—An offer or promise by a candidateto repair and renovate a Dargah with the object of inducing theMuslim voters in the locality to help him in his election, if established,whether carried out or not after his success in the election, would fallunder section 123(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,

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and would be a ground for setting aside his election under section100(1) of the Representation of the People Act.—KATARIA TAKANDASHEMRAJ v. PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

Employing voters as workers for remuneration.—Employingvoters as workers on remuneration would not amount to bribery undersection 123(1) unless it is established that they were so employed bythe candidate with the object of inducing them to vote in his favouror to refrain from voting at the election.—KATARIA TAKANDASHEMRAJ V. PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

Burden of proof—Proof of single act sufficient—Magnitude of actirrelevant—Nature of evidence required—Particulars.—Due proof of asingle act of bribery by or with the knowledge and consent of thecandidate or by his agents, however insignificant that act may be, issufficient to invalidate the election. The judges are not at liberty toweigh its importance nor can they allow any excuse, whatever thecircumstances may be, such as they can allow in certain conditions incases of treating or undue influence by agents. For this reason clearand unequivocal proof is required before a case of bribery will be heldto have been established. Suspicion is not sufficient, and the confessionof the person alleged to have been bribed is not conclusive. Bribery,however, may be implied from the circumstances of the case, and thecourt is not bound by the strict practice applicable to criminal cases,but may act on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. It is theduty of the court to find out from the whole evidence the true and realnature of the transaction. Circumstantial evidence is, however, notexcluded but must be such evidence as would enable a court to come toa conclusive finding and could not be based on mere suspicion. In anyallegation of bribery it must be shown that an elector or voter has beeninduced directly or indirectly to vote or refrain from voting by anypromises by and on behalf of the candidate. The name of the voterwho has been so induced would therefore be a necessary particular inany pleading wherein an allegation of bribery is made.—V. RAMA-CHANDRA RAO v. V. B. RAJU AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R. 358.

Promise to support a candidate in the next election if he withdrew—Whether amounts to "bribery."—Where an old member of the Congresswho was not given a Congress ticket stood as an Independent candi-date, but later on withdrew his candidature in order to avoid atriangular fight between the Socialist, the Independent and the Congresscandidates and to uphold the prestige of the Congress, after getting aletter from the Congress candidate and some prominent Congressmencontaining a request to him to withdraw and an assurance that theywill support him as a Congress candidate in the next elections and will

CORRUPT PRACTICE (3. BRIBERY) IOI

appeal to the Congress authorities to select him for the same, withdrewhis candidature: Held, that the letter did not contain any offer orpromise of gratification to the Independent candidate for withdrawalof his candidature, and the Congress candidate was not guilty of thecorrupt practice of bribery or undue influence under section 123(1) or(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The promise of aseat in the next elections is more a pious wish than a promise of agratification.—GOKULANANDA PRAHARAJ V. JOGESH CHANDRA ROUT ANDANOTHER, 18 E.L.R. 76.

Promise to get benefits to the local public—Whether " bribery "—Declaration of public policy and promise of gratification distinguished.—A promise relating to a public action which does not bring any privateor personal benefits to a voter, or a declaration of public policy cannotpossibly be deemed to be an offer of a gratification to any of the voterswithin the meaning of the word "gratification " as used and defined insection 123(1) of the Representation of the People Act. Where a candi-date pointed out that the election of a person other than a member ofthe Congress Party had not proved beneficial to the constituency andthat if he was elected he would obtain such benefit because he was amember of the Congress Party and there was no threat that he will usehis influence as a Congress member or would influence the Ministers tostop Government from carrying out schemes for the benefit of hisconstituency or in other ways obstruct any such schemes, if he was notelected: Held, that the candidate was not guilty of a corrupt practiceunder section 123(1) or (2). A promise of public action has been specifi-cally excluded by the Legislature from being considered as interferencewith an electoral right amounting to the corrupt practice of undueinfluence. This specific provision necessarily implies that the Legisla-ture intended that propaganda relating to a promise of public actionshould be freely permitted. A promise by a candidate that if he waselected he would see that expenditure on development plans wasincurred in his constituency is a promise which is permissible underthe Representation of the People Act and does not constitute the com-mission of a corrupt practice.—GANGADHAR MAITHANI V. NARENDRASINGH BHANDARI, 18 E.L.R. 124.

Acceptance of bribe, whether corrupt practice.—Under theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, as amended by Act 27 of 1956accepting a gift or gratification for withdrawing one's candidatureor retiring from contest is not corrupt practice.—S. B. ADITYAN ANDANOTHER V. S. KANDASWAMI AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 246.

Acceptance of bribe for withdrawing or retiring from contest—Whether corrupt practice.—The acceptance of a gift as an inducement

102 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

for withdrawing one's candidature or retiring from contest is notcorrupt practice.—S. B. ADITYAN V. S. KANDASWAMI AND ANOTHER, 14E.L.R. 394- [S.C]

Acceptance of gift.—Acceptance of a gift or gratification forwithdrawing one's candidature is not a corrupt practice under theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, after its amendment by Act 27of 1956 and a person who is alleged to have accepted a gratification forwithdrawing his candidature need not therefore be joined as a party tothe petition under section 82(6); and a petition cannot be dismissedsummarily under section 90(3) for non-joinder of such a person.—DURGA PRASAD CHOWDHARY v. MUKAT BEHARI LAL BHARGAVA AND

ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 471.Acceptance of bribe.—Under the Representation of the People

Act, 1951, as amended in 1956, acceptance of gratification does notamount to a corrupt practice.—SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA, 16E.L.R. 103.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (4. Publishing false Statements).Publishing false statements.—Publication of statements before

candidate held himself out as a prospective candidate.—In order that thepublication of a statement may fall under section 123(4) it is necessaryto prove that at the time it was made, the person in respect of whomit was made was a " candidate " within the definition of that term insection 79(6) i-c, that the candidate had begun to hold himself out as aprospective candidate, with the election in prospect; and that canonly be if he communicates his intention to stand for election to theoutside world by declaration or conduct and the determining factor isthe decision and action of the candidate himself and not of otherpersons or bodies accepting him as their candidate. Khader Sheriff v.Munnuswami Gounder (11 E.L.R. 208) followed. Walsall {Borough) case(4 O'M. & H. 123) and Dorsetshire Eastern Division case (5 O'M. & H.27) considered. DHARANIDHAR MOHAPATRA V. PRADIPTA KISHORE DAS

AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 427. Sec also cases cited under CORRUPT

PRACTICE ( I ) GENERAL PRINCIPLES at pp. 44-46 supra.

Scope of sec. 123(4)—Essentials of the corrupt practice—Burdenof proof of falsity—Difference between Indian and English law—Benefit ofdoubt—Counterblasts to petitioner's false statements.—Proof required toestablish a corrupt practice is one that is required to establish a criminaloffence. When the false allegations of fact pierce the politician andtouch the person of the candidate, e.g., where it is stated that thecandidat ewas trying to suppress his rivals by means of violent actssuch as beating their workers, a corrupt practice under section 123(4)is committed. That the statements complained of were false and were

CORRUPT PRACTICE (4. PUBLISHING FALSE STATEMENTS) 103

believed to be false or not believed to be true by the respondent, beingnegative facts, can be proved only by placing the relevant circum-stances before the court and it is for the court to draw the necessaryinferences. It may not ordinarily be possible to prove the factsaliunde. There is some difference between the English law and theIndian law in the matter of establishing the corrupt practice of mak-ing false statements during election. The English law requires thepetitioner to prove that the statement of facts made is false. Oncethat is established, it is for the opposite side to establish that themaker of that statement had reasonable grounds for believing, and infact he believed the same to be true. In India the burden of provingthat the statement of fact made is false and that the maker believed itto be false or did not believe it to be true is placed on the petitioner.The difference is, however, only in the approach and emphasis, anddoes not touch the substance of the matter. In determining whetherthe petitioner has discharged his burden under the Indian law ofproving that the statement of fact made against him was false andthat the respondent believed it to be false or did not believe it to betrue, courts have to bear in mind the fact (i) that the petitioner isrequired to prove the negative and (ii) that under the general law ofevidence when a fact is especially within the knowledge of a person,the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The rule that thecircumstances relied on must be proved by satisfactory evidence andthe inference drawn must be a reasonable one, and that the benefit ofdoubt must be given to the respondent, cannot be extended so far asto make them high sounding and meaningless maxims laying downimpossible conditions in the matter of proving corrupt practices.Though the success of a candidate at the polls will not be lightly setaside and compelling reasons are required to set at naught theapparent verdict of the people, the courts will not be justified in find-ing out excuses for rejecting election petitions, however well foundedthey are, for, the success of democracy depends on free and fairelections. A false statement of fact will not cease to be corruptpractice under section 123(4) merely because it was provoked by asimilar false statement made by the other side.—ANJANEYA REDDI V.GANGI REDDI AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 247.

False statements relating to candidate's party or its workers.—Animputation against the workers of a political party, or the party itself,cannot be taken to be an imputation in relation to the personalcharacter or conduct of a candidate who belongs to that party. Theterm " candidature " in section 123(4) cannot be equated to the term

104 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

" candidate ". It has been used in conjunction with the words "with-drawal or retirement", and in this context the "candidature" of acandidate can only mean " the state of his being a candidate " or "the

fact of his being a candidate. " Any false statement made in relationto the fact of a person being a candidate for an election would becovered, by section 123(4), but false statements in relation to theactivities of a political party of which the candidate is a membercannot be said to refer to his candidature.—SARLA DEVI PATHAK V.BIRENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 275.

False statements relating to candidate's patty—Whether affectscandidate—Statements in relation to candidature—" Candidature " mean-ing of.—In order to constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(4)of the Representation of the People Act, the false statement that ispublished must be a statement relating to the personal character orconduct of a candidate and not his political character or conduct.There is a great distinction to be drawn between a false statement offact which affects the personal character or conduct of a candidate anda false statement of fact which deals with the political position orreputation or action of the candidate. It cannot be held that everyfalse statement relating to the political party to which the candidatebelongs is a reflection on his personal character or conduct, thoughsome activities of a political character may involve personal characterand conduct. Where a hand-bill contained two false statements, viz.,(i) that the Praja Socialist Party (to which the candidate belonged)had threatened to shoot the Prime Minister of India, and (ii) that theparty had come to an understanding with the Muslim League : Held(i) the allegations did not amount to a reflection upon the personalcharacter or conduct of the candidate for the Praja Socialist Party ;there was only a general statement in regard to the activities of theparty and that did not reflect upon the personal character or conductof the candidate set up by the party; (ii) though the aspersions maybe regarded as aspersions upon the party or upon the people who weresupporting a particular candidate or even possibly upon the candidate,they could not be regarded as being made with regard to his " candida-ture. " The word " candidature " is narrower in its connotation than" candidate " ; it means the state of being a candidate, and a statementrelating to a candidate need not necessarily relate to his " candidature."The object of the latter portion of section 123(4) *s *-° protect thestatus and quality of being a candidate and if a false statement relat-ing to these is made section 123(4) is attracted, otherwise it is not.—KANHAIYALAL TIWARI v. SHYAM SUNDER NARAYAN MUSHRAN, 15E.L.R. 284.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (4. PUBLISHING FALSE STATEMENTS) IO5

Statement as to conduct of party reflecting on conduct of member,whether corrupt practice.—The appellant, a Congress candidate, hadaddressed a meeting, and thereafter there were disturbances and aclash with the police in which some persons were injured. The JanSangh Party took out a procession a few days later in protest againstthe atrocities committed on the previous occasion, and this was dis-persed by a lathi charge in which several women and children receivedinjuries. It was alleged in the election petition that during the electionsthe supporters of the respondent, the Jan Sangh candidate, publishedstatements that, the appellant was responsible for the dishonour metedout to the women-folk as well as the lathi charge and that he waspresent at the time the ladies were dishonoured and lathi-charged andthat it was he who prompted the police to beat and molest the ladies,and that the above statements constituted a corrupt practice undersection 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Held, thatthe first part of the allegation, namely, that the appellant was respon-sible for the atrocities committed on the women-folk did not constitutea corrupt practice under section 123(4) a s the Jan Sangh Party believedthat the Congress Party was responsible for the atrocities and theblame attached to the Congress Party also became personally attachedto the appellant. (There was no evidence to substantiate the remain-ing part of the allegation).—AMAR SINGH V. BALBIR SINGH AND OTHERS,19 E.L.R. 457.

False statements against party—Mere opinions.—Where a news-paper contained the following statements, viz., (i) that the workers ofthe " Hut symbol " party (the Praja Socialist Party) have been sofoolish as to threaten to shoot even Jawahar Lai Nehru, the greatleader of India, (ii) that the Praja Socialist Party is, by coming to anunderstanding with the Muslim League, following the footsteps of MirJafar, Jayachand and Mohammed Ali Jinnah and making commoncause with Pakistanis, and (iii) that to vote for such a party was tosell the country and nothing but treason : Held, agreeing with theTribunal, that the first two statements did not relate to the personalcharacter or conduct of the candidate or to his candidature, and thethird was not a statement of a fact but only an opinion, and the state-ments did not fall within section 123(4) of the Act. Principles to beapplied in deciding election disputes summarised.—SARLA DEVI PATHAKv. BIRENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 275.

Statements relating to party or members thereof.—A false state-ment about a political party or a leading member of the party, eventhough it is calculated to induce the voters to refrain from voting forthe candidate set up by that party, does not come within section 123(4),

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as it does not relate to the personal character or conduct of each candi-date set up by such party.—NAUNIHAL SINGH V. KISHORILAL PALIWAL

AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 33.

Statements about political party of candidate.—Allegations againsta political party to which a candidate belongs do not come within theexpression "in relation to the personal character or conduct of anycandidate" within the meaning of section 123(4) oi the Representationof the People Act, 1951. Nor do they come within the expression " inrelation to the candidature." In enacting section 123(4) tne Legislaturedid not, in the interests of the nation as a whole, intend to bringwithin its mischief any attack against a political party, though falseallegations against a political party made on the eve of election mightaffect the party's prospects at the election seriously. Political thinkershave after mature deliberation made a distinction between attacks ona political party and attacks on the personal character or conduct ofthe candidates set up by the party.—ANJANEYA REDDY V. GANGI

REDDY AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 247.

—-—Caricature of class to which petitioner belongs, whether personal.—Where a poster containing the caricature of a bearded Rajput whippinga tenant tied to a tree, under the orders of another bearded RajputSardar with a turban and wearing a typical Rajput achkan with asword, while the tenant's wife was lying at the foot of the Sardar pray-ing for mercy, was circulated in some constituencies, and the petitionerwho was a Rajput jagirdar contended that this amounted to publishinga false statement relating to his personal character and conduct withinsection 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951: Held, that,as the caricature was of a typical Rajput and not of the petitionerpersonally, publication of the poster did not amount to a corruptpractice under section 123(5).—MADAN SINGH D.LADHU RAM CHAUDHARY

AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 99.

—•—Burden of proof of falsity of statements—Petitioner's duty to denytruth of statement.—Even though section 123(4) is s o worded as to throwon the election petitioner the burden of showing that certain allegationsmade against him are false, this is only a general provision. Wherethe allegation concerns the character of a person, the ordinary presump-tion of law that a person must be presumed to be innocent will applyand the burden would be upon the person who has made defamatoryallegations against the character of another to prove that they aretrue.—BHIM RAO V. ANKUSH RAO, 22 E.L.R. 385.

Burden of proof—Duty on petitioner to prove falsity.—Theburden of proving that the statements contained in an article are false

CORRUPT PRACTICE (4. PUBLISHING FALSE STATEMENTS) IO7

lies on the petitioner. Where the petition is based on the ground thatfalse allegations have been made in relation to the conduct of the peti-tioner as a candidate which amount to corrupt practice, the petitionershould deny on oath the truth of the allegations made against him andhis failure to do so may give rise to a presumption against him.—BlSWANATH UPADHAYA V. HARALAL DAS AND OTHERS, l 6 EtL.R. 405.

——Burden of proof—Petitioner's duty to deny truth of statement—Publication of false statement that petitioner's party paid "bribe" to induceanother candidate to withdraw—Petitioner's duty to deny fact of paymentof bribe.—Where the gravamen of a charge of corrupt practice is thatthe respondent had published a pamphlet containing a false allegationthat the petitioner had paid a bribe to a contesting candidate to makehim withdraw, the petitioner should categorically assert in his petitionand in his evidence that he did not pay that bribe. In the absence ofsuch assertion there would be no warrant for a finding that the allega-tion of bribery was not true to the belief of the respondent and that hehad committed a corrupt practice prejudicing the prospects of theelection of the petitioner.—PRANANATH PATNAIK V. BANAMALI PATNAIK,16 E.L.R. 357.

Publishing false statements—Political statements and statementsas to personal character distinguished—Principles underlying sec. 123(4).—The principle underlying section 123(4) of the Representation of thePeople Act is that in order to come within the ambit of the corruptpractice under section 123(4) of the Act, there must be a false state-ment of fact by a candidate or his agent which is made in relation tothe personal character or conduct of any other candidate. Adversecriticism, however severe, however undignified or ill-mannered, how-ever regrettable it might be in the interests of purity and decency ofpublic life, in relation to the political views, position, reputation oraction of a candidate, would not bring it within the mischief of thestatute. The court in such matters cannot judge these statements inthe light of their decency or desirability in so far as they are politicalstatements not calculated to attack the personal character or conductof any rival candidate. Further, what is objectionable is a false state-ment of fact and not a false statement of opinion, however unfoundedor however unjustified. It is only when the person beneath the politi-cian is sought to be assailed and his honour, integrity and veracity ischallenged and such a statement is false that it could be said that afalse statement of fact about his personal character and conduct hasbeen made ; and once it is established that such a statement was madethe question whether there was malice or not is immaterial. Inascertaining the true nature of the statements made, the court will

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have to take into consideration all the surrounding circumstancesincluding the occasion when it was published or made, the person againstwhom it was made, the person publishing it or making it, the audienceor readers to whom it is addressed, as also the precautions or care takenby the publisher to verify the truth or otherwise of the statementchallenged.—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17E.L.R. 373.

Statements as to political conduct and personal conduct distin-guished.—A distinction must be drawn between criticism of a candi-date as a politician or a public man and statements in relation tohis personal character or conduct. Criticism of his public or politicalactivities, however ill-mannered, unfair or exaggerated it may be, isnot forbidden. It is only when the man underneath the politician isattacked and his honour, integrity or veracity assailed in the state-ment, that the statement becomes offensive within the meaning ofsection 123(5).—MAST RAM V. IQBAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 34.

Publishing false statements as to personal conduct—Essentials ofthe corrupt practice—Necessity of proof beyond reasonable doubt—Burden ofproof—Political parties—Candidate when liable for acts of party or itsmembers—Corrupt practice by agents—When candidate liable—Definitionof "agent"—Proof of consent for committing particular act of corruptpractice, whether necessary—Whether consent can be presumed—Scope andinterpretation of section ioo(i)(b) and (d)(ii), and 100(2)—Anomalies in thepresent law.—The onus to establish the different ingredients of thecorrupt practice mentioned in section 123(4) °f the Representation ofthe People Act, 1951, lies heavily upon the petitioner. In order toestablish a corrupt practice under section 123(4) ^ *s n°t enough toprove the falsity of the particular statement, but it must further beproved that it was false to the knowledge of the publisher or that thepublisher did not believe it to be true, and even if the statement isproved to be false, the publisher will be protected if he had reasonablegrounds to believe it to be true. Contribution by a candidate to theparty fund in general relating to printing works, would not amount toconsent on his part for publication of objectionable pamphlets by theparty, unless the sum was earmarked for the publication of suchobjectionable pamphlets. A general and vague evidence of circulationof objectionable leaflets and news-sheets on behalf of a party organisa-tion as a whole, is not sufficient to establish a corrupt practice by acandidate set up by the party. In order to make the candidate liablefor such corrupt practice the circulation of the leaflets must come with-in the purview of section 123(4). A candidate set up by a party cannotbe held responsible for all that the members of the party did in

CORRUPT PRACTICE (4. PUBLISHING FALSE STATEMENTS) IOO,

furtherance of the interests of the party organisation as a whole, unlessthe participation therein of the particular candidate or his agentexpressly or by necessary implication, is proved. All the members ofthe party cannot be deemed to be agents of the candidate set up by theparty ; agency has to be established as required by law. Their Lord-ships held as follows on the law relating to a candidate's liability foracts of agents under the Representation of the People Act as amendedin 1956, and the effect of the provisions of section ioo(i)(b) and (d)(ii),and section 100(2)* :—(i) Before the election of a returned candidatecan be declared to be void because of the commission of a corruptpractice by a person other than the candidate or his election agent, itmust be established either that that person committed it with the con-sent of the returned candidate or his election agent, or its commissionmaterially affected the result of the election, (ii) A corrupt practiceby an agent has to be dealt with in the same manner as one committedby a third person, as contemplated by section ioo(i){d)(ii), for thereason that the agent, acting as such, cannot in view of Explanation (1)to section 123 be deemed to have committed the corrupt practice withthe consent of the candidate. If that were not so, there would be noother provision under the Act for setting aside the election because ofthe commission of corrupt practice by an agent. * (iii) There is nojustification for the view that in the case of corrupt practice by anagent consent of the returned candidate must be presumed, and, there-fore, the election must be set aside, unless the grounds mentioned insub-section (2) are established. On the plain wording of section 100,there is no warrant for such construction and such construction willvirtually nullify the provisions of sub-section (i)(b). (iv) Wherecorrupt practice has been committed in the interest of the returnedcandidate by an agent, not being an election agent, or by a person otherthan a person acting with the consent of the returned candidate or hiselection agent, the election in either case cannot be declared to be voidunder section ioo{i)(d)(ii), unless the result of the election has beenmaterially affected. There is, however, one difference between agentsand other persons in this respect, namely, that in the case of corruptpractice by an agent, even where the result of the election has beenmaterially affected, the election of the returned candidate may be heldnot void, if the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (2)of section 100 are established, the burden of establishing these condi-tions being on the returned candidate. Dictum.—If section ioo(i)(i)(«)covers the commission of corrupt practice by an agent and by a thirdperson, then there is no cogent reason for such a distinction. The

* The law has since been materially amended by Act 58 of 1958.

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agent is rather placed on a lower footing than a third person, for thesimple reason that while in the case of a third person the election canbe set aside on mere proof of material prejudice, in the case of theother, the election cannot be declared to be void, notwithstanding thematerial prejudice, if the conditions laid down in clauses (a) to (d) ofsub-section (2) are established. It appears that all the contingencieswere not foreseen while enacting sub-sections (1) and (2). It is difficultto harmonise the provisions of section 100(1) and section 100(2).*(v) The consent to act as an agent within the meaning of Explanation(1) to section 123 may be express or implied. The fact that a personworked as an agent of a candidate with his consent may also beinferred from the circumstances of the case.—BADRI NARAIN SINGH V.KAMDEO PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER : KAMDEO PRASAD SINGH V.BADRI NARAIN SINGH AND ANOTHER, 21 E.L.R. 64.

Criticism of political conduct and activities.—Where the imputa-tion in a statement made about a candidate was that the candidatewhile a sitting member of the Assembly had taken contracts with theGovernment in his own name, in his wife's name and in the names ofbenamdars: Held, that the statement did not relate to the personalcharacter or conduct of the candidate but related to his politicalconduct and activities and did not fall within section 123(4). Criticismof the political activities or conduct of a candidate, however offensive,does not come within section 123(4). A. corrupt practice is committedonly when the man beneath the politician has his honour, integrityand veracity assailed.—DHARANIDHAR MOHAPATRA V. PRADIPTAKISHORE DAS AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 427.

Statements relating to candidature—English and Indian law—Meaning of "candidature ". —The words " or in relation to the candid-ature or withdrawal or retirement from contest of any candidate "appearing in section 123(4) 0* the Representation of the People Act ofIndia do not find a place in the English law of election. Section 123(4),therefore, covers a larger variety of cases than may arise under theEnglish law and accordingly, the decisions in Cockermouth ([1853] 2

P.R. & D. 166) and North Louth (6 O'M. & H. 129), which deal withthe question as to what constitutes personal character or conduct of acandidate in contradistinction to his political character or conduct,may not be of help to determine the extent and import of the word" candidature " in section 123(4) of the Act. While, on the one hand,it may only have a limited interpretation, meaning the right or qualifi-cation or factum of candidature, it may, in the circumstances of a case,even have a wider import including a reflection on the worthiness of

•The law has been materially amended by Act 58 of 1958.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (4. PUBLISHING FALSE STATEMENTS) I I I

a candidate to contest the election.—MAGANLAL BAGDI V. HARI VISHNUKAMATH, 15 E.L.R. 205.

Statement must be one of fact, not a general allegation of mis-conduct.—In order to constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(4)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the statement mademust be one of fact, not a general allegation of misconduct and thestatement must also be false to the knowledge of, or not believed tobe true by, the person making it.—CHIKATI PARASURAM NAIDU V.VYRICHERLA CHANDRA CHUDAMANI DEV, 13 E.L.R. 66.

Criticism of official acts—Liability of Deputy Minister for actsof cabinet—Collective responsibility of Ministers.—When the official orpolitical conduct of a candidate is being criticised, be the criticismtrue or false, the candidate criticising him does not commit anycorrupt practice. The appellant had published a statement relatingto the respondent who was a Deputy Minister of the Rajasthan Govern-ment that the Education Department of the Rajasthan Governmentwas under the supervision of the latter and she had passed an orderthat a certain Arts College be closed. In an election petition to setaside the election of the appellant, one of the grounds alleged againstthe appellant was that this statement was a false statement relating tothe respondent's personal character and conduct. It was admittedthat the Arts College was closed when the respondent was a DeputyMinister: Held, (i) that the statement did not relate to the personalcharacter or conduct of the respondent but to her conduct in herofficial capacity as Deputy Minister, as the College could not be closedby her in her individual capacity ; (ii) even though the petitioner hadnot herself passed the order for closing the College, as the College wasin fact closed when she was Deputy Minister, under the principle ofcollective responsibility of the Cabinet, the closure was as much an actof the petitioner as that of the Minister who actually ordered theclosure of the College, and the statement was therefore not a falsestatement.—RAWAL NARENDRA SINGH V. SMT. KAMLA BENIWAL, 18E.L.R. 28.

——Publishing false statements as to personal character and conduct—Statements imputing acts of violence during political career to rivalcandidate.—A statement which attributes acts of violence (e.g., instiga-tion of murder, throwing of stones at public meetings) to a candidateeven though such acts are done during his political career is a statementrelating to the personal character and conduct of the candidate, and ifsuch statements are published a few days before the polling, such state-ments must be held to be reasonably calculated to prejudice theprospects of that candidate's election, and the candidate publishing

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such statement would be guilty of a corrupt practice within themeaning of section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act.—T. K. GANGI REDDY V. M. C. ANJANEYA REDDY AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R.261. [S.C.]

Statements made to counteract statements of opponent.—Sub-section (4) of section 123 denning a corrupt practice is not conditionedby any proviso to the effect that it would cease to be a corrupt practiceif the statement was made to counteract the rival statement of anopponent and if the conditions of that sub-section are satisfied, it isirrelevant to enquire whether the statement was a counterblast toanother.—T. K. GANGI REDDY V. M. C. ANJANEYA REDDY AND OTHERS,22 E.L.R. 261. [S.C.]

Allegations against Congress Party of which candidate was Secretary—Imputations relating to candidature—Meaning of "candidature".—" Candidature " refers to the state of standing for election from thedate a candidate stands for election till the election is complete orwithdrawal is made, if it is done before the election. An imputationagainst "candidature " must, therefore, relate to the right or qualifica-tions of the candidate or the factum of his candidature. In an electionthe candidate set up by the Communist Party was elected. Thecandidate set up by the Congress Party, who was unsuccessful, filed anelection petition in which the main allegation against the respondent,the Communist candidate, was that the Communist Party had gotprinted and circulated several pamphlets containing a false statementthat the Congress Party had paid a sum of Rs. 20,000 to the Indepen-dent candidate as a bribe to induce him to withdraw his candidatureand that this was an imputation relating to the personal character andconduct of the petitioner, and his candidature, and constituted acorrupt practice under section 123(5): Held per NARASIMHAN, C.J.,(RAO, J., contra) that the imputation did not relate either to thepersonal character or conduct of the respondent or his candidature asthere was no allegation in the petition that the petitioner had any-thing to do with the payment of the bribe or any specific reference tothe petitioner's position in the Congress Committee or his control overthe funds of the Congress Committee. RAO, J.—The imputationcontained a reflection on the personal character and conduct of thepetitioner, in view of his position as General Secretary of the CongressCommittee, and also a Congress candidate for the election; but did notrelate to his candidature.—PRANANATH PATNAIK V. BANAMALI PATNAIK,16 E.L.R. 357.

Statement must not be believed to be true.—The publication of astatement of fact by a candidate or his agent will not be a corrupt

CORRUPT PRACTICE (4. PUBLISHING FALSE STATEMENTS) 113

practice under section 123(4) unless there is evidence to show that thecandidate or his agent believed the statement to be false or did notbelieve it to be true.—POTTEKKAT KRISHNAN SUKUMARAN V. KUNJUVA-REED JOSEPH MUNDASSERI, 14 E.L.R. 313.

What constitutes "publication "—Appearance in newspapers—Ifan offending article appears in a paper, which is proved' to havecirculation and is read by the public, this would be sufficient publica-tion in the eye of law to constitute corrupt practice within ^themeaning of the Act, provided it is also found that the said publicationwas at the instance, or with the consent, of the candidate or hiselection agent. The real point of the decision in Maulana Abdul JalilChoudhury v. Rathindra Nath Sen (13 E.L.R. 290) was that the publi-cation must be proved to be with the consent of the candidate.—NANI GOPAL SWAMI V. ABDUL HAMID CHOUDHURY AND ANOTHER, 19E.L.R. 175.

Where person against whom allegation was made cannot be fixedwith certainty.—When the person against whom a false statement issaid to have been made cannot be fixed with certainty, it cannot besaid that there was any publication in relation to the personalcharacter or conduct of any candidate.—KHILUMAL TOPANDAS V.ARJUNDAS TULSIDAS, 22 E.L.R. 404.

Statement that candidate is set up or financed by other parties orpersons.—Describing a candidate as really not Independent but asbeing set up or financed by other parties or prominent person of otherparties would not amount to an attack on his personal character orconduct.—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17E.L.R. 373.

Imputation of rough nature and abusive language—A statementimputing rough nature and abusive language to a candidate, eventhough it is statement relating to the personal character of the candi-date, will not come within section 123(4) a s it is n°t a statementaffecting the prospects of such candidate in the election.—KHILUMALTOPANDAS V. ARJUNDAS TULSIDAS, 22 E.L.R. 404.

Statement of opinion and fact distinguished—Imputation onpersonal character—Where a letter in a newspaper under the heading" History of Hendre's candidature " contained the following state-ments :—" Hendre (the petitioner) was the right hand man ofYeswantrao Chavan in the movement of 1942. But Hendre did notget contracts from Yeswantrao after the latter became a Minister.Therefore Hendre left the friendship, house and name of Yeswant-rao." Held, considering the circumstances under which this letter

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came to be published and the nature and the suggestions containedin the statement/ this letter did not contain merely statements ofopinion or facts which the proprietor of the newspaper could be saidto have believed to be true; the reference to the petitioner not gettingany contracts from Mr. Chavan when he became a Minister, was notmerely a statement of fact about the political reputation of the peti-tioner, but it was also an attack on the personal character of thepetitioner.—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17E.L.R. 373.

Statements about chances of candidate at election—Whether relateto " candidature ".—Statements affecting the chances of a candidate atthe election are not necessarily in relation to his candidature itself.A statement would be one relating to candidature only if it relates tothe rights or the qualifications of the candidate to stand as a candidatein a particular constituency or the factum of his being a candidate.Krishnaji Bhimrao Antrolikar v. Shanker Shantaram More (7 E.L.R.100) followed.—RAGUNATH MISRA V. KISHORE CHANDRA DEO BHANJAND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 321.

Statements about candidate's father.—Held, on the facts' thatthe pamphlet complained of contained mainly allegations againstthe petitioner's father and not the petitioner himself and eventhose allegations were purely political in nature and were not allega-tions of dishonesty, or bribery and that the respondent was notguilty of the corrupt practice of publishing a false statement relatingto the character or conduct of the petitioner.—RAGUNATH MISRA V.KISHORE CHANDRA DEO BHANJ AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 321.

Authorship of pamphlets, whether relevant.—Even though theauthorship of a pamphlet is not known, if it contains false statementsrelating to the personal character of a candidate, and another candi-date knowing that such statements are false, or not believing thatthey are true, reads it in a public meeting or circulates printed copiesof it, the latter will be guilty of a corrupt practice under sec-tion 123(4).—MAGANLAL BAGDI v. HARI VISHNU KAMATH, 15 E.L.R.205.

False statement that candidate said that Pandit Nehru was aworthless Prime Minister—A statement that the respondent had calledPandit Nehru nakabil (worthless) Prime Minister would affect thepersonal character and conduct of the candidate in the estimation ofa vast majority of people, and circulation of a pamphlet containingsuch a statement would come within section 123(4).—MAGANLAL BAGDIv. HARI VISHNU KAMATH, 15 E.L.R. 205.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (4. PUBLISHING FALSE STATEMENTS) H 5

Calling an Independent a Communist Candidate.—A statementabout a candidate who has stood as a non-party Independentcandidate, that he is a Communist is not a statement relating to hispersonal character or conduct nor one in relation to his candidature.Lachhiram v. Jamuna Prasad Mukharia and Others, (9 E.L.R. 149 ; 10E.L.R. 122 (S.C.)) distinguished.—VASANTHA PAI V. DR. V. K. JOHNAND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 107.

False statements against other candidates.—Corrupt practices com-mitted by or with the consent of the returned candidate or his electionagent or by any other person in the interests of the returned candidatecan alone be the subject-matter of enquiry in an election petition.Corrupt practices committed by other candidates in the field cannot beput to the account of the returned candidate. A false statement madeby any person against any candidate cannot amount to a corruptpractice. The court is concerned only with such statements as aredesigned to better the prospects of a returned candidate. Where theallegations do not satisfy the conditions laid down in the Act withregard to particulars, the Tribunal can refuse to allow the matter to goto trial.—JAMUNA PRASAD SINGH V. SHRI RAMNIVAS AND OTHERS, 18E.L.R. 145.

Mere circulation of pamphlets printed by party.—Where theCongress Party which had set up the respondent as a candidate, hadprinted some pamphlets containing false statements about the peti-tioner (the defeated candidate), which came within the purview ofsection 123(4) °f the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and therespondent had circulated such pamphlets : Held, that the respondentwas guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(4) °f t n e Act.—KAMDEO PRASAD SINGH V. BADRI NARAIN SINGH AND ANOTHER, 18E.L.R. 59.

False statements about ^votes obtained by a candidate or hischances of success.—The publication of posters containing false state-ments about the votes polled by a candidate or the estimate of acandidate's supporters of the number of votes which he is likely to get,which are intended to encourage the workers of that candidate anddemoralise the workers of the rival candidate do not constitute acorrupt practice under section 123(4).—RAM DIAL V. SANT LAL ANDANOTHER, 19 E.L.R. 430.

False statement as to character—Statement of person who was notgiven Congress ticket that he was a prominent Congressman.—Where a candi-date who had for several years been a prominent Congressman was not

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given a Congress ticket for standing for election as the Congress candi-date, and he stood for the election independently but published leafletsstating that he was a sincere Congressman and that giving a vote tohim would strengthen the Congress: Held, that the term " Congress-man " was not a term of art and a statement by the candidate that hewas a Congressman was not a false statement relating to the candi-dature of the candidate who was put up by the Congress Party.—RAMBINODE SINGH V. SHEOBACHAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 53.

False statement that candidate has withdrawn.—Distribution ofpamphlets containing a false statement about a candidate that he hadwithdrawn his candidature, with the knowledge that that statementwas false, constitutes a corrupt practice under section 123(4).—ASHFAQALI KHAN V. DARSHAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 136.

—•—Statements must be proved to be false and not believed to be true.—The respondent who was a Jat wrote a letter to another Jat that,being a Jat he should not join with the Rajputs and should do pro-paganda for the respondent alone and that they should not allow theRajputs, Brahmins and Banias to progress. The District CongressCommittee published a pamphlet containing a photostat copy of theletter and stating inter alia, that the respondent was a person pro-pagating feelings of communalism and Jat cult and that casting a votein his favour would be like giving milk to a snake etc. The respondentand his workers circulated this pamphlet: Held, that, as it was notproved that the statements in the pamphlet were false and that therespondent believed them to be false, the publication of the pamphletdid not amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(4).—SOOWALALv. P. K. CHAUDHARY AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 137.

True statements susceptible of false inferences.—If the statementof facts mentioned in a publication are true, a corrupt practice undersection 123(4) is n o t committed, even though the publication containscertain inferences from those facts which may not be true or sound.It was stated in a publication that Congressmen who were un-successful in getting the Congress ticket were seeking election againstthe Congress nominees and that " on account of selfish motivesthese people have not only committed breach of faith against thisinstitution but had also committed breach of faith with the public ingeneral." It was admitted that the appellant had given a pledge tothe Congress that she will not seek election even if she was not nom-inated by the Congress, but when she was not nominated she stood forelection as an Independent candidate: Held, (i) that, as the mainfacts alleged were admitted and the other allegations were mere

CORRUPT PRACTICE (4. PUBLISHING FALSE STATEMENTS)

inferences from these facts and not statements of fact, the publicationdid not come under section 123(4) - (") even if the inferences werecovered by section 123(4), the inferences could not be said to be falseor not believed to be true.—SAVITRI DEVI V. PRABHAWATI MISRA ANDANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 358.

Statements of fact may be made in the form of insinuations.—Astatement of fact can be made in a number of ways ; it can very oftenbe more expressive in the form of an insinuation than if it were madedirectly.—JAGAN PRASAD RAWAT V. KRISHNA DUTT PALIWAL, 20E.L.R. 443.

Statements partly false and partly true.—If any part of a state-ment is demonstrably false, the dissemination of that statement wouldfall within the definition of corrupt practice in section 123(4). Themere fact that there was a substratum of truth or that the statementwas partly ture is not enough to take the case out of section 123(4).—BHIM RAO V. ANKUSH RAO, 22 E.L.R. 385.

Statement that candidate was carrying on propaganda againstCongress amongst Muslims.—A false statement that a certain person wascarrying on propaganda amongst the Muslims against the Congresscandidate is not a statement relating to the personal character orconduct or candidature of any candidate.—RUSTOM SATIN V.DR. SAMPOORNANAND AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

Issuing of pamphlets at the time of election by the InformationDepartment of Government.—The question whether the issuing ofpamphlets by an officer of the Information Department of the Govern-ment at the time of the election, which would assist Congress candi-dates would constitute a minor corrupt practice under section 124(1)discussed. Bhola Nath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta (6 E.L.R. 104)followed.—KUSHWAQT RAI v. KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 1.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (5. Hiring or Procuring Vehicles)Hiring or procuring vehicles for conveying voters.—Hiring or

procuring vehicles for conveying voters—Pleadings—Particulars to bealleged.—Under section 123(5) 0 I the Representation of the People Act,a corrupt practice consists in the act of hiring or procuring certaintypes of vehicles by a candidate or his agent or by any other personfor the conveyance of any elector to or from any polling station. Thecorrupt practice is committed not by conveying the voter but by theact of hiring or procuring the conveyance. When such corrupt prac-tice is alleged the petitioner must give the names of the parties whoperformed the act of hiring or procuring the conveyance, the date ofthe commission of this act of hiring or procuring and the place wherethis act of hiring or procuring was committed. Sufficient particulars

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must be given which would enable the respondent to discover whichparticular vehicle he was charged with having hired or procured.—Quaere: Whether it is an essential ingredient for an act to constitutea corrupt practice under section 123(5) of the Representation of thePeople Act to allege and prove the actual conveyance of the votersalso.—MADAN LAL V. SYED ZARGHAM HAIDER AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R.456.

Where the election petition does not contain sufficient parti-culars about the date and place of procurement or conveyance of theelectors, the Tribunal should order the supply of better particulars orstrike off the pleadings relating thereto.—JAGAN PRASAD RAWAT V.KRISHNA DUTT PALIWAL, 20 E.L.R. 443.

Where a corrupt practice of hiring or procuring vehicles forthe conveyance of voters is alleged, the time and place of hiring shouldbe mentioned in the particulars, but the allegation relating to thecorrupt practice cannot be struck off on the ground of insufficiency ofparticulars after both parties have adduced evidence on the issue. Insuch a case the question would be whether any material prejudice hadbeen caused to the respondent by the omission to give these particulars.Madan Lal v. Zargham Haider (13 E.L.R. 456) explained and distin-guished. Bhagwan Datt Sastri v. Ram Ratan Gupta (11 E.L.R. 448) andTirath Singh v. Bachitai Singh (9 E.L.R. 163) followed.—LAKSHMINARAIN v. BALWAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 76.

Hiring vehicle for conveyance of voters—Gist of the corrupt practice—Particulars of contract of hiring, whether necessary—Supreme Court—Practice—Appeal by special leave—Interference with findings of fact.—Per SINHA, C.J., IMAM, WANCHOO and SHAH, JJ.—Under section 123(5)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it is the fact of hiringor procuring a vehicle for the conveyance of voters that is declared acorrupt practice, not the contract of hiring or procuring. Consequently,an election petition which sets forth the particulars about the use of avehicle for conveying voters to and from the polling station withdetails as to the time and place, coupled with as full a statement aspossible in support of the plea that the vehicle was hired or procuredby the candidate or his agent or another person, substantially complieswith the requirement of section 83(i)(fc). Failure to set out particularsof the contract of hiring or arrangement of procuring will not renderthe petition defective. Dictum.—" Normally, the arrangement for hiringor procuring a vehicle, is within the special knowledge of the partiesto that agreement and it is difficult to assume that it was intended torequire the petitioner in an election dispute to set out the particulars offacts within the special knowledge of the other party, and expose the

CORRUPT PRACTICE (5. HIRING OR PROCURING VEHICLES)

petition to a penalty of dismissal if those particulars could not begiven." Per SARKAR, J.—Under section 123(5) the hiring of the vehiclefor the conveyance of electors is the corrupt practice. It is of theessence of this corrupt practice that the vehicle must have been hired,that is to say, a contract for the hiring of the vehicle must have beenmade and particulars of that contract should, therefore, be given inthe election petition. An election petition cannot, however, be dis-missed merely because such particulars have not been given in it. Insuch a case the respondent would have a right under section 83 andalso under section 90(1) (which makes the provisions of the CivilProcedure Code applicable to a trial before an Election Tribunal), toapply for particulars of the contract of hiring. If he makes no suchapplication and goes to trial without taking any objection that he washampered in his defence for want of particulars, he cannot at a laterstage complain about the absence of particulars. Lakshmi Narain v.Balwan Singh and Others (20 E.L.R. 76) affirmed, but on differentgrounds.—BALWAN SINGH V. LAKSHMI NARAIN AND OTHERS, 22E.L.R. 273. [S.c.].

Burden of proof.—Where the allegation in an election petitionwas that the returned candidate carried voters from a village to thepolling station in a truck hired or procured by him: Held, that, as thecase was of a quasi-criminal nature, the burden was on the petitionerto establish his case and he could not wait for the defence to bring inthe material witnesses; that burden remained on the petitioner, and ifhe did not bring the witnesses, it did not lie in his mouth to say thatthe witnesses ought to have been examined in rebuttal by the returnedcandidate or that an adverse inference must be drawn—JAMUNAPRASAD SINGH V. SHRI RAMNIVAS AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 145.

Burden of proof—Proof of actual use for conveying voters,whether necessary.—Petitioner in an election petition in which a corruptpractice of hiring vehicles for conveyance of voters is alleged isexpected to find out the particulars of the contract of hiring, whetheroral or written, as between the successful candidate and the owner ofthe vehicle or the terms thereof but the fact of hiring and procuringand also such hired and procured vehicles having been used by thesuccessful candidate in conveying voters to the polling stations ortaking them back must be proved to bring it within the mischief ofsection 123(5). The mere act of hiring a vehicle with intention totake electors to the polling booth would not be sufficient but it mustbe shown that voters were so transported to the polling bcoth.—V. RAMACHANDRA RAO V. V. B. RAJU AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R. 358.

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Actual user for conveying voters, not necessary.—The basicingredient of the corrupt practice referred to in section 123(5) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, consists of the procurement ofany vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent or by any otherperson for the conveyance of any elector (other than the candidatehimself, the members of his family or his agent), to or from any pollingstation. The actual user of those vehicles or vessels for carryingelectors is not an ingredient of the corrupt practice under this sub-section, and evidence of such user is unnecessary except in so far as itmay have some bearing on the question of the purpose of the procure-ment. It is necessary, however, to prove that the procurement wasfor the specific purpose mentioned in the sub-section, viz., for convey-ing electors to or from any polling station.—JAGAN PRASAD RAW AT V.KRISHNA DUTT PALIWAL, 20 E.L.R. 443.

Proof of user alone insufficient—Hiring or procuringnecessary.—In order to constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(5)there must be evidence to show that the vehicles in which the electorswere conveyed were hired or procured by the candidate or somepersons other than the electors with his consent. Evidence whichmerely proves that the voters were conveyed in a vehicle in which theworkers of the candidate were sitting is not sufficient.—DIN DAYAL V.BENI PRASAD AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 131.

To establish the commission of a corrupt practice of procuringor hiring vehicles for the conveyance of voters it is necessary toadduce evidence to show not only that the car was used for conveyingvoters to the polling station, but also that the car was procured orhired by the candidate or by any other person with his consent.—MADAN MOHAN UPADHYA V. HARI DATT KANDPAL, 15 E.L.R. 331.

Section 123(5) of the Representation of the People Actprohibits and declares to be a corrupt practice the act of hiring orprocuring of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent or byany other person for the conveyance of any elector other than thecandidate himself, or the member of his family or his agent to or fromany polling station, and not the mere act of carrying or conveying anyelector on any vehicle or vessel. Therefore, if the petitioner fails toprove the hiring or procuring of a vehicle or vessel, by proving thatsome electors were carried or conveyed on a vehicle or vessel he can-not establish a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123(5).—MD. IBRAHIM ANSARI V. M. R. MASANI AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 160.

Consent of candidate must be proved—Inference of consent fromfacts.—Where several persons were working for the appellant and the

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evidence established that transport was arranged by these workers andthat voters were taken to and from the polling stations in the vehiclesso arranged: Held, that it was a reasonable conclusion under thecircumstances that all this was done with the consent of the appellant.It is important to remember in this connection that consent is a matterof inference and is not capable of proof by direct evidence.—V. B.RAJU v. V. RAMACHANDRA RAO AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 1.

A corrupt practice under section 123(5) of the Representationof the People Act, 1951, is committed only when a vehicle is hired orprocured by the candidate or his election agent or by any other personwith his consent. A candidate cannot, therefore, be found guilty ofsuch corrupt practice where the evidence only shows that voters werecarried in a motor vehicle belonging to a partner or relation of thecandidate, and there is nothing to show that the vehicle was hired orprocured by that person and the result of the election was materiallyaffected thereby.—-Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh (10 E.L.R. 129S.C.) followed. Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra (16 E.L.R. 103)distinguished.—CHENNA BYRE GOWDA V. S. R. RAMIAH AND ANOTHER :H. V. NANJIAH V. RUKMANIAMMA AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 37.

Where the hiring of vehicles for the conveyance of votershas been done by a person other than the candidate or his electionagent, the candidate cannot be held guilty of a corrupt practice undersection 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, unless itis further established that that person acted with the consent of thecandidate or his election agent, and the burden, of proving this is on thepetitioner.—Bhagwan Datt Shastri v. Ram Ratan Gupta and Others (11E.L.R. 448) distinguished.—NARASIMHA REDDY V. BHOOMAJI ANDANOTHER : MUTHYAL RAO V. BHOOMAJI AND ANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 207.

Evidence that certain persons who were workers of thecandidate in general and had his consent for that general work, hiredvehicles for conveying voters is not sufficient to bring home a chargeof corrupt practice under section 123(5). What the law requires isthat, in order that the candidate should be held to be liable for theacts of any other person, that person should be acting with his con-sent in the commission of those very acts. In the case of a corruptpractice under section 123(5), therefore, it is necessary to establishthat other persons, who had hired these vehicles, had done so with theconsent of the candidate.—DIN DAYAL V. BENI PRASAD AND ANOTHER,15 E.L.R. 131.

Though the knowledge of a candidate that his agents andworkers had conveyed voters may not lead to the inference that he

ELD—16

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had consented to such acts where all that is established is a stray actor a number of them committed on the same day, yet, where suchacts were numerous and exterded for a number of days, knowledgeof such acts and the absence of anything to show that the candidateprohibited such acts may lead to a reasonable inference that the actswere done with the candidate's consent; and if the High Court findsfrom all the circumstances that the acts were done with the consentof the candidate, the finding being one of fact the Supreme Court willnot interfere with that finding. [Since the High Court had come to afinding on the facts that the voters were conveyed with the consent ofthe candidate, their Lordships did not find it necessary to express anyopinion on the question whether the substitution of the word " con-sent " for " connivance " by the Amending Act of 1956 in section 100of the Representation of the People Act, has brought about anychange in the law.]—SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA ANDANOTHER, 16 E.L.R. 435. [S.C.I

Where the respondent was a candidate set up by the SocialistParty for the House of the People and it was found that a car belong-ing to the Socialist candidate for the State Assembly for the sameconstituency had been used for conveying voters to the polling stationfor the House of the People and it was also found that the respondenthad contributed funds for the expenses of the Socialist Party and hadnot employed any workers of his own, and the Tribunal held on thesefacts and the circumstances of the case tnat the conveying of votersmust have been done with the connivance of the respondent and thathe was guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(6): Held, thatthere was ample evidence to support the finding of the Tribunaland there was no ground for setting aside that finding on appeal.Obiter.—The questions as to the limits of the doctrine of agency inelection matters and the exact scope and effect of the statutory defini-tion of " agent " may require to be carefully considered by the courtwhen they become necessary in a proper case as these are importantquestions bearing on the whole structure of elections run on partylines.—BHAGWAN DATT SHASTRI V. RAM RATAN GUPTA AND OTHERS :BHAGWAN DATT SHASTRI V. BADRI NARAYAN SINGH AND OTHERS, I IE.L.R. 448. [S.c]

When election can be set aside.—Where the evidence did notestablish that the voters would not have come to the polling boothsfrom their villages but for the facilities accorded to them by carryingthem in vehicles, and the petitioner did not prove the number ofvotes recorded by such voters and that if those votes were excluded,the lead taken by the respondent would not have been maintained:

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Held, the election cannot be said to have been materially affected bythe commission of the corrupt practice under section 123(5).—BADRINARAIN SINGH V. KAMDEO PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER : KAMDEOPRASAD SINGH V. BADRI NARAIN SINGH AND ANOTHER, 21 E.L.R. 64.

——Where the appellant, the returned candidate, secured 8,093votes, the first respondent 8,059 votes, and the next candidate got6,239 votes and it was found that 60 votes were recorded by voterstransported by the appellant and had therefore to be rejected, andthe Tribunal, not only declared the election of the appellant void, butdeclared the first respondent as duly elected: Held,, that, inasmuchas, even if all these 60 votes had been cast in favour of a candidateother than the appellant the first respondent would have obtained amajority of votes, the decision of the Supreme Court in Jamuna Prasadv. Lachhi Ram (10 E.L.R. 120) was not applicable and the first respon-dent was rightly declared as duly elected. The judgment of theElection Tribunal, Shimoga, in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa andOthers (3 E.L.R. 197) affirmed.—T. NAGAPPA V. T. €. BASAPPA ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 203. [S.G.]

CORRUPT PRACTICE (6. Incurring unauthorised expenses)Incurring or authorising of expenditure in contravention of

sec. 77.—Scope of sec. 123(6)—Omission to keep accounts as prescribed insection 77 (1) or (2)—Whether corrupt practice—Law before and afterAct 2j of 1956.—Though the general words " in contravention ofsection 77 " are used in section 123(6) of the Representation of thePeople Act, the words " the incurring or authorising of expenditure "which precede those words relate the corrupt practice under sec-tion 123(6) to contravention of sub-section (3) of section 77, and thecorrupt practice under section 123(6) is not committed merely becauseaccounts of election expenses are not maintained in the manner pres-cribed in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 77. After the amendmentAct of 1956, the question whether accounts have been maintained inthe manner prescribed by sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 77 is amatter for the Election Commission to decide and not for the ElectionTribunal. Prior to the amending Act of 1956, the making of anyreturn of election expenses which was false in any material particularwas, under sub-section (4) of section 124, a minor corrupt practice,while the incurring or authorising by a candidate or his agent ofexpenditure in contravention of the Act or of any rule made there-under was, under sub-section (7) of section 123, a major corruptpractice. The distinction between major and minor corrupt practiceswas abolished by. the amending Act, and in connection with theelection expenses the only corrupt practice now remaining is the

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incurring or authorising of expenditure in excess of the prescribedlimit.—N. L. VERMA V. MUNI LAL AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 495.

——Incurring or authorising of expenditure beyond the prescribedlimit.—Under section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act,it is only the incurring or authorising of expenditure in contraventionof section 77 of the Act which amounts to a corrupt practice. Onlysub-section (3) of section 77 deals with the incurring or authorising ofexpenditure, for it lays down that the total amount of the said expen-diture, shall not exceed such amount as may be prescribed, and it isonly when the total expenditure exceeds this amount that it can besaid that it has been incurred or authorised in contravention of sec-tion 77 and a corrupt practice under section 123(6) is committed. Acontravention of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 77 of the Act is nolonger a corrupt practice. Nor is the submission of a false return ofexpenses a corrupt practice.—SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA, 16E.L.R. 103.

Furnishing false particulars in return of election expenses.—Though the incurring of election expenses in excess of the prescribedmaximum is a major corrupt practice under section 123(7) a nd is byitself a ground for setting aside the election under section ioo(2)(a) ofthe Act, furnishing false particulars in the return of election expensesis only a minor corrupt practice falling under section 124(4) a n ^ theelection can be set aside for such corrupt practice under sec-tion ioo(2)(c) of the Act only if the result of the election has beenmaterially affected thereby.—CHIKATI PARASURAM NAIDU V. VYRI-CHERLA CHANDRA CHUDAMANI DEV, 13 E.L.R. 66.

——Duty to keep accounts—Mere irregularities, effect of—Whetherdates when amounts given to workers were spent by workers must be stated.—Section 77(1) does not mean that it is obligatory on a candidate tomaintain two separate accounts, one being the account of all expendi-ture incurred, and the other being an account of all expenditureauthorised by him, or by his election agent. The section is compliedwith if the candidate keeps an account showing the dates on which theexpenditure was incurred by him, i.e., the dates on which he spent theamounts himself or paid them to a worker on submission of a bill tohim of the amounts spent by the worker. Per NARASIMHAM, C.J.—Though, if any amount actually expended is not brought into theaccounts it would constitute corrupt practice inasmuch as the totalamount of expenditure prescribed may be exceeded and thereby sub-section (3) of section 77 contravened, yet every petty irregularity inthe manner of maintenance of accounts, so long as the correctness ofthe entries is not in doubt, will not suffice to bring sub-section (6) of

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section 123 of the Act into operation.—PYARI MOHAN DAS V. DURGASANKAR DAS AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 338.

• Failure to maintain correct accounts.—A corrupt practice undersection 123(6) is committed only when there is a contravention of theprovisions of sub-section (3) of section 77, that is, where the candidatehas incurred or authorised expenditure exceeding the prescribed limit.Failure to maintain account of election expenses in the manner pre-scribed in sub-sections (i) and (2) of section 77 does not amount to acorrupt practice under section 123(6). It is a matter for the considera-tion of the Election Commission and not the Election Tribunal.—SHIVRAM SAWANT BHONSALE v. PRATAP RAO DEORAO BHONSALE, 17E.L.R. 37.

Expenses incurred before notification—Suppression of items ofexpenditure—Duty of Tribunal to estimate.—Price paid or payablefor copies of newspapers conducting propaganda for the candidate andpurchased for distribution by the candidate must be included in electionexpenses. Dictum,—As the Amending Act of 1956 has deliberatelyused in section 77 the words " incurred or authorised by the candidateor his election agent between the date of the publication of the notificationcalling an election and the date of declaration thereof," expenditureincurred by a candidate before the date of the notification would notfall within the operation of section 77, even if it was incurred in con-nection with the election. [Their Lordships expressed some doubt asto whether this correctly represents the intention of the Legislature.]If the tribunal comes to a conclusion that an item of expenditurehas been suppressed in the return of election expenses, the mere factthat there is no sufficient evidence about the amount that must havebeen spent is no ground for ignoring the matter. It is the duty ofthe Tribunal to assess the amount of expenses as best it can, andthough the Tribunal should not enter into the region of speculation ormerely try to guess the amount that must have been spent, it wouldgenerally be possible to arrive at an amount of expenditure on a con-servative basis, and where it is possible to arrive at any such estimate,such estimated amount should be held as not shown by the candidatein his election account.—SHIVRAM SAWANT BHONSALE V. PRATAP RAODEORAO BHONSALE, 17 E.L.R. 37.

Mere allegation that accounts of election expenses were notproperly kept—Whether allegation of corrupt practice under sec. 123(6)—Whether raises ground for declaring election void under sec. ioo(i)(d)(iv)—Omission to allege that prescribed maximum was exceeded and result ofelection was materially affected, effect of—Amendment to add allegation thatresult of election was affected, whether allowable.—Whenever a petition is

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based on the provisions of section ioo(i)(d) (iv) of the Representationof the People Act there must be a clear allegation in the first instancethat the result of the election has been materially affected and then, inaddition, the petition should show that it has been materially affectedby non-compliance with the provisions of the Representation of thePeople Act or the rules framed thereunder. Where the allegation in anelection petition was that the respondent did not keep any account ofthe expenditure from day to day as prescribed by section 77 of theAct and the rules made thereunder and his return of election expenseswas therefore fictitious and concocted and does not show the correctexpenditure but there was no allegation that the respondent hadexceeded the maximum expenditure allowed or that the result of theelection was materially affected by the non-compliance with section 77of the Act or the rules framed thereunder: Held, (i) that there was noallegation in the petition of a corrupt practice under section 123(6)against the respondent; and (ii) that there was no allegation in thepetition of any ground for declaring that the election was void undersection 100(1) (d) (iv) of the Act. Held further, that the Tribunal hadno power either under section 90(5) of the Act or Order VI, rule 17, ofthe Civil Procedure Code to allow the petitioner to amend the peti-tion, after the period of limitation for filing it had expired, by addingan allegation that the non-compliance with section 77 of the Act andthe rules had materially affected the result of the election. HarishChandra Bajpai and Another v. Triloki Singh and Another (12 E.L.R.461) referred to.—RAM ABHILAKH TEWARI V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,GONDA, AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 375.

——Corrupt practice under sec. 123(6)—Essentials of.—The corruptpractice defined in section 123(6) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, consists in incurring or authorising expenditure in excess ofthe maximum amount prescribed under section 77(3) of the Act.—RAMABHILAKH TEWARI V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, GONDA, AND OTHERS, 14E.L.R. 375.

Standard of proof—Hiring vehicles—Incurring expenditure—Charge of corrupt practice under sec. 123(6)—Burden of proving motorvehicles used, hire of such vehicles, price of petrol used, expenses of mikeetc., whether lies on petitioner or respondent—Failure of respondent to provesuch facts—Whether adverse inference could be drawn.—Though the pro-cedure followed in election enquiries is civil in form, the trial is acriminal trial in substance, especially in view of the results and con-sequences that follow from the decisions in election petitions ; and simplybecause the procedure to be followed is civil in form, it does not followthat the amount of proof required for bringing the charges home to the

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person against whom the accusation is made, is reduced to that of anenquiry in a purely civil proceeding so as to give room for the theoryof the balance of probabilities or the shifting of burden of proof. Itis not open in such enquiries for the petitioner to contend that if hehas proved a prima facie case against the respondent, it is for the res-pondent to rebut the case made out against him. There is a distinctionbetween the procedure that has to be followed by the Election Tribunalsand the amount of proof that has to be adduced in order to establishthe charges made against the successful candidate. Where a chargeagainst the respondent was that he had resorted to a corrupt practicein that he did not include in the return of election expenses the expensesthat he had incurred in connection with the petrol and the hire chargefor the motor vehicles and also the charges incurred by him in regardto the use of the mikes etc., and the petitioner's counsel relying onsection 106 of the Evidence Act contended that it was incumbent uponthe respondent to prove the facts which were within his special know-ledge, viz., use of petrol for the cars, the charges paid therefor, themileage that the vehicles did during the election period, the exactmileage in connection with the actual election and how much was forpurposes other than the election and so forth, and that if the respond-ent within whose knowledge these facts were, failed to prove thesame, an adverse inference should be drawn against the respondentand the petitioner should be deemed to have proved the case of corruptpractice in regard to the motor vehicles and the use of them: Held,that there was no burden on the petitioner to prove anything ascontended for and no adverse inference could be drawn against him ifhe does not prove such facts. Exceeding the maximum prescribed bythe rules framed under the Representation of the People Act being acorrupt practice as defined by section 123(6) and being a ground forsetting aside the election under section 100, the burden is heavily onlyon the person who alleges the corrupt practice to prove it; the peti-tioner cannot simply prove certain suspicious circumstances and thencall upon the person charged to explain those circumstances on theground that those facts about which suspicion has been raised arewithin the special knowledge of the accused person. Though it maybe difficult for the petitioner who accuses the successful candidate ofcorrupt practices to prove positively what motor vehicles had actuallybeen used for the purposes of the election, and what expenses wereactually incurred for petrol in connection therewith or the applicationswhich the respondent had made for permits or licences for the use ofmikes and so forth, the impossibility of proof of the actual electionexpenses would not dispense with the need for actual proof of the

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allegations. No question of ary rebuttal of the suspicious circum-stances raised by the petitioner against the respondent would arise insuch a case and the burden is heavily upon the petitioner to bring homethe guilt to the respondent by cogent, positive, specific and definiteevidence, if he is to succeed in establishing the corrupt practice allegedagainst the respondent, which would entail his election being declaredvoid. Though in section 123(6) only section 77 is referred to, still it isonly a contravention of sub-clause (3) of section 77 that would comeunder the scope of section 123(6). Even so, under section 100(6) acorrupt practice involved in contravention of sub-section (3) ofsection 77 will be a ground for setting aside an election.—S. KANDA-SWAMI v. S. B. ADITYAN AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 435.

An averment that the return of election expenses filed by therespondent was incorrect and false in material particulars, as paymentsmade to certain persons were not shown in the accounts does notamount to an averment of a corrupt practice against him undersection 123(6). A corrupt practice under section 123(6) is committedonly if the candidate incurs or authorises the expenditure in excessof the prescribed maximum amount. Ram Abhilak Tewari v. ElectionTribunal, Gonda, and Others (14 E.L.R. 375) followed.—SAVITRI DEVIv. PKABHAWATI MISRA AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 358.

The corrupt practice under section 123(6) consists in incurringor authorising expenditure in contravention of section 77 and expendi-ture can be said to be incurred or authorised in contravention ofsection 77 only if there is non-compliance with the condition laiddown in sub-section (3) thereof, viz., that the total of the said expendi-ture shall not exceed the prescribed amount.—KARAN SINGH V. JAMUNASINGH, 15 E.L.R. 370.

The words "incurring or authorising of expenditure in contra-vention of section 77" in section 123(6) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, mean incurring or authorising of expenditure in excessof the prescribed limit. Where there is no such allegation in an elec-tion petition but the only averments are that there are omissions in theaccounts and that the accounts have not been properly kept there isno allegation of a corrupt practice under section 123(6) and the Tribunalis not bound to embark upon an enquiry as to what was actually spentor not.—Babulal Sharma v. Brij Narain Brajesh (14 E.L.R. 72) and HarishChandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461) referred to.—PANDITK. C. SHARMA V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, CHHATARPUR, AND OTHERS, 15E.L.R. i n .

Mere filing of incorrect return of election expenses—Whethercorrupt practice.—The mere filing of an incorrect return of election

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expenses does not amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(6) ofthe Representation of the People Act. The corrupt practice under thatclause consists in incurring expenditure in excess of the prescribedlimit.—K.C. Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur, and Others (15E.L.R. i n . ) followed.—LAL CHANDRABHAN SHAH V. C. B. KEKRE,MEMBER ELECTION TRIBUNAL, AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 125.

Under section 123(6), it is only the incurring or authorising ofexpenditure in contravention of section 77 of the Act, that is, in excessof the amount prescribed under section 77(3), which amounts to acorrupt practice. The non-maintenance of true accounts is not a corruptpractice.—BIRESH MISRA V. RAM NATH SARMA AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R.243-

Section 123(6) defines the corrupt practice under that clauseas "the incurring or authorizing expenditure in contravention ofsection 77". The corrupt practice thus does not consist in not main-taining the account as required by sub-section (1) of section 77, butconsists in incurring or authorizing expenditure exceeding the amountprescribed under the Rules, as mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 77.Karan Singh v. Jamuna Singh (15 E.L.R. 370) followed.—GHAYUR ALIKHAN V. KESHAV GUPTA, 16 E.L.R. 154.

If the items of expenditure are accounted for, the mere omis-sion to enter the expenses from day to day does not amount to non-compliance with section 77 of the Act and rule 131. Where someworkers of a candidate used to dine at a particular place but noaccounts were maintained of the expenses incurred on such feedingcharges : Held, that unless it was further shown that the candidate hadundertaken to feed the workers whenever they dined at that office,the omission to note such feeding expenses in the accounts would notamount to contravention of section 77 of the Act, read with rule 131of the Rules.—AKSHAYA NARAYAN PRAHARAJ V. MAHESWAR BAG, 16E.L.R. 337-

A corrupt practice uuder section 123(6) of "incurring orauthorising expenditure in contravention of section 77" is committedonly if the maximum of election expenses prescribed by the rules isexceeded. Contravention of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section JJ doesnot constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(6) if the candidatehas not incurred or authorised expenditure in excess of the prescribedlimit. Prabhudas v. Jorsang (18 E.L.R. no) followed.—MD. IBRAHIMANSARI v. M. R. MASANI AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 160.

Non-compliance with sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 77with regard to the manner of keeping accounts will vitiate an election,

ELD—17

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only if it is proved that result of the election had been materiallyaffected thereby.—JAGAN PRASAD RAW AT V. KRISHNA DUTT PALIWAL,20 E.L.R. 443.

—•—The corrupt practice mentioned in section 123(6) consists in" incurring or authorising of expenditure in contravention of sec-tion 77", and though the general words " section 77" are used insection 123(6), inasmuch as sub-section (3) of section 77 alone deals withthe incurring or authorising of expenditure, and sub-sections (1) and(2) deal only with the manner and method of keeping accounts, thecorrupt practice under section 123(6) is committed only when there is acontravention of sub-section (3), that is, when the expenditure incurredor authorised exceeds the maximum amount of election expensesprescribed under section 77(3). The successful respondent is not boundto explain the facts within his knowledge, the burden of proving thecorrupt practices mentioned in section 123 being upon the petitioner.Exceeding the prescribed maximum expenditure being a corruptpractice as laid down by section 123(6), it would not be proper to throwthe burden on the successful respondent, even though certain suspiciouscircumstances are proved against him, to explain those circumstances.Nor can it be stated that the petitioner has discharged the burdenwhich lies upon him, by reason of the failure of the successful respond-ent to explain such circumstances. Mere failure to explain suchcircumstances or even an unsatisfactory explanation, therefore, cannotby itself advance the case of the petitioner, without positive evidencebeing let in by the petitioner in order to substantiate the charge ofcorrupt practice made in the petition and that evidence being of areliable kind. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, if applied literally tosuch a situation, would place the duty on the successful respondent toconvince the court that he has not committed the alleged corruptpractice. It would, however, be permissible to take into account thefailure of the respondent to explain the evidence adduced against him,in appreciating the evidence adduced by the petitioner.—S. KANDA-SWAMY v. S. B. ADITYAN, 20 E.L.R. 410.

Where there is no allegation in the petition that the respond-ent has incurred or authorised expenditure in excess, of the prescribedmaximum of election expenses, there is no allegation of a corruptpractice under section 123(6) and the Tribunal is not bound to embarkupon an enquiry as to whether expenses alleged to have been incurredand not shown in the accounts, have actually been incurred or not.—PANDIT K. C. SHARMA V. KRISHI PANDIT RISHABKUMAR AND OTHERS, 20E.L.R. 401.

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It is only when the total expenditure exceeds the prescribedlimit could it be said that it has been incurred or authorized to beincurred in contravention of section 77 ; accordingly, a contraventionof sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 77 is not a corrupt practice undersection 123(6). Nor is the submission of a false return a corruptpractice under the Act as amended in 1956. Therefore, the mere factthat certain items of expenses are proved to have been incurred butthe same have not been entered in the account, cannot amount to acorrupt practice. An omission to include items of expenditure in theaccount, would be a corrupt practice, only if such expense, if added tothe total expenses shown in the account, would take the total beyondthe limit prescribed.—M. S. SOURIMUTHU UDAYAR AND ANOTHER V.K. PANDIARAJ, 20 E.L.R. 256.

In regard to a corrupt practice under section 123(6) of theAct, viz., incurring or authorising expenditure in contravention ofsection 77 of the Act, the petitioner cannot be allowed to adduceevidence in respect of items of expenditure which have not beenspecified in the petition.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. LAL BAHADUR,20 E.L.R. 176.

The fact that one or more items of expenditure are not shownin the account of election expenses does not by itself constitute an"incurring or authorising of expenditure in contravention of section 77"within the meaning of section 123(6) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, and is not a sufficient ground for setting aside anelection under section IOO(I)(6). Though section 123(6) speaks ofsection 77 generally, and not sub-section (3) of section 77 alone, anexpenditure is "incurred or authorised in contravention of section 77"only when sub-section (3) of section 77 is contravened. Sub-sections (1)and (2) of section 77 deal only with the method and manner ofkeeping accounts. Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra (16 E.L.R. 103)and C. R. Narasimhan v. Natesan Chettiar (20 E.L.R. 1) followed. Saw.Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar (19 E.L.R. 16) not followed.—D. VENKATRAMIAH V. E. NARAYANA GOWDA, 20 E.L.R. 101.

The corrupt practice mentioned in section 123(6) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, of "incurring or authorisingof expenditure in contravention of section 77 " is committed only whenthere is a contravention of sub-section (3) of section 77, that is to say,when expenditure in excess of the amount prescribed is incurred orauthorised. Contravention of sub-section (1) of section 77 whichenjoins upon the candidate the duty of keeping a separate account, orof sub-section (2) of section 77 which lays down that such account shall

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contain such particulars as may be prescribed, does not involve anyincurring or authorising of expenditure in contravention of section 77,and does not, therefore, constitute a corrupt practice under sec-tion 123(6). Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra (16 E.L.R. 103), K. C.Sharma v. Election Tribunal (15 E.L.R. i n ) , Ram Abhilakh Tewari v.Election Tribunal (14 E.L.R. 375) and Prabhudas v. Jorsang (18 E.L.R.110) followed. Pyari Mohan Das v. Durga Sankar Das (14 E.L R. 338)and Akshaya Narayan Praharaj v. Maheswar Bag (16 E.L.R. 337)explained and distinguished.—C. R. NARASIMHAN V. M. G. NATESAN

CHETTIAR, 20 E.L.R. 1.The Election Tribunal has no jurisdiction to find that certain

items of expenditure not shown in the accounts have been spent orincurred, if there is no allegation in the petition that such items havebeen spent or incurred. Contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-sec-tion (2) of section JJ would not by itself constitute a corrupt practiceunder section 123(6). A corrupt practice under that clause is com-mitted only if sub-section (3) of section 77 is contravened, that is tosay, expenditure exceeding the maximum prescribed has been incurredor authorised by the candidate. C. R. Narasimhan v. M. G. NatesanChettiar (20 E.L.R. 1) and Ghayur AH Khan v. Keshav Gupta(16 E.L.R. 154) followed. This is no justification for the view thatthe object and effect of Act 27 of 1956 is to tighten the hold on thecandidate and to make the return of a false account a major corruptpractice. [The scope and effect of the amendments made by Act 27of 1956 discussed].—M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR V. SAW. GANESAN,

21 E.L.R. 215.Though their Lordships found it difficult to subscribe to the

view that incurring or authorising expenditure and suppressing suchexpenditure from the accounts, would not be "incurring or authoris-ing of expenditure in contravention of section 'jy ", they followed theprevious decision of the Court to the contrary in K. C. Sharma v.Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur (15 E.L.R. in).—NAUNIHAL SINGH V,KlSHORlLAL PALIWAL AND OTHERS, 21 E .L .R. 33.

Under section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Actit is " the incurring or authorising of expenditure in contravention ofsection 77 " which is made a corrupt practice, and this contraventioncan only have reference to section 77(3), i.e., the incurring or author-ising of expenditure in excess of the prescribed maximum.—LACHHMANSINGH GILL V. HARPARKASH KAUR, 22 E.L.R. 249.

Failure to keep separate and correct account of expenditureand to lodge with the returning officer a true copy of the account kept

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may amount to non-compliance with the provisions of Act 43 of 1951or of any rules or orders made thereunder and, may thus fall withinthe purview of section ioo(i){d)(iv), but to avoid an election on thisground there must be a plea and proof that such non-compliance has,in fact, materially affected the result of the election in so far as itconcerns the returned candidate.—LACHHMAN SINGH GILL V. HARPAR-KASH KAUR, 22 E.L.R. 249.

The deposit made by a candidate under section 34 of theRepresentation of the People Act is not an item of expenditureunless such amount is forfeited, and omission to include the amountof such deposit in the return of election expenses does not amountto any contravention of section 77 of the Act.—CHANDRASHEKHARSINGH V. SARJOO PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER, 22 E.L.R. 206.

The omission of certain items of expenditure in the accountof election expenses, even though done intentionally, would not beincurring expenditure in contravention of section 77 of the Act, andwould not amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(6), if theprescribed maximum election expenditure would not be exceeded evenif all such omitted items are included in the election expenses. Thelaw in India after the Amendment Act of 1956, is different in thisregard from the English law. Pyari Mohan Das v. Durga Sankar Das(14 E.L.R. 338) explained.—CHANDRASHEKHAR SINGH V. SARJOO PRA-SAD SINGH AND ANOTHER, 22 E.L.R. 206.

It is not correct to say that the contravention of the provi-sions of section 77 (1) and 77 (2) are matters for the Election Commis-sion and not the Election Tribunal, to enquire into. It is incumbenton the Election Tribunal to inquire into the falsity of a return ofelection expenses, if it is alleged that expenses have been authorisedor incurred in contravention of section 77(1) or (2). The Election Com-mission's jurisdiction is confined to considering whether the'return hasbeen lodged in time and whether the accounts have been made up inthe manner prescribed by law. The Tribunal is an independent bodywith original jurisdiction to be exercised by it exclusively in the firstinstance and there can be no res judicata on account of any other orearlier decision standing in the way of the Tribunal exercising thatoriginal jurisdiction.—SAW. GANESAN V. M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR,19 E.L.R. 16.

The view that a corrupt practice under section 123(6) iscommitted only when there is a contravention of the provisions ofsection 77(3), that is, when the maximum of election expenses prescrib-ed is exceeded, is not correct. Even if the item of expenditure

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incurred or authorized is within the maximum prescribed, if in respectthereof an account is not kept as provided in section 77(1) or particularsthereof are not given as provided by section 77(2), then that would bea case of incurring or authorizing of an expenditure in contraventionof section 77(1) or section 77(2) and a corrupt practice under sec-tion 123(6). There is an incurring or authorising of expenditure incontravention of section 77 not only when expenditure is incurred orauthorised in contravention of section 77(3) but also when an expendi-ture is incurred or authorised in contravention of the provisions ofsection 77(1) or section 77(2). Incurring or authorizing of an expendi-ture in contravention of section 77 would be a corrupt practiceirrespective of the quantum of the expenditure. When a maximumis fixed as under section 77(3), exceeding that maximum, even by avery small amount would be a corrupt practice. The same ruleapplies to an omission of an item of expenditure from the accounts orto give particulars thereof under clause (1) or clause (2) of section 77.The maxim de minimis non cured lex has no application to such cases.The reasonable hire of propaganda vans and jeeps used for the electioncampaign and where a car or a building has been used exclusively forthe purposes of election for some period, a reasonable estimate of thevalue of the user of the car or the building must be included in theelection expenses, even though the car might not have been purchasedor the building constructed for the purposes of the election. Expensesincurred by agents which are ratified by the candidate subsequentlywould be expenses authorised by the candidate and should be includedin election expenses. Where a paid secretary of the candidate or hismotor drivers attend to election work also in addition to their ordi-nary duties, their salary need not be included in election expenses.Harinder Singh v. Karnail Singh (12 E.L.R. 421) referred to.—SAW.GANESAN v. M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR, 19 E.L.R. 16.

Irregularities in maintaining accounts would not in themselvesamount to corrupt practice and could only affect the decision of theelection petition if it could also be shown that they had materiallyaffect ed the result of the election. Where there was a very definite chargeto the effect that the respondent had engaged a party of so-calledpoets and a party of musicians to tour around the villages in theconstituency on her behalf during the period of the election campaignfor the purpose of carrying on propaganda for her election, and thatin this connection she had spent a sum of about Rs. 3,000 at the rateof Rs. 200 per day and no such expenditure was mentioned at all inher return of election expenses and it was also alleged that the actualexpenditure of the respondent on her election amounted to about

CORRUPT PRACTICE (6. INCURRING UNAUTHORISED EXPENSES) 135

Rs. 30,000: Held, that, though the latter allegation taken by itselfmight be regarded as vague, it was evident from the paragraph as awhole that it was intended to be read in conjunction with the otheralleged items of expenditure incurred by the respondent and notshown by her in her return, and if any of these items were drawn upwith the necessary particulars and did not suffer from vagueness, andsuch an item, is added to the amount shown by the respondent in herreturn, would bring the expenditure above the prescribed limit ofRs. 7,000, the allegations cannot be struck off for vagueness thematter but must be investigated and the petitioner must be given anopportunity to substantiate his allegations.—Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v.Brijlal Nandlal Biyani (10 E.L.R. 357) distinguished.—LACHHMANSINGH V. HARPARKASH KAUR, 19 E.L.R. 417.

In election petitions which are in the nature of a criminaltrial, there is no such thing as shifting of the burden of proof as thereis in civil cases, and it is for the petitioner to prove and it is not forthe respondent to rebut, after a certain stage, the facts that have tobe proved. Therefore, if the petitioner had not laid the foundationthat the cars had been given exclusively for election purposes but hadadmitted, or if it should be the necessary inference to draw from thefacts alleged, that the quantity of petrol used was for both the electionpurposes and for the private purposes of the owner, it is for the peti-tioner to prove how much petrol was consumed for election purposes,and he cannot be heard to say that the burden is shifted to therespondent the moment he proves that the cars were used for electionpurposes and that petrol was supplied to them.—M. S. SOURIMUTHUUDAYAR AND ANOTHER V. K. PANDIARAJ, 20 E.L.R. 256.

Mere contravention of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 77 ofthe Act is not sufficient to constitute the corrupt practice under sec-tion 123(6). A corrupt practice under that provision is committedonly when the prescribed maximum of election expenses is exceeded.Venkatramiah v. Narayana Gowda (20 E.L.R. 101) followed.—ANJANEYAREDDY v. GANGI REDDY AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 247.

" Incurring or authorising expenditure in contravention of s. yy "—Whether includes contravention of els. (1) and (2) of s. yy—Agreementbetween two candidates to share expenses—Legality.—A, the respondent,was a candidate for a seat in a State Legislative Assembly constituencyset up by the Congress Party and B was the candidate for the Parlia-mentary constituency set up by the same Party, for a particular area.The elections to the Parliament and the Assembly were to be held atthe same place, on the same date and at the same time, and the elec-tors in respect of both were the same persons. A and B agreed to

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share the expenses that A may incur in the election campaign. Thetotal amount spent in the election campaign namely, Rs. 13,861 wasapportioned between A and B, and A showed in his return of electionexpenses the amount of Rs. 7,361 which A had to bear under thisapportionment. The maximum which A could incur under the ruleswas Rs. 8,000. In an election petition to set aside the election of A,it was contended that A had committed the corrupt practice referredto in section 123(6), viz., incurring or authorising expenditure in contra-vention of section 77 : 'Held, (i) that the corrupt practice of " incurringor authorising expenditure in contravention of section 77" iscommitted only if the maximum expenditure prescribed is exceeded ;mere omission to keep a separate account of a candidate's expenseswith the particulars required by rule 131 or to keep the account fromday to day does not amount to the corrupt practice under that provi-sion ; (ii) there was nothing objectionable in the agreement betweenA and B to share the expenses in the circumstances; there was nothingillegal or any contravention, technical or otherwise, of any electionrule in such an agreement, provided it was bonaftde, and provided therequirements of the Act and the rules relating to maintenance ofaccounts were faithfully carried out; (iii) A and B could not betreated as agents of each other and each cannot be regarded as havingincurred Rs. 13,861. Held further, when it is the case of a petitionerthat the respondent has spent any amount in excess of that prescribedunder the rules, it would be necessary for him to set out in clear termsthe items of expenditure, which, according to him, take the aggregatebeyond the prescribed limit. This may be done by setting out itemsnot included in the account which may have been submitted or byshowing that the items of expenditure were not correct or the accountshowed lesser amount than what was actually spent. But in any case,the actual item of expenditure or items of expenditure on which hewants to reply or the items of expenditure the aggregate of which hewants to challenge must be specifically set out. The view that a pleathat the maximum prescribed has been exceeded is sufficient and thatamounts by which the maximum has been exceeded may be shownlater by an amendment of the petition or in the evidence, is notcorrect. The burden of proving that such an agreement is not a bonafide one and that the division of the expenses was artificial, is on thepetitioner.—PRABHUDAS V. JORSANG, 18 E.L.R. no .

Expenses of party organisation—Whether to be included.—Expenses incurred by the Congress Committee for printing and distri-bution of leaflets to induce people to support the Congress candidateCannot be deemed expenses incurred 01 authorised by the candidate

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himself; and the candidate is not, therefore, bound to include suchexpenses in the account of election expenses.—BIRESH MISRA V. RAMNATH SARMA AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 243.

Expenses of parly.—As a political party is interested in carry-ing on propaganda in favour of the party as such, moneys that it mayspend in furtherance of any such propaganda cannot in law be said tohave been incurred as an agent of the candidate that may be set upunder the aegis of the party. The mere fact that the expenses incurredby a party organisation was incurred with the consent of the candidateset up by the party, and if these expenses are included, the maximumprescribed would be exceeded, is not sufficient to bring the case undersection IOO(I)(<2). It cannot be laid down that if a candidate knewthat any person was incurring any expenditure and the candidate wasgetting the benefit of the same and if he kept quiet, that wouldamount to giving his consent and that such consent amounts to autho-rity. Expenses incurred by a political party which sets up candidates fornumerous constituencies, not in the matter of contesting the electionof a particular candidate set up by the party itself, but by way ofpropaganda relating to the principles or policy which the party standsfor, cannot be regarded as expenses incurred for and on behalf of thecandidates in the matter of fighting the election for a particularconstituency.—PRABHUDAS V. JORSANG, 18 E.L.R. n o .

Where the respondent, a candidate set up by the CongressParty had contributed Rs. 600 towards election expenses to acommittee constituted by the Congress Party as the City CongressElection Committee for the conduct of elections in the city, andtheir main purpose was to see to the success of the Congresscandidate in the elections by employing all methods of persuasion bymeetings, propaganda, mobile vans, cycle processions, etc., and thisCity Congress Election Committee was a separate body from thePradesh Congress Committee: Held, that the City Election Committeemust be considered as agent of the respondent and the proportionateamount of the expenditure incurred by the Committee for electionpurposes, over and above Rs. 600 contributed by the respondent ,must also form part of the election expenses and was liable to beIncluded in the accounts under section 77(1). These expenses couldnot be considered to be expenses met by a person or organisationwhich was voluntary and which had no authority of the candidate.Where the expenditure in question is not expenditure incurred by arecognised party organisation but expenditure incurred by a bodyspecially constituted for the purpose of conducting the elections onbehalf of the candidates including the respondent the expenditure must

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be included in the respondent's election expenses. Even if anyexpenditure has been incurred by the Congress Party as such theywould be in connection with the election and that would be requiredto be included in the account to be maintained under section 77(1).Even if there was any doubt as to whether expenditure incurred by arecognised party organisation, for furthering the prospects of anelection supported by it, would be expenses incurred in the election,that doubt was removed by the Parliament by deleting clause 4 of theDraft Bill which eventually became the amended Act 27 of 1956.—•V. RAMACHANDRA RAO V. V. B. RAJU AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R. 358.

Where the evidence showed that the leader of the CongressParty had come to the constituency and addressed meetings in supportof the candidature of the respondent (the Congress candidate) and thepetitioner contended that the expenses incurred by the All-India^Congress Committee and the District Congress Committee in this behalfmust be included in the election expenses of the respondent: Held,(i) that, under rule 131 of the Rules as amended in 1956, only suchexpenditure as had been incurred or authorised by the candidate or hiselection agent had to be included in the election expenses; (ii) that theword " authorised " was not equivalent to the expression " with theconsent or the knowledge of," and that even if the respondent knewthat the All-India or the District Congress Committees had incurredsome expenditure in this behalf such expenditure could not be treatedas expenditure "incurred or authorised" by the respondent; (iii) theburden of proving that the All-India and the District CongressCommittees had incurred some expenses in this matter and the amountof the expenses that they had incurred, was on the petitioner and noton the respondent. Held also, that the facts and circumstances of thecase did not show that the All-India Congress Committee or the DistrictCongress Committee was the agent of the respondent. Prabhudas v.Jorsang (18 E.L.R. no) relied on.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. LALBAHADOOR, 20 E.L.R. 176.

The corrupt practice under section 123(6) is the expenditure,that is, the act of spending in contravention of section 77(3). Failureon the part of the candidate to keep a correct account or to enter thenecessary particulars in the account would not be corrupt practice.But, if the addition of omitted items of expenditure would result inthe limit of the expenditure being exceeded, the candidate would beguilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(6). Expenditure incurredby a party organisation for holding public meetings in the generalcampaign conducted by the party for the purpose of getting support

CORRUPT PRACTICE (6. INCURRING UNAUTHORISED EXPENSES) 139

for all the party candidates of a particular locality is not expenditureincurred by any of the particular candidates and need not be includedin their return of election expenses. A committee called the CityCongress Election Committee was entrusted with the work of conduct-ing elections in the Hyderabad City for eight Assembly seats and oneParliamentary seat. The appellant, a Congress candidate, paid Rs. 100and contributed Rs. 500 out of a total amount of Rs. 2,000 requiredto be paid by each of the candidates as per the circular issued by theCentral Congress Committee. The evidence showed that a totalamount of Rs. 12,183-14-0 was incurred by the City Congress ElectionCommittee towards election expenditure on behalf of all the Congresscandidates who contested the eight Assembly seats and the oneParliamentary seat. The Tribunal held that i/o,th of the said totalamount, after deducting the sum of Rs. 600 already paid by him andshown in his accounts, i.e., Rs. 753-12-6 should be treated as the appel-lant's election expenses : Held, the view that a share of the expendi-ture incurred by a party organisation which had set up severalcandidates in a particular locality should be allocated proportionatelyto each of the candidates, necessarily involves an element of surmiseand speculation as it is not possible to predicate with any degree ofcertainty as to which part of the expenditure by the organisation wasactually spent in connection with the election of any particular candi-date, particularly when some of the candidates are returned un-contested and some others had not serious opposition. Further, afinding as to the commission of a corrupt practice entails seriousconsequences to the candidate and to base a finding of corrupt prac-tice on a notional apportionment of the expenditure in such cases,is not warranted by the provisions of the Act; and the amount ofRs. 753-12-6 should not, therefore, be included in the election expensesof the appellant in determining whether he had committed a corruptpractice under section 123(6). [Judgment of the Election Tribunal,Hyderabad, reported as V. Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju and Others(19 E.L.R. 358) dissented from on this point, but affirmed on othergrounds.] —V. B. RAJU V. V. RAMACHANDRA RAO AND OTHERS, 21E.L.R. 1.

Free services of friends—Whether value should be included.—Free services rendered by friends of a candidate, e.g., free advertise-ments in a newspaper, free printing of manifestos, free re-printing ofelectoral rolls, making of blocks etc., which have a cash value must beincluded in the return of election expenses. Cockermouth Division Case(5 O'M. & H. 155) and Khan Bahadur Haji Badi Ahmed Choudhury v.Muhammad Anwarul Azim (Sen and Poddar 261) relied on. Munuswami

140 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Gounder v. Khader Sheriff and Others (4 E.L.R. 283) not followed.Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and Others (10 E.L.R. 129) distin-guished. An omission to include items of expenditure in the return ofelection expenses will not constitute a corrupt practice unless it is donewith a corrupt motive. Where the value of free services was omittedon the bona fide belief that it need not be included under the law :Held, that the omission did not amount to a corrupt practice undersection 124(4).—VASANTHA P A I V- DR. V. K. JOHN AND OTHERS, 12E.L.R. 107.

Cars supplied by friends—Whether to be included.—Where noexpenditure is, as a matter of fact, incurred as for instance, in caseswhere the owners use their own vehicles or where friends voluntarilylend their cars free for being used in the elections, it is not necessaryfor the respondent to calculate the hire which he would have paid ifhe had taken such vehicles on hire and then include the same in thereturn of election expenses as though he had actually incurred thatexpenditure.—CHIKATI PARASURAM NAIDU V. VYRICHERLA CHANDRA

CHUDAMANI DEV, 13 E.L.R. 66.Vehicles supplied by friends and relatives—Whether reasonable

hire should be included.—Where the friends or relatives of a candidatelend vehicles gratuitously to a candidate for his use for election pur-poses the candidate is not bound to include a reasonable hire for thevehicles in his election expenditure. Rananjaya Singh v. BaijnathSingh (10 E.L.R. 129) relied on. This rule, however, is not applic-able to cases where the friend or relative lending his vehicle or theassistance of his servants incurs any additional expenditure in doingso. When private cars not intended to be hired are obtained by acandidate from his friends or relatives the burden is on the electionpetitioner to prove that the owners did not intend to lend the vehiclesgratuitously to the candidate.—SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA,

16 E.L.R. 103.Vehicles lent gratuitously by friends—Reasonable hire whether

should be included.—If a vehicle is lent to a candidate by his friendsgratuitously, it cannot be said that an expenditure is incurred orauthorised by the candidate and it is not therefore, necessary for thecandidate to show in his account of election expenses the reasonablerent of the vehicles lent to him by his friends gratuitously.—RananjayaSingh v. Baijnath Singh and Others (10 E.L.R. 129) and Sheopat Singhv. Harish Chandra (16 E.L.R. 103) relied on.—BIRESH MISRA V. RAMNATH SARMA AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 243.

Free services of friends—Motor-cars lent by friends—Entire cost ofpetrol put in by candidate or proportionate salary of drivers—Whether to be

CORRUPT PRACTICE (6. INCURRING UNAUTHORISED EXPENSES) 141

included.—Where a candidate is allowed by his friends to use their carsfor election purposes whenever they do not require their cars and thecandidate returns their cars whenever the friends require them withoutdraining all the petrol he has put in the cars, it is not necessary forthe candidate to include in his election expenses the entire cost of thepetrol he has purchased for the cars or a proportionate part of thesalary of the drivers.—M. MUTHIAH V. A. SUBBARAJ, 18 E.L.R. 73.

Use of own vehicles—Cars lent by friends—Whether notional hire,cost of petrol or repairs to be included—Cars procured on hire by friends.—A corrupt practice under section 123(6) is committed only whenexpenditure in excess of the prescribed maximum is incurred or author-ised. The failure to carry out the requirements of sub-sections (1) and(2) of section 77 read with rule 131 of the rules, does not amount to acorrupt practice under section 123(6). The onus of proof of a corruptpractice under section 123(6) is on the petitioner and has to bedischarged satisfactorily and beyond any reasonable doubt. Merelyshowing or suggesting that the expenses could not have been so muchor that they were likely to be more, would not be enough. While onemay raise inferences or presumptions contemplated by the IndianEvidence Act out of facts established, the evidence to establish suchfacts must be both clear, specific and reliable in the circumstances ofthe case. Where no expenditure was, as a matter of fact, incurred, asfor instance, in cases where the candidate uses his own vehicles orwhere friends voluntarily lend their cars free to a candidate for beingused in the election, it is not necessary for the candidate to estimatethe hire charges which he would have paid if he had taken such vehicleson hire and then show the same in the election return as though he hadactually incurred that expenditure. But if petrol was purchased,whether it be by the candidate or the owner of the vehicle for thepurpose of using the vehicle for election purposes, the cost of the petrolmust necessarily be shown in the election return. Other runningexpenditure of candidate or by the owner for the candidate, e.g., costof loud-speakers, batteries, etc. have to be shown as they are actuallyspent or are authorised to be spent by the candidate. Where a friendor a relation has procured a car on hire for the candidate and has paidfor it, such hire charges should be included. If repairs to a car are doneby the owner of the car and he does not claim the cost thereof fromthe candidate who has been allowed to use it, the cost of such repairsneed not be included in the candidate's election expenses.—KATARIATAKANDAS HEMRAJ v. PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

Free services—Free use of family motor cars.—Where a candi-date was allowed by his family concern, of which he was the managing

142 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

partner, to use a number of motor vehicles for his election propagandawithout any charge or hire: Held, that, as the candidate had notincurred or authorised any expenditure by way of charge or hire forthe vehicles, he was not bound to include a notional hire or charge forthe use of the vehicles in his return of election expenses. RananjayaSingh v. Baijnath Singh (10 E.L.R. 129) followed. M. R. Meganathanv. K. T. Kosalram (9 E.L.R. 242) not followed.—SARDAR DAYAL SINGHv. SARDAR SURJIT SINGH MAJITHIA, 19 E.L.R. 305.

Free services—Notional rent for rooms etc. for which no hire waspaid.—Though the intention of the Legislature in enacting the newsection 77, clauses (1) and (2), making it more comprehensive andmandatory, was to bring the contravention of any of its clauses withinthe mischief <Si section 123(6), in view of the absence of any change inthe language of section 123(6) after the amendment, the intention of theLegislature has not been clearly expressed ; and, on the plain languageof section 123(6), only the incurring or authorising of expenditureexceeding the amount fixed under the rules would be a corrupt practiceunder section 123(6). For the purpose of showing the correctness orotherwise, the account can be examined and any omissions can bepointed out and it is in that connection that the maintenance of a trueand correct account becomes important. It is only expenses actuallyincurred or authorised to be incurred by the candidate that would comewithin the meaning of "expenses incurred or authorised" undersection 77(1) or under section 123(6). The view that notional rent forthe rooms or premises where election offices were admittedly located,but for which no hire was paid or incurred on behalf of a candidate,should be included, does not receive support from the language of theAct.—V. RAMACHANDRA RAO V. V. B. RAJU AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R.358.

Free use of buildings.—Where services are rendered free to acandidate by his friends, e.g., the free use of buildings for electionpurposes, the candidate is not bound to make an estimate of the valueof such services and include such value in his election expenses.VasanthaPai v. Dr. V. K.John (12 E.L.R. 107) and Khan Bahadur HajiBadi Ahmed Chaudhury v. Muhammad Anwarul Azim (Sen & Poddar 261)explained and distinguished.—D. VENKATRAMIAH V. E. NARAYANAGOWDA, 20 E.L.R. 101.

Car lent by friend of candidate—Candidate not bound to includeall petrol expenses unless car was given for exclusive use—Apportionmentof cost of petrol—Burden of proof of quantity of petrol used for purposes ofelection.—If a car had been given to a candidate for being used exclu-sively for his electioneering campaign, then all the petrol that had been

CORRUPT PRACTICE (6. INCURRING UNAUTHORISED EXPENSES) I 4 3

supplied to that car during the relevant period should be brought intoaccount and will form part of the election expenses, and when that isnot done, the cost of the same should be added on to the electionexpenses. But to enable one to come to this conclusion, foundationshould be laid that those cars were given exclusively for the use of thecandidate for his electioneering campaign, and in the absence of aver-ment and proof that the cars were given exclusively for the use of thecandidate, he cannot be called upon to account for all the petrol usedfor the cars Muring the relevant period.—M. S. SOURIMUTHU UDAYARAND ANOTHER V. K. PANDIARAJ, 20 E.L.R. 256.

Use of one's own car—Voluntary services of others—Free use offriend's motor-cars.—Where a candidate goes from his residence to theoffice of the returning officer to file his nomination in his own car whichhad sufficient fuel in it, it is not necessary to include in the electionexpenses an amount representing expense which he must be deemed tohave incurred for the purpose of going to the office of the returningofficer, based on a rough estimate of the quantity of petrol spent, wearand tear of the car etc. The travelling expenses of polling agents whichare incurred by the polling agents voluntarily and gratuitously with-out any intention to claim them from the candidate are not expensesincurred by the candidate and need not be included in the electionexpenses. Under the Indian law a candidate is not bound to includein his election expenses the value of free services {e.g., use of motor-cars or vans, or premises for holding election offices) rendered to himby others. Under the provisions of the Indian Act as interpreted bythe Supreme Court it is only the expenses incurred or authorised bythe candidate or by his election agent that should be included in thereturn of election expenses and there is no provision which makes itincumbent on the candidate to include therein expenses incurred byother persons. Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh (10 E.L.R. 129)followed. [Their Lordships left open the question whether suchexpenses should be included where the third persons had themselveshired and incurred expenditure in procuring the vehicles or premisesfor the use of the candidate.] The law prevailing in England in thisrespect is somewhat different and is not applicable to India. JosephForster Wilson v. Sir Christopher Furness (6 O'M. & H. 6), CockermouthDivision Case (5 O'M. & H. 56), Berwick-on-Tweed (7 O'M. & H. 1) andBorough of Oxford (7 O'M. & H. 49) referred to.—MUTHIAH CHETTIARI;.SAW. GANESAN, 21 E.L.R. 215.

Expenditure incurred by friends to help candidate—" Incurringor authorising of expenditure, " meaning of.—Where persons interestedir» a candidate spend money to help the candidate jn his election but

144 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the candidate himself has not authorised and does not eventually meetsuch expenditure, the candidate is not bound to include such expendi-ture in his return of election expenses ; and he would not be guilty ofthe corrupt practice under section 123(7) °f the Representation of thePeople Act if he omits to include such expenses in his return.—Narasimhan v. Natesan Chettiar (20 E.L.R. 1) and Muthiah Chettiar v.Saw. Ganesan (21 E.L.R. 215) followed. Dr. A. Srinivasan v. G. VasanthaPai and Others (12 E.L.R. 453) affirmed on other grounds.—G. VASANTHAPAI v, A. SRINIVASAN AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 221.

Purchase of motor vehicles whether whole price, or wear and tearonly, to be shown as election expenses.—The fact that a motor vehiclewas used for some time for election purposes does not make the wholeamount invested in its purchase an election expenditure which has tobe taken into account for purposes of section 77 of the Act. The onlyamount, that can be taken into account, is the amount spent in theactual use of the vehicle, i.e., the amount of wear and tear which itmight have suffered while being used for election purposes. Even ifa vehicle has been purchased for election purposes, the whole capitalexpenditure on the purchase cannot be treated as expenditure forelection. What can be treated as expenditure for election would be theinitial investment minus the value of the article after the election wasover, i.e., its depreciation and wear and tear on account of its use forelection purposes.—KARAN SINGH V. JAMUNA SINGH, 15 E.L.R. 370.

Election expenses—Duty to maintain separate and proper accountsof election expenses.—Sub-section (1) of section 77 does not containa direction to keep a regular daily account of the expenditure incurredas is done in the account books maintained by commercial firms. Whatthis sub-section requires is that the candidate himself or his electionagent should keep a separate and correct account of all expenditure inconnection with the election, incurred by the candidate or by hiselection agent. The requirement is that the account should be a separateone and a correct one, and it is to be kept either by the candidate or byhis election agent.—GHAYUR ALI KHAN V. KESHAV GUPTA, 16 E.L.R.

154-j_CORRUPT PRACTICE (7. Procuring assistance of Govt. servants).

Obtaining or procuring assistance of Government servants.—Difference between old and new law—The present law.—There is a mate-rial difference between the phraseology of section 123(8) before thesection was amended and section 123(7) a s n o w contained in the Act.The language of the provisions of section 123(8) covered a wide fieldand referred to every person serving under the Government of India

CORRUPT PRACTICE (7. OBTAINING HELP OF GOVT. SERVANTS) I45

or a State unless such person was declared to be one to whom the pro-visions would not apply. After the amendment, the provisions ofsection 123(7) a r e narrower in scope and apply to any person in theservice of the Government belonging to the classes specified inclauses (a) to (g) and none else.—KISHORE CHANDRA DEO BHANJ V.RAGHUNATH MISRA AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R. 1. [S.C.]

Policy underlying sec. 123(7)—Not to disenfranchise Governmentservants—Obiter.—The policy of the law underlying section 123(7) ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, is to keep Governmentservants aloof from politics and also to protect them from being impos-ed upon by those with influence or in position of authority and power.The prevention of Government servants from actively canvassing fora particular candidate would not amount to disenfranchising themwithin the contemplation of the rule laid down by the Supreme Courtin Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo and Others (9 E.L.R. 294). Theobservations of the Supreme Court in this case about disenfranchise-ment have to be read in their own context.—LACHHMAN SINGH GILL V.HARPARKASH KAUR, 22 E.L.R. 249.

Person giving assistance does not commit a corrupt practice.—Under section 123(8) of the Act, a person serving under the State, doesnot himself commit a corrupt practice by giving assistance. It is onlythe candidate or his agent who commits the corrupt practice if heobtains the assistance of persons serving under the State.—TRILOKISINGH V. SHIVRAJWATI NEHRU AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 234.

" Obtaining or procuring " connotes a positive act on the part ofthe candidate, not mere passive receipt.—In order to prove that assistancefrom a person in the service of the Government had been " procured ",it must be shown that the candidate had consciously done some posi-tive act in order to bring about the result of receiving assistance fromthat person. The word "obtain" in section 123(7) also connotes" purpose " or " effort " behind the action of the candidate. The wordhas not been used in the sub-section in the sense of a mere .passivereceipt of assistance without the candidate being even conscious of thefact that the assistance has been rendered. Consequently, in order tobring the case under sub-section (7) it must be shown that the candi-ate did some- effort or performed some purposeful act in order to getthe assistance. The receipt of assistance must be the result of someconscious action of the candidate and not a mere passive happening ofgetting the assistance.—MOTILAL V. MANGLA PRASAD, 15 E.L.R. 425.

" Obtain " and " procure " connote positive act with a purpose.—In an election petition it was proved that the Chief Minister and the

ELD—19

I 4 6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

respondent, who was a Congress candidate, went together to address aCongress election meeting in a railway trolley which was brought bythe Traffic Manager, who was a Government officer. There was noevidence to show that the respondent made any effort to obtain theassistance of the Traffic Manager, or the Chief Minister: Held (i) thatthe words " obtain " arid "procure " in section 123(7) connote purposeor effort behind the action of the candidate; they do not includepassive receipt of assistance ; (ii) as the evidence did not show that therespondent had obtained or procured the assistance of the Chief Ministeror the Traffic Manager, or that the Chief Minister had obtained theassistance of the Traffic Manager with the consent of the respondentand for the furtherance of the prospects of his election, the respondenthad not committed a corrupt practice under section 123(7). Motilal v.Mangla Prasad (15 E.L.R. 425) referred to.—BIRESH MISRA V. RAMNATH SARMA AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 243.

—— Obtaining or procuring by candidate must be proved.—Evidencewhich merely goes to show that certain persons who were in the serviceof the Government did work for the furtherance of the prospects of acandidate does not amount to proof of a corrupt practice under section123(7) f°r the purpose of challenging an election under section IOO(I)(6).There must further be evidence to show that the candidate, or hisagent, or any other person with his consent, had procured or obtainedtheir assistance. To come under section 100(1) (d)(ii), there must alsobe evidence to prove that the result of the election was materiallyaffected.—MADAN MOHAN UPADHYA V. HARI DATT KANDPAL, 15 E.L.R.33i-

Assistance must be obtained or procured with the object of further-ing the prospects in election—Acts in "private personality ".—'Everyact done by a Government servant at the instance of a candidate or hisagent does not necessarily constitute a corrupt practice under section123(8) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, even though itmay result in the furtherance of the candidate's election. In order toconstitute a corrupt practice under section 123(8) the obtaining andprocuring of the assistance of the Government servant has to be withthe object or with the intention of furthering the prospects of a candi-date's election and further this assistance which is taken of the Govern-ment servant must be taken because the individual happens to be aGovernment servant, which fact or circumstance was likely, in theopinion of the person who obtained the assistance, to influence the pros-pects of the election. Where it was alleged in an election petition thatthe Minister of a State, who was the agent of a candidate, wrote out anappeal in his own hand and signed it and sent it to his personal

CORRUPT PRACTICE (7. OBTAINING HELP OF GOVT. SERVANTS) 147

assistant, who was a Government servant, to be communicated to thepress and the latter typed, attested, and issued the matter to the pressand it was contended that the Minister had committed the corruptpractice of obtaining the assistance of a Government servant: Held, thatthe allegations even if proved, would not constitute a corrupt practiceunder section 123(8). Every Government servant has a personalityapart from his official personality and the intention of section 123(8) isnot to keep this " private personality ", so to speak, from acting inelections or rendering assistance to candidates in their private capacitywithout involving in that assistance their official personality in anymanner. Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod'.Kanungo and Others ([1954] S.C.R.913 ; 9 E.L.R. 294) referred to.—HAFIZ MOHD. IBRAHIM V. ELECTIONTRIBUNAL, LUCKNOW, AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 262.

Getting mere ministerial acts done.—In order that obtaining theassistance of a Government officer may constitute a corrupt practiceunder section 123(7) the assistance obtained must be for furtheranceof the prospects of the candidate's election. Obtaining the assistanceof a Government officer to get a list of the polling stations from theDistrict Election Office will not by itself constitute a corrupt practiceunder section 123(7).—HAJI ABDUL WAHID V. B. V. KESKAR ANDANOTHER, 21 E.L.R. 409.

Government officer doing mere acts of courtesy to his superiors.—A candidate is not guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(7)merely because his son, who was a Sub-Inspector of Police on leave,drove a jeep, in which important members of the Government whowere also leaders of the party to which the candidate belonged, weretravelling during the election period. A Sub-Inspector of Police, evenif he was on leave, could be expected, if required, to show this muchof courtesy to the important leaders who were also members of theGovernment.—CHANDRASHEKHAR SINGH V. SARJOO PRASAD SINGH ANDANOTHER, 22 E.L.R. 206.

Officer allowing candidate's brother to sit and work aj election agent.—Where the brother of a candidate who was not in fact his electionagent, was allowed by an officer to sit and work as an electionagent, at several polling booths which were presided over by that officer:Held, that, though the presence of the brother at the polling boothswas illegal and the conduct of the presiding officer was very suspicious,in the absence of any allegation or proof that the brother had misusedhis presence at the booths and his association with the officer, in sucha way as to interfere with the free exercise of the rights of the voters,the candidate could not be held to have committed a corrupt practice

I48 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

under section 123(8) of the Act*—RAJENDRA PRASAD YADAV V. SURESH

CHANDRA MISRA, I I E.L.R. 222.

Appointment of officer as polling agent.—Under the secondExplanation to clause (7) of section 123 of the Representation of thePeople Act, which was inserted by Act 27 of 1956, if a Governmentservant has been appointed as a polling agent of a candidate and func-tions in that capacity he must be deemed to have assisted that candi-date in the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's electionwithin the meaning of section 123(7). The ruling of the Supreme Courtin Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others (10 E.L.R. 103) hasbeen overruled by the Legislature on this point.—DR. Y. S. PARMAR V.

HIRA SINGH PAL AND ANOTHER, 16 E.L.R. 45.When anyone is appointed as a polling agent, it can be

assumed that the appointment must be with the consent of thecandidate. Consequently, if it be established that any person in theservice of the Government did act as a polling agent for the respond-ent, the essential ingredient for constituting a corrupt practice undersection 123(7) of the Act would be established, namely, that theassistance of that particular person was obtained by the candidatehimself by making him a polling agent, or the assistance had beenobtained by some other persons with his consent if the latter got suchperson appointed as a polling agent.—MADAN MOHAN UPADHYA V.

HARI DATT KANDPAL, 15 E.L.R. 331..Appointment oj polling agent in blank signed forms supplied by

candidate.—Where there were numerous polling stations, and a candi-date handed over several blank forms of appointment of polling agentsduly signed by him to an officer of the party to which he belonged,and the polling agents were appointed under the instructions of thelatter, and a polling agent so appointed happened to be a Governmentservant: Held, that the legality of the appointment of the polling agentcould not be questioned by the candidate and he was guilty of a corruptpractice under section 123(7), even though he had no knowledge thatthat polling a*gent was a Government servant, and he had also giveninstructions to the persons to whom he had handed over the blank formsthat no Government servant was to be appointed as a polling agent;the case fell under section IOO(I)(6) of the Representation of thePeople Act since the candidate must be deemed to have himselfappointed the polling agent, and not under section zoo(i)(d){ii), andconsequently, the question of consent of the candidate to the commis-sion of the corrupt practice or the result of the election having beenmaterially affected, did not arise in the case.—DR. Y. S. PARMAR V.

SINGH PAL AND ANOTHER, 16 E.L.R. 45.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (7. OBTAINING HELP OF GOVT. SERVANTS) 149

Where the election agent of a candidate had distributedblank forms of appointment of polling agents signed by him to theelection workers and the names of the polling agents, some of whomwere Sarpanches, were subsequently inserted by the workers : Held,that the polling agents must be deemed to have been appointed by theelection agent, and the consent of the candidate for such appointmentmust be presumed; and the case fell under section IOO(I)(&) of theRepresentation of the People Act, and not under section ioo{i)(d)(ii)and in order to set aside the election it was not necessary to show thatthe result of the election was materially affected by the appointmentof the Sarpanches as polling agents. In section 123(7) of the Act asamended in 1956, the qualifying words " with the connivance of thecandidate or his agent " which appeared after " by any other person "in the old Act have been dropped, and the restriction which was thereunder the old Act has thus been removed under the Act as amended.Obtaining or attempting to obtain the assistance of the prohibitedpersons whether by the candidate, his agent or by any other person isplaced under the same category, and under section 123(7) a s it nowreads any other person acting without the candidate's or his agent'sconnivance may do something which will entail the candidate aforfeiture of his seat*. [The difference between section 123(8) of theAct as it stood before 1956 and section 123(7) of the Act as amendedand the scope and meaning of clauses (b) and (/) of section 123(7)discussed.]—SARDAR DAYAL SINGH V. SARDAR SURJIT SINGH MAJITHIA,19 E.L.R. 305.

Officer acting as polling agent without candidate's authority.—When Explanation 2 to section 123 refers to a person acting as apolling agent of a candidate, it contemplates the action of a pollingagent who is duly appointed in that behalf by the candidate undersection 46, and it is only when it is shown that a person has been dulyappointed a polling agent by the candidate and has in consequenceacted as such agent for the said candidate that Explanation 2 wouldcome into operation. If, without being appointed as a polling agentby the candidate, a person fraudulently, or without authority, managesto act as the polling agent of the said candidate, Explanation 2 wouldnot apply.—BARU RAM V. PRASANNI AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 450. IS.c]

Persons in the service of Government—Chairman of LegislativeCouncil.—The Chairman of the Legislative Council of a State is not aperson in the service of the Government within the meaning of sec-tion 123(7) °f the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as he is

•The law has since been amended by Act 58 of 1958 which has inserted thewords " with the consent of a candidate or his election agent " in section 123(7).

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chosen by election under article 182 of the Constitution and not by theGovernment, and the termination of his service is also regulated byarticles 183 and 185 of the Constitution, and not by any Rules madeby the Government.—RUSTOM SATIN V. DR. SAMPOORNANAND AND

OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

• Gaoburas and Mouzadars.—As Gaoburas are not included in thelist of officers mentioned in clause (/) of section 123(7), procuring theassistance of such persftns does not constitute a corrupt practice undersection 123(7). Quaere : Whether Mouzadars are revenue officers inthe service of the Government.—BIRESH MISRA V. RAM NATH SARMAAND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 243.

Gazetted Officer—Essential incidents of.—The usual incidentsattached to the office of a Gazetted Officer which distinguish such anofficer from a non-Gazetted Officer are : (i) the appointment of aGazetted Officer is always published in the official Gazette; (ii) aGazetted Officer can draw his salary and allowances on bills signed byhimself; (iii) a record of his services is maintained by the audit office ;(iv) the powers and previleges of such officers are enumerated inthe Financial Code, Civil Service Regulations and the Service ConductRules.—R. SUBBANNA v. S. R. GURU AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 201.

Latnbardars.—Under the Representation of the People Act,1951, as amended by Act 27 of 1956, latnbardars are excluded from theoperation of clause (/) of section 123(7)* a s they are village revenueofficers not coining within the category of village accountants.[Meaning of the expressions " revenue officers " and " village officers "discussed.] Raja Bahadur Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj v. RaghunathMisra (19 E.L.R. 1) explained. Partap Singh Khairon v. Rama PrasadMookerjee and Another (21 E.L.R. 46) affirmed.—SARDAR GURMEJ

SINGH V. SARDAR PARTAP SINGH KAIRON, 21 E.L.R. 471. [S.G.].

Lambardars do not come within the purview of sec-tion 123(7)1/) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, asamended in 1956, inasmuch as the said clause expressly excludes" village officers " other than the classes of village officers mentionedtherein, and lambardars are not mentioned in the said clause. The word-ing of clause (/) is clearly meant to exclude village officers like lambar-dars. The fact that clause (/) of section 123(7) was amended in 1958

*Clause (/) of section 123(7) as amended by Act 58 of 1958, expresslyexcludes from the operation of the said clause " village officers known as lambar-dars, malguzars, patels, desmukhs, or by any other name, whose duty is to collectland revenue and who are remunerated by a share of, or commission on, theamount of land revenue collected by them, but who do not discharge any policefunctions."

CORRUPT PRACTICE (7. OBTAINING HELP OF GOVT. SERVANTS)

so as to exclude lambardars in express terms from the scope of thesaid clause does not lead to any inference that they were within thescope of the clause as it stood before the amendment of 1958. Theamendment of 1958 was intended by the Legislature merely to clarifythe existing law and to make plain an intention which was not suffi-ciently clearly expressed by the law as it stood before. The decisionsof the High Court of a State are binding on Election Tribunal sittingwithin the jurisdiction of that High Court. Amar Singh v. BalbirSingh and Another (19 E.L.R. 457) followed; Kishore Chandra DeoBhanj v. Raghunath Misra and Others (20 E.L R. 1) referred to.—PARTAP SINGH KHAIRON V. RAMA PRASAD MOOKERJEE AND ANOTHER,21 E.L.R. 46.

Lambardars and members of village Panchayats are notpersons in the service of the Government within the meaning of sec-tion 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, i95r, and obtain-ing their assistance does not, therefore, constitute a corrupt practiceunder that provision.—AMAR SINGH V. BALBIR SINGH AND OTHERS, 19E.L.R. 457.

Malguzars.—A malguzar is not a person in the service of theGovernment within the meaning of clauses {d) and (/) of sub-section (7)of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act.—GANGADHARMAITHANI v. NARENDRA SINGH BHANDARI, 18 E.L.R. 124.

Malguzar Padhans of Kumaun—Malguzar Padhans of Kumaunare not persons in the service of the Government within the meaningof section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, andprocuring or obtaining their assistance would not amount to a corruptpractice under section 123(7). [The status, rights and duties ofMalguzar Padhans discussed.] MADAN MOHAN UPADHYA V. HARI DATTKANDPAL, 15 E.L.R. 331.

Ministers—Use of State car and national flag when going toaddress election meetings to support party candidate.—The mere use of aState car or the national flag by a Minister when he goes to address anelection meeting for supporting Congress candidates does not constitutea corrupt practice under section 124(8), if there is no evidence to provethat it was done with the knowledge or connivance of the candidate.Quaere : Whether a Minister is a " person serving under the Govern-ment ", and if he addresses a political meeting to support the candi-date set up by his party, the act amounts to a corrupt practice undersection 124(8). Rikhab Das v. Ridhichand Palliwal and Others (9 E.L.R.115) referred.—MADAN SINGH V. LADHU RAM CHAUDHARY AND OTHERS,11 E.L.R. 99.

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Ministers in their capacity as members of theirparty are entitled to address meetings and to tell people what theirparty had done and what its programme was and to ask them to votefor the candidate set up by their party. Such an action of theMinisters cannot be held to amount to " exercising undue influence."Ministers are officers appointed by the Government, but they are in nosense servants of the Government, and the rules requiring Governmentservants to refrain from taking part in election propaganda or in anyother way assisting a candidate in an election, do not apply to them.Canvassing by them would not therefore, be a corrupt practice undersub-section (8) of section 123 of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951. Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavda Akbar Dalumiyanand Others (7 E.L.R. 374), Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others,{10 E.L.R. 57) relied on.—MAST RAM V. IQBAL SINGH AND OTHERS,12 E.L.R. 34.

The right to canvass must be conceded to Minis-ters as leaders of the political party which has a majority in theLegislature and which has to maintain that majority in order tofunction effectively. Just as they have a right to vote and to standas a candidate, they also have a right to canvass for themselves andfor the other candidates set up by their party. Though a Ministeroccupies a high position and commands great influence, if he onlysolicits votes and tries to pursuade the electors to vote for a candidatein whom he is interested and asks them not to vote for any othercandidate or to remain neutral and does nothing more, he cannot besaid to interfere unduly with the free exercise of the electoral right ofvoters. It is only if he does anything of the nature described in para,(a) of the proviso to clause (2) of section 123 of the Representation ofthe People Act, that his conduct will amount to undue influence. AMinister has not only a right to canvass for the candidate supportedby his party but he can canvass without divesting himself of theparaphernalia of his office while so canvassing. The mere fact thatthe Ministers went to the election meetings in the State cars flyingthe National Flag or were accompanied by their orderlies or shadowscannot be held to amount to their using undue influence over thevoters within the meaning of clause (2) of section 123 of the Represen-tation of the People Act. [The status and functions of Ministers underthe Constitution discussed.] Quaere : Whether, if Ministers utilise theservices of chauffeurs paid by the Government, in canvassing for acandidate they can be treated as agents of the candidate and they willbe committing a corrupt practice under section 123(8) ?—TRILOKISINGH V. SHIVRAJWATI NEHRU AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 234.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (j. OBTAINING HELP OF GOVT. SERVANTS) 153

A candidate cannot be held to be guilty of corruptpractice merely because the Chief Minister and other Ministers of theState addressed public meetings whereat they canvassed support forhis candidature. Where the Tribunal observed that " in the interestsof fair and free elections the participation of highly placed persons ofa particular party in the election campaign is not desirable " : Held,that this observation was not warranted either in theory or practice inrelation to modern democratic Governments. Though public servantsand ministerial officers ought not to take part in public affairs orparticipate in elections, that interdict does not apply to Ministers ofGovernment. The Ministers, however, are not entitled to use theirofficial position in any manner for the furtherance of the prospects oftheir party candidates or otherwise act in any manner which is notconsistent with the Act. [Position of Ministers in democratic consti-tutions discussed.]—JAYALAKSHMI DEVAMMA V. JANARDHAN REDDI,17 E.L.R. 302.

——Minister of State—A Minister of a State is also not a personin the service of the Government for the purposes of section 123(7).RUSTOM SATIN V. DR. SAMPOORNANAND AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

Mukhias.—Mukhias are Government servants within themeaning of section 123(8) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,and procurement of their services for the furtherance of electionwould amount to corrupt practice under section 123(8).—SHRIKRISHNA V. RAJESHWAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 1.

Mukhias and sarpanches.—Mukhias and sarpanches functioningunder the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, are not persons in theservice of the Government, nor do they belong to any of the classes ofpersons enumerated in section 123(7) °f t n e Representation of thePeople Act, and obtaining their assistance would not constitute acorrupt practice under section 123(7). Even though extra department-al agents of branch post offices are persons in the service of theGovernment, they do not come within the classes of persons enumer-ated in clauses {a) to (g) of section 123(7).—CHANDRASHEKHAR SINGH V.SARJOO PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER, 22 E.L.R. 206.

Punches and Sarpanches, and Mukhias—Sarpanches and mem-bers (i.e., panches) of the Nyaya Panchayats or Panchayati Adalats, Pra-dhans,up-Pradhans and members of Gaon Sabhas, and Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen (if any), and members of the Land Managing Committeescannot be said to be serving under the Government of the State (of UttarPradesh) under sub-section (8) of section 123 of the Representationof the People Act, 1951. Mukhias, however, are persons serving

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under the Government of the State under that sub-section.—GANGAPRASAD PATHAK v. SALIGRAM JAISWAL AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 415.

Panches and Sarpanches—Panches and Sarpanches under theU. P. Panchayat Raj Act, (XXVI of 1947) would come under thecategory of " other village officers" within Explanation (b) to sec-tion 123(8) of the Act, and obtaining or procuring assistance from themin the shape of canvassing, would be a major corrupt practice entitl-ing the Tribunal to declare the election of the returned candidatevoid under section ioo(2)(6) of the Act.—Madan Pal v. Rajdeo Upadhyaand Others (6 E.L.R. 28) and Shibban Lai Saksena v. HarishankarPrasad and Others (9 E.L.R. 403), followed.—SHRI KRISHNA V. RAJESH-WAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 1.

Panches of Niyaya Panchayats.—Panches of Niyaya Panchayatsare not persons in the service of the Government and, consequently,if they acted as polling agents or did any other work for a candidatefor furthering his candidature, the candidate will not be guilty of acorrupt practice under section 123(7) of the Act.—BALWAN SINGH V.ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KANPUR, AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 199.

Panches and Sarpanches.—Obtaining assistance of Governmentservants—Vice-Sarpanches and Panches of U. P.—Whether " personsin the service of Government".—Vice-Sarpanches and Panches ofNiyaya Panchayats constituted under the Uttar Pradesh PanchayatRaj Act, 1947, are not persons " in the service of the Government "within the meaning of section 123(7) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951. In the Representation of the People Act, 1951,before its amendment in the year 1956, the requirement was that aperson should be serving under the Government of a State. " Servingunder a Government " is different from being " in the service of theGovernment", for a person temporarily doing some work may, whiledoing that work, be " serving under the Government " but that wouldnot make him a person " in the service of the Government ". Theuse of the expression " in the service of " implies a sort of continuity.The word " stipendiary " in section i23(7)(6) applies to " magistrates"as well as " judges ", and since Vice-Sarpanches and Panches are notstipendiary magistrates though they have some magisterial powers,they do not come under section i23(7)(6).—TEJ PAL SINGH V. JAGBIRSINGH AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 349.

Sarpanches—Though a sarpanch is not appointed by theGovernment, he is a " person in the service of the Government " as heperforms many governmental duties and is also removable by Govern-ment, and as such a sarpanch falls within the expression " and the

CORRUPT PRACTICE (7. OBTAINING HELP OF GOVT. SERVANTS) 155

like " in clause (f) of section 123(7) a s amended in 1956. Where theservices of a sarpanch are used by the returned candidate the latter isguilty of the corrupt practice contemplated by section 123(7) and thecase would fall under section IOO(I)(6), and it is not necessary toprove that the result of the election so far as he is concerned hasbeen materially affected.—Ganga Prasad Pathak v. Saligram Jaiswal(11 E.L.R. 415) and Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand (13 E.L.R. 149)distinguished.—RAGHUNATH MISRA V. KISHORE CHANDRA DEO BHANJAND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 321.

Sarpanches oj Gram Panchayats of Orissa—" In the service ojGovernment " meaning oj.—A Sarpanch of a Grama Panchayat consti-tuted under the Orissa Grama Panchayats Act, 1948, is neither " aperson in the service of the Government" nor " a revenue officer " or"a village accountant" within the meaning of clause (/) of sub-section (7)of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amend-ed in 19̂ 56 ; and obtaining or procuring the assistance of such a persondoes not, therefore, amount to a corrupt practice under the said clause.The mere fact that under section 31 of the Orissa Grama PanchayatsAct, 1948, a Grama Panchayat is enabled to enter into a contract withthe State Government to collect its taxes or its dues cannot make aSarpanch a revenue officer. There is a distinction between " servingunder the Government" and " in the service of the Government,"because, while one may serve under a Government, one may not neces-sarily be in the service of the Government; under the latter expressionone not only serves under the Government but is in the service of theGovernment and it imports the relationship of master and servant.There are two essentials to this relationship, viz., (i) the servant mustbe under the duty of rendering personal services to the master or toothers on his behalf and (ii) the master must have the right to controlthe servant's work either personally or by another servant or agent.The judgment of the Orissa High Court in Raghunath Misra v. KishoreChandra Deo Bhanj and Others (17 E.L.R. 321) reversed.—KISHORECHANDRA DEO BHANJ V. RAGHUNATH MISRA AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R. 1.IS.C.l

Sarpanches under Punjab Gram Panchayat Act.—Sarpanchesappointed under the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, are not"stipendiary judges or magistrates" nor "village officers" nor "vijlageaccountants" "nor persons in the service of the Government," withinthe meaning of clauses (b) or (/) of sub-section (7) of section 123 andappointment of such Sarpanches as polling agents does not, therefore,amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(7).—SARDAR DAYALSINGH V. SARDAR SURJIT SINGH MAJITHIA, 19 E.L.R. 305.

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" Revenue officers " meaning of—Reader of Colonisation Tahsil-dar.—The Representation of the People Act, 1951, is an all-India Actand there is no reason to give a restricted meaning to the word" revenue " as used in this Act and confine it to land revenue. Thisword has been used in a wide sense in the expression " revenue officer "in section i2^(y)(f) of the Act, and it should be taken to mean any officeremployed in a business of any sort of revenue by the Union or States.The term " officer " has also been used in a wide sense and means anoffice-holder. Every office-holder of a revenue department, who hasany connection with the assessment or collection of revenue or withthe maintenance of revenue records will thus come within clause (/) ofsection 123(7) of the Act. A Reader of the Colonisation Tahsildarwhose duty it is to allot Government lands to tenants and to fix renton them, and an Irrigation Patwari whose duty it is to maintain recordswith the help of which irrigation dues are collected are " revenueofficers " within section i23(7)(f).—SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA,16 E.L.R. 103.

Village headmen.—It is now settled law that the village head-men of Uttar Pradesh are persons serving under the Government of theState within the meaning of section 123(8), but there is no legal bar tothe appointment of a village headman, or in fact any person servingunder the Government, as a polling agent; nor is there any legal barto his acting as such, provided he confines himself to only such func-tions in connection with the poll as are authorized under the law.Where two Mukhias one of whom was a Pradhan of a Goan Sabha andthe other a Sabhapati, were appointed as polling agents, and theevidence showed that these persons visited the Congress camps atintervals and were seen going to and coming out of the polling stationseveral times : Held, per RAGHUNANDAN SARAN AND FARUQI (SANYALdissenting)—that the evidence was not sufficient to show that thesepersons gave any further assistance than as polling agents and a corruptpractice under section 123(8) was not proved. Per SANYAL.—The visitsof these persons who had some influence in the village to the Congresscamps and their presence there was an act furthering the prospects ofthe Congress candidates in the election and the corrupt practice undersection 123(8) was proved*.—KUSHWAQT RAI V. KARAN SINGH ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 1.

— —Village headmen do not come within the ambit of sec-tion 123(7), a s clause (/) thereof expressly excludes village officers otherthan those enumerated in the said clause and no rule has been made

•Law has been amended. See section 123(7), Expl. 2.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (8. UNDUE INFLUENCE) 157

under clause (g) of section 123(7) by the Government includingvillage headmen, within the scope of section 123(7).—SAW. GANESANv. M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR, 19 E.L.R. 16.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (8. Undue influence.)Undue Influence.—English and Indian law—Difference—Value of

English precedents.—The law in England relating to undue influencecontained in section 2 of 46 & 47 Viet. c. 51, is not the same as the lawin India. The words of the English statute lay emphasis on theindividual aspect of the exercise of undue influence. The Indian law,on the other hand, does not emphasize the individual aspect ofthe exercise of such influence, but pays regard to the use ofsuch influence as has the tendency to bring about the result, contem-plated in the clause, viz., interference with the free exercise ofany electoral right. What is material under the Indian law, is not theactual effect produced, but the doing of such acts as are calculated tointerfere with the free exercise of any electoral right. Decisions of theEnglish Courts, based on the words of the English statute, which arenot strictly in pari materia with the words of the Indian statute, can-not, therefore, be used as precedents in this country.—RAM DIAL V. SANTLAL, 20 E.L.R. 482. [S. c.l

Undue influence implies an element of compulsion—Strong cri-ticisms and attaching photos oj martyrs.—Where an appeal was made toMaharashtrians not to vote for the Congress candidate as the CongressGovernment had resorted to firing and killed Maharashtrian leaders fordemanding a separate Maharashtra State and photos of martyrs whohad been killed were attached to the appeal and it was even stated thatthe ballot box of the Congress Party was filled with the blood of Maha-rashtrian martyrs : Held, that such appeals by speeches and displayof photos did not constitute undue influence on the voters within sec-tion 123(2). A candidate has every right to persuade people to votein his favour at the election and in. that respect he is further entitledto be even critical of the policy and the acts of the rival party or itscandidate and it is legitimate for a candidate to influence the voters,provided he does not transgress the legitimate bounds of criticism. Itis only undue influence which can be taken exception of and, eventhough that term is wide enough to cover any interference with theexercise of the electoral right, one can justifiably call any act an inter-ference only when it has in it an element of compulsion in the matterof the exercise of the electoral rights of the voters. —KATARIA TAKAN-DAS HEMRAJ v. PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

Importance of exact words used and context in which they areused.—In cases where the nature of a corrupt practice depends upon

I58 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the words used by the candidate at a meeting, oral testimony insupport of the actual words used must be viewed with great care andcaution, and apart from the fact whether certain words were used ornot, unless the entire context of the speech is before the Tribunal,isolated words, even if proved, may not give a true import of thespeech, and would not be sufficient to prove the commission of thecorrupt practice of undue influence. Where there was evidence to theeffect that the respondent said at a meeting that refugees were annualpattadars and if they did not vote for the Congress they will lose theirpattas, and there was no evidence as to the context in which thesewords were used: Held, that the use of these isolated words bythemselves in the absence of the context in which they were used, couldnot be held to constitute undue influence.—BIRESH MISRA V. RAM NATH

SARMA AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 243.

Wide terms of the definition of " undue influence "—Using flagsof rival party.—The definition of "undue influence" in section 123 is invery general terms, but in order to constitute undue influence theremust be direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on thepart of the candidate or his agent or any other person, with the freeexercise of any electoral right. The mere fact that a candidate and hisagents who did not belong to the Congress Party were moving in a jeepflying the Congress flag, will not amount to exercising undue influenceover the electorate though the voters may be misled to think that hewas a Congress candidate and induced thereby to cast their votes in hisfavour.—BISWANATH UPADHAYA v. HARALAL DAS AND OTHERS, 16

E.L.R. 405.

Pleadings—Charge under section 123(4)—Finding of corruptpractice under section 123(2)—Legality.—-Though it is stated in an elec-tion petition that the acts alleged to have been committed by therespondent amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(4) °f theRepresentation of the People Act, I95r, if the acts alleged and provedin the evidence, constitute a corrupt practice under section i23(2)(a) ofthe Act, it is open to the Tribunal to find that the respondent is guiltyof a corrupt practice under section I23(2)(a).—MAULANA ABDUL JALILCHOUDHURY v. RATINDRA NATH SEN, 13 E.L.R. 290.

Declarations of policy by Ministers—Offer to redress grievances.'i —A declaration made by a Deputy Minister during election propa-I ganda that if the voters of a locality voted in favour of the candidate

set up by the Congress Party, he would take steps to see that certainI public grievances are redressed does not amount to undue influence

within section 123(2). It is only a declaration of public policy.—BASA-WARAJ K. NAGUR v. B. R. SHIDLINGAPPA, 12 E.L.R. 168.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (8. UNDUE INFLUENCE ) 159

Declarations of public policy by Ministers—Undue influence—Declarations by Ministers in support of their party, whether undue influence.—A leader of a political party is entitled to declare to the public thepolicy of the party, and ask the electorate to vote for his party, with-out interfering with any electoral right and such declarations on hispart would not amount to undue influence under section 123(2) of theRepresentation of the People Act. The fact that he happens to be aMinister or Chief Minister of the State would not deprive him of thisright.—DR. Y. S. PARMAR V. HIRA SINGH PAL AND ANOTHER, 16 E.L.R.45-

Ministerjwriting lelten.Io-supporl-candidate,,,of his,party.—A\political party is entitled to issue a manifesto to the voters requestingIthem to vote only for the candidate set up by the party. The fact that

I the leader of the Congress Legislature Party who was also the ChiefMinister of the State had written letters to the members of the Congress

I Party to support the candidates set up by the party would not amountito undue influence within section 123(2) of the Act.—N. SANKARASREDDI v. YASHODA REDDI AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 34.

Exhortations by religious leaders.—Mere exhortations by apriest or head of a religious institution to explain the moral orreligious code and to explain that according to that code a parti-cular candidate should be supported would not amount to a corruptpractice within the meaning of section i23(2)(«). But if he exceededthese limits and playing upon the sentiments and beliefs of hisaudience, threatened them or made them believe that they willbecome an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure by notsupporting a particular candidate, it would then be interference on hispart with the free exercise of their electoral rights, and would be acorrupt practice within the meaning of this provision of law.—BRIJSUNDER SHARMA V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHERS, 12EX.R. 216.

The election of the respondent was sought to be declaredvoid, inter alia, on the ground that the respondent and his agents hadcommitted the corrupt practice of exercising undue influence : (i) byissuing pamphlets containing copies of a telegram from H., who was aMaulana and a leader among the Muslims, and making a propagandathat he had imposed a condition on all Muslims to vote for the respond-ent and that if his commands were disobeyed they would be renderedobjects of divine displeasure; (ii) by publishing a booklet entitled" Why you should vote for me " which contained in its cover page aphotograph of S. who had been killed during police firing, with thecaption "Do not vote for the Congress who had killed S." With

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regard to the first count the evidence showed that H. had issued atelegram which merely stated " full sympathies with Nityananda (therespondent) " and the evidence as to whether the pamphlets had statedthat H. had made it a condition that all Muslims should vote for therespondent or that an oral propaganda had been carried on thatMuslims would be rendered objects of divine displeasure if they dis-obeyed the command of H., was conflicting: Held, per RAO andDAS, JJ. (BARMAN, J., contra)— (i) that the telegram sent by H. was initself innocuous, as H. was perfectly entitled to inform the voters thathis sympathies were with the respondent, and the evidence was notsufficient to establish that the pamphlets had stated that H. hadimposed a condition (sarta) on Muslims to vote for the respondent orto establish the alleged oral propaganda ; (ii) that the publication ofthe booklet with the photo of the dead person and the caption above-mentioned amounted only to a criticism of the Congress Party and itsacts and was not calculated or sufficient to induce a fear in the mindsof the voters that if they voted for the Congress and it came intopower, they would also be shot like S. and thus to interfere with thefree exercise of the electoral right of the voters ; the acts imputed tothe respondent did not amount to a corrupt practice of exercisingundue influence under section 123(2) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951. Per BARMAN J.—(i) The evidence clearly establishedthat the respondent and his workers and agents had, while issuing thepamphlets containing the telegram of H. carried on a propaganda thatH. had " commanded " Muslims to vote for the respondent and thatthey would be objects of divine displeasure if they disobeyed ; (ii) thatthe publication of the photo of S. with the caption above-mentionedwas intended to overawe the voters, who were mostly illiterate, and tostrike terror into their minds that if they voted for the Congress, suchatrocities would be committed against them and their children also ;at any rate the publication would have that effect on the voters; boththese acts, therefore, clearly amounted to the corrupt practice of exer-cising undue influence. Jujhar Singh v. Bhairon Lull and Others (7E.L.R. 457) distinguished. Per RAO, J., (DAS J., agreeing).—The casesof undue influence contemplated under clause (a) of section 123(2) arespecific instances constituting undue influence and these are insertedwithout prejudice to the generality of the provisions of the clauseabove them. Apart from the cases covered by clauses (a)(i) and (a)(ii)there may be other instances of undue influence coming under thegeneral concept of undue influence or coercion, and undue influence asdefined in the Contract Act, and it is to those cases that the generalclause of sub-section (2) applies. The general clause of sub-section (2)

CORRUPT PRACTICE (8. UNDUE INFLUENCE) l 6 l

cannot be taken to apply to all cases which do not constitute undueinfluence under the general juristic concept of the expression. PerDAS, J.—The definition of " undue influence " in the Act, is ratherwide in its terms and contemplates four distinct forms of interferencewith the free exercise of any electoral right, viz., direct interference,indirect interference, direct attempt at interference and indirectattempt at interference. There is nothing in the definition that suchinterference or attempt at interference should be by any method ofcompulsion. Evidently, the offence includes such interference orattempt to interfere by any method, and it definitely includes themethod of inducement wherein there may not be any compulsion atall. The inducement again must be of such a powerful type as wouldleave no free will to the voter in the exercise of his electoral right.There may be some element of mental compulsion, but not necessarilya physical one or a threat actually held out by the person who inter-feres or attempts to interfere. It is only the abuse of influence whichis prohibited under the law and amounts to " undue influence." Inthe case of general influence, it must be proved that it prevailedextensively and the election was not a free election by reason thereof.Per BARMAN, J.—In English law, the definition of undue influencespecifically includes a fraudulent device or contrivance. The Indiandefinition is general in its terms and does not mention devices andcontrivances specifically, but if a contrivance or device interferes withthe free exercise of any electoral right, then it would fall within theIndian definition. It is impossible to enumerate the forms that suchdevices or contrivances may take. They must perforce be as unlimit-ed as ingenuity of the human mind. All that is required to constitutethe corrupt practice of undue influence under section 123 of the Act isa tendency to interfere with the free exercise of electoral right. Theeffect produced at the actual voting is not the crucial thing nor thereal test.—RADHAKANTA MISHRA V. NITYANANDA MAHAPATRA ANDANOTHER, 19 E.L.R. 203.

Hukams of religious leader.—Where the spiritual head (SatGuru) of the Namdhari sect who wielded great influence amongst themissued a circular to his followers to the following effect:

" A command (Hukam) from Shri Sat Guru Sacha Padshah to the Namdharisof Halqa-Sirsa.

Every Namdhari of this Halqa is commanded by Shri Sat Guru that he shouldmake every effort for the success of Shri Ram Dayal Vaid, a candidate for thePunjab Vidhan Sabha, by giving his own vote and those of his friends andacquaintances, it being our primary duty to make him successful in the election.The election symbol of Shri Vaid is a riding horseman."

ELD—21

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Held (affirming the judgment of the Punjab High Court), that thecircular, with the printing of the word " Hukam " in very bold type,conveyed the impression that it was a mandate from their SpiritualGuru that it was their bounden duty to vote for the appellant andthat any infringement of that mandate had implicit in it divine dis-pleasure and spiritual censure ; and distribution of such a circular,therefore, amounted to a corrupt practice under section 123(2) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951. Ram Dial v. Sant Lai andAnother (19 E.L.R. 430) affirmed. Quaere : Whether clause (2) of sec-tion 123, apart from paragraph (ii) of the proviso thereto, covers acase where the undue influence is of a spiritual character as distin-guished from threats of injury to person or property.—RAM DIAL V.SANT LAL, 20 E.L.R. 482.

Invoking divine displeasure—Threat that voters who vote for rivalwill go to Hell.—Where a publication contained the following state-ments : (i) that the Congress is against banning of cow-slaughter, andgiving a vote to the Congress candidate would be a vote in favour ofcow-slaughter, and (ii) that those who vote for that candidate wouldgo to hell: Held, that in view of article 48 of the Constitution whichlays down that every State shall, inter alia endeavour to take steps forpreserving and improving the breeds of cattle and prohibiting theslaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle, thefirst part of the statement did not constitute a corrupt practice, undersection 123(3), but so far as the expression " go to hell" was concerned,having regard to the context in which it was used, it must be held toamount to a threat, or to the employment of undue influence withinthe meaning of s'ection 123(2) of the Act.—JAGAN PRASAD RAW AT V.KRISHNA DUTT PALIWAL, 20 E.L.R. 443.

Getting signed slips from voters that they will vote for afiarticularcandidate.—Getting signed slips from voters that they agree to votefor a particular candidate does not amount to a corrupt practice undersection 123(2), for no voter is bound to sign such a slip, and at anyrate, when voting takes place in a secret manner, a voter who hassigned on any such slips is not bound necessarily to vote for the sameperson.—KATARIA TAKANDAS HEMRAJ V. PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL,18 E.L.R. 403.

Collecting postal ballot papers from voters and filling them as

candidate desires.-—Where an election, which was conducted on thesystems of single transferable votes by postal ballot, was sought to bedeclared wholly void in an election petition on the following grounds,namely, (i) that the first respondent was guilty of undue influence ashe was a man of very great influence and had collected a very large

CORRUPT PRACTICE (8. UNDUE INFLUENCE) 163

number of ballot" papers from persons over whom he had influence,unattested and unmarked, and had got them marked and attested byothers subsequently, and (ii) that the nomination of his son wasimproperly accepted as he was at the time of election below thequalifying age of 30 years, and the result of the election had beenmaterially affected thereby. Held,per RAGHUNANDAN SARAN and FARUQI(SANYAL dissenting) that the evidence in the case, though it createdsome suspicion was not sufficient to establish beyond doubt that thefirst respondent had collected the ballot papers as alleged in this peti-tion, and it was not therefore necessary to decide •. whether collectionof ballot papers from the voters before they are marked and attestedwould by itself amount to undue influence under section 123(2) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951. Per SANYAL.—The evidenceclearly established that the first respondent had collected a largenumber of ballot papers from persons over whom he had great influ-ence and had got them filled in as he desired, and attested, by hisfriends; that this act clearly interfered with the free exercise of theelectoral right of the voters on an extensive scale and constitutedundue influence within the meaning of section 123(2) of the Act.—RATAN SHUKLA v. DR. BRIJENDRA SWARUP AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R.332.

Getting son nominated by giving false affidavit as to age andgetting second preferences from others.—The first respondent was foundto have given a false affidavit as to the age of his son (who was in factbelow age) in order to get him also nominated as a candidate and hisson got a very large number of second preferences from persons overwhom the first respondent had influence: Held, per RAGHUNANDANSARAN and FARUQI (SANYAL dissenting)—that though this conductmight be fraudulent, as it only invited the voters to vote for his son anddid not interfere with the freedom of choice of the voters to vote for anyone else, the act did not amount to undue influence. Per SANYAL.—The act of the respondent amounted to undue influence and was alsoan offence under section 140 of the Act and entailed disqualificationunder the said section.—RATAN SHUKLA V. DR. BRIJENDRA SWARUPAND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 332.

Reading out communal articles and declaring Jehad in public•meetings.—Where a publication in a newspaper stated that the party towhich the petitioner belonged did not admit the independence of Indiaand if members of that party are elected, Muslims will be driven outof India and feuds will be created with neighbouring countries and assuch, Congress was the only dependable organisation of the Muslims ,and it was proved that this article was read out and distributed by

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the respondent at some public meetings : Held, that the mere publica-tion of the article in the paper by itself did not amount to " undueinfluence ", but reading out the article and distribution of copies of itat meetings did amount to undue influence within section 123(2) of theAct: Held further, that the reading out the article and declaring ajehad at religious meetings constituted a corrupt practice undersection 123(3) also.—MAULANA ABDUL JALIL CHOUDHURY V. RATHINDRA

NATH SEN, 13 E.L.R. 290.

Threat distinguished from opinion.—A statement that " not tovote for the Congress will be like committing betrayal of the country "is a mere expression of opinion and does not amount to a threat orinterference with the free exercise of the right of voting within themeaning of section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act,1951.—BIRESH MISRA v. RAM NATH SARMA AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R.

243-Threats, when undue influence.—In order to constitute undue

influence a threat must be serious and deliberately uttered with theintention of carrying it into effect and not in a moment of anger.General intimidation or rioting is not enough, there must be proof ofundue influence upon individual voters; and individuals must beidentified as the objects upon whom it was practised or to whom it wasaddressed by the candidate or his agent.—DHARANIDHAR MOHAPATRAv. FRADIPTA KISHORE DAS AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 427.

Threats.—A threat can amount to undue influence only if itwas a serious and deliberate threat uttered with the intention of carry-ing it into effect. Norfolk (Northern) Case (1 O'M. & H. 236) followed.Jujhar Singh v. Bhairon Lai and Others (7 E.L.R. 457) distinguished.—RADHA KRISHNA SHUKLA AND ANOTHER V. TARA CHAND MAHESHWAR

AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 378.

Threats.—The question whether a threat was intended literallyor was used figuratively is one of fact and if it was used only figurati-vely it may not amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(2).—MAGANLAL BAGDI v. HARI VISHNU KAMATH, 15 E.L.R. 205.

Threatening workers of candidate.—Workers for canvassing are" persons in whom the candidate is interested " within the meaning ofsection 123(2) and an averment that the workers of the petitionerwere threatened with injury constitutes a charge of undue influenceunder section 123(2). Such interference also constitutes an interferencewith the free exercise of his electoral right.—SAW. GANESAN V. M. A.MUTHIAH CHETTIAR, 19 E.L.R. 16.

" Advice " by influential leader of party to withdraw.—A politicalleader is within his rights to keep discipline in his party and to stop

CORRUPT PRACTICE (8. UNDUE iNFLUENCE) 165

party rift at the time of general elections and an advice by the leaderof a party, however influential he may be, to a candidate to withdrawhis candidature in the interests of party discipline, cannot amount toundue influence within section 123(2). Amir Chand v. Smt. SuchetaKriplani (18 E.L.R. 209) affirmed.—AMIR CHAND V. SMT. SUCHETA

KKIPLANI, 21 E.L.R. 286.

Defacing posters of rival candidate or altering them to his pre-judice.—Defacing or removing posters or banners or paintings in wallsor altering them in such a way as to help the rival candidate does notamount to a corrupt practice under section 123(2), though such actsmay amount to an offence.—KATARIA TAKANDAS HEMRAJ V. PINTO

FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

Preventing workers from approaching voters by throwing stonesetc.—Not undue influence though an offence.—Prevention of workers ofa candidate from having access to voters and educating them, e.g., bythrowing stones at the workers or at propaganda cars or threateningthe workers does not amount to undue influence within section 123(2).For, the prevention of the exercise of such a right to approach thevoters does not in any way affect the exercise by a voter of a right tovote or to refrain from voting at an election for any particularcandidate. Such acts may amount to an offence either under theelection law or any other law of the land, but cannot fall within theambit of section 123(2) of the Act.—KATARIA TAKANDAS HEMRAJ V.

PINTO FREDERICK MICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

Disturbance of canvassers.—The right of a candidate tocanvass or to carry on propaganda in support of his candidature is notan electoral right, though it would be a right incidental to his electoralright to stand as a candidate, as defined in section 7g(d), and disturb-ance of canvassers in their work is not interference with an electoralright within section 123(3).—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE

AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

Asking voters to come out of polling station.—Where theevidence showed that a Socialist worker had an altercation with thepolice and asked the voters to come out of the polling booth and someof the voters thereupon came out, and the question was whether thisamounted to undue influence by the respondent, who was a candidateset up by the Socialist Party : Held, that the facts were not sufficientto make that worker an agent of the respondent and to amount toundue influence on the part of A. Abdul Wali Khan v. EhtishamMahmood Ali (1 D.I.E.C. 149) distinguished.—RAJENDRA PRASAD

YADAV v. SURESH CHANDRA MISRA, I I E.L.R. 222.

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Giving badges to a large number of workers.—Distribution of alarge number of badges to workers and voters would not amount to acorrupt practice under section 123(2) as wearing of badges cannot inany sense be said to violate any rule or any provision of the Act, andmere wearing of badges cannot scare away or intimidate people to anextent that they would not, on that account exercise their electoralright freely.—K AT ARIA TAKANDAS HEMRAJ V. PINTO FREDERICKMICHAEL, 18 E.L.R. 403.

Statement that the rival. candidate will be appointed as Minister.—A statement that a particular candidate will be appointed as aMinister after the election is not a statement of fact but mere specula-tion about the future, and in any case, such a statement, howeverfalse, cannot be said to prejudice the prospects of the rival candidateand it cannot, therefore, come under section 123(4). It cannot consti-tute a corrupt practice under section 123(2) also, because such astatement cannot interfere in any way with the free exercise of theright of voting by the electors.—AMIR CHAND V. SUCHETA KRIPLANI,21 E.L.R. 286.

Publishing statements of Mahatma Gandhi which he has notmade.—The corrupt practice of undue influence consists in interferingwith the free exercise of the right of voting; inducement to vote bywrongly imputing statements to leaders like Mahatma Gandhi whichthey have not made, cannot be said to amount to interference withthe free exercise of the right of voting, and does not amount to acorrupt practice under section 123(2).—GHAYUR ALI KHAN V. KESHAVGUPTA, 16 E.L.R. 154.

Publishing appeals from ex-Maharaja to vote for particularcandidate with his photo.—Though an ex-Maharaja may wield greatinfluence among his quandom subjects, an appeal by him to his subjectsto vote for the candidate of a particular party (e.g., the Congress Party)will not by itself amount to undue influence. Publishing printedleaflets containing his appeal, in which he is described as "Maharaja"and his photo in his regal robes is also exhibited, cannot amount toundue influence or fraudulent device interfering with the free exerciseof the rights of the voters.—CHUNNILALKEN V. RADHACHARAN SHARMAAND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 320.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (9. Use of national or religious symbols.)Use of national or religious symbols.—Appeal to national symbols—

Whether should be systematic.—The word " systematic " in section 123(3)of the Representation of the People Act applies only to the first partof the sub-section, namely, appeal to vote or refrain from voting on

CORRUPT PRACTICE (9. USE OF NATIONAL OR RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS) 167

the grounds of caste, race, community or religion ; it does not applyto the second part, namely, appeal to religious symbols or nationalsymbols ; appeal to national symbols need not, therefore, be systematic,to constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(3): even a singleappeal to a national symbol would be a corrupt practice.—TEJ PALSINGH V. JAGBIR SINGH AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 349.

Essentials of " religious " and " national" symbols.—(i) Theexpression " national symbol" in section 123(3) °f the Representationof the People Act, 1951, has a limited and special meaning and has tobe understood as connoting something symbolical of all the citizensof the Indian Republic who constitute the nation. The symbol must bea mark or a character taken as a conventional sign or an emblem ofsome object or idea of the nation. It must be something adopted bycommunis sententia as representing or identifying something by posses-sion of analogous qualities or by association in fact or thought of thenation. The view that there could be a national symbol for a parti-cular group of the Indian society and that groups of people speakingdifferent languages constitute different nations, is erroneous, (ii) Aportrait of Shri Shivaji Maharaj is not therefore, a national symbol,and a candidate cannot be held guilty of a corrupt practice undersection 123(3) merely because he exhibited portraits of Shri ShivajiMaharaj in furtherance of the prospects of his election. Dictum.—"Wewould like to enter a caveat against an attempt on the part of anycandidate for an election to introduce into the dust of the arenaof an election campaign or an election petition, the memory of suchgreat historical national figures under the guise of paying homageor reverence to them." (iii) Where the symbol "Jai Shamboo" whichwas the motto of the State of which the candidate was the Rulerand was used by the State in official documents and in the officialGazette of the State, and which was also used as a personal motto ofthe candidate, was used on badges issued to the candidate's volunteersand in some printed matter in his election campaign, but, apart fromthe mere use of these words, there was nothing in the manner or extentof the use of these words to show that the use was made in furtheranceof the prospects of the candidate's election : Held, that in the absenceof an allegation and proof that the symbol was used in furtherance ofthe prospects of the election, the candidate could not be held guilty ofa corrupt practice under section 123(3). (iv) Though the expression"religious symbol" can well include special flags of temples and articlesof the deity of a temple, a candidate who was formerly the Ruler of aState cannot be held guilty of the corrupt practice of using religioussymbols in furtherance of his election merely because he was received

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by the villagers at meetings, with abdagirs and temple flags and otherarticles of the village deity.—SHIVRAM SAWANT BHONSALE V. PRATAPRAO DEORAO BHONSALE, 17 E.L.R. 37.

Use of national symbols—Nature of particulars required.—Theprovisions of Order VI, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code, apply to the trialof an election petition by an Election Tribunal, and if the allegationsare vague and general, the Tribunal would be justified in striking offthe paragraphs containing such vague allegations. A mere allegationthat the respondent in furtherance of the prospects of his election" used national symbols such as the national flag, in the constituency",is vague and, if full particulars of the place or places in the constituencywhere they were used, the actual national symbols used and the personsby whom and the manner in which the symbols were used, are notgiven the allegation could be struck off.—MADAN LAL V. SYED ZARGHAMHAIDER AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 456.

Mere presence of national symbols not enough—Use for furtheringelection must be proved.—The existence of national flags at a conferenceis not by itself evidence of the commission of a corrupt practice undersection 123(3). There must further be evidence to show that the nationalflags were used for the furtherance of the prospects of the candidate'selection.—MADAN MOHAN UPADHYA V. HARI DATT KANDPAL, 15 E.L.R.33* •

" Cock"—Appeal to religious symbols and on the ground of religion/ —Adivasis of Chotanagpur—Selection of "Cock" as symbol—Appeal to

vote for Cock as it is recognised, in the worship of their Gods, and threatthat if vote is not given to Cock eternal miseries will follow—Whetherappeal on the ground of religion—rC^ck, whether religious^ symbol.—Where a leaflet published by the JharicTiand Party! which had set upthe respondent who was an Adivasi as its candidate, and had selected"Cock" as its symbol, appealed to the voters, the majority of whomwere Adivasis, to vote for the respondent whose symbol was the Cock, kin view of the importance of the Cock in their services and worship \of their forest God and for relief from distress, and that if they didnot give food (chara) in the form of their vote to the Cock they willsuffer eternal miseries : Held, (J)Jh^jtJJxeJ^Cc^kJ^^as-»Qt,a. religioussymbol_of _th£,Adiva.siSj. though it formed an integral part of the religi-

rouiTceremonies which they perform while worshipping their important *"deities; (ii) the leaflet however, contained a clear appeal to thereligious sentiments of the Adivasis and the publication of the leafletconstituted a systematic appeal to the Adivasis on the ground ofreligion, within the meaning of section 123(3) of the Representationof the People Act, 1951, and, as the respondent had distributed the

CORRUPT PRACTICE (9. USE OF NATIONAL OR RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS) 169

leaflet and made speeches making such appeal, his election was liableto be set aside.—RAM NARAIN PFASAD YADAV V. SUBNATH DEOGAM

AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 108.Appeal that vote to symbol of "Cock" would bringreligious merit,

and not voting for it would bring displeasure of deities and miseries—Whe-ther corrupt practice—Appeal on the ground of religious affinity or conflict,whether essential. —The appellant who belonged to the Adibasi commu-nity and was put up as a candidate by the Jharkhand Party, whosesymbol was the "Cock", was declared elected. The main allegation in an \election petition to set aside the election of the appellant was that he \had committed the corrupt practice of making a systematic appeal on \the ground of religion, inasmuch as, he and his supporters had widelycirculated and orally explained amongst the electorate, who weremostly composed of Adibasis, a leaflet to the following effect: " In thebox of the Jharkhand Party is printed the symbol of Cock. Put yourvotes in the box with Cock symbol. O rise ye children of men—Res-pected sons of men, open your eyes, lend your ears, recognise me andmy crow. In your services and worships, in the worship of your forestGod (Buru), in stomach pain and headache, at the time of yourdistress and miseries, I am with you even after giving my life. Yourecover (from illness) even by applying knife at my neck. This thoughtgives me pleasure. In exchange of this give me chara in the shape ofvote. I am victorious. Do not forget me, otherwise I tell ye sons ofmen will suffer eternal miseries. Crow of Cock, Cock crowed, risenow, open your eyes, be prepared for duty. Yours only Cock." Itwas found that though the cock was not a religious symbol of theAdibasis, it was an integral part of the worship of their deities andthey offered the cock as a sacrifice to their deities after offering foodto the cock, to get happiness and avoid miseries. The High Court heldthat the appeal in the leaflet was an appeal on the ground of religionand that the appellant was guilty of the corrupt practice alleged. Onappeal to the Supreme Court: Held, by the majority (S. K. DAS, P. B.GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR and HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.—SUBBA RAO,J., dissenting)—that, when the leaflet stated that food should be givento the cock in the shape of votes what was meant was that the deitieswould be pleased if votes were cast in the box with the cock symbol.The reference to the religious ceremonies involving the sacrifice of Ithe cock and the alleviation of pain and miseries thereby was also a Ireference to religion. As the leaflet further invoked the wrath of the \deities on the electorate in case they did not vote for the party whosesymbol was the cock, there was a clear appeal to religion and theappellant was guilty of the cdffuJJt" pra€tice-«Hc^ect;"against ~ him.

ELJ3—22 ~ '

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Per SUBBA RAO, J.—To constitute the corrupt practice of systematicappeal on the ground of religion it is essential that the appeal should,expressly or by implication, seek votes on the ground of religiousaffinity or religious conflict. Section 123(3) is n° t intended to preventappeals in picturesque or metaphorical language drawing analogies frommythology, religion or folklore, and the appellant did not commit thecorrupt practice under section 123(3). The judgment of the PatnaHigh Court in Ram Narain Prasad Yadav v. Subnath Deogam and Others(21 E.L.R. 108) affirmed.—SHUBNATH DEOGAM V. RAM NARAIN PRASADAND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 1. [S.C.]

Congress flag, not national flag.—The Congress flag is not/a national flag within the meaning of section 123(4) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951.—RAM BINODE SINGH V. SHEOBACHANSINGH AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 53.

Portrait of Mahatma Gandhi, whether national symbol—Meaningof " symbol" and " national symbol "—A portrait of Mahatma Gandhi isnot a " national symbol" within the meaning of section 123(3) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, and its use for the furtheranceof the prospects of a candidate's election would not, therefore, be acorrupt practice under section 123(3). The fact that Mahatma Gandhi'sbirthday is observed as a national holiday and is a public holidayunder the Negotiable Instruments Act and his portraits are hung inpublic offices at Government expense cannot make his portrait anational symbol. The use of the expression, " such as " instead of" including " or " for example ", in section 123(3) connotes an ideathat only those national symbols should be taken into account whichare alike and similar to the national flag or the national emblem. Inorder to be like or similar to the national flag or the national emblem,a national symbol must possess the same characteristics which arepossessed by the national flag or a national emblem and, therefore,must become a national symbol by a process similar to that by whichthe national flag became a national symbol. [Meaning of the words"symbol" and "national symbol" discussed.]—KARAN SINGH V.JAMUNA SINGH, 15 E.L.R. 370.

——The photo of Mahatma Gandhi is not a national symbol andpublishing a poster with his photo with the words Congress ko tor dodoes not amount to a corrupt practice under section 123. KaranSingh v. Jamuna Singh (15 E.L.R. 370) followed.—RAJA VIJAI KUMARTRIPATHI AND ANOTHER V. RAM SARAN YADAV AND OTHERS, 18E.L.R. 289.

i The portrait of Mahatma Gandhi is not a national symbol•j within the meaning of the expression as used in section 123(3) of tile\

CORRUPT PRACTICE (iO. MISCELLANEOUS) 17I

Act. The portrait not being a national symbol, its use by a candidatedoes not constitute a corrupt practice.—GHAYUR ALI KHAN V. KESHAVGUPTA, 16 E.L.R. 154.

Using photo and quotation of Mahatma Gandhi.—Charge that aphoto of Mahatma Gandhi was used with a quotation of his to misleadvoters does not amount to a charge of an appeal to a national symbolwithin section 123(3).—TEJ PAL SINGH V. JAGBIR SINGH AND OTHERS,15 E.L.R. 349.

Singing National Anthem.—A symbol necessarily connotes asign or mark; singing the National Anthem does not constitute thecorrupt practice of using a national symbol. Amir Chand v. SurendraLai Jha (10 E.L.R. 57) followed.—D. VENKATRAMIAH V. E. NARAYANAGOWDA, 20 E.L.R. 101.

-—ReligioMS~sVMhoLr-z:Banyan tree—QUt&r.—The banyan tree is asacred tree worshipped by persons following the Hindu religion andthe symbol of the banyan tree is therefore a religious symbol.—LAKSHMI NARAIN v. BALWAN SINGH ANB OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 76.

Displaying pictures of God Viswanath with candidate's symbol.-—DistributionT5f pictures displaying the election symbol of the Congresswith the figures of Annapurnaji or Bhagwan Viswanathji constitutesuse of religious symbols within section 123(3).—RUSTOM SATIN V.DR. SAMPOORNANAND AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

Use of titles " Bharata Ratna " and " Padma Bhushan ".—Asymbol, to become a national symbol, has to be recognised as such bycompetent legislative authority. The titles of " Bharata Ratna " and"Padma Bhushan" are not national symbols—RUSTDH'SATIN V.DR. SAMPOORNANAND AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 221.

CORRUPT PRACTICE (10. Miscellaneous)1. Employing more than prescribed number of workers.—Contract

of employment must be proved.—Where the only evidence on which therespondent was found to have committed a corrupt practice undersection 123(7), of employing more than the prescribed number ofpersons in connection with the election, was that he had engaged aperson to prepare three carbon copies of the electoral rolls and hadpaid him Rs. 500 at the rate of 8 as. per 100 voters, and anotherperson had also been engaged to enter the names of the voters inprinted cards and had been paid Rs. 275 at 4 as. per 100 cards, and ifthese two persons also were taken into account the prescribed numberwould be exceeded: Held, that the evidence was wholly insufficient toestablish that there was a contract of employment of these two personsand the respondent could not be found guilty of a corrupt practice

172 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

under section 123(7) on this evidence.—HARISH CHANDRA BAJPAI ANDANOTHER V. TRILOKI SINGH, 12 E.L.R. 461. [s.c.]

— -Persons already employed for other work, whether to be counted,—Rule 118 of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections andElection Petitions) Rules, 1951, does not require that the person engag-ed by a candidate to work in the election should have been speciallyemployed for the purpose of the election ; it is sufficient that that personis employed in connection with the election ; but at the same time, therequirements of rule 118 are not satisfied by proving merely that theperson does work in connection with the election. That work must bedone under a contract of employment. Consequently, if the candidatehas been maintaining a regular staff of his own, and its members havebeen doing personal service to him and he has been paying them, andthen the election supervenes, and off and on, he sets them "on electionwork but they continue to do their normal work as members of his staff,it cannot be said of them that they have been employed in connectionwith the election. But, if, on the other hand, he takes them out oftheir normal work and puts" them on wholetime or substantiallywholetime work in connection with the election, that would amountto converting t>heir general employment into one in connection withthe election. It will be a question of fact in each case, whether whatthe candidate has done amounts merely to asking the members of thestaff to do casual work in connection with the election in addition totheir normal duties, or whether it amounts to suspending the worknormally done by them, and assigning to them election work instead.Where it was found that 25 persons belonging to the staff of a candi-date had taken part in his election, that they had been in the serviceof the candidate for a long time and that their appointment was notcolourable for election purposes and it was also found that they werenot paid anything extra for what work they might have done inconnection with the election, but there was no finding that, havingregard to the work which they were proved to have done, they mustbe taken to have been relieved of their original work and put on elec-tion work: Held, that in the absence of such a finding, it cannot beheld that rule 118 had been infringed. Hartlepools case (6 O'M. & H. 1),Amritsar case (Hammond's E. C. 83), Farrukhabad case (Hammond'sE. C. 349) distinguished.—H. H. RAJA HARINDER SINGH V. S. KARNAILSINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 421. [S.G.J

Contract of employment—What constitutes employment.—Thereal test for deciding whether a contract was. one of employmentwithin the meaning of section 123(7) is to find out whether the agree-ment was for the personal labour of the person engaged, and if that was

CORRUPT PRACTICE (iO. MISCELLANEOUS) 173

so, the contract would be one of employment, whether the work wastime-work or piece-work or whether the employee did the whole workhimself or whether he obtained the assistance of other persons also forthe work. But before it could be held that a person was employed,it must be shown that the contract with him was that he should person-ally do the work, with or without the assistance of other persons.—HARISH CHANDRA BAJPAI AND ANOTHER V. TRILOKI SINGH, 12 E.L.R.461. [S.c]

Law under Act as amended in 1956.—The result of the deletionof the provisions relating to the employment of paid canvassers fromthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, by the Amendment Actof 1956, is that their employment for payment is now permitted if thepurpose of engaging them was merely to promote or procure the elec-tion of a candidate, provided the expenses do not exceed the pre-scribed limit and the canvassers do not induce any electors to vote orrefrain from voting at the election. There is a distinction betweenthe engagement of a person for the ordinary purpose of canvassingand that for inducing an elector. While canvassing i.e., promoting orprocuring the election of a candidate implies a general appeal to elec-tors, inducing an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an electionsignifies use of personal or undue influence on any particular electoror body of electors.—JHUMAKLAL V. AMBIKA SAO AND OTHERS, 16E.L.R. 447.

2. False personation.—-False personation—Offender detected beforevoting—Validity of election.—In order that an election may be setaside on the ground of false personation it must be proved that theelection was procured or induced, or the result of the election wasmaterially affected, by the false personation. An election cannot, there-fore be set aside on this ground where the personation is detected andthe person is arrested before he casts his vote.—S. NORATA SINGH V.S. DHARAM SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 57.

No evidence as to real offender—Whether intention to personatemay be inferred.—To entitle a person to relief on the basis of the minorcorrupt practice of false personation it is not necessary to allege andprove who the actual offender was who committed the false persona-tion ; for, even though one may not know the actual offender, it maybe possible to infer the intention to personate from the nature of theact and the attendant circumstances, e.g., when votes have been castin the names of deceased voters. Stepney case (4 O'M. & H. 34) andIn re Venkayya (I.L.R. 53 Mad. 444) distinguished.—A. K. SUBBARAYAGOUNDER v. K. G. PALANISAMI GOUNDER AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 251,

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3. Setting up canvassing office near polling station.—Settingup canvassing office near polling station—Whether ground for setting asideelection.—Though setting up a canvassing office within ioo yards of apolling station may be punishable as an offence under section 130 ofthe Act, it is not a ground for setting aside an election unless it hasmaterially affected the result of the election.—MAST RAM V. S, IQBALSINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 34.

Though the setting up of a canvassing office within 100 yardsof a polling office is punishable under section 130 of the Act, it is nota corrupt practice. Where parchis were given to the voters by oneof the parties showing the way in which they should vote for thatparty and these parchis were carried inside the booths by the voters :Held, that this did not amount to a corrupt practice.—RADHA KRISHNASHUKLA AND ANOTHER V. TARA CHAND MAHESHWAR AND OTHERS, 12E.L.R. 378.

4. Coercion and intimidation by " community, group or sec-tion ".—Coercion and intimidation by groups or communities—"Commu-nity" meaning of—When election void.—An election can be set aside undersection IOO(I)(&) of the Representation of the People Act on the groundof the exercise of coercion or intimidation only if such coercion orintimidation was exercised or resorted to by any particular commu-nity, group or section of the public on another community, group orsection. Where the particulars with regard to the exercise of coercionand intimidation stated that the respondents and their agents whobelonged to one section of anti-Communists, like the Catholic Associa-tion of Mangalore, Y.M.C.A., Welfare Mission, Indian ChristianTemperance Association and groups of commercial employees consti-tuted the group which exercised the coercion and that Governmentservants and employees, Catholics, employees in commercial firmsand Congressmen formed the other group or section on which thecoercion was exercised : Held, these alleged groups did not constituteany "community, group or section" of the public, and section 100(i)(6) was not applicable to the case.—VASANTHA PAI V. DR. V. K.JOHN AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 107.

COUNCIL OF STATESCouncil of States.—Casual vacancy—Election by members of Legis-

lative Assembly—Holding of separate by-elections for each vacancy—Lega-lity—Prejudice to minority—Only one candidate nominated—Candidatedeclared elected before administration of oath to members of Assembly—Validity of election—Non-compliance with Act or Rules—Election not voidunless result materialy affected.—When there is a casual vacancy in themembership of the Council of States the vacancy has to be filled up in

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 175

the manner provided for in section 147 of the Representation of thePeople Act, that is to say, the Election Commission has to call uponthe ' elected members of the Legislative Assembly or the members ofthe Electoral College, as the case may be, to elect a person to fill upthe vacancy. There is nothing in the Constitution or the Representa-tion of the People Act or the Rules thereunder, which compels the Elec-tion Commission to wait till there is more than one vacancy and thento hold a by-election with regard to more than one seat, so that theright of the minorities may be safeguarded. Even if there are twoor more casual vacancies to be filled up, there is no provision in lawthat they must be filled up by a single by-election. There were fourcasual vacancies in the Council of States and separate dates werefixed by the Election Commission for the by-elections to fill up thesevacancies. There was only one nomination for the first vacancy andthe person nominated was therefore declared elected. The electionwas challenged on the ground (i) that all the four vacancies must havebeen filled by a single by-election and (ii) that the election was void asthe members of the Assembly had not yet taken their oath of officeand were not therefore entitled to elect a member for the Council ofStates. Held,, (i) that under the law it was not necessary that all thevacancies must be filled by a single by-election, and the holding ofseparate by-elections to fill up each vacancy was not illegal; (ii) asthere was only one nominated candidate and no election had there-fore, to be held and the members of the Assembly were not in factcalled upon to vote, the question whether the members of theAssembly could exercise their right to vote~ and validly elect aperson before the oath had been administered to them, did not arisefor decision, and the declaration that the only candidate who had beennominated was duly elected was not invalid. An election cannot beset aside under section ioo(i)(d) for any non-compliance with the pro-visions of the Constitution or of the Act or the Rules unless the resultof the election was materially affected thereby.—SHRIDHAR MAHADEOJOSHI v. RAJBHOJ PANDURANG NATHOJI, 13 E.L.R. 430.

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES

1. Qualifying date—Entry In roll—Candidate entered on electoralroll after nomination but before date of scrutiny—Whether qualified—Acceptance of nomination, whether proper.—The last day fixed for filingnominations for an election was the 29th of January, 1957, and thedate fixed for scrutiny of nominations was 1st February, 1957. Theappellant's name was not on the electoral roll of the constituency on29th January, but an application which she had made to the Chief

I76 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Electoral Officer for the inclusion of her name in the electoral roll ofanother constituency was allowed and her name was entered on theroll of that constituency on the 31st January, 1957, and a certified copyof this electoral roll, in which her name was included, was produced byher before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny of nominations onthe 1st February. The returning officer accepted her nomination andshe was elected. In an election petition, her election was declared voidon the ground that her nomination was improperly accepted as hername was not on the electoral roll and she was not, therefore, qualified,on the 29th January, the last day fixed for nominations. On appealto the High Court: Held, reversing the decision of the Tribunal, thatthe returning officer had acted properly in accepting her nominationas her name was entered on the electoral roll and she was qualified onthe date fixed for scrutiny of the nominations. The view that thequalification of a candidate to stand for election must be determinedwith reference to the date of his nomination alone and not with refer-ence to the date fixed for scrutiny of the nominations is not correct.Earlier cases on the point are not of much value. Held further, that ina case of this nature the fact that the electoral roll number was notgiven in the nomination paper would not be a substantial defect.Balasubrahmanyan v. Election Tribunal, Vellore (7 E.L.R. 496), notfollowed.—OM PRABHA JAIN V. GIAN CHAND AND ANOTHER, 22 E.L.R.

242.

Qualifying date—Date of filing nomination or last date fixed fornomination—Interest in contract—Nomination filed when contract wassubsisting—Fresh nomination filed before last date after getting release fromcontract—Validity of second nomination—Scope of sec. 36(2) and (3).—Itis the last date fixed for filing of nominations that has to be takeninto consideration in deciding the question of qualification anddisqualification of candidates, and not the date on which the nomina-tion papers were filed. Where, therefore, a candidate filed a nomina-tion paper on the 28th of January, 1957, when a contract which he hadentered into with the State Government was subsisting, but he got arelease of all his liabilities and full payment by cheque of the amountsdue to him as per final bills, on the 29th of January, which was thelast day for filing nominations, and filed another nomination paper onthe same day, and the returning officer rejected the first nomination,but accepted the second one: Held, that, as the contract was notsubsisting when the second nomination paper was filed, the returningofficer acted rightly in accepting the second nomination, and as thecandidate was not disqualified on the last day fixed for nominations,his election was not liable to be set aside on the ground that he was

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES ( i . AGE) 177

disqualified for standing as a candidate. Though sub-section (3) ofsection 36 of the Representation of the People Act 1951, referred toclauses (b) and (c) only of sub-section (2), it did not prevent the return-ing officer from accepting the second nomination.—NARAYANA GOWDA

v. B. L. NARAYANASWAMY AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 485.Disqualification ceasing before election—Scope of sec. ioo(i)(a).—

The ground on which the election of a returned candidate could be declar-ed void under section 100(1 )(a) of the Representation of the People Act isthat he was disqualified on the date of his election, to be chosen as a candi-date. If his disqualification had ceased before the date of the election,the case does not come under section ioo(i)(a), even though the candi-date was disqualified on the date of the nomination. The words "thedate of his election" in section ioo(i)(a) must be construed withreference to section 67A and mean the date on which the candidatewas declared by the returning officer under section 53, 54, 55A or 56to be elected.—LAL SHYAM SHAH V. V. N. SWAMI, 16 E.L.R. 74.

Scope of sec. ioo(i)(a) find ioo{i){d){i).—Clause (a) andclause (d)(iv) of sub-section (1) of section 100 of the Representation ofthe People Act do not cover the same field. Clause (a) refers to caseswhere the candidate was disqualified on the date of the election;clause (d)(iv) applies to cases where the candidate was disqualified atthe time of nomination.—LAL SHYAM SHAH V. V. N. SWAMI,

16 E.L.R. 74.

Sitting member of Legislative Council elected for LegislativeAssembly—Validity of election—Failure to resign seat in Council within14 days—No disqualification.—The respondent who was a sittingmember of the Legislative Council of the Bombay State was declaredelected to the Legislative Assembly on the 8th March, 1957, and heresigned his seat in the Legislative Council only on the 24th March,1957: Held, whatever may be the effect of the provisions of sec-tions 67A and 70 and rule 136, this was not a ground for declaringthe election void in an election petition.—RAMNARAIN V. RAMCHANDRA,

15 E.L.R. 100.

I. Age—Crucial date—" Date of election ", meaning of—Burden ofproof of disqualification—V alue of school registers—Candidate found dis-qualified—Whether votes cast for him are " invalid " and next candidate canbe declared elected.—Under section 100(1) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, if the Tribunalis of opinion that on the date of theelection a returned candidate was not qualified to be chosen to fill theseat under the Constitution or under the Act, the Tribunal has todeclare the election void. The expression " the date of the election "

ELD—23

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in this connection means the date on which a candidate is declared bythe returning officer to be elected to the Legislature. A candidate tothe Legislative Assembly would, therefore, not be qualified to bechosen as a member of the Assembly under article 173 of the Consti-tution unless he was not less than 25 years of age on the date when hewas declared elected by the returning officer. The burden of provingthat the candidate who has been elected was less than 25 years on thedate of the election and was, therefore, disqualified to be chosen as amember, is on the election petitioner who seeks to have the electiondeclared void on this ground. He must prove his case by positiveevidence and if he is unable to adduce positive evidence to dischargethe burden, the election petition has to be dismissed. Much reliancecannot be placed on entries in school admission registers which are notproved to have been made on the basis of statements made by aperson, e.g., the father of the boy, who knew the true date of his birth.Votes cast in favour of a candidate who was elected, but who is sub-sequently held to have been under 25 years of age on the date of theelection, cannot be regarded as " invalid " votes, and the candidatewith the next highest number of votes cannot be declared elected onthis ground.—KRISHNA RAO MAHARU PATIL V. ONKAR NARAYAN WAGH,14 E.L.R. 386.

Disqualification of members of Legislature—Disqualificationbefore election—Whether can be objected under the Constitution.—No ques-tion of the disqualification of a member of a Legislature can be raisedunder article 103 or 192 of the Constitution if such disqualificationexisted before his election as such member.—In re YADVENDRA SINGH,M.L.A., VINDHYA PRADESH, 12 E.L.R. 162.

Election of person disqualified under Constitution for want of age—When next candidate can be declared elected.-—Where a person who is infact disqualified for being chosen as a member of a Legislative Assemblyunder the Constitution, being below the minimum age prescribed bythe Constitution, is elected as a candidate, there is a non-compliancewith the provisions of the Constitution and the result of the electionmust be deemed to have been materially affected, and his electionshould be set aside. But the votes obtained by him cannot be deemedto have been " thrown away" and the next candidate cannot bedeclared to have been duly elected, merely because he was in factunder-age and this fact was published in a newspaper at the time ofelection ; for, several voters might not have read the newspaper atall, particularly in the case of hilly areas inhabited by illiteratepersons. Votes in favour of a person who was really disqualified underthe Constitution can be treated as " votes thrown away " only if it is

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES ( i . AGE) 179

proved that the notice of the disqualification was given to the votersand the circumstances in which the voters voted even after notice weresuch as to lead to the fair inference of wilful perverseness on theirpart; it will not do if on the position notified to the voters, there wasroom for any ambiguity or doubt as to whether the candidate wasreally disqualified or not.—KARAM BAPANNA DORA V. SYAMALA SEETHA-RAMAYYA AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 463.

Candidate below prescribed age—Votes given for such candidate,whether invalid—Doctrine of votes " thrown away "—Necessity of notice,actual or constructive.—The question of "thrown away" votes wouldnot and cannot arise unless the votes were cast in favour of the dis-qualified candidate with notice or knowledge of the disqualification orof the facts creating the same. Such notice or knowledge may beactual or constructive and may arise from the notoriety of the fact onwhich the disqualification is based, or otherwise. But, where the votesare cast without notice or knowledge of the basic fact of the particulardisqualification, they would be good votes and cannot be treated asvotes thrown away. Where the disqualification depends upon a factwhich may be unknown to the elector he is entitled to notice, for,without that, the inference of assent, which is essential for inferringwilful perverseness on the part of the elector, could not be fairlydrawn nor would the consequence as to the vote, that is, of its beingthrown away, be just. There is no authority for the view that " statusincapacity" or " status disqualification " as in the case of aliens,infants, etcv stands differently from othepjdisqualifications and wouldby itself be sufficient to lead to the inference of wilful perverseness onthe part of the voters voting for such disqualified candidate. Thereis also no authority or principle to support the view that consti-tutional incapacit^or the disqualification of status arising under theConstitution, stands on a different footing from mere statutorydisqualification and that the question of notice does not arise in sucha case. The appellant got 14,720 votes, respondent No. 1 got 14,427votes and respondent No. 2 got 1,979 votes and the appellant wasaccordingly declared duly elected. In an election petition it was foundthat the appellant was below 25 years of age on the date of the electionand as such disqualified under article 173(6) of the Constitution tostand for election, and his election was accordingly set aside. Thequestion being whether the 14,720 votes given for the appellant couldbe treated as votes " thrown away ", and respondent No. 1 could bedeclared elected : Held, that as the voters who had voted for theappellant had no notice that the appellant was below 25 years and thefact that he was below 25 years was not a notorious fact which the

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voters should be presumed to know, the votes could not be treated as" thrown away " and invalid; and respondent No. i could not bedeclared elected under section ioi(a) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951.—JAGADANANDA ROY V. RABINDRANATH SIKDAR ANDOTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 99.

Age—Admission registers of private aided schools, whether rele-vant.—The rules for recognition and rules for aid, contained in G. O.No. 1903, of the Madras Government, dated the 21st August, 1939,under which admission registers are kept by private aided schools,have not been previously published as required by section 56 of theMadras Elementary Education Act, 1920, and the G. O. does not giveany indication that the rules were framed in the exercise of any statu-tory power by the Government of Madras. These rules are not there-fore, statutory rules and cannot be regarded as " law " within themeaning of section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. Entries in theadmission registers of private aided schools kept under these rules, are,therefore, neither entries made by public servants in the discharge ofduty nor are they made in performance of a duty specially enjoined by" the law " of the country, and as such section 35 of the Evidence Actis not applicable to them and they are not relevant facts.—GOPALAN V.KANNAN, 14 E.L.R. 458.

Entries in admission registers of educational institutions arerelevant under section 35 of the Evidence Act to prove the age of aperson as they are entries made by public servants in the discharge oftheir official duty. But they are not of much evidentiary value if thereis no evidence to show on what materials the entries were made. Entriesin Birth Registers are of higher value and are conclusive evidenceunless they are proved to be incorrect.—N. SANKARA REDDI V.YASHODA REDDI AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 34. 0

Double member constituency.—Where in a double member consti-tuency, the election of one of the returned candidates was found to bevoid on the ground that that candidate was below 25 years of agewhen his nomination papers were filed, and was consequently dis-qualified under the Constitution to be chosen as a member, but thegrounds alleged for setting aside the election of the other candidatewere not proved : Held, that the case was covered by s. ioo(2)(c) andnot by s. 100(1 )(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951; thewhole election including that of the other candidate did not becomevoid and the election of the candidate who was found disqualifiedalone should be declared void. Durga Shankar Mehta v. ThakurRaghuraj Singh (9 E.L.R. 494), followed.—S. NORATA SINGH V.S. DHARAM SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 57.

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (2. CITIZENSHIP) l 8 l

——2. Citizenship—Person domiciled and born in India migrating toPakistan in 1947—Return to India in 1948—Registration in 1956 ascitizen of India by Collector under Citizenship Act, J955—Validity ofregistration—Validity of election as member of Legislature in 1957—Statusbefore and after migration, and after return to India—Definitions of" citizen of India ", " citizenship or nationality law ".—The appellant hadhis original domicile in the territory of India and he, as well as both hisparents, were born in the territory of India. He was in Governmentservice in India in the year 1947 and had the choice of opting forPakistan. He exercised his final option to opt for Pakistan and leftIndia for Pakistan in August, 1947, but resigned his service in Pakistanand returned to India in February, 1948. On the 31st August, 1956, hegot himself registered as a citizen of India under section 5(i)(a) of theCitizenship Act, 1955, by the Collector of Rampur. He was nominatedas a candidate for election to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assemblyon the 31st January, 1957, and was declared elected on the 1st March,1957. His election was declared void by the Election Tribunal on theground that he was not a citizen of India on the relevant date, and wasnot, therefore, qualified for being chosen as, or for being, a member ofthe Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly under articles 173 and 191(1){d) of the Constitution. On appeal to the High Court: Held, (i) that,as the appellant had decided finally to opt for Pakistan and left Indiafor Pakistan in August, 1947, he must be held to have "migrated toPakistan from the territory of India after 1st March, 1947 ", within ,the meaning of article 7 of the Constitution and the appellant's casewas, therefore, covered by article 7 and not by article 5 or 6 of theConstitution, and the appellant had not become a citizen of India underthe Constitution; (ii) when the appellant came back to India in Feb-ruary, 1948, he was not, therefore, a citizen of India; (iii) as sections3 and 4 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, applied only to persons born on orafter 26th January, 1950, the appellant could not acquire citizenshipby registration under sections 3 and 4 of the Citizenship Act; (iv) theappellant was, however, entitled to be registered as a citizen of Indiaunder section 5 of the Citizenship Act; (v) as the appellant was nota citizen of India, on the 31st August, 1956, or before that, no questionof renunciation, deprivation or termination of citizenship arose and theappellant's case was not covered by section 5(3) of the Citizenship Act;(vi) as the appellant was of Indian origin and was an ordinary residentof India and had been so resident for six months before applying forregistration, all the requirements of section 5(i)(a) of the CitizenshipAct were satisfied and the appellant was entitled to be registered as acitizen of India by the Collector of Rampur; (vii) as no declaration

182 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

was made by the Central Government with regard to the PakistanCitizenship Act, 1951, that Act was not a " citizenship or nationalitylaw " within the definition contained in section 2(i)(c) of the (Indian)Citizenship Act and the appellant's application for registration was nottherefore, governed by section 5(i)(e) of the (Indian) Citizenship Act,and registration of citizenship by the Central Government undersection 5(i)(e) was not necessary to confer the status of a citizen ofIndia on the appellant; (viii) the decision of the Tribunal that theappellant was not a citizen of India on the relevant date was, there-fore, wrong and the appellant's election was not liable to be declaredvoid on this ground.—ASLAM KHAN V. FAZAL HAQUE KHAN AND OTHERS,16 E.L.R. 34.

The appellant was born in 1927 in the village of Jhawariansituated in the Sargodha district of the Punjab, which became part ofPakistan in 1947. In 1929 he was taken to Burma by his parents. In1942 they returned to Jhawarian owing to Japanese occupation ofBurma. In 1944 his parents permanently returned to Burma but theappellant came to Jullundur, and in December, 1944, he took up mili-tary service there. In 1946 he gave up this service but continued tomove from place to place in the districts of Hissar and Rohtak of thePunjab, organising the Rashtriya Sewak Sangh, a militant organisationof the Hindus. In 1957 he was elected as a member of the PunjabLegislative Assembly but his election was declared void by the Elec-

• tion Tribunal on the ground that he was not a citizen of India at therelevant date and was, therefore, disqualified to be chosen as a memberof the Legislature under article igi(i){d) of the Constitution : Held,(i) that the fact that the appellant's name was entered as an elector inthe electoral roll was not conclusive on the question whether he was acitizen of India, and it was open to the Election Tribunal to considerwhether he was a citizen and to declare the election void, if he was nota citizen; (ii) that under article 6(6) of the Constitution, the appellantwould be a citizen of India if he had migrated to the territory of Indiafrom the territory of Pakistan before the commencement of the Con-stitution, and if he had migrated before the 19th July, 1948, he hadbeen ordinarily resident in India since the date of his migration;(iii) the question whether the appellant had "migrated" to India fromPakistan depended on the animus of the appellant in the matter ofselecting a permanent home ; and regard being had to the bent of theapplicant's mind, his ambitions and aspirations, sentiments, habits,conduct and religion, the missionary zeal with which he was organisingthe militant Hindu organisation and the circumstances under whichPakistan came into existence and the manner in which particularly the

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (2. CITIZENSHIP) 183

Hindu and Sikh inhabitants of what is now known as West Pakistanwere compelled to leave their hearths and homes and also consideringthe fanatic and aggressive Muslim League ideology which dominatedthe entire social fabric in West Pakistan, the only conclusion that couldbe arrived was that after the 15th August, 1947, the appellant had noother intention than to make the Dominion of India his place of abode,and the appellant must be deemed to have completely migrated toIndia on the 15th August, 1947 ; (iv) as there was also evidence toshow that the appellant was ordinarily resident in India after hismigration and also on the 26th November, 1949, when article 6 cameinto force the appellant must be deemed to be a citizen of India on thecommencement of the Constitution and the election of the appellantwas not liable to be set aside on the ground that he was not a citizenof India. [In view of this opinion, their Lordships did not find itnecessary to express any definite finding on the question whether theappellant became a citizen under article 5 also.] Dictum: The word" migrate " in article 6 must be construed in a wide sense and mustreceive a beneficial, broad and liberal construction. To place a narrowor strict construction would result in making many persons who hadto change their residence owing to the partition of India, stateless.—MANGAL SAIN V. SHANNO DEVI, 17 E.L.R. 263.

The words " migrated to the territory of India " in article 6of the Constitution mean migrated at any time before the com-mencement of the Constitution to a place now in the territory of India.The migration must take place before the commencement of the Con-stitution. In article 6 of the Constitution, the words " migrate to theterritory of India " are used in the narrower sense and mean " cometo the territory of India with the intention of residing there perma-nently. " Dictum: " The only explanation why the framers of theConstitution did not expressly mention 'domicile' or the 'intention toreside permanently' in article 6 seems to be that they were confidentthat in the scheme of the Constitution the word 'migration' couldonly be interpreted to mean 'come to the country with the intention ofresiding there permanently.' If a person who moves from one place toanother or from one country to another has at the point of time ofmoving, an intention to remain in the country where he moved onlytemporarily, but later on he forms the intention of residing therepermanently, he should at this later point of time be held to have'come to the country with the intention of residing there permanently'."—SHANNO DEVI V. MANGAL SAIN, 22 E.L.R. 469. [S.C.]

For applying the test of being " ordinarily resident in theterritory of India since the date of his migration " for the purposes of

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article 6 of the Constitution, it is necessary to consider the period up tothe 26th day of November, 1949, from the date of migration. It is not,however, necessary that on the 26th day of November, 1949, or imme-diately before that date he must have been residing in the territory ofIndia. What is necessary is that, taking the period beginning with thedate on which migration became complete and ending with the date26th November, 1949, as a whole, the person has been " ordinarilyresident in the territory of India ". In the absence of the definition ofthe words " ordinarily resident" in the Constitution it is reasonable totake the words to mean resident during this period without any seriousbreak ". It is not necessary that the person should have resided inIndia during every day of this period. The judgment of the PunjabHigh Court reported as Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi (17 E.L.R. 263)affirmed.—SHANNO DEVI V. MANGAL SAIN, 22 E.L.R. 469. [S.C.]

The word " migrate " may have in some contexts the widermeaning "come or remove to a place with or without an intention toreside there permanently " and in some context the narrower meaning" come or remove to a place with the intention of residing therepermanently ".—SHANNO DEVI V. MANGAL SAIN, 22 E.L.R. 469.IS.C]

3. Corrupt practice—Mere finding that certain election agentshad committed corrupt practice—Not named as guilty persons after noticeto show cause—Whether agents disqualified.—A person who was not aparty to an election petition cannot be named a person guilty of acorrupt practice under section gg(z){a)(ii) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, unless notice is given to him under the proviso tothat clause, to appear before the Tribunal and to show cause why heshould not be so named. Even though the person to be named was theelection agent of a candidate who was a party to the petition, and wasproved during the trial of the election petition to have committedsome corrupt practices as such agent he would be entitled to receive anotice under the proviso to section 99(i)(a)(n) to show cause why heshould not be named. The fact that the election agent had during thetrial of the election petition an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-nesses who gave evidence of the corrupt practices and to defend hisprincipal (the candidate) would not make any difference in this respect.The mere fact that during the trial of an election petition, the electionagent of a candidate who was respondent was found to have com-mitted certain major corrupt practices mentioned in section 123 of theAct and this fact was recited in the order of the Election Tribunalwould not disqualify the election agent under section y{a) of the Repre-sentation of the People Act, 1951, on the ground that he was " foundto have been guilty of a corrupt practice", especially where the

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (4. CONVICTION) 185

Tribunal has purposely refrained from taking proceedings against theelection agent on the ground that the candidate was mainly respon-sible for the commission of the corrupt practice.—K. P. KARIYAPPA V.

H. M. CHANNBASAPPA VENKATE GOWDA AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 484.Abolition of illegal practices—Effect on disqualifications already

incurred.—The effect of section 72 of the Representation of the People(Second Amendment) Act, 1956, is that disqualifications which wereentailed under section 140 of the Act of 1951 owing to the commissionof illegal practices stand removed from the date on which the Amend-ing Act of 1956 came into force, viz., 28th August, 1956. Their Lord-ships left open the question whether section 72 of the Amending Actof 1956 was retroactive and had the effect of removing the disqualifi-cation altogether even from before the commencement of the Amend-ing Act and did not consider it necessary to express any opinion onthe effect of section 84 of the Amending Act which excluded the appli-cation of the Act to pending elections and election petitions.—DR.V. K. JOHN V. CHIEF JUDGE, COURT OF SMALL CAUSES; MADRAS, AND

OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 329.Disqualification for corrupt practice—No moral turpitude-

Removal of disqualification.—In view of the fact the corrupt practice ofwhich the 1st respondent was found guilty did not involve any moralturpitude, the High Court recommended to the Election Commissionthat the disqualification imposed on him under section 140. may beremoved.—AHMEDMIYA SHERUMIYA SHAIKH V. CHHIPPA IBRAHIM NURAJI

AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 218.——Though a person who is found guilty of a corrupt practice

under section 123(7) incurs a disqualification under section 140 for aperiod of six years, the fact that, due to the conflict of decisions thelaw was not settled and the candidate was under the bonafide impres-sion that what he did was not a corrupt practice, is a ground for theremoval of the disqualification by the Election Commission.—RAGHU-NATH MlSRA V. KlSHORE CHANDRA DfiO BHANJ AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R.

321.

4. Conviction.—Power of State to reduce sentence.—Section 401 of theCriminal Procedure Code merely empowers the appropriate Govern-ment or the Government concerned to remit the whole or any part ofthe punishment to which any person has been sentenced; and thispower which is exercised under the Code is largely an executive powervested in the appropriate Government, and by reducing the sentencethe authority concerned does not thereby mQdify the judicial sentencewhich was passed by the court.—KHAGENDRANATH NATH ANDANOTHER V. UMESH CHANDRA NATH AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 207,

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186 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

-Difference between pardon and remission of sentence.—Theconsiderations which arise in the case of pardon do not necessarilyarise in the case of a mere remission of a part of the sentence, eventhough the remission may be unconditional to that extent. The vitaldifference between a pardon and a mere remission of sentence lies inthe fact that in the former case, it affects both the punishmentprescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender, in other words,a full pardon may blot out the guilt itself; in the latter case, the guiltof the offender is not affected nor is the sentence of the court affected,except in the sense that the person concerned does not suffer incarce-ration for the entire period of the sentence, but is relieved fromserving out a part of it. Quaere : Whether, in view of the provisionsof the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, the Governor of a State or aState Government has power to remit a sentence given by a court foran offence under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.—KHAGENDRA-NATH NATH AND ANOTHER V. UMESH CHANDRA NATH AND OTHERS, l 6E.L.R. 207.

Conviction and sentence for 2 years or more—Remission ofsentence under s. 401, Cr.P.C, effect of.—A person would be disqualifiedunder section y(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, forbeing chosen as a member of the Legislature if he was convicted by acourt in India of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for notless than two years, even though his sentence was remitted by theGovernment and he was released from prison under section 401 of theCriminal Procedure Code before he had undergone imprisonment for aperiod of two years.—KHAGENDRANATH NATH AND ANOTHER V. UMESHCHANDRA NATH AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 207.

5. Interest in contract with Government.—Where the respondentshad applied to the Deputy Commissioner under the Uttar PradeshLand Utilisation Act, 1948, for allotment of certain plots of uncultivatedlands to them for cultivation and the Deputy Commissioner granted alease of the lands to them with the condition mentioned in section 4 ofthe Act that the respondents shall if required, give half the produce tothe Government at such rate as may be fixed by the Government, andthat if they did not cultivate the lands they may be prosecuted: Held,per RAGHUNANDAN SARAN AND FARUQI (SANYAL dissenting)—thatthough the lands were let out to the respondents under a contract, thecondition for compulsory sale of grain when demand was made, was astatutory obligation created by the Act; there was no contract by therespondents to supply goods to the Government within the meaning ofsection j(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951; and therespondents were not disqualified under that section to be chosen as

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (5 . CONTRACT, WITH GOVT.)

members. Per SANYAL.—The condition to sell to the Government onehalf of the produce when demanded was an obligation voluntarilyentered into by the respondents to help the Government to performthe function of supplying food grains to the people of the State whichthe Government had undertaken, as the respondents were not at allbound to apply for the land or to accept a lease with such a conditionif they did not want it, and the respondents were therefore disqualifiedunder section y(d).—KUSHWAQT RAI V. KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS,11 E.L.R. 1.

Contract with government entered into by Father of Hindufamily—Whether sons disqualified.—Under the Hindu law there is nopresumption that a business standing in the name of a member of ajoint family is a joint family business, even when that member is amanager of a family ; and it makes no difference in this respect thatthe manager is the father of the coparceners. Though in the case of abusiness started by the father, the sons may be liable to pay the debtscontracted for the purposes of the business by the father, under thedoctrine of the pious obligation of the sons under Hindu law for thedebts contracted by the father, the business itself would not on thataccount cease to be the separate business of the father and become thebusiness of the joint family composed of the father and his sons.Where a Hindu father entered into a contract with the Governmentfor the execution of certain works for the Government, and thequestion was whether the contract was one entered into by the jointfamily consisting of the father and sons, so as to disqualify a son forbeing chosen as a member of the Legislature, under section y(d) readwith section 9 (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, andthough there was evidence in the case which might be sufficient forcoming to a finding that the contract was entered into by the fatheron behalf of the family, the Tribunal, without relying on the evidence,decided that the contract was entered into on behalf of the family,upon the view that there was a presumption under Hindu law that abusiness standing in the name of a father was a joint family businessof the father and his sons: Held, that there was no such presumption,and the finding of the Tribunal could not be sustained; but, as therewas evidence on the point, the Tribunal must reconsider the questionand come to a finding on the issue upon the evidence and the facts andcircumstances of the case. [The case was accordingly remitted to theTribunal for rehearing]. The question whether a transaction is abenami transaction is one of fact and the Supreme Court will notinterfere with a finding of the Tribunal on the question upon theevidence and circumstances of the case.—CHATTANATHA KARAYALAK V.RAMACHANDRA IYER AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R 216. [s.c.J

l 8 8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Section y(d) should be liberally construed and its beneficialeffect should not be allowed to be whittled down by subtle arguments.—BHIKAJI KESHAV JOSHI AND ANOTHER V. BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANIAND OTHERS (NO. 4), 11 E.L.R. 301.

Interest in contract not giving pecuniary gain—Whether dis-qualifies.—The respondent was interested in a firm which held an"A" class licence under the C. P. and Berar Cotton Cloth ControlOrder, 1948, for doing business in cloth. This firm was a memberof an Association of "A" class licence holders, which had, undera contract with the Government, a monopoly for importing anddistributing the quota of cloth allotted to the State by theCentral Government: Held, apart from the question whether the"A" class licence itself was a contract, as the Association had enteredinto a contract for the performance of a service undertaken by theState, and the firm, of which the respondent was a member, was amember of the Association, the respondent was interested in the saidcontract and therefore disqualified under section y(d) of the Act. Held,also that the fact that the Association made no profit was immaterial,for it is not necessary for the purposes of section y(d) that the contractshould be such as to lead to any pecuniary gain.—BHIKAJI KESHAVJOSHI AND ANOTHER V. BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS(No. 4), 11 E.L.R. 301.

Whether continuity of contract necessary.—For the purposes ofthe disqualification under section y(d) it is not necessary that thereshould be a continuity of contracts; even a single contract subsistingat the time of the nomination is enough.—BHIKAJI KESHAV JOSHI ANDANOTHER V. BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS (NO. 4), 11 E.L.R.301.

Where orders for printing the electoral rolls were placed bysome officers of the Government with a press in which the respondentwas interested as a shareholder and director, and the printing chargeshad not been fully paid by the Government when the respondent'snomination was • filed: Held, that the contract must be deemed tohave been subsisting when the nomination was filed and the respon-dent was disqualified under section y(d) from being chosen as a mem-ber at the time of the nomination.—BHIKAJI KESHAV JOSHI ANDANOTHER V. BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 301.

Public Service Commission—Whether "Government."—ThePublic Service Commission is an independent body created by theConstitution and is not a part of the executive department of the State,and a contract with the Public Service Commission for publishing its

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 5. (CONTRACT WITH GOVT.) 189

advertisements is not, therefore, a contract with the " Government "within the meaning of section j(d) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951.—BHIKAJI KESHAV JOSHIAND ANOTHER V. BRIJLALNANDLALBIYANI AND OTHERS (NO. 4), 11 E.L.R. 301.

Member of legislature undertaking to execute Government reliefschemes receiving subsidy from Government—Whether becomes disqualified.—As part of a scheme for relief of villagers rendered destitute bya severe drought, the Government sanctioned a subsidy of Rs. 1,800to be spent on the construction of a particular project providingfor a road. A member of the Legislative Assembly of the Statereceived Rs. 1,500 as " subsidy " under an agreement to execute thework according to the plans and specifications approved by the Collector,and executed the work accordingly for the sum of Rs. 1,500. On areference by the Governor under article 192 of the Constitution :Held, whether the project can be taken to be part of " services " under-taken by the Government towards the drought stricken people or not,the Government undoubtedly had undertaken some "works" which hadto be executed; the agreement amounted to a " contract " between theGovernment and the Member of the Assembly within section 2,{h) andsection 10 of the Indian Contract Act; the member had an " interestin the contract" within the meaning of section y(d) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951; and he, therefore, became disqualifiedunder article igi(i)(e) of the Constitution read with section j(d) of theRepresentation of the People Act. The use of the wprd " subsidy "does not ipso facto imply that the work concerned was necessarily ofan honorary nature or that the work was in the nature of a communityeffort or community project. " Interest" in a contract with theGovernment for the purpose of disqualifying a person under section y(d)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, need not necessarily befinancial interest. If a person by entering into a contract with theGovernment gets a chance of enhancing his importance in the consti-tuency or bettering his prospects with the electorate or rewarding hisfollowers, that is sufficient to bring the case within section y(d).—In reS. N. PATNAIK, 13 E.L.R. 58.

Procuring agent under Food-grains Control Orders—Whether dis-qualifies.— By an agreement entered into by the respondent with theGovernment on the 7th May, 1951, under the Madras Food-grains Pro-curement Order, 1950, the respondent agreed to purchase food-grainsin the area allotted to him at the rates prescribed by the Governmentfrom time to time, to store them in proper godowns, and sell them to thepersons to whom he was directed to sell. The respondent had to depositRs. 1,000 as security for the due fulfilment of this undertaking which

I90 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the Collector could forfeit for breach of the agreement. The respond-ent relinquished the procuring agency and this relinquishment wasaccepted by the Collector on the 13th November, 1951. The control offood-grains was also lifted in 1952. There were, however, some enquiriesrelating to the stock in respect of the stock of grains. The respondent'sexplanations were accepted, it was found that he was not liable toaccount for any stock. The criminal cases filed against his sub-agentwere also disposed of on the 30th April, 1954. The sub-agent wasacquitted, and the deposit which was kept pending until the disposalof the enquiries and the criminal cases was refunded to the respondenton the 30th June, 1955. The respondent had meanwhile filed hisnomination papers on the 3rd January, 1955, and the question waswhether he was disqualified on the date of the nomination under sectiony(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Held, (i) that theagreement between the respondent and the Government was not amere licence but fulfilled all the essentials of a contract, and thecontract was one for the performance of services undertaken by theGovernment within the meaning of section y(d); (ii) as the respondenthad in fact fulfilled all his obligations under the contract before thenomination and the delay in refunding the deposit was due to amistaken view that he had not fulfilled all his obligations and the slowprogress of the administrative machinery, and not due to any realpending dispute between the Government and the respondent, he wasnot "interested " in the contract within the meaning of section j(d) atthe time of his nomination ; (iii)the mere fact that some enquiries hadbeen started against the respondent under a mistake as to the realfacts and the stocks seized from the sub-agent in connection with thecriminal cases were restored to the sub-agent only after the date ofnomination was no ground for holding that the respondent was" interested in the contract " at the time of his nomination ; the res-pondent was not, therefore, disqualified under sub-section j(d) at thetime of his nomination for being chosen as a member of the Legislature..•—CHIKATI PARASURAM NAIDU v. VYRICHERLA CHANDRA CHUDAMANIDEV, 13 E.L.R. 66.

Scheme of Central Government for local development—Cost ofconstruction to be contributed one half by villagers and one half byCentral Government.—Under the First Five Year Plan the CentralGovernment set apart 15 crores for local development purposes.Under the scheme the State Government, or the local body or thevillagers concerned, were to contribute one half of the cost of thedevelopment works. Estimates had to be prepared, contracts enteredinto and the work supervised by the State Government. The State

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (5 . CONTRACT WITH GOVT.) 19I

Government had also to pay the contractors in the first instance andto obtain recoupment from the Central Government by book adjust-ments later. The appellant entered into an agreement with a RevenueDivisional Officer of the Madras State on the 16th March, 1955, forconstructing a road in a village in the State at an estimated cost ofRs. 10,000. He did part of the work (for Rs. 3,174) and as he did notcontinue the work the Tahsildar wrote to the appellant on 1st March,1957, that the contract given to him " was cancelled ", and RevenueDivisional Officer " approved " the action of the Tahsildar on the18th March, 1957. A sum of Rs. 317 still remained due to him for workdone. The appellant was returned at an election held on the n t h March,1957. It was contended in an election petition that on the date of theelection he was interested in a contract for the execution of a work orperformance of a service undertaken by the Madras State Governmentand that he was, therefore, disqualified under section j{d) of the Repre-sentation of the People Act and his election was void : Held, (i) that,even though the villagers had to contribute one half of the cost andthe other half of the cost was ultimately re-imbursed to the StateGovernment by the Central Government, the contract related to theexecution of a work or performance of a service " undertaken " by theMadras State Government within the meaning of section j{d) of theAct; (ii) as the Tahsildar was not competent to cancel the contractentered into by the appellant with the Revenue Divisional Officer thecontract was legally terminated only on the 18th March, 1957, whenthe Revenue Divisional Officer approved of the Tahsildar's cancella-tion ; (iii) the approval of the Revenue Divisional Officer could nothave retrospective effect from the date of the Tahsildar's order;(iv) that, at any rate, as a sum of Rs. 317 was still due to the appel-lant under the contract on the date of the election the contract wasstill subsisting on the date of the election and the appellant was there-fore disqualified under section y(d), and his election was rightly set asideby the Tribunal.—KR. RM. KARIAMANICKAM AMBALAM V. RAMAKRISHNATHEVAR, 13 E.L.R. 275.

Person making gift or loan to contractor for completion ofcontract, whether interested.—The word " interest" in section y(d)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, must be given itsnormal meaning which the context and scheme of the Act war-rant, as there is no statutory definition of the word in theAct. "Interest" for the purposes of the section must be morethan a mere sentimental interest such as that arises from naturallove and affection; it must be a pecuniary or at least a materialinterest though there need not necessarily be any participation in

i g2 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

pecuniary gain or loss. What constitutes "interest in a contract"within the meaning of section j{d) of the Act must be answeredprimarily with reference to the facts established in each case. Theinterest that a person may have in a contract because the contractoris his brother-in-law or because the contract is intended to benefit thecommunity as a whole and the person concerned, as a public man, isinterested in its successful completion does not constitute "interest"within the meaning of section 7(d). The further fact that the personhas made a gift of money to the contractor to help him to perform thecontract does not make that person " interested " in the contractwithin the meaning of the section. Quaere: Whether a person whohas lent money to a contractor could be deemed to have acquired, bythe very act of lending with the obvious expectation of repayment, an" interest" in the contract within the meaning of section 7(d).—M. SHANMUGA UDAYAR V. V. P. SARANGAPANI GOUNDAR, 13 E.L.R. 490.

Contract with Cochin State—Contract executed before formation ofKerala State.—The appellant had entered into certain contracts for theexecution of works in 1946 and 1947 with the Cochin State and theworks were executed before 1st November, 1956, the date on which theCochin State became part of the State of Kerala. The appellant wasnominated as a candidate in January, 1957, and he was declared electedon the 16th March, 1957. Though the works had been completed on thedate of his nomination, it wacfound that the accounts had not beensettled and all payments under the contracts had not been made bythe Government on the date of the nomination: Held, (i) that inview of the definition of " State " and " State Government" con-tained in the General Clauses Act, 1897, the contracts in question werefor the execution of works undertaken by " the appropriate Govern-ment" within the meaning of section y(d) of the Representation ofthe People Act, 1951, even though the works were undertaken andcompleted prior to the formation of the State of Kerala ; (ii) that thecontracts must be deemed to be subsisting until all payments dueunder the contracts had been, made by the Government; (iii) that theappellant was accordingly disqualified for being chosen as a candidateunder section y(d) on the date of his nomination and election. In thelight of the definition of the expression " State Government" givenin section 3(60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the " appropriateGovernment " or " State Government " cannot be considered as anidentical institution at all times. Different Governments at differenttimes may constitute the " appropriate Government", and as far asthe Travancore and Cochin States are concerned the " appropriateGovernment " will be the separate Governments of those States till

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (5. CONTRACT WITH GOVT.) 193

the Covenant of Integration, the common Government of Travancore-Cochin for a time known as the Government of the United State ofTravancore and Cochin till 1st November, 1956, and the Governmentof Kerala on and from that date.—C. G. JANARDHANAM V. JOSEPH,14 E.L.R. 88.

Stipulation in contract that work should be performed to thecomplete satisfaction of Sub-Divisional Engineer.—The respondent hadentered into certain contracts with the State Government for the const-ruction of tube-wells, which contained an express stipulation that if thework was not completed to the satisfaction of the Sub-Divisional Officer,the respondent would refund the advance paid to him under the agree-ment, with interest. The work was completed on 7th July, 1955, and theSub-Divisional Officer ordered final payment of the amounts due to therespondent. He also directed the Overseer to get the measurementsdone by 30th July, 1955. Records did not show that the Overseersubmitted any report before the date of the respondent's nomination,viz., 29th January, 1957, or even at a later date. Held, per BALAKRISHNARAO, J.—The order for final payment was an irrevocable one and putan end to the contract, and nothing remained to be done by both sideson the contract, and, therefore, at the date of the nomination therewas no subsisting contract as contemplated in section 7(0!) cf theRepresentation of the People Act, and the respondent was not dis-qualified under section j(d). As the Sub-Divisional Officer had orderedfinal payment on 7th July, 1955, it was no longer necessary to refer tothe contract in case the respondent had to recover the amount due tohim on that date. After the order for final payment the position ofthe respondent was that of a creditor and that of the Sub-DivisionalOfficer, a debtor. Per NARASIMHAM, C.J.—The respondent's contractwith the Sub-Divisional Officer would ordinarily continue to subsist solong as the completion certificate was not obtained, but the unreason-able delay on the part of the Sub-divisional officer and his subordinatein issuing the certificate brought about the discharge of the contractand it did not subsist on the date of the nomination. The respondentwho was a Government servant before his nomination went to attendan exhibition in connection with public relations under the orders ofthe Government. He took an advance of Rs. 60 towards travellingallowance and submitted a T. A. bill for Rs. 31, leaving Rs. 28 asbalance due from him. No steps were, however, taken to recover thisamount before his resignation with the result that at the date of hisnomination this amount remained outstanding against him: Held,(i) Per BALAKRISHNA RAO, J.—The holding of an exhibition in connec-tion with public relations was not such a service undertaken by

ELD—25

t<H ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Government as is contemplated under section y(d). Per NARASIM-HAM, C.J. (contra)—Exhibitions have great educative and publicityvalue and if the State undertakes to hold such exhibitions it is difficultto say that the service is not undertaken by the State, especially if inthe budget it is clearly stated that it is a new service. Per NARA-SIMHAM, C.J., and BALAKRISHNA RAO, J.—A contract referred to insection j(d) of the Act is a contract directly for the performance of theservice itself and will not include ancillary contracts connected withthe performance of such service. Even though there was an impliedcontract at the time of drawing the advance to fefund the balance,such a contract could not be deemed to be a contract contemplatedunder section j(d) as it was merely an ancillary and secondary contractarising out of the usual course of business as a public servant and therespondent was not disqualified under section j{d) merely because anamount of Rs. 28 was still due from him to the Government.—PYARIMOHAN DAS V. DURGA SANKAR DAS AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 338.

Whether contract subsists until bills are paid.—Even though acandidate who had entered into a contract for execution of certainworks had completed the execution of the works, the contract must bedeemed to be subsisting so long as he has to do work in the shape ofrectification of mistakes and repairs to the work done and so long ashis bills had not been paid.—INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIWANCHANDMAHAJAN AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 219.

Contract with Bhopal Government before igs6—Whether dis-qualifies.—Contracts entered into with the Government of the erstwhileState of Bhopal must be treated as contracts entered into with theGovernment of the Madhya Pradesh after the enactment of the StatesReorganisation Act, 1956, on account of the provisions of section 101 ofthis Act.—INAYATULLAH KHAN?/, DIWANCHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS,15 E.L.R. 219.

Contract entered into by partner of firm—Other partners, whetherdisqualified.—When one partner takes a contract on behalf of the firm,he takes it for the benefit of all the partners of the firm, and all thepartners of the firm would be disqualified under section j{d) of theRepresentation of the People Act if the contract is for the supply ofgoods to the appropriate Government. Under section 109 of theEvidence Act when the question is whether the persons concerned arepartners and it has been shown that they had been acting as such, theburden of proving that they are not partners or that they had ceasedto be partners is on the person who says that he was not a partner orhad ceased to be a partner.—ALLAH BUX V. RATAN LAL JAIN, 15 E.L.R,407.

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (5. CONTRACT WITH GOVT.) 195

Goods supplied, account settled and order for return of securitydeposits and certificate of completion of contract issued—Cheque for returnof deposits not issued—Whether contract subsists.—Where, though therespondent was interested in a contract for supply of goods with arailway administration it was found that before the date of nominationthe goods had all been supplied, all accounts had been settled, andorders had been issued for the return of the security deposits (whichwere returnable only after completion of the contract), and the railwayadministration had also issued a certificate that no contract was pend-ing : Held, that there was no subsisting contract at the time of thenomination and the respondent was not disqualified under section 7(d),'even though the routine matter of issuing the cheques for the amountof the security deposits in pursuance of the orders made, remained tobe gone through at the time of the nomination.—LAL SHYAM SHAH V.V. N. SWAMI, 16 E.L.R. 74.

Contract to supply goods—Whether contract subsists till price ispaid.-—A contract for the supply of goods at a certain price subsistsuntil the price of the goods is paid.—BADRIVISHAL PITTIE V. J. V.NARSINGH RAO, 16 E.L.R. 183.

——Contract not complying with art. 299—Validity.—A contract forsupply of goods to the Government entered into by a Governmentservant is not void even though it may not comply with article 299 ofthe Constitution and for this reason it may not be enforceable againstthe Government.—BADRIVISHAL PITTIE V. J. V. NARSINGH RAO, 16E.L.R. 183.

Contract need not be executory.—Interest in a contract with theGovernment, to be a disqualification under section j(d) of the Repre-sentation of the People Act, 1951, need not be an interest in anexecutory contract. Where a tender is submitted to the Governmentfor supply of goods at a certain price and on the acceptance of thetender, goods are supplied, there is a contract within the meaning ofsection 7(d).—BADRIVISHAL PITTIE V. J. V. NARSINGH RAO, 16 E.L.R.183.

Contract to supply printed books.—A contract by a printer tosupply a certain number of printed coupon books at a certain price perbook including the cost of paper is a contract for supply of goods, not acontract for work and labour.—BADRIVISHAL PITTIE V. J. V. NARSINGHRAO, 16 E.L.R. 183.

Stipulation that contract will be performed to the satisfactionof Sub-Divisional Officer—Whether contract subsists till certificate ofsatisfaction is given.—Where a person has not merely contracted

Ig6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

to construct a building but has also agreed to construct the buildingto the satisfaction of the Sub-Divisional Officer and to refund theadvances made to him with interest if the work is not completed tohis satisfaction, the contract subsists until a certificate is obtainedfrom the competent authority and final payment is made to him, orat least ordered to be made to him; and the person will be disquali-fied under section 7(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,until the certificate is obtained and final payment is ordered.—AKSHAYA NARAYAN PRAHARAJ 1;. MAHESWAR BAG, 16 E.L.R. 337.

What constitutes " interest "—Contract resulting in loss.—For aperson to be " interested " in a contract within the meaning of sec-tion j(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the interestmust be a pecuniary one, but the contract need not necessarily be onewhich results in a pecuniary advantage or profit. It is sufficient if inlaw that person has to bear the loss or can retain the profit resultingfrom the contract.—AKSHAYA NARAYAN PRAHARAJ V. MAHESWAR BAG,16 E.L.R. 337.

-Breach of contract by one party—.Rescission, of contract by theother—Whether contract subsists until penalties stipulated in contract forbreach are enforced,.—'When one of the parties to a contract, before theexpiry of the time fixed for performance thereof, expresses hisinability to perform the contract and the other party accepts thisexpression of inability as a breach of the contract, and rescinds thecontract, the contract must be treated as discharged by breach andthough the other party is entitled under the terms of the contract torecover some penalty or damages for breach of the contract, thecontract cannot be deemed to be subsisting even after the rescissionof the contract until the penal clauses are enforced. The appellanthad entered into a contract with the Deputy Commissioner for print-ing of electoral rolls. Before the expiry of the period allowed for theprinting, he intimated to the Deputy Commissioner that owing tounavoidable circumstances he was unable to execute the work. TheDeputy Commissioner asked for return of the manuscript copies of therolls and paper supplied, got the printing done by another press andtook proceedings under a penal clause of the contract for recovery ofa sum of Rs. 1,933 being the extra cost incurred by him in getting therolls printed elsewhere. The appellant filed his nomination paperafter the Deputy Commissioner had given the contract to anotherpress but before he had recovered the sum of Rs. 1,933 : Held, thatthe contract for printing did not subsist after the Deputy Commis-sioner had rescinded the contract and the appellant was not disquali-fied to stand as a candidate on the date of nomination under

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (5. CONTRACT WITH GOVT.) 107

section j(d) of the Representation of the People Act.—GAURISHANKERSHASTRI v. MAYADHARDAS AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 441.

Agreement by leading member of village with Circle Officer ofState Government to supervise and guarantee execution of work as" sponsor "—Party whether, " interested in contract ".—Under a Deve-lopment Scheme which was introduced and financed by the Govern-ment of India, the Central Government agreed to meet 50 per cent, ofthe cost of Community Projects if the people of the locality contributedthe other 50 per cent. The Central Government placed the money atthe disposal of the State concerned and agreements were entered intoby officers of the State. The respondent who was a sitting member qfthe Legislature of a State and an important person of the localityentered into an agreement with the Circle Officer of the DevelopmentProject, who was an officer of the State Government, to supervise theexecution of a work according to specification and to guarantee thatthe people of the locality contributed 50 per cent, of the cost. Shewas described as the " sponsor " in the agreement, though the agree-ment itself was styled as a contract. Before she filed her nominationshe expressed her inability to fulfil the agreement and suggested thename of another person in her stead. The Circle Officer recommendedto the Sub-Divisional Officer that her application may be accepted andon the 27th January, the Sub-Divisional Officer passed an order accept-ing the recommendation of the Circle Officer, and directing therespondent to refund the security amount by the 29th January, 1957,which was the last day for filing the nominations, and for giving thecontract to another person. The question being whether the respond-ent was disqualified under section y(d) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, on the ground that she was interested in a contractfor the execution of a work undertaken by the appropriate Govern-ment : Held, (i) that the respondent had only sponsored the executionof a Community Project as a responsible and important individual ofthe locality and a member of the Legislature, and as she had nopecuniary or material interest in the contract except as an importantperson of the locality, she was not " interested in a contract " withinthe meaning of section j{d); (ii) that, even assuming that she wasinterested in a contract, there was nothing to show that the CircleOfficer had entered into the contract on behalf of the " appropriateGovernment," i.e., the State Government in this case, and not theCentral Government; (iii) in any event the contract had ceased tosubsist two days before the last date fixed for nominations as the Sub-Divisional Officer accepted on the 27th January the application of therespondent for terminating the agreement; (iv) that since the

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Sub-Divisional Officer had not made refund of security a condition pre-cedent for terminating the contract, the contract terminated as soon asthe order was made and could not be treated as continuing until thesecurity was actually refunded by the respondent. Held, also, that asthe contract was entered with the Circle Officer, he had the powerto terminate it, and as soon as he accepted the application of the otherparty to the contract to terminate the contract, the contract termina-ted, and the mere fact that order was sent for approval to the Sub-Divisional Officer did not extend the duration of the contract till theSub-Divisional Officer's approval.—RADHA MOHAN RAI V. SUMITRADEVI AND ANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 162.

P.W.D. contractor—Removal from list oj contractors—Whetherterminates contract.—The removal of a P.W.D. contractor from the listof approved contractors and cancellation of his certificate as a " D "class contractor will not automatically terminate all the contractsalready entered into by him. Such contracts will continue to subsistuntil the final bills are paid to the contractor. A request by a P.W.D.contractor that his name may be removed from the list of Govern-ment contractors does not amount to a rescission of subsisting contractsand disentitle the contractor to claim refund of the deposits made byhim.—NARASIMHA REDDY V. BHOOMAJI AND ANOTHER : MUTHYAL RAOv. BHOOMAJI AND ANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 207.

Mukhias of Gram Panchayats of Bihar—Whether disqualified.—A Mukhia of a Gram Panchayat constituted under the Bihar PanchayatRaj Act, 1947, is not a person having " a share or interest in a contractfor the performance of any services undertaken by the Government "within the meaning of section j{d) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, even though the Panchayat of which he is, the Mukhia has enteredinto a contract with the Government for collection of taxes and thePanchayat is entitled to a certain percentage of the collection as collec-tion fee, and it may also allow a certain portion of such fee to the collec-tion staff. Neither does he hold an office of profit under the Governmentwithin the meaning of article io,i(i)(a) of the Constitution. A Mukhiais not, therefore, disqualified to be chosen as a member of the StateAssembly. A Mukhia is not " a revenue officer " or " a person in theservice of the Government " within the meaning of section I23(7)(/), aQdobtaining the assistance of a Mukhia does not, therefore constitute acorrupt practice. Under the old law as provided under section 123, sub-section (8), clause (6), of the Representation of the People Act, 1951," village headman or any other village officer by whatever name he iscalled" was specifically included in the category of parsons servingunder the Government. But by the amending Act XXVII of 1956, the

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connotation of " a person serving under the Government " has beenconsiderably narrowed down. " Village headman or any other villageofficer " is not specifically included in the class of " revenue officers "in clause (/). On the other hand, the words " excluding other villageofficers " appearing at the end of clause (/) indicate that the Legisla-ture intended to exclude Mukhias and other village officers from thecategory of revenue officers.—PRABHUNATH TIWARI V. JANARDANSINGH AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 1.

— • Central Government advancing loan to State Government forconstructing dam in State territory—Contractor, whether disqualifiedto be member of State Assembly.—Under an agreement between theGovernment of Orissa and the Central Government of India, thelatter agreed to advance as a loan the capital necessary for theconstruction of the Hirakud Dam Project and a ConstructionOrganisation was established to deal with the matter of construc-tion of the dam under the supervision of the Central Waterwaysand Irrigation Commission of the Government of India. The entireexpenditure except that relating to the land required was to beunder the control of the Government of India. The Governmentof Orissa empowered the Government of India to accord all technicaland financial sanctions to estimates of works and other con-nected expenditure. For the allotment of work to contractors andother matters relating to the agency of construction, a ContractBoard was formed consisting of the Premier of Orissa, theChairman of the Central Waterways Commission, the Chief Engineerof the Project and the Financial Adviser to the Project. The appel-lant who stood as a candidate for election to the Orissa State Assemblyhad submitted a tender for construction of a portion of this work andthe tender was accepted by the Superintending Engineer of the con-cerned Circle of the Project " on behalf of the President of India ",and this contract was subsisting when he filed his nomination. Theelection of the appellant was set aside by the Tribunal on the groundthat he was interested in a contract with the Government of the Stateof Orissa and was so disqualified under section j(d) of the Representa-tion of the People Act : Held, that, whatever be the nature of theagreement and the financial arrangements between the Government ofIndia and the State of Orissa, the contract was one between the appel-lant and President of India in the exercise of the executive power ofthe Union of India ; the President was not acting as an agent of theOrissa Government in accepting the tender, and the appellant was nottherefore, interested in any contract with the Government of Orissa,and was not disqualified under section j(d) of the Representation of

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the People Act 1951, to be a member of the Orissa State LegislativeAssembly.—NIKUNJA BEHARI SINGH V. DURYODHAN PRADHAN AND

ANOTHER, 18 E.L.R. 37.

In September, 1956, a service was undertaken by the State ofUttar Pradesh to supply cheap food-grains to the people of a districton account of famine conditions and, in pursuance of that under-taking, a scheme was evolved by the State Government by which food-grains supplied by the Government were issued to various retaildealers who were directed to sell the same to the consumers atspecified prices and subject to specified conditions. The appellantexecuted an agreement on the 27th November, 1956, to supply grainsas a retail dealer under this scheme and deposited a sum of Rs. 200 assecurity in the Government Treasury, for due performance of hisduties and proper fulfilment of the terms of the agreement, thecondition attached being that, in case of any misconduct, neglect,default or departure from the terms of the agreement by the appel-lant or his employees, the security money in whole or in part wasliable to be forfeited under the orders of the District Magistrate whosedecision in that behalf was to be final. An application by the appel-lant dated the 17th of January, 1957, was put up before the DistrictSupply Officer on the 21st of January, 1957, in which the appellantmade a request that, instead of his name, the name of another person,who had been original owner of the shop, be substituted for carryingon the retail shop. The District Supply Officer permitted the changeof name but no fresh security was deposited and no fresh agreementwas executed by the substitute. The appellant was, however, givena complete discharge of his liabilities to the Government by a certifi-cate issued to him by the District Supply Officer on the 21st of January,X957- On the 29th January, 1957, the appellant was nominated acandidate for election and he was declared elected on the 8th March.The Government decided sometime in March to give cartage allowanceto the retail dealers with retrospective effect and an amount of Rs. 281was due to the appellant in respect of the period prior to 21st January.It was contended in an election petition that, as the securityamount had not been refunded and the cartage dues were still due tothe appellant when he was nominated and elected, he was disqualifiedunder section j(d) of the Representation of the People Act: Held,(i) that though the agreement of the 27th November, 1956, wasexecuted and signed by the appellant alone, it constituted a validcontract as the terms were accepted by the Government; (ii) even ifthe appellant was not the real owner of the shop but had only foundthe security and signed the agreement as a benamidar for the real

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owner, who was later substituted in his place, he was in law himselfthe contracting party ; (iii) that, as the resignation of the appellantwas accepted by the District Supply Officer and the latter had giventhe appellant a certificate on the 21st January, 1957, giving completeclearance in respect of all the liabilities of the appellant under thecontract, the contract ceased to subsist on the 21st January, 1957 ;(iv) that the contract did not continue to subsist after 21st January,1957, merely because the security deposit had not been refunded tothe appellant, for, under the agreement the security money was forthe purpose of due performance of the appellant's duties and properfulfilment by him of the terms of the agreement and it was only incase of any misconduct, negligence, default or departure from theterms of the agreement by the appellant that a part or the whole ofthe security money could be forfeited by the Government. Since on22nd January, 1957, a certificate was issued on behalf of the Govern-ment under which the Government accepted that the appellant haddischarged all his liabilities under the agreement and th^t there wereno claims at all outstanding in favour of the Government against theappellant under the agreement thereafter, the security money at oncebecame refundable to the appellant and the right to receive back thesecurity money deposited did not arise under the contract or anyof the terms of the contract; (v) that the fact that cartage for theperiod prior to 21st January, 1957, had not yet been paid to the appel-lant did not render the contract a subsisting one, inasmuch as this

• amount was not due under any terms of the contract, but was in thenature of an ex gratia payment decided upon after the contract hadbeen terminated by the Government. Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v.Moreshwar Parashram (9 E.L.R. 301) distinguished. GaurishankerShastri v. Mayadhardas (15 E.L.R. 441) relied on.—PABBAR RAM V.RAMESHWAR RAI AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 14.

A teacher who is receiving training in a basic training schoolunder a scheme adumbrated by the Government, and receiving astipend during the period of his training, is not " interested in acontract for the performance of any services undertaken by theGovernment" within the meaning of section y{d) of the Act, and isnot, therefore, disqualified for being chosen as a member of theLegislature, under that provision. Undergoing training in a basictraining school does not amount to holding an office.—N. P. VELUSAMITHEVAR v. G. RAJA NAINAR AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 338.

Interest in contract for supply of goods to Government.—Theholder of a licence from the Government of a State for the exclusivesupply of country spirit for the State for a certain period, is a person

ELD—36

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interested in a contract for the supply of goods to the Government ofthe State and is therefore disqualified to be a member of the Legis-lative Assembly of the State under section y(i). Such a licence is nota mere permission for manufacture of country spirit and for wholesalesupply of the same to the retail traders of the State.—SOOWALAL V.P. K. CHAUDHARY AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 137.

Contract executed by Mukhia of village—Whether Mukhia person-ally disqualified.—The appellant, who was the Mukhia of a village,undertook by a written contract to execute certain works for thedevelopment of the village, under the Local Development Works Pro-gramme envisaged by the Second Five Year Plan formulated by theGovernment of India, under which 50 per cent, of the cost was to beborne by the people of the locality which benefited by the contract, andthe remaining 50 per cent, was to be contributed by the Central Govern-ment. At the commencement of the contract the appellant describedhimself by his name and stated that he belonged to the village ofJeorakhan Tola and that his profession was cultivation. The preambleto the contract showed that the appellant undertook to carry out theconstruction of the development project under the Local WorksProgramme mentioned in the contract as per estimate attached there-to, and he agreed to execute the work according to and subject to theterms and conditions contained therein, and he also undertook tocontribute 50 per cent, of the cost in cash and labour. At the end,the appellant signed as Mukhia and gave his address as JeorakhanTola Gram Panchayat. The High Court took the view that the -description of the appellant given by him at the time when he signedthe contract was not a term of the contract and could not thereforesupport his plea"that he had executed the contract as Mukhia of thePanchayat, and that he was therefore disqualified under section j(d)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as the contract wassubsisting at the date of his election. Held, considering the contractin question in the light of the background of 'the Plan of which itformed one item, and taking into account all its conditions together,it was clear that the appellant, as the Mukhia of the Village Panchayat,acted as its agent when he signed the contract, and not as an individualacting in his personal capacity, and the appellant was not, therefore,disqualified to be chosen as a member of the Legislative Assemblyunder section y(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Heldfurther, that the fact that the Panchayat was a body corporate, andcontracts which have not been executed in the name of the corporatebody might not be enforceable against the Panchayat, would notaffect the question whether the appellant was disqualified under

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section y(d) or not. Judgment of the Patna High Court reported asRameshwar Prasad Shastri v. Bhagwan Singh and Another (20 E.L.R.45) reversed on this point.—BHAGWAN SINGH V. RAMESHWAR PRASAD

SASTRI AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 126. [S.C.]

Agreement with Governor for stocking and storing grains anddisposing of them as directed—Whether contract for performance of servi-ces or mere licence.—In pursuance of a grain supply scheme of the Govern-ment of Bihar, under which the Government had to-stock and storefoodgrains, an agreement was entered into between the Governor ofBihar (1st party) and the firm of N. B. (2nd party) under which the2nd party agreed to become the custodian and bailee of such stock offoodgrains as the 1st party shall deliver to the 2nd party. The 2ndparty was to take over the foodgrains from the railway wagons and tostore them in its own godowns, and had to dispose of the foodgrains asdirected by the 1st party, and the 2nd party was to receive a remunera-tion of 1 per cent, on the value of the stocks removed from itscustody. The Tribunal was of opinion that though the Governmentwas performing a service undertaken by it, namely, that of stockingand storing foodgrains, the firm was a mere depot-holder and was notinterested in any contract for the execution of any work or perform-ance of any service undertaken by the Government. On appeal:Held, that under the terms of the agreement there was mutuality ofrights and obligations between the parties, and the firm was clearlyinterested in a contract for the performance of a service undertakenby the Government within the meaning of section y(d) of the Re-presentation of the People Act, 1951.—BALESHWAR RAM V. RAM-PADARATH MAHTON AND OTHERS : MlSHRI SlNHA V. RAMPADARATH

MAHTON AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 390.——Contract to supply goods.—The Controller of Stores called for

tenders on the 6th August, 1956, for seven items. On the 16thAugust, 1956, B. & Co. offered to supply five items including anamplifier. On the 21st December, 1956, the Controller asked forthe supply of an amplifier at the price quoted by the firm. On the19th January, 1957, the firm supplied this article with a billfor the price, quoting the order dated 21st December, 1956. Thefirm received payment on the 8th March, 1957. The respondentwho was interested in the firm had filed his nomination onthe 29th January, 1957, and was declared elected on the 9thMarch, 1957: Held, (i) that the order placed by the Governmentand accepted by the firm was not a solitary case of sale of specificgoods but constituted a distinct contract for the supply of thegoods and the above-mentioned contract must be treated as subsisting

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till the payment for the goods had actually been made ; the contractdid not terminate, so far as the firm was concerned, after the supplyhad been made and it was not correct.to say that thereafter therelationship between the Government and the firm was merely that ofa creditor and debtor ; (ii) that the fact that the contract terminatedjust before the date on which the candidate was declared elected, wasimmaterial, since, if the disqualification attaches to the candidate atany one of the stages commencing with the nomination and endingwith the declaration of the result, he cannot be chosen.—GUR-BANTA SINGH V. PIARA RAM AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 350.

K, who was the karta of a joint Hindu family, carried on ajoint family business. On the 2nd January, 1956, a firm under thename of B & Co. was formed to take up the business of the jointfamily firm, with K, his son G, and a third person T, as partners, andthe partnership was registered under the Indian Partnership Act. Byanother deed of the 25th January, 1957, purporting to be a deed ofdissolution of partnership, K withdrew from the partnership and, onthe understanding that his capital would be paid to him within3 months, he transferred his interest to G and T, and the lattercontinued as partners of the firm B & Co. K filed his nomination as acandidate on the 29th January, 1957, and was declared elected. Inan election petition it was alleged that K was disqualified as he was apartner of the registered firm called B & Co. and continued to be suchat the time of nomination, and B & Co. had a subsisting contract withthe Government. The Tribunal found that the deed of 2nd January,1956, was a bogus one, the firm B & Co. never came into existence,the firm continued to be a joint family firm, the deed of dissolution of25th January, 1957, was of no effect, andK was therefore disqualified:Held, (1) that as the case set up in the petition was that B & Co. wasa registered firm and K was a partner in it, the petitioner could notbe allowed to adduce evidence to show that the firm in question was ajoint family firm which continued as such even after the deed executedon the 2nd January, 1956; the Tribunal acted wrongly in basing itsdecision on a case not set up in the pleadings ; (ii) on the facts of thecase there was a valid dissolution of the firm on the 25th January,1957, and K ceased to have an interest in the firm from that date andhe was not therefore disqualified on the 29th January, 1957, when hefiled his nomination.—GURBANTA SINGH V. PIARA RAM AND OTHERS,20 E.L.R. 350.

What is required under section 7(d) is a share or interestin the relevant contract though that interest may well be material asdistinguished from pecuniary interest strictly so called. In order.

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (5. CONTRACT WITH GOVT.) 205

therefore, that a person may be held disqualified under section y(d) itmay be necessary to prove not only that the said person had a share orinterest, i.e., a material interest, proprietary or otherwise, in the firmwhich had or held the particular contract with the relevant Govern-ment, but also that the said contract was such as to be capable ofconferring upon him, i.e., upon the firm and through it upon him, atleast a material interest therein. Interest in the above context doesnot necessarily postulate a pecuniary advantage or the possibilitythereof; it may as well include pecuniary loss or disadvantage andcorresponding possibility. The fact that a firm which had entered intoa contract with the Government had entered into such contract onlyas agent of another foreign firm and consequently had no financial orpecuniary interest will not take such a contract outside the purviewof section y(d). The firm in such cases must be held to have had amaterial interest therein as it would have been liable for any defect,irregularity or default in the matter of the performance of thecontract, and therefore, had at least the possibility of a pecuniarydisadvantage thereunder, and even if they were mere contract agentsthey had the risk of losing their reputation as good or efficient contractagents and that would have affected their business in case of delay ordifficulty in the matter of payment. In order that a person may havea "share or interest " in a firm for the purposes of section J(d), it isnot necessary that he should be owner of the firm, or of a definiteshare in the firm. Even a financier of a firm may under proper cir-cumstances be a person having an " interest" in the firm and in itscontracts within section 7{d). Dicta.—" Provisions like section y(d)have been a familiar feature of election laws from very early times.They are based on a sound, solemn and salutary principle whichdemocracies or democratic constitutions can ill afford to spare orignore. Their purpose is to guarantee the purity of the Legislatureand of the administrative machinery as well, and it has been variouslyput by various eminent judges and noted authorities, but always withan eye to the guarantee of purity of the Legislature and administra-tion, and to keep the source or the fountain head of law and thestream of administration unsullied and free from corruption. Thebasic standpoint is to prevent conflict between interest and duty whichwould otherwise inevitably arise." If the election petitioner hasproved a prima facie case that the respondent (the returned candidate)whose election is sought to be set aside was interested in a firm whichhad entered into a contract with the Government, those who affirmthe contrary have to refute the same to secure the dismissal of theelection petition. [Their Lordships, agreeing with the Tribunal, held

2o6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

on the facts and circumstances and the oral and documentary evidenceadduced in the case, that the returned candidate had an interest in acontract which had been entered into with the Government by a firm,and was thus disqualified under section y{d).]—BROJAGOPAL DAS V.KALIPADA BANERJEE AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 325.

Subsistence of contract until all payments are made—English andIndian law.—Whatever may be the English law, the law applicable toIndia, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Chaturbhuj VithaldasJasani v. Moreshwar Par ashram (9 E.L.R. 301) is that a contractsubsists so long as payments due to a party under the contract areoutstanding.—BROJAGOPAL DAS V. KALIPADA BANERJEE AND OTHERS,20 E.L.R. 325.

Contract for picking and removing beedi-leaves from forest area—Whether contract for sale of goods, or performance of services.—A contractby which the Government, for a consideration, purports to sell thebeedi-leaves in a particular forest area for a particular period, whichspecifies also that the contractor should pick and remove the beedi-leaves from that area before a certain date, is not a contract for theexecution of any works or the performance of any services undertakenby the Government but a contract for sale of goods, even though inentering into such a contract the Government is exercising its powersand doing its duties under the Forest Act. A contract of service mustin order to come within the mischief of section y(d) of the Act, specific-ally have as its object the performance of a service, in other words,it must be a contract directly for the performance of services or ancil-lary to the performance of any such service.—R. DESHPANDE V. MUTT AMREDDY AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 314.

Works and finance entrusted to State Governments but supervisedby Central Government Officers—Whether contract one with StateGovernment or Central Government.—The Planning Commission ofIndia introduced a scheme of "Local Government Works", theessential features of which were these: The Central Governmentundertook to bear 50 per cent, of the cost of works for improvinglocal conditions for the benefit of the local residents if local contribu-tions in kind or cash to the extent of 50 per cent, were forthcoming.The execution of the works was to be carried on by the State Govern-ments and the Central Government had the power to advise andsupervise the works and check the accounts. The individual workswere to be initiated, scrutinised and sanctioned by the State Govern-ment and the 50 per cent, payable by the Central Government wasplaced at the disposal of the State Government as a grant-in-aid in

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (5. CONTRACT WITH GOVT.) 207

suitable instalments. At the end of each year the State Governmenthad to furnish to the Planning Commission a consolidated statementof the expenditure on those schemes. Contracts for the execution ofthe works were entered into by the State Officials and there wasnothing to show that they were acting on behalf of the CentralGovernment: Held, that under the circumstances, the execution ofof these works must be deemed to be undertaken by the State Govern-ments and not by the Central Government, for the purposes of section7(rf) of the Representation of the People Act.—RAMESHWAR PRASADSHASTRI v. BHAGWAN SINGH AND ANOTHER, 20 E.L.R. 45.

Contract signed by the Mukhiya 0/ village.—Where a contractfor such a work was executed by a person who was the Mukhiya ofJ. T. Gram Panchayat and after signing his name under the contracthe had added the words " Mukhiya, J. T. Gram Panchayat" and itwas contended that the contract was entered into by him in his capa-city as a Mukhiya of the Panchayat and he was not therefore, dis-qualified under section y(d): Held, that the addition of the above-mentioned words after the signature did not show that the contractwas not entered into on his own behalf. If the contract was on behalfof the Gram Panchayat, it would have been executed in the name ofthe corporate body in the heading of the contract though the sign-atory might have been the executive head after putting the commonseal. Where the same person had entered into another contract whichbegan with the words " I . . . . , Secretary, Madhyamik Vidyalaya, dohereby undertake . . . ." Held, that the heading in the contract showedthat the contract was not entered into by him in his personal capa-city, but as Secretary of the Vidyalaya.—RAMESHWAR PRASAD SHASTRIv. BHAGWAN SINGH AND ANOTHER, 20 E.L.R. 45.

A person who is interested in the contracts for the executionof works undertaken by the State Government would be disqualifiedunder section j(d) even though such contracts do not fulfil the require-ments of article 299 of the Constitution and are not therefore, enforce-able against the Government.—RAMESHWAR PRASAD SHASTRI V.BHAGWAN SINGH AND ANOTHER, 20 E.L.R. 45.

Agreement in official capacity to execute works—Whetherexecutant disqualified.—A person who puts forward schemes as anoffice bearer of an institution for the benefit of the institution andundertakes to execute the schemes by supplying half of the amountrequired either from his own pocket or by raising it by local contribu-tion and receives the remaining 50 per cent, from the Governmentdoe$ not hold any share or interest in the contract within ihe

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meaning of section j(d) of the Representation of the People Act.Under a scheme drawn up by the Planning Commission of theGovernment of India for local development the Government of Indiaadvanced funds to the State Governments for such developmentbut the schemes were executed by District Development Committeesunder the supervision of the local officials. The respondent whowas the Secretary of a School, executed an agreement as such Secre-tary to the Circle Officer, for the construction of some rooms anda tank for the school, under which the respondent undertook to beresponsible for the 50 per cent, of the cost of construction which wasto be borne by the villagers and the other 50 per cent, was to be borneby the Government. Held, that as the agreement was executed bythe respondent in his official capacity as Secretary of the School hehad no interest in a contract for the execution of any works or perform-ance of any services undertaken by the State Government withinsection j(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Held, alsothat if he was interested in a contract it was in a contract with theState Government not the Government of India.—JANGALDHARI RAIv. SHEOPUJAN RAI, 18 E.L.R. 86.

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (6. Holding Office of Profit)

Office of Profit.—Acting as Patel without formal appointment—Ceasingto act as such without formal resignation before nomination—Validity ofnomination.~The office of a Patel under the Jaipur Land Revenue Act,1947, is an office of profit. The remuneration received by him is not anallowance for out-of-pocket expenses but a salary for services renderedto the Government which is fixed at a certain percentage of the landrevenue collections. Though there is no provision in the Rajasthan LandRevenue Act, 1956, for the appointment of Patels, the office of aLambardar under this Act corresponds to the office of a Patel under theJaipur Land Revenue Act, 1947, and, therefore, by virtue of section 27of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, the appointment of Patel,if any, made under the Jaipur Land Revenue Act continued to be inforce under the new Act. The respondent was permitted to do theduties of a Patel during the lifetime of his father when the latter whowas a Patel became blind, and he continued to perform the duties ofa Patel and to receive the remuneration fixed therefor, even after hisfather's death. He was not, however, formally appointed as Pateland his name was not entered in the register of Patels. The evidenceshowed that after the 26th June, 1956, he ceased to act as a Patel andhe was not paid any remuneration, but there was no evidence to showthat he had formally resigned his office. • His nomination was filed op

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (6. OFFICE OF PROFIT) 209

the 21st January, 1957. Held, that, under the circumstances, thoughthe respondent had not formally resigned his office, he cannot bedeemed to have held an office of profit at the time of his nomination.—RAM SAHAI V. GAJJA AND ANOTHER, 20 E.L.R. 301.

Honorary officers getting only travelling allowance.—Under theemergency irrigation drive of the Bihar Government, a large number ofpersons including the respondent, were appointed as Honorary Inspec-tors of Minor Irrigation. No salary or remuneration was attached tothis post, but, as such Inspectors had to make local inspection ofirrigation projects in accordance with the instructions of the Govern-ment, they were given the power to draw travelling allowance admis-sible to Government servants of the second grade : Held, that therespondent held an " office," but did not hold " an office of profit "as the travelling allowance given to him was intended and sufficient tocover his out-of-pocket expenses only.—KARU LALL AND ANOTHER V.FlDA HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER, 20 E.L.R. 169.

"Meena Bara Gaon" of Rajasthan.—A"Meena Bara Gaon "of Rajasthan does not hold " an office of profit under the Govern-ment " within the meaning of article igi(a) of the Constitution ofIndia inasmuch as, apart from other considerations, the grant of a" Meena Bara Gaon " is both heritable and partible and the number ofgrantees increase or decrease without any control of the Government,even though the grant is subject to " Chehra " and mutation proceed-ings and the grantee has to pay a " tafawat " of 2 annas per day tothe Government if he fails to render the personal service which he hasto render under the terms of the grant. If a particular post is createdby the Government and then a grant of land is made to the personholding that post, to remunerate him for his services in lieu of cashpayment, then it may he held that he is holding an office under theGovernment, because in such a case it is the office which is created firstand land is granted only as remuneration to the office-holder for hisservices. If, however, a grant of land is made by the Government toa certain person out of regard for his meritorious services or some otherpersonal consideration for the grantee and if in such a case somefurther service is also required from him, then it cannot be said thathe is holding any particular office under the Government. In thesecond case he is primarily a grantee, and the service, if any, requiredfrom him is subsidiary and it is only a term attached to that grant.Ramappa v. Sangappa (15 E.L.R. 475) distinguished.—BHAIRONLAL V.DOONGARSIDAS AND ANOTHER, 20 E.L.R. 157.

Ghatwals of Birbhum.—The holder of Ghatwali tenure (ofBhirbum) holds an office of profit under the State Government and,

ELD—27

210 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

as such, is disqualified for being chosen as a member of the StateLegislative Assembly ; but he does not hold such office after his estatehas been taken over by the Government under the provisions of theBihar Land Reforms Act, even though under the said Act he and hissuccessors are entitled to receive compensation from the Governmentin consideration of the acquisition of his tenure.—KAMDEO PRASADSINGH V. BADEI NARAIN SINGH AND ANOTHER, 18 E.L.R. 59.

Member of District Development Board and Electricity AdvisoryBoard.—Members of the District Development Board of the BombayState hold an office of profit but they do not hold such office under theState Government. Members of the Bombay Electricity AdvisoryBoard do not hold an office of profit as they merely receive a dailyallowance and travelling allowance for meeting their personal expend-iture incurred for attending meetings of the Board. In re VindhyaPradesh Legislative Assembly Members (4 E.L.R. 422) and MehtaGordhandas v. Chavadha Akbar Dalumiyan, No. 2 (7 E.L.R. 374) reliedon.—RAMDAYAL AYODYAPRASAD GUPTA V. K. R. PATIL AND OTHERS,

18 E.L.R. 378.

Honorary office to which "contingent allowance" is attached.—The holder of an honorary office (e.g., Convenor of a District ProjectCommittee constituted by the Central Social Welfare Board) who isreimbursed for his out-of-pocket expenses by travelling allowances,etc., does not become holder of an " office of profit" merely because inthe budget with regard to the office, provision is made for a " contin-gent allowance " of a certain fixed sum per annum which is intendedto be spent on festival occasions such as the Republic Day, entertain-ment of guests, etc.—LACHHMAN SINGH V. HARPARKASH KAUR, 19 E.L.R.417.

Office of Ghatwal.—The office of a Ghatwal is an office of profitheld under the State, and, notwithstanding the acquisition of Ghatwalitenures by the State under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, both thegrant and the office of the Ghatwals subsist, though in an altered form,and the performance of their obligations under the contract cannotalso be said to have become impossible. A Ghatwal is, therefore, dis-qualified under article i9i(i)(«) of the Constitution for being chosen as,and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or LegislativeCouncil of the State, even after his tenure has been acquired under theBihar Land Reforms Act. Kamdeo Prasad Singh v. Badri Narain Singhand Another (18 E.L.R. 59) reversed.—BADRI NARAIN SINGH V. KAMDEO

PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER; KAMDEO PRASAD SINGH V. BADRI

NARAIN SINGH AND ANOTHER, 21 E.L.R. 64.

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (6. OFFICE OF PROFIT) 211

A Sarbarakar holds an office of profit under the State inasmuchas he is appointed and is removable by the State, and he is thereforedisqualified under article I9i(i)(«) to be a member of the State Legisla-ture. The true test to determine whether a person holds an office of profitunder the State is the power of the Government to appoint the personto the office or to revoke his appointment. Payment of remunerationto him from a source other than Government revenue is not always thedecisive fact. Mahendra Sahu v. Dutia Raul (3 E.L.R. 117) dissentedfrom.—RAGHUNATH MISRA V. KISHORE CHANDRA DEO BHANJ ANDOTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 321.

Village patels.—The election of the respondent as a member ofthe Mysore Legislative Assembly from a constituency which, before theStates Re-organisation Act, 1956, formed part of the Hyderabad State,was sought to be set aside in an election petition on the ground that, ashe was a mali patel of a village, he held an office of profit under theGovernment and was therefore disqualified for being chosen as a memberof the Assembly under article 191 of the Constitution : Held, (i) that,though the office of the respondent was not governed by the MysoreVillage Offices Act, 1908, the principle of the decision of the SupremeCourt in Ramappa v. Sangappa (15 E.L.R. 475) was applicable; and, asa mali patel was appointed by the State Government and was paid outof the Government revenues, the respondent held " an office of profit "under the State Government; (ii) the respondent did not cease to holdan office of profit merely because the rules governing the appointmentof patels permitted a patel to appoint a deputy in his place and therespondent had appointed another person to do the duties of a patel inhis place for five years and transferred to him a portion of his remu-neration and this appointment had been accepted by the government;(iii) even though the area of the constituency had been transferred tothe Mysore State under the States Re-organisation Act, 1956, theHyderabad Legislature (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1955, whichexempted village officers from the disqualification under article 191 ofthe Constitution, continued to apply to the constituency until that Actwas repealed by an Act of the Mysore State; (iv) there was nothingin the Mysore Legislature (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1956,repealing or inconsistent with the provisions of the Hyderabad Legis-lature (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1955; (v) the respondentwas, therefore, exempted by the Hyderabad Legislature (Prevention ofDisqualification) Act of 1955, from the disqualification under article 191of the Constitution, and his election was not liable to be declared voidon the ground that he was disqualified.—SHIRUR VEERABHADRAPPAVEERAPPA v. SHANKARAGOUDA BASANGOUDA, 17 E.L.R. 117.

212 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Test of office of profit.—In order that an office may be an officeof profit it is not necessary that there must be a fixed pay attached tothe office. If the holder of the office can charge any fee or remunera-tion for exercising the function of his office, he holds an office of profit.—HOTI LAL v. RAJ BAHADUR, 15 E.L.R. 55.

Defect in appointment, effect of.—The disqualification from thefact of holding an office of profit under the Government of India or theGovernment of a State arises even if there is some defect, legal orotherwise, in the order making the appointment. The intention behindarticle 102 is to debar all de facto holders of office of profit under theGovernment of India or the Government of any State.—HOTI LAL t\RAJ BAHADUR, 15 E.L.R. 55.

Connotation " Government of India or the Government of anyState "—The words " Government of India or the Government of anyState " in article 102 must be interpreted in their widest import andwould thus include a judicial office or office under the judicial depart-ment.—HOTI LAL V. RAJ BAHADUR, 15 E.L.R. 55.

Oath Commissioner in District Courts.—A person who wasperforming the duties of an Oath Commissioner from the ist January,1957, was formally appointed as an Oath Commissioner on the4th January, 1957, but with effect from the ist January. He filed anomination paper on the ist January and it was rejected on the groundthat he held an office of profit on the date of the nomination : Held,that the candidate held an office of profit on the ist January, 1957,even though the formal order appointing him was made only on the4th January and the nomination was rightly rejected.—HOTI LAL V.RAJ BAHADUR, 15 E.L.R. 55.

An Oath Commissioner appointed under rule 69 of the GeneralRules (Civil), 1957, holds an office of profit under the Government ofthe State, within the meaning of article io2(i)(a) of the Constitutionand is disqualified to be a member of either House of Parliament.HOTI LAL V. RAJ BAHADUR, 15 E.L.R. 55.

Members of Legislature.—Though a member of the LegislativeCouncil of a State who receives a monthly salary holds an office ofprofit, he does not hold an office of profit " under the Government ofIndia or the Government of any State ", within the meaning of articleI9i(i)(a) of the Constitution, and the election of a person for a seat inthe Legislative Assembly of a State cannot, therefore, be declaredvoid under section ioo(i)(a) of the Representation of the People Act,merely because at the time of the election he was a sitting memberof the Legislative Council of the State and receiving a salary as such

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (6. OFFICE OF PROFIT) 213

from the State. [The position of Ministers and Members of theLegislature compared.]—RAMNARAIN V. RAMCHANDRA, 15 E.L.R. 100.

Meenas Bara Gaon of Rajasthan.—A Meena Bara Gaon ofRajasthan does not hold an office of profit under the Government,within the meaning of article 191 of the Constitution of India andis not, therefore, disqualified under that provision to be chosen asa member of the Legislative Assembly of the State. [The status, rightsand duties of a Meena Bara Gaon and the nature of his office and theemoluments received by him discussed.]—BHAIRON LAL V. DUNGARSIDAS AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 115.

Officers appointed by a common managing agent of severedcompanies.—Shaw Wallace & Co. were the managing agent of threecompanies, A & Co., B & Co., and C. & Co. The respondent was thecoal auditor of A & Co. and B & Co. His salary was paid from thecentral office of Shaw Wallace & Co. He also acted as the coal auditorof C. & Co. and the labour officer of all the three companies when hewas directed to do so by the Chief Mechanical Engineer of ShawWalllace & Co. When he worked for C. & Co., a proportionate amountof his salary and allowance were debited to C. & Co. The UnionGovernment held more than 25 per cent, of the shares in C. & Co :Held, (i) that the respondent held an office of profit; (ii) he held theoffice under C. & Co., even though his engagement rested with themanaging agents; and (iii) as the Union Government held more than25 per cent, of the shares in C. & Co., the respondent held an office ofprofit under the Union Government and he was, therefore, disqualifiedfor being a member of the House of the People under section 7(0) ofthe Representation of the People Act.—RAMAKANT KESHEORAOHULDURKAR v. BHIKULAL LAXMICHAND CHANDAK, 15 E.L.R. 467.

Patels and Shanbhogs of Mysore State—Nature of hereditaryvillage offices.—Patels and Shanbogs of the State of Mysore, who holdtheir office under the terms and conditions laid down in the MysoreVillage Offices Act, 1908, are persons holding an office of profit underthe Government of the State of Mysore and are, therefore, disquali-fied for being chosen as members of the Mysore State LegislativeAssembly. Patels and Shanbhogs hold their office under the Govern-ment even though, on the death of a Patel or Shanbhog his legal heiris entitled to be appointed to the office if he fulfils the statutory require-ments, the holder of the office is not liable to be dismissed by theGovernment at its pleasure but only on certain conditions which arementioned in the Act, and their remuneration is not paid to them bythe Government directly. Judgment of the Mysore High Court in

214 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Sangappa and Others v. Ramappa (14 E.L.R. 229) reversed.—M. RAM-APPA v. SANGAPPA AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 475. [S.C.]

Employee of Life Insurance Corporation of India.—The LifeInsurance Corporation Act, 1956̂ (an Act to provide for thenationalisation of life insurance business in India by transferringall such business to a corporation established for the purpose andto provide for the regulation and control of the business of thecorporation), provided for the establishment of a corporation calledthe Life Insurance Corporation of India as a body corporate havingperpetual succession and a common seal. The Act provided for theappointment by the Government of India of persons who shallconstitute the Corporation and laid down the qualifications anddisqualifications of the persons to be appointed as members. Theoriginal capital of the Corporation of five crores rupees was providedby the Central Government. The Act further laid down the functionsof the Corporation and provided for the Central and Zonal offices of theCorporation. The location of the Central office was determined by theCentral Government and that of each of the Zonal offices was deter-mined by the Corporation, with the previous approval of the CentralGovernment. In the discharge of its functions under this Act, theCorporation was to be guided by such directions in matters of policyinvolving public interest as the Central Government may give to it inwriting ; and if any question arose whether a direction related to amatter of policy involving public interest the decision of the CentralGovernment was to be final. The Act enabled the Corporation toemploy such number of persons as it thought fit in order that it mightproperly discharge its functions. A separate fund was constituted forthe Corporation to which all receipts of the Corporation were to becredited, and payments by the Corporation were to be therefrom.Auditors were to be appointed by the Corporation with the approvalof the Central Government. 96 per cent, of the profits earned by theCorporation was to be reserved for the policy-holders and the balancewas to be utilised for such purpose as the Central Government shoulddetermine. The reports of the auditors and of the actuaries relatingto the activities of the Corporation were to be laid before the Parlia-ment. The Act contained a guarantee by the Central Government tothe policy-holders that their policies when matured shall be paid overto the beneficiaries under them. The Corporation could not be woundup except under the orders of the Central Government and in suchmanner as they may direct. The Act reserved power to the CentralGovernment to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, and

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (6. OFFICE OF PKOFIT) 215

in particular, the term of office and the conditions of service ofmembers who formed the Corporation, and the conditions subject towhich the Corporation might appoint employees. The Corporation wasinvested with power to make regulations not inconsistent with the Actand the Rules, with the previous approval of the Central Governmentinter alia, for "the method of recruitment of employees and agents ofthe Corporation and the terms and conditions of service of suchemployees or agents". Regulation 29 of these Regulations providedthat no employee shall take an active part in politics or in any politi-cal demonstration or stand for election as a member for a MunicipalCouncil, District Board or any Legislative body. The nomination ofthe respondent who was a salaried employee of this Corporation, as acandidate for the Madras State Assembly, was rejected on the groundthat he was disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Assemblyunder clauses (a) and (e) of article 191(1) of the Constitution. In anelection petition filed by the respondent to set aside the election onthe ground of improper rejection of his nomination the Tribunal heldthat the respondent held his office not under the Government of Indiabut under a statutory Corporation and Regulation 29 was merely arule of conduct and did not impose any disqualification under any lawmade by Parliament and that his nomination was therefore improperlyrejected. On appeal to the High Court it was contended first, thatthough in form a new legal entity was created, the Life InsuranceCorporation was virtually a department of the Government with theresult that the Corporation was a servant of the State and the em-ployees of the Corporation were employees of the State, and secondly,that regulation 29 of the Regulations framed by the Corporationcreated a disqualification " under a law made by Parliament " withinthe meaning of article igi(i)(e) of the Constitution: Held, (i) eventhough the initial capital was contributed by the Government, themembers of the Corporation were appointed by the Govern-ment and the Government had very large powers of controland supervision over the activities of the Corporation, theCorporation was neither a department nor an agent of theGovernment, and service under the Corporation was not service"under the Government of India" within article I9i(i)(«) ofthe Constitution, and the respondent was not, therefore, disqualifiedunder article igi(i)(a) of the Constitution ; (ii) Regulation 29 made bythe Corporation, however, constituted a disqualification " under a lawmade by Parliament ", within the meaning of article 191(1)^) of theConstitution ; (iii) that the rejection of the nomination paper was nottherefore improper. Their Lordships laid down the following tests for

2l6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

determining whether a public corporation was a department of Govern-ment or servant of the State or a distinct entity :—If the statute interms answered the question, as it did in the case of the Central LandBoard under the County and Town Planning Act, 1947, the need forany further enquiry is obviated. In the absence of such statutorydeclaration or provision, the intention of Parliament has to be gatheredfrom the provisions of the statute constituting the Corporation andthese provisions have to be judged in the light of the following consi-derations : First, the incorporation of the body though not determina-tive is of some significance, as an indication by Parliament of itsintention to create a legal entity with a personality of its own, distinctfrom the State; Secondly, the degree of control exercised by theMinister over the functioning of the corporation is a very relevantfactor, a complete dependence on him marking it as really a govern-mental body, while comparative freedom to pursue its administrationbeing treated as an element negativing an intention to constitute it aGovernment-agent, this semi-autonomy deriving from the desire toavoid plenary Parliamentary control over the details of its normaladministration. Third, is the degree of dependence of the corporationon the Government for its financial needs. Lastly, whether the functiondischarged by the corporation could really be treated historically asa pure governmental function, i.e., one which pertained to sovereignty,or whether it was the administration of a matter merely of local orregional concern.—G. NARAYANASWAMY NAIDU V. C. KRISHNAMURTHI

AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 21.

Patels and Shanbhogs of Mysore State. Hereditary villageofficers of the State of Mysore, known as Patels and Shanbhogs, whoserights and duties are regulated by the Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908,do not hold an office of profit under the Government of the MysoreState though they hold an office of profit, and are not, therefore, dis-qualified under article 191 of the Constitution for being chosen asmembers of the Mysore Legislative Assembly. [Their Lordships did notexpress any opinion about stipendiary patels and shanbhogs].—SAN-GAPPA AND OTHERS V. RAMAPPA, 14 E.L.R. 229.

Membership of the Zonal Railway User's Consultative Committee.—Membership of the Zonal Railway Users' Consultative Committeeis not an office of profit within the meaning of article 191 of theConstitution as the allowances paid to the members under the rulesare only intended to cover their out-of-pocket expenses.—CHIKATIPARASURAM NAIDU V. VYRICHERLA CHANDRA CHUDAMANI DEV,

13 E.L.R. 66,

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (6. OFFICE OF PROFIT) 217

Holding office of profit under authority subject to control ofGovernment—Whether disqualifies—Tests of disqualification.—In orderthat the holding of an office of profit may be a disqualification underarticle IO2(I)(«) of the Constitution for being chosen as, or for being,a member of the Parliament, the office of profit must be held underthe Government. Holding of an office under any other authority eventhough that authority is subject to the control of the Government isnot a disqualification. The Madarsa Durgah Khwaja Sahib Akbariwas a school for teaching Persian, Arabic and Muslim theology whichwas being managed and run by the Government of the Nizam ofHyderabad until 1950. Under an Act of 1950 the management wasvested in an administrator who was appointed by the Central Govern-ment and was to work under the control of the Central Government.In February, 1955, the appellant was given an honorary appointmentas its mohatmin (manager) with an honorarium of Rs. 100 per monthby the administrator of the Durgah Committee and he was to workunder the administrator. Under the Durgah Khwaja Sahib Act(XXXVI of 1955) which came into force on the ist March, 1956, theadministration, control and management of the Durgah Endowmentwas vested in a committee, which was a body corporate with perpetualsuccession and common seal and which could sue and be sued throughits president. The members of the committee were appointed by theCentral Government, and the Central Government in consultation withthe committee appointed an administrator of the Durgah who was tobe the ex officio secretary of the committee. His salary was fixed bythe Central Government but was to be paid out of the Durgah Endow-ment funds. The committee which exercised its powers through theadministrator was entitled to appoint, suspend and dismiss servantsof the Durgah and to make bye-laws providing inter alia for the dutiesand powers of employees of the Durgah. The appellant filed twonomination papers on the 28th February, 1956, and a third one on theist March, 1956. The Returning Officer rejected the first two nomina-tion papers on the ground that the appellant was holding an office ofprofit under the Government on the 28th February, 1956, but acceptedthe nomination paper filed on the ist March on the ground that theappellant did not hold the office under the Government on the ist March,1956, as Act XXXVI of 1955, had come into force on that day. TheTribunal, by a majority, held that the appellant held an office of profitunder the Government even after Act XXXVI of 1955 came into force.Held, reversing the view of the majority of the Tribunal and agreeingwith the view of the dissenting chairman, that the appellant did nothold an office of profit under the Government on the ist March, 1956.

ELD—28

2 l 8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Though the committee of the Durgah Endowment was to be appointedby the Goverrment of Tndia it was a body corporate with perpetualsuccession acting within the four corners of the Act. The fact thatthe committee or the members of the committee were removable bythe Government of India and that the committee could make bye-lawsprescribing the duties and powers of its employees could not convertthe servants of the committee into holders of office of profit under theGovernment of India. As the appellant was neither appointed by theGovernment of India nor was removable by the Government of Indianor was he paid out of the revenues of India he did not hold an officeunder the Government. The power of the Government to appoint aperson to an office of profit or to continue him in that office or revokehis appointment at their discretion and payment from out of Govern-ment revenues are important factors in determining whether thatperson is holding an office of profit under the Government, thoughpayment from a source other than Government revenue is not alwaysa decisive factor.—MAULANA ABDUL SHAKOOR V. RIKHAB CHAND ANDANOTHER, 13 E.L.R. 149IS.C]

" Insurance Medical Practitioner "—Whether holds office ofprofit under State Government.—The word " office " does not necessarilyimply that it must have an existence apart from the person who mayhold it. The mere fact that the post which a person holds will ceaseto exist as soon as he gives it up or other persons cannot be appointedto that post, is not a ground for holding that that person does not holdan " office ". In order that an office may be an " office of profit " itis not necessary that the holder of the office should actually make aprofit out of it. It is enough if the office is capable of yielding a profit,or in other words, is one from which the person holding it mayreasonably be expected to make a profit out of it. Delane v. Hillcoat(1829) 109 E. R. 115, Cowan v. Seymour (1920) 1 K.B. 500 referred to.The principal tests for deciding whether an office is under the Govern-ment, are (1) what authority has the power to make an appointmentto the office concerned, (2) what authority can take disciplinary actionand remove or dismiss the holder of the office ? and (3) by whom andfrom what source is his remuneration paid ? Of these, the first two aremore important than the third one. The Employees' State InsuranceAct, 1948, provided for the establishment of the Employees' StateInsurance Corporation by the Central Government. It was to consistof representatives of the Central and State Governments, of employersand employees, and of the medical profession. Its principal officerswere appointed by the Central Government and it had to work underthe control and supervision of the Government. It empowered the

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (6. OFFICE OF PROFIT) 210,

State Governments to make arrangements for giving medical benefitsand treatment to employees with the approval of the Corporation. TheRules made by the Bombay Government provided for the maintenanceof a list of " Insurance Medical Practitioners ", i.e., medical practi-tioners who had undertaken to provide medical services to employeesunder the Rules, in response to applications called for by the Govern-ment, and whose services were accepted by the Surgeon-General. Theycould be removed from the list by the State Government and couldresign by giving notice to the Surgeon-General. Their remunerationwas fixed by the State Government and the expenses were partly metout of the revenues of the State. They were allowed to have privatepractice. The appellant was an " Insurance Medical Practitioner"included in this list: Held, that the appellant held an office; the officewas an office of profit; and the office was one held under the BombayState Government and not under the Corporation ; the appellant wastherefore disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member ofthe Legislative Assembly of the State of Bombay.—DR. DEORAOLAKSHMAN ANANDE v. KESHAV LAKSHMAN BOKKAR, 13 E.L.R. 334.

——Acceptance of appointment as " special counsel " of Government—Whether creates disqualification under sec. j(d)—Appointment beforeelection—Objection cannot be raised under art. 103.—A contract to act asspecial counsel on behalf of the Government for defending a suitbrought against it is not a contract in relation to the performance ofany services undertaken by the Government, and the acceptance ofsuch a contract does not, therefore, result in any disqualification undersection y(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. On the21st October, 1954, the respondent was appointed as a " specialcounsel" by a State Government to conduct on behalf of the Govern-ment a suit which had been instituted against it in a District Court.On the 22nd December, 1954, the respondent filed his nomination paperfor election to the State Assembly, on the 7th February, 1955, he wasdeclared elected, the result of the election was published on the14th February, and he was sworn in as a member on the 21st February.As his appointment as special counsel was objected to, he did not takeany part in the conduct of the suit after the 12th February, and theappointment was cancelled by the Government on payment of remu-neration for work done till the 12th. A petition was presented to thePresident of India under article i02(i)(e) on the ground that therespondent was interested in a contract to perform services undertakenby the Government and was so disqualified to be a member undersection y(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and thepetition was referred by the President to the Election Commission for

220 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

its opinion : Held, (i) assuming that the acceptance of the appointmentas a special counsel amounted to a disqualification under section y(d),as the alleged disqualification existed before the election, the questionof such disqualification could not be enquired into under articles 102and 103 of the Constitution; (ii) that, as the respondent had ceasedto be a special counsel before the date on which his election waspublished in the Gazette, viz., the 14th February, 1954, it was notnecessary to consider whether each appearance on behalf of theGovernment constituted a fresh incurring of the disqualification;(iii) the acceptance of the appointment as special counsel did notresult in any disqualification under section 7(d) of the Representationof the People Act. Obiter: It is conceivable that in a suitable case theacceptance of an appointment as a Government counsel in a suit orother action in which the Government is a party may legitimatelyraise a substantial question as to whether such appointment amountsto an office of profit or not. [As no such question was raised in thepetition it was not necessary for the Election Commission to considerthe question in this case.] Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao(2 E.L.R. 449) followed.—In re YADVENDRA SINGH, M.L.A., VINDHYAPRADESH, 12 E.L.R. 162.

Watandar police patils—Whether hold office of profit.—A policepatil is a Government servant even though he holds the office as ahereditary watandar. The watan property enjoyed by him is theremuneration for the services rendered by him and he therefore holdsan office of profit under the Government within the meaning ofarticle 191 of the Constitution.—BASAWARAJ K. NAGUR V. B. R. SHID-LINGAPPA, 12 E.L.R. 168.

Failure to lodge return of election expenses—Disqualification forvoting—Repeal of sec. 143 and removal of such disqualification by Act 27 of1956—Whether retrospective—Disqualification under sec. 143, whetherdisqualifies for voting at municipal elections.—Sub-section (1) of section 74of the Representation of the People (Second Amendment) Act (27 of1956), enacted that section 143 of the principal Act, i.e., the Re-presentation of the People Act (43 of 1951), shall be omitted, and sub-section (2) thereof declared that " any disqualification for votingincurred by any person under the said section (i.e., section 143) fordefault in making a return of election expenses shall stand removed ":Held, that sub-section (2) of section 74 of the Act 27 of 1956 wasretrospective in operation and removed the disqualification incurredby a person under section 143 even with respect to periods prior tothe coming into force of that Act. The appellant who stood as acandidate for a State Legislative Assembly failed to file his return of

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES (6. OFFICE OF PROFIT) 221

election expenses which ought to have been lodged on the 24th March,1952, and so became disqualified for voting at any election undersection 143 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for aperiod of five years from that date, i.e., until the 24 th March, 1957.He stood for a municipal election in 1955 in the Madhya PradeshState and was declared elected. An election petition was filed to setaside his election on the ground that he was not qualified to be acandidate for the municipal election under section i2(^)(d) of theCentral Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, as he was disqualifiedfor voting under section 143 of Act 43 of 1951, at •'»»-*}Tne he stood asa candidate for the municipal election and w&s t : Held, thatthough the Representation of the People (Second Amendment)Act (27 of 1956) came into force only on the 28th August, 1956, sec-tion 74(2) thereof was retrospective in operation and removed thedisqualification of the appellant, and his election was not liable to be setaside on this ground. Held also, that the disqualification for voting undersection 143 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, disqualifieda person for voting at a municipal election also under section i2(^)(d)of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act.—SADASHEOJAGANNATH BARAPATRE v. HEMAJI HIRAMAN BAKDE, 18 E.L.R. 20.

Failure to lodge return of election expenses—Omission to submitvouchers, whether entails disqualification—Rule 131(3), whether ultravires—Delay of Election Commission in removing disqualification—Jurisdiction of Tribunal to consider whether there was inordinatedelay—Order notifying disqualification before hearing candidate—Whetheragainst natural justice—Removal of disqualification after rejectionof nomination but before polling—Whether rejection becomes improper—Crucial date for determining disqualification.'—The petitioner, whowas a candidate for election during the general elections of 1957,lodged his return of election expenses on the 22nd April, 1957, butdid not lodge all the vouchers relating to the expenses as required byrule 131(3) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Electionsand Election Petitions) Rules, 1956. The Election Commission notifiedon the 29th August, 1957, that he had incurred disqualification undersection y(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and undersection 8(i)(6) this disqualification took effect from the 29th October,1957. The disqualification was, however, removed by the ElectionCommission on the 21st January, 1958. In the meanwhile, on the20th December, 1958, the petitioner had filed his nomination as acandidate for a bye-election, and the nomination was rejected on thedate of scrutiny, viz., the 23rd December, 1958, on the ground that hewas disqualified under section j(c) of the Act. In a petition to set

222 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

aside the election of the candidate who was successful at the bye-election, the petitioner contended that his nomination was improperlyrejected because the Act did not provide for the lodging of vouchers,and if any rule provided for the lodging of vouchers it was ultra viresthe rule-making authority, that there was inordinate delay on thepart of the Election Commission in removing his disqualification, andthat in any event the removal of the disqualification on the 21stJanuary, 1958, had retrospective effect. Held, (i) that rule 131(3) ofthe Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions) Rule*. 10,56, which provides that all vouchers shall be lodgedalong with ;otmt of election expenses, was not ultra vires inas-much as section 169 of the Act empowers the Central Government tomake rules "for carrying out the purposes of the Act" and also toprovide for " any other matter required to be prescribed by the Act,"and rule 131(3) merely carries out the purposes of sections 77 and 78of the Act; (ii) the provision contained in section 131(2) that a vouchershall be obtained for every item of expenditure was not directory, butmandatory ; (iii) notification of disqualification by the Election Com-mission before hearing the candidate was not against the rules ofnatural justice, inasmuch as, under rule 134 the candidate is given anopportunity to make a representation for removal of the disqualifica-tion, and the disqualification takes effect only after the expiry of twomonths from the date of the decision of the Election Commission ;(iv) that the subsequent removal of the disqualification cannot relateback to the date of the nomination or scrutiny thereof, and, as thepetitioner was disqualified under section y(c) of the Act, on the dateof nomination and at the time of the scrutiny of nominations, hisnomination was not improperly rejected, and the election could not beset aside on this ground. Held also, that the Election Tribunal has nojurisdiction to consider whether there was any inordinate delay on thepart of the Election Commission in removing the disqualification, andeven if there was inordinate delay, the nomination could not be saidto have been improperly rejected, and the election could not be setaside on this ground.—L. M. CHAKRADEO V. M. S. ANEY, 21 E.L.R. 376.

DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES *Double-member Constituencies—Petition seeking declaration that

entire election is void—Limitation.—Where the constituency is a double-member constituency and the petitioner prays for a declaration thatthe election of both the returned candidates is void, the case is onewhere the entire election is being questioned and the petition isgoverned by clause (b) of rule 119 of the Representation of the People

* Double-member Constituencies have since been abolished by the Two-memberConstituencies (Abolition) Act 1961 (i of 1961,)

DODBLE MFMBFK CONSTITUENCIES 223

(Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, and theperiod of limitation is the 60 days mentioned in that clause of rule 119.—RADHA KRISHNA SHUKLA AND ANOTHER V. TARA CHAND MAHESHWARAND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 378.

Election of candidate for general seat only declared void—Applica-tion for declaring void election of candidate for reserved seat also in appeal—Maintainability.—Where, in an election petition seeking to set asidethe election of the candidate for the general seat in a double-memberconstituency, the election of this candidate was set aside on the groundthat the nomination of another candidate had been improperly rejected,and in an appeal against this order, an unsuccessful candidate for thereserved seat applied that the election of the candidate returned forthe reserved seat should also be set aside : Held, that, as there was norequest before the Tribunal to set aside the election of the candidatefor the reserved seat and there was also no appeal against the orderof the Tribunal so far as it related to the election of the candidate forthe reserved seat, the application was not maintainable. PerMEHROTRA, J.—Sub-sections (2)(b) and (4) of section 36 are not mutuallyexclusive, and under section 36(4) an election cannot be set aside evenfor a non-compliance falling under sub-section (2)(b), if it is not of asubstantial nature.—DEV KANTA BAROOAH V. KUSHARAM NATH ANDOTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 66.

Candidate for reserved seat whether can be declared elected togeneral seat.—The declaration by a candidate of the Scheduled Caste orScheduled Tribe in his nomination paper that he belongs to theScheduled Caste or the Scheduled Tribe, does not mean that he intendsto stand as a candidate for the reserved seat alone, and even if anomination paper contains such a declaration and no separate nomina-tion has been filed for the general seat, the Scheduled Caste or ScheduledTribe candidate can be declared elected to the general seat if he getsmore votes than the other candidates for the general seat.—DIPPALASURI DORA V. V. V. GIRI AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 1.

Candidate nominated as member of Scheduled Tribe—Whether canbe declared elected to general seat.—Four persons (the petitioner and thethree respondents) were candidates for the election to a double-memberconstituency, one of the seats in which was reserved for a member ofthe Scheduled Tribe and the other was a general seat. The first andsecond respondents filed nominations as members of a Scheduled Tribe.The second respondent got 1,26,792 votes, the first respondent got1,24,604 votes, the petitioner got 1,24,039 and the third respondentgot 1,18,968 votes. The second respondent was declared elected to the

224 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

reserved seat; and, though the first respondent had filed a nominationas member of a Scheduled Tribe, the returning officer, applying theprovisions of section 54(4) and the illustration thereto, declared him aselected to the general seat. The petitioner presented an electionpetition for declaring the election of the first respondent to the generalseat void alleging: (i) that, as the first respondent had filed hisnomination as a member of the Scheduled Tribe paying the concessiondeposit he could not be declared elected to the general seat, (ii) thatthe first respondent had ceased to be a member of a Scheduled Tribeand had become a Kshatriya at the time of his nomination and hisnomination itself was therefore invalid : Held, (i) that section 54 of theRepresentation of the People Act in its entirety had become a super-fluity after the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952; neither section 54(3)or (4) or the illustration thereto had any application to elections in thepresent set up of constituencies, where only one seat could be areserved seat; (ii) if, however, section 54(4) was applicable notwith-standing the passing of the Delimitation Commission Act restrictingthe reserved seat to only one in a single member-constituency or in adouble-member constituency, there being no longer any plurality ofreserved seats or more than two member-constituencies, section 54(4)was ultra vires, and void as being opposed to the provisions of theConstitution, in particular, article 330 and articles 14 and 15 ; (iii) ifsection 54(4) was to be applied in the present case as it is understoodin the light of its illustration to the clause, it would necessarily havethe effect of circumventing the principle of reservation as contemplatedunder article 330 and implemented and determined by the DelimitationAct; (iv) section 54(4) contravened the fundamental right of equalitybefore law enacted in article 14, as it placed the Scheduled Tribes insuch a position as to infringe the constitutional rights of the non-Scheduled Tribes and was therefore ultra vires and void ; (v) as the 1strespondent had filed his nomination declaring himself to be a member ofthe Scheduled Tribe and paying the concession rate of deposit, hisnomination was in fact for the reserved seat alone; it could not be treatedas a nomination for both the reserved and the general seat; (vi) as thiswas not merely a case of improper acceptance of a nomination but acase where the returned candidate had not been nominated at all forthe general seat, and the only contestants to the general seat were thepetitioner and the third respondent, and the petitioner had received amajority of the votes for the general seat, the Tribunal had power todeclare not only that the election of the first respondent was void butalso that the petitioner was duly elected.—V. V. GIRI v. DIPPALA SURI

DORAANP OTHERS, 15 E.L,.R. 1. [Reversed on appeal in 16 E.L.R. 1].

DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES 225

Scheduled Tribe candidate getting more votes than candidate forgeneral seat—Whether can be declared elected to general seat.—There werefour candidates A, B, C and D for an election to a double-memberconstituency in which one of the seats was reserved for a member ofthe Scheduled Tribe. Two of the candidates, A and B, were membersof the Scheduled Tribe. A got the highest number of votes and hewas declared elected to the reserved seat. B got the next highestnumber of votes and he was declared elected to the general seat. Inan election petition, C, who was not a member of the Scheduled Tribe,contended that B cannot be declared elected to the general seat and Calone could be declared elected to that seat, and the Tribunal upheldthis contention. On appeal : Held, reversing the order of the Tribunal,that even though B was a member of the Scheduled Tribe and haddeclared himself as such in his nomination paper and had not fileda separate nomination for the general seat, B could be declared electedto the general seat under the provisions of the Constitution andsection 54 of the Representation of the People Act.—DIPPALA SURIDORA V. V. V. Gnu AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 1.

Sec. 54(4) of Representation of the People Act whether ultravires art. 230 or art. 14 of the Constitution.—The Illustration to sec-tion 54(4) of the Representation of People Act is not inconsistentwith section 54(4) but merely explains its object. The words" remaining candidates " in section 54(4) mean, the candidates whohave not been elected, including the candidates belonging to theScheduled Tribes or Scheduled Castes who have not been elected.Section 54(4) and the Illustration thereof are not repugnant to article230, or article 14 of the Constitution.—DIPPALA SURI DORA V. V. V.GIRI AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 1.

Section 54 of the Representation of the People Act has notbecome superfluous after the Delimitation Act. The section is applic-able even where there are two seats, one being reserved for theScheduled Caste or for the Scheduled Tribe. There is also nothing inthe Delimitation Act which conflicts with the provisions of section 54,because the former Act still allows two member constituencies wherea seat is reserved for the Scheduled Caste or for the Scheduled Tribe.—DIPPALA SURI DORA V. V. V. GIRI AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 1.

Scheduled Caste candidate getting more votes than non-ScheduledCaste candidate—Whether can be elected, to general seat.—Where inan election to a double-member constituency, one of the seats inwhich was reserved for the Scheduled Castes, a candidate belongingto a Scheduled Caste got the highest number of votes and he was

ELD-29

226 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

declared duly elected to the reserved seat, and the candidate whogot the next highest number of votes was also a member of a ScheduledCaste : Held, that this Scheduled caste candidate (who got the nexthighest number of votes) was entitled to be declared as elected to thegeneral seat, even though he had paid the concession deposit of Rs. 250only and in his nomination paper he had made a declaration that hewas a member of a Scheduled Caste, and he had not filed any separatenomination for the general seat. The Indian Constitution contem-plates only one class of citizens. It makes no distinction between a citizenand a citizen on grounds of caste, community or colour and in orderto carry out both the idea of common citizenship and a secularstate, it provides for one common electoral roll, and every one,who is a citizen and who has attained a certain age and who is nototherwise disqualified, is entitled to be on this common roll, and elec-tions are held from each constituency delimitated for that purpose bycitizens on the roll voting for those who stand for election. The onlyunusual feature, which our Constitution has introduced is that certainspecial rights are conferred upon members of the Scheduled Castesand Scheduled Tribes. Members of the Scheduled Castes have notbeen given the right to elect their representatives in a separateelectorate, nor have they been allowed to have a separate roll consist-ing of members of the Scheduled Castes. The only privilege whichthe Constitution confers upon them is the privilege of having seats inParliament commensurate with their population, and in order to carryout this object the Constitution has provided that seats should bereserved for the Scheduled Castes proportionate to their population.This reservation is a privilege; it is a concession which Constitutionmakes to the Scheduled Castes which is something more than what themembers of other communities are entitled to, and which must not beconstrued in any way as to cut down the ordinary rights which amember of a Scheduled Caste has along with the other citizens ofIndia. The reservation does not mean that if there is a two-memberconstituency and one seat is reserved for the Scheduled Castes, onlyone member of the Scheduled Castes can be elected to the Parliament.It only means that at least one member should be elected and there isnothing in law to prevent both the seats being held by members of theScheduled Caste and electors voting for two members of the ScheduledCaste to repf esent them in Parliament. The election even in a multi-member constituency where a reservation is made for a member of theScheduled Caste, is a general election, not a compartmental one and itis only when the results are declared that the question arises whetherthe reservation clause has come into play or not. As no separate

DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES 227

nomination is necessary for the general seat and a member of theScheduled Caste is qualified by his very nomination to the reservedseat to contest the general seat as well, no question of discriminationcan possibly arise in a case like this. The judgment of the ElectionTribunal, Nagpur, in Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble (15E.L.R. 41) affirmed.—DIGAMBAR RAO BINDU V. DEV RAO KAMBLE ANDOTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 187.

Election of one candidate void joy improper rejection of nomination—Whether whole election void.—Where the nomination paper of one of thecandidates in a double-member constituency, which in fact compliedwith the rules, is wrongly rejected on the ground that it did notcomply with the rules, the case falls under section IOO(I)(C) and notunder section ioo(2)(c) and the entire election must be set asideincluding that of the other candidate. The decision of the SupremeCourt in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others(9 E.L.R. 494) is not applicable to such a case.—DALIP SINGH V.SURENDRA NATH ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 120.

Election of candidate for general seat declared void for wrongacceptance of nomination—Whether whole election void.—Where in adouble-member constituency, the election of the candidate for thereserved seat was declared void on the ground that his nominationwas improperly accepted, and the Tribunal declared the election of thecandidate for the general seat also void on tie ground that the electionwas an indivisible one, and the whole election must be set aside eventhough the election of the candidate for the general seat was notsubject to any defects : Held, that the Tribunal had misdirected itselfand acted erroneously in declaring void the election of the candidatefor the general seat. The law after the amendment of section IOO(I)(C)by the Amending Act of 1956 was substantially different in this respectfrom the law before this amendment; after the amendment, improperacceptance of any nomination of a returned candidate is not by itselfa ground for declaring the election of any other candidate or candi-dates void.— CHANDRA SHEKHAR PRASAD AND ANOTHER V. JAI PRAKASHSINGH, 17 E.L.R. 126.

Election of one candidate set aside for disqualification underConstitution being below 25 years—Whether whole election void.—Where,in a double-member constituency, the election of one of the returnedcandidates was found to be void on the ground that that candidate wasbelow 25 years of age when his nomination papers were filed and wasconsequently disqualified under the Constitution to be chosen as amember, but the grounds alleged for setting aside the election of theother candidate were not proved : Held, that the case was covered by

228 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

section ioo(2)(c) and not by section IOO(I)(C) of the Representation ofthe People Act, 1951; the whole election including that of the othercandidate did not become void and the election of the candidate -whowas found disqualified alone should be declared void. Durga ShankarMehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh (9 E.L.R. 494) followed.—S. NORATASINGH V. S. DHARAM SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 57.

Election of one candidate void for interest in contract—Whetherelection void.—Where, in a double-member constituency, the election ofthe candidate for the general seat was declared voir1 on the groundthat he was interested in a contract with the Government and as suchdisqualified to be chosen as a member, and it was urged that the elec-tion of the candidate for the reserved seat must also be declared voidon the ground that the election to a double-member constituency wasan integral whole and if the election of one of the candidates is setaside the election of the other candidate should also be set aside : Held,that the disqualification of the candidate for the general seat and thesetting aside of his election was not a ground for setting aside theelection of the candidate for the reserved seat also. Surendra NathKhosla v. Dalip Singh (12 E.L.R. 370) distinguished.—NARASIMHAREDDY v. BHOOMAJI AND ANOTHER ; MUTHYAL RAO V. BHOOMAJI ANDANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 207.

Petition seeking declaration that election is wholly void—Whe-ther grounds falling under section 100(2) can be proved.—If the onlyrelief claimed in an election petition is the relief mentioned in sec-tion 84(0) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, namely, adeclaration that the election is wholly void, the petitioner can succeedonly if he establishes the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) of sec-tion 100; he cannot be allowed to avail himself of the grounds men-tioned in sub-section (2) of section 100.—RADHA KRISHNA SHUKLAAND ANOTHER V. TARA CHAND MAHESHWAR AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 378.

Instruction to voters to put the two ballot papers into two differentboxes—Whether proper—Nature and effect of reservation of seats forScheduled Castes.—In a double-member constituency there were fourcandidates, two for the general seat and two for the reserved seat, andthe peons on duty at polling stations were instructed to warn everyvoter that he should insert the two ballot papers in two different boxesif he wanted both of his votes to be counted, and if he inserted boththe ballot papers in the same box, one of the votes would be rejected.It was contended that the peons should have been further instructedto tell the voters that one of the seats having been reserved for aScheduled Caste candidate, the voter could elect only one person forthe general seat and, therefore, he could not cast both of his votes in

DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES 229

favour of the two candidates for the general seat thus omitting to voteentirely for any candidate of the Scheduled Caste: Held, section 55of the Representation of the People Act makes it clear that it ispossible that members of the Scheduled Castes may be elected to boththe seats in a double-member constituency, though members notbelonging to such caste cannot be elected for both the seats. Theinstructions that were issued by the peon on duty, to the electors,were fully in accordance with the provisions of section 63 of theRepresentation of the People Act.—MOTILAL V. MANGLA PRASAD,15 E.L.R. 425.

Scheduled Tribe candidate nominated for reserved seat getting morevotes than candidates for general seat—Whether can be declared elected togeneral seat.—In an election to a double-member constituency, A and Bstood as candidates for the seat reserved for the Scheduled Tribes and Cand D, as candidates for the general seat. A obtained the highest numberof votes and was elected to the reserved seat. B obtained the next highestnumber of votes, that is, more votes than C and D: Held, by the major-ity (B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, GAJENDRAGADKAR and WANCHOO, JJ.—J. L. KAPUR, J. dissenting) that B could be declared elected to thegeneral seat, even though he had declared himself as a member of theScheduled Tribe in his nomination paper and had been nominated forthe reserved seat and had not filed a separate nomination and depositedseparate security for the general seat also. Per SINHA, JAFER IMAM,GAJENDRAGADKAR and WANCHOO, JJ.—Election to the House of thePeople even from a double-member constituency where one seat isreserved for the members of the Scheduled Tribes is one, and thoughthe Constitution shows anxiety to afford necessary protection to themembers of the Scheduled Tribes it has not adopted the system ofseparate electorates. The constituency is one and election is held tothe said constituency from one joint electoral roll prepared on the basisof qualifications which are of general and uniform application. Inregard to double-member constituencies the Constitution has not evenadopted the course of providing for a special constituency confined tothe members of the Scheduled Castes or Tribes but has only providedfor the reservation of seats for the members of the said Tribes or Castes.Even for the reserved seat all voters in the constituency are entitled tovote. The reservation of a seat in a double-member constituency cannottherefore, affect the main basic position that the constituency is oneand it is the same joint electorate that goes to the poll. The effect ofsection 33(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is thatunless a member of the Scheduled Caste or Tribe makes sthe requireddeclaration he would not be entitled to claim election to the reserved

230 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

seat. In other words, if a member of the Scheduled Caste or Tribe doesnot want to be considered for election to the reserved seat he need notmake the said declaration ; and in that case he would be entitled tocontest the election only for the general seat. But it does not followthat if a candidate belonging to the Scheduled Caste or Tribe makesthe said declaration he forfeits his right to contest for the general seat.The use of the expression " fill the seat " or the reference to " seat "in some of the articles of the Constitution or the sections of the Actdoes not mean that election to the House of the People from a double-member constituency is held not for the constituency as a whole but byreference to the two seats. Section 54(4) and the Illustration thereof,and section 55 are wholly consistent with the relevant provisions of theConstitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section54(4) is not ultra vires, nor has it become otiose after the enactment ofthe Delimitation Act, 1952. Whatever may have been the origin ofHindu castes and tribes in ancient times, gradually status came to bebased on birth alone and it is very difficult, if not impossible for aperson who belongs by birth to a, depressed caste or tribe to attain thestatus of a higher caste amongst the Hindus by virtue of his volition,education, culture and status. The caste-status of a person wouldnecessarily have to be determined in the light of the recognition receiv-ed by him from the members of the caste into which he seeks an entry.Unilateral acts of a person are not sufficient to prove the claim for thehigher status which the said acts purport to make. Per J. L. KAPUR, J.—The language used in the Constitution as well as in the election lawstends to show that the election though in a constituency is for the fill-ing of a seat and it is for the filling of that seat that the voters in aconstituency exercise their right to vote, and a person who has beennominated as a candidate for the reserved seat and has not filed anomination for the general seat also and deposited separate securityfor the same cannot be declared elected to the general seat, even if hehas obtained more votes than the candidates for the general seat.Judgment of the Andhra High Court in Dippala Suri Dora v. V. V. Giriand Others (16 E.L.R. 1) affirmed.—V. V. GIRI V. D. SURI DORA ANDOTHERS 21 E.L.R. 188 [s.G.]: DIGAMBAR RAO BINDU V. DEV RAO KAMBLEAND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 213 [s.c.J

Candidates for general and reserved seats set up by same partyworking in co-operation and helping each other—Whether each is agent ofthe other.—The mere fact that the two candidates set up by thesame party (e.g., the Congress Party) in a double-member constituencyone for the reserved seat and the other for the general seat, givemutual support to each other and co-operate with each other in the

ELECTION AGENTS 23I

election, would not make one of them the agent of the other, so as tomake the latter liable for the wrongful acts committed by the former.There must be some further evidence, apart from their having agreedto help each other, to enable the court to draw an inference that anillegal act done by one was with the consent or authority of the other.Where the candidate for the general seat in a double-member consti-tuency offers a gratification to one of two candidates for the reservedseat to induce him to withdraw, it cannot be said that this act wasdone in the interests of the other candidate for the reserved seat,because, though the withdrawal may be prima facie for the benefit oflatter, it may as well be for the benefit of the candidate for the generalseat, as a Scheduled Caste candidate can be returned for the generalseat also, if he gets more votes than the candidate for the general seat.Even assuming that such an act is an act done in the interests of thecandidate for the reserved seat, the election cannot be set aside unlessit is proved that the result of the election was materially affected bysuch act. In such cases, it may be difficult or well-nigh impossible forthe petitioners to establish by positive evidence the fact that the resulthas been materially affected, and this may operate harshly on thepetitioners, but section ioo(i)(d)(ii) makes it imperative for the Tribu-nal, before it can set aside an election in such cases, to come to theconclusion that the " result of the election, in so far as it concerns areturned candidate, has been materially affected by any corrupt practicecommitted in the interests of the returned candidate by a person otherthan that candidate or his election agent or a person acting with theconsent of such candidate or election agent. "•—GURBANTA SINGH V.PIARA RAM AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 350.

ELECTION AGENTS

Election agents—Candidate appointing himself as agent—Separatesignatures and declarations as candidate and as agent, whether necessary.—•Where the candidate has appointed himself as his election agent, it isnot necessary to file two separate declarations with the return of elec-tion expenses, one as a candidate and another~as the election agent orto sign the return twice. Even assuming that it is necessary to do so,omission to do so will be a mere technical defect not of a substantialnature.—RAJENDRA PRASAD YADAV V. SURESH CHANDRA MISHRA, I IE.L.R. 222.

Appointment of election agent—Omission to file Form V-A—Whether ground for election of nomination—Duty to prove that appoint-ment in Form V-A was made before nomination.—A nomination papercannot be rejected merely because Form V-A was not delivered along

232 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

with it. Appointment of an election agent and the acceptance of theagent in writing in Form V-A has, however, to be made at the time of,or before the delivery of the nomination paper to the returning officer,and if there is no evidence to prove this fact, the returning officerwould be acting properly in rejecting the nomination.—S. GURBHAJNIKSINGH AND ANOTHER V. S. BHAGWANT SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R.272.

Mere finding that certain election agents had committed corruptpractice—Not named as guilty persons after notice to show cause—Whetheragents disqualified—See DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES.

ELECTION CIRCULARS

Election circulars.—" Circular ", meaning of.—The word "circular"used in section 125(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,means something addressed to a circle of persons and " circular letter "means notice, advertisement, etc., reproduced for distribution. Thewords used in the English Act in this connection are not " circular,placard or poster " but " bill, placard or poster " and, as a documentmay be a circular though not a " bill ", English decisions which turnupon the meaning of the word " bill " are not of much assistance indetermining whether a corrupt practice under section 125(3) of theIndian Act has been committed. Alcott v. Emden ([1904] 68 J.P. 434D.C.), Cockermouth Division case (5 O'M. & H. 155) and Borough ofOxford case (7 O'M. & H. 49) distinguished.—DR. V. K. JOHN V. CHIEF

JUDGE, COURT OF SMALL CAUSES, MADRAS, AND OTHERS : DR. V. K. JOHN

v. VASANTHA PAI AND ANOTHER, 12 E.L.R. 329.

Duty to give printer's and publisher's names separately—Badgesto workers and chits to voters—Whether circulars or placards.—Unless anelectioneering pamphlet shows clearly on its face that the printer andpublisher are the same, the name and address of the printer and thepublisher must be separately given. South Saran case (2 HammondE. P. 250) distinguished. Badges meant to be issued to workers, andchits intended to be issued to voters on the polling days are notcirculars or placards within section 125(3) of the Representation ofthe People Act, 1951, and need not contain the names of the printersand publishers.—MAST RAM V. S. IQBAI. SINGH AND OTHERS, 12E.L.R. 34.

Duty to give name and address of printer and publisher—Givingname and address of publisher only—Whether trivial breach of law—" Circular ", essential features of.—Section 125(3) requires that the nameand address of both the printer and the publisher must appear on the

ELECTION COMMISSION 233

face of circulars, placards, and posters having reference to the election." And " must not in this context be read as equivalent to "or ", andif the name and address of the printer is omitted a corrupt practiceunder section 125(3) is committed, even though the name and addressof the respondent who is the publisher appear in the document. Suchomission is not a trivial or technical breach of the law but amounts toa corrupt practice under the Indian law. The essential features of a" circular " are (i) identity of the text and (ii) circulation or distribu-tion to a body of persons. A letter on the other hand is a missive orepistle and is a personal communication addressed to a single indivi-dual. A circular does not necessarily imply that the same documentmust be circulated. Distribution severally of documents with identicaltext is equally circulation. Printing includes any process of multiply-ing copies otherwise than copying by hand.—VASANTHA PAI V.DR. V. K. JOHN AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 107.

ELECTION COMMISSION

Election Commission.—General powers of superintendence.—Thepower contained in article 324(1) is a general power and the ElectionCommission, therefore, would be bound to carry out the specific provi-sions contained in any Act passed by the Parliament. But where theAct itself omits to provide for a contingency and does not contain anyprovision for meeting the situation, the general power conferred uponthe Election Commission by article 324(1) of the Constitution will comeinto play, and the Commission will have a right to pass the necessaryorders, if they fall within the ambit of its powers enumerated inarticle 324(1).—MOTILAL V. MANGLA PRASAD, 15 E.L.R. 425.

Instructions issued to presiding officers—Value of.—Instruc-tions issued by the Election Commission (e.g., instructions issued forthe guidance of presiding officers at polling stations) are not issuedunder any statutory power and have not got the force of law. Theyare in the same position as orders issued by the Government of a Stateto its officers in the discharge of its executive functions.—LAKSHMINARAIN v. BALWAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 76.

Functions of Election Commission and Tribunal—Jurisdiction 0/ Tri-bunal—Power to grant exemption for disqualification for offences.—Whilein cases falling within sections 139 and 140, the disqualification isautomatic and immutable, in cases falling within sections 141 to 143the Election Commission has power to grant exemption under sec-tion 144 of the Act. It is to guide the Commission in exercising itspowers under section 144, that the Tribunal is directed in section 99(1)(a)(ii) to make any recommendations with reference thereto, and the

ELP—30

234 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of this matter is purely advisory.There is nothing to prevent the Commission from taking up the ques-tion of exemption under section 144 suo motu, even though the Tribunalhas made no recommendation, and there is nothing to prevent theperson adversely affected from applying directly to the Commissionfor exemption. While, therefore, there is compelling reason why aperson should have an opportunity of showing cause before he isnamed, there is none such when the question is one of recommenda-tion.—TIRATH SINGH V. BACHITAR SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 192.[S.C.]

Mere transmission of second list to Tribunal—Whether proof ofcondonation of delay by Election Commission.—The mere fact that theElection Commission has transmitted a second list of charges alsoalong with the main petition does not lead to any inference that theElection Commission has condoned the delay in the filing of this list.—A. K. SUBBARAYA GOUNDER V. K. G. PALANISAMI GOUNDER ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 251.

Notifications and directions—Necessity of publication—Directionsnot published—Rejection of nomination by returning officer, whetherimproper.—Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and theRules framed thereunder, notifications and directions issued by theElection Commission require publication in the official Gazette only ifthe Act or the Rules provide that such notifications or directions shouldbe so published. A direction issued by the Election Commission underRule 2(2) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections andElection Petitions) Rules specifying the officers who may attest themarks of illiterate persons is not invalid merely because it was notpublished or promulgated. Where the Election Commission has issueddirections which authorised inter alia, Magistrates to attest the marksof illiterate persons, but these directions had not been published andthe circular sent by the Chief Electoral Officer to the returning officers,by a clerical mistatke, omitted Magistrates from the list of personsauthorised to attest, and a nomination paper attested by a Magistratewas rejected by a returning officer on the ground that it was notproperly attested: Held, that the nomination paper was improperlyrejected.—DALIP SINGH V. SURENDRA NATH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R.120.

Power of Election Commission to call for further facts and takefurther evidence in reference by Governor as to disqualification.—In the absence of any statutory provisions laying down the pro-cedure to be followed by the Election Commission, the ElectionCommission is free to adopt any reasonable procedure that it may

ELECTION COMMISSION 235

consider proper to follow in a particular case, so long as the same isconsistent with fairness, equity and natural justice. In a referencemade by the Governor under article 192 of the Constitution, the Elec-tion Commission may, therefore, for the elucidation of the full factsof the case and the respective averments of the parties without whichthe provisions of the law cannot be applied to the case, call for affi-davits of the parties, and if necessary, examine witnesses for thepurpose, as also call for and take into evidence documents relevant tothe subject-matter at issue. The Commission is not bound by thestatement of facts that the Governor might choose to make in hisreference.—In re S. N. PATNAIK, 13 E.L.R. 58.

-Reference by President as to disqualification—Duty to makeenquiry even if petitioner does not appear.—Where it is alleged in apetition to the President of India that a member of a LegislativeAssembly is disqualified under article i02(i)(e) of the Constitutionand that petition has been referred by the President to the ElectionCommission for its opinion under article 103, the Election Commissionis bound to enquire into the matter and forward its opinion to thePresident even though the petitioner does not press the petition.—In re YADVENDRA SINGH, M.L.A., VINDHYA PRADESH, 12 E.L.R. 162.

Power to extend date fixed for poll—Retirement of candidate-Notice delivered ten days prior to extended date for poll—Validity.—Section 55A (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,provided that a contesting candidate may retire from the contestby a notice delivered to the returning officer on any day "notlater than ten days prior to the date or the first of the dates fixed forthe poll." The poll was at first notified to commence on the 24th ofFebruary, 1957, and to close on the 14th of March, 1957, but owingto the exigencies of the weather polling could not take place and thedates were postponed from time to time, and the poll was finallynotified to commence on the 2nd of June, 1957, and to close on the14th of July. One of the candidates delivered a notice of retirementon the 18th of May. It was contended in an election petition thatsection 30 of the Act lays down a rigid and close schedule of dateswhich must be adhered to, beginning with the notification callingupon the constituency to elect a member or members and ending withthe date before which the election shall be completed and that if thedates have been once announced, a contesting candidate can onlyretire from the contest according to section 55A of the Act withinthose dates and that, the last date for delivering notice of retirementwas, therefore, the 14th of February, and as it was not delivered onor before that date the retirement was invalid, and election held

236 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

without placing the ballot boxes of that candidate was also invalid :Held, that the only restriction imposed by section 30 with regard tothe date for poll is that it should not be earlier than the twentiethday after the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures fixed underclause (c) of section 30 ; it was open to the Election Commission to fixany date beyond the twentieth day for taking the poll and to alter orextend that date under section 153 of the Act and, as the notice ofretirement delivered on the 18th of May was delivered more than tendays prior to the 2nd of June, which was the first of the dates fixedfor the poll, the retirement was not invalid.—PANDIT RAM NATHKALIA v. HEM RAJ AND ANOTHER, 21 E.L.R. 161.

Power to adjourn poll or to order repoll.—Though, underarticle 324, the Constitution has created an Election Commission forthe superintendence, direction and control, and conduct of all electionsto Parliament and the State Legislatures, the Election Commissionmust act within the terms of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, and the Act itself does not confer on the Election Com-mission any power to adjourn a poll or to take a fresh poll beyondwhat is provided under sections 57 and 58 of the Act.—SUDHIR LAXMANHENDRE v. S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

See also under BALLOT PAPERS pp. 12, 13, 16, 17, ELECTION

EXPENSES pp. 238, 239.

ELECTION EXPENSES

[See also under CORRUPT PRACTICE pp. 123 to 144.]

Account of election expenses—Scope of rules relating thereto.—With regard to maintaining an account of election expenses all thatthe rules require is the maintenance of a separate account book inwhich the particulars mentioned in rule I3r of the Representation ofthe People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1956,should be noted. So far as vouchers are concerned, the reference inrule 131 is only to vouchers received from dealers. Bills refer to thebills received from persons who have supplied goods or rendered someservice on credit. There is no direction for keeping a separate cashbook, nor is there any direction for maintaining any order book orreceipt book or vouchers book.—SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA,16 E.L.R. 103.

Return of election expenses—When return "false"—A personwould be guilty of minor corrupt practice under section 124(4)* of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, only if the return of expensesthat he has filed had been false in any material particular. " False "

*Section 124 was deleted from the Act by Act 27 of 1926,

ELECTION EXPENSES 237

in this connection does not mean inaccurate, but deliberately in-correct, which means that there must be some corrupt motive behindmaking it incorrect.—GANGA PRASAD PATHAK V. SALIGRAM JAISWAL

AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 415.The word "false" in clause (4) of section 124 of the Representa-

tion of the People Act, 1951, does not mean " incorrect" but implies adeliberate attempt to suppress some items of expenditure in order toescape the application of the provisions of that clause and is not intend-ed to cover minor omissions to include small items of expenses, e.g., thecost of voters' lists, especially where the maximum limit of expenditurepermitted by law would not be exceeded even if these items wereincluded. Mast Ram v. Harnani Singh and Others (7 E.L.R. 301)followed.—S. NORATA SINGH V. S. DHARAM SINGH AND OTHERS,

11 E.L.R. 57.The word " false " in section 124(4), which makes the filing

of a false return of election expenses a corrupt practice, is not equiva-lent to " incorrect " but means " deliberately false " and implies acorrupt motive.—MAST RAM V. S. IQBAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R.

34-Omission of several small items—Return whether "false."—

Where the respondent, a Congress candidate, had omitted varioussmall items of expenditure which should have been included in hisreturn, such as the expense for filling up voters' cards, the propor-tion of the expenses incurred by the Congress Party for printingand publishing posters and pamphlets for the benefit of Congresscandidates generally, money equivalent of the service of cars lentby others, and amount paid to the Congress Party for Congresstickets, but it appeared that even if such expenses had been added tothe amount returned, the maximum limit would not have beenexceeded: Held, per RAGHUNANDAN SARAN and FARUQI (SANYALdissenting)—that the omissions could not be said to be " false " asthere was no corrupt motive for such omission and the respondentwas not guilty of a corrupt practice under section 124(4) °f the Act.Per SANYAL.—If a candidate makes a large number of omissions in hisreturn of election expenses, even if it be due to ignorance of fact orlaw, it is an untrue declaration and such a return would be false inmaterial particulars. The omission to include such expenses as theabove, must be deliberate. Before making a solemn affirmation thattheir return is true it is the duty of candidates to see whether suchexpenses are included, and if they do not include them, the returnis "false" and they would be guilty of a corrupt practice undersection 124(4).—KUSHWAQT RAI V. KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS,

11 E.L.R. 1.

238 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Duty of election agent to keep proper accounts.—In view of theprovisions of section 44 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,and rule i n of the Rules, which impose a duty on an election agent tokeep proper accounts of election expenses, non-production of suchaccount books raise a presumption that, the candidate has eithercontravened those provisions or that the accounts, if produced, wouldbe unfavourable to him.—BRIJ SUNDAR SHARMA V. ELECTIONTRIBUNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 216.

Jurisdiction of Tribunal to enquire into falsity of return—when trial proceeds on other grounds as well.—Where the trial of anelection petition is proceeding on other matters as well, the Tribu-nal is bound under section 143 of the Act to enquire into the questionof falsity of the return of election expenses also, even though it isa minor corrupt practice and, standing by itself, it may not be asufficient basis for setting aside the election. Quaere: Whether anElection Tribunal can inquire into a minor corrupt practice, whenthat is the only allegation made or where it is not reasonably con-nected with any allegation about any major corrupt practice. Thedecision of the Punjab High Court in Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulatand Others (9 E.L.R. 145) affirmed.—SUCHETA KRIPALANI V. S. S.DULAT AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 175. [S.C]

Under section 143 of the Representation of the People Act,1951, it is incumbent on the Election Tribunal to enquire into thefalsity of a return of election expenses when that matter is raisedand placed in issue and the allegations made ar^ reasonably con-nected with other allegations about a major corrupt practice.—SUCHETA KRIPALANI V. S. S. DULAT AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 175. [S.C.]

Defective return of election expenses—Disqualification byElection Commission—Submission of fresh return—Disqualification re-moved by Election Commission—Respective jurisdictions of ElectionCommission and Tribunal.—The fact that the Election Commission haddisqualified a candidate on the ground that the return of electionexpenses was defective, and on the submission of a fresh return hadremoved the disqualification, would not prevent the Election Tribunalfrom enquiring into the falsity of the second return even though thesecond return is attacked on the same grounds as the first, as thejurisdiction of the Election Commission is confined to the form of thereturn, and the falsity of the return is a matter for the Tribunal todecide.—SUCHETA KRIPALANI V. S. S. DULAT AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R.175. [s.c]

Return of election expenses—Duty to fill up receipt column.—The receipts column in the return of election expenses must be duly

ELECTION EXPENSES 239

filled up even when the candidate himself is the election agent. KhanBahadur Haji Badi Ahmed Chaudhury v. Mi. Anwarul Azim (Sen andPoddar 261) relied on.—VASANTHA PAI V. DR. V. K. JOHN AND OTHERS,12 E.L.R. 107.

Rule providing for lodging of vouchers with election accounts—Validity—Omission to lodge vouchers—Disqualification by Commission—Rejection of nomination—Disqualification removed after nomination butbefore polling—Whether rejection of nomination improper—Validity ofelection—Pendency of application for removal of disqualification, effect of—The appellant, who was a candidate for election during the generalelections of 1957, lodged his return of election expenses on the 22ndApril, 1957, but did not lodge all the vouchers relating to the expensesas required by rule 131(3) of the Representation of the People (Conductof Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1956. The Election Com-mission notified on the 29th August, 1957, that he had incurreddisqualification under section j(c) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, and under section 8(i)(6) this disqualification took effectfrom the 29th October, 1957. The disqualification was, however,removed by the Election Commission on the 21st January, 1959. Inthe meanwhile, on the 20th December, 1958, the appellant had filedhis nomination as a candidate for a bye-election, and the nominationwas rejected on the date of scrutiny, viz., the 23rd December, 1958, onthe ground that he was disqualified under section j(c) of the Act. Ina petition to set aside the election of the candidate who was successfulat the bye-election, the appellant contended that his nomination wasimproperly rejected, because the Act did not provide for the lodgingof vouchers, and if any rule provided for the lodging of vouchers itwas ultra vires the rule-making authority, that there was inordinatedelay on the part of the Election Commission in removing disqualifica-tion, that during the pendency of his representation to the ElectionCommission for removal of disqualification, the order of disqualificationmust be deemed to have been in abeyance or suspended and that, inany event, the removal of the disqualification on the 21st January,1959, had retrospective effect. The Election Tribunal dismissed thepetition, overruling these contentions. On appeal to the High Court:Held, affirming the judgment of the Tribunal—(i) that the provisionsof rule 131 requiring the furnishing of vouchers and the mention ofvoucher numbers in the accounts are merely incidental to the mainten-ance of accounts and are not ultra vires; (ii) the word " shall " in thelast part of sub-rule (3) of rule 131 cannot be construed as "may " andthe provision for the lodging of vouchers along with the accounts wasa mandatory provision ; (in) it was not open to the Election Tribunal

240 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

to consider whether the omission to lodge the vouchers was onlyof a minor character and did not entail disqualification, inasmuch asthe Act left the matter wholly to the decision of the Election Commis-sion ; (iv) it was also not open to the Tribunal or the High Court toconsider whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of theElection Commission to remove the disqualification; (v) the removalof the disqualification before the date of polling could not relate backto the date of the nomination and make the rejection of the nomina-tion improper; (vi) the making of an application to the ElectionCommission for removal of disqualification would not suspend or keepin abeyance the order of disqualification till the decision of theapplication, and the rejection of the nomination of the appellant was,therefore, not improper. As the rules made under section 169 arerequired by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (3) thereof to belaid before both the Houses of Parliament for not less than thirty daysafter they are made and the rules are subject to such modifications asParliament may make during the session in which they are so laid orthe session immediately following they are nothing but statutory rules,and, therefore, the question of their being in excess of the provisionsof the Act cannot arise. L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney (21 E.L.R.376) affirmed.—L. M. CHAKRADEO V. M. S. ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 95.

Return of election expenses—Candidate appointing himself asagent—Separate signatures and declarations as candidate and as agent withreturn—Whether necessary.—Where the candidate has appointed him-self as his election agent, it is not necessary to file two separatedeclarations with the return of election expenses, one as a candidateand another as the election agent or to sign the return twice. Evenassuming that it is necessary to do so, omission to do so will be a meretechnical defect not of a substantial nature.—RAJENDRA PRASAD

YADAV v. SURESH CHANDRA MISHRA, I I E.L.R. 222.

-Payments for refreshments to workers—Whether unauthorisedexpenditure.—Agents in election law are wide enough to include thecandidate's workers in the polling booths and expenditure incurred forgiving refreshments to such workers is not, therefore, unauthorisedexpenditure within the meaning of section 123(7) of the Act.—RAJENDRA PRASAD YADAV V. SURESH CHANDRA MISHRA, I I E.L.R. 222.

Payment to motor drivers to convey agents to booths—Whethertravelling expenses oj the agents—Payment made for service as a motordriver for conveying the candidate's agents to the booths is not anillegal payment, for, even though a driver is not one of the personsspecified in Schedule VI, such payment may be treated as the travel-ling expenses of the agents which a candidate is entitled to incur,—

ELECTION EXPENSES 241

RAJENDRA PRASAD YADAV v. SURESH CHANDRA MISHRA, I I E.L.R.222.

Amounts paid to party organisations for being accepted as theircandidate—Amounts paid to them as "donations"—Whether "electionexpenses "—Under the rules of the Tamil Nad Congress Committee aperson who wished to stand as a candidate on the Congress ticket hadto apply to the Committee paying a subscription of Rs. ioo which wasnot retur nable and also a deposit of Rs. 400 which was to be returnedif he was not selected as a candidate by the Committee. The appellantmade an application to the Committee declaring his intention tostand as a candidate and seeking the Congress ticket, paying the sumof Rs. 500. He also paid another sum of Rs. 500 to the DistrictCongress Committee as a " donation ". The evidence showed thatcandidates were selected on the recommendation of the District Cong-ress Committee and that the District Congress Committee spentmoneys out of the donation for carrying on propaganda for Congresscandidates. The appellant did not show these two items of Rs. 500 inthe return of election expenses and if he had included these two itemsthe expenses would have exceeded the maximum permitted by theRules: Held, (affirming the decision of the Election Tribunal)—(i)that the appellant must be deemed to have become a prospectivecandidate from the date on which he applied to the Congress Com-mittee for the Congress ticket; the sum of Rs. 500 paid to theCongress Committee with his application was an election expense ; andomission to show it in the return of election expenses was a corruptpractice under section 124(7); (ii) the sum of Rs. 500 paid to the DistrictCongress Committee was not really a charitable donation but anexpenditure incurred for furthering his prospects as a candidate andthis sum also should have been shown in the return.—KHADERSHERIFF V. MUNNUSWAMI GOUNDER AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 208. [S.C.]

Donations to party.—A donation made by a candidate to thegeneral fund of his party cannot be regarded as an election expenseof the candidate. Where the donation was made to the CongressParty fund at Delhi: Held, it could not be regarded either as anelection expense or as one made with the object, directly or indirectly,of inducing any elector to vote or refrain from voting at the election.—PANDIT K. C. SHARMA V. KRISHI PANDIT RISHABKUMAR AND OTHERS,20 E.L.R. 401.

Amounts paid as " donations "—Whether " election expenses."—While it is meritorious to make a donation for charitable purposes, ifa donation is made at the time, or on the eve, of an election, it is opento the charge that its real object was to induce the electors to vote in

ELD-3!

242 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

favour of the candidate who makes the donation and that it shouldtherefore be treated as an election expense. It is a question of factin each case whether a payment was a pure act of charity or anexpense incurred for election purposes. Kennington case (40'M. & H.93) commented upon.—KHADAR SHERIFF V. MUNNUSWAMI GOUNDER

AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 208. [S.c]Security deposits—Whether election expense.—The amount of

security deposited under section 34 of the Act need not be included inhis return by a candidate if after the declaration of the result of theelection it is found to be returnable to him.—KUSHWAQTRAI V.KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 1.

—•—Remuneration paid to staff members who do election work—Whether to be included.—It is a condition for the application of rule 118that the employment of the person must be for payment. If themembers of the staff continue to do their normal work and do casualwork in connection with the election, the payment of salary to themwould be a payment on account of their employment as such membersof the staff and not in connection with the election, and rule 118 wouldnot apply to that case, as there is neither an employment in connec-tion with the election, nor a payment on account of such employmentand the salary paid to the members would not even be electionexpenses liable to be included in the return. But, if the members arepaid extra for their work, such extra payment will have to be includedin the return of election expenses, though it may be that rule 118 itselfmight have no application for the reason that there is no employmentfor election and the payment is not in respect of such employment.If however, the members of the staff are switched off from the normalwork and turned on to election work, so that it could be said that thatwork has been assigned to them in supersession of their normal work,then the salary paid to them could rightly be regarded as paymentfor work in connection with election within rule 118.—H. H. RAJA

HARINDAR SINGH V. S. KARNAIL SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 421.[S.C]

Expenses incurred by polling agent themselves—Whether, shouldbe included in the return of election expenses.—Expenses incurred by acandidate's polling agents in connection with his election must beincluded in the return of election expenses even though the expenseswere incurred by the agents themselves. The law makes the filing ofthe return of election expenses a solemn affair and a candidate whoacted as his own election agent, must be saddled with full respon-sibility for the statements made by him in that return. The argumentthat the respondent was a young man of little education, or that the

ELECTION PETITION ( i . GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 243

election return was made up for him by some of his advisers, can beof no avail.—SRI KRISHNA V. RAJESHWAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 12E.L.R. 1.

ELECTION PETITION (l. General principles)General principles.—Necessity of strict observance of statutory forma-

lities.—It is a well settled principle that the statutory requirements ofelection law must be strictly observed.—SARDAR HARIHAR SINGH V.SINGH GANGAPRASAD AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 478.

Analogy of civil suits not wholly applicable as electorate also areinterested parties.—An election petition is not a matter in which theonly persons interested are the candidates, who fought against eachother in the elections. The citizens at large have an interest in seeingand they are justified in insisting that elections are free and not viti-ated by corrupt or illegal practices. In addition to this the lawimposes a specific duty on the Tribunal to find whether any corrupt orillegal practice has been committed at the election and to name theguilty persons. The analogy founded on a civil suit cannot, therefore,be pressed very far in dealing with election petitions.—A. SREENIVASANv. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, MADRAS, AND ANOTHER : DR. V. K. JOHN V.VASANTHA PAI AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 278.

Purity of elections to be safeguarded.—Though it is well-settledthat the success of a candidate who has won at an election should notbe lightly interfered with, one of the essentials of the law is also tosafeguard the purity of the election process and to see that people donot get elected by corrupt practices.—MAGANLAL BAGDI V. HARIVISHNU KAMATH, 15 E.L.R. 205.

Elections not to be held up.—The well-recognised principle ofelection law, Indian and English, is that elections should not be heldup and that the person aggrieved should not be permitted to ventilatehis individual interest in derogation of the general interest of thepeople, which requires that elections should be gone through accord-ing to the time schedule.—DR. NARAYAN BHASKAR KHARE V. ELECTIONCOMMISSION OF INDIA and PT. RAM NATH KALIA V. ELECTION COMMIS-SION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER, 13 E.L.R. 112. is.c.l '

Application for amendment—Dismissal on the ground that itwould not be possible to decide the petition within six months if applicationis allowed—Legality.—The fact that if an application for amendmentof an election petition is entertained it would not be possible to decidethe petition within six months from the date of publication of thecopy of the petition in the Gazette, as directed by sub-section (6) ofsection 90 of the Representation of the People Act, is not a valid

244 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

ground for rejecting the application. If a tribunal rejects an applica-tion for amendment on this ground it would not be exercising itsdecision judicially and its order can be vacated by the High Court onan application for a writ under article 226 of the Constitution.—KSHATRAPAL SlNGH V. F. S. CHISTI AND OTHERS, l6 E.L.R. 70.

ELECTION PETITION (2. Who may present)

Who may present.—Duly nominated but disqualified candidate.—Under section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, readwith section 79, any person who claims to have been a duly nominatedcandidate can present an election petition. Trie question whetherthe petitioner was in fact disqualified to be chosen as a memberunder the Constitution or the Act is not, therefore, a relevant matterfor deciding the competency of an election petition. Monks v. Jackson(1875-76 C. P. 683) distinguished.—MADAN SINGH V. LADHU RAMCHAUDHARY AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 99.

Agents under power of attorney.—An instrument in writingwhich authorises another person to act for the executant will amountto a power of attorney only if, in addition to empowering the personto act for the executant, it further authorises him to act in the name ofthe executant. A letter addressed to the Secretary, Election Commis-sion, which merely authorises another person to present before theElection Commission an election petition which has been signed bythe person who sends the letter, is not a power of attorney within themeaning of the Stamp Act and could be acted upon, even though it isnot stamped under the said Act. Even if it contains a further state-ment that any corrections made and anything done by the person whois authorised to present it, will be binding on the petitioner, it can beheld to be valid so far as the authority to present the petition isconcerned.—CHHEDA LAL GUPTA V. NIRANJAN SINGH DEO AND OTHERS,17 E.L.R. 97.

ELECTION PETITION (3. Alternative reliefs)

Alternative reliefs.—The fact that the petitioner had claimed tworeliefs in the alternative is not a ground for dismissing an electionpetition. In such a case the Tribunal can grant him such relief as heis found entitled to, at the conclusion of the trial.—K. P. KARIYAPPA V.H. M. CHANNABASAPPA VENKATE GOWDA AND OTHERS, 11 E.L.R. 484.

An election petitioner, just like a plaintiff in a suit, is entitledto plead on an alternative basis, though having regard to the circum-stances of a particular case, a tribunal or a court might take that factinto consideration in weighing the evidence ; it cannot be asserted asa proposition of law that such a course is not available in an election

ELECTION PETITION (4. AMENDMENT) 245

petition. Anjaneya Reddi v. Gangi Reddi and Others (21 E.L.R. 247)affirmed.—T. K. GANGI REDDY V. M. C. ANJANEYA REDDY AND OTHERS,22 E.L.R. 261. [S.C.I

Under section 84 of the Representation of the People Act,1951, in an election petition, the petitioner can claim any one or moreof the reliefs mentioned in the section even though the Tribunal cangrant only one of such reliefs. V. K. John v. G. Vasantha Pai andOthers (10 E.L.R. 345) followed. Brijendra Swarup v. Election Tribunal,Lucknow, and Others (10 E.L.R. 191 and 11 E.L.R. 188) not followed.—B. M. KRISHNA MURTHY V. R. SUBBANNA AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 123.

Under section 84 of the Representation of the People Act,1951, it is open to the petitioner to claim one or the other of the reliefsmentioned in that section alternatively; he is not bound to confine hisprayer to one of those reliefs. It is for the Tribunal to give theappropriate relief considering all the facts and circumstances of thecase.—GADIPALLI PARAYYA V. BOYINA RAJAYYA AND OTHERS, 12E.L.R. 83.

Granting of relief not asked for.—The relief under section 84(6)is a composite relief and section 101 indicates that it is only afterdeclaring that the election of the returned candidate is void that afurther declaration that the petitioner has been elected could be made.Consequently, though the petitioner has claimed the relief undersection 84(6) alone, a declaration under section 84(0) that the electionof t.he returned candidate is void can be granted, even if a declarationunder the second half of section 84(6) that the petitioner has been dulyelected could not be granted.—A. K. SUBBARAYA GOUNDER V. K. G.PALANISAMI GOUNDER AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 251.

ELECTION PETITION (4. Amendment of Petition)(See also under CORRUPT PRACTICE, pp. 34-40 supra.)

Amendment of petition.—Application for amendment givingseparate lists—Effect of delay.—Though there was delay in the filing of anapplication of amendment under terms of section 83(3) the applicationcould be entertained at any time provided it was bonafide and therewere sufficient reasons to allow the amendment.—DATLA SURYA-NARAYANA RAJU V. AMMANNA RAJA AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 156.

Power of Tribunal to direct amendment of petition.—As section 90(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, lays down that sub-ject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder everyelection petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may be,in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of CivilProcedureito the trial of suits and neither the Act nor the Rules contain

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any provision taking away the power to allow amendments, an electionTribunal can direct amendment of an election petition, within certainlimits, for the purpose of ensuring a fair and effectual trial of thepetition.—Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh Shankar SinghParihar (2 E.L.R. 283) relied on.—'YAMUNA PRASAD V. JAGDISH PRASADKHARE AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 1.

Power to amend without formal application.—It is open to theTribunal to permit an amendment to be made to an election petition,even though the petitioner has not made any formal application forpermission to amend the petition.—RAM DIAL V. SANT LAL ANDANOTHER, 19 E.L.R. 430.

Amendment adding new grounds of disqualification after limita-tion—Whether permissible.—Section 83(2) and (3) of the original Repre-sentation of the People Act lay down a special rule applicable to chargesof corrupt practice and the amendment of particulars regarding them.Where a charge of corrupt practice is made, fresh instances of suchcorrupt practice might, by way of amendment, be added even after theperiod of limitation for the filing of a petition had elapsed, by reasonof the use of the expression " at any time " in section 83(3). Where,however, a new charge of corrupt practice, and not merely a freshinstance of an already formulated charge, is sought to be added, thiswould not be covered by section 83(3) and the jurisdiction to allow itwould be dependent on the proper construction of section 90(2) of theAct. In cases not covered by section 83(2) and 83(3), that is, in rela-tion to grounds for the avoidance of an election resting on reasons otherthan charges of corrupt practice, there being no special rule governingthe permissible amendments, the matter is governed by the provisionsof section 90(2) of the Act, which render the provisions of the CivilProcedure Code applicable to the trial of suits to the trial of the elec-tion petitions. Among the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code thusrendered applicable would undoubtedly be that contained in Order VI,rule 17.—M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR V. SAW. GANESAN AND ANOTHER, 13E.L.R. 201.

The power of the Election Tribunal to allow an amendmentof an election petition invoking the provisions of Order VI, rule17, of the Civil Procedure Code, is subject to the provision containedin section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,that an election petition should be filed within the period prescribedin that section. Where, therefore, by an amendment, the partyapplying for it seeks to allege a new fact and not merely to explain orclarify a material fact already stated as a ground for setting aside theelection, the amendment cannot be allowed, if the application is made

ELECTION PETITION (4. AMENDMENT) 247

after the expiry of the period prescribed by section 81 for filing the elec-tion petition. The amendments made in the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, by Act 27 of 1956, have not altered the law in this respect.Where the ground alleged in an election petition for setting aside anelection was that the respondent, the returned candidate, was dis-qualified to be chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly undersection j{d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for thereason that he was on the date of the election a large shareholder in acertain limited company which had entered into a contract with theGovernment for the construction of a particular building and, after theperiod of limitation prescribed in section 81 for filing the petition hadexpired, he made an application for amendment of the election petitionby adding the following reasons also for disqualification, viz., that therespondent had shares or interest in a number of other companies alsowhich had subsisting contracts with the Government for the supply ofgoods, execution of works, etc., and the Tribunal allowed the amend-ment invoking its powers under Order VI, rule 17, of the CivilProcedure Code : Held, that the power of the Tribunal to allow amend-ments under Order VI, rule 17, of the Civil Procedure Code was subjectto the provisions contained in section 81 prescribing a period of limita-tion, and, as the amendment was not one giving further particulars ofthe facts already alleged or of an explanatory nature, but sought toadd new grounds for disqualification, the Tribunal acted in excess ofits jurisdiction in allowing the amendment. Held, further, that, as theTribunal had acted in excess of its jurisdiction, the High Court hadpower to set aside its order in exercise of the powers vested in it byarticle 226 of the Constitution, even though the order could be impugnedin an appeal under section 116A of the Representation of the People Actfrom the final order of the Tribunal on the election petition. If section90(2) were absolute and unconditional, the power of the Tribunal wouldhave been plenary and subject to no limitation, except the requirementthat the discretion to order an amendment should be properly exercisedwith reference to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.Even if the Tribunals had such a power, the usual rule by which civilcourts refuse an amendment which introduces a fresh cause of actionafter the period of limitation within which it could be agitated hadexpired, would be applicable to such tribunals. Section 90(2), however,is not absolute but is subject to the provisions of the Act. The questionwhether the allegations made in an election petition amount to acorrupt practice which is capable of avoiding an election, is a matter ofconstruction of the pleadings and the Tribunal is the proper authorityfor deciding this question. But this is a matter which should be decided

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before commencing the evidence, even though the questions involvedmay be difficult. Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461)explained and applied.—M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR V. SAW. GANESAN

AND ANOTHER, 13 E.L.R. 201.Effect of long delay—Where there is a long delay in making an

application for amendment of an election petition and the writtenstatements on the original allegations are already in, the amendmentcan be refused.—JAMUNA PRASAD SINGH V. SHRI RAMNIWAS ANDOTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 145.

Amendment to itnpiead proper party at later stage.—The non-joinder of a duly nominated candidate who had withdrawn his candi-dature and has not contested the election, as a respondent to theelection petition is not fatal to the petition as no prejudice is likely toresult to the petitioner, and this defect can be cured by adding him asa party at a subsequent stage. Where by a bonafide mistake a wrongperson was impleaded as a party respondent, instead of the real personwho had been duly nominated, and subsequently an application wasmade for amending the election petition by adding the real person, andthe latter when impleaded withdrew from the contest: Held, that theelection petition was not liable to be dismissed on the ground that allpersons who had been duly nominated had not been joined as partiesas required by section 82 of the Representation of the People Act,1951.—N. SANKARA REDDI V. YASHODA REDDI AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R.34-

For addition of party after limitation.—Neither under theRepresentation of the People Act, nor under the Code of Civil Procedureis it permissible for an Election Tribunal to allow the addition of anyperson as a party who was necessary party under section 82 of theRepresentation of the People Act, after the period of limitation forpresentation of the election petition has expired. Even an amendmentfor striking out the prayer for declaring the petitioner as duly electedcannot be permitted in such a case.—Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevarand Others (14 E.L.R. 270), and Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur,and Another (15 E.L.R. 301) followed.—KAMALA SINGH V. S. B. MALIKAND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 456.

Obiter.—Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, asamended by Act XXVII of 1956, the Tribunal has no power to invokethe procedure laid down in Order I, rule 10, of the Civil ProcedureCode, and permit, after the period of limitation has expired, the addi-tion of persons who ought to be added as parties to the election petitionunder section 82 of the Act. The decision of the Supreme Court in

ELECTION PETITION (4. AMENDMENT) 249

Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh (9 E.L.R. 231) was a decision under thelaw as it stood before the Amendment Act of 1956, and is not appli-cable to cases which are governed by the Act as amended in 1956,inasmuch as under sections 85 and 90(3) of the Act as amended in 1956,an election petition which does not comply with the provisions ofsection 82 has to be dismissed.—S. B. ADITYAN AND ANOTHER V.S. KANDASWAMI AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 246.

Amendment of mistake in description of respondent.—Theprovisions of Order VI, rule 17, of the Civil Procedure Code apply toapplications for amendment of election petitions in respect of matterswhich are not covered by the provisions of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951. The only provision in this Act concerning amend-ment of election petitions is sub-section (5) of section 90 of the Actand this deals only with the subject of particulars of corrupt practices.Applications for amendment of election petitions in respect of othermatters are, therefore, governed by Order VI, rule 17, of the CivilProcedure Code. Where Sheodan Singh, son of Nanak Chand, was acontesting candidate at an election and in an election petition thename of the contesting candidate who was joined as a respondent wasshown as Sheodan Singh, son of Ram Swarup, by mistake, and whenthe mistake was discovered an application was made after the periodof limitation, for substituting the words " son of Nanak Chand " for" son of Ram Swarup" : Held, the amendment could properly beallowed.—BHIM SEN V. CHHATTAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 175.

Amendment for giving fresh instances or particulars of corruptpractice—Law before and after Amendment Act of 1956.—The decision ofthe Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R.461) that if a corrupt practice has been alleged in an election petition,the Tribunal has power to allow amendment of the petition by addingfresh instances or particulars of such corrupt practice, is good laweven after the amendment of the Representation of the People Act,1951, by the Amendment Act, XXVII of 1956. The omission of thewords " or order such further and better particulars in any matterreferred to therein to be furnished" in section 90(5) of the Act asamended in 1956 (which corresponds to section 83(3) of the Act beforeit was amended), affects only the Tribunal's power to order furtherand better particulars; it does not take away the Tribunal's power toallow an application by the petitioner for amendment for addingfurther or better particulars.—BABULAL SHARMA V. BRIJNARAINBRAJESH AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 72.

Amendment adding new allegations after limitation—•Permissibility.—The allegation in an election petition relating to a

ELD—32

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double-member constituency, was that, as the returning officer had notenquired into each case of double voting before deciding whether anyvotes had been cast in contravention of section 63(2) and could berejected, the petitioner " believes " that the respondent" could " receivemany void votes. As the allegation was vague no issue was framed onthe question whether the respondent had received any void votes. Afterthe period of limitation had expired the petitioner applied for inspec-tion of the ballot papers, and on discovering that 37 ballot paperscounted in favour of the respondent should have been excluded undersection 63(2), made an application for amendment of the election peti-tion by substituting " alleges " for " believes " and " did " for " could ",and the Tribunal allowed the amendment: Held, that such an amend-ment could not be allowed either under Order VI, rule 17, CivilProcedure Code, or under section 90(5) of the Act: Held also, that asthere was no allegation in the petition that the result of the electionhad been materially affected by the reception of the invalid votes, theTribunal acted wrongly in permitting this ground to be added andinquiring into the matter. Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh(12 E.L.R. 461) relied on.—BHIM SEN V. CHHATTAR SINGH AND OTHERS,

15 E.L.R. 175.

Amendment in regard to material facts—Allegation of impersona-tion of voters—Duty to supply list of persons impersonated—Wherea petitioner alleges in an election petition that impersonation ofdead persons has taken place, he must give the names of the personswho are said to have been impersonated in the petition itself or atleast before the period of limitation for filing the petition expires; andif he has given a list of the names of the impersonated voters, hecannot be permitted to prove during the trial that other persons whosenames were not included in the list of names supplied b}' him, had alsobeen impersonated. Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461)distinguished. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan (13 E.L.R. 201)followed.—C. R. NARASIMHAN V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, MADURAI, AND

OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 327.

Supply of further particulars—Allegation that return of electionexpenses was false—No allegation of corrupt practice of exceeding prescribedlimit—Supply of further particulars involving such corrupt practice—Whether permissible.—The question whether the petitioner in an elec-tion petition should be allowed by way of amendment to introducematters which will have the effect of introducing particulars of acorrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition, even in theform of particulars furnished under Order VI, rule 17, Civil Procedure

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Code, is a matter involving jurisdiction, and is one on which the HighCourt can interfere under article 226 in order to prevent the Tribunalfrom proceeding with the trial on wrong and illegal lines. The pro-hibition contained in the words " shall not allow any amendment ofthe petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of acorrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition " in section 90(5)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is absolute, and allega-tions which would have this effect cannot be permitted to be introducedinto a petition as amendments even if it is sought to bring them inunder Order VI, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. In an election petitionit was alleged that the return of election expenses filed by the respond-ent was false in material particulars and amounted to a corrupt practiceand that he had prepared false and bogus accounts, but there was noallegation that the respondent had incurred or spent more electionexpenses than that prescribed and had therefore committed a corruptpractice under section 123(6). The petitioner subsequently applied forsupplying further particulars, and one of the particulars sought to besupplied was that the respondent had incurred expenditure for petrolto the extent of Rs. 4,889 from a particular firm alone. If the respon-dent had incurred this expenditure of Rs. 4,889, the prescribed limit ofRs. 7,000 would be exceeded and the respondent would be guilty of thecorrupt practice under section 123(6) which was not alleged in thepetition: Held, that though the particulars related to the allegationmade in the petition, the addition of such particulars would have theeffect of introducing a fresh charge of corrupt practice, and permissionto add such particulars could not be granted inasmuch as section 90(5)of the Act prohibits the Tribunal from allowing any amendment ofparticulars which will have the effect of introducing particulars of acorrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. Held, further,that such amendment could not be allowed even under Order VI, rule17, of the Civil Procedure Code.—GIANI KARTAfe SINGH V. ELECTIONTRIBUNAL, CHANDIGARH AND ANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 148.

Amendment for giving particulars of corrupt practice—Guidingprinciples.—The. effect of the provisions of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, relating to amendment of an election petition andgiving of further particulars of corrupt practice, and of the decidedcases on this subject, is that, by way of an amendment a petitionercannot introduce a new charge or bring in a new transaction, but he isnot precluded from giving particulars of a charge which he has alreadyformulated or details of a transaction, the nature of which he hasalready specified with reasonable definiteness. Where the allegations inthe original petition were (i) that "the followers of the first respondent

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obstructed voters on their way to the polling station " and (ii) that the" party-men of the first respondent and his agents " severely beat theworkers of the other candidate, and it was sought to amend the petitionby giving the names of the persons who had committed these offences :Held, that, if the amendments were to be allowed, the result would beto enable the petitioner to formulate a new and a specific charge,because the original allegations were so vague, so far as it related tothe identity of the offenders as to be considered no charge at all, andthese amendments should not be allowed. Where the allegation in theoriginal petition was that A., B. and C, actively participated in theelection campaign and an amendment sought to give further details ofthe activities of A., B. and C.: Held, that these amendments could beallowed. Where the allegations in the original petition were that theagents and followers of the first respondent stabbed A. and beat B.,for having supported the other candidate and that complaints aboutthese acts were made to the police on the same day, and by an amend-ment it was sought to give the names of the persons who participatedin these offences: Held that, if all that the petitioner was seeking todo was to bring into the petition the names already mentioned in thecomplaints made to the police, the amendments would be in order,because in effect and substance what he was doing was to mentionexplicitly the names which he had already given by reference. Whereit was alleged in the election petition that the police had seizedvarious deadly weapons from the hands of the followers of the firstrespondent and an amendment sought to give the names of the personsfrom whom the weapons were seized : Held, that the amendment couldbe flowed.—SASIVARNA THEVAR V. ARUNAGIRI AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R.313-

To add names of persons referred to in petition.—In an electionpetition it was alleged that certain offences were committed by therespondent's men and a reference was given to a police complaint inwhich the names of these men were mentioned. The petitioner soughtto amend the election petition by adding the names of these persons.On a writ petition a Single Judge of the High Court allowed theamendments on the ground that, as the petitioner had given the namesof the men who had committed the offences in the police complaintand had also referred to the police complaint in the election petition,by the amendment sought, the petitioner was only seeking to mentionexplicity the names which had already been given by reference, andthe amendment could be allowed so far as it related to the personswhose names were mentioned in the police complaint. On appeal toa Division Bench: Held, that the order of the Single Judge allowing

ELECTION PETITION (4. AMENDMENT) 253

the amendment petition so far as it related to the names mentioned inthe police complaint was right. The judgment of BALAKRISHNA AYYAR J.,in Sasivarna Thevar v. Arunagiri and Others (17 E.L.R. 313) affirmed.—T. L. SASIVARNA THEVAR V. ARUNAGIRI AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 19 E.L.R.200.

In view of the powers given to the Tribunal to amend anelection petition, if there is an application for amendment offering togive further particulars of a corrupt practice already alleged in thepetition and also in view of the general powers of amendment possessedby Election Tribunals under the Civil Procedure Code, it is not properto strike off allegations in a petition merely for want of full parti-culars.—V. RAMACHANDRA RAO V. V. B. RAJU AND OTHERS, 19 E.L.R.358.

Within the limits prescribed by the decisions of the SupremeCourt the discretionary jurisdiction of Election Tribunals to amend thepleadings is as extensive as that of a civil court. The same well-settled principles laid down in the matter of amendments to thepleadings in a suit should also regulate the power of amendment by aTribunal; and in dealing with this question substance is more impor-tant than form.—BHIM SEN V. GOPALI AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 288. [S.C.I

Amendment introducing new ground after limitation—Petitionjor setting aside election on the ground oj improper acceptance—-Amendmentfor adding plea that nomination did not comply with section 33(3)—Whetherpermissible—Scope of clauses (i) and (iv) of section ioo(i)(d)—Scope of thedecisions in Durgah Shankar Mehta's case and Veluswami Thevar'scase—Tribunal—Powers of amendment—Interference by appellate court—Guiding principles—The judgment of the Supreme Court in DurgahShankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh (9 E.L.R. 494) is a clearauthority for the proposition that if the want of qualification of acandidate does not appear on the face of the nomination paper and ifno objection is raised on that ground before the returning officer, theacceptance of the nomination must be deemed to be a proper acceptance.The decision in Veluswami Thevar v. Raja Nainar (17 E.L.R. 181) is notinconsistent with that decision, for Veluswami Thevar's was a case inwhich an objection was raised on the ground of disqualification beforethe returning officer and it was decided that it was open to the electionpetitioner to raise new grounds of disqualification which were notraised before the returning officer. The former case was concerned withimproper acceptance and the latter was a case of improper rejection.Their Lordships did not find it necessary to refer the soundness of thedecision in Durgah Shankar Mehta's case to a larger Bench. The effectof the decisions in Durga Shankar Mehta's case and Veluswami Thevar's

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case is (i) sub-clauses (i) and (iv) of section ioo(i)(i) of the Act providefor two distinct grounds; the former for the case of improper accept-ance of any nomination, and the latter for that of non-compliance withthe provisions of the Constitution or of the Act, or of any rules ororders made under the Act; (ii) when the candidate appears to beproperly qualified on the face of the electoral roll and the nominationpaper, and no objection is raised to the nomination, the acceptance ofthe said nomination by the returning officer must be deemed to beproper acceptance; (iii) even if there is a proper acceptance, it isopen to the petitioner to question the validity of the election undersection igo(i)(d)(iv) on other grounds, namely, that the candidate whosenomination was accepted was not qualified at all or could not be deemedto be duly nominated as a candidate for the reason that he did notcomply with the provisions of section 33(3) of the Act; and (iv) ifthe second ground in substance is not taken in the petition—substanceis more important than form—the Tribunal has no power after theprescribed period of limitation for the filing of the petition to allow anamendment introducing the second ground. In sub-paragraphs (a), (b)and (c) of paragraph 5 of an election petition, it was stated that theappellant had been dismissed by Government from service on chargeof disloyalty and gross misconduct but he did not submit to the saidorder and had filed a writ petition in the High Court at Calcutta ques-tioning the validity of the said order and that under the circumstanceshe should be deemed to be a Government servant and, therefore, hewas not competent to be nominated as a candidate for election toParliament. Sub-paragraph (d) recited " That apart from the above-mentioned reasons the nomination paper of the respondent was alsoimproperly accepted by the returning officer, inasmuch as the respon-dent having been dismissed from Government service did not obtain acertificate in the prescribed manner from the Election Commission tothe effect that he had not been dismissed for corruption or disloyaltyto the State." Sub-paragraph {d) thus raised a ground under sub-clause (i) and not under sub-clause (iv) of section ioo(i)(d) of the Act,and even if the facts mentioned therein are disannexed from the ground,they refer only to the disqualification of the appellant to stand as acandidate for the election and not to the procedural defect covered bysection 33(3) of the Act. The Tribunal held that the plea set up in theelection petition was one of improper acceptance on the ground of wantof qualification and rejected the application for amendment as itproposed to introduce a new ground, viz., of non-compliance of theprovisions of section 33(3), after the period of limitation. The HighCourt set aside the order of the Tribunal holding that sub-paragraph (d)

ELECTION PETITION (4. AMENDMENT) 255

of paragraph 5 contained the ground under section ioo(i)(d)(i), viz.,improper acceptance of the nomination and the amendment only askedfor clarification of that ground : On further appeal to the SupremeCourt: Held, (i) Sub-paragraph (d) raised a gieund under sub-clause (i)and not under sub-clause (iv) of section ioo(i)(d) of the Act, and evenif the facts mentioned therein were disannexed from the ground, theyreferred only to the disqualification of the appellant to stand as acandidate for the election and not to the procedural defect covered bysection 33(3) of the Act. (ii) That the High Court had missed the realpoint to be decided in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court inDurgah Shankar Mehta's case (9 E.L.R. 494); there was no improperacceptance of the nomination paper by the returning officer, for, thenomination paper ex facie did not disclose any defect or disqualification.The petition for amendment asked for inserting a statement in sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 5 under the ground of improper acceptanceof the nomination paper, viz., that .the prescribed certificate did notaccompany the nomination paper of the candidate, and at the appel-late stage the other proposed amendment based upon section 33(3) ofthe Act was given up. The result was that no relief for raising theground under section ioo(z)(d)(iv) had survived and tne ground undersection zoo{i)(d)(i) was not open to the respondent. In the circum-stances, the amendment was foreign to the scope of the enquiry underthe ground governed by section ioo(i)(d){i) of the Act and was rightlydisallowed by the Tribunal, (iii) In any event as the Election Tribunalhas neither exceeded its powers nor acted perversely, but on the otherhand, its order had only advanced the cause of justice in that it helpedto maintain the election of a candidate who was duly qualified and whohad secured a large majority of votes over all the rival candidates,there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with thediscretion exercised by the Tribunal in disallowing the amendmentprayed for. An appellate court has an unquestioned right to review ormodify an order made by a subordinate court, but it is undesirable todo so when the subordinate court has made an order in the exercise ofits discretion without exceeding the limits of its power, unless it hasacted perversely or unless the view taken by it is clearly wrong.Dictum :—Courts and Tribunals are constituted to do justice betweenthe parties within the confines of statutory limitations, and undueemphasis on technicalities or enlarging their scope would cramp theirpowers, diminish their effectiveness and defeat the very purpose forwhich they are constituted. We must make it clear that within thelimits prescribed by the decisions of this court the discretionary juris-diction of the Tribunals to amend the pleadings is as extensive as that

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of a civil court. The same well-settled principles laid down in thematter of amendments to the pleadings in a suit should also regulatethe exercise of the power of amendment by a Tribunal. Durga ShankarMehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh (9 E.L.R. 494), Harish Chandra Bajpaiv. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461) and Veluswami Thevar v. Raja Nainar(17 E.L.R. 181) explained. Sri Krishna Agarwal v. S. M. Banerji (19E.L.R. 466) reversed.—S. M. BANERJI V. SRI KRISHNA AGARWAL, 22E.L.R. 64. [S.C.]

Amendment of pleadings—General principles—Allegation thatvoid votes "could" have been received owing to non-observance of rules byreturning officer—Void votes discovered on inspection of ballot papers—Amendment for giving full particulars of void votes—Whether permissible—Decision in Harish Chandra Bajpai's case.—In a petition to set asidethe election of a candidate for the reserved seat in a double-memberconstituency it was alleged, inter alia, that, being a double-memberconstituency, it was incumbent upon the returning officer to go intoeach case of double voting in order to reject one of the two votes castin contravention of section 63(1) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, and that the returning officer having failed to discharge his dutyof rejecting ballot papers in contravention of section 63, the petitioner"believes" that the respondents "could" receive many void votes.When the ballot box was opened it was found that 37 void votes hadbeen counted in favour of respondent 1. In view of the disclosuremade by the inspection of the ballot papers the petitioner appliedunder Order VI, rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, to amend the petitionby adding a specific statement about his allegation that 37 void voteshad in fact been counted in favour of respondent and for this purposeprayed that the words "alleges" and "did" be substituted respec-tively for the words "believes" and" could", and along withthis application he filed a list giving the particulars of the void votes.The Tribunal allowed the amendment, framed issues on the point andfound them in favour of the petitioner. The High Court, relying onthe decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Bajpai's case,held that the Tribunal erred in allowing the amendment and reversedthe order of the Tribunal. On appeal to the Supreme Court: Held,that in a case like this, definite particulars about the number andnature of the void votes that had been counted could only be suppliedafter inspection of the ballot papers; the election petition as originallypresented must, therefore, be regarded as having given the materialparticulars, and the amendment petition must be treated merely as anapplication for clarification of the pleadings ; the decision in HarishChandra Bajpai's case was not applicable, and the High Court was

ELECTION PETITION (4. AMENDMENT) 257

wrong in holding that the amendment could npt be allowed.—BHIMSEN v. GOPALI AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 288. IS.C]

Dismissal after amendment—Legality—Where a petition has beenamended after it was referred to the Tribunal by the Election Commis-sion, the Tribunal can dismiss the petition under section 90(3) if the peti-tion as amended does not comply with section 82(6), even though it wasnot subject to this defect when it was presented to the Election Commis-sion. Notwithstanding that the Election Commission allows a petition topass to the Election Tribunal for Trial, the Tribunal is bound toconsider whether the provisions of sections 8i, 82 and 117 have beencomplied with, and if it comes to the conclusion that they have notbeen complied with, albeit contrary to the decision of the ElectionCommission, still it is bound to dismiss the petition.—BABU RAO V.M. S. ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 321.

Amendment to alternative of charge on same facts.—The duty ofthe petitioner in respect to a corrupt practice alleged in an election peti-tion is to state the facts and full particulars. It is the duty of the Tribunalto decide under which sub-section of section 123 it falls and even if in theelection petition it is alleged that the acts constitute a corrupt practiceunder a particular sub-section of section 123, it is open to the Tribunalto find that the acts constitute a corrupt practice under another sub-section. Where, therefore, the petitioner stated that the facts allegedconstituted a corrupt practice under section 123(4) a nd in an amend-ment of the petition giving further particulars, added a statement thatthe acts constituted a corrupt practice under section 123(3): Held, thatthe amendment was permissible.—Maulana Abdul Jalil Choudhury v.Rathindra Nath Sen (13 E.L.R. 290) relied on.—MD. IBRAHIM ANSARIv. M. R. MASANI AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 160.

Order allowing amendment conditional on payment of costs—Dismissal of election petition for non-payment of costs—Legality.—AnElection Tribunal has no power to make an order allowing anamendment of an election petition conditional on payment of costs,and to dismiss the election petition itself merely because the order forpayment of costs was not complied with. Election disputes shouldnot be treated as pure personal disputes between the parties to theelection petition. If the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that inthe interests of justice an amendment should be allowed and has madean order permitting amendment on payment of costs, the Tribunal haspower to proceed with the trial of the petition as amended even thoughcosts are not paid. The costs can be recovered in other ways. Quaere:Whether the passing of such conditional orders in the matter of

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election matters was contemplated by the Parliament at all, andwhether the Election Tribunal has power to dismiss even the petitionfor amendment, for non-payment of costs.—PANDIT RAM NATHKALIA v. PAUL SINGH, 17 E.L.R. 282.

ELECTION PETITION (5. Deposit of security)

Deposit of security.—Failure to make deposit "in favour ofSecretary of Election Commission"—Validity of deposit.—The peti-tioner deposited Rs. 1,000 in a Sub-Treasury of the Government atMadura without stating in the column relating to the head of theaccount that it was in favour of the Secretary, Election Commission,but stating generally that it was security for costs of election petitionand the head of the account was stated as " election R. D." It wascontended that section 117 had not been complied with and thepetition should be summarily dismissed for this reason under sec-tion 90(3): Held, that it could not under the circumstances be saidthat the terms of section 117 were not complied with, and the petitionwas not liable to be dismissed under section 90(3) for non-compliancewith section 117.—KAMRAJ NADAR V. KUNJU THEVAR AND OTHERS,13 E.L.R. 159 affirmed in 14 E.L.R. 270. See p. 262 infra.

Deposit not made out in favour of the Secretary, Election Com-mission—Amount credited in books to Secretary, Election Commission—Dismissal of petition for non-compliance with sec. ny—Legality.-—Theprovision of section 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,that the petitioner shall enclose with the election petition a Govern-ment treasury receipt showing that a deposit of Rs. 1,000 has beenmade in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India infavour of the Secretary to the Election Commission as security forcosts of the petition is mandatory, and if the deposit receipt does notshow on the face of it that it is made in favour of the Secretary to theElection Commission, section 117 is not complied with and the petitionhas to be dismissed by the Tribunal under section 90(3) of the Act.The defect of such non-compliance cannot be cured by producingevidence to show that in actual point of fact the amount of the depositwas credited in the books of the Treasury Officer or the Bank in favourof the Secretary to the Election Commission.*—SARDAR HARIHARSINGH V. SINGH GANGA PRASAD AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 478.

The deposit reciept filed along with an election petition didnot specifically state that it was in favour of the Secretary to the

* This view has since been overruled by the Supreme Court in Civil AppealNo. 763 of 1957, K. Kamraj Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and Others decided on th§?2nd April, 1958 (14 E.L.R. 270).

ELECTION PETITION (5. DEPOSIT OF SECURITY) 259

Election Commission. The petitioner, however, stated before theElection Tribunal that he had deposited the security for costs of theelection petition and a certificate was also produced from the treasuryofficer showing that a sum of Rs. 1,000 deposited under the challanhad been credited to the account of the Secretary to the ElectionCommission. The petitioner further declared before the ElectionTribunal that he would have no objection if the costs that may beawarded against him were paid out of the deposit by the order ofthe Election Tribunal. He also filed an affidavit saying that he wouldnot withdraw the money deposited as security for costs unlessordered to do so by the Secretary to the Election Commission or bythe Election Tribunal. The Election Tribunal held that in view ofthe affidavits and the certificate of the treasury officer, there wouldbe no difficulty in realising the costs, if any, ordered against thepetitioner, there was thus substantial compliance of section 117 ofthe Representation of the People Act and that the election petitioncould not be dismissed in limine for non-compliance with the pro-visions of section 117: Held, that the provisions of section 117 ofthe Representation of the People Act are mandatory in character,they must be strictly complied with both in letter and subst-ance, and in the absence of such compliance the election petitionwas bound to be dismissed under section 90(3) of the Representationof the People Act; the circumstance that the deposit was subsequentlyshown in the books of the treasury officer to the credit of the Secretaryto the Election Commission was not sufficient to cure the defect in thechallan which was fatal in character; the order of the ElectionTribunal was erroneous in law and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction toproceed further with the hearing of the petition. Sardar Harihar Singhv. Singh Ganga Prasad (13 E.L.R. 478) followed.—BHOLA MANJHI V.DAS GURU RAM AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 486.

Deposit not made in the name of Secretary, Election Commission,but in the name of Election Commission itself—Validity.—The questionwhether there has been a compliance with the provisions of section 117of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in the matter of depositof security for costs of an election petition depends on the facts of eachcase. If by an accident or error of judgment, the provisions of thesection have not been carried out strictly but have been carried out insubstance, the section must be deemed to have been fully compliedwith. Where the deposit was made not in favour of the Secretary tothe Election Commission, but in the name of the Election Commissionitself: Held, there was sufficient compliance with the provisions ofsection 117 and the election petition was not liable to be dismissed

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under section 90(3) for non-compliance with the provisions of sec-tion 117.—BIREN RAY V. BEJAYES MUKHERJEE AND OTHERS, 14E.L.R. 83.

Deposit not made in favour of Secretary, Election Commission, oras security for costs but only in connection with election petition—Dis-missal of petition for non-compliance with s. 117—Legality.—Thereceipted challan, i.e., the Government Treasury receipt, filed alongwith an election petition showed deposit of Rs. 1,000 by the petitionerin "connection with " an election petition for setting aside the electionresult of the Contai North constituency, District Midnapore, in theLegislative Assembly constituency in the State of West Bengal". Themoney was also credited under the head of account relating, inter alia,to " Deposits for Election Petitions ", but there was nothing in thereceipt or in the materials placed before the Tribunal from which itcould necessarily or even reasonably be construed that the deposit wasin favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission or as securityfor costs of the petition : Held, that there was not even a substantialcompliance with the provisions of section 117 of the Representation ofthe People Act, 1951, and the petition was properly dismissed by theTribunal under section 90(3) for non-compliance with the provisionsof section 117. Biren Ray v. Bejayes Mukherjee (14 E.L.R. 83) distin-guished.—SUDHANSU SEKHAR PANDA v. NARENDRA NATH DAS ANDANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 223.

Deposit receipt incorrectly showing that deposit was made infavour of " Secretary, Election Petition "—Original challan in favour of" Secretary, Election Commission "—S. ny, whether complied with—Effectof mere clerical errors.—Where the deposit receipt for security for costsfiled with an election petition showed that the deposit was made inthe name of " The Secretary, Election Petition ", but a certified copyof the original challan presented to the Treasury showed that it wasmade in favour of " The Secretary, Election Commission ", and theevidence of the accountant corroborated this, but the Tribunal dismis-sed the petition for non-compliance with section 117: Held, that asthere was only a clerical error in the duplicate copy of challan pro-duced with the election petition, and as the original of the receipt wasin favour of Secretary, Election Commission, section 117 was in factcomplied with and the Tribunal acted wrongly in rejecting the petition.—MUTI AHMED JAFARI V. VIRENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 241.

Deposit not made expressly in favour of Secretary, Election Com-mission—Maintainability of petition.—Where the receipt for deposit ofsecurity filed along with an election petition showed that it was areceipt for " security deposit in election petition in favour of Security

ELECTION PETITION (5. DEPOSIT of SECURITY) 261

Election Commission " : Held, that there was a non-compliance withthe provisions of section 117 of the Representation of the People Actand the petition was liable to be dismissed under section 90(3). Themaxim falsa demonslratio non nocet was not applicable to the case.Sardar Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad (13 E.L.R. 478) andSunder Singh v. Member, Election Tribunal (M.J.C. No. 686 of 1957)followed. * —NAND KISHORE PRASAD SINGH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,PATNA, AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 246.

The words " in favour of the Secretary to the Election Com-mission " used in section 117 are directory and not mandatory intheir character. What is of the essence of the provision contained insection 117 is that the petitioner should furnish security for the costsof the petition, and should enclose along with the petition a Govern-ment treasury receipt showing that a deposit of one thousand rupeeshas been made by him either in a Government treasury or in theReserve Bank of India, is at the disposal of the Election Commissionto be utilised by it in the manner authorised by law, and is under itscontrol and payable on a proper application being made in that behalfto the Election Commission or to any person duly authorised by it toreceive the same, be he the Secretary to the Election Commission orany one else. If, therefore, it can be shown by evidence led beforethe Election Tribunal that the Government treasury receipt or thechallan which was obtained by the petitioner and enclosed by himalong with his petition presented to the Election Commission was suchthat the Election Commission could, on an application in that behalf,be in a position to realise the said sum of Rs. 1,000 for payment of thecosts to the successful party it would be sufficient compliance withthe requirements of section 117. The treasury receipt filed with anelection petition showed that a deposit of Rs. 1,000 had been made bythe petitioner in the Government sub-treasury at Madura as securityfor the costs of the election petition, but it did not expressly showthat it was made in favour of the Secretary, Election Commission.The evidence of the head accountant of treasury in which the moneywas deposited showed that the amount was kept in the electionrevenue deposit, that it was at the disposal of the Election Commis-sion, that the Election Commission or anyone authoriled by the

* Note.—The judgment of the Patna High Court in Sunder Singh v. Member,Election Tribunal (M.J.C. No 686 of 1957) and Aniruddha Sinhav. Chief ElectionCommissioner and Others (M.J.C. No. 523 of 1957) in which a similar view washeld are not reported in E.L R. as the Supreme Court has in Kamaraja Nadar v.Kunju Thevar and Others (Civil Appeal No. 763 of 1957 decided on the 22nd April,1958—14 E.L.R. 270) taken a different view and these cases can no longer betreated as laying down sound law.

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Election Commission in that behalf could draw the said amount and thatno one else could withdraw it without such authority : Held, (affirmingthe decision of the Madras High Court) that there was sufficient com-pliance with the provisions of section 117. Where the treasurydeposit receipt does not show on the face of it that it was made infavour of the Secretary, Election Commission, and a preliminaryobjection to the maintainability of the petition is raised on the groundthat section 117 has not been sufficiently complied with, the Tribunalmust try this question as a preliminary issue giving liberty to theparties to adduce evidence relating to the nature of the deposit, inorder to avoid unnecessary harassment and expenditure to the parties.Judgment of the Madras High Court in Kamaraj Nadar v. KunjuThevar and Others (13 E.L.R. 159) overruled in part and affirmed inpart.—K. KAMARAJA NADAR V. KUNJU THEVAR AND OTHERS, MARI-APPAN v. V. R. NEDUNCHEZHIYAN AND OTHERS, M. R. MASANI V. ELEC-TION TRIBUNAL, RANCHI, AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 270. [S.C.I

Deposit made "for election petition "—Not expressly in favourof Secretary, Election Commission—Maintainability of petition. —Wherethe deposit receipt filed with an election petition as required by sec-tion 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, showed that itwas made by the election petitioner and was a " deposit for electionpetition " but it did not expressly show that it was made in favour ofthe Secretary, Election Commission : Held, affirming the decision of theTribunal, that there was a sufficient compliance with the provisions ofsection 117, and the election petition was not liable to be dismissedunder section 90(3) for non-compliance with section 117. KamarajNadar v. Kunju Thevar and Others (13 E.L.R. 159) followed.—POTTEK-KAT KRISHNAN SUKUMARAN V. KUNJUVAREED JOSEPH MUNDASSERI, 14E.L.R. 313.

Deposit not made in favour of Secretary, Election Commission—Slight inaccuracies, effect of.—Though the provisions contained insection 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, aremandatory, if there has been a real and effective compliance withthe requirements of the section, slight inaccuracies which are capableof rectification will not affect the validity of the deposit. Where thedeposit receipt showed that Rs. 1,000 was deposited by the electionpetitioner as " security deposit for election petition of Bargi AssemblyConstituency No. 97 . . . refundable by order of the Election Commis-sion of India, New Delhi " : Held, there was a sufficient compliancewith the provisions of section 117/—SHIVAPRASAD CHANDPURIA V.CHANDRIKA PRASAD AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 328.

ELECTION PETITION (5. DEPOSIT OF SECURITY) 263

Deposit receipt in favour of Secretary, Election Commission—Notexpressly made for " security for costs"—Validity.—In a deposit receiptfiled along with an election petition the entry relating to the particularsof the deposit ran as follows : " Election petition, deposit in favour ofSecretary, Election Commission of India, New Delhi." Objection wasraised that it did not comply with section 117 inasmuch as it did notappear from the receipt that it was made as "security for costs ". Thepetitioner requested that he may be permitted to adduce evidence tobring out the true meaning and import of the receipt. The Tribunalrefused to grant this request and, holding that there was non-compliancewith section 117, dismissed the petition : Held, (i) that the clear intend-ment of section 118 of the Act was to make the receipt itself a self-contained document which should ex facie show that the statutoryrequirements have been fulfilled, and the Tribunal rightly disallowedthe request of the petitioner to lead extrinsic evidence to bring outthe true meaning and import of the deposit receipt * ; (ii) that theentry of the particulars, however, clearly implied that the deposit wasmade as security for costs of the election petition, there was a real andeffective compliance with the provisions of section 117, and the Tribu-nal was not justified in dismissing the petition under section 90(3).Held also, that an order dismissing an election petition summarilyunder section 90(3) for non-compliance with section 117 is an orderunder section 98 and is appealable to the High Court undersection 116A.— U. M. TRIVEDI V. MANAKLAL AND OTHERS, 15E.L.R. 88.

An election petition cannot be dismissed summarily undersection 90(3) for non-compliance with section 117, merely because it isnowhere stated in the treasury receipt for the deposit of Rs. 1,000,produced with the petition that the deposit was made " in favour ofthe Secretary to the Election Commission. " It can be shown byevidence led before the Election Tribunal that the GovernmentTreasury receipt or challan which was obtained by the petitioner andenlcosed by him along with the election petition was such that theElection Commission could, on a necessary application in that behalf,be in a position to realise the said sum of Rs. 1,000 for payment of thecosts to the successful party. A literal compliance with the terms ofsection 117 is not all necessary ; further, the language of section 117does not say that the receipt should in so many words " state " that theamount has been deposited as security for costs of the petition ; it isenough if on reading together all the entries in the receipt it is madereasonably clear that the deposit is by way of security for costs of the

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petition. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar (14 E.L.R. 270) followed.Dictum : " l a m not unmindful of the undesirability of lightly settingaside elections on inadequate, flimsy or frivolous grounds; at thesame time it is, in my opinion, of the utmost importance for thehealthy growth of parliamentary system of Government and of truedemocracy that the purity of the election process should be jealouslysafeguarded and people should in no case be allowed to get elected byflagrant breaches of the law of elections and by corrupt practices.Enquiry into allegations of corrupt practices, therefore, should not beshut out or throttled by dismissing election petitions on unsubstantialor highly technical grounds."—GIAN CHAND V. OM PRABHA JAIN ANDANOTHER, 16 E.L.R. 384.

Treasury receipt showing correct head of account but not showingthat deposit wasmade in favour of Secretary, Election Commission—Validityof deposit—Treasury Rules, whether statutory rules and have force of law—Error apparent on the face of the record—Power of High Court to issuewrit.—Where the Government Treasury receipt for the sum ofRs. 1,000 deposited by the petitioner, which was filed along with anelection petition showed the correct head of account to which theamount was credited, but the petition was dismissed by the Tribunalon the ground that, since the receipt did not show on its face thatthe amount was deposited "in favour of the Secretary, Election Com-mission," there was a non-compliance with the provisions of sec-tion 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and thepetitioner applied to the High Court for a writ to quash this order ofthe Tribunal: Held, (i) that as the head of account prescribed by theGovernment for the deposit of security for costs of election petitionswas correctly shown in the Government Treasury receipt it necessarilyfollowed that the deposit was in favour of Secretary, Election Com-mission, and the Tribunal was wrong in holding that section 117 hadnot been complied with; (ii) that rules relating to Government Trea-suries contained in Vol. I of the " Compilation of Treasury Rules "except those in Part XIV of that volume are statutory rules, andcourts and tribunals, when deciding cases, have to refer to them in thesame manner as they are required to refer to laws properly promul-gated ; (iii) that if the Tribunal decided without referring to, and inignorance of, the provisions contained in these Rules this was anerror apparent on the face of the record, and if it had referred to theRules its decision was clearly erroneous, and the High Court had inany event the power to correct the error by issuing a writ of certiorari.—HAJI ABDUL WAHID V. B. V. KESKAR AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 393.

ELECTION PETITION (5. DEPOSIT OF SECURITY) 265

Where in the Treasury challan for a deposit under section 117of the Representation of the People Act, the column of " particulars "did not contain the words " in favour of the Secretary to the ElectionCommission of India," but in the column " heads of deposit," it wasshown that the deposit was for the election petition and it was alsoclearly mentioned in the Treasury receipt that the amount in questionwas a deposit of security for election petition : Held, that there wassubstantial compliance with the provisions of section 117 as theamount was available as security for costs, and the petition was notliable to be dismissed summarily under section 90(3) for non-com-pliance with section 117.—BISWANATH UPADHAYA V. HARALAL DASAND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 405.

Where a sum of Rs. 1,000 was deposited in connection with anelection petition and the Treasury receipt showed that it was made asdeposit for election petition in favour of the Secretary, Election Com-mission, but the petition was dismissed under section 90(3) for non-compliance with section 117 on the ground that the receipt did notshow that it was made " as security for the costs of the petition" :Held, that since the receipt was enclosed with the election petition andmade the amount of the deposit available to the Secretary to theElection Commission in connection with the election petition, it neces-sarily implied that it was made under section 117 as security for costsof the election petition ; there was real and effective compliance withsection 117 of the Act, and the order dismissing the petition undersection 90(3) for non-complhnce with section 117 was wrong.—MOHANSINGH V. BHANWARLAL NATHA AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 1.

Where in a Treasury receipt for Rs. 1,000 filed with an elec-tion petition for setting aside an election to the Gharaunda constituency,the column relating to " full particulars of the remittance and ofauthority if any " was filled up as follows: " Secretary, ElectionCommission, Zamanat Election Petition Nisbat Gharaunda constituency,Punjab Vidhan Sabha " and the petition was dismissed under section90(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, on the groundthat the deposit did not show on the face of it that it was made " foror in favour of " the Secretary to the Election Commission or that itwas made " as security for costs of the election petition " and thatthere was non-compliance with section 117 of the Act: Held, that inthe circumstances there was a sufficient compliance with section 117and the Tribunal acted wrongly in dismissing the petition merelybecause the words " for " or " in favour of " and " as security for costs "did not appear in the receipt. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar (14

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E.L.R. 270) relied on.—RULYA RAM V. CHAUDHRI MULTAN SINGH ANDANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 6.

A deposit made in a Government Treasury or in the ReserveBank of India in favour of the " Election Commission " itself wouldbe sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 117 of theRepresentation of the People Act, and the dismissal of an electionpetition on the mere ground that the amount was not deposited infavour of the " Secretary to the Election Commission " would beimproper. The description of the deposit as " the amount regardingelection petition " instead of " security for the costs of the petition "could not be held to be a material non-compliance with section 117justifying summary dismissal of the petition, unless it was alleged andproved by evidence that owing to the defect the money would not beavailable to the Election Commission for being applied to the paymentof costs awarded. The observations of the Supreme Court in KamarajaNadar's case do not mean that in every case where there is a non-compliance with the literal terms of section 117, it is a matter to bedecided on the circumstances of the case and the evidence, whether

*' the non-compliance is a substantial one for which the petition could bedismissed in limine. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar (14 E.L.R. 270),explained and followed. Judgment of the Calcutta High Court inBiren Roy v. Bejoyesh Mukherjee and Others (14 E.L.R. 83), affirmed.—BIREN ROY V. BEJOYESH MUKHERJEE AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 466.

The order of an Election Tribunal dismissing an electionpetition under section 90(3) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, for non-compliance with the provisions of section 117 of the Act(relating to deposit of security) is an order passed " at the conclusionof the trial of an election petition " within the meaning of section 98and is, therefore, appealable to the High Court under section 116A ofthe Act. Where the sum of Rs. 1,000 has in fact been deposited infavour of the Secretary to the Election Commission, the mere fact thatthe deposit receipt does not, on the face of it, show that the amounthas been deposited in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commis-sion is not a ground for dismissing an election petition under section90(3) for non-compliance with section 117. If a deposit receipt orchallan does not show expressly that it has been made as security forcosts of the election petition it can be shown by evidence laid before theElection Tribunal that the receipt or challan which was obtained bythe petitioner and enclosed by him along with the election petitionwas such that the Election Commission could, on a necessary applica-tion in that behalf, be in a position to realise the said sum of rupeesone thousand for payment of the costs to the successful party

ELECTION PETITION (5. DEPOSIT OF SECURITY) 267

Section 117 does not say that the receipt should in so many words" state " that the amount has been deposited as security for costs of thepetition; it is enough if on dreading together all the entries in thereceipt it is made reasonably clear that the deposit is by way of securityfor costs of the petition. Dicta.—It is in the interest of justice not tothrow out election petitions on hyper-technical grounds, and in thetrial of election petitions where the purity of an election is questionedthe most searching enquiry should be instituted and the Tribunaltrying the petitions should afford every possible facility in its power,to ensure such enquiry. Though it is not desirable to lightly set asideelections on inadequate, flimsy or frivolous grounds, at the same timeit is of the utmost importance for the healthy growth of parliamentarysystem of Government and of true democracy that the purity of theelection process should be jealously safeguarded and people should inno case be allowed to get elected by flagrant breaches of the law ofelections and by corrupt practices. Enquiry into allegations of corruptpractices, therefore, should not be shut out or throttled by dismissingelection petitions on unsubstantial or highly technical grounds.Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad (13 E.L.R. 478) not followed.—GIAN CHAND PURAN CHAND v. SMT. OM PKABHA JAIN AND ANOTHER,18 E.L.R. 136.

The result of an election was announced on the 8th March,1957, and an election petition had to be filed within 45 days, i.e., on orbefore the 22nd April, 1957. The appellant (an elector) sent ten copiesof an election petition under section 81 of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, to the Secretary to the Election Commission byregistered post on the 20th April, 1957, and these were received bythe Secretary on the 22nd April, 1957. Though the appellant haddeposited the sum of Rs. 1,000 as security in the Government Treasuryon the 20th April, 1957, he was not able to enclose the Treasuryreceipt with the ten copies, as he had not received the challan when heposted the copies. He received the challan later, on the 20th April,1957, and he sent three copies more of the election petition with theTreasury receipt by Air Mail (Express Delivery) on the same day, butthis packet was received by the Secretary to the Election Commissiononly on the 26th April, 1957. The Election Tribunal, to which theelection petition was referred, tried as a preliminary issue the questionwhether the petition complied with the provisions of sections 81 and117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and dismissed thepetition on the ground that these sections had not been complied with.The appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court from this orderunder section 116A of the Act, and also applied under articles 226 and

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227 of the Constitution for a writ quashing the order of the Tribunal :Held, per MOHAPATRA, DAS and BARMAN, JJ.—(i) That the orderdismissing the election petition under section 90(3) was an order passedby the Tribunal at the conclusion of the trial under section 98 of theAct and was appealable to the High Court, under section 116A of theAct; (ii) that, as the order was appealable, the appellant was notentitled to any relief under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution ;(iii) that the Tribunal had power to try the question whether thepetition complied with sections 81 and 117, as a preliminary issue anddecide it before considering the petition on the merits. Held further,per MOHAPATRA and BARMAN, JJ. (DAS, J. contra)—that the mere factthat the appellant had deposited the security amount in the Govern-ment Treasury and filed the election petition before the 22nd April, wasnot a sufficient compliance with sections 81 and 117 of the Act as sec-tion 81 requires that an election petition shall be filed within 45 daysof the date of the election and section 117 requires that the petitionershall enclose with the petition a Government Treasury receipt showingthat a deposit of Rs. 1,000 has been made by him as security for costs.As the packet containing the three copies of the petition and theTreasury receipt was not received before the 22nd April, and theTreasury receipt was not enclosed in the packet containing the tencopies which were received on the 22nd April, there was non-compliancewith sections 81 and 117 and the Tribunal acted rightly in dismissingthe petition under section 90(3) of the Act. Per DAS, J.—There wascompliance of the provisions of section 81 of the Act taken by itself,and there was also substantial compliance of the provision of sec-tion 117 of the Act, as the petitioner had in fact deposited the requisitemoney in time and had also sent the packet on the 20th April, and hehad done all that was required of him, and the money was alsoavailable to the Election Commission.—JAGANNATH DALAI V. RAMA-CHANPRA NAHAK AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 305.

Section 117 of the Act should not be strictly and technicallyconstrued and if the provisions of the section are substantially compliedwith, an election petition should not be dismissed under section 90(3).Where the deposit receipt did not show that it was made in favour ofthe Secretary to the Election Commission, but showed that the depositwas made as security deposit for the election petition of a particularAssembly constituency and was refundable by the order of the ElectionCommission of India: Held, that there was sufficient compliance withsection 117 and the election petition could not be summarily dismissedunder section 90(3). Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and Others (14E.L.R. 270) applied.—CHANDRIKA PRASAD TRIPATHI V. SHIV PRASADCHANPURIA AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 172. IS.C.J

ELECTION PETITION (5. DEPOSIT OF SECURITY) 269

If, along with an election petition, the petitioner has encloseda Government Treasury receipt showing that a sum of Rs. 1,000 hasbeen deposited as security for the costs of the petition, the mere factthat the deposits receipt does not expressly show on the face of it thatthe deposit is made in favour of the Secretary, Election Commission,is not a ground for summarily dismissing the petition under section90(3) of the Representation of the People Act, on the ground of non-compliance with section 117 of the Act. The fact that the receipt doesnot in terms specify that the deposit is made for the costs of thatparticular election petition is also not a ground for dismissing the peti-tion under section 90(3), for the deposit must evidently be taken to besecurity for the costs of the election petition to which the receipt isattached. Judgment of the Patna High Court in Budhi Nath Jha v.Manilal Jadav reversed. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar (14 E.L.R.270; and Chandrika Prasad Tripathi v. Shiv Prasad Chanpuria (21E.L.R. 172) followed. Sardar Harihaf Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad(13 E.L.R. 478) dissented from.—BUDHI NATH JHA V. MANILAL JADAV,22 E.L.R. 86. [S.C.]

Though section 117 of the Representation of the People Act,1951, provided that the deposit of security shall be made " in favourof the Secretary to the Election Commission/'* the matter of primaryimportance is the deposit of the amount, which may be at the disposalof the Election Commission, and if the security is deposited, a venialerror in describing the name of the person in whose favour the amountis deposited will not affect the validity of the deposit. Where thechallan for the deposit of security showed that the amount was tenderedas security deposit for election petition in favour of " security, Elec-tion Commission," the word "security" before "Election Commission"being a clerical mistake for " Secretary ": Held, that the deposit wasnot invalid on account of this mistake and the election petition wasnot liable to be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions ofsection 117. The judgment of the Patna High Court in Nand KishorePrasad Singh v. Election Tribunal, Patna, and Others (14 E.L.R. 246)reversed. Sardar Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad (13 E.L.R. 478)and Sunder Singh v. Election Commission (Miscellaneous Judicial CaseNo. 686 of 1957) disapproved. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar (14E.L.R. 270) followed.—KAUSHALENDRA PRASAD NARAIN SINGH V. NANDKISHORE PRASAD SINGH AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 484. [S.G.J

Objection that sec. ny has not been complied with—To be decidedbefore trial of petition on merits.—If a preliminary objection is raised toan election petition that the provision contained in section 117 of the

*Note :—The words "the Secretary to " were omitted by Act 58 of 1958.

270 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act as to deposit of security has not beenduly complied with and the election petition is therefore liable to bedismissed under section 90(3) of the Act, such objection must be heardand decided before the petition is tried on the merits.—DHANANJOYMAHTO v. R. K. SINGH AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 99.

ELECTION PETITION (6. Limitation)

Limitation.—" Not later than 14 days"—Last day a holiday—Rightto apply on next day.—The object of section 10 of the General ClausesAct, 1897, is to enable a person to do what he could have done ona holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period isprescribed for the performance of an act in a court or office and thatperiod expires on a holiday, then, according to the section, the actshould be considered to have been done within the period if it is doneon the next day on which the court or office is open. For that sectionto apply, therefore, all that is requisite is that there should be a periodprescribed, and that period should expire on a holiday. The Legislaturehas used the expression " not later than fourteen days" in rule ii()(a)of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions) Rules, 1951, in the same sense as " within fourteen days "and there are accordingly no grounds for holding that section 10 ofthe General Clauses Act, 1897, is not applicable to petitions fallingwithin rule 119. The proviso to section 37 of the Representation ofthe People Act, 1951, is not intended generally to exclude the operationof section 10 of the General Clauses Act in the construction of theRules; that proviso applies only to section 3o(c) of the Representationof the People Act and has been enacted ex abundanti cautela to removeany doubts as to whether section 3o(c) would, having regard to itsterms, fall within section 10 of the General Clauses Act.—H. H. RAJAHARINDER SINGH V. S. KARNAIL SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 421.[S.C.]

Special arrangements made by Election Commission to receivepetitions on holidays—Whether petition can be filed next day.—Where thelast day for filing an election petition falls on a public holiday, eventhough the Election Commission has made arrangements for receivingelection petitions on that day as a special case, the petitioner is entitledto present the election petition on the next working day under section10 of the General Clauses Act.—KAPILDEO SINGH V. SURAJ NARAYANSINGH AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 475.

Condonation of delay by Election Commission—Finality ofdecision.—-Where the Election Commission has condoned the delay infiling an election petition, it is not open to the Election Tribunal to

ELECTION PETITION (7. NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS) 271

which the petition is referred for trial, to re-consider the question oflimitation and dismiss the petition as time-barred. Dinabandhu Sahuv. Jadumoni Mangaraj and Others (9 E.L.R. 485) followed.—MATADINCHAURASIA v. MAHENDRA KUMAR MANAV, 12 E.L.R. 144.

Mere transmission of second list to Tribunal—Whether proof ofcondonation of delay by Election Commission.—The mere fact that theElection Commission has transmitted a second list of charges also alongwith the main petition does not lead to any inference that the ElectionCommission has condoned the delay in the filing of this list.—A. K. SUBBARAYA GOUNDER V. K. G. PALANISAMI GOUNDER AND

O T H E R S , I I E.L.R. 251.

ELECTION PETITION (7. Notice to respondents)

Notice to respondents.—Duty of Tribunal to send notice to respon-dents of date and place fixed for trial of petition—Proceeding ex partewithout sending notice—Legality.—The Election Tribunal should notproceed with the hearing of an election petition before the respondentshave been served with notice of the first date fixed for the hearing ofthe petition and if it proceeds ex parte before such notice has beenserved, the fact that such notice had not been served on a respondentis a proper ground for setting aside the ex parte proceedings againstthat respondent, even though the respondent had knowledge of theproceedings.—GIRDHARILAL V. THAKUR KAHAN SINGH AND OTHERS,19 E.L.R. 352.

Even assuming that notice under the proviso to section 99(1){a)(ii) should be given to a party to the election petition, since thereliefs which could be claimed in the election petition under section 84are those mentioned in section 98, and action under section 99(i)(«) isto be taken at the time when the order under section 98 is pro-nounced, there is no insuperable difficulty in treating the notice to theparty in the election petition as notice for purposes of the proviso tosection 99(i)(a)(w) as well. The decision of the Pepsu High Court inTirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh and Others (9 E.L.R. 163), affirmed.—TIRATH SINGH V. BACHITAR SINGH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 192. [S.G.J

ELECTION PETITION (8. Parties to the petition)Parties to the petition.—Candidates against whom corrupt practices

are alleged—Omission to implead—Duty of Tribunal to dismiss petition—Candidate who has withdrawn, whether necessary party.— For the applica-tion of the provision contained in section 82(6) of the Representationof the People Act, 1951, that candidates against whom allegations ofcorrupt practice are made in an election petition should be joined asrespondents to the petition, it is not necessary that the corrupt

272 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

practice must be an act done by the candidate in his own interests, ordone in his capacity as a candidate. Even if the alleged corruptpractices are acts done by a candidate in the interests of another candi-date, the candidate who is alleged to have committed the act must bejoined as a respondent.—BABU RAO V. M. S. ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 321.

F o r the purposes of section 82(6) a candidate who has with-drawn his candidature under section 37 is still "a candidate ", and ifallegations of corrupt practice are made against such a person in theelection petition, he must be joined as a respondent.—BABU RAO V.M. S. ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 321.

If it appears in the course of the trial that a person, who isalleged to have committed corrupt practice but who was not joined as arespondent, was a candidate who had withdrawn his candidature, it isopen to the Tribunal to permit the respondent even at that stage toraise the objection that the petition does not comply with section 82(6)and to dismiss the petition under section 90(3) on this ground.—BABURAO v. M. S. ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 321.

——A person who was nominated as a candidate but who has with-drawn his candidature within the time prescribed in section 37 of theAct is also a " candidate " within the meaning of section 82(6) of theAct, and if allegations of corrupt practice are made against such aperson and he has not been joined as a respondent, the election petitionmust be dismissed under section 90(3). The fact that the allegedcorrupt practices were committed after withdrawal of his candidatureis immaterial. Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh (IJ E.L.R. 475)dissented from. Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur (15 E.L.R.301) followed.—BABU RAO V. M. S. ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 105.

The provision contained in section 82(6) of the Representationof the People Act, 1951, that a candidate against whom allegations ofcorrupt practice are made in the election petition shall be joined as arespondent to the petition, and the provision contained in section 90(3)of the Act that the Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition whichdoes not comply with the provisions of sections 81, 82 and 117, aremandatory. The Tribunal is, therefore, bound to dismiss an electionpetition to which a candidate against whom allegations of corruptpractice are made, is not joined as a respondent. Omission to impleadsuch a candidate as a party cannot be permitted to be cured either byallowing an amendment of the petition by dropping the allegations ofcorrupt practice made against the candidate or by permitting the peti-tioner to add such a candidate as a respondent.—BABU RAO V. M. S.ANEY, 22 E.L.R. 105.

ELECTION PETITION (8. PARTIES TO THE PETITION) 273

Agents committing corrupt practices.—Where allegations aremade in an election petition that the agents and workers of the respond-ent committed certain corrupt practices, and the name of a certainperson, who was also a candidate at the time of the commission of thecorrupt practices, is included in the list of agents and workers who hadcommitted such corrupt practices, that person must also be impleadedas a party to the petition, under section 82(6) of the Representation ofthe People Act, 1951. The fact that he is alleged to have committedthe corrupt practice as an agent of the respondent and not in his owncapacity as a candidate would not take the case out of the purview ofsection 82(6).—ASHRAF ALI KHAN V. TIKA RAM AND OTHERS, 20E.L.R.470.

-Candidates who have withdrawn.—A candidate who had beenduly nominated as a candidate at an election but has withdrawnhis candidature under section 37 of the Act is not a " candidate " with-in the meaning of section 82(6) of the Act and is not a necessary partyto the election petition, and an election petition cannot be dismissed inlimine for not impleading such a candidate. There is a marked differ-ence between section 55A(2) under which a candidate retires from thecontest and section 37 under which a candidate withdraws from thecandidature itself and not merely retires from the contest. K. KamarajaNadar v. Kunju Thevar (14 E.L.R. 270) distinguished.—KAPILDEOSINGH V. SURAJ NARAYAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 475.

Abandonment of part of claim—Whether permissible.—The pro-visions of Order XXIII, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, do not apply toan election petition and it is not open to a petitioner to withdraw orabandon a part of his claim once an election petition was presented.Inamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa (14 E.L.R. 296),relied on.—KAPILDEO SINGH V. SURAJ NARAYAN SINGH AND OTHERS,17 E.L.R. 475.

Candidates who have retired.—That the expression " contestingcandidates " in section 82(0) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, includes candidates who have retired under section 55A is clearlyimplied in section 55A (5) of the Act; and rules 16(2) and 2o(i)(6) ofthe Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions) Rules, 1956, which contemplate correction of the list ofcandidates prepared under section 38 if any candidate has retired,cannot affect that implication or alter the meaning of the term" contesting candidates " arising from such implication. The fact thatunder the executive instructions issued by the Election Commission a

ELD—35

274 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

blank paper was pasted over the names of the retired candidates in thecopy of the list of contesting candidates sent to the petitioner undertule 16(2) is no ground for putting any other interpretation on theexpression " contesting candidates " in section 82(a) or for not dismiss-ing an election petition under section 90(3) for non-joinder of retiredcandidates. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and Others (14 E.L.R.270) explained and followed.—KAMAL BASU V. PURNENDU SEKHARNASKAR, 15 E.L.R. 292.

Candidates against whom corrupt practice is alleged—Whethernecessary parties, if they have withdrawn—Scope and object of section 82(0).—Whether the expression " contesting candidates " used in clause (a)of section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, does notinclude retired candidates, it is necessary under clause (b) of thatsection to implead as parties, candidates against whom allegations ofcorrupt practice are made in the petition even if they have withdrawntheir candidature under section 37 of the Act or retired from thecontest under section 55 A of the Act. Clause (b) of section 82 of theAct must be interpreted as covering cases where a candidate is allegedto have committed a corrupt practice at any time even though he mayhave ceased to participate in the contest by withdrawing his candi-dature or by retiring from the contest or may have been incapable ofparticipating in the election because his nomination was rejected. Theapplication of section 82(6) is not confined to cases where corruptpractices are alleged to have been committed by a candidate in hiscapacity as a candidate. Where a person who should have been joinedas a party to an election petition under section 82(6) has not beenimpleaded as a party, there is no duty on the Election Tribunal togive an opportunity to the petitioner suo motu, to join him as a party.Further, the Tribunal would not be justified in permitting the implead-ing of necessary parties by subsequent amendment applications at atime when an election petition filed against those parties who had beenomitted, would have been time-barred.—CHATURBHUJ V. ELECTIONTRIBUNAL, KANPUR, AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 301.

The Election Tribunal has also no power to strike off theallegations of corrupt practice made in an election petition against acandidate who has not been joined as a party as required by section82(6), inasmuch as, section 90(3) contains a mandatory provision thatthe petition should be dismissed if section 82 is not complied with.The special provision in section 82(6) of the Act, in spite of theexistence of the provision of section 99 of the Act relating to thenaming of persons found guilty of corrupt practices, has been madebecause the Legislature attached special importance to commission^ of

ELECTION PETITION (8. PARTIES TO THE PETITION) 275-

corrupt practice by candidates as distinguished from voters. In thecase of a candidate against whom there are allegations of corruptpractice in the petition, the Legislature did not leave it to the optionof the Tribunal to give him a notice under section 99 of the Act, butlaid down a mandatory provision requiring that such a person must beimpleaded as a party to the petition by the petitioner himself, so thatfrom the very initial stage the attention of the Tribunal will befocussed on those allegations of corrupt practice and, in the course ofthe trial of the petition, an enquiry into those allegations would bemade by the Tribunal in the presence of the person against whom theallegations have been made. The word " candidate " includes " everyperson who has been duly nominated as a candidate at any election "and this expression is thus wide enough to include any candidate whomay have withdrawn his candidature under section 37 of the Act orwho may have retired from the contest under section 55A of the Act,even though the result of the election may be decided by an actualpoll. The interpretation which was put in Sheo Kumar v. V. G. Oak(5 E.L.R. 103), on the definition of the word "candidate " in section79(b) as it occurred in the unamended Act cannot be applied to thedefinition of the word " candidate " in the present Act, even thoughthe language in the definition has remained unaltered.—CHATURBHUJv. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KANPUR, AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 301.

A retired candidate is a " contesting candidate " and con-sequently a necessary party to an election petition under clause {a) ofsection 82 of the Representation of the People Act, in cases where inaddition to the relief for a declaration that the election of the success-ful candidate is void, there is a further prayer in the petition thatsome other candidate be declared as duly elected.—KAMALA SINGH V.S. B. MALIK AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 456.

The expression "all the contesting candidates" in section 82(0)of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, means not merely thosecandidates who contested at the election but also those candidates whocontested for the election. The expression, therefore, includes not onlyall the candidates who took part in the contest at the poll but alsothose who have retired from the contest under section 55A of the Act.Section 38 does not contain a definition of the expression " contestingcandidates".—YESHAWANTRAO BALWANTRAO CHAVAN V. K. T. MANGAL-MURTI AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 122.

Persons against whom corrupt practice is alleged—Allegations inrecital of facts, not made with the intention of making any charge of corruptpractice—Effect.—Where certain facts are alleged in an election petitionwith the intention of describing what actually took place during

276 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the election, and to show that there was non-compliance with the pro-visions of the Act and the rules and orders thereunder within themeaning of section ioo(i)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, and not with the intention of making any charge of thecommission of a corrupt practice against any particular person, it isnot necessary to make that person a party to the election petition undersection 82(6), even though the facts alleged may disclose the commis-sion of a corrupt practice by that person ; and the election petitioncannot be dismissed under section 90(3) for non-compliance withsection 82, because that person has not been impleaded as a party tothe petition. Though the expression used in sub-section (4) of section123 of the Act is " any candidate ", the sub-section evidently refers tofalse statements in respect of the candidature of a candidate otherthan the candidate who makes the statement.—SHRINIWAS V. RUKMINIRAMAN PRATAP SINGH AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 190.

Candidates who have retired—Whether necessary parties—Failureto implead—Maintainability of petition.—The expression "all the contes-ting candidates " in section 82(a) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, includes candidates who have retired from the contest inaccordance with the provisions of section 55A of the Act; and a candi-date whose name was included in the list of contesting candidatespublished under section 38 of the Act but who was retired under section55A should be joined as a respondent to the election petition undersection 82(0) if the petitioner, in addition to claiming that the electionof the returned candidate or candidates is void, claims a further declara-tion that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected. Ifa candidate who has retired under section 55A is not joined as a res-pondent to an election petition in which such a further declaration isaUo claimed, the petition has to be dismissed under section 90(3) of theAct. The Election Tribunal has no power to permit the petitioner, insuch a case, to abandon or withdraw the claim for such further relief.The procedure relating to withdrawal of election petitions and abandon-ment of reliefs is governed by the special provisions contained inChapter IV of Part VI of the Act and not by the general provisions ofthe Civil Procedure Code. The Tribunal has also no power to permit thepetitioner to add a candidate who had retired and who was not joinedas a party to the election petition, as a respondent, after the period oflimitation prescribed in section 81 has expired. Where such a candidatehas not been joined as a respondent, the two reliefs claimed in thepetition cannot be treated as separate reliefs and the first relief aloneenquired into in the absence of such a candidate.—SHAH ALIM UDDINv. SATISH CHANDRA AGARWAL AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 199.

ELECTION PETITION (8. PARTIES TO THE PETITION) 277

A candidate whose name was included in the list of contestingcandidates prepared and published under section 38 of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951, but who has retired from the contestunder section 55A of the Act continues to be a contesting candidatefor the purposes of the Act, though by reason of such retirement itwould be unnecessary for the constituency to cast its votes in hisfavour at the poll. Such a candidate is, therefore, included within theexpression '• all the contesting candidates " in section 82(a) of the Actand must be joined as a respondent to an election petition, if thepetitioner, in addition to claiming a declaration that the election of allor any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declarationthat he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected. Wherean election petition has been filed without joining such a candidate asa respondent, the Tribunal has no power to allow an amendment of thepetition for withdrawal or abandonment of the claim for a declarationthat the petitioner or any other candidate has been elected. Section 90(3)of the Act is mandatory and the Election Tribunal is bound to dismissan election petition which does not comply with the provisions ofsection 82{a), if an application is made before it for the purpose.—K. KAMARAJA NADAR V. KUNJU THEVAR AND OTHERS ; MARIAPPAN V.V. R. NEDUNCHEZHIYAN AND OTHERS : M. R. MASANI V. ELECTIONTRIBUNAL, RANCHI, AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 270. [S.C.]

Candidates against whom corrupt practice is alleged—Acceptanceofbribe for withdrawing or retiring from contest.---The acceptance of agift as an inducement for withdrawing one's candidature or retiringfrom contest is not a corrupt practice under the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, as amended by Act XXVII of 1956. Section 123(1)contemplates only the making of a gift, offer or promise of gratification.An allegation in an election petition that the respondent gave a certainsum of money as a gift or gratification to another candidate forinducing the latter to withdraw his candidature or retire from thecontest, and that the latter, in pursuance thereof, withdrew his candi-dature or retired from the contest does not, therefore, amount to an" allegation of a corrupt practice " against that candidate within themeaning of section 82(6) of the Act and it is not necessary to join thatcandidate as a respondent to the petition under section 82(6) and thepetition cannot be dismissed under section 90(3) for not joining that N

candidate as a respondent. Though a gift contemplates both a givingand an acceptance, these are none the less different acts and it is opento the Legislature to provide that the making of a gift alone should bea corrupt practice. Section 99 of the Act does not define or widen thedefinition of a corrupt practice contained in section 123. It applies

278 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

only to corrupt practices as denned in section 123. Offer of withdrawalof his candidature by a candidate cannot be regarded an offer of a"gratification " within the meaning of section 123(1). The expression" allegations of corrupt practice against a candidate " in section 82(6)means allegations that a candidate has committed a corrupt practice,in other words, that the candidate was guilty of a corrupt practice.It does not mean merely allegations relating to or concerning a corruptpractice. The judgment of the Madras High Court reported asS. B. Adityan and Another v. S. Kandaswami and Others (13 E.L.R. 246)affirmed.—S. B. ADITYAN V. S. KANDASWAMI AND OTHERS,

14 E.L.R. 394. [S.C.]

Prayer for declaring election of respondent void and petitionerduly elected—Omission to implead all contesting candidates—Maintain-ability of petition.—Under section 90(3) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, as amended by Act XXVII of 1956, the Tribunal isbound to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with theprovisions of section 82 of the Act, even though the petition has notbeen dismissed for this reason by the Election Commission under sec-tion 85 of the Act. The word " shall" which was substituted for" may " in section 90(3), by the amending Act of 1956, makes theprovision strictly mandatory. As section 90(3) contains a mandatoryprovision that the petition shall be dismissed in such a case, thepetitioner cannot be permitted to amend the petition by invoking inhis aid the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and section 90(1).Where in an election petition which contained two prayers, viz., fordeclaring the election of the respondents void and also for declaringthat the petitioner was duly elected, the petitioner did not implead allthe contesting candidates as parties as required by section 82(a) andthe petitioner subsequently made an application for amendment of thepetition by deleting the prayer for the second relief: Held, that theTribunal was bound to dismiss the petition under the mandatoryprovisions of section 90(3) and had no power to proceed with thepetition after allowing an amendment of the petition by deleting thesecond prayer. Quaere : Whether, when a petition contains twoprayers, one for declaring the election of the respondents void andsecondly for declaring the petitioner duly elected, a prayer for amend-ing such a petition by deleting the prayer for declaring the petitionerduly elected is tantamount to withdrawal of part of the petition.—SITA RAM KHEMKA V. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND ANOTHER, <13 E.L.R. 126.

Section 90(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,as amended by Act XXVII of 1956, is a mandatory provision and if in

ELECTION PETITION (8. PARTIES TO THE PETITION) 279

an election petition which contains a prayer for declaring thepetitioner duly elected in addition to a prayer for declaring theelection of the respondent void, a contesting candidate is notimpleaded as a party as required by section 82(0) of the Act, theTribunal is bound to dismiss the petition. It has no power to permitthe petitioner to withdraw the prayer for this relief by an amendmentof the petition ar.d proceed with the petition so far as it relates to the

prayer for declaring the election of the respondent void. A candidatewho retires under section 55A of the Representation of the People Actis still a " contesting candidate " within the meaning of section 82 ofthe Act. It is only for the purposes of section 52 that he is to be deemednot to be a contesting candidate. Retirement under section 55A ofthe Act is not a withdrawal under section 37 of the Act.—KAMAL BASU

V. PURNENDU SEKHAR NASKAR AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. I39.

Under section 82{a) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, as amended by Act XXVII of 1956, a petitioner who prays fora declaration that the election of the respondent is void and also for adeclaration that the petitioner has been duly elected, has to impleadall the contesting candidates as parties and if he fails to do so, theTribunal is bound to dismiss the petition under section 90(3) of theAct. The wording of section 90(3) is very clear and does not providefor any exception whatever. To allow the petitioner to implead thecontesting candidates after the expiry of the period of forty-five dayswithin which a petition has to be presented, would be improper,because by the failure of the petitioner to implead the contestingcandidates in time, a very valuable right has come to be vested in therespondent, who has been declared successful in the election. There isalso no authority for holding that the Tribunal has power to allow thepetitioner to amend the petition so as to seek only a declaration thatthe election is void and omit the further relief claimed by him ofgetting himself declared as duly elected. An application by thecontesting candidates under section 90(4) to be impleaded as partiesto such a petition is also incompetent, as the petition itself is liable tobe dismissed under section 90(3). Section 90(4) applies only to caseswhere the petition as presented complies with the provisions ofsection 82.—RATTAN SINGH V. RAM KISHAN GUPTA, 13 E.L.R. 135.

A candidate who has retired from the contest under sec-tion 55A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amendedin 1956, is not a "contesting candidate" within the meaning ofsection 82(a) of the said Act and need not therefore be impleaded as aparty to an election petition, even though the petitioner claims insuch petition, in addition to a declaration that the election of all or

280 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

any of the returned candidates is void, a further declaration that hehimself or any of the other candidates has been duly elected. Anelection petition to which all the retiring candidates are not impleadedas parties cannot therefore be summarily dismissed under section 90(3)on the ground that it does not comply with the provisions of sec-tion 82. The provision in section 55A(5) that a person who has givena notice of retirement under section 55A(2) shall thereafter be deemednot to be a contesting candidate for the purposes of section 52, doesnot necessarily lead to the inference that for other purposes such acandidate is a contesting candidate.—KAMARAJ NADAR V. KUNJUTHEVAR AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 159.

Allegation of corrupt practice of bribery—Persons accepting bribes,whether necessary parties.— Under the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, as amended by Act XXVII of 1956, accepting a giftor gratification for withdrawing one's candidature or retiring from thecontest, is not a corrupt practice, and it is not therefore necessary toimplead as parties to an election petition under section 82 of the Act,persons who are alleged to have accepted bribes from the returnedcandidate for withdrawing their candidature or retiring from thecontest. Section i23(i)(a) of the Act as amended in 1956 does notmake acceptance of a bribe or gratification a corrupt practice, andsection IOO(I)(6) does not enlarge the scope of section i23(i)(a).Even assuming that acceptance of a bribe amounts to abetment of thecorrupt practice of giving the bribe, section 82(6) does not contem-plate that those who merely abet corrupt practices should also be madeparties to the petition.—S. B. ADITYAN AND ANOTHER V. S. KANDA-SWAMI AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 246 affirmed in 14 E.L.R. 394. [S.C.I

All persons liable to be " named "—Whether should be madeparties—Liability to be " named " under section 99 of the Act is nota test for determining either the scope of section 82(6) or sec-tion I23(i)(a). There is nothing in section 99 or 82 indicating that allpersons who are liable to be " named " under section 99 should bemade parties to an election petition.—S, B. ADITYAN AND ANOTHER V.S. KANDASWAMI AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 246.

Non-joinder of unsuccessful candidates—Maintainability ofpetition.—Under the provisions of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951. as amended by Act XXVII of 1956, it is obligatory onthe Election Tribunal to dismiss an election petition which does notcomply with the provisions of section 82 of the Act, even though theElection Commission had not dismissed it on this ground under sec-tion 85. The wording of sub-section (3) of section 90 of the Act asamended by the Act of 1956 differs materially from the language used

ELECTION PETITION (9. NAMING OF GUILTY PARTIES) 281

in the corresponding provisions of the Act before it was amended.The Election Tribunal has no power to permit an amendment of theelection petition for the addition of parties or abandoning of prayers.On the other hand section 85 and section 90(3) provide for the dis-missal of the petition if it does not comply with section 8r, 82 or 117.The general provisions of the Civil Procedure Code permitting amend-ment of pleadings is not applicable to election petitions in view of theprovisions of sections 85 and 90(3). The Order of the Election Tribu-nal, Allahabad, in Sita Ram Kemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru and Another (13E.L.R. 126) affirmed.—SITA RAM KHEMKA V. JAWAHARLAL NEHRUAND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 322.

Omission to implead candidates who have withdrawn—Main-tainability of petition.—Omission to implead candidates who hadbeen duly nominated, but who had withdrawn, is not fatal to themaintainability of an election petition.—Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singhand Others (9 E.L.R. 231) followed.—MATADIN CHAURASIA V. MAHENDRAKUMAR MANAV, 12 E.L.R. 144.

Joinder of unnecessary parties.—An election petition is not liableto be dismissed summarily under section 90(3) of the Representationof the People Act, 1951, merely because some candidates who are notnecessary parties have been impleaded as parties to the petition.—SARDAR DAYAL SINGH V. SARDAR SURJIT SINGH MAJITHIA, 19 E.L.R.305-

Returning officer, whether necessary or proper party.—The return-ing officer is not a necessary or a proper party to an election petition,even though allegations are made against him in the petition. Inaya-tuttah v. Diwanchand (15 E.L.R. 219) distinguished. Amjad Ali v.B. C. Barua (13 E.L.R. 285) and Adilyan v. Kandaswami (14 E.L.R.394) relied on.—RETURNING OFFICER, ATMAKUR V. G. C. KONDAIAH, 22E.L.R. 45.

ELECTION PETITION (9. Naming of guilty parties)Naming of guilty parties.—-Allegation of corrupt practice against

third, persons—Proper stage for issuing notice.—Where allegations ofcommission of corrupt practice are made in an election petitionagainst a person who is not a party to the petition, the Tribunal can-not issue a notice to him to appear before the Tribunal under theproviso to section 99(1) of the Representation of the People Act,before the conclusion of the trial of the petition. Such a notice can beissued only if at the conclusion of the trial the Tribunal finds that hehas committed a corrupt practice and the Tribunal has to "name"him under section 99(i)(«)(«) of the Act, What the Legislature

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contemplates is that even if the Tribunal finds him guilty at the trialhe can be " named " as a person guilty of a corrupt practice undersection 99(1)(«) only after he is given an opportunity to cross-examinethe witnesses who have been already examined, of calling evidence inhis defence, and of being heard. Such a person cannot be made aparty to an election petition at an earlier stage either under section 82or in exercise of any residuary powers or under Order I, rule 8, of theCivil Procedure Code.—AMJAD ALI V. B. C. BARUA AND OTHERS,13 E.L.R. 285.

Proper stage for issuing notice—Issuing notice before decidingpetition—Legality.—The intention of sections 98 and 99 of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, is that the final order of theTribunal deciding the election petition one way or another undersection 98, and any orders passed under section 99 naming persons asguilty of corrupt practices in connection with the election, must bepassed simultaneously and that if the decision to name particularindividuals as guilty of corrupt practices under section 99 has anybearing on the fate of the election petition as such, then the findingseven in the main election petition on those particular charges ofcorruption can only be given after the affected parties have been heardunder section 99. The view that notice under the proviso to section 99to persons who are not parties to the petition, can be issued only afterthe Tribunal has decided the election petition and come to a finding thatsuch persons are guilty of a corrupt practice, is not correct. AmjadAli v. B. C. Barua and Others (13 E.L.R. 285) commented upon.—PARTAP SINGH KAIRON V. KARTAR SINGH CHADHA AND OTHERS,17 E.L.R. 236.

Notice to parties to petition, whether necessary.—Under theproviso to section gg{i)(a)(ii) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951, it is not obligatory on the Tribunal to serve notice on suchpersons as were parties to the petition and had an opportunity todefend themselves against the charges against them, before namingthem for disqualification. The Indian law and the English law on thematter are substantially the same. Kesho Ram v. Hazura Singh andOthers (8 E.L.R. 320) overruled.—TIRATH SINGH V. BACHITAR SINGH ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 192. [S.C.I

Jurisdiction of Tribunal to enquire into allegations againstMember of Legislature.—The Election Tribunal has power to enquirewhether a person has committed a corrupt practice and to name himunder section 99(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, eventhough that person is a member of a State Legislature, and a findingof the Tribunal that he is guilty of a corrupt practice would disqualify

ELECTION PETITION (9. NAMING OF GUILTY PARTIES) 283

him for membership under the Act. Article 192 of the Constitutionwhich provides that if any question arises as to whether a member ofa State Legislature has become subject to any disqualification, thequestion shall be referred for the decision of the Governor, does notdeprive the Tribunal of its jurisdiction to enquire into such a questionand name him under section 99(1). The only question which theGovernor has to decide under article 192, where the alleged disqualifi-cation is under clause (e) of article 191(1) is whether the member hasbeen disqualified by virtue of an order made by a validly constitutedTribunal under section 99(1) of the Act.—HAFIZ MOHD. IBRAHIM V.ELECTION TRIBUNAL, LUCKNOW, AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 262.

Third persons found guilty—Tribunal declining to hold enquiryand "name" them—Validity of order declaring election void.—Section 99(1) of the Representation of the People Act does not meanthat the Tribunal is bound in all cases where it finds that a person whois not a party to the petition has been guilty of a corrupt practice, tohold an enquiry and name such person under clause {i)(b) of sub-sec-tion (1) of the section. If, having regard to the circumstances of thecase, e.g., the pendency of criminal proceedings against him in respectof the corrupt practice, the Tribunal thiiJks it unnecessary to namethat person in the final order and does not hold an enquiry under theproviso, the order declaring the election of the returned candidate voidon the ground of corrupt practice, is not liable to be set aside on appealon the score of procedural irregularity.—PARSHOTTAMDAS TALSHIBHAIPATEL V. LlLUBHAI KlSHOREBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 403.

An election petition which contained allegations of variouscorrupt practices against the respondents prayed for the followingreliefs: (a) declaring the election vto be wholly void, (b) declaringthe election of both the respondents void. It was also prayed that afinding that the respondents were guilty of the corrupt and illegalpractices specified in the petition, may be recorded. In an applicationfor a writ, the High Court held that the election petition, so far as itrelated to relief (b), i.e., for declaring the election of the respondentsvoid, was barred by limitation, and issued a writ " prohibiting theElection Tribunal from proceeding with the trial of the petition so faras relief {b) was concerned." When the case went back to the Tribunalit was contended on behalf of the respondents that in view of theabove said writ the Tribunal was precluded from considering allega-tions which were germane to relief (b), and that the trial should beconfined to matters necessary for giving relief (a) and to such practicesas had a bearing on this relief. Held, overruling this objection, thatunder section 99 the Tribunal had a duty to investigate and record a

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finding on all the corrupt and illegal practices alleged in the petition,and the writ issued by the High Court did not preclude it from doingso. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sucheta Kripalani's case(ir E.L.R. 175) does not in any way modify the view expressed bythat court in Raj Krnshna Bose's case (9 E.L.R. 294).—A. SREENI-

VASAN v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, MADRAS, AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 278.

ELECTION PETITION (10. Withdrawal of petition)Notice of withdrawal—Notice not delivered by candidate, proposer

or election agent—Validity.—One of the candidates for an election sentto the returning officer a notice of withdrawal of his candidature dulysigned by him through another person, with a letter to the returningofficer informing him that he was sending a notice of withdrawal andthat the security amount deposited by him may be paid over to thebearer of the notice, and the returning officer, on the strength of thisletter, endorsed his acceptance of the notice on the form, and thesecurity amount was also withdrawn by the candidate. In an electionpetition it was contended that, as the notice of withdrawal was notpresented to the returning officer by " the candidate or his proposeror election agent " as required by section 37 of the Representation ofthe People Act, the returning officer acted wrongly in accepting it,and, as the candidate was thus wrongly kept out of the election, theelection was void. The Tribunal upheld this contention and declaredthe election void. On appeal to the High Court: Held, (i) that theexpression " election agent " is used in its technical sense in section 37of the Act, meaning a person appointed in accordance with the provi-sions of section 40 of the Act; (ii) that since the person who presentedthe notice of withdrawal was not an "election agent" of the candi-date, section 37 of the Act was not complied with, and there was novalid notice of withdrawal; (iii) that under section IOO(I)(^) of the Actthe election could not be set aside for such a mere non-compliance withthe provisions of the Act, unless the result of the election was materiallyaffected by such non-compliance; and (iv) that on the facts of thecase the election had not been materially affected by the fact that thenotice of withdrawal was not presented by an " election agent ", andthe Tribunal acted wrongly in declaring the election void. Under theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, even after its amendmentby Act XXVII of 1956 an election agent can be appointed before thescrutiny of nominations.—H. H. MAHARANI VIJAYA RAJE SCINDIA V.

MOTILAL, 14 E.L.R. 251.

When others can be impleaded.—Where a person, who was anelector in a constituency and had filed an election petition as such,sought to withdraw the election petition, and another person who was

ELECTION PETITION (10. WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION) 285

not an elector in the constituency but who had stood as a candidatefor election from that constituency and was a respondent to the elec-tion petition, applied under section no(3)(c) for substitution as thepetitioner: Held, (i) that the applicant was " a person who mighthimself have been the petitioner " within the meaning of section n o(3)(c) even though he was only a candidate and not an elector, and hewas entitled to be substituted as petitioner; (ii) the fact that theapplicant had already been impleaded in the petition as a respondent,was no reason for rejecting his application to be substituted as peti-tioner ; the Tribunal can in such a case, applying Order I, rule 4, ofthe Civil Procedure Code, strike off his name from the array of res-pondents and substitute him as petitioner. Held also, that the fact thatthe applicant had been elected as a member from another constituencycould^not take away his right to present an election petition or to besubstituted as petitioner under section no(3)(c).—KASHI NATHPANDEY v. SHIBBAN LAL SAXENA AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 389.

Limitation for application to implead.—In computing the periodof 14 days prescribed by section uo(3)(c) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, for making an application to be substituted as peti-tioner in place of a petitioner who withdraws an election petition, theday of the publication of the notice of withdrawal must be excluded.Where notice of withdrawal was published in the Gazette on the 26thDecember, 1957, and an application for substitution as petitioner waspresented on the 9th January, 1958: Held, that the application waspresented " within fourteen days of such publication" within themeaning of section no(3)(c) and the application was not time-barred.—KASHI NATH PANDEY V. SHIBBAN LAL SAXENA AND OTHERS, 15E.L.R. 389.

Provisions of sections 108 to n o of the Representation of thePeople Act come into play only if the election petition is to be with-drawn from the Tribunal and the withdrawal is granted ; where theelection petition is never sought to be withdrawn at any stage, theprovisions of section no(3)(c) cannot be attracted.'—HEERSINGH ANDOTHERS V. VEERKA AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 92.

Withdrawal of relief—Whether partial withdrawal of petition.—Quaere: Whether an amendment of a petition whereby a prayer forthe further relief is given up amounts to a withdrawal of the petitionin part, attracting the safeguards provided by sections 108 to 111.—KAMARAJ NADAR I>. KUNJU THEVAR AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 159.

Where it is alleged in an election petition that the withdrawalof one of the candidates was not valid as he had not delivered the

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notice of withdrawal to the returning officer before 3 p.m. on the dayfixed under section 30(0) of the Act, that candidate is a necessary partyto the election petition ; and if that candidate is not joined as a party,the election petition could be dismissed for non-compliance with sec-tion 82 of the Act.—MOHAN SINGH V. BHANWARLAL NATHA ANDOTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 1.

ELECTION PETITION (11. Grounds for setting aside election)Grounds for setting aside election.1—Non-compliance with Act or Rules

—Election not void unless result materially affected.—An election cannotbe set aside under section ioo(i)(i) for any non-compliance with theprovisions of the Constitution or of the Act or the Rules unless theresult of the election was materially affected thereby.—SRIDHARMAHADEO JOSHI v. RAJBHOJ PANDURANG NATHOJI, 13 E.L.R. 430.

Contravention of rules—When ground for setting aside election.—Where an electoral roll relating to one village is sent by mistake toanother village, there is a contravention of rule 2o(i)(a) of theRepresentation of the People (Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions) Rules, 1956, which would be covered by section ioo(i)(d)(iv)of the Representation of the People Act, but an election can bedeclared void on this ground only if it is proved that the result of theelection was materially affected so far as the returned candidate wasconcerned, by this irregularity. The mere fact that if there was nonon-compliance with the Act or Rules the returned candidate wouldhave received less votes cannot necessarily lead to an inference thatthe result of the election has been materially affected. Although itmay be difficult for the petitioner to discharge this burden, he mustlead satisfactory evidence to prove that the result of the electionwould have been different.—CHAMPA DEVI V. JAMUNA PRASAD ANDOTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 443.

Grounds for declaring void.—Sub-section (2) of section 100 doesnot imply that the election of the candidate will be void on proof of acorrupt practice by an agent unless it is shown that the case fallsunder sub-section (2) of section 100. The cases in which the electionis void are enumerated in sub-section (1) to section 100. Sub-section (2) of section 100 can only be regarded as a proviso to clause (d)of sub-section (1) and will only be applicable to those cases where acorrupt practice of a trivial and limited character has materiallyaffected the result of the election.—SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISHCHANDRA, 16 E.L.R. 103.

Though under section 100 of the Act as amended in 1956, anelection cannot be held to be void merely upon the proof of a corrupt

ELECTION PETITION ( i l . GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE ELECTION) 287

practice by a person other than the candidate or his election agent ora person acting with their consent, unless it is also proved that theresult of the election has been materially affected, the numerousinstances of corrupt practices proved in a case may lead to a reason-able inference that the corrupt practices were committed with theimplied consent of the candidate, and in such a case the election canbe declared void under section IOO(I)(&) of the Act without proof thatits result has been materially affected by such corrupt practices.—SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA, 16 E.L.R. 103.

Improper acceptance of nomination.—Even though where thedisqualification is not apparent on the nomination paper but is onelike a constitutional disability to stand for election regarding whichno objection has been taken at the time of scrutiny, the case is not oneof improper acceptance of the nomination yet, the petitioner challeng-ing the election in such a case has to show that the result of theelection in so far as it concerns that candidate has been materiallyaffected by the acceptance of the nomination. That is a conditionrequisite both under sub-clause (i) and sub-clause (iv) ofN clause (d)of sub-section (1) of section 100.—RAGHUNATH MISRA V. KISHORECHANDRA DEO BHANJ, AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 321.

Omission to arrange names alphabetically.—Failure to arrangethe names of the candidates in the alphabetical order is not a groundfor setting aside an election unless such failure is proved to havematerially affected the result of the election.—NARAYANA GOWDA V.B. L. NARAYANASWAMY AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 485.

Omission to supply copies of electoral roll.—The fact that freecopies of the draft electoral roll were not given to the appellant butfree copies were given to Congress Party which had set up the respon-dent does not amount to a contravention of article 14 of the Constitu-tion.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. LAL BAHADUR, 20 E.L.R. 176.

Result has been materially affected—Burden of proof.—Undersection ioo(2)(c), mere non-compliance with the provisions of theConstitution or of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, or ofany Rules or orders made under the Act or of any other Act or Rulesrelating to elections, is by itself not sufficient to declare the electionof the returned candidate void. The petitioner has further to provethat the result of the election has been materially affected by such non-compliance and the onus of doing so lies on the petitioner. There isa difference between the English and the Indian law in this respect.—SHRI KRISHNA V. RAJESHWAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 1.

The words " the result of the election has been materiallyaffected " in section ioo(i)(i) of the Act indicate that the result

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should not be judged by the mere increase or decrease in the totalnumber of votes secured by the returned candidate but by proof of thefact that the wasted votes would have been distributed in such amanner between the contesting candidates as would have brought aboutthe defeat of the returned candidate. The burden of proof is on theperson who seeks to have an election set aside, and if the petitioneris unable to adduce the necessary evidence, the inescapable conclusionis that the burden is not discharged, and the election must stand.—GOPALAN v. KANNAN, 14 E.L.R. 458.

—•—Under the Indian law the burden of proving that an electionhas been materially affected by a contravention of the rules is on thepetitioner. S. S. Ghosh v. S. N. Basu (4 Indian Election Petitions, 73).S. C. Basak v. Chairman, Dacca M. Board (24 C.W.N. 189), Abdul Raufv. G. B. Pant (8 E.L.R. 240), Vashist Narain Shartna v. Deo Chand (10E.L.R. 30), H. V. Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (10 E.L.R. 216) relied on.—TRILOKI SINGH V. SHIVRAJWATI NEHRU AND OTHERS, 16 E.LR. 234.

Result when materially affected.—The result of an electioncould not be said to have been materially affected by a non-compliancewith the provisions of the Act or the Rules merely because such non-compliance has resulted in some increase in the number of votes of thereturned candidate, but there must be proof that if the Act or theRules had been complied with the unsuccessful candidate would havegot more votes than the returned candidate.—DIPPALA SURI DORA V.V. V. GIRI, 16 E.L.R. 1.

The result of an election can be held to have been materiallyaffected only if there is evidence to prove that if the acts complainedof had not been committed the votes would have been cast in such away that the candidate who was returned would have been defeated.—DHARANIDHAR MOHAPATRA v. PRADIPTA KISHORE DAS AND OTHERS,17 E.L.R. 427.

The consequence of a returned candidate or his election agentor any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or hiselection agent, committing a corrupt practice is that the election is voidunder section IOO(I)(6). In a case coming under section IOO(I)(6) it isnot necessary to prove that the result of the election has been materi-ally affected thereby. But section ioo(x)(d)(ii) envisages a corruptpractice committed in the interests of the returned candidate by aperson other than that candidate or his election agent or a person acting withthe consent of such candidate or election agent, and in a case falling undersection ioo(i)(i)(«) it must be proved that the result of the election inso far as it concerns a returned candidate has been materially affected.—JAYALAKSHMI DEVAMMA v. JANARDHAN REDDI, 17 E.L.R. 302,

ELECTION PETITION ( I I . GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE ELECTION) 289

Where the respondent had asserted in his written statementthat the returning officer had not counted any void votes, and he hadnot given notice of recrimination within the time prescribed by sec-tion 97(2) of the Act and furnished the necessary security, the SupremeCourt held that the Tribunal acted rightly in disallowing a claim madeby the respondent, when he discovered that some of his votes werevoid, for inspection of the voting papers cast in favour of the appellantto see if some of those votes were also void. Bhim Sen v. Chhattar Singhand Others (15 E.L.R. 175) reversed. Harish Chandra Bajpai v. TrilokiSingh (12 E.L.R. 461) distinguished. S. M. Banerjee v. Sri KrishnaAgarwal (22 E.L.R. 64) relied on.—BHIM SEN V. GOPALI AND OTHERS,22 E.L.R. 288 [S.G.]

The burden of proving that the result of the election has beenmaterially affected by the improper acceptance of a nomination is onthe person who seeks to set aside the election, and the election cannotbe set aside unless this burden is fully discharged, however difficult itmay be. The question cannot be decided on the opinion of witnessesas to how the voters would have cast their votes if the nominationwhich had been improperly accepted had not been accepted. Thepetitioner has to prove that the result of the poll had in fact beenmaterially affected by the improper acceptance, and to do this it hasto be demonstrated that if the nomination had not been accepted thevotes would have been divided in such a way that the returned candi-date would have been unsuccessful. The principles laid down by theSupreme Court in Vashist Naram Sharma v. Dev Chand (10 E.L.R. 30)have not been modified by the later decision of that Court in SurendraNath Khosla v. Dalip Singh (12 E.L.R. 370).—CHUNNILAL KEN V.RADHACHARAN SHARMA AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 320.

-Where there was a difference of only 277 votes between theappellant (who was the successful candidate) and the respondent, andthe Tribunal held that, owing to the corrupt practices committed bythe appellant under section 123(3) a nd (4). the respondent had lostseveral votes, and setting aside the election of the appellant, declaredthe respondent as duly elected : Held, that in applying the provisionsof section 101(6) of the Act account is to be taken only of the voteswhich have been actually cast and not of those which might have beencast, and as there was no good evidence as to the number of votesobtained by the appellant as a result of the commission of the corruptpractices it was not possible to come to the conclusion that, but for thevotes thus obtained, the respondent would have obtained a majorityof valid votes. Even if the respondent had lost more than'277 votesas a result of the corrupt practice of the appellant, he cannot be given

ELD—37

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the benefit of section ior(6) because none of those votes could be saidto have been obtained by the appellant as a result of the commissionof the corrupt practice. To apply section IOI(&), the votes obtainedby the returned candidate by the commission of corrupt practice areto be deducted from the number of votes actually obtained by him,and then it is to be seen whether the votes obtained by the othercandidate exceeded the votes of the returned candidate after makingthe deduction; or, if some of the votes of the other candidate had beendeflected and cast in favour of the returned candidate, they might beadded to the votes which the other candidate had actually received.It would thus appear that the votes lost by the other candidate butnot gained by the returned candidate, as a result of the commission ofcorrupt practices, are not to be taken into account. The votes whichhave not been cast at all because of the commission of corrupt practicesshould not be taken into account. T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa (10E.L.R. 14), T. Nagappa v. T. C. Basappa (11 E.L.R. 203), and JamunaPrasad Mukhariya v. Lachhi Ram (10 E.L.R. 120) relied on.—ASHFAQALI KHAN V. DARSHAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 136.

The question of jthrowing away of votes cannot arise in theabsence of some special pleading that particular voters had cast theirvotes with knowledge or notice that the candidate for whom they hadvoted was not eligible for election and that consequently, they haddeliberately thrown away their votes in favour of a disqualified person.At an election, the respondent got 22,914 votes and the appellant14,885 votes, and the respondent was declared duly elected. In anelection petition, the nomination paper of the respondent was found tohave been wrongly accepted and his election was declared invalid.The appellant claimed that all the votes cast for the respondent mustbe treated as invalid votes and accordingly, the appellant had receiveda majority of the valid votes within the meaning of section 101 of theRepresentation of the People Act, and he should be declared dulyelected: Held, affirming the judgment of the High Court, that theacceptance of a nomination under section 36(8) makes the candidatewhose nomination is accepted a validly nominated candidate for thepurpose of receiving votes and the votes cast in favour of such validlynominated candidate cannot be treated as " invalid " votes for thepurposes of section 101 even though the nomination is afterwardsfound in an election petition to have been improperly accepted ; andthe appellant was not, therefore, entitled to be treated as havingreceived a majority of the valid votes and declared duly elected undersection 101. Keshav Lakshman Borkar v. Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande(13 E.L.R. 334) affirmed.—KESHAV LAKSHMAN BORKAR V. DR. DEORAOLAKSHMAN ANANDE, 21 E.L.R. 446 [s.c.j

ELECTION PETITION ( I I . GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE ELECTION) 291

Election petition—Practice.— Though an election in which thesuccessful candidate has been declared elected by a very large majorityof votes should not be lightly interfered with and should be set asideonly on very strong and compelling grounds, if the election suffersfrom any material or fatal defect or infirmity, for instance, if itultimately turns out that the successful candidate suffered from somedisqualification at the material date, the mere fact that he won theelection, or won it by a very comfortable margin or overwhelmingvotes, would not justify the rejection of the election petition. It willbe only in border-line cases, or where the ground for setting aside theelection or for a declaration that it was void, is not wholly or absolu-tely clear or free from doubt, that the elected candidate, by reason ofhis election the more so, where he won by a comfortable margin, mayhave a weightage in his favour and may get the benefit of doubt.—BROJAGOPAL DAS V. KALIPADA BANERJEE AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 325.

Where a candidate whose nomination was wrongly acceptedobtained 3,908 votes and the difference in the number of votes bet-

" ween the returned candidate and the petitioner, the next successfulcandidate, was only 1,234 votes : Held, that from this fact alone, itcannot be held that the result of the election was materially affected,and the election of the returned candidate could not be set aside inthe absence of positive proof that the petitioner would have got morethan 1,234 votes out of the 3,908 wasted votes. The question whetherthe result of the election was materially affected by improper accept-ance of a nomination is a question of fact and the burden of provingit has to be discharged by the petitioner as in any other case. Suchburden may be difficult to discharge but it cannot be regarded asimpossible.—SOOWALAL V. P. K. CHATJDHARY AND OTHERS, 21 E.LR.

137-In order that the result of the election of the returned

candidate may be said to be materially affected, the corrupt practicecomplained of must operate to reduce the number of votes securedby the returned candidate; it is not enough that it should go toenhance, or add to, the number of votes secured by any of the defeat-ed candidates, even though the number be enhanced to the extentof wiping out the majority commanded by the returned candidate andmake that defeated candidate command a majority over the returnedcandidate. Whereas under the English law there is a presumptionthat irregularities and corrupt practices when proved affect the resultof the election, under the Indian law there is no such presumption,and the burden is upon the petitioner who alleges that any corruptpractice or irregularity has affected the result of the election to prove

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it, and the difficulty in the matter of proof will not relieve him of thatburden. The question is one of fact and has to be proved by positiveevidence. If the petitioner is unable to adduce such evidence, theonly inescapable conclusion to which the Tribunal can come is thatthe burden is not discharged and that the election must stand. Suchresult may operate harshly upon the petitioner seeking to set asidethe election on the ground of improper acceptance of a nominationpaper, but neither the Tribunal nor the Court is concerned with theinconvenience resulting from the operation of the law.—SAW. GANE-SAN V. M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR, IC; E.L.R. l 6 .

When next candidate can be declared elected.—It is open to therespondent to file a cross-objection to the appeal, and claim that heshould be declared to have been duly elected. Even though theelection of the appellant could be declared void if it was proved thathe had committed a corrupt practice, the respondent could be declaredduly elected only if there was evidence to show that but for the votesobtained by the returned candidate by the corrupt practice therespondent would have obtained a majority of the votes.—TAJUDDINAHMAD V. DHANIRAM TALUKDAR, 18 E.L.R. 193.

Where an election is set aside in an election on the groundthat the respondent had committed a corrupt practice, the petitionercannot be declared elected unless there is evidence to show how manyvotes were obtained by the respondent by the commission of suchcorrupt practice and that if such votes are excluded the petitionerwould have a majority of the valid votes.—BHIM RAO V. ANKUSH RAO,22 E.L.R. 385.

ELECTION PETITION (12. Miscellaneous matters)

Miscellaneous matters—Power of Tribunal to dismiss for non-appearance of petitioner—Inherent powers of Tribunal—Power torestore ex debito justitiae.—An Election Tribunal has inherent powerto dismiss an election petition for default if neither the petitionernor any authorised person appears on his behalf on the day ofhearing ; and to restore the petition if justice requires that such peti-tion should be restored to the file.—SUNDER LAL NANDRAMDAS DWAR-KADAS AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 68.

New pleas—Grounds raised by respondent.—An election cannotbe set aside on a ground not urged in the election petition itself butset up only in the written statement of a respondent other than asuccessful candidate.—RATTAN SINGH V. DAVINDAR SINGH ANDOTHERS (NO. 2), 11 E.L.R. 67.

ELECTION PETITION ( l 2 . MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS) 293

The rule applied in civil cases that a party cannot be permittedto set up a case which is not pleaded, applies with still greater forceto election petition?.—GURBANTA SINGH V. PIARA RAM AND OTHERS,20 E.L.R. 350.

Grounds raised by respondent—Per NAWAL KISHORE, DALIP

SINGH and KRISHNA SAHAI.—It is not open to a respondent to an elec-tion petition to attack the validity of the election on a ground notraised in the election petition, after the time for filing an election peti-tion has expired and without depositing any security.—DALIP SINGHV. SURENDRA NATH AND OTHERS, II E.L.R. 120.

In an election petition the Tribunal cannot enquire intoobjections to the validity of the election which are not raised in theelection petition itself but only by some of the respondent to thepetition.—BASAWARAJ K. NAGPUR V. B. R. SHIDLINGAPPA, 12 E.L.R.168. .

Verification.—The failure to put the verification below theSchedule can only be treated as a technical defect of an unsubstantialcharacter, if at the foot of the petition there is an unequivocal verifica-tion by the petitioner, of the Schedule appended to his petition.—RAMDAYAL AYODYAPRASAD GUPTA V. K. R. PATIL AND OTHERS, 18E.L.R. 378.

Though sub-section (2) of section 83 of the Representation ofthe People Act, 1951, clearly provides that any schedule or annexureto the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in thesame manner as the petition, a petition cannot be dismissed summarilyfor non-compliance with section 83(2) merely because the petitionerhad given the verification clauses of the subsequently added annexuresin his application for adding such annexures, and signed those verifica-tion clauses at the end of the last verification. There is a substantialcompliance with section 83(2) in such a case, and even if the verificationwas not proper, the petition should not be summarily dismissed on thisground but the petitioner should be allowed to sign the verification atthe proper places.—LAKSHMI NARAIN V. BALWAN SINGH AND OTHERS,20 E.L.R. 76.

A pleading is not liable to be summarily rejected for a mistakein verification. The opposite party must raise his objections to verifi-cation at the earliest opportunity, and if there are any mistakes suchmistakes can be rectified with the permission of the Court.—SHRIKRISHNA V. RAJESHWAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 1.

The Election Tribunal has power to allow the petitioner toamend a defective verification of an election petition.—GADIPALLIPARAYYA v. BOYINA RAJAYYA AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 83.

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Costs—Power to allow costs exceeding Rs. 1,000.—Even thoughat the time of presenting an election petition the petitioner is requiredby the Act to furnish security for Rs. 1,000 only the Tribunal haspower to award as costs to the respondent an amount exceedingRs. 1,000.—LAL SHYAM SHAH V. V. N. SWAMI, 16 E.L.R. 74.

It is not open to the appellate court in an appeal by the elec-tion petitioner to vary the order of costs passed by the Tribunal in hisfavour and against the respondent."Further, awarding of costs is amatter primarily in the discretion of the Tribunal and the appellatecourt will not interfere with an order of the Tribunal awarding costs,unless it is perverse or contrary to law.—LACHHMAN SINGH GILL V.HARPARKASH KAUR, 22 E.L.R. 249.

Trial of preliminary issues—Duty of Tribunal to try preliminaryissues before trial on merits.—The provision contained in Order XIV,rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code that where issues both of law and offact arise in the same suit and the court is of opinion that the case orany part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall trythose issues first, is mandatory. The court has discretion to determinewhether the case or any part thereof can or cannot be disposed of onissues of law only, but if it finds in the exercise of its own honest judg-ment and discretion that it can, it must decide those issues first.Consequently, when issues of fact and law are raised in an electionpetition the Tribunal has a discretion to decide whether the case or anypart thereof can be disposed of on the issues of law only, but if it findsin the exercise of its honest and judicial discretion that the case or anypart thereof can be so disposed of it must decide those issues first. Itcannot decline to decide those issues on extraneous grounds, forexample, that piecemeal trial is not desirable or that the Representa-t i o n ^ the People Act, 1951, requires that election petitions should bedisposed of expeditiously.—S. PARTAP SINGH KAIRON V. S. GURMEJSINGH, 14 E.L.R. 412.

Where, among other issues, the following two issues were alsoraised in an election petition, namely, (i) "is it competent to thepetitioner to raise any objection at this stage that the nomination paperfiled by S. should not have been rejected", and (ii) "is a lambardara person in the service of the Government under section 123(7) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951", and the Tribunal refused totry these issues as preliminary issues: Held, (i) that these two issueswere preliminary issues which would dispose of the case or a part ofthe case, (ii) the Tribunal did not exercise its discretion according toestablished rules of law, but in an arbitrary and capricious manner in

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declining to try these issues as preliminary issues, before the trial ofthe petition on the facts and merits; (iii) that the High Court hadpower on an application under article 227 of the Constitution, to directthe Tribunal to decide these issues as preliminary issues.—S. PARTAPSINGH KAIRON V. S. GURMEJ SINGH, 14 E.L.R. 412.

Evidence—Admissibility of returns and, statements made to SalesTax Officer and assessment order.—The Election Tribunal has power tocall upon a Sales Tax Officer to produce before it the return of sales taxsubmitted to him by a firm, statements made before him, and theassessment order made by him under the U. P. Sales Tax Act; and theTribunal can admit them as evidence and look into them in consideringwhether a candidate was a partner in a firm and was disqualified undersection j{d) of the Act. The return of sales tax filed by an assesseeunder the U. P. Sales Tax Act is also a public document. Apart fromsection 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, this return of sales tax is alsoadmissible under section 11 of the Evidence Act, as it makes the exist-ence of the fact in issue highly probable. Section 23(1) of the U. P.Sales Tax Act differs from section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922,in two important respects, namely, (i) the words " all particulars con-tained in any record of any assessment proceeding " do not appear inthe U. P. Sales Tax Act, (ii) the provision that no court shall be entitledto require any public servant to produce before it any return, accountsor documents or to give evidence before it in respect thereof, also donot appear in the U. P. Sales Tax Act.—ALLAH BUX V. RATAN LALJAIN, 15 E.L.R. 407.

Petitioner examining respondent as his own witness—Impro-priety.—The election petitioner examining the respondent as a witnesson his own (the election petitioner's)side, is a most reprehensible practice,and the Election Tribunal should not ordinarily permit the electionpetitioner to resort to such a course. But, if the election petitionerchooses to adopt such procedure and examines the respondent as awitness on his own side, he cannot ask the court to reject the evidenceof this witness, if it goes against him. Entries in books and registersmade by census officers are not admissible to prove the religion of aperson under section 15 of the Census Act. Entries in other registers,such as the National Register of Citizens which are compiled from thecensus reports and are not made on enquiry or admission of the personsconcerned are, in any event, of no probative value. Where the electionof a person to a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes is sought to beset aside on the ground that the respondent was a Christian on the dateof his nomination and not an Adi-Dravida and was therefore disqualifiedto fill a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes the burden of proving

296 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

that the respondent was a Christian and not an Adi-Dravida at the timeof the nomination is on the election petitioner.—THANGAVELU V.KRISHNAMOORTIGOUNDER AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 319.

Conversion of charges.—The principle that the court has nojurisdiction to convert an offence charged under one statutory provi-sion into an offence against another provision, though the facts mightsupport the latter offence, has no application to a case of this nature.Eastern Division of Manchester Case ([1892] 4 O'M. & H. 120) distin-guished.—M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR v. SA. GANESAN AND ANOTHER

(No. 2), 14 E.L.R. 432.• Scope of enquiry—Legality of non-inclusion of qualified persons

in voters' lists.—Where one of the grounds alleged in an election petitionfor setting aside an election was that a large number of persons whowere qualified to vote were not included in the voters' lists and theresult of the election was materially affected thereby : Held, that anenquiry into such matters cannot be made in the course of an electionpetition as the Legislature has provided another specific procedure andmachinery for determining such matters, at any rate until all theremedies provided by such procedure have been availed of by theaggrieved party.—MADAN SINGH V. LADHU RAM CHAUDHARY AND

OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 99.

ELECTION TRIBUNAL (1. Constitution)Constitution—Retired District Judge practising as advocate—

Appointment as judicial member.—The lists prepared under clauses {a)and (b) of section 86 are not mutually exclusive, and if a DistrictJudge has resumed practice as an advocate after retirement, and thusfulfils the requirements of the list under clause (a) and also the listunder clause (b), it is for the High Court to put him in list (a) orlist (b) and the Election Commission can thereafter appoint him asbelonging to that category in which he is placed.—N. V. L. NARA-

SIMHA RAO v. RAO BAHADUR TELLAKULA JALAYYA AND OTHERS

(No. 2), 11 E.L.R. 402.——The words " have been " in section 86(2) do not imply that a

District Judge must have continued to function as District Judge atthe time his name was included in the list by the High Court. Evenretired District Judges can be included in the list and appointed asmembers.—N. V. L. NARASIMHA RAO V. RAO BAHADUR TELLAKULAJALAYYA AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 11 E.L.R. 402.

—-—Appointment as judicial member of a person not included in the listof High Courts—Whether unconstitutional.—The appointment of a personas a member of an Election Tribunal is not unconstitutional merely

ELECTION TRIBUNAL ( l . CONSTITUTION) 297

because his name was not included in the list of qualified personsobtained by the Election Commission under section 86(2) from theHigh Court of the particular State in which the Tribunal is to func-tion. A person whose name is included in the list obtained from theHigh Court of another State can also be appointed.—N. V. L. NARA-SIMHA RAO v. RAO BAHADUR TELLAKULA JALAYYA AND OTHERS (NO. 2),11 E.L.R. 402. !

If a person had been serving as a District Judge in the com-posite State of Madras before the separation of Andhra, the MadrasHigh Court can include him in its list even after the formation of theAndhra State, even though the person was residing in the AndhraState and received his pension from a treasury situated within theAndhra State. The result of the formation of the Andhra State is thatout of the area included in the composite State of Madras, two definiteparts were carved out, one forming the Andhra State and the otherbeing added to the Mysore State. The balance of the area continuedto be the Madras State. So far as the Madras State is concerned, nonew State was formed but only a portion of the area constituting thatState was taken out to be formed into a different State. In this view,the Madras State retains its continuity and the present Madras Stateis not a new State carved out of the earlier composite Madras State.Therefore, a retired Judge of the Madras State before 1st October,JQSS. is a retired Judge of the present Madras State and could not beconsidered to be a Judge of some other State, which is no longer inexistence.—N. V. L. NARASIMHA RAO V. RAO BAHADUR TELLAKULAJALAYYA AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 11 E.L.R. 402.

Qualifications of judicial member—Resuming practice as advocateafter retirement, effect of.—A District Judge did not cease to be aretired District Judge, merely because he resumed practice as anadvocate after his retirement; and such a person is not disqualifiedto be a member of the Tribunal.—N. V. L. NARASIMHA RAO V. TELLA-KULA JALAIAH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 321.

Power of Tribunal to consider whether it is properly constituted.—Where one of the Judicial Members appointed to an ElectionTribunal in the Andhra State was a retired permanent SubordinateJudge of the composite State of Madras before the separation of theAndhra State, who had acted for some time as a District Judge, andhe was selected from the list forwarded to the Election Commission bythe Madras High Court after the formation of the Andhra State, andconstitution of the Tribunal was challenged before the Tribunal itselfon the ground that he was not qualified to be a member: Held, that

ELD—38

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the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider whether it was properlyconstituted; (Assuming that the Tribunal had power to decide thequestion) the Tribunal was properly constituted inasmuch as (a) theJudicial Member who had been appointed did not cease to be a retiredjudicial officer of the State of Madras, after the constitution of theState of Andhra, and the Madras High Court had power to includehim in list (a) under section 86(2) even after the formation of theAndhra State ; (b) retired District Judges of one State could validly beappointed to Tribunals of another State ; (c) under section 86(2) it wasnot necessary that a Judicial Member should be or should have been apermanent District Judge before he could be appointed as a member ofa Tribunal and at any rate as the expression " District Judge "includes " Assistant Sessions Judges " and all Subordinate Judges arealso Assistant Sessions Judges, and the Judicial Member had also actedas a District Judge for some time, he was a " retired District Judge "within the meaning of section 86(2).—N. V. L. NARASIMHA RAO V.TELLAKULA JALAIAH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 321.

Appointment of retired judge of High Court as member—Validity—Provision for appointment of retired- judges, whether contravenes art. 14or 3og.—The Election Commission has power, under the second provisoto section 86(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1956, asamended by Act 27 of 1956, to appoint a retired judge of a High Courtas the member of an Election Tribunal. The words "has been a judgeof a High Court" do not necessarily mean that the person to beappointed under the proviso must be holding office as a judge of a HighCourt at the time of his appointment as member of the Tribunal. Thefact that the Legislature has not made any provision for payment of asalary to a retired High Court Judge does not deprive the ElectionCommission of its power under section 86(3) to appoint such a personas the member of an Election Tribunal. Sub-section (3) of section 86does not contravene either article 309 or article 14 of the Constitutionand is not ultra vires.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. K. K. BANERJI, 13E.L.R. 328.

Appointment of District Judges for some Tribunals and retiredHigh Court judges for others—Whether discriminatory.—The fact thatthe presiding officers of some of the Election Tribunals functioning ina place are District Judges whereas the presiding officers of the otherTribunals are retired High Court Judges cannot be said to bring aboutany discrimination which would violate the provisions of article 14 ofthe Constitution. If Election Tribunals presided over by DistrictJudges are appointed for hearing election petitions in general, andTribunals presided over by retired High Court Judges are appointed

ELECTION TRIBUNAL (2. POWERS) 299

to hear petitions challenging the election of persons who have becomeCentral or State ministers, the differentiation made cannot be said tobe unreasonable or not related to the purpose for which ElectionTribunals are appointed.—SITA RAM KHEMKA V. K. K. BANERJI ANDOTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 301.

Appointment of Tribunals functioning in one State to hearelection petitions arising from another State—Legality.—Whenever aTribunal is to be constituted, the authority having the power to con-stitute it necessarily has also the power to direct where the Tribunalshould function and there is no provision in the Constitution or underany law which makes it compulsory that the Tribunal must sit fordisposal of the matter at the very place where the cause of action mayhave arisen.—SITA RAM KHEMKA V. K. K. BANERJI AND OTHERS, 13E.L.R. 301.

Power of Tribunal to consider whether it is properly constituted.—An Election Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider whether it hasbeen properly constituted. Being a special tribunal created by astatute it can enquire into and decide only such matters as the statutewhich created it requires it to decide.—N. V. L. NARASIMHA RAO V.TELLAKULA JALAIAH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 321.

ELECTION TRIBUNAL ( 2. Powers)Powers.—Power to permit addition or striking off panics—

Limitations.—The effect of the words " subject to the provisions of theAct and of any rules made thereunder" in section 9o(i),is that the pro-visions of the Code of Civil Procedure become applicable to the trialof election petitions subject to two limitations so far as the question ofpermitting amendments is concerned, viz., (i) the power of amendmentunder the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be exercised so as to permitnew grounds of charges to be raised, or to so alter the character of thepetition as to make it in substance a new petition, if a fresh petitionon those allegations will then be time-barred; and (ii) the power ofamendment under the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be exercised soas to defeat the mandatory provisions of the Representation of thePeople Act itself. Since the Act as amended by Act 27 of 1956 con-tains a mandatory provision laying down the consequences for non-compliance with the requirements of section 82 of the Act, if thepower of permitting amendment of a petition by addition of a partyunder Order X, rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure is exercised byan Election Tribunal, the result would be that the mandatory provi-sion contained in section 90(3) of the Act would be defeated. Order X,rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure is not, therefore, applicable to

300 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the trial of election petitions by Election Tribunals. The interpretationof sub-section (2) of section 90 of the unamended Representation ofthe People Act by the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Bajpai's case(12 E.L.R. 461), is fully applicable to sub-section (1) of section 90 ofthe Act as amended.—CHATURBHUJ V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KANPUR,AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 301.

Power to strike off pleading for not furnishing particulars.—AnElection Tribunal has no power to strike off a pleading relating to thedisqualification of the respondent, for failure to give full particulars.The power to strike off pleadings under section 83(i)(6) of the Repre-sentation of the People Act is confined to particulars of corruptpractices, and under Order VI, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Codewhich gives a general power to the court to order a party to givebetter particulars, it is open to the party to show that he is unable tofurnish particulars; and the fact that the particulars cannot befurnished without laborious enquiry is a sufficient reason for notfurnishing such particulars.—LAL SHYAM SHAH V. V. N. SWAMI, 16E.L.R. 74.

Power to allow amendment of petitions.—The Election Tribunalhas power under the provisions of Order VI, rule 17, of the CivilProcedure Code, to order an amendment of the election petition. Theapplication of Order VI, rule 17 of the Code to the proceedings beforethe Tribunal is not excluded by section 83(3) of the Act. Section 83(3)of the Act relates only to the amendment of particulars of a corruptpractice and that section will apply to particulars of a corrupt practiceto the exclusion of any rule of the Civil Procedure Code which mightconflict with it. But, where the amendment relates not to any parti-culars but to other matters, that is a field not occupied by section 83(3),and Order VI, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply. Theprinciple of the decision of the Supreme Court in Harish ChandraBajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461) applies even after the amend-ment of the Representation of the People Act, 1956.—SINGHESHWARPRASAD VERMA v. KAMALNATH TIWARI, 16E.L.R. 95.

Power to order better particulars and strike off pleadings—Lawafter amendment oj 1956—Interference by writ.—Under the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951, as amended in 1956, the Election Tribunaldoes not possess the power to order better particulars. It can onlyeither consider an application for amendment if one was made orrefuse to try a matter which does not raise a precise issue. Where anElection Tribunal ordered certain matter to be struck off from theelection petition as being vague and did not allow a prayer for

ELECTION TRIBUNAL (2. POWERS) $01

amendment for supplying better particulars: Held, that the order,whether right or wrong, was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal andcould not be interfered with by a writ under article 226 of the Constitu-tion as there was no error of law apparent on the face of the record ora violation of the principles of natural justice or the case otherwisewarrants interference1, on well-settled principles. Hari Vishnu Katnathv. Election Tribunal, Jabalpur (14 E.L.R. 147), relied on.—CHUNNILALKEN v. RADHACHAKAN AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 93.

Power to enquire into charge of corrupt practice alleged against asitting member of Legislature.—When during the trial of an electionpetition a question arises whether a person who is a sitting member ofthe Legislature has committed a corrupt practice, the Tribunal is notbound to make a reference of the question to the Governor underarticle 192 of the Constitution ; it has jurisdiction to inquire into thematter itself even though as a result of its finding the sitting membermay become disqualified. There is no conflict between article 192 ofthe Constitution and sections 98 and 99 of the Representation of thePeople Act. The stage for applying article 192 arises only after aTribunal finds a member guilty under section 98 or 99.—TRILOKI SINGHv. SHIVKAJWATI NEHRU AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 234.

While sub-section (3) of section 83 of the Representation ofthe People Act before it was amended in 1956, empowered additions tobe made to the particulars of corrupt or illegal practices furnishedunder sub-section (2), that sub-section did not permit additions to bemade to "the material facts" referred to in sub-section (1) ofsection 83. When a petition is sought to be amended in respect ofmatters which do not relate to a corrupt practice, the powers of theTribunal are the same as that of a civil court when it tries a suit.—C. R. NARASIMHAN V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, MADURAI, AND OTHERS, 16E.L.R. 327.

Power to enquire into validity of votes and recount valid votes.—The words " no application for recount shall be entertained there-after " in sub-rule (6) of rule 64 of the Representation of the People(Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1956, are confinedin their application to proceedings before the returning officer. Thesub-rule does not deprive the Election Tribunal of its power to inquirewhether certain votes given for a particular candidate are valid and todetermine the number of valid votes given for him. Quaere: Whetherif the Election Tribunal permits the petitioner to inspect the votes castin favour of the respondent to ascertain whether they are valid votesit should not allow an opportunity to the respondent also to inspect thevotes given in favour of the petitioner, even though the respondent

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has not filed any recrimination petition and furnished security undersection 97.—BHIMSEN V. CHHATTAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 175.

Power to decide whether provision of R. P. Act is ultra vires.—An Election Tribunal has power to enquire into an objection that aparticular provision of the Representation of the People Act wasultra vires or unconstitutional, even though it may have no power todeclare that the entire Act under which the Tribunal jitself wasconstituted is ultra vires.—V. V. GIRI V. DIPPALA SURI DORA ANDOTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 1.

The Election Tribunal, and the High Court hearing an appealfrom an order of the Election Tribunal, have power to determinewhether a provision in the Representation of the People Act is uncon-stitutional and ultra vires.—DIPPALA SURI DORA V. V. V. GIRI, 16E.L.R. 1.

Power to review its own orders.—(i) Since sub-section (1) ofsection 90 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, makes theprovisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code relating to the trialof suits applicable to the trial of an election petition subject to theprovisions of the Act, and there is no provision in the Act which prohi-bits the Tribunal from reviewing its orders, an Election Tribunal haspower to entertain an application for review of its order, under OrderXLVII of the Civil Procedure Code, (ii) Even if the case is not strictlycovered by Order XLVII, rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, theTribunal has got inherent power to review its orders to prevent mis-

' carriage of justice, (iii) The principle underlying the two sub-rules ofrule 1 of Order XLVII on which applications for review are barred isthat if the applicant can have the opportunity of having the pointurged and finally decided by the higher court and that opportunity hadbeen made available before the application for review is filed (suchopportunity being afforded either on his own motion by filing an appeal,or on steps taken by another party interested in the matter in thesame way) the applicant cannot, thereafter be allowed to move thelower court for review, (iv) If a party applying for review has appliedto the High Court under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution forhaving the order set aside, the Tribunal would be acting properly inrefusing to entertain an application for review of the order during thependency of such application. Quaere : Whether an application forreview can be entertained after the disposal of the writ petition,(v) Even though article 173 of the Limitation Act is not in termsapplicable, an application for review of an order of an Election Tribunalcan be rejected if it is not made with due diligence or the delay is notexplained.—PRITAM SINGH V. KARTAR SINGH, 17 E.L.R. 11.

ELECTION TRIBUNAL (2. POWERS) 303

Election Tribunal, whether " court "—Power to make complaintfor perjury—Whether Tribunal becomes f unctus officio as soon as judgmenton election petition is delivered.—An Election Tribunal is a " court"within the meaning of section ig5(i)(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code,and it has power to direct that a complaint be filed to the proper courtunder that section against a person who has committed perjury in thecourse of the proceedings before the Tribunal. Where an ElectionTribunal, at the time of delivering the judgment in an election petition,issued notice to the petitioner under section 479A of the Criminal Pro-cedure Code to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for givingfalse evidence and on the date fixed for showing cause, it held that ithad no jurisdiction to hold an inquiry under section 479A, but directedthat a complaint be filed against the petitioner under section 193 of theIndian Penal Code. Held, that the Tribunal was a " court " and hadjurisdiction to make a complaint under section 195 of the CriminalProcedure Code. Held also, that the Tribunal did not become functusofficio as soon as it delivered judgment on the election petition but hadpower to dispose of the matter in respect of which it had issued noticeat the time of delivering the judgment. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. AhmedIshaque (10 E.L.R. 216) explained.—RAJA BAHADUR KISHORI RAMANSINGH V. G. C. AGARWALA AND ANOTHER, 19 E.L.R. 164.

Power to disqualify candidates.—An Election Tribunal hasno power under section 99 of the Representation of the People Act,1951, to make an order that a candidate shall stand disqualified or todeclare that he is disqualified, for membership of the Parliament andthe Legislature of the States and for voting at elections for a periodof six years. It can only record a finding whether a corrupt or illegalpractice has or has not been committed by, or with the connivance of,the candidate or his agent, at the election and the nature of thatcorrupt or illegal practice, and the names of all persons who have beenguilty of any corrupt or illegal practice with such recommendations forexemption from the disqualification that such persons may incur undersections 141 to I43.^J3RIJ SUNDAR SHARMA V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,JAIPUR, AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 216.

Power to review its orders.—-The provisions of Order XLVII,rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the trial of anelection petition by an Election Tribunal, but the question whethercircumstances justifying the exercise of the power to review did or didnot exist, is not an appropriate ground for interference by theHigh Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.— BALWAN SINGH V.ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KANPUR, AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 199.

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ELECTION TRIBUNAL (3. Contempt of Tribunal)

Contempt of Election Tribunal—Power of High Court to punish—Liability of printer and publisher—Apology.—An Election Tribunalconstituted under section 86 of the Representation of the People Act,1951, is a court; it is also a court subordinate to the High Court and theHigh Court has therefore power to punish a person for contempt of theElection Tribunal. Where a person published a printed pamphletduring the pendency of an election petition before an Election Tribunalcontaining a statement that there was no substance in the electionpetition and that the idea behind it was to raise money in order toopen a shop: Held, that the allegations contained in the pamphletwere calculated to poison the mind of the judge hearing the petitionas well as the witnesses and to prejudice the public against the peti-tioner^and to imperil fair and impartial trial, and, therefore, constitutedcontempt of court and the High Court had power to punish thecontemners. Held also, that the printer and publisher of an articleor a pamphlet, which tends to influence the mind either of the courtor witnesses or the general public is equally guilty of contempt, in thathe prejudices the public against the merits of the case. An apologyusually mitigates a contempt of court, and if it is unreserved the courtmay accept it. The court is, however, not bound to accept an apology.In this case the petitioners who were charged with contempt of court,instead of tendering an apology in open court resorted to the methodof filing what purported to be an apology in the Deputy Registrar'sOffice, and as there was no evidence of real contriteness the HighCourt refused to accept the apology.—C. CHUNNILAL KEN V. SHYAMLALSUKHRAM AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 483.

ELECTORAL ROLL

(See also NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES)

Entry in electoral roll—Value of.—Under section 36(7) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, though there is a presumptionthat the certified copy of the electoral roll is conclusive evidence of the factthat the person concerned is an elector for the constituency, it can beproved that he is subject to any disqualification mentioned in section 16of the Act. The use of the word " conclusive " is, therefore, technicallyinaccurate, for the ultimate effect of section 36(7) is that the certifiedcopy of the relevant entry would prima facie show that the personconcerned is not subject to any of the said disqualifications, but thisprima facie presumption can be rebutted by evidence to the contrary.Further, since a person could be registered as a voter in the electoralroll if he is not less than 20 years of age, entry in the roll does not

ELECTORAL ROLL 3<>5

raise any presumption that he is a qualified elector, for unless he hasc ompleted 25 years, he would not be qualified under article 173 of theConstitution. Jwala Prasadv. Brijendra Gupta and Another (21 E.L.R.485) reversed. Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh andOthers (9 E.L.R. 494) and Praiap Singh v. Sri Krishna Gupta and Others(A.I.R. 1 956 S.C. 140) distinguished. Chiranji Lai v. Lahri Singh (15E.L.R. 397) disapproved.—BRIJENDEALAL GUPTA AND ANOTHER V.

JWALA PRASAD AND OTHERS 22 E.L.R. 366 [S.c]

The entry in an electoral roll is, under section 36(7) of theAct, conclusive proof-that the person enrolled was an elector for the con-stituency. Since the law lays down that the entry is conclusive proof,it is not permissible to go into the question how far that entry wascorrectly or incorrectly made. The only exception is where the personhappens to be disqualified under section 16 of the Representation ofthe People Act, 1950.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. LAL BAHADUR, 20 E.L.R.176.

Once a person's name is entered in the electoral roll, sub-sec-tion (1) of section 62 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,applies and even though he is not entitled under the law to be includedin the rolls, his vote cannot be regarded as having been improperlyaccepted, or as a void vote, within the meaning of section 100(1)(d)(Hi)of the Act, except in the cases mentioned in sub-sections (2) to (5) ofsection 62.—RAMDAYAL AYODHYAPRASAD GUPTA V. K. R. PATIL AND

OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 13.

""*——Under section 36(7) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, an entry in an electoral roll is conclusive evidence that theperson referred to in that entry is an elector, subject to the provisionsof section 16 of the Act of 1950, and his nomination cannot be rejectedon the ground that he was not ordinarily resident in the constituencyand was not, therefore, qualified to be an elector under section 19(6) ofthe Act of 1950.—RAMSWAROOP PRASAD YADAV V. JAGAT KISHORE

PRASAD NARAIN SINGH, 17 E.L.R. n o .

Preparation of—Sec. 18 of R. P. Act whether mandatory.—Theprovisions of section 18 of the Representation of the People Act of1950 are not mandatory but only directory. They merely give a direc-tion to the officers preparing the electoral roll that they should takecare that the name of an elector does not appear more than once in theelectoral roll of that constituency.—RAMNARAIN V. RAMCHANDRA, 15E.L.R. 100.

Absence of provision for revision of electoral roll and foradjudication of claims—Validity of electoral roll,—The Ajmer-Merwara

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Municipalities Regulation, 1925, provided (by sub-section (1) of sec-tion 30) that a person shall not be deemed to be an elector unless hewas enrolled as an elector ; and sub-section (2) of that section providedthat " every person who would be entitled under the Representationof the People Act, 1950 (XLIII of 1950), to be registered in theelectoral roll for a Parliamentary constituency if that constituencyhad been co-extensive with the Municipality, and whose name isregistered in the electoral roll for the Parliamentary constituencycomprising the Municipality, shall be entitled to be enrolled as anelector of the Municipality." Section 43 empowered the Chief Com-missioner to make rules consistent with the Regulation for " thepreparation and revision of electoral rolls and the adjudication ofclaims to be enrolled and objections to enrolment." In exercise of thispower the Chief Commissioner framed rules which, provided inter aliathat " the electoral roll for the particular Municipality shall be thesame as the final printed roll for the Parliamentary constituencyrepresenting the area covered by the Municipality." An electoral rollwas published on August 8, 1955. The respondent whose father's namewas entered wrongly in the electoral roll applied for rectification ofthe mistake in the electoral roll on August 10, 1955, but his applica-tion was rejected on the ground that the roll for the municipal electionshad been finally published on August 8, 1955, and therefore no correc-tion could be made, and his nomination paper filed on August 16, 1955,was also rejected on the ground that he was not an elector. Therespondent applied for a writ of mandamus against the Chief Com-missioner restraining him from holding the elections: Held, (1) undersection 30(2) of the Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation, 1925,the electoral roll for the Parliamentary constituency was onlytreated as the basis for the electoral roll of the Municipality, and therules in so far as they made no provision for the revision of theelectoral roll, for the adjudication of claims to be included therein andfor entertaining objections to such inclusion, were inconsistent withthe provisions of section 30(2), or defective ; the electoral roll of theMunicipality published on August 8, 1955, was not, therefore, inconformity with the provisions of section 30(2), and could not formthe basis of any valid elections to be held to the Ajmer MunicipalCommittee.—Dicta: " It is of the essence of these elections that properelectoral rolls should be maintained and in order that a proper electoralroll should be maintained it is necessary that after the preparation ofthe electoral roll opportunity should be given to the parties concernedto scrutinize whether the persons enrolled as electors possessed therequisite qualifications. Opportunity should also be given for the

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revision of the electoral roll and for the adjudication of claims to beenrolled therein and entertaining objections to such enrolment. Unlessthis is done, the entire obligation cast upon the authorities holdingthe elections is not discharged and the elections held on such imperfectelectoral rolls would acquire no validity and would be liable to bechallenged at the instance of the parties concerned."—CHIEFCOMMISSIONER, AJMER V. RADHEY SHYAM DANI, 12 E.L.R. 443. [S.C.J

Incompleteness of rolls—Proceeding with election before all rollsare received—Legality.—The expression " any other sufficient cause " insection 57 of the Representation of the People Act must be construedejusdem generis, and incompleteness of the rolls is not a sufficient causefor adjourning an election. An election cannot, therefore, be declaredvoid merely because the presiding officer proceeded with the electioneven before the complete rolls were received, unless there is evidenceto show that some voters were unable to cast their votes owing to theincompleteness of the roll.—RADHA KRISHNA SHUKLA AND ANOTHER V.TARA CHAND MAHESHWAR AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 378.

Entry of name—residence.—In view of the provisions con-tained in section 20(1) and (4) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1950, if a person keeps a rented house in a particular constituencyfor his residence he is entitled to be registered as an elector in thatconstituency, even though, being a Minister of the Union Govern-ment, he was mostly residing at Delhi.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. LALBAHADUR, 20 E.L.R. 176.

-^y^Omission to include several qualified, persons in electoral roll—Whether ground for setting aside election—Finality of rolls—Contraventionof Constitution.—Where an election was sought to be set aside on theground that the names of a large number of persons (about 7,529) whowere qualified to be enrolled as voters were not entered in theelectoral rolls and the result of the election was materially affectedthereby: Held, that the Election Tribunal had no jurisdiction toinquire whether all persons qualified to vote were entered in the rolls.The jurisdiction to prepare the electoral rolls is vested in certainauthorities by the Representation of the People (Preparation ofElectoral Rolls) Rules, 1956, and the Rules give finality to the decisionof those authorities. Held also, that it cannot be said that there is acontravention of article 326 of the Constitution within the meaning ofsection xoo{i)(d){iv) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, insuch a case.—CHANDRA SHEKHAR SINGH V. SARJOO PRASAD SINGH ANDANOTHER, 19 E.L.R. 490.

• It cannot be laid down broadly that the Election Tribunalhas no jurisdiction to go behind the electoral rolls or to question the

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validity of the entries in the electoral rolls. Under certain circum-stances the Election Tribunal has power to question the validity ofthe electoral rolls, for example, where, as stated in section ioo{i)(d)(iii),the result of an election is materially affected by improper receptionof votes which are void, or, as indicated in section ioo(i)(d)(iv), theresult is materially affected by any non-compliance with the provisionsof the Constitution or of the Representation of the People Act or anyrules or orders made under the Act. The validity of the rolls cannot,however, be challenged in an election petition merely because somepersons who were not entitled to vote were entered in the rolls orothers who were entitled to vote were not entered in the rolls.—RAMDAYAL AYODYAPRASAD GUPTA V. K. R. PATIL AND OTHERS,18 E.L.R. 378.

Omission to enter names of candidates in alphabetical order—•Whether ground for setting aside election.—Omission to enter the namesof the candidates in alphabetical order in the list of contesting candi-dates, as directed by rule 38(2) of the Rules, is not a ground for settingaside an election in the absence of proof that the result of the electionwas materially affected thereby.—JHUMAKLAL V. AMBIKA SAO ANDOTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 477.

Preparation of electoral roll—Application for inclusion ofname—Order for inclusion passed—Order or amended list not published—Not attached to, or pasted, on original list—Number given to another votergiven by mistake—Validity of order of inclusion—Applicant, whether an"elector"—Right to vote or file election petition.—As soon as the ElectoralRegistration Officer passes an order for correction of any entry undersection 22, or inclusion of a name under section 23 of the Representa-tion of the People Act of 1950, the right to exercise franchise is createdin favour of the applicant. The neglect of duty by the office staff ofthe Electoral Registration Officer in omitting to integrate the amend-ment list (sudhipatra) with the main electoral roll by pasting orattaching it to the latter cannot deprive him of that right. There isnothing in rule 26 or in rule 23 of the Preparation of Electoral RollsRules, 1956, to show that an order for inclusion of name, or the sudhi-patra prepared on its basis, must be published as required by rule 23.The enrolment of a person in the electoral rolls is not vitiated merelybecause the serial number allotted to him is one which had alreadybeen allotted to another person.—MANZOOR AHMED V. BUDHI LAL,16 E.L.R. 470.

Omission of some persons qualified to vote in electoral roll—Validityof election.—An election cannot be called in question merely becausethe names of some persons qualified to vote were not recorded in the

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electoral roll. Under the law it is the duty of the voters themselvesto apply and have their names recorded if they have been for anyreason omitted in the rolls. The candidates cannot be made to sufferon this account.—BHAWANI PRASAD TIWARI V. JAGDISH NARAYANAWASTHI AND OTHERS, l 6 E.L.R. 143.

Preparation of fresh electoral roll whether compulsory afterreorganisation of States.—There was a joint list of voters for two wardsin a constituency. One of the wards was assigned to another constitu-ency by a delimitation order. Without preparing new voter's listsfor the constituencies the election authorities supplied the jointlist of voters for the two wards to each of the new constituencieswith appropriate corrections: Held, that the action of the authoritiesdid not contravene any of the provisions of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1950, or any rule made thereunder, and even assumingthat it was an irregularity, the election cannot be declared void unlessthere was proof that the result of the election was materially affectedthereby. Even if the electoral rolls of a constituency were not revisedannually as required by section 21 of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1950, the proviso to sub-section (2) of that section cures thisdefect, and an election is not invalid merely because the rolls on thebasis of which it was held were not revised annually.—BHAWANIPRASAD TIWARP V. JAGDISH NARAYAN AWASTHI AND OTHERS, 16E.L.R. 143.

Order for inclusion of name—Effect of.—As soon as a directionhas been passed under section 23 of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1950, for the inclusion of the name of a person in the electoralroll, that person becomes an " elector " within the definition of thisexpression in section 2(i)(e) of the Representation of the People Act,1951. Rejection of the nomination of a person whose name has beenordered to be included in the electoral roll, on the ground that hewas not an " elector " as his name had not yet been actually insertedin the voter's list, even though an order for inclusion of his name hadbeen made, is improper. The expression " within a period of sevendays from the date of such posting " in sub-rule (3) of rule 26 of theRepresentation of the People (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules,1956, does not mean that a period of seven clear days from the date ofposting must be given for presenting objections to an application forinclusion of a name in the electoral roll. Where an application wasposted on the 22nd and time was allowed for preferring objections tillthe 28th: Held, that there was no contravention of rule 26. Heldfurther, that the period of seven days prescribed in rule 26 was merelya directory provision, and omission to give seven days time for

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objections would not invalidate an order for inclusion of a name inthe electoral roll, especially, where no objection was raised, and noprejudice was caused to any one. The essence of the provision is thatsufficient time should be given for objections, if any, against the inclu-sion of the name.—CHANDRA SHEKHAR PRASAD AND ANOTHER V. JAIPRAKASH SINGH, 17 E.L.R. 126.

Omission to include all qualified persons in the voter's list—Validity of election—The fact that the names of some persons who werequalified to be enrolled as voters had not been included in the electorallists is not a ground vitiating an election under the Constitution orthe Act.—JAYALAKSHMI DEVAMMA V. JANARDHAN REDDI, 17 E.L.R.302.

Application for inclusion of name—Jurisdiction of ElectoralRegistration Officer.—If an application under section 23 of the Repre-sentation of the People Act, 1950, for the inclusion of a name in theelectoral roll has been made to the Electoral Registration Officer beforethe issue of a notification calling upon the constituency to elect a memberor members, the issue of such a notification will not deprive him ofhis jurisdiction to hear the application and to pass orders thereon.If an Electoral Registration Officer exercises his power under sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act of 1950, and directs a person'sname to be included in the roll, he becomes immediately entitled toexercise the right of franchise, and he is not deprived of such a rightmerely because the office staff of the Electoral Registration Officer didnot paste or stitch the sudhipatra to the electoral roll as finallypublished.—RAMSWAROOP PRASAD YADAV V. JAGAT KISHORE PRASADNARAIN SINGH, 17 E.L.R. no .

Order for inclusion of name in roll—When takes effect.—Once theElectoral Registration Officer has passed an order under section 22 or23 of the Act of 1950, the elector whom it concerns immediately getsthe right to exercise his franchise. The mere fact that the assistantsor the office staff of the Electoral Registration Officer did not carryout the officer's order immediately or in time cannot deprive him ofthat right.—RAMKISHUN SINGH AND ANOTHER V. TRIBENI SINGH ANDOTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 81.

Electoral Registration Officer's power to correct errors.—The stageof correction of entries in an electoral roll under section 22 and inclu-sion of names under section 23 of the Representation of the PeopleAct of 1950 comes after the final publication of the roll under rules23 and 25. The Electoral Registration Officer has power to direct thecorrection of the rolls under section 22 (1) of the Act of 1950, even if

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the error was more serious than a clerical or printing error, if he wassatisfied that the entry related to the applicant, and there was nodoubt about his identity.—RAMKISHUN SINGH AND ANOTHER V. TKI-BENI SINGH AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 81.

HIGH COURTS

High Courts.—Jurisdiction to question validity of appointment ofmembers-—Power to issue writ against Tribunal net legally constituted.—AHigh Court cf a State has jurisdiction to issue a writ prohibiting anElection Tribunal functioning within the State from proceeding withthe trial of an election petition, if it finds that the Tribunal has not beenlegally constituted, even though the Tribunal was constituted by theElection Commission which is situated at Delhi.—N. V. L. NARASIMHARAO v. RAO BAHADUR TELLAKULA JALAYYA AND OTHERS (NO. 2),11 E.L.R. 402.

Jurisdiction of High Courts to issue writs in election petitions.—The jurisdiction of the High Court under articles 225 to 227 of theConstitution in election petitions is exercised by that High Courtwithin whose jurisdiction the Tribunal is situated and there is nothingin the Constitution laying down that this automatic vesting of thejurisdiction in that High Court as a result of the situation of theTribunal is prohibited or can be held to be void on the ground that itamounts to interference with the jurisdiction of the High Courts.— SITARAM KHEMKA V. K. K. BANERJI AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 301.

If a High Court comes to the view that an inferior court orTribunal has not allowed its discretion to run to the grooves indicatedtherefor either by law or by judicial precedents, it is at liberty tointerfere either under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure orunder article 227 of the Constitution.—S. PARTAP SINGH KAIRON V.S. GURMEJ SINGH, 14 E.L.R. 412.

In a matter arising under article 226 of the Constitution theHigh Court will not at an interlocutory stage decide upon the correct-ness of orders made by a Tribunal with jurisdiction. Where it is opento the Tribunal to reach a conclusion, even if the Tribunal errs inreaching that conclusion it is not a matter which can be corrected bythe High Court in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction whichit possesses either under article 226 or under article 227 of the Consti-tution. It is a matter to be rectified on appeal.—HARI VISHNUKAMATH v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, JABALPORE, AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R.147.

The mere fact that a Tribunal has come to an erroneousdecision or that the High Court, on the evidence before the Tribunal,

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could have or would have come to a different conclusion would not bea sufficient ground for interference under article 227 with the order ofthe Tribunal unless the Tribunal has failed to exercise a jurisdictionvested in it or has omitted to exercise a jurisdiction which it ought to

have exercised or there has been a capricious or arbitrary exercise ofjurisdiction. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide whether a parti-cular application for amendment should or should not be allowed andeven though the decision of the Tribunal may not appear to be correct,that by itself will not call for interference when the matter is broughtup under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India before thecourt.—HABIBUR REHMAN V. SHIVA GOPAL TEWARI AND OTHERS, 13E.L.R. 377.

—•—Interference during pendency of trial.—The High Court shouldnot ordinarily intervene under article 226 of the Constitution duringthe pendency of an election petition and take upon itself the task ofdeciding matters which lie within the jurisdiction of Election Tribunal.Mohd. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow (A.I.R. 1957 All. 292) notapproved.—PARTAP SINGH KAIRON V. KARTAR SINGH CHADHA ANDOTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 236.

Power to issue writs in interlocutory matters.—Though as ageneral rule the High Court will not issue a writ in an interlocutorymatter, it can do so in an appropriate case.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V.K. K. BANERJI AND ANOTHER, 13 E.L.R. 310.

The fact that an interlocutory order passed by an ElectionTribunal could be impugned in an appeal under section 116A of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, from the final order of theTribunal on the election petition, does not deprive the High Court ofits power to issue a writ under article 226 of the Constitution if theTribunal has acted in excess of its jurisdiction in passing the inter-locutory order.—RAJA NAINAR V. VELUSAMI THEVAR AND OTHERS,13 E.L.R. 231.

The High Court will not interfere by way of writ underarticle 226 or 227 of the Constitution with interlocutory orders of anElection Tribunal disallowing amendments to an election petition orstriking out paragraphs for vagueness except in very exceptional cases,as such matters could be agitated in appeal from the final order of theTribunal under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act.—SIYA RAM v. PERTAP BAHADUR AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 128.

The question whether the High Court should interfere underarticle 226 of the Constitution in the trial of an election petition at apreliminary stage depends entirely on the nature of the order which is

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sought to be challenged.—GIANI KARTAR SINGH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,

CHANDIGARH, AND ANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 148.

As the Legislature has now amended the law by providing aright of appeal against a decision of the Tribunal to the High Courtunder section n6A, with the obvious intention that proceedings beforethe Tribunal should go on with expedition and without interruption,and that any error in its decision should be set right in an appeal underthat section it would be proper exercise of discretion under article 226to decline to interfere with interlocutory orders.—VELUSWAMITHEVAR v. RAJA NAINAR AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 181. [s.c.l

The High Court has power to interfere under article 226 ofthe Constitution even with interlocutory orders made by an ElectionTribunal during the trial of an election petition. For deciding whetherthe High Court should interfere in the exercise of its powers underarticle 226, the stage at which the person claiming to be aggrievedseeks relief is not the determining factor. The real question is whetherthe Tribunal has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred on it by theterms of the statute which created it.—M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR V. SA.

GANESAN AND ANOTHER (NO. 2), 14 E.L.R. 432.

Though the High Court has power to issue writs againstthe orders of an Election Tribunal, the High Court would decline, asa rule, to issue a writ against an order of the Tribunal allowing amend-ment of an election petition, inasmuch as it would be open to theaggrieved party to attack the correctness of the order in an appealfiled under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act.—SANJEEVI REDDI V. KONDAYYA AND ANOTHER, 22 E.L.R. 92.

Power of High Court to punish for contempt of Tribunal—Publishing comment on pending election petition tending to prejudice fairtrial—Liability of author, publisher and printer—Effect of apology.—AnElection Tribunal constituted under the Representation of the PeopleAct is " a court " as the functions which the Tribunal performs aresimilar to those of a court, and it has authority to hear and decidedisputes so as to bind the disputants. Since the orders of an ElectionTribunal are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, anElection Tribunal is a court subordinate to High Court, and the HighCourt has, therefore, power to punish a person who has committedcontempt of an Election Tribunal. Any writing which is calculated topoison the mind of a judge or witnesses and which tends to create anatmosphere which imperils a fair and impartial trial constitutes con-tempt. Where, during the pendency of an election petition, a pamphletwas published containing a statement that the election petition was

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without substance and that the idea behind it was to raise money toopen a big shop: Held, that the publication of the pamphlet constitutedcontempt of court and the High Court had power to punish the authorof the statement and its printer and publisher. Held also, that anapology usually mitigates the offence and if it is unreserved, the Courtmay accept it, but it does not follow that because an apology is offered,the court must accept it. [The High Court refused to accept the apologyin this case].—CHUNNILAL KEN V. SHYAMLAL SUKHRAM AND OTHERS,18 E.L.R. 103.

Notice threatening to prosecute party to proceeding before court—Whether amounts to contempt.—The Election Tribunal is a " court, "and, as an appeal lies to the High Court from the orders of theTribunal, it is " a court subordinate to the High Court," and the HighCourt has, therefore, power to punish a person who commits an actamounting to contempt of the Tribunal. Chunnilal v. Shyamlal (18E.L.R. 103), followed. Where a person who was not a party to an electionpetition^ sent a notice to the petitioner that he and his daughter hadbeen maliciously dragged into the election petition, and threatened thepetitioner with prosecution for defamation and suit for damages in acivil court, and also warned him that he and his daughter belonged tothe " Balai" caste and if the petitioner wrote or uttered or expressedtheir caste to be something else, it would give rise to fresh liability forprosecution and action in a civil court: Held, that though the High Courthad power to punish a person who did any act amounting to contemptof an Election Tribunal, the person who gave the notice in this case didnot by the giving of such a notice commit any act amounting to con-tempt of the Tribunal, as the notice in question did not call upon theelection petitioner to withdraw any plea which he had made in theelection petition and thus interfere with the administration of justice.Rajindra Singh v. Umaprasad (I.L.R. 57 All. 573) and Tehra CottonGinning Co.'s case (I.L.R. 1940 All. 710) distinguished.—NIRBHAYADASGANGARAM v. RAMESHWAR AGNIBHOJ, 20 E.L.R. 493.

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Interpretation of statutes—Two interpretations possible—Which tobe preferred.—Article 191 has been inserted in the Constitution with adeliberate purpose and in cases of doubt or where two interpretationsare possible, that interpretation should be preferred, which will furtherand effectually carry out the object of the makers of the Constitution.—DR. DEORAO LAKSHMAN ANANDE V. KESHAV LAKSHMAN BORKAR,13 E.L.R. 334-

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When on a construction of a statute, two views are possible,one which results in an anomaly and the other, not, it is the duty ofthe courts to adopt the latter, and not the former.—VELUSWAMITHEVAR v. RAJA NAINAR AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 181 [S.C.]

LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS

Legislative Councils.—Election by Members of Legislative Assembly—System of proportional representation by single transferable vote—Count-ing of votes—Exclusion of candidates lowest on poll—Decision by lot ofperson to be first excluded—Meaning of "first excluded "—Whether allsuch candidates are to be excluded—Construction of rule I2${y)—Charac-teristics of system of proportional representation by single transferable vote.—With regard to the counting of votes at elections by members of theState Legislative Assemblies to fill seats in the Legislative Councils inaccordance with the system of proportional representation by means ofthe single transferable vote as prescribed by article 171(4) of the Con-stitution, sub-rule (7) of rule 125 of the Representation of the People(Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1956, provides that" If two or more candidates are lowest on the poll and each has thesame value of votes at all counts, the returning officer shall decide bylot which candidate shall be first excluded " : Held, that the use of thewords "first excluded " in rule 125(7) instead of the word " excluded "is of no significance and does not imply that if there are two suchcandidates, after excluding one candidate by drawing lots, the othercandidate also should be excluded. Seven members had to be electedto the Mysore Legislative Council by the members of the Mysore Legis-lative Assembly and there were thirteen candidates. Respondent 3, 7,9 and 11 were elected at one stage and respondents 1,4,10 and 12 wereeliminated as they got the lowest number of votes. There remained 3seats to be filled up and five continuing candidates, viz., the petitionerand respondents 2, 5, 6 and 8. The respective votes of these candidateswere: petitioner 1,800, 5th respondent 1,800, 2nd respondent 2,125,6th respondent 1,900 and 8th respondent 2,087. As the votes of thepetitioner and the 5th respondent were equal at all counts, applyingrule 125(7) the returning officer drew lots and the 5th respondent waseliminated. In the original papers of the 5th respondent there wereeight papers with next preferential marks, of which 4 were for the 6threspondent and 4 for the petitioner. The returning officer transferred400 votes to the 6th respondent (making his votes 2,300) but did nottransfer the remaining 400 to the petitioner, under the impression thatthe petitioner was also to be excluded under rule 125(7), and declaredrespondents 6, 2 and 8 as elected. In an election petition the Tribunal

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held, that, on a proper construction of rule 125(7)tne returning officershould not have excluded the petitioner also, but should have addedthe remaining 400 votes to the petitioner's votes and, since the peti-tioner would then have got 2,200 votes, the petitioner was entitled to bedeclared duly elected instead of the 8th respondent who got 2,087 votesonly, and judgment of the Tribunal was upheld by the High Court onappeal.—MARISWAMY HIREMATHA GANGADHARASWAMY V. B. CHIK-KANNASWAMY AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. I I 4 .

Local authorities' constituency—Inclusion of Councillors ofNagpur Corporation and members of Notified Area Committees andJanapada Sabhas (Urban Circle) in electoral roll—Legality—Validity ofelection—Persons not entitled to vote entered in roll—Election, whether liableto be set aside for wrongful acceptance of votes, invalidity of votes, or non-compliance with Act—Finality of rolls.—Article i7i(3)(a) of the Consti-tution provides that, as nearly as may be, one-third of the members ofthe Legislative Councils of the States shall be elected by electoratesconsisting of members of " municipalities, district boards and such otherlocal authorities in the State as Parliament may by law specify." Sec-tion 27 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, provides that" for the purposes of election to the Legislative Council in a State in anylocal authorities' constituency the electorate shall consist of membersof such local authorities as are specified in the Fourth Schedule ", andthe Fourth Schedule (as amended by the Legislative Councils Act, 1957)specifies, as regards the Bombay State, the following local authorities,viz., (1) Municipalities, (2) District Local Boards, (3) Cantonment Boards,(4) District Boards, (5) District Panchayats, (6) Town Committees and(7) Janapada Sabhas (Rural Circle). An election to the said consti-tuency was sought to be set aside on the grouud that these personswere not entitled to be included in the electoral roll of the localauthorities' constituency or to vote at the election and the election wastherefore void : Held, (i) that ttie expression " municipalities " usedin the Constitution as well as in the Fourth Schedule to the Repre-sentation of the People Act of 1950, is used in the widest sense andincludes all bodies entrusted with the administration of municipalaffairs of a city or a town ; and the councillors of the Corporation ofthe City of Nagpur were, therefore, rightly included in the electoralroll for the Vidarbha Local Authorities' constituency; (ii) on thelanguage of section 242 of the C. P. and Berar MunicipalitiesAct, 1922, it was clear that a Notified Area Committee was not a"municipality" though for certain purposes as provided in the sec-tion it should be treated as a municipality, and members of NotifiedArea Committees were, therefore, wrongly included as voters in the

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electoral roll for the constituency ; (iii) in view of the clear indica-tion of the intention of the Legislature contained in clauses (a) and (b)of sub-section (2) of section 27 of the Representation of the PeopleAct of 1950, the names of the members of the Janapada Sabhas(Urban Circle) were also entitled to be included in the electoral rollsof the Local Authorities' constituency even though item 7 of theFourth Schedule as amended by the Legislative Councils Act of 1957refers to Janapada Sabhas (Rural Circle) only ; (iv) even though themembers of the Notified Area Committees were wrongly included inthe electoral roll of the constituency, the votes, if any, cast by suchpersons cannot be said to have been improperly accepted, orvoid, and the election was not liable to be set aside under sectionioo(i)(d)(iii); (v) the election could not be set aside under sectionioo{j)(d)(iv) also on the ground that there was a non-compliance withthe provisions of the Constitution or of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, or the rules and orders made thereunder, for thenon-compliance contemplated by section 100(1 ){d){iv) is the non-compliance of the provisions of the Constitution, or of the provisionsof the Representation of the People Act of 1951, or of the rules ororders made under the Act of 1951, and non-compliance of the pro-visions of the Act of 1950, did not fall within the scope and ambit ofthat sub-clause ; (vi) even assuming that non-compliance with anyof the provisions of the Act of 1950, would fall within the ambit andscope of the said sub-clause (iv), before an election can be set aside onthis ground, it had further to be established that the result of theelection, in so far as it concerned the returned candidates, had beenmaterially affected on account of that non-compliance; (vii) theburden to establish that the result of the election had been materiallyaffected was on the petitioner and howsoever difficult it may be todischarge that burden, it was incumbent on him to discharge i t ; (viii)as the petitioner had only proved that the names of 23 members hadbeen wrongly entered in the electoral roll and the valid votes cast were2,001, it was not possible to hold that the result of the election hadbeen materially affected, and the election of the respondent could notbe declared void.—RAMDAYAL AYODHYAPRASAD GUPTA V. K. R. PATIL

AND OTHERS, 20 E.L.R. 13.The term " municipalities " in the Fourth Schedule to Repre-

sentation of the People Act, 1950 as amended by the LegislativeCouncils Act, 1957, so far as the Bombay State is concerned, must beunderstood in a broad sense meaning a body which deals with themunicipal affairs of a town or a city and is wide enough to include theCity of Nagpur Corporation, the Janapada Sabhas (Urban Circle) and

318 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the Notified Area Committees, and there is nothing illegal or contraryto law including the members of these bodies in the electoral rolls ofthe Local Authorities' constituency of the Bombay Legislative Council.—RAMDAYAL AYODYAPRASAD GUPTA V. K. R. PATIL AND OTHERS, 18

E.L.R. 378.

Non-compliance with the provisions of the LegislativeCouncils Act, 1957, in the preparation of the electoral roll is not aground for setting aside an election under section ioo(i)(d)(iv). Thisclause covers only non-compliance with the Constitution or theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, or the rules or orders madethereunder. Even assuming that such a ground is covered bysection ioo(i)(d)(iv), the election cannot be set aside unless it is provedthat the result of the election has been materially affected thereby.—RAMDAYAL AYODYAPRASAD GUPTA V. K. R. PATIL AND OTHERS, 18

E.L.R. 378.

—•—In the case of an election where the voting is under thesystem of single transferable vote and the election is one and the voteis also one and a number of candidates have to be selected on thestrength of that vote, if the election is challenged on the ground ofinvalidity of the electoral roll all the persons who had contested theelection and in particular all the persons who had been declaredelected are necessary parties.—RAMDAYAL AYODYAPRASAD GUPTA V.K. R. PATIL AND OTHERS, 18 E.L.R. 378.

Function of Chairman, whether administrative or quasi-judicial—Conditional legislation—Laws vesting uncontrolled discretion—Right toapply for writ of prohibition before Chairman exercised his powers.—Sec-tion 35(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, cannot be supportedeither on the principle laid down in Empress v. Burah (3 A.C. 889), oron the ground that the Chairman was not exercising a judicial orquasi-judicial function but only an administrative function in specify-ing the members to be eliminated, or on the ground that the rule thata person shall not be judge in his own cause was merely a rule ofstatutory construction and not a limitation of Parliamentary powers;for, the impugned provision was not in the nature of conditional legis-lation, the Chairman was not exercising a purely administrativefunction but was performing an administrative duty of a quasi-judicial character, and the Legislature did not lay down any rationalclassification, or in fact any classification at all, for selecting themembers whose membership was to cease. Held further, that thepetitioner was entitled to apply for a writ of prohibition restrainingthe Chairman from exercising his powers under section 35(3) and wasnot bound to wait until the Chairman had made his order, and then

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 319

apply for a writ of certiorari to quash his order. [Their Lordshipsmake absolute a rale nisi restraining the Chairman from exercisinghis powers under section 35(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956,in so far as it related to mambars representing the Madras (Graduates)constituency.—DR. V. K. JOHN V. CHAIRMAN, MADRAS LEGISLATIVECOUNCIL, AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 345.

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES

General principles.—Law in India and England—Difference.—The law in India with regard to defects in a nomination paper is notexactly the same as in England. A mere omission of some particularmay in England be an incurable defect, but in India it will depend onthe facts and circumstances of a particular case, whether a defect is asubstantial one and the nomination cannot be rejected unless the defectis of a substantial character. The words of section 36(4) of the IndianRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, specially after the SecondAmendment of 1956, are large enough to cure a total omission, if, onthe facts and in the circumstances of a particular case, the omission isnot a defect of a substantial character. Ajayab Singh v. Karnail Singh(6 E.L.R. 368), Karnail Singh v. Election Tribunal, Hissar (10 E.L.R.189) and Rosamma Punnose v. Balakrishnan Nair (14 E.L.R. 210)relied on. Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath (15 E.L.R. 66, onappeal 21 E.L.R. 459), Ramayan Shukla v. Rajendra Prasad Singh (16E.L.R. 491), Rattan Anmol Singh v. Attna Ram (10 E.L.R. 41)distinguished. Per SAHAI, J.—The principle for ascertaining whether adefect is one of a substantial character or not is simple and clear. Theprovisions requiring the candidate and his proposer to give out parti-culars in the nomination papers have all been made with this purposein view that the returning officer should be able to locate the names ofthe candidate and the proposer in the electoral roll quickly and with-out any difficulty. If the defect is such as to defeat this purpose, itmust be held to be of a substantial character. If, on the other hand,the names of the candidate and the proposer can be located easily inthe electoral roll in spite of the defect, or if the defect is not of anyimportance and the candidate or the proposer is present to point outtheir names in the electoral roll to the returning officer, the defectcannot be held to be one of a substantial character.—DAHU SAO V.RANGLAL CHAUDHARY AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 229.

—Presentation after 3 p.m.—Validity.—The provision containedin section 33(1) of the Act that a nomination paper must be presentedto the returning officer between the hours of eleven o' clock in theforenoon and three 0' clock in the afternoon is a mandatory provision,

3 2 0 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

and if a nomination paper is presented after three o'clock in theafternoon, even though there was only a delay of a few minutes, thedelay cannot be condoned, and the nomination paper has to berejected.—LAKSHMI NARAIN V. BALWAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 20

E.L.R. 76.Adjournment of proceedings—Legality.—Where objections are

raised to any nomination paper which requires an investigation or asummary enquiry of certain facts, it would be proper for the returningofficer to adjourn the hearing of the objections for some time.—PAR-MESHWAR KUMAR V. LAHTAN CHAUDHARY, 14 E.L.R. 444.

Though the holding of the scrutiny of nominations cannot bepostponed by the returning officer " except when such proceedings areinterrupted or obstructed by riot or open violence or by causes beyondhis control," yet the scrutiny can be postponed for a day or two forfurther scrutiny in order to allow time to the candidate concernedwhose nomination is objected to. There is also nothing in the Act orthe Rules to prevent the returning officer from postponing the decisionof the matter to the following day. Parmeshwar Kumar v. LahtanChaudhary (14 E.L.R. 444) followed.—DAHU SAO V. RANGLAL CHAU-

DHARY AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 299.

Filling up of form—Interpretation of instructions.—The instruc-tion contained in the form of nomination that the first portion of itshould be filled by the proposer, the second by the candidate, and thethird by the returning officer, does not mean that the respectiveportions must be filled by the respective hands of the proposer, candi-date and the returning officer. The reasonable interpretation of thewords in the brackets in the form concerned is that the respectiveportions are meant to be filled up by or on behalf of the propose r, byor on behalf of the candidate, and by or on behalf of the returningofficer.—PARMESHWAR KUMAR V. LAHTAN CHAUDHARY, 14 E.L.R. 444.

Signature and attestation.—A nomination paper is not invalidsimply because the candidate signed it before the proposer and seconderhad put their signatures.—YAMUNA PRASAD 1;. JAGDISH PRASAD KHARE

AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 1.Want of proper attestation of the thumb-marks put by illite-

rate proposer and seconder in a nomination paper is not a meretechnical defect of an unsubstantial character. A nomination paper inwhich the thumb-marks of the proposer and seconder were not affixedin the presence of the returning officer and were not attested by himis therefore invalid and must be rejected.—YAMUNA PRASAD V. JAGDISH

PRASAD KHARE AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 1.

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 381

In view of the definition of the word " sign " contained insection 2(i)(i) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, andrule 2(2) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Electionsand Election Petitions) Rules, 1956, where the proposer is an illiterateperson, unless he places his mark on the nomination paper in thepresence of the returning officer or such other officer as may be speci-fied and such officer on being satisfied as to the identity of the person,attests the mark as being the mark of that person, the nominationcannot be treated as duly signed by the proposer and can be properlyrejected. The mere fact that the mark was put in the court room whenthe returning officer was also present there is not sufficient. RattanAnmol Singh v. Atma Ram (10 E.L.R. 41) followed.—KHAGENDRA-NATH NATH AND ANOTHER V. UMESH CHANDRA NATH AND OTHERS,16 E.L.R. 207.

Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and theRules framed thereunder, notifications and directions issued by theElection Commission require publication in the Official Gazette only ifthe Act or the Rules provide that such notifications or directionsshould be so published. A direction issued by the Election Commis-sion under rule 2(2) of the Representation of the People (Conduct ofElections and Election Petitions) Rules specifying the officers who mayattest the marks of illiterate persons is not invalid merely because itwas not published or promulgated. Where the Election Commissionhad issued directions which authorised, inter alia, Magistrates to attestthe marks of illiterate persons, but these directions had not beenpublished and the circular sent by the Chief Electoral Officer to thereturning officers, by a clerical mistake, omitted Magistrates from thelist of persons authorised to attest, and a nomination paper attestedby a Magistrate was rejected by a returning officer on the ground thatit was not properly attested: Held, that the nomination paper wasimproperly rejected.—DALIP SINGH V. SURENDRA NATH AND OTHERS,11 E.L R. 120.

Several nominations by same proposer and seconder—Validity.—Where more nomination papers than one are filed in favour of thesame candidate by the same proposer and seconder, when there is onlyone vacancy, all the nominations cannot be held to be invalid andrejected on the ground that there was a contravention of section 33(2)of the Representation of the People Act. The first nomination paperwill not be invalid in any event, whether the remaining nominationpapers be valid or not.—MATADIN CHAURASIA V. MAHENDRA KUMARMANAV, 12 E.L.R. 144.

ELD—41

322 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Age of candidate—Evidence to show that nomination was impro-perly accepted, as candidate was below age—Admissibility—Whether casefalls'within sec. IOO{I)(C) or sec. ioo(2)(c)— Scope of the decision in DurgaShankar Mehta's case.—One of the grounds on which an election as awhole was impugned;in an election petition was that the nominationpaper of one of the candidates X, was improperly accepted as he wasbelow 30 years of age. It was contended, relying on the decision of theSupreme Court in Durga Shankar Mehta's case (9 E.L.R. 494) that thequestion raised was one covered by section ioo(2)(c) and not by sectionIOO(I)(C), and an issue was raised whether " the case as regardsnomination of X came within the purview of section IOO(I)(C) or sectionioo(2)(c). " When evidence as to the age of X was sought to be adducedit was again objected, that evidence as to age was inadmissible in-asmuch as, even if X was below 30 years the case would be covered bysection ioo(2)(c). The Tribunal overruled the objection and thepetitioner applied to the High Court for a writ for excluding suchevidence: Held, that the question whether such evidence should orshould not be admitted was a matter within the discretion of the Tri-bunal and the High Court would not interfere.—DR. BRIJENDRA SWARUPv. ELECTION TRIBUNAL (LUCKNOW) AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 188.

Age—Decision of returning officer as to age—Whether final.—The decision of a returning officer during scrutiny of nominationsthat a particular candidate was over 25 years of age is not final and itis open to the petitioner in a petition to set aside the election of thatcandidate, to prove that he was below 25 years and was therefore dis-qualified under article 173(6) of the Constitution, to be elected as acandidate.—KARAM BAPANNA DORA V. SYAMALA SEETHARAMAYYA ANDANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 463.

Age—Birth register—Admissibility—Evidentiary value.—Birthregisters kept by village officers in the course of their official dutiesare public documents and entries contained therein are admissible toprove the age of a person. The fact that Act No. Ill of 1899 w a s n°tin force in the particular area does not make entries in a birth registerinadmissible. Such entries must, however, be proved and shown torelate to the person concerned.—KARAM BAPANNA DORA V. SYAMALASEETHARAMAYYA AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 463.

Age—Power to make inquiry—Entry in roll, evidentiary value of.—The age of the candidate was not given in the nomination paper. Anobjection was raised that the candidate was under 25 years of age, and,as neither the candidate nor any one on his behalf appeared at the timeof scrutiny to satisfy the returning officer that the age of the candidatewas not less than 25 years of age, the returning officer rejected the

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 323

nomination on the ground that he was not satisfied that the candidatewas not less than 25 years of age even though in the electoral roll hisage was given as 28 years: Held, (i) that the presumption of regularityattaching to official acts did not apply to entries of age in electoral rollswhich are filled up on hearsay and are not attested or verified ; (it) undersub-section (2) of section 36 of the Act it was incumbent on the returningofficer at the time of scrutiny to examine the nomination papers and toconsider and inquire into all objections which may be raised or which hemay discover himself, and if the candidate was not qualified under therequirements of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of this section, the nomina-tion paper had to be rejected; (in) since neither the candidate nor theproposer nor any other person authorised on his behalf was present atthe time of scrutiny to testify to his age, there was no course open tothe returning officer but to reject the nomination paper and that rejec-tion cannot, therefore, be said to be an improper rejection within themeaning of IOO(I)(C) of the Act. Quaere : Whether a nomination papercould be rejected for mere omission to give the age of the candidate.—CHIRANJI LAL v. LAHRI SINGH, 15 E.L.R. 397.

Age—Omission to declare age of candidate in nomination paper—Offer by candidate to prove his age at the time of scrutiny—Rejectionof nomination—Whether rejection improper.—Where a candidateomitted to declare his age in his nomination paper and the return-ing officer rejected his nomination on the ground that the omission" could not be treated as a clerical or technical error, as a declarationwith regard to age was necessary in order to entitle the candidateto be qualified under article 173 of the Constitution ", even though inthe voters' list his age was shown as 48 years and the candidate offeredat the time of scrutiny of the nomination paper to prove that he wasnot less than 25 years of age : Held, that nomination could be rejectedon the ground that the candidate was disqualified under article 173 ofthe Constitution merely because his age was not declared in the nomina-tion paper, nor could the nomination be rejected on the ground thatit did not comply with section 33 of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951; the rejection of the nomination under the circum-stances was, therefore, improper within the meaning of section 100(i)(c) of the Act.—JWALA PRASAD V. BRIJENDRA GUPTA AND OTHERS,21 E.L.R. 485.

Age—Omission to specify age—Rejection of nomination-Legality—Defect, whether substantial—Whether returning officer boundto look into electoral roll or make inquiry as to age.—Omission to specifythe age of the candidate in the nomination paper is a defect of asubstantial character within the meaning of section 36(4) of the

324 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act, 1951, and is a ground for rejection ofthe nomination under section 36(2X6) of the Act. In such a case thereturning officer is not bound to make an enquiry under section 36(2)as to his age and find out whether he is qualified to stand as a candidateunder article 173 of the Constitution.—BRIJENDRALAL GUPTA ANDANOTHER V. JWALAPRASAD AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 366. is .c]

Even if the impugned nomination has complied with theprovisions of section 33 and as such does not fall under section 36(2X6),the validity of the nomination can be challenged on the ground that infact article 173 is not complied with. Cases falling under this class mustbe distinguished from cases falling under section 36(2X6). In the latterclass of cases the failure to comply with the provisions of section 33being established, there is no scope for any enquiry under section36(2X0)- Once the alleged non-compliance is proved, the defectivenomination falls to be accepted or rejected according as the defect isof an unsubstantial or of a substantial character. Therefore, the viewthat even after the returning officer is satisfied that the omission tospecify his age showed that the nomination paper of a candidate hadnot complied with the provisions of section 33, he should still haveheld an enquiry under section 36(2X0) is not correct. Non-compliancewith the provisions of section 33 itself would justify the rejection ofthe nomination paper provided that the defect arising from the non-compliance in question is of a substantial character.—BRIJENDRALALGUPTA AND ANOTHER V. JWALAPRASAD AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 366.IS.G.J

If the nomination paper of a candidate does not comply withthe provisions of section 33, the case falls squarely under section 36(2X6)and the only question which can arise in such a case is whether or notthe defect arising from the failure to comply with the provisions ofsection 33 is of a substantial character or not. If the defect is not ofa substantial character the returning officer shall not reject the nomina-tion paper on the ground of the said defect; if, on the other hand, thedefect is of a substantial character the returning officer has to rejectthe nomination paper on the ground of the said defect. This is theeffect of the provisions of section 36(2X6) and (4) read together.—BRIJENDRALAL GUPTA AND ANOTHER V. JWALAPRASAD AND OTHERS,22 E.L.R. 366. IS.C.)

The fact that in the electoral roll the age of the candidatewas specified and the returning officer could have satisfied himself asto the age of the candidate easily by looking at the electoral roll, is notmaterial in construing section 36(4).—BRIJENDRALAL GUPTA ANDANOTHER V, JWALAPRASAD AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 366. [s.c.J

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Candidate, voter of different constituency—Production of certifiedcopy of entry in roll—" Certified copy ", meaning of—Whether copy shouldcomply with conditions of section 76, Evidence Act—Copy issued underorder of Deputy Collector who is also Electoral Registration Officer, by hispeshkar, with his seal and certified by Record Keeper—Whether certifiedcopy—Defect, if any, whether substantial—Rejection of nomination—Legality.—The nomination of a candidate who was an elector in adifferent constituency, was accompanied by a copy of the relevant entryof the electoral roll in which the candidate's name was registered. Thecopy was obtained from the office of the Deputy Collector who was theElectoral Registration Officer of the constituency and in whose custodythe electoral roll was kept. It contained the seal of the DeputyCollector and it was certified to be a true copy by the Record Keeper,and issued by the peshkar, of the Deputy Collector's office. There wasalso evidence to show that an application for the copy was made tothe Deputy Collector, and he had issued an order directing the peshkarto issue a certified copy. The nomination was, however, rejected bythe returning officer on the ground that the copy was not a " certifiedcopy" within the meaning of section 33(5) of the Representation ofthe People Act. In an election petition the Tribunal held that thecopy was a " certified copy " and that the nomination was improperlyrejected. On appeal to the High Court: Held, (i) that, as the Repre-sentation of the People Act, 1951, does not contain any definitionof " certified copy " and there is nothing in the Act to show that theconditions laid down in section 76 of the Evidence Act should becomplied with before a copy can be regarded as a certified copy forthe purposes of section 33(5) of the Act, the copy of the relevant entryfiled before the returning officer in this case must be regarded as acertified copy within the meaning of section 33(5) and the Tribunalwas right in holding that the nomination paper was wrongly rejected;(ii) even assuming that the expression " certified copy " in section 33(5)should be construed in the light of the definition of that expression insection 76 of the Evidence Act, as the Deputy Collector was theElectoral Registration Officer and the electoral roll was in his custody,and he had authorised the peshkar to issue the copy, and the copy borethe seal of the Deputy Collector, and was certified by the RecordKeeper, the copy in question was a " certified copy" within themeaning of section 76 of the Evidence Act; (iii) at any rate, even ifthere was any defect in complying with section 33(5), the defect wasnot one of a substantial character within the meaning of section 36(4)and the nomination paper was improperly rejected by the returningofficer. Rattan Anmol Singh v. Atma Ram (10 E.L.R. 41) distinguished.—MOHAN REDDY V, NEELAGIRI MURALIDHAR RAO, 14 E.L.R. 167.

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Under section 33(5) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, where the candidate is an elector of a different constituency hemust produce with the nomination or before scrutiny thereof, a copy ofthe electoral roll of that constituency or of the relevant part thereof ora certified copy of the relevant entries in such roll. The section itselfmakes a distinction between a copy and a certified copy. The sectionwill be complied with even if an ordinary true copy, e.g., an uncertifiedprinted copy, is produced if what is produced is a copy of the roll orof the relevant part thereof. A certified copy is necessary only if thecopy produced is that of the relevant entries in the roll.—ROSAMMAPUNNOSE v. K. BALAKRISHNAN NAIR AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 210.

Candidate, elector of another constituency—Duty to produce copyof electoral roll or part of the roll of that constituency—Provision, whethermandatory—Rejection of nomination for failure to produce such copy,whether improper—Granting of adjournment—Matter of discretion.—Theprovision contained in sub-section (5) of section 33 of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951, that where a candidate is an elector of adifferent constituency, a copy of the electoral roll of that constituencyor of the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevantentries in such roll shall be produced before the returning officer at thetime of scrutiny, if it has not been produced along with the nominationpaper, is a mandatory provision and the nomination of a candidate canbe properly rejected if this provision is not complied with. Whetheran adjournment should be granted to a candidate who has failed toproduce a copy of the electoral roll or of the relevant part thereof ora certified copy of the relevant entries even at the time of scrutiny asrequired by section 33(5), in order to enable him to comply with theprovisions of section 33(5) is a matter within the discretion of thereturning officer to be exercised by him in view of all the circumstancesof the case ; and if the returning officer in the proper exercise of hisdiscretion gives only a short adjournment and rejects the nominationon the expiry of the time allowed, for non-compliance with section 33(5)the rejection of the nomination cannot be said to be "improper".—BARU RAM V. SHRIMATI PRASANNI AND ANOTHER, 16 E.L.R. 127.

The provision contained in section 35 of the Representationof the People Act, 1951, that if the candidate is an elector of a differentconstituency he must produce at least before the scrutiny of thenominations a certified copy of the electoral roll of that constituencyor the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entryof such roll, is a mandatory provision and a nomination can berejected for non-compliance with this provision. Failure to producethe requisite copy is not a defect of an unsubstantial character. The

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 327

observations contained in the judgment of the Andhra High Court inMohan Reddy v. Neelagiri Muralidhar Rao (14 E.L.R. 167) that theprovisions of sections 33(5) and 36(7) of the Act do not precludeproof of the fact that the candidate was an elector in another con-stituency, by other means, do not correctly represent the effect ofthe relevant provisions of the Act.—BAKU RAM V. PRASANNI AND

OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 450. is.C]

When a statute requires specific facts to be proved in a specificway and it also provides for the consequence of non-compliance withthe said requirement the application of the penalty clause cannot beresisted on the ground that such an application is based on a technicalapproach.—BARU RAM V. PRASANNI AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 450. [S.G.]

Candidate, voter of another constituency—Duty to produce copyof roll in which his name appears—Omission to do so—Rejection of nomin-ation—Same returning officer for both constituencies—Whether rejectionimproper.—The provision contained in section 33(5) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951, that where a candidate who files anomination is an elector of a different constituency, a copy of theelectoral roll of that constituency or of the relevant part thereof or acertified copy of the relevant entries in such roll shall be producedbefore the returning officer at the time of scrutiny, is not directory butmandatory in its nature, and a nomination paper can be properlyrejected if the above-mentioned provision is not complied with. Thefact that the returning officer before whom the nomination is filed isalso the returning officer of the constituency, in the roll of which thecandidate's name is entered as a voter, would not render the rejectionof the nomination in such a case improper. While under section 33 ofthe Act before it was amended in 1956 it was the returning officer onwhom the duty was cast to verify from the electoral roll that the nameof the candidate appeared in the electoral roll of any constituency andhe was to direct the person presenting the nomination paper to producethe documents referred therein for the purpose of satisfying himselfthat the names in the nomination paper were the same as were enteredin the electoral roll, under the amended law the duty is on the candi-date to produce the relevant documents referred to in section 33(5).Baru Ram v. Prasanni (16 E.L.R. 450) applied.—CHAND SINGH V. SHAN-KARLAL, 20 E.L.R. 63.

Candidate, elector of different constituency—Duty to producecertified copy of entry in electoral roll—Copy produced containing correc-tions—Whether s. 33(5) complied with—Defect, whether substantial.—Theobject of section 33(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,is that there should be evidence that the candidate in question is an

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elector of a different constituency. If that fact is reasonably clear,and what purports to be a certified copy of the relevant entry relatingto him had been filed, any defect in the copy, even if it is a defectwhich consisted in an interpolation or a scoring off of any part of thecopy, will not amount to a defect of a substantial character within themeaning of section 36(4), and the nomination cannot be rejected fornon-compliance with section 33(5).—N. P. VELUSAMI THEVAR V. G. RAJANAINAR AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R.. 338.

Candidate of different constituency—Duty to produce copyof electoral roll or certified copy of entry therein—Whether mandatory—Production of certificate from election officer or other evidence that he is avoter, whether sufficient.—Where a candidate, who was an elector ofa different constituency, instead of either filing along with hisnomination or producing before scrutiny a copy of the electoral rollof that constituency, or of a relevant part thereof, or a certifiedcopy of the relevant entry in such roll, as required by section 33(5) ofthe Representation of the People Act, 1951, produced along with thenomination, a certificate purporting to be signed by the election officerto the effect that the candidate was a voter in a particular ward ofthat constituency and that his name appeared in the voter's list ofthat ward against a particular number, and his nomination was reject-ed by the returning officer for non-compliance with section 33(5):Held, that the provisions of section 33(5) were mandatory; theproduction of a mere certificate of this nature did not comply with theprovisions of section 33(5); and the returning officer acted properly inrejecting his nomination.—VINAYA KUMAR DIWAN V. RAGHUNATH-SINGH KlLEDAR, 22 E.L.R. 425.

-—Though the main purpose of section 33(5) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951, in insisting on the copies of the electoralrolls or of the relevant entry in those rolls is to enable the returningofficer to satisfy himself at the time of the scrutiny of the nominationpapers that the name of the candidate who happened to be an electorof a different constituency was present in the electoral roll of thatconstituency, in order to satisfy himself the returning officer cannotrely on any evidence other than that mentioned in section 33(5) of theAct.—VINAYA KUMAR DIWAN V. RAGHUNATH SINGH KILEDAR, 22 E.L.R.425-

Electoral roll number—Serial number of candidate in electoral roll—Giving the serial number in superseded roll—Validity of nomination—Absence of dispute as to identity of candidate, production of revised rollbefore scrutiny—Whether defect in nomination paper cured—Amendmentof errors at the time of scrutiny—Whether permissible.—The electoral roll

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of a constituency prepared in 1951 was superseded by another electoralroll which was prepared in 1952. In a nomination paper filed in 1953.after the first electoral roll had ceased to be in force and the roll of1952 had come into force, against column 8 (which relates to " theserial number of the candidate in the electoral roll of the constituencyin which his name is included ") the serial number of the candidate asit appeared in the electoral roll of 1951 was given and a certified copyof this electoral roll was also annexed to the nomination paper. A certi-fied copy of the roll of 1952 was produced at the time of scrutiny of nominations. The returning officer refused to allow the serial number to becorrected at the time of scrutiny and rejected the nomination paper onthe ground that it did not comply with section 33(1) of the Represent-ation of the People Act, 1951. In an election petition the Tribunalheld, by a majority (S. N. GURTU and R. K. RASTOGI) that thoughthere was a substantial defect in the nomination, as a certified copy ofthe electoral roll of 1952 was produced at the time of scrutiny and thecandidate's name appeared in that roll, and there was also no disputeas to the identity of the candidate, the nomination was improperlyrejected. The Chairman (A. N. KAUL) held that the mention of thecorrect serial number of the candidate in column 8 of the nominationpaper was material for determining not only the identity but also theeligibility of the candidate, and there was a substantial non-compliancewith the provisions of section 33 of the Act, that this defect was notcured by the production of a certified copy of the roll of 1952 at thetime of scrutiny and the nomination was therefore properly rejected.In an application to the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of theConstitution to quash the order of the Election Tribunal: Held (revers-ing the judgment of the majority and agreeing with the dissentingopinion of the Chairman)—(i) that giving the serial number of thecandidate in the superseded roll and not giving the number in the rollwhich was in force at the time of the nomination was equivalent togiving no number at all and amounted to a substantial non-compliancewith the provisions of section 33; (ii) the mistake was not merelya clerical or printing error which could be rectified or overlookedunder the proviso to section 33(5); (Hi) the error in the nominationpaper could not be rectified at the time of scrutiny; (iv) the opinionof the majority of the Tribunal that the defect in the nomination lostits substantial character on the production of the roll of 1952 as therewas no dispute about the identity of the candidate and the returningofficer could have easily seen from the copy of the roll of 1952 thatthe candidate was entered in that roll, was erroneous; and (v) thiserror was an error apparent on the face of the record and the High

ELD—42

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Court had power to issue a writ quashing the order of the Tribunal,under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.—BRIJ SUNDAR SHARMA

v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 216.

Description of proposer—Number of part of roll wrongly givenby mistake—whether defect substantial—Rejection of nomination, whetherproper.—When a wrong part number is furnished with regard to theproposer in a nomination paper it cannot be said that the nominationpaper has been duly completed in the prescribed form, but whetherthe defect is substantial or not will depend on whether it is such as todefeat the purpose of the requirement that the electoral roll numberof the proposer should be entered in the nomination paper, andobviously that purpose is to ensure that the proposer's name can bereadily located in the electoral roll so as to enable the returning officerto satisfy himself that the proposer is an elector of the constituency asrequired by section 33(1), before he accepts the nomination undersection 36(6). Whether a defect is substantial or not is not a questionto be answered in the abstract but is to be determined in relation tothe surrounding facts, the test, in a defect like the present, beingwhether the purpose of the information required to be furnished isdefeated. Where the purpose is not defeated the defect cannot beregarded as substantial. The two proposers for a nomination to aparticular constituency were electors in that constituency and qualifiedto act as proposers. The serial number of one of the proposers wasNo. 811 in Part 115 of the electoral roll and that of the other wasNo. 927 in Part i n . But, in furnishing the electoral roll numbers ofthe proposers in the nomination papers, while their serial numbers inthe respective parts and the name of the constituency were correctlyentered, the serial numbers of the parts in the roll were wronglyentered as 60, instead of 115 and 111 respectively, in both papers.The mistake arose because the part in question was No. 60 in the rollbefore the constituencies were reconstituted and the No. 60 was notproperly defaced in the printed copies. There was no dispute as to theidentity or eligibility of the proposers, but the nomination papers wererejected by the returning officer: Held, that in the circumstances ofthe case the mistake in the nomination papers was not a defect of asubstantial nature within section 36(4) of the Act and the nominationpapers were wrongly rejected.—ROSAMMA PUNNOSE V. K. BALA-

KRISHNAN NAIR AND ANOTHER, 14 E .L .R. 210.

Electoral roll number of proposer and candidate—Constituencydescribed fully in heading—Description not full in items (2) and (5) ofForm—Rejection of nomination—Propriety.—In a form of nominationthe name of the constituency was given in full as " Nowgong Assembly

NOMINATION OP CANDIDATES 331

constituency " in the heading, but against item No. 2 (electoral rollnumber of proposer) and item No. 5 (electoral roll number of candi-date), though the part of the electoral roll and the number of proposerand the candidate in the roll respectively, were correctly given, in thedescription of the roll only the word "Nowgong" appeared and it wasnot specifically stated that the roll was of the " Nowgong Assemblyconstituency." The nomination was rejected for non-compliance withsection 33(1): Held, that though the word " Nowgong " by itself maynot indicate the Nowgong constituency, as the word appeared incolumns (2) and (5) of the nomination paper in describing the part ofthe roll, " Nowgong " must obviously be taken to refer to the " Now-gong Assembly constituency " referred to in the heading of the form,and the defect, if there was any, in the form of nomination was not asubstantial one and the rejection of the nomination paper wasimproper.—DEV KANTA BAROOAH V. KUSHARAM NATH AND OTHERS ,

15 E.L.R. 66.

Omission to give serial number of part of roll—Whether substantialdefect.—Omission to give the serial number of the part of the electoralroll in which the names of the proposer and the candidate wereentered is a substantial defect which would justify the rejection of anomination. Where the name of the constituency of Durg in theLegislative Assembly was given in a nomination paper as " Durg Townconstituency " instead of " Durg Legislative Assembly constituency " :Held, that the word " Town " cannot be deemed to be a mere surplus-age as it had the effect of delimiting the constituency and did not giveproper notice of the constituency, and the defect was, therefore, of asubstantial nature justifying the rejection of the nomination.—

DHANRAJ DESHLEHARA V. ViSHWANATH YADAV TAMASKAR AND OTHERS,

15 E.L.R. 260.

Electoral roll number of proposer given as in original roll—Namescored out by supplementary list but re-entered against another number—Returning officer not aware of re-entry against another number—Rejectionof -nomination.—The electoral roll numbers of the proposers of twocandidates were 7852 and 7853 in the original electoral roll, and thesenumbers were shown in the nomination papers as the electoral rollnumbers of the proposers. Their names were, however, scored outagainst Nos. 7852 and 7853 by a supplementary roll and enteredagainst Nos. 1866 and 16970 respectively, in that list. At the time ofscrutiny of the nomination papers, as the returning officer found thatthe names of the proposers were scored out against numbers 7852 and7853, and the fact that their names were entered against Nos. 1866and 16970 was not brought to his notice by any one, he rejected the

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nomination. In an election petition the Tribunal held that thenomination papers were not improperly rejected by the returningofficer. On appeal: Held, that in a case such as the present one,where the nomination paper has been rejected on account of the failureto comply with any of the provisions of sections 33 under clause (d) ofsub-section (2) of section 36 as distinct from the requirements as toqualification mentioned in clause (a) of the same sub-section, theconsideration of the propriety or otherwise of rejection of the nomina-tion paper cannot be divorced from the state of evidence before thereturning officer at the relevant time, and under the circumstancesthe nomination papers could not be said to have been improperlyrejected by the returning officer. Dictum.—" To hold in such circum-stances that the nomination papers were improperly rejected by thereturning officer would open the door wide to much uncertainty,expense and chicanery of which there is perhaps already too much inelections." The requirement of mentioning the name and the electoralroll number of the proposer in the nomination form must be regardedas a matter of substance. The proviso to sub-section (4) of section 35makes it clear that the correspondence between the names andelectoral roll numbers as entered in the nomination papers with thoseentered in the electoral rolls need not be meticulously exact and anyclerical or technical error would be permitted to be corrected and anyclerical or printing error may be overlooked. All the same, thereshould not be so much divergence between the entries in the electoralrolls, that the returning officer is left in doubt as to whether theyrelate to the same person. If there is any such doubt and it is notresolved at the scrutiny stage, the returning officer has no alternativebut to reject the nomination.—RUP LAI. V. JUGEAJ SINGH,15 E.L.R. 484.

Electoral roll divided into several parts with separate series ofnumbers for voters—Omission to give number of part of roll—Whether fataldefect—Rejection of nomination—Legality. — Where a constituency isdivided into separate electoral areas and the electoral roll for eachsuch area forms a separate part of the electoral roll of the constituencywith a separate series of numbers for the voters in each part of the roll,omission to give the serial number of the part of the electoral roll inwhich the name of the candidate appears is a serious defect in anomination paper and the rejection of a nomination paper on theground that the serial number of the part of the roll in which thecandidate's name appears is not given in it would not be an improperrejection. The three items given in rule 2(i)(b) of the Representationof the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules,

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1956, are interconnected, each of them is equally important, andunless all of them are given in a nomination paper, the returningofficer may find it difficult to satisfy himself about the identity ofthe candidate and proposer without a lengthy examination of the rollsof all the parts.—NETRAM V. LAKSHMAN PRASAD AND OTHERS, 15

E.L.R. 266.

Omission to state constituency of proposer and candidate againstitems 2 & $ of Form 2B—Omission to give particulars sufficient to enablereturning officer to identify entries in roll as to proposer and candidate—Rejection of nomination paper, whether improper.—A constituencyconsisted of 414 villages. There were 1,37,106 electors and there werealso separate serial numbers for the electors of each village. Theelectoral roll of the constituency was not, however, divided into partsas required by the Rules. In the nomination papers filed on behalf ofa candidate the serial numbers of the proposer and the candidate inthe roll were given but neither the name of the constituency nor anyfurther particulars were given against items Nos. 2 and 5 of the formof the nomination paper, which would enable the returning officer toidentify the entries and to ascertain the constituency to which theproposer and the candidate belonged nor did any one offer to adduceany evidence at the time of scrutiny relating to these matters : Held,that the omission of the name of the constituency and other particularsagainst items Nos. 2 and 5 in the form of nomination was, in thecircumstances of the case, a defect of a substantial character withinthe meaning of section 36(4) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, and the returning officer acted properly in rejecting the nomina-tion papers.—RAMAYAN SHUKLA V. RAJENDRAPRASAD SINGH ANDANOTHER, 16 E.L.R. 491.

Electoral roll number — Description of constituency —Sufficiency of description—Interpretation of entries.—A nominationpaper for the Nowgong constituency of the Assam LegislativeAssembly contained a recital in the heading that the respondent wasthereby nominated as a candidate for election " from the NowgongAssembly constituency," but against Column No. 2 of the nominationpaper relating to the electoral roll number of the proposer and ColumnNo. 5 relating to the electoral roll number of the candidate, the entrywas " Assam Legislative Assembly constituency, Part No. 10 of theElectoral Roll of village Phulaniati, Mouza Hatichung, Police StationSadar, Nowgong, Roll No...". The returning officer rejected thenomination paper on the ground that the name of the constituency towhich the electoral roll related was not mentioned in Columns 2 and 5as required by section 33(4) of the Representation of the People Act,

334 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

1951. Held, agreeing with the findings of the Tribunal and the HighCourt, that, construed in the light of the description " NowgongAssembly constituency " in the heading of the nomination paper and,the electoral roll numbers given in the said entries which correspondedwith the roll numbers of the Nowgong Assembly constituency, theentries in Columns 2 and 5, clearly referred to the Nowgong cons-tituency, and the rejection of the nomination paper on the ground thatit did not comply with section 33(4) was improper. Kusharam Nath v.Dev Kanta Barooah (15 E.L.R. 66) affirmed.—DEV KANTA BAROOAH

v. KUSHARAM NATH AND OTHERS, 21 E.L.R. 459. [S.C.]

Though the returning officer would be well advised tocompare the names and electoral roll numbers of the candidate andhis proposer as entered in the nomination paper with those entered inthe electoral rolls when the papers are presented and, if he does so,the technical error of omission of the name of the constituency wouldbe detected and could be allowed to be corrected at the time of thepresentation of the nomination paper itself, failure of the returningofficer to follow this procedure would not cure the defect, if there hasbeen a failure to comply with the provisions of section 33(1) on thepart of the candidate in not filing a nomination paper completed inthe prescribed form. Such a defect could not be allowed to be remediedat the time of scrutiny at which the only jurisdiction of the returningofficer is to see whether the nominations were in order and to hearand decide the objections.—DAHU SAO V. RANGLAL CHAUDHARY AND

OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 299.

In order to judge about the substantial character or otherwiseof the defect in a nomination paper, the fact that no objection wastaken before the returning officer and he did not feel any difficulty inlocating the name of the candidate or proposer in the electoral roll ofthe constituency, is a material factor to be considered.—DAHU SAO V.RANGLAL CHAUDHARY AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 299.

Where the electoral roll of a constituency is not given anypart number, but it is divided municipal-ward-wise and ward numbersare given, non-mention of the part number is not a defect in thenomination paper. In the absence of the part number in the electoralroil a proposer is left to his discretion either not to give any distinc-tive mark of the portion of the electoral roll where the names of theproposer and of the candidate are to be found entered, or to givesuch distinctive mark as he may think fit and proper.—DAHU SAO V.RANGLAL CHAUDHARY AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 299.

Proposer giving his serial number in Parliamentary roll insteadoj his number in the Electoral College list—Rejection of nomination—

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 335

Legality—Defect, whether substantial.—Where, in the nomination of acandidate for a seat in the Council of States for the Union Territoryof Delhi, the proposer, instead of giving his serial number in thelist of members of the electoral college for that territory, mentionedhis serial number in the electoral roll of the Parliamentary cons-tituency of the Chandni Chowk constituency (of Delhi), and hisnomination was rejected under section 36(2X6) of the Representationof the People Act on the ground that there was a failure to complywith the provisions of section 33 of the Act: Held, that, as the serialnumber of the proposer in the list of members of the electoral collegeof the Union Territory of Delhi was not stated in the nominationpaper, there was a failure to comply with the provisions of section 33of the Act; that this was a defect of a substantial character in thenomination paper, and it was, therefore, properly rejected.

Held further, that the failure* of the returning officer to satisfyhimself about the identity of the proposer, would not cure this defectin the nomination paper ; and the fact that the returning officer hadrefused to allow an adjournment to enable the petitioner to call theproposer for purposes of identification was also immaterial, as therewas a substantial defect in the nomination paper itself.—BRIJ BEHARIv. MIRZA AHMAD ALI, 22 E.L.R. 455.

Omission to fill in name of constituency or number of part ofelectoral roll—Returning officer finding no difficulty in identification—Defect, whether substantial—Rejection of nomination—Whether can besupported on grounds not raised before returning officer—Scrutiny—Power to adjourn for further scrutiny.—Where, in a nomination paperfor the Dhanbad constituency of Bihar, the name of the consti-tuency " Dhanbad " was mentioned in the blank space in the head-line, and in the two blank spaces in the next line the name of thecandidate was written at the place where it ought to have been writ-ten, but in the second blank space, instead of the name of constituency" Dhanbad " the word " Bihar " was written by mistake as the nextwords were " Vidhan Sabha " : Held, that, as the head-line suffici-ently and clearly indicated that the nomination was for the " Dhan-bad " constituency, the mistake in the line below the head-line was amistake of an unsubstantial character and was not a ground forrejecting the nomination paper under section 36(4). Ramayan Shuklav. Rajendra Prasad Singh (16 E.L.R. 491) followed.—DAHU SAO V.RANGLAL CHAUDHARY AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 299.

Name of candidate entered in two electoral rolls of same consti-tuency—Nomination under one roll—Vote cast under other roll—Validity

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of election.—A person is not disentitled to stand for election for a seatin a constituency merely because he has been registered twice as a voterin the electoral rolls of the constituency. The respondent was regist-ered as a voter in roll No. 572 of a constituency and also in rollNo. 816 of the same constituency. His nomination paper was filed onthe basis of roll No. 572 and he cast his vote on the basis of rollNo. 816. In an election petition it was contended that the provisionsof section 18 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, were notcomplied with and that, therefore, he was not qualified to fill a seatin the Legislative Assembly and his election was liable to be declaredvoid: Held, merely because the name of the respondent appearedmore than once in the electoral roll of the constituency, it cannot besaid that the nomination of the respondent for being elected was voidor that there has been any non-compliance with the provisions of theConstitution or the Act of 1951, within the meaning of sub-clause (iv)of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 100 of the Act of 1951.—RAMNARAIN v. RAMACHANDRA, 15 E.L.R. 100.

Scheduled Castes—Wrong description of sect in the nominationpaper—Rejection of nomination.—If in truth a candidate was a memberof a Scheduled Caste and has stated so in his declaration, the fact thathis religion was not mentioned, or was wrongly mentioned, in thedeclaration is not a ground for rejecting his nomination paper.Lakshmana Pillai v. Chengam Pillai and Others (2 E.L.R. 103)relied on.—RATTAN SINGH V. DAVINDAR SINGH AND OTHERS (NO. 2),11 E.L.R. 67.

Schedule Caste candidate—Adi-Dravida declaring himself as" Hindu-Harijan "—Defect, whether substantial—Rejection of nomination—Legality.—Where a candidate for a seat reserved for the ScheduledCastes who was in fact an "Adi-Dravida," described himself merelyas " Hindu-Harijan " in the declaration in the nomination form whichhas to be made under section 33(2) of the Representation of the PeopleAct of 1951, by candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes: Held,that, as "Hindu-Harijan" is not mentioned as one of the ScheduledCastes in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, there was apatent defect in the declaration ; but the defect was not of a substan-tial character, as the term " Hindu-Harijan " includes Adi-Dravidas,and the nomination could not be rejected on the ground that it did notcomply with the provisions of section 33(2) of the Act. LakshmanaPillai v. Chengam Pillai (3 E.L.R. 103) followed.—K. PARTHASARATHI

v, NATARAJA ODAYAR AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 201.

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Dismissed Government servant—Provision that a certificate thatthe dismissal was not for corruption or disloyalty must accompany nomi-nation paper—Whether ultra vires—Sufficiency of particulars—Mereallegation thzt respondent has not "obtained" such certificate and hisnomination was "improperly accepted," whether discloses ground forsetting aside election—Application for amendment to clarify allegation—Power to allow amendment.—It was alleged in an election petition thatthe nomination of the respondent was improperly accepted by thereturning officer, because the respondent was a person who was dismis-sed from Government service and he had not obtained a certificatefrom the Election Commission that he was not dismissed for corruptionor disloyalty as required by section 33(3) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951. On objection being taken that the petition did notcontain sufficient averments, an application was made for amendmentof the relevant paragraph by adding the words " and such certificatedid not accompany the nomination paper of the respondent and theacceptance of this nomination materially affected the result of theelection." The Tribunal declined to permit the amendment on theground that it raised a new ground and altered the nature of thepetition and dismissed the election petition : Held, (i) that the petitiondisclosed a ground falling within section xox(i){d){i) of the Act; (ii) thatthe allegation that the respondent had not " obtained " a certificateunder section 33(3) necessarily implied that he had not produced acertificate along with the nomination paper and, as the improperacceptance of the nomination was of the returned candidate himself,a specific allegation that the result of the election was materiallyaffected was also implied, and the amendment did not, therefore, raisea new ground or alter the nature of the petition, and the Tribunalacted wrongly in disallowing the amendment and dismissing thepetition: Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (12 E.L.R. 461)referred to. The main object of insisting on the pleadings being clearis that the other party may have proper notice of the ground of attackwhich he has to meet. The pleadings are not to be scrutinised withmeticulous care and the form is not of importance. The importantthing is whether in substance the petition contains the particularground of attack or not. Sub-section (3) of section 33 of the Repre-sentation of the People Act, 1951, which provides that if the candi-date is a person who had been dismissed from Government service, acertificate from the Election Commission that he has not been dismis-sed for corruption or disloyalty to the State, must also accompanythe nomination paper does not contravene article 14 of the Consti-tution. The Legislature has not made any discrimination between

PLD-43

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Government servants, but on the other hand, it has made a reasonableclassification dividing Government servants into two categories, viz.,(i) those who had been dismissed, and (ii) those who had ceased to beGovernment servants for other reasons. The ground of the classifi-cation was also connected with the object of the enactment which wasto prevent undesirable persons who have once been found guilty ofcorruption or disloyalty from being permitted to seek election to theLegislature within a period of five years of their dismissal.—SHRIKRISHNA AGARWAL V. S. M. BANERJI, 19 E.L.R. 466.

Election agents—Appointment of election agent—Omission tofile Form $A with nomination—Whether ground, for rejecting nomina-tion—Duty to enquire whether Form 5A was signed before delivery ofnomination.—A nomination paper which is otherwise in order,cannot be rejected simply for the reason that Form 5A was notdelivered along with it. But, where Form 5A is not filed with thenomination, an enquiry has to be made whether the appointment ofthe election agent had been made and the agent had accepted hisappointment, in Form 5A, before the nomination paper was deliveredto the returning officer.—Gurdial Singh v. Manmohan Kaur andOthers (10 E.L.R. 450) followed.—RANBIR SINGH V. BEANT SINGH ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. 182.

Proposal or seconding by Government servant—Validity ofnomination.—The nomination of a candidate is not illegal or voidmerely because the person who has proposed or seconded the candi-date in the nomination paper is a Government servant. But, if theproposal or seconding was part of a plan to help the candidate infurthering his prospects in the election, the provisions of sec-tion 123(8) may be attracted.—Raj Krushna Bose v. Binode Kanungoand Others (9 E.L.R. 294) relied on.—MATADIN CHAURASIA V. MAHENDRAKUMAR MANAV, 12 E.L.R. 144.

Objections as to disqualification—Objection not raised duringscrutiny—Acceptance of nomination whether " improper".—Where, eventhough a person was in fact disqualified under article 191 of the Consti-tution, if none of the rival candidates raised any objection to his nomi-nation and there was nothing to show at the time of the scrutiny of thenominations that he was disqualified and his nomination was there-fore accepted by the returning officer, the nomination cannot be saidto have been "improperly accepted" by the returning officerwithin the meaning of section ioo(2)(c) of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951.—BASAWARAJ K. NAGUR V, B. R. SHIDUNGAPPA,12 E.L.R. 168.

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 339

Omission to raise objection as to age—Right to raise objection inelection petition.—The fact that the petitioner had not taken beforethe returning officer the objection that a person who had beenproposed as a candidate was not qualified to stand as a candidate ashe was below the prescribed age, would not debar him from seekingto have election of that candidate declared void by means of anelection petition on the ground that he was disqualified under theConstitution to be chosen as a candidate as he was below the prescrib-ed age.—N. SANKARA REDDI V. YASHODA REDDI AND OTHERS, 13E.L.R. 34.

Objections not raised before returning officer—Whether can beraised before Tribunal—Scope of enquiry by Tribunal.—The enquiry beforethe Tribunal in a petition to set aside an election on the ground thatthe nomination of a candidate was improperly rejected by the return-ing officer must be restricted to the objections that were raised to thenomination before the returning officer. Even though the Tribunal hasjurisdiction to adjudicate upon the truth and validity of those objec-tions on relevant evidence or material which was not placed before thereturning officer, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to investigate intothe truth or validity of objections to the nomination which were notput forward before the returning officer, and which he had thereforeno occasion to consider.—RAJA NAINAR V. VELUSAMI THEVAR, 13E.L.R. 231.

Rejection by returning officer—When rejection " improper "—Power of Tribunal to find that nomination was improperly rejected onmaterials which were not before the returning officer—Form of nomination—Filling up by proposer, candidate and returning officer—Meaning of" by ".—Where an election is sought to be declared void on the groundthat a nomination was improperly rejected, the question to be decidedby the Tribunal is not whether on the materials available to thereturning officer at the time of the scrutiny of the nominations he actedimproperly in rejecting the nomination, but whether on all the factsof the case as established by the evidence adduced by the parties beforethe Tribunal during the trial of the election petition, the nominationwas improperly rejected. The decision of the Supreme Court in DurgaShankar Mehta's case (9 E.L.R. 494) does not lay down that in decidingwhether a nomination was " improperly rejected " the Tribunal cannotlook into fresh materials which were hot available to the returningofficer, and take a view different from that of the returning officer onsuch fresh materials. When neither the candidate or the proposer noranyone on their behalf were present at the time of the scrutiny ofnominations, and objection was raised to the nomination on the ground

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that the signature of the proposer was not genuine, and the returningofficer, there being no evidence before him to disbelieve the testimonyof the objectors, rejected the nomination : Held, that though thereturning officer had not acted improperly in rejecting the nominationon the materials before him, yet it was open to the Election Tribunalto permit the parties to adduce fresh evidence on the question whetherthe signature of the proposer was genuine and on the evidence soadduced come to the conclusion that the nomination was improperlyrejected.—PARMESHWAR KUMAR V. LAHTAN CHAUDHARY, 14E.L.R. 444.

Power to uphold rejection of nomination on other grounds.—Indetermining whether a nomination was improperly rejected, the Elec-tion Tribunal is not bound to confine its enquiry to the ground onwhich the returning officer rejected it. Even if the ground on whichthe returning officer rejected the nomination could not be sustained,the rejection cannot be held to be improper if the Tribunal finds otherfatal defects in the nomination.—DHANRAJ DESHLEHARA V. VISHWA-

NATH YADAV TAMASKAR AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 260.

Objection to nomination not raised—Whether acceptance improper—Election of candidate whether non-compliance with law.—A nominationcannot be said to have been " improperly accepted " within the mean-ing of section ioo(i)(d)(i) and an election cannot be set aside on thisground, if though the candidate was disqualified under section y(d) onthe date of the nomination, no objection was raised to the nominationbefore the returning officer at the stage of nomination. Durgah ShankarMehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others (9 E.L.R. 494) relied on.Where a candidate who was disqualified under section y(d) on the dateof nomination but whose disqualification had ceased before the date ofthe election is declared elected there is a non-compliance with theprovisions of article i02(i)(eO of the Constitution and this is a groundfor setting aside an election under section ioo(i)(d)(iv).—LAL SHYAMSHAH V. V. N. SWAMI, 16 E.L.R. 74.

Rejection—Scope of inquiry before Tribunal.—The question whe-ther a nomination was improperly accepted or rejected has to bedetermined by the Election Tribunal on all relevant evidence adducedby the parties during the trial of the election petition. The inquiryshould not be restricted to the materials placed before the returningofficer.—RAMKISHUN SINGH AND ANOTHER V. TRIBENI SINGH ANDOTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 81.

New grounds of disqualification not raised before returning officer—Whether can be raised and enquired into by the Tribunal.—In deter-mining whether the nomination of a candidate was "improperly

NOMINATION Ot CANDIDATES 3 4 !

rejected" within the meaning of section 100(1 )(c) of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951, the scope of enquiry before the ElectionTribunal is not limited to the particular grounds of disqualificationwhich were raised before the returning officer and on the basis of whichthe nomination was rejected. It is open to a party to the electionpetition to plead that the candidate whose nomination was rejectedwas also disqualified on grounds other than those which were raisedbefore the returning officer, and the Election Tribunal has jurisdictionto enquire into the new grounds of disqualification; and, if the Tribunalfinds on inquiry that the candidate was disqualified on any of thegrounds mentioned in section 36(2), whether such ground was raisedbfore the returning officer or not, it cannot hold that the nominationwas improperly rejected within the meaning of section IOO(I)(C). Anelection petition, even when it raises a question under section IOO(I)(C)

is not in the nature of an appeal against the decision of the returningofficer but is an original proceeding and it is open to the parties toadduce fresh evidence even on the pleas raised before the returningofficer. When a question is raised in an election petition as to thepropriety of the rejection of a nomination paper, the point to bedecided is about the propriety of the nomination and not the decisionof the returning Officer on the materials placed before him. ChiranjiLai v. Lahri Singh (15 E.L.R. 397) and Hari Vishnu Katnath v. SyedAhmed Ishaque (10 E.L.R. 216) explained. Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas(2 E.L.R. 301), Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur (9 E.L.R. 193),Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Yadav Tamaskar (15 E.L.R. 260) andBadrivishal Pittie v. J. V. Narsingh Rao (16 E.L.R. 183) approved. RajaNainar v. Veluswami Thevar and Others (13 E.L.R. 231) reversed.—VELUSWAMI THEVAR V. RAJA NAINAR AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 181.[S.G.]

Where a nomination has been objected to before the returningofficer on certain grounds and the nomination has been rejected,additional grounds of attack can be taken with regard to the validityof the nomination before the Tribunal to uphold the order of rejection.Veluswami Thevar v. Raja Nainar (17 E.L.R. 181) and S. M. Banerjee v.Sri Krishna Agarwal (22 E.L.R. 64) relied on.—DAHU SAO V. RANGLALCHAUDHARY AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 299.

Improper rejection—Presumption—Rebuttal—Nature of evid-ence necessary for rebuttal.—Held, per NAWAL KISHORE and KRISHNA

SAHAI.—Where the nomination of a candidate is improperly rejected,the electorate is deprived of its right to give their votes in his favourand there is a strong presumption that the result of the election hasbeen materially affected thereby, and it is for the respondent to show

342 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

that the result of the election has not been materially affected by theimproper rejection ; (ii) this presumption is not an irrebuttable one,but very strong and convincing evidence is necessary to rebut i t ; (iii)while on the one hand a decision that the result of the election has notbeen materially affected cannot be arrived at on mere conjectures orsuspicions or on the opinion of the witnesses, the evidence on the pointcannot be wholly shut out or ignored on the ground that it is bound tobe of a conjectural nature. DALIP SINGH—Even in the case of an improperrejection of a nomination paper the burden of proving that the resultof the election was materially affected is on the petitioner accordingto the plain meaning of section IOO(I)(C) and the petitioner must provein the affirmative by positive evidence that the result of the electionhas been materially affected by the improper rejection of the nomina-tion. The difficulty of proving the fact cannot be got over by intro-ducing the fiction of a presumption and it cannot be invariablypresumed in every case of improper rejection from this fact alone thatthe electorate has been deprived of its right to vote. There may becases in which the candidate whose nomination paper was rejected wasa dummy, or would not have contested the election seriously, or wouldhave withdrawn from the contest if his nomination paper had not beenrejected. In such a case the entire electorate would not be deprived ofits right to vote and no presumption would arise. It is therefore, aquestion of fact in each case depending upon the evidence led by theparties whether a presumption should be drawn or not and a presump-tion cannot be drawn merely from the argument that the entire elec-torate has been deprived of its right to vote for a candidate whosenomination has been rejected. Even if there is any such presump-tion, it may be rebutted by the evidence and the circumstances of thecase. [Nature of the evidence that would rebut such presumptiondiscussed.]—DALIP SINGH V. SURENDRA NATH AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R.120.

Improper acceptance of nomination—Candidate below age—Admissibility—Whether case falls within sec. IOO(I)(C) or sec. ioo{2)(c).—One of the grounds on which an election as a whole was impugned in anelection petition was that the nomination paper of one of the candi-dates X, was improperly accepted as he was below 30 years of age. Itwas contended, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in DurgaShankar Mehta's case (9 E.L.R. 494) that the question raised was onecoveredby section i.oo(.2)(c) and not by section IOO(I)(C), and an issuewas raised whether " the case as regards nomination of X came withinthe purview of section IOO(I)(C) or section ioo(2)(c). When evidenceas to the age of X was sought to be adduced it was again objected,

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 343

that evidence as to the age was inadmissible inasmuch as, even if Xwas below 30 years the case would be covered by section ioo(2)(c).The Tribunal overruled the objection and the petitioner applied to theHigh Court for a writ for excluding such evidence: Held, that thequestion whether such evidence should or should not be admittedwas a matter within the discretion of the Tribunal and the HighCourt would not interfere.—DR. BRIJE'NDRA SWARUP V. ELECTIONTRIBUNAL, LUCKNOW, AND OTHERS, I I E.L.R. 188.

Improper acceptance—When acceptance " improper "—Whetherresult of election materially affected—Principle of Vashist NarainSharma's case—Whether applicable to selection by single transferablevotes.—Per RAGHUNANDAN SARAN, SANYAL and FARUQI—The accept-ance of the nomination of the respondent's son was " improper"within the meaning of section IOO(I)(C) of the Act as he was below 30years of age and the electoral roll, which was filed with the nomina-tion, itself showed that the age was below 30 years. Per RAGHUNANDANSARAN and FARUQI (SANYAL, dissenting)—Though the acceptance of thenomination of the first respondent's son was improper, as the numberof votes secured by the first respondent's son was less that the differ-ence between the number of votes secured by the first respondent andthe next successful candidate, the principle laid down by the SupremeCourt in Vashist Narain Sharma's case (10 E.L.R. 30) was applicableand the result of the election could not be held to have been materiallyaffected by this improper acceptance. Per SANYAL—The principlelaid down.in Vashist Narain Sharma's case is not applicable to the caseof an election by single transferable votes, where it is not possible todecide the probable result of an election on simple arithmeticalcalculations as in the case of ordinary elections where votes are castseparately for the different candidates; and the result of the electionmust, in the circumstances of the case, be held to have been materiallyaffected by the improper acceptance of the nomination of the firstrespondent's son.—RATAN SHUKLA V. DR. BRIJENDRA SWARUP ANDOTHERS, 11 E.L.R. 332. ,

Improper rejection of nomination—Whether election wholly void.—Where a nomination paper was improperly rejected on the groundthat the candidate was disqualified under section y(a) while in fact hewas not so disqualified: Held, that the case was covered by sectionIOO(I)(C) of the Act and the election was wholly void.—K. P. KARI-YAPPA v. H. M. CHANNABASAPPA, VENKATA GOWDA AND OTHERS, I IE.L.R. 484.

Improper acceptance—Effect—Necessity of proof that the resultof election was materially affected.—Where a nomination has been

344 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

improperly accepted, the mere fact that the wasted votes are greaterthan the margin of votes between the returned candidate and thecandidate securing the next highest number of votes will not lead tothe necessary inference that the result of the election has beenmaterially affected. That is a matter which has to be proved and theonus of proving it lies upon the petitioner. It will not do merely tosay that all or a majority of the wasted votes might have gone to thenext highest candidate. Vashist Narain Sharma v. Deo_ Chandra (10E.L.R. 30) applied.—BASAWARAJ K. NAGUR V. B. R. SHIDLINGAPPA, 12E.L.R. 168.

Improper rejection—Presumption that result of election wasmaterially affected—-Finding that result was affected—Interference inspecial appeal—Double-member constituency—Improper rejection of candi-date for general seat —Whether whole election void.—In an election for adouble-member constituency the nomination of a candidate for thegeneral seat was rejected on the ground that the thumb marks of theproposer and seconder to his nomination paper were not attested by amagistrate who was duly authorised by the Election Commission toattest such thumb-marks. In an election petition the majority of theTribunal held that the rejection of the nomination was improper asthe nomination paper was attested by a magistrate who was in factduly authorised by the Election Commission even though the fact ofsuch authorisation had not been communicated to the returningofficer. They held further that there was a presumption where anomination was improperly rejected that the result of the election hasbeen materially affected, and declared the whole election, includingthe election of the candidate for the reserved seat, to be void. Inspecial appeal to the Supreme Court: Held, (i) as the Tribunal hadfound as a fact that the persons whose thumb impressions the nomina-tion paper purported to bear had really proposed and seconded thecandidate, and that those thumb impressions had been attested by amagistrate who had in fact been authorised in that behalf, theTribunal was right in holding that the nomination paper wasimproperly rejected; (ii) though the words of section IOO(I)(C) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951 (before it was amended in1956), were general, and applied equally to cases of improper accept-ance as well as improper rejection of a nomination, there is a materialdifference between the two cases, which has been recognised in theseveral decided cases, and the view of the Tribunal that in the case ofan improper rejection there is a presumption that the result of theelection has been materially affected, was correct; (iii) that the findingof the Tribunal that the election had been materially affected by the

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 345

improper rejection of the nomination was a finding of fact and inspecial appeal the Supreme Court will not go into the evidence to seewhether that finding was correct; (iv) that the Tribunal was justifiedin declaring the election of the candidate* to the reserved seat also voidas the election for the two seats was an integral whole and section ioo(i)(c) of the Representation of the People Act provides that in suchcases the election must be declared to be " wholly void." DalipSingh v. Surendra Nath and Others ( n E.L.R. 120) affirmed.—SURENDRANATH KHOSLA AND ANOTHER V. DALIP SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R.370. [S.c.l.

Improper acceptance—Evidence required to prove that the resultof election was materially affected.—A, the successful candidate at anelection, got 1,398 votes, the next candidate, B, got 1,337 votes, andthe next one, C, got 997 votes. It was found that the nominationpaper of B was wrongly accepted. B and C were candidates put upby the same political party, and there was oral evidence to show thatif B's nomination had been rejected at the time of scrutiny the partywould have set up C only. Some witnesses also gave evidence that allthe votes cast for B would have gone to C if B's nomination had beenrejected: The Tribunal held distinguishing Vashist Narain Sharma'scase that the evidence was sufficient for coming to a finding that theresult of the election was materially affected by the improper accept-ance of B's nomination. There was an appeal to the Supreme Court,but, as the Assembly had ceased to exist and neither of the partiesappeared before the Court, the appeal was dismissed by the SupremeCourt with the remark that the Court was " reluctant to decide animportant legal question of this kind" in this appeal.-^-YAMUNAPRASAD v. JAGDISH PRASAD KHARE AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 1.

Improper acceptance of invalid notice of retirement.—There isno distinction in principle between improper rejection of a nominationand improper acceptance of an invalid notice of retirement; and aconclusive presumption that the result of the election has been mate-rially affected arises in the latter case also.—RANDHIR SINGH V. SURAJBHAN, 15 E.L.R. 146.

Wrongful acceptance—Proof that result was materially affected—Sufficiency of proof—Necessity of amending the law.—The party whowishes to get an election declared void on the ground of improperacceptance of a nomination has to establish that the result of the pollhad in fact been materially affected by the improper acceptance. Todo this, it has to be proved that the votes would have been divided insuch a way that the returned candidate would have been unsuccessful.

ELD—44

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Obiter: " We cannot help expressing with regret that the law is as itis. It is quite obvious that the law should not contemplate the doingof an impossible task by a candidate who is contesting the election ofa returned candidate on such grounds. The law should provide for aburden of proof which would be capable of being humanly dischargedand not a burden which no person can hope to discharge. We hopethat the Legislature will intervene and deal with this question astheir Lordships of the Supreme Court have already expressed ".—INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIVANCHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R.219.

Improper rejection—Scope of enquiry.—Where an objection israised to the nomination of a candidate before the returning officer onthe ground that the candidate was disqualified to be chosen as acandidate and the nomination is rejected by the returning officer onthis ground, and in an election petition it is contended that the nomina-tion was " improperly rejected", it is open to the respondent tosupport the order of rejection on grounds of disqualification whichwere not raised before the returning officer, and if the Tribunal findsthat the candidate was really disqualified, even though such dis-qualification arose from grounds not raised before the returning officer,the Tribunal cannot hold that the nomination was "improperlyrejected " within the meaning of section IOO(I)(C) of the Representationof the People Act.—BADRIVISHAL PITTIE V. J. V. NARSINGH RAO, 16E.L.R. 183.

Improper acceptance—When result of election materially affected.—Under section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,as amended in 1956 improper rejection of a nomination byitself is enough to declare the election void. But if there isan improper acceptance of any nomination, it is necessary for thepetitioner to prove further that the result of the election so far as itconcerns a returned candidate has been materially affected. Wherethe votes cast in favour of the candidate whose nomination has beenimproperly accepted exceed the difference between the votes securedby the successful candidate and the petitioner, it becomes a questionof fact depending upon evidence whether all the wasted votes wouldhave gone to the petitioner and the improper acceptance has con-sequently affected the result of the election. There is no presumptionthat all such votes would have gone to the petitioner; it is for him toprove that all of them would have gone to him and that, therefore,the result of election has been materially affected.—RAGHUNATHMISRA v. KISHORE CHANDRA DEO BHANJ AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 321.

OFFENCES 347

OFFENCES

Offences—Whether non-compliance with rules—Validity of elec-tion.—Committing an act which is an offence under the Rules(e.g., carrying identity cards of candidates to the polling station) isnot a non-compliance with the rules within the meaning of sectionioo(i)(i)(w).—NAUNIHAL SINGH V. KISHORILAL PALIWAL AND OTHERS,

21 E.L.R. 33.

POLL(See also BALLOT PAPERS & VOTING.)

Delay in commencing poll—Voters returning without voting—Whether ground for setting aside election—Necessity of proof that resultof election was materially affected—Nature of proof required.—An elec-tion cannot be set aside for delay in commencing the poll unless it isalso proved that this irregularity has materially affected the resultof the election. Evidence which merely shows that a certain numberof voters who had come at the proper time went away is not sufficientto prove that the result of the election has been materially affected.The petitioner ought to establish by clear proof not only the numberof voters who went away, but also the fact that they did not returnand vote. It is further necessary to establish that such voters as didnot exercise their franchise would have- voted in his favour and thatthis would have materially affected the result of election so far as;thereturned candidate was concerned. There must be similar evidenceeven in the case of a non-compliance with rule 22(2) of the Conductof Elections and Election Petitions Rules, 1956. Vashist NarainSharma v. Dev Chandra (10 E.L.R. 30) and Basappa v. Nagappa (10E.L.R. 14) applied.—BUGGAVETI KRISHNAYYA V. LAKSHMIKANTAMMA

AND ANOTHER, 18 E.L.R. 476.

Change of place—Necessity of consent of Election Commission.—It was notified that the voting for a particular area in which therewere 840 voters would be held at Tangaliapara Lower PrimarySchool, but, as the Primary School of the village was shifted to thevillage of Chakabausi after the notification, the poll was held at theChakabausi Primary School without a fresh notification. Out of the481 votes which were polled, the appellant got 418 votes and therespondent 63 votes at this centre and the appellant having obtained224 votes more than the respondent on the whole, he was declaredelected. In a petition to set aside the election of the appellant andfor a declaration that the respondent was duly elected, the electionof the appellant was set aside by the Tribunal: On appeal, Held, (i)that there was a contravention of section 25 of the Representation of

348 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the People Act, 1951, inasmuch as the sanction of the Election Com-mission had not been obtained for holding the election at the Chaka-bausi Primary School; that under the circumstances, the returningofficer was bound to adjourn the poll and proceed in the manner laiddown in section 57, and as he had not done so there was non-comp-liance with section 57 also; (ii) that under the circumstances, as 359persons had not voted, the respondent must be deemed to have dis-charged the burden of proving that the result of the election hadbeen materially affected by the non-compliance with the Act eventhough it was not proved by the respondent that more than 224persons out of the 359 voters who had not voted at the Chakabausipolling station would have voted for him, and (iii) the election of theappellant was rightly set aside by the Tribunal.—TAJUDDIN AHMED V.DHANIRAM TALUKDAR, 18 E.L.R. 193.

False information given to polling officer that a candidate haswithdrawn—Ballot box of such candidate not placed in polling booth.—Where the ballot boxes of the petitioner and another candidate werenot placed in the polling booth until 11-30 a. m. owing to false infor-mation given to the polling officer that they had withdrawn theircandidature, but there was no reliable evidence on the record to showthat the respondents or their election agents or polling agents wereresponsible for giving this false information to the polling officer or toshow that this was done with the consent of either the respondents ortheir election agents: Held, (i) that this did not amount to any cor-rupt practice mentioned in section IOO(I)(6) of the Act; (ii) assum-

' ing that the matter fell under section IOO(I)(^)(M), the election couldnot be set aside unless it was proved that the election, in so far as itconcerned the returned candidates, was materially affected; (iii)assuming that the failure to place the boxes till 11-30 a. m. wouldamount to improper reception, refusal or rejection of any votewithin section ioo(i)(i)(m) or to non-compliance with any provisionof the law or rules within section ioo(i)(d)(w), the election could not beset aside even then, unless the result of the election was materiallyaffected thereby so far as it concerned the returned candidates. [Thedistinction between the provisions of clause (b) and clause (i)(ii) ofsub-section (1) of section 100 explained.]—SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V.

S. A. DANGE AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

POLLING AGENTS

Appointment of Government servants as polling agents—Villageheadmen of Uttar Pradesh as polling agents.—It is now settled law thatthe village headmen of Uttar Pradesh are persons serving under the

POLLING AGENTS 349

Government of the State within the meaning of section 123(8), butthere is no legal bar to the appointment of a village headman, or infact any person serving under the Government, as a polling agent;nor is there any legal bar to his acting as such, provided he confineshimself to only such functions in connection with the poll as areauthorised under the law.—KUSHWAQT RAI V. KARAN SINGH ANDOTHERS, I I E.L.R. I .

Appointment of polling agent—Form of appointment signed bycandidate—Name of agent filled up by another—Validity of appointment—Appointing Government servant as polling agent—Corrupt practice undersec. 123(7)—Proof that polling agent assisted in the furtherance of candi-date's election, whether necessary—Scope of Expl. (2) to sec. 123—Absence of knowledge of candidate that polling agent was a Governmentservant, whether relevant.—Where a candidate has personally signed aform of appointment of polling agent and delivered it to anotherwith the intention that it should be filled up, and the name of thepolling agent is filled up by the latter, the appointment of the pollingagent is by the candidate himself and not by a person acting as hisagent. If a person has been appointed as a polling agent and he actsas a polling agent, under Explanation (2) to section 123 of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, as amended in 1956, he mustbe deemed to have assisted the candidate in the furtherance of theprospects of the candidate's election without any further proof of hishaving done so ; the intention of the candidate in procuring the assist-ance is therefore, irrelevant, and knowledge of the candidate as towhether the person whose services had been procured was a personin the service of Government or not, is also irrelevant. The questionof mens rea or intention or knowledge of the candidate does not arisein the case of a corrupt practice of this nature under the Indianlaw. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, HimachalPradesh, in Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh Pal and Another (16 E.L.R. 45)affirmed.—Y. S. PARMAR V. HIRA SINGH PAUL AND ANOTHER, 16E.L.R. 483. [S.C.I

Appointment—Proof of signature—Nature of evidence.—Theappointment of a polling agent has to be made in the manner prescrib-ed in section 46 of the Representation of the People Act; where thecandidate denies that he has put his signature to the form of appoint-ment and there is no evidence at all to show that the candidate hadsigned the form of appointment, the appointment of the person as apolling agent cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the pollingagent had signed the form and presented it to the presiding officerand had also acted as a polling agent. Where the candidate denies

350 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

that he put his signature to the form of appointment, his signaturehas to be proved in the manner prescribed in sections 45, 47 and 67of the Evidence Act. Assuming that the signature of a person can belegally held to be proved on circumstantial evidence, it is only if thecourt is satisfied that the circumstantial evidence irresistably leads tothe inference that the appellant must have signed the form, that thecourt can legitimately reach such a conclusion.—BARU RAM V. PRA-SANNI AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 450. [S.C.I

PRESIDENTElection of President—Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to enquire

into doubts relating to election—Whether jurisdiction can be exercisedbefore completion of election—Application for enquiry and stay of election—Maintainability.—The jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Courtby article 71(1) of the Constitution to enquire into and decide " alldoubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with the electionof the President or Vice-President" is a jurisdiction which is to beexercised after the entire process of the election is complete and acandidate is declared to be elected as President or Vice President, asthe case may be. An application to the Supreme Court under arti-cle 71(1) to enquire into and decide a " doubt" in connection withthe election of the President, before the election is complete, and fora direction to the Election Commission to stay the polling in connec-tion with the election until such enquiry is made, is incompetent andwill not be entertained by the Supreme Court. This view is supportedalso by sections 14 and 18 of the Presidential and Vice-PresidentialElection Act, 1952.—DR. NARAYAN BHASKAR KHARE V. ELECTION COM-MISSION OF INDIA AND PT. RAM NATH KALIA V. ELECTION COMMISSIONOF INDIA AND ANOTHER, 13 E.L.R. 112. [S.C]

Election of President—Petition to quash election—Petition notcomplying with Act 31 of 1952 and Supreme Court Rules—Maintain-ability—Act 31 of 1952, whether ultra vires—Right to apply to set asideelection—Statutory right.—The petitioner, describing himself as anintending candidate for the Presidential election and alleging thatthere had been violations of the provisions of the Constitution in theelection of the President, made an application to the Supreme Courtunder article 71(1) of the Constitution praying " that grave doubtsthat exist in connection with the Presidential election be enquiredinto, resolved and decided " and "the entire proceedings of the Presi-dential election be quashed as void ".—Held, that the petition was insubstance a petition " calling in question " the election of the Presi-dent within the meaning of section 14 of the Presidential and

RECRIMINATION 351

Vice-Presidential Elections Act (XXXI of 1952) and it had therefore tocomply with the provisions of the said section and Order XXXVII-Aof the Supreme Court Rules; and since the petition did not complywith these provisions it was not maintainable. Held further, that theabove said Act XXXI of 1952 and Chapter XXXVII-A of the SupremeCourt Rules did not contravene article 71(1) of the Constitution,which conferred upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction to enquire intoand decide all disputes and doubts arising out of the election of thePresident, and are not ultra vires on this ground. Held also, that thepetitioner had no right merely because he was a citizen to apply tothe court under article 71(1) to set aside the election of the Presidenton the ground that the election was held in breach of constitutionalprovisions. The right to make such an application is determined andregulated by Act XXXI of 1952 and the petitioner had no rightapart from that conferred by the statute to make an application ofthis nature.—DR. N. B. KHARE V. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA, 13E.L.R. 318. [S.C.]

RECRIMINATION

Plea by elected candidate that some of his votes were wrongly rejectedand petitioner's votes wrongly accepted.—It is open to the elected candi-date who is the respondent in an election petition to take up the pleathat some of his votes were improperly rejected and some of the votesof the petitioner were improperly accepted even though he has notfiled a separate recrimination petition under section 97 of the Repre-sentation of the People Act or has not included such a plea in therecrimination petition filed by him. Such a plea does not fall withinthe ambit of section 97 of the Act.—LAKSHMI SHANKAR YADAV V.KUNWAR SRIPAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 47.

Period prescribed for giving notice of recrimination expiring onholiday—Notice given on re-opening day—Whether valid—Applicabilityof General Clauses Act, sec. 10—Days notified as holidays by High Court—Whether holidays for Election Tribunal.—Section 10 of the GeneralClauses Act, 1897, applies to the interpretation of section 97 of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951. There is nothing in theExplanation to section 30 or in section 97 of the latter Act showingan intention to exclude the operation of section 10 of the GeneralClauses Act in the construction of section 97. In order to attract theapplication of the provisions of section 10 of the General Clauses Act1897, all that is requisite is that there should be a period prescribedand that period should expire on a holiday. Consequently, if theperiod of 14 days prescribed by section 97 of the Representation of

352 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the People Act, 1951, for giving notice of recrimination expires on aday on which the office of the Tribunal is closed, such notice given onthe next day on which the office of the Tribunal is open would bewithin time. A public holiday declared by the High Court for observ-ance of civil courts should be considered to be a public holiday forthe Election Tribunal, particularly when the sole member constitutingthe Election Tribunal is a District Judge, who observes these publicholidays and whose office, therefore, remained closed that day.—Harinder Singh v. Karnail Singh (12 E.L.R. 421) applied.—KAUSHA-LENDRA PRASAD NARAYAN SlNGH V. R.P. SlNGH AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R.

385-Claim for declaration that petitioner was duly elected—Notice of

recrimination—Withdrawal or abandonment of claim—Whether permissible—Applicability of 0. 23, r. 1, C.P.C—Scope of s. go(i)—Difference betweenmatters of procedure and powers of Tribunal—Nature of election petitions—Right of electors on withdrawal of petition or death of petitioner, tocontinue petition.—-Where a person has filed an election petition con-taining a claim for a declaration that he himself or any other candidatehas been duly elected, in addition to a declaration that the election ofthe returned candidates or any of them is void, the Election Tribunalhas no power, either under Order 23, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, orunder any other provision of law, to permit him to withdraw or abandonthe claim, for a declaration that he himself or any other candidate hasbeen duly elected. Under section 87 of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, as soon as an election petition containing a claim fora declaration that the petitioner or any other candidate has been dulyelected, is filed, the respondent and other parties to the petition get aright to give evidence to prove that the election of the petitioner orsuch other candidate would have been void, if he had been returnedand an election petition had been filed questioning that election, andan election petitioner cannot be permitted to deprive them of thisright by abondoning or withdrawing his claim for a declaration that hehimself or any other candidate has been duly elected. The provisionsof the Representation of the People Act, 1951, constitute a self con-tained code governing the trial of election petitions and, in spite ofsection 90(1) of the Act, the provisions of Order 23, rule 1, of the CivilProcedure Code, are not applicable to the trial of election petitions byElection Tribunals. The Act treats the procedure for the trial beforethe Tribunal and the powers of the Tribunal separately, and section 90provides only for the procedure for the trial. An election petition oncefiled is not a contest only between the parties thereto but continuesfor the benefit of the whole constituency and it cannot come to an end

REORGANISATION OF STATES 353

by the withdrawal thereof by the petitioner or by the death of thepetitioner or by the death, or withdrawal of the opposition, by therespondent, but is liable in such cases to be continued by any personwho might have been a petitioner.—INAMATI MALLAPPA BASAPPA V.DESAI BASAVARAJ AYYAPPA AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 296. [S.C.I

REORGANISATION OF STATES

Reorganisation of States. —Law empowering Chairman of LegislativeCouncil to specify two of the sitting members for elimination frommembership—Chairman himself a sitting member—No test, standard orclassification prescribed for selecting the members to be eliminated—Validity of the law—Rule that no one shall be judge in his own cause—Fundamental right of equality before the law and equal protection of thelaws.—Sub-section (3) of section 35 of the States Reorganisation Act(XXXVII of 1956) provided with regard to the Madras LegislativeCouncil that " the two sitting members of the said Council represent-ing the West Coast (Local Authorities) Constituency and such two ofthe six sitting members representing the Madras (Graduates) Consti-tuency, and such two of the eighteen sitting members elected by themembers of the Legislative Assembly, as the Chairman of the saidCouncil shall by order specify shall, on the appointed day, cease to bemembers of the said Council." One of the sitting members of theMadras (Graduates) constituency applied for a writ of prohibition orother appropriate writ directing the Chairman of the LegislativeCouncil, to forbear from exercising his powers under section 35(3) onthe ground that the said provision of law offended article 14 of theConstitution and was void and inoperative : Held, that section 35(3),in so far as it invested the Chairman of the Madras Legislative Councilwith power to specify by order two of the sitting members of theMadras (Graduates) constituency who should cease to be members ofthe Council from the appointed day, offended against article 14 of theConstitution and was therefore void and inoperative under article 13,inasmuch as the said provision of law enabled the Chairman, who wasalso a sitting member, to be a judge in his own cause and to discri-minate in his own favour, and further gave to the Chairman anabsolute and uncontrolled discretion to specify the members to beeliminated, and thereby violated the fundamental right of equalitybefore the law and equal protection of the laws guaranteed byarticle 14.—DR. V. K. JOHN V. CHAIRMAN, MADRAS LEGISLATIVECOUNCIL AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 345.

Reorganisation of States and Delimitation—Redistribution ofwards in constituencies—Preparation of fresh electoral rolls, whether

ELD-45

354 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

compulsory.—The States Reorganisation Act and the DelimitationOrders do not require the re-writing of the electoral rolls or the pre-paration of new complete electoral rolls for the new constituencies.Rule 24 of the Representation of the People (Preparation of ElectoralRolls) Rules, 1956, empowers the Election Commission to put togetherthe electoral rolls of such of the existing constituencies or parts thereofas are comprised within new constituencies and by making such altera-tions in the arrangement, serial number, and heading of the rolls socompiled as may be appropriate. The only condition precedent totheir validity is that they should be published as required by rule 23.—BHAWANI PRASAD TIWARI v. JAGADISH NARAYAN AWASTHI ANDOTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 143.

RES JUDICATA

Petitioner praying for several reliefs against A and B—Objectionby A and B that Tribunal has no jurisdiction to inquire into corrupt prac-tices alleged against them—Objection upheld by single judge—Appeal byB alone—Division Bench holding Tribunal has no jurisdiction—Applica-tion by A for writ to quash order of Tribunal finding him guilty—Main-tainability—Principle of res judicata—Applicability to election enquiries—Principles not applicable to orders passed without jurisdiction.—An electionpetition was filed against A and B, the two returned candidates, pray-ing (a) that the election be declared wholly void, (b) that the electionof both the candidates be declared void, and (c) for a finding that therespondents had committed certain corrupt practices mentioned insection 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Therespondents contended that prayer (b) was barred by limitation andcould not be enquired into by the Tribunal. This contention wasfinally upheld by the High Court. When the hearing was resumed bythe Tribunal the respondents contended that the Tribunal had nojurisdiction to inquire into matters covered by prayer (c) as they couldhave relevance only to prayer (b). This plea was overruled by theTribunal, and the Tribunal's order was confirmed by a Single Judgeof the High Court. B appealed against the decision but A did notappeal. In the appeal of B, a Division Bench of the High Court heldthat the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to enquire into the corruptpractices alleged, as prayer (c) had no existence apart from a prayer (b).Meanwhile, as no stay order had been obtained, the Tribunal foundA and B guilty. B applied for a writ and obtained a decision of theHigh Court quashing this order. In a similar writ application by A itwas contended that, as A had not appealed from the Single Judge'sdecision, this decision was binding on A and on the analogy of theprinciple oires judicata he could not contend that the Tribunal had

RETIREMENT OF CANDIDATE 355

no jurisdiction to enquire into the corrupt practices alleged against himand find him guilty. Held, that, as the Division Bench had decidedthat the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to inquire into the matterscovered by prayer (c), the principle of res judicata could not be invokedagainst A, notwithstanding the fact that he had not appealed fromthe decision of the Single Judge ; and, as the Single Judge had pnlydecided the abstract question of law whether the Tribunal had juris-diction to proceed with the inquiry and there was no adjudicationof any legal right of any party, his decision could not operate as resjudicata, for this reason also ; the finding of the Tribunal that A wasguilty of the corrupt practice under section 123(7) being without juris-diction was liable to be quashed.—DR. A. SRINIVASAN V. G. VASANTHAPAI AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 453.

The principle of res judicata has no application to orderspassed without jurisdiction.—DR. A. SRINIVASAN V. G. VASANTHA PAIAND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 453.

See also ELECTION PETITION.

RETIREMENT OF CANDIDATE *-Notice of retirement " not later than ten days "—Whether both

the day of the poll and the day of the delivery of notice have to be excluded—Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act, i8gy, whether applicable.—In deter-mining whether a notice of retirement from contest has been deliveredon a day " not later than 10 days prior to the date fixed for the poll "as required by section 55A (2) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, the day of the poll as well as the day on which the notice wasdelivered have to be excluded. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act,1897, which provides that where by an Act or regulation, any act isdirected or allowed to be done in any court or office on a certain dayor within a prescribed period, then, if the court or office is closed onthat day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act shall bedeemed to have been duly done if it is done on the next day on whichthe court or office is open, is not applicable to section 55A of theRepresentation of the People Act. Where the date fixed for the pollwas the 10th March, 1957, and the notice of retirement was deliveredon the 28th February, 1957, the 27th being a public holiday:Held, that the last day on which the notice could be delivered was the27th February and not the 28th and accordingly the notice was notdelivered within the prescribed period and as section 10 of the GeneralClauses Act was not applicable to the case, the notice cannot be deemedto have been delivered in due time.—RANDHIR SINGH V. SURAJ BHAN,15 E.L.R. 146.

* Section 55A h as since been deleted fiom the Act by Act 58 of 1958.

356 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

The words " not later than ten days prior to the date fixedfor the poll" in section 55A (2) of the Representation of the PeopleAct, do not mean that notice of retirement from contest under section55A should be given 10 clear days before the date fixed for the poll.Where the date fixed for the poll was 10th March, 1957, and notice ofretirement was given on the 28th February, 1957: Held, that thenotice was given within the time prescribed in section 55A (2). Section10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, is applicable to the filing of anotice of retirement under section 55A, and if the period within whichnotice has to be given under section 55A (2) expires on a holiday, thenotice can be given on the next working day.—SURAJ BHAN V. RANDHIRSINGH, 15 E.L.R. 460.

The expression " not later than ten days prior to the date ofthe poll" in section 55A (2) of the Representation of the People Actdoes not mean that the notice of retirement should be given ten cleardays before the date of the poll. It means notice can be given up toten days before the date of the poll. Where the date of the poll was25th February, 1957, and notice of retirement was given on the 15thof February, 1957: Held, that the notice was given within the timeprescribed in section 55A (2).—HOTI LAL V. RAJ BAHADUR, 15 E.L.R. 55.

Notice of retirement—Period for filing notice.—The provisioncontained in section 55A (2), that a notice of withdrawal must bedelivered to the returning officer " not later than ten days before thedate fixed for the poll " does not mean that ten clear days shouldelapse between the date of delivery of the notice and the date of thepoll. Where the date fixed for the poll was the 4th March, 1957, andthe notice was delivered on the 22nd February, 1957 : Held, that thenotice was delivered within the time prescribed by section 55A (2).—CHAKRAPANI v. CHANDOO AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 271.

Retirement—Time for giving notice of retirement—" Ten cleardays before date fixed for poll," meaning of—Validity of notice—Omis-sion to give notice to other candidates.—-Under section 55A(2) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, notice of retirement of acandidate had to be delivered to the returning officer between thehours of 11 o'clock in the forenoon and 3 o'clock in the afternoon of"any day not later than ten days prior to the date fixed for poll."Where the date fixed for the poll was 25th February, 1957, and a noticeof retirement was delivered on the 15th February, 1957, and it wascontended that the last day for presenting the notice was the 14thFebruary. Held, that, on a proper interpretation of the term " anyday not later than ten days prior to," the notice delivered on the

RETURNING OFFICER 357

15th February, was delivered within the time prescribed by section55A (2). Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ekbal v. <§• Co. (A.I.R. 1945 Bom.316) distinguished.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. LAL BAHADUR, 20 E.L.R.176.

——Rule 16(2) was made for the purpose of informing the candi-dates who continued as contesting candidates up to the time of poll, thatone of their rival candidates duly nominated had retired from thecontest and, if that purpose was served, literal compliance with thatrule was not necessary, nor should it be required.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR

v. LAL BAHADUR, 20 E.L.R. 176.

The second part of the form of retirement is independent ofthe first part wherein the candidate gives notice of his retirement fromthe contest, and in cases where the form is presented by the candidate

' himself, the second part becomes redundant and unnecessary, and anextra signature of the candidate in the redundant part cannot, in anyway, affect the validity, of the first part which contains the notice ofretirement, provided the candidate himself presents this notice to thereturning officer.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. LAL BAHADUR, 20 E.L.R. 176.

If the notice of retirement is presented in accordance withsection 55A of the Act and within the time prescribed by that provisionof law, the retirement becomes effective without any acceptance by thereturning officer. It is the act of presentation that makes a notice ofretirement effective and if the presentation was noted down by thereturning officer on the notice of retirement, omission to note the timeof presentation or acceptance will not vitiate the notice of retirement.—MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. LAL BAHADUR, 20 E.L.R. 176.

Failure of the returning officer to supply copies of the noticeof retirement to the remaining candidates as required, by section 55Awill not affect the validity of the notice of retirement.—MUBARAKMAZDOOR V. LAL BAHADUR, 20 E.L.R. 176.

Improper retirement—Effect of.—Improper retirement fromcontest does not stand on the same footing as improper rejection of anomination and an election cannot be declared to be void merelybecause a candidate had retired without giving notice of retirementwithin the time prescribed by section 55A (2). Judgment of the Elec-tion Tribunal, Rohtak, in Randhir Singh v. Suraj Bhan (15 E.L.R. 146)reversed.—SURAJ BHAN V. RANDHIR SINGH, 15 E.L.R. 460.

RETURNING OFFICERDecision of returning officer as to age—Whether final.—The

decision of a returning officer during scrutiny of nominations that aparticular candidate was over 25 years of age is not final and it is open

358 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

to the petitioner in a petition to set aside the election of that candi-date, to prove that he was below 25 years and was thereforedisqualified under article 173 (b) of the Constitution, to be elected as acandidate.—KARAM BAPANNA DORA V. SYAMALA SEETHARAMAYVA

AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 463.

Whether judicial officer.—A returning officer is not in any realsense a judicial officer, but he is an executive officer.—SHAH SANKAL-

CHAND MOTILAL v. SHUKLA DAMUBHAI CHHAGANLAL, 12 E.L.R. 184.

Acceptance of nomination—Power to review order—Orders ofreturning officer, whether judicial.—The respondent filed nominationsfor a Parliamentary constituency and a State Assembly constituency.The returning officer accepted the nomination for the Parliamentaryconstituency as no objection was raised by any one to it. On thescrutiny of the nomination for the Assembly constituency, an objectionwas raised that he was disqualified under section j{e) of the Repre-sentation of the People Act. This objection was upheld by the returningofficer, and he, thereupon, rejected his nomination for the Parliamentaryconstituency also. It was contended that the rejection of the nomi-nation for the Parliamentary constituency was improper as he had nopower to review his order: Held, that until the question of accept-ance or rejection of a nomination was decided judicially in accordancewith the procedure laid down in section 36 of the Act, the returningofficer had the power to reject the nomination till such time as thelist of validly nominated candidates has not been made and affixed tohis notice board under sub-section (8) thereof, and the order of thereturning officer rejecting the nomination of the respondent to theParliamentary constituency also, was not improper.—RAMAKANTKESHEORAO HULDURKAR v. BHIKULAL LAXMICHAND CHANDAK,

15 E.L.R. 467.

Informal advice, effect of.—If a candidate chooses to consult thereturning officer informally and the advice given by the returningofficer turns out to be wrong, it cannot be said that the returningofficer has contravened any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules.—BASAVIAH v. BACHIAH AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 293.

Whether necessary party of election petition.—See ELECTION

PETITION (PARTIES), p. 281.

SCHEDULED CASTES AND TRIBES[See also DOUBLE-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES supra.]

Mazhabi Sikhs—Whether Scheduled Castes—Wrong descriptionof sect—Rejection of nomination—Legality.—Under the Constitution(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, Balmikis or Chuhras and Mazhabis aremembers of the Scheduled Castes, and to the general rule that only

SCHEDULED CASTES AND TRIBES 359

those professing the Hindu religion can be members of the ScheduledCastes there is an exception that Mazhabis shall be deemed to bemembers of a Scheduled Caste whether they are Hindus or Sikhs.The respondent, when he stood as a candidate at the general electionshad stated that he was a Balmiki Hindu and not a Sikh. His electionwas set aside and at the time of the bye-election he made a declarationthat he was a Mazhabis Sikh, alleging that he had accepted Sikhism :Held : (i) that Hindu Chuhras or Balmikis are called Mazhabi Sikhson conversion to Sikhism; (ii) that the respondent did not cease to be 'a member of a Scheduled Caste on embracing Sikhism in view of theprovisions of the Scheduled Castes Order of 1950; (iii) even if theallegation of conversion was not true he would still be a HinduBalmiki and would remain a member of a Scheduled Caste ; and thedescription as a Mazhabi Sikh instead of a Hindu Balmiki would beonly a technical defect not of a substantial character and his nomina-tion paper was not liable to be rejected on the ground that he was nota member of a Scheduled Caste.—RATTAN SINGH V. DAVINDAR SINGHAND OTHERS (NO. 2), 11 E.L.R. 67.

Member of Scheduled Tribe—Change of religion—Effect—Proofof conversion—Status of Konda Doras and Muka Doras.—A member ofthe Scheduled Tribe does not cease to be a member of that Tribe byembracing the Christian or any other religion. The condition thatno person who professes a religion different from Hinduism shall bedeemed to be a member of the Scheduled Caste does not apply tomembers of the Scheduled Tribes. The Election Tribunal has nojurisdiction to decide whether any part or group of a Tribe mentionedin the schedule relating to the Scheduled Tribes has ceased to belongto that Tribe. If any part or group of a Scheduled Tribe has ceased tobelong to that Tribe it is for the President after consultation with theGovernors concerned to amend the schedule. In deciding the effect ofconversion to another faith there are three factors which have to beconsidered, viz., (1) the reactions of the old body, (2) the intentions ofthe individual himself, and (3) the rules of the new order. If the oldorder is tolerant of the new faith and sees no reason to outcaste orex-communicate a convert and the individual himself desires andintends to retain his old social and political ties the conversion is onlynominal for all practical purposes and when we have to consider thelegal and political rights of the old body the views of the new faithhardly matter. The-new body is free to ostracise and outcaste the-convert from its fold if he does not adhere to its tenets but it canhardly claim the right to interfere in matters which concern thepolitical rights of the old body when neither the old body nor the

360 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

convert is seeking either legal or political favours from the new asopposed to purely spiritual advantage. A member of the Muka DoraTribe does not cease to belong to that Tribe and become a Kshatriyaby merely wearing the sacred thread or following Kshatriya habits.—GADIPALLI PARAYYA v. BOYINA RAJAYYA AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 83.

Scheduled Tribes—Khasis of Assam—Person born of Europeanfather and Khasi mother—Joining Auxiliary Force as Anglo-Indian—Nomination for seat reserved for Khasis—Rejection of nomination-yLegality—Membership of Scheduled Tribe—Tests—Purity of blood —Domicile—Whether Anglo-Indian can be member of Scheduled Tribe—Claiming double privilege—Meaning of " Tribe ".—There is nothingin the Constitution or any other provision of law debarring a personwho is an Anglo-Indian within the definition of that term inarticle 366(2) of the Constitution, from claiming the privileges of amember of a Scheduled Tribe under the Constitution, if he is alsoa member of a Scheduled Tribe. The question whether a person whosefather was a European and whose mother was a member of the Khasitribe is or is not a member of the Khasi tribe will have to be deter-mined by the courts when they are required to adjudicate upon thatquestion, as a " Khasi tribe " is not defined in the Constitution or inthe Representation of the People Act. The test which will determinethe membership of that individual will not be the purity of bloodalone, but his own conduct in following the customs and the way oflife of the tribe, the way in which he was treated by the communityand the practice amongst the tribal people in the matter of dealingwith persons whose mother was a Khasi and father was a European.The mere fact that such a person is an Anglo-Indian and that he gothimself enrolled in the Auxiliary Force on the ground that he was anAnglo-Indian does not debar him from claiming that he is a memberof the Khasi tribe and is, as such, entitled to stand as a candidate forthe seat reserved for the Khasi tribe. There is nothing in the Actwhich lays down that a person who claims to be a British subject ofEuropean descent in the male cannot be a Khasi or that by claiming tobe of European descent in the male line, he forfeits his right tocontinue to be a member of the Khasi tribe. There is no apparentcontradiction between the two positions. There is also no question ofthe candidate enjoying a double privilege in such a case, inasmuch as,if he was chosen for the seat reserved for Anglo-Indians and also theseat reserved for the Khasi tribe, he would have to resign one of theseats. Per DEKA, J.—The question whether a person belongs to aparticular community or tribe must be decided in a common sensepractical way rather than on theoretical or theocratic grounds. "Tribe"

SCHEDULED CASTES AND TRIBES 361

is, in the main, a political rather than a domestic group, with commonspeech as its main characteristic. The father of the appellant was anEnglishman who married a Khasi woman. The appellant had neverseen his father. He had from his childhood lived among the Khasis,and excepting a daughter of his, who had married a Bengali andanother who married an American, all his children were married toKhasis. The appellant himself had married a Khasi woman. He allegedfurther that under the practice prevalent among the Khasi tribalpeople, any one who was born of a Khasi mother was regarded as amember of the Khasi tribe. The appellant occupied an importantposition among the Khasis and was a founder member and a memberof the executive committee of a political organisation called the "KhasiNational Durbar", which came into existence in 1923. He was also amember and treasurer of the District Tribal Union which was a branchof the Eastern India Tribal Union, and an elector and treasurer of theFederation of the Khasi States. He was also a candidate both for theParliament and the State Legislative Assembly of Assam as a memberof the Khasi tribe and had filed his nomination in the last election, andthis was accepted. His nomination for the present elections was rejectedand the rejection was upheld by the Tribunal on the ground (i) that hewas not a Khasi of pure blood and was an Anglo-Indian, and (ii) that,at any rate he had, claiming that he was an Anglo-Indian, enjoyed theprivileges of an Anglo-Indian by joining the Auxiliary Force and soforfeited his right to be regarded as a Khasi: Held, (i) that on theevidence adduced in the'case the appellant was a member of the Khasitribe ; (ii) assuming that the appellant was an Anglo-Indian, and hadclaimed and enjoyed the privileges of an Anglo-Indian, that did notdebar him from claiming that he was also a member of the Khasi tribeand seeking election for the seat reserved for the Khasi tribe.—WILSONREADE v. C. S. BOOTH AND OTHERS, 14 E.L.R. 480.

Conversion to Buddhism—What constitutes abandonment of Hindureligion and acceptance of Buddhism—Mere declarations, whether sufficient—" Professes a religion ", meaning of.—Article 330 of the Constitutionof India confers a very valuable right on persons belonging to thecastes and tribes which are declared as Scheduled Castes and ScheduledTribes, either by an Order of the President or an Act of the Parlia-ment ; and they should not be deprived of this right unless there isvery satisfactory evidence to establish the facts contemplated byparagraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Theword " professes a religion" in paragraph 3 of the Constitution(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, means publicly enters a religious order ;and in order to attract the provisions of this paragraph it has to be

ELD—46

362 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

established that the person concerned has in fact publicly entered areligion different from the Hindu or Sikh religion. Mere declarationsfalling short of this are not sufficient. Where the evidence showedthat the respondent who was a Mahar became Member of the ReceptionCommittee and the Propaganda Committee of the Deeksha ceremonywhich was arranged for the mass conversion of Scheduled Caste peopleto the Buddhist religion on or about the 14th October, 1956, and thathe was present at the ceremony but there was nothing to show thatthe respondent had also taken the oath abandoning the Hindu religionand accepting the Buddhist religion which was administered on theoccasion to those who wanted to become Buddhists: Held, that theevidence was not sufficient to establish that the respondent had ceasedto be a member of the Scheduled Caste.—NARAYAN RAO WAKTUKARWADE v. PUNJAB RAO HUKAM SHAMBHARKAR AND ANOTHER, 14

E.L.R. 1.

Commission to Buddhism—Sufficiency of proof.—The evidenceshowed that the respondent who was a Mahar became Member of theReception Committee and the Propaganda Committee of the Deekshaceremony which was arranged for the mass conversion of ScheduledCaste people to the Buddhist religion on or about the 14th October,1956, and that he was present at the ceremony but there was nothingto show that the respondent had also taken the oath abandoning theHindu religion and accepting the Buddhist religion which wasadministered on the occasion to those who wanted to becomeBuddhists: Held, that the evidence was not sufficient to establish thatthe respondent had ceased to be a member of the Scheduled Caste.—NARAYAN RAO WAKTU KARWADE V. PUNJAB RAO HUKAM SHAMBHARKAR

AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 1.

Scheduled Caste candidate getting more votes than non-ScheduledCaste candidates—Whether can be declared elected to general seat—Separatenomination for general seat, whether necessary—Reservation of seats forScheduled Castes and Tribes—Legal basis and effect of reservation—5.54(4)R. P. Act, whether discriminatory and ultra vires—Applicability to two-member constituencies—Effect of Delimitation Commission Act—Meaningof " remaining candidates ".—In a two-member constituency, one ofthe seats of which was reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the otherwas not, the first respondent who was a member of the ScheduledCaste got the highest number of votes, viz., 1,77,275, and he wasdeclared elected. The second respondent, who was also a member ofthe Scheduled Caste and who had filed four nomination papers, all ofwhich contained a declaration that he was a member of a ScheduledCaste, got 1,49,667 votes, and the petitioner who was not a member

SCHEDULED CASTES AND TRIBES 363

of a Scheduled Caste, and had filed a nomination for the general seatgot 1,46,698 votes. The returning officer, relying on the provisionsof section 54(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, andthe illustration thereto, declared the second respondent as duly electedto the general seat. The petitioner challenged this declaration on theground that, since the second respondent was a member of the Sche-duled Caste and had filed nominations only for the reserved seat, hecould not be declared elected to the general seat, and the petitionerwas therefore entitled to be declared elected to that seat: Held, (i)that the provisions of the Constitution of India relating to ScheduledCastes and Scheduled Tribes have not created any separate electoratesor separate constituencies for them, but have only secured for themthe minimum number of seats according to the population by reserv-ing a certain number of seats ; (ii) it is not necessary for a memberof a Scheduled Caste to file a separate nomination for the general seatin order to entitle him to be declared elected to the general seat;(iii) the declaration in the form of nomination that the candidate is amember of a Scheduled Caste does not mean that the nomination is forthe reserved seat alone, but only means that he is also qualified tostand for the reserved seat; (iv) section 34(0) does not mean that ifa Scheduled Caste candidate deposits Rs. 250 only, he can stand forthe reserved seat alone; it gives a general concession to members ofthe Scheduled Caste whether they are nominated for the general orthe reserved seat; (v) section 34(a) does not offend article 15 ofthe Constitution as clause (4) thereof contemplates special provisionsfor the advancement of Scheduled Castes; (vi) there is nothing in theDelimitation Commission Act of 1952 which conflicts with section 54of the Representation of the People Act or makes section 54(4) andthe illustration thereof inapplicable to two-member constituenciesin which one seat is reserved for Scheduled Castes or ScheduledTribes and the other is not; nor is section 54(4) or the illustrationdiscriminatory or contrary to the principles enunciated in articles 14,15 or 330 of the Constitution; (vii) the returning officer actedrightly in declaring the second respondent duly elected to thegeneral seat. The expression "remaining candidates" in section 54(4)of the Act includes also candidates qualified to fill reserved seats, butwho have not been elected to fill those seats.—DIGAMBAR RAO BINDUv. DEV RAO KAMBLE AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 41.*

Filing two nominations—Right to be elected for one seat only,general or reserved—Failure to allot more than one symbol.—Even though

•This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Digambar Rao BinduV. Dev Rao Kamble and Others, 21 E.L.R. 213. See pp. 229—230 supra.

364 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

a person may file two or more nominations, he cannot be elected tomore than one seat in a constituency, and consequently, there is noneed under rules 10 and 21 of the Representation of the People (Con-duct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1956, to allot to himmore than one symbol and more than one ballot box. One of thenominations filed by a Scheduled Caste candidate who has filed twonominations cannot, therefore, be said to have been improperly reject-ed merely because two symbols and two ballot boxes were not allottedto him.—JHUMAKLAL V. AMBIKA SAO AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 477.

Conversion—Nature of evidence required—Quantum of proof.—It is possible that members of a Scheduled Tribe may in course of timeadopt certain customs and practices in vogue among the Hindus, butin order to bring them within the fold of Hinduism it would takegenerations. Even if they come within the fold of Hinduism, thequestion would arise whether they have formed separate sects amongthemselves, or they would belong to the 4th class or to the twice-bornclass. This will again depend on the circumstances and differentconsiderations. That apart, the mere performance of the ceremoniesor adopting the ceremonies of the higher classes of Hindus would notbe enough to remove them from the fold of the original tribe unless,reactions of the old body, the intentions of the individual himself andthe rules of the new order, are shown. Evidence which merely showsthat a member of a Scheduled Tribe and his family members werefollowing the manners and customs of the twice-born Hindus wouldnot be sufficient to prove that he or the members of his family hadceased to be members of the Scheduled Tribe and become twice-bornHindus. Judgment of the Election Tribunal, Hyderabad, in V.V. Giriv. Dippala Suri Dora and Others (15 E.L.R. 1) reversed.—DIPPALASURI DORA V. V. V. GIRI, 16 E.L.R. 1.*

Reservation seats—Object and legal effect.—Article 130 of theConstitution has only secured for the Scheduled Castes and theScheduled Tribes the minimum number of seats according to theirpopulation. It has not created any separate electorates for them, norhas it created separate constituencies for them and the Constitutiondoes not preclude them from getting more seats as citizens of India.A candidate for the reserved seat may be elected to the General seatif he gets the highest number of votes; 15 E.L.R. 1 reversed.—DIPPALA SURI DORA V. V. V. GIRI AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. i.*

Objection that the candidate is not member of Scheduled Tribe—Duty of the returning officer to decide the question—Accepting nomination

*The judgment in 16 E.L.R. 1 was affirmed by the Supreme Court in V. V. Giriv. Dippala Suri Dora and Others (21 E.L.R. 188). The head note of this case isprinted at pp. 229—230 supra.

SCHEDULED CASTES AND TRIBES 365

reserving the question to be decided before counting of votes—Legality.—When an objection is raised before the returning officer that aperson who has been nominated for a reserved seat as a member ofa Scheduled Tribe is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe, the return-ing officer must decide the question before accepting the nomination.He cannot accept the nomination leaving this question to be decidedafterwards before the counting of the votes. But accepting the nomina-tion without deciding the question is not a ground for setting asidethe election unless it is shown that this non-compliance with law hasmaterially affected the result of the election. Further, acceptancein such a case is only a proper acceptance though in an improper waywhere the candidate is really a member of a Scheduled Tribe, andsection IOO(I)(C) is not applicable to such a case.—GADIPALLI PARAYYAV. BOYINA RAJAYYA AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 83.

Member of Scheduled Caste becoming Arya Samajist—Whetherceases to belong to the Scheduled Caste for purposes of election—AryaSamajists, whether Hindus—Effect of conversion on social and politicalrights—Guiding principles.—A person who belongs to one of theScheduled Castes does not cease to be a Hindu by becoming a memberof the Arya Samaj; nor does he cease to belong to that Scheduled Casteeven though Arya Samaj does not recognise the classification of Castesaccording to birth. Arya Samaj, unlike Christianity or Islam, is not anew religion entirely distinct from Hinduism and the mere profession ofArya Samajism by a Hindu cannot have the effect of excluding himfrom Hinduism though he was born in it. As laid down by the SupremeCourt in Chaturbhuj Vithaldas fasani v. Moreshwar Parashram (9 E.L.R.301), the question whether a person born as a Hindu ceases to be aHindu or ceases to be a member of the caste in which he was born, whenhe adopts another faith, has to be determined in a common sense prac-tical way and on the social and political consequences of such conversionthan on theoretical and theocratic grounds. There are three factorswhich have to be considered in this connection, viz., (i) the reactions ofthe old body; (ii) the intentions of the individual himself; and (iii) therules of the new order. If the old order is tolerant of the new faithand sees no reason to outcaste or excommunicate the convert and theindividual himself desires and intends to retain his old social andpolitical ties, the conversion is only nominal for all practical purposes,and when we have to consider the legal and political rights of the oldbody the theological doctrines of the new faith hardly matter.—B. SHYAMSUNDER v. SHANKAR DEO VEDALANKAR, 21 E.L.R. 303.

Notification as to Scheduled Castes—President's power to modify—Reorganisation of States—Accidental omission of certain area in Modifi-cation Order—Status of Scheduled Castes of that area, whether lost—Power

366 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

of Courts to interpret enactment according to true intention—Accidentalmistakes in President's Order—Whether notification of correction should besigned by President—Nomination of Scheduled Caste candidate for reservedseat—Election for general seat'—Validity—False statement about Party—Whether comes within sec. 123(4)—Cerrupt practice under sec. 123(6)—Suppression of expenditure from accounts—Commission of offence—Whether non-compliance of Act.—In the original Constitution (ScheduledCastes) Order of 1950 the caste of " Chamar" was notified as aScheduled Caste throughout the State of Madhya Pradesh. After theenactment of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the Scheduled CastesOrder of 1950 was modified by the Scheduled Castes and Tribes List(Modification) Order, 1956, and " Chamar" was mentioned as aScheduled Caste in the District of Hoshangabad, overlooking the factthat Narsimhapur which was a tahsil of Hoshangabad was constitutedas a separate district in 1956. The respondent who was a Chamarresiding in Narsimhapur was nominated as a Scheduled Caste candidatefor the reserved seat in a double-member constituency and was electedto the reserved seat. His election^ was sought to be set aside on theground that under the Modification Order as it stood, Chamars ofNarsimhapur could not be deemed to be members of a Scheduled Casteand his nomination was therefore wrongly accepted: Held, (i) thatunder clause (2) of article 341 of the Constitution, without any lawmade by Parliament, the original Scheduled Castes Order specifying" Chamar " as a Scheduled Caste for the entire area of Madhya Pradeshcould not be varied by any subsequent notification ; (ii) section 41 ofthe States Reorganisation Act, 1956, extended only to making suchmodification in the original Scheduled Castes Order, as was compatiblewith the territorial changes and formation of new States; that power,therefore, did not authorise the President to exclude any person fromthe category of a Scheduled Caste, who enjoyed that status under theoriginal Scheduled Castes Order : (iii) it was, therefore, only by anaccidental omission or a clerical error that Narsimhapur district wasnot specifically mentioned in Part VI, of Schedule I, of the Modifica-tion Order, and under the rules relating to interpretation of statutesit was permissible to read " Hoshangabad " district in the Schedule tothe Modification Order, as comprising the area of the quondam tahsilof Narsimhapur also; (iv) since a member of a Scheduled Caste maybe returned to a general seat, if, after the reserved seat is rilled, hehappens to obtain the largest number of votes among the remainingcandidates, even though the respondent may not be a member of aScheduled Caste but had wrongly declared himself as such in thenomination paper, his right to contest the election for the general seat

SUPREME COURT 367

cannot be questioned, and his nomination could not be said to havebeen improperly accepted, although he may not be eligible to fill thereserved seat; (v) accordingly, the case did not fall within sectionioo{i)(d)(i) of the Act and the respondent's election was not liable tobe set aside on the ground that his nomination was wrongly accepted.Mere correction of a clerical mistake or omission in a notification isonly a ministerial act, and not an executive action of the Governmentof India, and accordingly a corrigendum, which does not effect anychange in a notification relating to Scheduled Castes need not beexpressed to be in the name of the President.—NAUNIHAL SINGH V.

KlSHORILAL PALIWAL AND OTHERS, 21 E .L .R. 33.

SUPREME COURT

Supreme Court.—Leave to appeal to Supreme Court—Practice ofCalcutta High Court.—A certificate for leave to appeal to the SupremeCoujt from a judgment of the High Court under article 132 of theConstitution can be given only if a substantial question of law as tothe interpretation of the Constitution is involved ; and according tothe rules and practice of the Calcutta High Court an application for acertificate under article I33(i)(c) of the Constitution can be entertainedonly by the Bench taking up Supreme Court matters.—KAMAL BASTJ V.

PURNENDU SEKHAR NASKAR, 15 E.L.R. 292.

Application to High Court for leave to appeal to Supreme Court—Maintainability.—Obiter: The questions (i) whether an applicationto the High Court for a certificate of fitness for appeal to SupremeCourt under article 133 is maintainable, and (ii) whether a respondentto an appeal by special leave under article 136 can support the judg-ment of the High Court by challenging the decision of the High Courton points decided against him by the High Court may have to beconsidered by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court when necessityarises to decide the questions.:—BARU RAM V. PRASANNI AND OTHERS,

16 E.L.R. 450. [S.C.I.

Even assuming that in an appeal before the Supreme Courtarising out of an election petition, the respondent has no right tochallenge the decision of the High Court on grounds decided againsthim by the High Court, it is open to the Supreme Court to treat anapplication by the respondent to challenge the findings of the HighCourt which were against him, as an application for special leave toappeal and to condone delay in filing the application.—BARU RAM V.PRASANNI AND OTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 450. IS.C.l.

Appeal to Supreme Court—Application for certificate underArt. I33(J)(C)—Maintainability.—Article 329(6) of the Constitution

368 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

does not bar the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain anappeal from a judgment of the High Court in an appeal under sec-tion 116A of the Representation of the People Act. Article 329 onlyprohibits the initiation of proceedings for setting aside an electionotherwise than by an election petition.—KISHORE CHANDRA DEO

BHANJ v. RAGHUNATH MISRA AND ANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 65.

Leave to appeal—When granted.—It is the settled practice ofthe Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal under article 136, only ifexceptional and special circumstances exist, or substantial and graveinjustice has been done and the case presents features of sufficientgravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. Merelybecause an appeal has been admitted by special leave the entire caseis not at large, and the appellant is not free to contest the findings offact of the subordinate tribunals. Only those points on which specialleave may initially be granted can be urged at the final hearing ; andnormally, special leave will not be granted under article 136(1) of theConstitution on a plea of error committed by the courts below in theappreciation of evidence.—BALWAN SINGH V. LAKSHMI NARAIN AND

OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 273. [S.C.I

——Special appeal—Interference on facts.—The question whether atransaction is a benami transaction is one of fact and the Supreme Courtwill not interfere with a finding of the Tribunal on the question uponthe evidence and circumstances of the case.—CHATTANATHA KARAYALAR

v. RAMACHANDRA IYER AND ANOTHER, I I E.L.R. 216. [S.C.]

Findings of Tribunal based on evidence—Interference in specialappeal.—The question when a candidature commences is one of fact,and a decision of the Tribunal on this question is not liable to bereviewed by the Supreme Court in special appeal.—KHADER SHERIFF

V. MUNNUSWAMY GOUNDER AND OTHERS, I I E .L.R. 208.

Special appeal—Interference with findings of fact.—The SupremeCourt will not ordinarily in special appeal, review findings of factrecorded by an Election Tribunal if there is any evidence on whichthey could be reached.—T. NAGAPPA V. T. C. BASAPPA AND OTHERS, I I

E.L.R. 203. [S.C.I

Once it is shown that the High Court was justified in criticis-ing the approach of the Tribunal and in coming to the conclusion thatsome of the important reasons given by the Tribunal for discardingevidence were unsatisfactory, it is open to the High Court to considerthe evidence for itself and reach its own conclusions on the relevantquestions of fact. In such a case, it would ordinarily not be open to aparty to challenge the correctness or the propriety of the findings of

SUPREME COURT 369

fact recorded by the High Court before the Supreme Court, in anappeal by special leave. The judgment of the Allahabad High Courtin Nani Gopal Swami v. Abdul Hamid Chaudhury and Others (19 E.L.R.175) affirmed.—ABDUL HAMID CHAUDHURY V. NANI GOPAL SWAMI AND

OTHERS, 22 E.L.R. 358. [ s .c ]

In interfering with a finding of fact arrived at by theHigh Court in an appeal under section 116A of the Representation of thePeople Act, 1951, the Supreme Court will bear in mind the provisioncontained in section 116B which lays down that the decision of theHigh Court on appeal from an order of the Election Tribunal in anelection petition shall be " final and conclusive."-—SHANNO DEVI V.MANGAL SAIN, 22 E.L.R. 469. [S.C]

On the facts of the case the Supreme Court held that therewas nothing on the record to justify any doubt as regards the correct-ness of the High Court's decision that after 15th August, 1947, therespondent who had earlier moved from a place now in Pakistan toJullunder in India, definitely made up his mind to make India his per-manent home.—SHANNO DEVI V. MANGAL SAIN, 22 E.L.R. 469. [S.C]

—t—Jurisdiction to enquire into doubts relating to election—Whethercan be exercised before completion of election.—DR. NARAYAN BHASKAR

KHARE v. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA and PT . RAMNATH KALIA V.

ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER, 13 E.L.R. 112. [S.c.[

Obiter dicta—Value of.—Even obiter dicta of the Supreme Courtare binding on the High Courts.—BABU RAO V. M. S. ANEY, 22E.L.R. 321.

SYMBOLS

Symbols.—Omission to state three symbols—Whether ground forrejection.*—The defect of not giving all the three symbols in thenomination paper is not a defect of a substantial character within themeaning of section 36(4) of the Representation of the People Act,1951, and is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the nomination.—MANZOOR AHMAD V. BUDHI LAL, 16 E.L.R. 470.

Omission to state three symbols—Whether substantial defect.*—A nomination cannot be rejected merely because only one symbol wasgiven in the form of nomination, and not three in the order of prefer-ence, as required by sub-rule (2) of rule 5 of the Representation of thePeople (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1956. Adefect of this nature is not a defect of substantial character within

* The Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, contains an express provision thatomission to declare the symbols shall not be deemed to be a defect of a substantialcharacter: see Rule 4.

ELD—47

370 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

section 36(4) of the Act of 1951, as expressly stated in the proviso torule 5(2).—RAMKISHUN SINGH AND ANOTHER V. TRIBENI SINGH ANDOTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 81.

Omission to state three symbols.—Omission to give the namesof three symbols in a nomination paper is not a defect of a substan-tial character on the basis of which a nomination paper could berejected.—RAMSWAROOP PRASAD YADAV V. JAGAT KISHORE PRASADNARAIN SINGH, 17 E.L.R. n o . (See footnote on p. 369 supra.)

Allotment of symbols—Rule made by Central Government em-powering Election Commission to impose restrictions on the choice of symbolsand, to issue directions as to allotment of symbols—Whether ultra vires—Press notes of Election Commission on choice and allotment of symbols—Whether discriminatory—Classification of political parties into recognisedand unrecognised parties—Validity—Omission to allot same symbol of "tree"to Socialist candidates uniformly in all constituencies—Whether sufficientground to vitiate election.—Section 169 of the Representation of theAct, 1951, provided that the Central Government may, after consultingthe Election Commission, make rules for carrying out the purposes ofthe Act. Rule 5 of the Conduct of Elections and Election PetitionsRules made by the Central Government, which made provision for thechoice of symbols by candidates, contained a proviso that the choice ofsymbols to be made by a candidate " shall be subject to such restric-tions as the Election Commission may think fit to impose in that behalf";and rule 10 of the said Rules, which dealt with the, allotment ofsymbols by the returning officer, provided that such allotment " shallbe subject to any general or special direction issued in this behalf bythe Election Commission". The Election Commission issued some pressnotes, worded like rules, classifying parties into recognised and un-recognised parties, allotting symbols to recognised parties and layingdown the conditions and the procedure for the allotment of symbols tounrecognised parties. The Socialist Party was an unrecognised partyand the symbol of " tree " was allotted to it but this symbol was notuniformly allotted to the candidate of the party in all the constituencies.In an election petition filed on behalf of an unsuccessful candidate towhom the symbol of " tree " had been allotted, it was contended (i) thatin making rules 5 and 10 the Central Government had in realitydelegated its rule-making power to the Election Commission and theserules were, therefore, ultra vires; (ii) that the directions issued by thepress notes amounted to rules and were not mere directions; (iii) thatthe directions were discriminatory in nature; (iv) that there was dis-crimination in fact in the application of these directions; and (v) thatthese irregularities were of such a serious nature that the whole election

SYMBOLS 371

was vitiated: Held, (i) that in investing the Election Commission withpower to impose such restrictions on the choice of symbols as it mightthink fit, and in empowering the Election Commission to issue generalor special directions in the matter of allotment of symbols, the CentralGovernment did not delegate its rule-making power to the ElectionCommission, and rules 5 and 10 of the Conduct of Elections and Elec-tion Petitions Rules, 1951, were not ultra vires or void or beyond thepowers of the Central Government under section 169; (ii) thoughframed like rules, the press notes issued by the Election Commissionwere merely restrictions and directions which the Election Commissionwas authorised by rules 5 and 10 to impose on the choice and allotmentof symbols; (iii) in making a distinction between recognised and un-recognised parties in the matter of allotment of symbols, the pressnotes were not discriminatory as the distinction was based on a reason-able classification ; (iv) the failure to allot the symbol of "tree " to theSocialist candidates in all the constituencies uniformly, did not amountto any discrimination in fact in applying the rules or directions;(v) that in the present case looking to the figures of the poll, the allot-ment of the symbol of " tree " to the Socialist Party candidate in allthe constituencies would not have materially affected the result of theelection. (The total poll amounted to 1,40,115. Of these 94,522 werepolled by the recognised parties, and the Socialist candidate, for whomthe election petition was filed, got only 21,381 votes).—PRABHUCHABAN v. SHIV DUTT, 14 E.L.R. 108.

Use of symbols in official handbills.—Symbols should never bemade part of any Governmental propaganda machine ; whether theybelong to one party or the other, they should be completely left out inofficial handbills and propaganda.—INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIWAN-CHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS, 15 E.L.R. 219.

Recognition of political parties and reservation of symbols—Presscommunique of Election Commission recognising parties whose candidateshad polled not less than 3 per cent, of total votes in last general elections—Interpretation—New parties including persons who had polled more than 3per cent, of votes—Whether entitled to recognition—Difference betweenmerger and mere alliance of parties—Proviso to rule 5, giving absolutediscretion to Election Commission, whether void.—Under rule 5 ofthe Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions) Rules, 1956, a declaration specifying the particularsymbol chosen by the candidate, had to be filed with every nominationpaper. The rule also contained a proviso that the choice to bemade by the candidate shall be subject to such restrictions as theElection Commission may think fit to impose in this behalf. With

372 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

regard to the recognition of political parties and reservation of symbolsto such parties for the purposes of the general elections of 1957, theElection Commission decided that if the total number of valid votespolled by all the candidates set up by a party during the last generalelections, was not less than 3 per cent, of the total votes cast at theelections, such party would be recognised as a political party for thegeneral elections of 1957. The Socialist Party and the Kisan MazdoorPraja Party were two all-India parties recognised as such for the lastgeneral elections. These parties merged together and formed them-selves into a new party called the Praja Socialist Party and this wasrecognised as a party for the present elections. Some members of thisparty had left it and formed themselves again into a Socialist Partyand the petitioner, who claimed to be the chairman of the "SocialistParty, Uttar Pradesh" applied to the Election Commission for recogni-tion of this party and for reservation of the symbol of "tree" for it. Thiswas refused on the ground that his party was a new party. He filed anapplication to the High Court for a writ of mandamus directing theElection Commission to recognise his party and to reserve the symbolof " t r ee" for the party: Held, (i) that, as the "Socialist PartyUttar Pradesh ", of which the petitioner claimed to be the chairman,was not a continuation of the old all-India Socialist Party which hadbeen recognised in 1952 but a new party altogether, it was not entitledto be recognised as a party and to have a symbol reserved for it underthe press communique, even though the number of votes polled bypersons who are its members, in the last general elections was over 3per cent, of the total votes cast; (ii) the case of merger of two partiesinto a new party is different from a mere alliance between two partieswho keep their individuality distinct but merely allow the symbol ofthe one party to be used by the other, and the principle under whichthe Praja Party, Andhra, was recognised was not applicable to the caseof the Socialist Party, Uttar Pradesh. Held also, that the proviso torule 5 which confers a power on the Election Commission to imposesuch restrictions as it thinks fit on the choice of the symbols by a candi-date did not contravene article 14 of the Constitution, as the ElectionCommission had itself laid down a rule which is applicable to all partiesalike in accordance with which its discretion under the proviso wouldbe exercised.—RAM CHANDRA SHUKLA V. ELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA,13 E.L.R. 105.

Choosing of symbols—Discrimination.—In exercise of the powerconferred on the Election Commission by section 5(1) of the Repre-sentation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions)Rules, the Election Commission issued a notification on the 12th of

SYMBOLS 373

November, 1956, in continuation of a prior notification directing interalia that no candidate shall choose except with the permission of thereturning officer any of the symbols specified in items 1 to 4of the list of symbols published under the earlier notification viz.,1. Two bullocks with yoke on, 2. Hut, 3. Ears of corn and a sickle,and 4. Lamp. I t was admitted by the parties that the limitationplaced on the choice of these four symbols was placed by theElection Commission for the purpose of a scheme evolved by theElection Commission of allotting these four symbols to certain recog-nised parties. The appellant contended that this manner of allottingsymbols adopted by the Election Commission gave an unfair advantageto the candidates sponsored by the recognised parties as against Inde-pendent candidates because of the fact tha t the candidates sponsoredby the recognised parties will know their symbols much earlier thanthe Independent candidates, who will come to know of their symbolsonly after the symbols were allotted to them under rule 10 after theirnomination papers had been scrutinised, giving them much less timeto instruct their voters : Held, that though this discrimination broughtabout by the Rules promulgated by the Central Government in con-sultation with the Election Commission and by the procedure adoptedby the Election Commission in actually allotting symbols, did give anadvantage to the candidates of the recognised parties over the Inde-pendent candidates it was not necessary to express any final opinionon this point because on the particular facts of the case, it did not andcould not possibly materially affect the result of the election. [TheirLordships also expressed that it was unnecessary in this case to go intothe point urged by the appellant that the power of allotting symbolswhich has been given to the Election Commission was arbitrary andwas actually exercised in an arbitrary manner in favour of the candi-dates sponsored by the recognised parties.] Obiter.—Even if there be adiscrimination in favour of candidates sponsored by the recognisedparties the discrimination would be justified under article 14 of theConstitution. The parties and Independent candidates cannot be placedon the same footing in the matter of forming a Council of Ministersand carrying on the Government and since the elections were heldprincipally for the purpose of forming the Government and carryingon its functions and duties, the classification which gave any prefer-ence to parties over individuals was a reasonable one.—MUBARAKMAZDOOR v. LAL BAHADUR, 20 E.L.R. 176.

Allotment of symbols to recognised political parties does notamount to discrimination under article 14 of the Constitution.—SAW,GANESAN v. M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR, 19 E.L.R. 16.

374 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

U. P. PANGHAYAT RAJ RULES, 1947

Rule 61-A, whether ultra vires.—Rule 61-A of the Rules framedunder the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act (XXVI of 1947) is not ultra viresor inconsistent with the provisions of the Representation of the PeopleAct, 1951.—Deo Chand and Others v. Vashist Narain and Others (6E.L.R. 138) followed.—SHRI KRISHNA V. RAJESHWAR SINGH ANDOTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 1.

VOTING

(See also BALLOT PAPERS)

Counting of votes—Duty of returning officer to give facilities tocandidates and counting agents—Secrecy of voting.—Even though there isnoexpress provision in the Representation of the People Act of India,similar to rule 45, clause (Hi), of the Parliamentary Election Rules ofthe United Kingdom, the returning officers should give the candidate andhis counting agents all reasonable facilities for overseeing the proceed-ings of counting and all such informations in respect thereof as can begiven consistently with the orderly conduct of the proceedings. A candi-date along with counting agents is not only entitled to be physicallypresent in the counting room but is also entitled to watch the proceedingsand to see for himself that the counting was being done strictly accord-ing to the rules, in a fair and proper manner. He is also entitled to notehow the counting was proceeding and what the position of the variouscandidates was in respect of voting at a particular stage or at a parti-cular polling station. Section 128 of the Representation of the PeopleAct only requires that there should be no disclosure as to how a parti-cular elector had voted at a particular election. The section cannot beused as an excuse for throwing a veil of secrecy over the proceedingsin the counting room.—TRILOKI SINGH V. SHIVRAJWATI NEHRU ANDOTHERS, 16 E.L.R. 234.

WORDS & PHRASES

"Any candidate". SHRINIVAS V. RUKMINI RAMAN PRATAPSINGH AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 190.

" Appropriate Government". C. G. JANARDHANAM V. JOSEPH, 14E.L.R. 88 ; INAYATULLAH KHAN V. DIWANCHAND MAHAJAN AND OTHERS,15 E.L.R. 219.

" Candidature ". KANHAIYALAL TIWARI V. SHY AM SUNDERNARAYAN MUSHRAN, 15 E.L.R. 284 ; PRANANATH PATNAIK V. BANAMALIPATNAIK, 16 E.L.R. 357 ; SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE ANDOTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373 ; RAGHUNATH MISRA V. KISHORE CHANDRA DEOBHANJ AND OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 321.

WORDS & PHRASES 375

" Candidates at an election ". CHATURBHUJ V. ELECTION TRIBU-NAL, KANPUR, AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 301

" Certified copy ". MOHAN REDDY V. NEELAGIRI MURALIDHARRAO, 14 E.L.R. 167.

"Circular". VASANTHA PAI V. DR. JOHN AND 0THERS,]I2 E.L.R.107; DR. V. K. JOHN V. CHIEF JUDGE, COURT OF SMALL CAUSES,MADRAS, AND OTHERS : DR. V. K. JOHN V. VASANTHA PAI AND ANOTHER,12 E.L.R 329.

" Community ". SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE ANDOTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373.

" Community, group or section ". VASANTHA PAI V. DR. V. K.JOHN AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 107.

" Conclusion of the trial". MADAN LAL V. SYED ZARGHAMHAIDER AND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 456 ; GIAN CHAND V. OM PRABHA JAINAND ANOTHER, 16 E.L.R. 384 [S.G.I.

" Contesting candidates ". KAMRAJ NADAR V. KUNJU THEVARAND OTHERS, 13 E.L.R. 159, 14 E.L.R. 270; KAMAL BASU V. PURNENDUSEKHAR NASKAR, 15 E.L.R. 292 ; YESHAWANTRAO BALWANTRAO CHAVANv. K. T. MANGALMURTI AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 122.

"Contract". In re S. N. PATNAIK, 13 E.L.R. 58.•' " Copy ". ROSAMMA PUNNOSE v. K. BALAKRISHNAN NAIR AND

ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 210." Date of election ". KRISHNA RAO MAHARU PATIL V. ONKAR

NARAYAN WAGH, 14 E.L.R. 386." Election ". DR. NARAYAN BHASKAR KHARE V. ELECTION COM-

MISSION OF INDIA and PT. RAM NATH KALIA V. ELECTION COMMISSION OFINDIA AND ANOTHER, 13 E.L.R. 112 [S.C.J; ASHRAF ALI KHAN V. TIKARAM AND OTHERS, 20 E L.R. 470.

" Election agent ". H. H. MAHARANI VIJAYA RAJE SCINDIA V.

MOTILAL, 14 E.L.R. 251."Electorate right". M. A. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR V. SA. GANESAN

ANOTHER (NO. 2), 14 E.L.R. 432." Error apparent on the face of the record ". BRIJ SUNDAR

SHARMA v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 216" False ". S. NORATA SINGH V. S. DHARAN SINGH AND OTHERS,

11 E.L.R. 57; MAST RAM V. IQBAL AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 34." Has been a judge ". MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. K. K. BANERJI,

13 E.L.R. 328."Inducing to vote". PYARI MOHAN DAS V. DURGA SANKAR

DAS AND ANOTHER, 14 E.L.R. 338." Interest". RADHA MOHAN RAI V. SUMITRA DEVI AND

ANOTHER, 17 E.L.R. 162 ; M. SHANMUGHA UDAYAR V. V. P. SARANGA-

PANI GOUNDER, 13 E.L.R. 490,

376 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

"Interest in contract ". In re S. N. PATNAIK, 13 E.L.R. 58.

" Migrate ". MANGAL SAIN V. SHANNO DEVI, 17 E.L.R. 263.

" National symbol ". KARAN SINGH V. JAMUNA SINGH, 15

E.L.R. 370."Not later than 14 days ". H. H. RAJA HARINDAR SINGH V.

S. KARNAIL SINGH AND OTHERS, 12 E.L.R. 421."Not later than ten days". HOTI LAL V. RAJ BAHADUR, 15

E.L.R. 55-"Not less than ten days before the date fixed for the poll".

CHAKRAPANI v. CHANDOO AND ANOTHER, 15 E.L.R. 271 [S.C.I• " Not later than ten days prior to the date fixed for the poll ".

SURAJ BHAN v. RANDHIR SINGH, 15 E.L.R. 460." Obtain ". MOTILAL V. MANGLA PRASAD, 15 E.L.R. 425;

BIRESH MISRA v. RAM NATH SARMA, 17 E.L.R. 243.

" Office " and "Office of profit". DR. DEORAO LAKSHMANANANDE v. V. V. KESHAV LAKSHMAN BORKAR, 13 E.L.R. 334.

" Particulars ". SANGAPPA V. SHIVAMURTI SWAMY AND ANOTHERand SHANKAKGOUDA BASANGOUDA V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, RAICHURAND ANOTHER, 13 E.L.R. 365.

——" Procure ". MOTILAL V. MANGLA PRASAD, 15 E.L.R. 425 ;BIRESH MISRA V. RAM NATH SARMA, 17 E.L.R. 243.

" Professes a religion ". NARAYAN RAO WAKTU KARWADE V.

PUNJABRAOHUKANESHAMB'HARKAR AND ANOTHER, 14E.L.R. 1.

" Remaining candidates ". DIGAMBAR RAO BINDHUW. DEV RAOKAMBLE AND OTHERS, 15 E.L R. 41.

• "Revenue officers". SHEOPAT SINGH V. HARISH CHANDRA, 16E.L.R. 103.

" Shall". SITA RAM KHEMKA V. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND

ANOTHER, 13 E.L.R. 126."Symbol". KARAN SINGH V. JAMUNA SINGH, 15 E.L.R. 370.

" Systematic ". SUDHIR LAXMAN HENDRE V. S. A. DANGE AND

OTHERS, 17 E.L.R. 373." Trial". MUBARAK MAZDOOR V. K. K. BANERJI AND ANOTHER,

13 E.L.R. 310."Tribe''. WILSON READE V. C. S. BOOTH AND OTHERS, 14

E.L.R. 480." Undertaken ". KR. RM. KARIAMANICKAM AMBALAM V. RAMA-

KRISHNA THEVAR, 13 E.L.R. 275." Within seven days". CHANDRA SHEKHAR PRASAD AND

ANOTHER V. JAI PRAKASH SINGH, 17 E.L.R. 126.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO

Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950.Khagendranath Nath v. Umesh Chandra Nath, 16 E.L.R.

207.Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956.

Shirur Veerabadrappa Veerappa v. Shankaragouda Basan-gouda, 17 E.L.R. 117.

Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation, 1925 (VI of 1925).Sees. 30(2) & 43.

Chief Commissioner, Ajmer v. Radhey Shyam Dani, 12E.L.R. 443.

Ajmer State Municipalities Election Rules, 1955.r.J.

Chief Commissioner, Ajmer v. Radhey Shyam Dani,12 E.L.R. 443.

Andhra State Act, 1953.Sees. 5 & 30.

N. V. L. Narasimha Rao v. Rao Bahadur Tellakula Jalay-ya & Others (No. 2) 11 E.L.R. 402.

Bengal Regulation, 1814 (XXIX of 1814).Kamdeo Prasad Singh v. Badri Narain Singh, 18 E.L.R.

59-Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (XXX of 1950).

Sees. 4 & 6.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R.

64.Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.

Prabhunath Tiwari v. Janardhan Singh, 18 E.L.R. 1.Chandra Shekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 22 E.L.R.

206.

Census Act, 1950.See. 15.

Thangavelu v. Krishnamoorthi Gounder, 16 E.L.R. 319.Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (II of 1922).

Sees. 12 (3)(d).Sadasheo Jagannath Barapatre v. Hemaji Hiraman Bakde,

18 E.L.R. 30.ELD—48

ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Citizenship Act, 1955 (Indian).Sec. 2(i)(b), 2(i)(c), 5(i)(a) & 5(i)(e).

Aslam Khan v. Fazal Haque Khan, 16 E.L.R. 34.

Citizenship Act, 1951 (Pakistan).Aslam Khan v. Fazal Haque Khan, 16 E.L.R. 34.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908).Or. VI, rr. 5& 6.

Lai Shyam Shah v. V. N. Swami, 16 E.L.R. 74.Or. VI, r. 16.

Madan Lai v. Syed Zargham Haider, 13 E.L.R. 456.Or. VI, r. 17.

Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 E.L.R. 461.M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 13 E.L.R. 201.Ram Abhilakh Tewari v. Election Tribunal, Gonda, 14

E.L.R. 375.Kshatrapal Singh v. F. S. Chisti, 16 E.L.R. 70.Singheshwar Prasad Varma v. Kamalnath Tiwari, 16

E.L.R. 95Giani Kartar Singh v. Election Tribunal, Chandigarh, 17

E.L.R. 148.T. L. Sasivarna Thevar v. V. Arunagiri, 17 E.L.R. 313.S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, 22 E.L.R. 64.Bhim Sen v. Gopali, 22 E.L.R. 288.

Or. X, rr. 1, 9, 10,16, 17.Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, 15 E.L.R; 301.

Or. X, r. 2.Udal v. Lai Bahadur, 21 E.L.R. 180.Braj Bhushan v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah, 22 E.L.R.

225.Or. XIV, r. 2.

S. Partap Singh Kairon v. S. Gurmej Singh, 14 E.L.R. 412.Or. XVII, r. 3.

Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v. Paul Singh, 17 E.L.R. 282.Or. XXIII, r. 1.

Inamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa, 14E.L.R. 296.

Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 475.Or. XLI, r. 22.

Inayatulla Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219.Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj, 17

E.L.R. 321.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 379

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)—(Contd.)Or. XLI, 27.

Chakrapani v. Chandoo, 15 E.L.R. 271.

Or. XLVII, r. 1.Balwan Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, 15 E.L.R. 199.Pritam Singh v. Kartar Singh, 17 E.L.R. 11.

Constitution of India.Art. 5.

Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.Art. 6.

Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain, 22 E.L.R. 469.

Art. 13.Dr. V. K. John v. Chairman, Madras Legislative Council, 12

E.L.R. 345.Art. 14.

Dr. V. K. John v. Chairman, Madras Legislative Council,12 E.L.R. 345.

Ram Chandra Shukla v. Election Commission, India, 13E.L.R. 105.

Sita Ram Khemka v. K. K. Banerji, 13 E.L.R. 301.Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji, 13 E.L.R. 328.V. V. Giri v. Dippala Suri Dora, 15 E.L.R. 1.Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 41.Sri Krishna Agarwal v. S. M. Banerjee, 19 E.L.R. 466.Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.

Art. 15.V. V. Giri v. Dippala Suri Dora, 15 E.L.R. 1.Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 41.

Art. 18.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan Sharma, 21 E.L.R. 320.

Art. 36.Gopalan v. Kannan, 14 E.L.R. 458.

Arts. 54, 62 & 71(1).Dr. Narayan Bhaskar Khare v. Election Commission of

India, 13 E.L.R. 112.Art. 72.

Khagendranath Nath and Another v. Umesh ChandraNath, 16 E.L.R. 207.

Art. iO2(i)(a).Maulana Abdul Shakoor v. Rikhab Chand, 13 E.L.R. 149.Hoti Lai v. Raj Bahadur, 15 E.L.R. 55.

380 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Constitution of India—(Contd.)Art. 102 (i)(e).

In re. Yadvendra Singh, M.L.A., 12 E.L.R. 162.Lai Shyam Shah v. V. N. Swami, 16 E.L.R. 74.

Art 103.In re. Yadvendra Singh, M.L.A., 12 E.L.R. 162.

Art. 132.Karaal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 15 E.L.R. 292.

Art. 133.Baru Ram v. Prasanni, 16 E.L.R. 450.

Art. I33(i)(c).Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 15 E.L.R. 292.Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra, 17

E.L.R. 65.Art. 136.

Baru Ram v. Prasanni, 16 E.L.R. 450.Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, 22 E.L.R. 273.Abdul Hamid Choudhury v. Nani Gopal Swami, 22 E.L.R.

358.Art. 154.

Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.Arts. 161, 162.

Khagendranath Nath v. Umesh Chandra Nath, 16 E.L.R.207.

Arts. 164, 166,167.Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.

Art. 171.Ramdayal Ayodyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 18 E.L.R.

378-Art. 171(4).

Mariswamy Hirematha Gangadharaswamy v. B. Chikkan-naswamy, 20 E.L.R. 114.

Art. 173.Krishna Rao Maharu Patil v. Onkar Narayan Wagh, 14

E.L.R. 386.Chiranji Lai v. Lahri Singh, 15 E.L.R. 397.Aslam Khan v. Fazal Haque Khan, 16 E.L.R. 34.Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.Jwala Prasad v. Brijendra Gupta, 21 E.L.R. 485.Brijendralal Gupta v. Jwalaprasad, 22 E.L.R. 366.

Art.i73(a).Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain, 22 E.L.R. 469.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 381

Constitution of India—(Contd.)

Art. i73(b).Karam Bapanna Dora v. Syamala Seetharamayya, 11

E.L.R. 463.Jagadananda Roy v. Rabindranath Sikdar, 14 E.L.R. 99.

Art. I73(3)(a).Ramdayal Ayodhyaprasad Gupta v. K.R. Patil, 20 E.L.R. 13.

Art. igi.In re. S. N. Patnaik, 13 E.L.R. 58.Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyricherla Chandra Chuda-

mani Dev, 13 E.L.R. 66.Sangappa v. Ramappa, 14 E.L.R. 229.Bhairon Lai v. Dungarsi Das, 15 E.L.R. 115.M. Ramappa v. Sangappa, 15 E.L.R. 475.Shirur Veerbhadrappa Veerappa v. Shankaragouda Basan-

gouda, 17 E.L.R. 117.

Art. igi(i).Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande v. Keshav Lakshman

Borkar, 13 E.L.R. 334.

Art. igi{i)(a).G. Narayanaswamy Naidu v. C. Krishnamurthi, 14 E.L.R. 21.Ramnarain v. Ramchandra, 15 E.L.R. 100.Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj, 17

E.L.R. 321.Prabhunath Tiwari v. Janardan Singh, 18 E.L.R. 1.Lachhman Singh v. Harparkash Kaur, 19 E.L.R. 417.Bhaironlal v. Doongarsidas, 20 E.L.R. 157.Karu Lall v. Fida Hussain, 20 E.L.R. 169.Ram Sahai v. Gajja, 20 E.L.R. 301.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R. 64.

Art. igi(i)(d).Aslam Khan v. Fazal Haque Khan, 16 E.L.R. 34.Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.

Art. igi(i)(e).G. Narayanaswamy Naidu v. C. Krishnamurthi, 14

E.L.R. 21.Art. ig2.

In re. S. N. Patnaik, 13 E.L.R. 58.Hafiz Moh. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow, 13

E.L.R. 262.Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.

382 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Constitution of India—(Contd.)Art. 226.

Datla Suryanarayana Raju v. Ammanna Raja, 12 E.L.R.156

Brij Sundar Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, 12E.L.R. 216.

Dr. V. K. John v. Chairman, Madras Legislative Council,12 E.L.R. 345.

M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 13 E.L.R. 201.Raja Nainar v. Velusami Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 231.Sita Ram Khemka v. K. K. Banerji, 13 E.L.R. 301.Habibur Rehman v. Shiva Gopal Tewari, 13 E.L.R. 377.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, 14

E.L.R. 147.S. Partap Singh Kairon v. S. Gurmej Singh, 14 E.L.R. 412.M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan (No. 2), 14 E.L.R.. 432-Siya Ram v. Pertap Bahadur, 15 E.L.R. 128.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan, 16 E.L.R. 93.Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar, 16 E.L.R. 393.Pritam Singh v. Kartar Singh, 17 E.L.R. 11.Giani Kartar Singh v. Election Tribunal, Chandigarh, 17

E.L.R. 148.Bishen Chand Seth v. Election Tribunal (Shahjahanpur),

17 E.L.R. 196.Partap Singh Kairon v. Kartar Singh Chadha, 17 E.L.R.

236.Jagannath Dalai v. Ramachandra Nahak, 18 E.L.R. 305.Sanjeevi Reddi v. Kondayya, 22 E.L.R. 92.

Art. 227.Habibur Rehman v. Shiva Gopal Tewari, 13 E.L.R. 377.Siya Ram v. Pertap Bahadur, 15 E.L.R. 128.Pritam Singh v. Kartar Singh, 17 E.L.R. n .Jagannath Dalai v. Ramachandra Nahak, 18 E.L.R. 305.Sanjeevi Reddi v. Kondayya, 22 E.L.R. 92.

Art. 230.Dippala Suri Dora v. V. V. Giri, 16 E.L.R. 1.

Art. 299.Badrivishal Pittie v. J. V. Narsingh Rao, 16 E.L.R. 183.

Art. 309.Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji, 13 E.L.R. 328.

Art. 324.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 383

Constitution of India—(Contd.)Art. 324(1).

Motilal v. Mangla Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 425.Art. 326.

Chandra Shekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 19 E.L.R.490.

Art. 327.Motilal v. Mangla Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 425.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.

Art. 32g.Dr. Narayan Bhaskar Khare v. Election Commission of

India, 13 E.L.R. 112.Art. 32g{b).

Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra, 17E.L.R. 65.

Ramdayal Ayodyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 18 E.L.R.378.

Sarla Devi Pathak v. Birendra Singh, 20 E.L.R. 275.Art. 330.

Narayan Rao Waktu Karwade v. Punjab Rao HukamShambharkar, 14 E.L.R. 1.

V. V. Giri v. Dippala Suri Dora, 15 E.L.R. 1.Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 41;

15 E.L.R. 187.V. V. Giri v. D. Suri Dora, 21 E.L.R. 188.B. Shamsundar v. Shankar Deo Vedalankar, 21 E.L.R. 303.

Art. 331.V. V. Giri v. D. Suri Dora, 21 E.L.R. 188.

Art. 332.Wilson Reade v. C. S. Booth, 14 E.L.R. 480.

Art. 341.B. Shyamsunder v. Shankar Deo Vedalankar, 21 E.L.R. 303.

Art. 341(2).Naunihal Singh v. Kishorilal Paliwal, 21 E.L.R. 33.

Art. 342.Wilson Reade v. C. S. Booth, 14 E.L.R. 480.

Art. 362.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan Sharma, 21 E.L.R. 320.

Art. 366(2).Wilson Reade v. C. S. Booth, 14 E.L.R. 480.

Art. 394.Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.

384 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.Rattan Singh v. Davindar Singh (No. 2), 11 E.L.R. 67.K. Parthasarathy v. Nataraja Odayar, 17 E.L.R. 201.

Paras. 2 & 3.B. Shyamsunder v. Shankar Deo Vedalankar, 21 E.L.R. 303.

Para. 3.Narayan Rao Waktu Karwade v. Punjab Rao Hukam Sham-

bharkar, 14 E.L.R. 1.Sch. I.

Naunihal Singh v. Kishorilal Paliwal, 21 E.L.R. 33.

Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.Gadipalli Parayya v. Boyina Rajayya, 12 E.L.R. 83.Wilson Reade v. C. S. Booth, 14 E.L.R. 480.

Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (12 of 1926).Sec. 3.

Nirbhayadas Gangaram v. Rameshwar Agnibhoj, 20 E.L.R.493-

C. P. and Berar Cotton Cloth Control and Distribution Order, 1948.Bhikaji Keshav Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani (No. 4), I I

E.L.R. 301.Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898).

Sec. 195(1).Raja Bahadur Kishori Raman Singh v. G. C. Agarwala

and Another, 19 E.L.R. 164.Sec. 401.

Khagendranath Nath v. Umesh Chandra Nath, 16 E.L.R.207.

Sec. 479A.Raja Bahadur Kishori Raman Singh v. G. C. Agarwala, 19

E.L.R. 164.

Delimitation Commission Act, 1952.Sec. 8.

V. V. Giri v. Dippala Suri Dora, 15 E.L.R. 1.Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 41.

Sec. 8(2).Dippala Suri Dora v. V. V. Giri, 16 E.L.R. r.

Durgah Khwaja Sahib Act, 1955 (XXXVI of 1955).Maulana Abdul Shakoor v. Rikhab Chand, 13 E.L.R. 149.

Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande v. Keshav Lakshman Borkar,

13 E.L.R. 334.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO - 385

Explosive Substances Act, 1908.Khagendranath Nath v. Umesh Chandra Nath, 16 E.L.R.

207.Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).

Sec. 35.Gopalan v. Kannan, 14 E.L.R. 458.

Sees. 45, 57, 67.Baru Ram v. Prasanni, 16 E.L.R. 450.

Sec. 76.Mohan Reddy v. Neelagiri Muralidhar Rao, 14 E.L.R. 167.

Sees. 101 & 102.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.T. K. Gangi Reddy v. M. C. Anjaneya Reddy, 22 E.L.R.

261.Sec. 106.

Dharanidhar Mohapatra v. Pradipta Kishore Das, 17 E.L.R.427.

Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.S. Kandaswamy v. S. B. Adityan, 20 E.L.R. 410; 21 E.L.R.

435-

General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897).Sees. 3(58), 3(60).

C. G. Janardhanam v. Joseph, 14 E.L.R. 88.Sec. 10.

H. H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, 12 E.L.R.421.

Kaushalendra Prasad Narayan Singh v. R. P. Singh, 13E.L.R. 385.

Randhir Singh v. Suraj Bhan, 15 E.L.R. 146.Suraj Bhan v. Randhir Singh, 15 E.L.R. 460.Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 475.

Hyderabad Legislature (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1955.Shirur Veerabhadrappa Veerappa v. Shankaragouda Basan-

gouda, 17 E.L.R. 117.

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922).Sec. 54(r).

Allah Bux v. Ratan Lai Jain, 15 E.L.R. 407.Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (IX of 1932)

Sec. 32.Badrivishal Pittie v. J. V. Narsingh Rao, 16 E.L.R. 183.

386 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Jaipur Land Revenue Act, 1947.Sees. 33, 35.

Ram Sahai v. Gajja, 20 E.L.R. 301.

Jaipur State Grants and Land Tenure Act (1 of 1947).Bhairon Lai v. Dungarsi Das, 15 E.L.R. 115.

Legislative Councils Act (37 of 1957).Ramdayal Ayodhyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 20 E.L.R.

13-Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956).

G. Narayanaswamy Naidu v. C. Krishnamurthi, 14 E.L.R.21.

Life Insurance Corporation Regulations.Reg. 29.

G. Narayanaswamy Naidu v. C. Krishnamurthi, 14 E.L.R. 21.

Madras Food grains Procurement Order, 1950.Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyricherla Chandra Chudamani

Dev, 13 E.L.R. 66.Mysore Legislature (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1956.

Shirur Veerbhadrappa Veerappa v. Shankaragouda Basan-gouda, 17 E.L.R. 117.

Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908.Sangappa v. Ramappa, 14 E.L.R. 229.Ramappa v. Sangappa, 15 E.L.R. 475.

Orissa Grama Panchayats Act, 1948.Sees. 8, 9, 10, 16, & 17.

Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj, 17 E.L.R321.

Sec. 31.Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra, 19 E.L.R. 1.

Sec. 20(4).Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.

Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Act, 1952 (XXXI of 1952).Sec. 14.

Dr. Narayan Bhaskar Khare v. Election Commission ofIndia, 13 E.L.R. 112.

Dr. N. B. Khare v. Election Commission of India, 13 E.L.R.318.

Sec. W.Dr. Narayan Bhaskar Khare v. Election Commission of

India, 13 E.L.R. 112.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 387

Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956.Sec. 37.

Ram Sahai v. Gajja, 20 E.L.R. 301.

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1950).Sec. 16.

Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.Sec. 18.

Ramnarain v. Ramchandra, 15 E.L.R. 100.Sec. igifi).

Ramswaroop Prasad Yadav v. Jagat Kishore PrasadNarain Singh, 17 E.L.R. n o .

Sec. 20(1) & 20(4).Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.

Sec. 21(2).Bhawani Prasad Tiwari v. Jagdish Narayan Awasthi, 16

E.L.R. 143.Sec. 22.

Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.Ramkishun Singh v. Tribeni Singh, 17 E.L.R. 81.

Sec. 22(1).Ramdayal Ayodyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 18 E.L.R.

378.Sec. 23.

Ramkishun Singh v. Tribeni Singh, 17 E.L.R. 81.Ramswaroop Prasad Yadav v. Jagat Kishore Prasad Narain

Singh, 17 E.L.R. n o .Chandra Shekar Prasad v. Jai Prakash Singh, 17 E.L.R.

126.Sec. 23(1).

Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R.'470.Sec. 25.

Tajuddin Ahmed v. Dhaniram Talukdar, 18 E.L.R. 193.Sec. 27(1), 27(2), 27(2)(a), 27(2)(b), Sch. IV.

Ramdayal Ayodhyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 20 E.L.R.13-

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951).

Sec. 2.Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand, 22 E.L.R. 242.

Sec. 2{e).Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.Chandra Shekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 19 E.L.R.

490.

388 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 2(k).Yamuna Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad Khare, 13 E.L.R. 1.

Sec. 2(i){e).Chandra Shekhar Prasad v. Jai Prakash Singh, 17 E.L.R.

126.Sec. 2(i)(i).

Khagendranath Nath v. Umesh Chandra Nath, 16 E.L.R.207.

Sec. 5.Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.

Sec. 5(c).Ramnarain v. Ramchandra, 15 E.L.R. 100.

Sec. 7(a).K. P. Kariyappa v. H. M. Channabasappa, 11 E.L.R. 484.Hafiz Moh. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow, 13

E.L.R. 262.Sec. 7(6).

Khagendranath Nath v. Umesh Chandra Nath, 16 E.L.R.207.

Sec. 7(c).L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 21 E.L.R. 376 ; 22 E.L.Zi. 95.

Sec. y{d).Kushwaqt Rai v. Karan Singh, 11 E.L.R. 1.Chattanatha Karayalar v. Ramachandra Iyer, 11E L.R. 216.Bhikaji Keshav Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani [No. 4], 11

E.L.R. 301.In re. Yadvendra Singh, M.L.A., 12 E.L.R. 162.In re. S. N. Patnaik, 13 E.L.R. 58.Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyricherla Chandra Chudamani

Dev, 13 E.L.R. 66.KR. RM. Kariamanickam Ambalam v. Ramakrishna

Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 275.M. Shanmuga Udayar v. V. P. Sarangapani Gounder,

13 E.L.R. 490.C. G. Janardhanam v. Joseph, 14 E.L.R. 88.Pyari Mohan Das v. Durga Sankar Das, 14 E.L.R. 338.Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219.Allah Bux v. Ratan Lai Jain, 15 E.L.R. 407.Lai Shyam Shah v. V. N. Swami, 16 E.L.R. 74.Badrivishal Pittie v. J. V. Narsingh Rao, 16 E.L.R. 183.Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj, 17 E.L.R,

321.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 389

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—{Contd.)

Sec. 7(d)—(Contd.)

Akshaya Narayan Praharaj v. Maheswar Bag, 16 E.L.R.

337-Gaurishanker Shastri v. Mayadhardas, 16 E.L.R. 441.Radha Mohan Rai v. Sumitra Devi, 17 E.L.R. 162.Narasimha Reddy v. Bhoomaji, 17 E.L.R. 207.Prabhunath Tiwari v. Janardan Singh, 18 E.L.R. 1.Nikunja Behari Singh v. Duryodhan Pradhan, 18 E.L.R. 37.Kamdeo Prasad Singh v. Badri Narain Singh, 18 E.L.R. 59.Jangaldhari Rai v. Sheopujan Rai, 18 E.L.R. 86.Narayana Gowda v. B. L. Narayanaswamy, 18 E.L.R. 485.Rameshwar Prasad Shastri v. Bhagwan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 4 'R. Deshpande v. Muttam Reddy, 20 E.L.R. 314.Brojagopal Das v. Kalipada Banerjee, 20 E.L.R. 325.Gurbanta Singh v. Piara Ram, 20 E.L.R. 350.Baleshwar Ram v. Rampadarath Mahton, 20 E.L.R. 390.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R. 64.Bhagwan Singh v. Rameshwar Prasad Sastri, 21 E.L.R. 126.Soowalal v. P. K. Chaudhary, 21 E.L.R. 137.N. P. Velusami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, 21 E.L.R. 338.Pabbar Ram v. Rameshwar Rai, 22 E.L.R. 14.

Sec. 7(e).Ramakant Kesheorao Huldurkar v. Bhikulal Laxmichand

Chandak, 15 E.L.R. 467.Ramdayal Ayodyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 18 E.L.R.

378.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R. 64.

Sec.7(J). .S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, 22 E.L.R. 64.

Sec. 8(i)(b).

L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 21 E.L.R. 376.Sec. 9(2).

Chattanatha Karayalar v. Ramachandra Iyer, 11 E.L.R.216.

Sec. 9(3).S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, 22 E.L.R. 64.

Sec. 22.Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.

Sec. 30(c), (d).Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v. Hem Raj, 21 E.L.R. 161.

390 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)Sec. 32.

Prananath Patnaik v. Banamali Patnaik, 16 E.L.R. 357.Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.

Sec. 33.Bhagwan Datt Shastri v. Ram Ratan Gupta, 11 E.L.R. 448.Matadin Chaurasia v. "Mahendra Kumar Manav, 12 E.L.R.

144.Brij SundarSharma v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, 12 E.L.R.

2i6.

Yamuna Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad Khare, 13 E.L.R. 1.Parmeshwar Kumar v. Lahtan Chaudhary, 14 E.L.R. 444.Chiranji Lai v. Lahri Singh, 15 E.L.R. 397.Prananath Patnaik v. Banamali Patnaik, 16 E.L.R. 357.S. Kandaswamy v. S. B. Adityan, 20 E.L.R. 410.V. V. Giri v. D. Suri Dora, 21 E.L.R. 188.Brijendralal Gupta v. Jwalaprasad, 22 E.L.R. 366.Brij Behari v. Mirza Ahamad Ali, 22 E.L.R. 455.

Sec. 33(1).Brij Sundar Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, 12 E.L.R.

216.Rosamma Punnose v. K. Balakrishnan Nair, 14 E.L.R. 210.Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath, 15 E.L.R. 66.Rup Lai v. Jugraj Singh, 15 E.L.R. 484.Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.Ramayan Shukla v. Rajendra Prasad Singh, 16 E.L.R. 491.Lakshmi Narain v. Balwan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 76.Jwala Prasad v. Brijendra Gupta, 21 E.L.R. 485.Dahu Sao v. Ranglal Chaudhary, 22 E.L.R. 299.

Sec. 33(2).Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 187.D. Parthasarathy v. Nataraja Odayar, 17 E.L.R. 201.

Sec. 33(3)-Rattan Singh v. Davindar Singh [No. 2], 11 E.L.R. 67.Sri Krishna Agarwal v. S. M. Banerji, 19 E.L.R. 466.S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, 22 E.L.R. 64.

Sec. 33(4).Mohan Reddy v. Neelagiri Muralidhar Rao, 14 E.L.R. 167.Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath, 15 E.L.R. 66.Netram v. Lakshman Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 266.Rup Lai v. Jugraj Singh, 15 E.L.R. 484.Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath, 21 E.L.R. 459.Jwala Prasad v. Brijendra Gupta, 21 E.L.R. 485.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 391

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 33(5).Mohan Reddy v. Neelagiri Muralidhar Rao, 14 E.L.R. 167.Rosamma Punnose v. K. Balakrishnan Nair, 14 E.L.R.

210.

Baru Ram v. Shrimati Parsanni, 16 E.L.R. 127.Baru Ram v. Prasanni, 16 E.L.R. 450.Ramayan Shukla v. Rajendra Prasad Singh, 16 E.L.R. 491.Chand Singh v. Shankarlal, 20 E.L.R. 63.Velusami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, 21 E.L.R. 338.Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand, 22 E.L.R. 242.Vinaya Kumar Divvan v. Raghunathsingh Kiledar, 22

E.L.R. 425.See. 33(6).

Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 187.Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath, 21 E.L.R. 459.Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand, 22 E.L.R. 242.

Sec. 34.Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 187.Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Yadav Tamaskar,

15 E.L.R. 260.Chiranji Lai v. Lahri Singh, 15 E.L.R. 397.V. V. Giri v. D. Suri Dora, 21 E.L.R. 188.Chandrashekar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 22 E.L.R.

206.Sec. 34(0).

Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 41.Sec. 34(6).

Mohan Reddy v. Neelagiri Muralidhar Rao, 14 E.L.R. 167.Netram v. Lakshman Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 266.

Sec. 36.Karam Bapanna Dora v. Syamala Seetharamayya, 11

E.L.R. 463.Sankara Reddi v. Yashoda Reddi, 13 E.L.R. 34.Raja Nainar v. Velusami Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 231.Dr. Deo Rao Lakshman Anande v. Keshav Lakshman

Borkar, 13 E.L.R. 334.Parmeshwar Kumar v. Lahtan Chaudhary, 14 E.L.R. 444.Chiranji Lai v. Lahri Singh, 15 E.L.R. 397.S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, 22 E.L.R. 64.Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand, 22 E.L.R. 242,

39 2 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951) —(Contd .)

Sec. 36(2).Gadipalli Parayya v. Boyina Rajayya, 12 E.L.R. 83.Ramakant Kesheorao Huldurkar v. Bhikulal Laxmichand

Chandak, 15 E.L.R. 467.Rup Lai v. Jugraj Singh, 15 E.L.R. 484.Badrivishal Pittie v. J. V. Narsingh Rao, 16 E.L.R. 183.Baru Ram v. Prasanni, 16 E.L.R. 450.Ramkishun Singh v. Tribeni Singh, 17 E.L.R. 81.Velusvvami Thevar v. Raja Nainar. 17 E.L.R. 181.Narayana Gowda v. Narayanaswamy, 18 E.L.R. 485.Chand Singh v. Shankarlal, 20 E.L.R. 63.

Sec. 36{2){a).

L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 21 E.L.R. 376.Jwala Prasad v. Vrijendra Gupta, 21 E.L.R. 485.Brijendralal Gupta v. Jwalaprasad, 22 E.L.R. 366.

Sec. 36(2)(b).Brijendralal Gupta v. Jwalaprasad, 22 E.L.R. 366.Brij Behari v. Mirza Ahmad Ali, 22 E.L.R. 455.

Sec. 36(3).Narayana Gowda v. B. L. Narayanaswamy, 18 E.L.R. 485.

Sec. 36(4).Rattan Singh v. Davindar Singh (No. 2.), 11 E.L.R. 67.Brij Sundar Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur,

12 E.L.R. 216.Rosamma Punnose v. K. Balakrishnan Nair, 14 E.L.R. 210.Dev. Kanta Barooah v. Kushram Nath, 15 E.L.R. 66.Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Yadav Tamaskar, 15

E.L.R. 260.Rup Lai v. Jugraj Singh, 15 E.L.R. 484.Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.Ramayan Shukla v. Rajendra Prasad Singh, 16 E.L.R. 491.Ramkishun Singh v. Tribeni Singh, 17 E.L.R. 81.Ramswaroop Prasad Yadav v. Jagat Kishore Prasad

Narain Singh, 17 E.L.R. n o .Parthasarathy v. Nataraja Odayar, 17 E.L.R. 201.Veiusami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, 21 E.L.R. 338.Dahu Sao v. Ranglal Chaudhary, 22 E.L.R. 299.Brijendralal Gupta v. Jwalaprasad, 22 E.L.R. 366.Brij Behari v. Mirza Ahmad Ali, 22 E.L.R. 455.Jwala Prasad v. Brijendra Gupta, 22 E.L.R. 485.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 393

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—{Contd).

Sec. 36(5).Jwala Prasad v. Brijendra Gupta, 21 E.L.R. 485.Dahu Sao v. Ranglal Chaudhary, 22 E.L.R. 299.

Sec. 36(7).Basawaraj K. Nagur v. B. R. Shidlingappa, 12 E.L.R. 168.Baru Ram v. Prasanni, 16 E.L.R. 450.Ramswaroop Prasad Yadav v. Jagat Kishore Prasad Narain

Singh, 17 E.L.R. n o .Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.Brijendralal Gupta v. Jwalaprasad, 22 E.L.R. 366.Keshav Lakshman Borkar v. Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande,

21 E.L.R. 466.Sec. 36(8).

Keshav Lakshman Borkar v. Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande,21 E.L.R 466.

Sec. 37.H. H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, 12 E.L.R.

421.H. H. Maharani Vijaya Raje Scindia v. Motilal, 14 E.L.R.

251.Bhim Sen v. Chhattar Singh, 15 E.L.R. 175.Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 475.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R. 64.

Sec. 37(1).Mohan Singh v. Bhanwarlal Natha, 17 E.L.R. 1.

Sec. 38.Thippa Rudrappagowda v. Kundur Rudrappa, 18 E.L.R. 97.

Sec. 38(1).Yeshavantrao Balwantrao Chavan v. K. T. Mangalmurthi,

14 E.L.R. 122.Sec. 40.

Ranbir Singh v. Beant Singh, 11 E.L.R. 182.S. Gurbhajnik Singh v. S. Bhagwant Singh, n E.L.R. 272.H. H. Maharani Vijaya Raje Scindia v. Motilal, 14 E.L.R.

251.Sec. 44.

Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthia Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.Sec. 46.

Baru Ram v. Prasanni, 16 E.L.R. 450.ELD—50

394 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 52.Thippa Rudrappagowda v. Kundur Rudrappa, i8;E.L.R.

97. •Sec. 53(2).

Thippa Rudrappagowda v. Kundur Rudrappa, 18 E.L.R.

97-Sec. 54.

Dippala Suri Dora v. V. V. Giri, 16 E.L.R. 1.Sec. 54(4).

V. V. Giri v. Dippala Suri Dora, 15 E.L.R. 1.Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 41.Digambar Rao Bindu v. Dev Rao Kamble, 15 E.L.R. 187.V. V. Giri v. D. Suri Dora, 21 E.L.R. 188.

Sec. 55.Motilal v. Mangla Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 425.V. V. Giri v. D. Suri Dora, 21 E.L.R. 188.

Sec. 55A.Yeshavantrao Balwantrao Chavan v. K. T. Mangalmurti,

14 E.L.R. 122.Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 15 E.L.R. 292.Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 475.

Sec. 55A(2).Hoti Lai v. Raj Bahadur, 15 E.L.R. 55.Randhir Singh v. Suraj Bhan, 15 E.L.R. 146.Chakrapani v. Chandoo, 15 E.L.R. 271.Suraj Bhan v. Randhir Singh, 15 E.L.R. 460.Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v. Hem Raj, 21 E.L.R. 161.

Sec. 56.Gopalan v. Kannan, 14 E.L.R. 458.Buggaveti Krishnayya v. Lakshmikantamma, 18 E.L.R.

476.Sec. 57.

Radha Krishna Shukla v. Tara Chand Maheshwar, 12E.L.R. 378.

Motilal v. Mangla Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 425.Tajuddin Ahmed v. Dhaniram Talukdar, 18 E.L.R. 193.

Sec. 58.Motilal v. Mangla Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 425.Keshav Lakshman Borkar v. Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande,

21 E.L.R. 466.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 395

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)— (Contd.)

Sec. 62.Chandra Shekhar Singh v. 'Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 19 E.L.R.

490.Ramdayal Ayodhyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 20 E.L.R.

13-Sec. 62(4).

Ramnarain v. Ramchandra, 15 E.L.R. 100.Sec. 63(2).

Bhim Sen v. Chhattar Singh,^i5 E.L.R. 175.Bhim Sen v. Gopali, 22 E.L.R. 288.

Sec. 63(3).Bhim Sen v. Gopali, 22 E.L.R. 288.

Sec. 64.Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.

Sec. 67 A.Ramnarain v. Ramchandra, 15 E.L.R. 100.

Sec. 70.Ramnarain v. Ramchandra, 15 E.L.R. 100.

Sec. 76.Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat, 11 E.L.R. 175.Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra, 11

E.L.R. 222.Sec. 77.

Ganga Prasad Pathak v. Saligram Jaiswal, 11 E.L.R. 415.Pyari Mohan Das v. Durga Shankar Das, 14 E.L.R. 338.Karan Singh v. Jamuna Singh, 15 E.L.R. 370.N. L. Verma v. Muni Lai, 15 E.L.R. 495.Akshaya Narayan Praharaj v. Maheswar Bag, 16 E.L.R. 337.Biresh Misra v. Ram Nath Sarma, 17 E.L.R. 243.M. Muthiah v. A. S. Subbaraj, 18 E.L.R. 73.Prabhudas v. Jorsang, 18 E.L.R. n o .Md. Ibrahim Ansari v. M. R. Masani, 18 E.L.R. 160.Kataria Takandas Hemraj v. Pinto Frederick Michael, 18

E.L.R. 403.Lachhman Singh v. Harparkash Kaur, 19 E.L.R. 417.D. Venkatramiah v. E. Narayana Gowda, 20 E.L.R. 101.Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Krishi Pandit Rishabkumar, 20

E.L.R. 401.V. B. Raju v. V. Ramachandra Rao, 21 E.L.R. 1.Anjaneya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy, 21 E.L.R. 247.

396 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 21 E.L.R. 376.Chandrashekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 22 E.L.R.

206.Lachhman Singh Gill v. Harparkash Kaur, 22 E.L.R. 249.

Sec. 77(1).Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103.Giani Kartar Singh v. Election Tribunal, Chandigarh, 17

E.L.R. 148.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.V. Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju, 19 E.L.R. 358.C. R. Narasimhan v. M. G. Natesan Chettiar, 20 E.L.R. 1.M. S. Sourimuthu Udayar v. K. Pandiaraj, 20 E.L.R. 256.S. Kandaswamy v. S. B. Adityan, 20 E.L.R. 410.Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal, 20 E.L.R.

443-M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 21 E.L.R. 215.

Sec. 77(2).Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103.Giani Kartar Singh v. Election Tribunal, Chandigarh, 17

E.L.R. 148.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, igiE.L.R. 16.V. Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju, 19 E.L.R. 358.C. R. Narasimhan v. M. G. Natesan Chettiar, 20 E.L.R. 1.M. S. Sourimuthu Udayar v. K. Pandiaraj, 20 E.L.R. 256.S. Kandaswamy v. S. B. Adityan, 20 E.L.R. 410.Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal, 20 E.L.R. 443.M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 21 E.L.R. 215.L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 95.

Sec. 77(3).Ram Abhilakh Tewari v. Election Tribunal, Gonda, 14

E.L.R. 375-Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103.Giani Kartar Singh v. Election Tribunal, Chandigarh, 17

E.L.R. 148.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.V. Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju, 19 E.L.R. 358.C. R. Narasimhan v. M. G. Natesan Chettiar, 20 E.L.R. 1.M. S. Sourimuthu Udayar v. K. Pandiaraj, 20 E.L.R. 256.S. Kandaswamy v. S. B. Adityan, 20 E.L.R. 410.M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 21 E.L.R. 215.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 397

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 78. • -L. M: Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 21 E.L.R. 376.

Sec. 79.Madan Singh v. Ladhu Ram Chaudhary, 11 E.L.R. 99.Bhagwan Datt Shastri v. Ram Ratan Gupta, 11 E.L.R. 448.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, 18 E.L.R. 209.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, 21 E.L.R. 286.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 105.

Sec. 7p(a).Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra, 11

E.L.R. 222.Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.

Sec. 79(b).Kushwaqt Rai v. Karan Singh, 11 E.L.R. 1.Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder, 11 E.L.R. 208.Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, 15 E.L.R. 301.Dharanidhar Mohapatra v. Pradipta Kishore Das, 17

E.L.R. 427.Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 475.Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal, 20 E.L.R.

443-Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar, 21 E.L.R. 409.

Sec. 79{d).M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan (No. 2), 14 E.L.R.

432.Sec. 81.

Rattan Singh v. Davindar Singh (No. 2), 11 E.L.R. 67.Madan Singh v. Ladhu Ram Chaudhary, 11 E.L.R. 99.Dalip Singh v. Surendra Nath, 11 E.L.R. 120.Karam Bapanna Dora v. Syamala Seetharamayya, 11

E.L.R. 463.Matadin Chaurasia v. Mahendra Kumar Manav, 12 E.L.R.

144.Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 E.L.R. 461.Dhananjoy Mahto v. R. K. Singh, 16 E.L.R. 99.Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 475.Jagannath Dalai v. Ramachandra Nahak, 18 E.L.R. 305.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.

Sec. 81(1).Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.

398 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 8i(2)(a)(ii).Chheda Lai Gupta v. Niranjan Singh Deo, 17 E.L.R. 97.

Sec. 82.Matadin Chaurasia v. Mahendra Kumar Manav, 12 E.L.R.

144.N. Sankara Reddi v. Yashoda Reddi, 13 E.L.R. 34.Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur, 14

E.L.R. 13.Mohan Singh v. Bhanwarlal Natha, 17 E.L.R. 1.Sardar Dayal Singh v. Sardar Surjit Singh Majithia, 19

E.L.R. 305.Returning Officer, Atmakur v. G. C. Kondiah, 22 E.L.R. 45.

Sec. 82(0).Yeshavantrao Balwantrao Chavan v. K. T. Mangalmurti,

14 E.L.R. 122.Bhim Sen v. Chhattar Singh, 15 E.L.R. 175.Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 15 E.L.R. 292.Kamala Singh v. S. B. Malik, 15 E.L.R. 456.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 105.

Sec. 82(b).Shriniwas v. Rukmini Raman Pratap Singh, 14 E.L.R. 190.S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswamy, 14 E.L.R. 394.Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, 15 E.L.R. 301.Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 475.Ashraf Ali Khan v. Tika Ram, 20 E.L.R. 470.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R. 64.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 105.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 321.

Sec. 83.Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh, 11 E.L.R. 192.Dr. V. K. John v. Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes,

Madras, 12 E.L.R. 329.Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 E.L.R. 461.Madan Lai v. Syed Zargham Haider, 13 E.L.R. 456.Lai Shyam Shah v. V. N. Swami, 16 E.L.R. 74.C. R. Narasimhan v. Election Tribunal, Madurai, 16 E.L.R.

327-Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v. Paul Singh, 17 E.L.R. 282.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 399

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 83(1).S. Kandaswami v. S. B. Adityan, 19 E.L.R. 260.V. Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju, 19 E.L.R. 358.Ashraf AH Khan v. Tika Ram, 20 E.L.R. 470.Udal v. Lai Bahadur, 21 E.L.R. 180.

Sec. (83){i)(b).Balwant Rai Tayal v. Bishan Saroop, 17 E.L.R. IOI.-Bishen Chand Seth v. Election Tribunal (Shajahanpur), 17

E.L.R. 196.T. L. Sasivarna Thevar v. V. Arunagiri, 17 E.L.R. 313 ; 19

E.L.R. .200.Saw. Ganesan v. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Krishi Pandit Rishabkumar, 20

E.L.R. 401.Singheswar Prasad Vaima v. Kamalnath Tiwari, 21 E.L.R.

121.

Anjaneya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy, 21 E.L.R. 247.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan Sharma, 21 E.L.R. 320.Amjad AH v. Nazmul Haque,*2i E.L.R. 345.Rukmini Raman Pratap Singh v. Srinivas Tiwari, 22 E.L.R.

37-Chandrashekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 22 E.L.R.

206.

Braj Bhushan v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah, 22 E.L.R. 225.Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, 22 E.L.R. 273.Bhim Sen v. Gopali, 22 E.L.R. 288.Abdul Hamid Choudhury v. Nani Gopal Swami, 22 E.L.R.

358.Sec. 83(2).

Datla Suryanarayana Raju v. Ammanna Raja, 12 E.L.R.156.

C. R. Narasimhan v. Election Tribunal, Madurai, 16 E.L.R.327-

Lakshmi Narain v. Balwan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 76.Sec. 83(3).

Rattan Singh v. Davinder Singh (No. 2), 11 E.L.R. 67.Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh, 12 E.L.R. 1.Datla Suryanarayana Raju v. Ammanna Raja, 12 E.L.R.

156.C. R. Narasimhan v. Election Tribunal, Madurai, 16 E.L.R,

327-

400 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 83(3).Sri Krishna Agarwal v. S. M. Banerji, 19 E.L.R. 466.V. B. Raju v. V. Ramachandra Rao, 21 E.L.R. 1.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 105.

Sec. 83(b).Ashfaq Ali Khan v. Darshan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 136.

Sec. 83(c).Singheshwar Prasad Varma v. Kamalnath Tiwari, 16 E.L.R.

95-Sec. 84.

Dr. Brijendra Swarup v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow, 11E.L.R. 188.

A. STeenivasan v. Election Tribunal, Madras, 11 E.L.R.278.

K. P. Kariyappa v. H. M. Channabasappa, 11 E.L.R. 484.Gadipalli Parayya v. Boyina Rajayya, 12 E.L.R. 83.Dr. A. Srinivasan v. G. VasanthaPai, 12 E.L.R. 453.B. M. Krishna Murthy v. Subbanna, 13 E.L.R. 123.

Sec. 84(0.) & §4(6).,A. K. Subbaraya Gounder v. K. G. Palanisami Gounder,

11 E.L.R.:25i.Sec. 84(c).

Radha Krishna Shukla v. Tara Chand Maheshwar, 12E.L.R. 378.

Sec. 85.Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 E.L.R. 461.Biren Roy v. Bejoyesh Mukherjee, 17 E.L.R. 466.

Sec. 86.N.V.L. Narasimha Rao v. Tellakula Jalaiah, 11 E.L.R. 321.N.V.L. Narasimha Rao v. Rao Bahadur Tellakula Jalayya

(No. 2), 11 E.L.R. 402.Sita Ram Khemka v. K. K. Banerji, 13 E.L.R. 301.Ram Swarup v. G. D. Sahgal, 21 E.L.R. 42.

Sec. 86(1).

Girdharilal v. Thakur Kahan Singh, 19 E.L.R. 352.Sec. go.

Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 E.L.R. 461.Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v. Paul Singh, 17 E.L.R. 282.S. Kandaswami v. S. B. Adityan, 21 E.L.R. 435.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 401

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)Sec. 90(1).

Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji, 13 E.L.R. 310.Inamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa,

14 E.L.R. 296.S. Partap Singh Kairon v. S. Gurmej Singh, 14 E.L.R. 412.Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, 15 E.L.R. 301.Pritam Singh v. Kartar Singh, 17 E.L.R. 11.Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 475.Girdharilal v. Thakur Kahan Singh, 19 E.L.R. 352.Udal v. Lai Bahadur, 21 E.L.R. 180.Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, 22 E.L.R. 273.

Sec. 90(3).Bhudhar Lai v. Bansidhar Shukla, 13 E.L.R. 399.Virendra Pati Yadav v. Jai Deo Singh, 13 E.L.R. 476.Sardar Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad, 13 E.L.R.

478.Bhola Manjhi v. Das Guru Ram, 13 E.L.R. 486.Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur, 14

E.L.R. 13.Biren Ray v. Bejayes Mukherjee, 14 E.L.R. 83.Yeshavantrao Balwantrao Chavan v. K.T. Mangalmurti,

14 E.L.R. 122.Shriniwas v. Rukmini Raman Pratap Singh, 14 E.L.R. 190.Sudhansu Sekhar Panda v. Narendra Nath Das, 14 E.L.R.

223.Muti Ahmed Jafari v. Virendra Singh, 14 E.L.R. 241.Nand Kishore Prasad Singh v. Election Tribunal, Patna,

14 E.L.R. 246.Pottekkat Krishnan Sukumaran v. Kunjuvareed Joseph

Mundasseri, 14 E.L.R. 313.Shivaprasad Chandpuria v. Chandrika Prasad, 14 E.L.R.

328.S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami, 14 E.L.R. 394.U. M. Trivedi v. Manaklal, 15 E.L.R. 88.Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 15 E.L.R. 292.Chaturbhuj v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, 15 E.L.R. 301.Kamala Singh v. S. B. Malik, 15 E.L.R. 456.Dhananjoy Mahto v. R. K. Singh, 16 E.L.R. 99.Gian Chand v. Om Prabha Jain, 16 E.L.R. 384.Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Mohan Singh v. Bhanwarlal Natha, 17 EfL.R. 1,

pLD—51

402 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—{Contd.)

Sec. 90(3)—(Contd.)Rulya Ram v. Chaudhri Multan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 6.Biren Roy v. Bejoyesh Mukherjee, 17 E.L.R. 466.Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur (No. 2),

18 E.L.R. 69.Gian Chand Puran Chand v. Smt. Om Prabha Jain, 18

E.L.R. 136.Jagannath Dalai v. Ramachandra Nahak, 18 E.L.R. 305.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.Sardar Dayal Singh v. Sardar Surjit Singh Majithia, 19

E L.R. 305.Radha Kishan v. Election Tribunal, Amritsar, 20 E.L.R.

321.Ganpatsingh v. Brij Mohan Lai Sharma, 20 E.L.R. 374.Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand, 21 E.L.R. 54.Chandrika Prasad Tripathi v. Shiv Prasad Chanpuria, 21

E.L.R. 172.Budhi Nath Jha v. Manilal Jadav, 22 E.L.R. 86.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 105.Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, 22 E.L.R. 273.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 321.

Sec. go(5).Madan Lai v. Syed Zargham Haider, 13 E.L.R. 456.Babulal Sharma v. Brijnarain Brajesh, 14 E.L.R. 72.Ram Abhilakh Tewari v. Election Tribunal, Gonda, 14

E.L.R. 375-Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur, 15

E.L.R. 111.Bhim Sen v. Chattar Singh, 15 E.L.R. 175.Balwan Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, 15 E.L.R. 199.Kshatrapal Singh v. F. S. Chisti, 16 E.L.R. 70.Singheshwar Prasad Varma v. Kamalnath Tiwari, 16

E.L.R. 95.Pritam Singh v. Kartar Singh, 17 E.L.R. 11.Balwant Rai Tayal v. Bishan Saroop, 17 E.L.R. 101.Giani Kartar Singh v. Election Tribunal, Chandigarh, 17

E.L.R. 148.Bishen Chand Seth v. Election Tribunal, Shahjahanpur,

17 E.L.R. 196.T. L. Sasivarna Thevar y, V. Arunagiri, 17 E.L.R. 313.

iNDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 40^

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. go($)—(Contd.)T. L. Sasivarna Thevar v. Arunagiri (No. 2), 19 E.L.R. 200.S. Kandaswami v. S. B. Adityan, 19 E.L.R. 260.Ram Dial v. Sant Lai, 19 E.L.R. 430.Sri Krishna Agarwal v. S. M. Banerji, 19 E.L.R. 466.Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Krishi Pandit Rishabkumar, 20

E.L.R. 401.Ashraf Ali Khan v. Tika Ram, 20 E.L.R. 470.V. B. Raju v. V. Ra-.nachandra Rao, 21 E.L.R. 1.Udal v. Lai Bahadur, 21 E.L.R. 180.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan Sharma, 21 E.L.R. 320.Amjad Ali v. Nazmul Haque, 21 E.L.R. 345.S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, 22 E.L.R. 64.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 105.Braj Bhushan and Another v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah,

22 E.L.R. 225.

Sec. go(6).Kshatrapal Singh v. F. S. Chisti, 16 E.L.R. 70.

Sec. g2.Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 E.L.R. 461.Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v. Paul Singh, 17 E.L.R. 282.Udal v. Lai Bahadur, 21 E.L.R. 180.Braj Bhushan v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah, 22 E.L.R. 225.

Sec. 92(2).B. M. Krishna Murthy v. R. Subbanna, 13 E.L.R. 123.

Sec. 97.Kaushalendra Prasad Narayan Singh v. R. P. Singh, 13

E.L.R. 385.Inamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa,

14 E.L.R. 296.Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219.

Sec. 97(1).Lakshmi Shankar Yadav v. Kunwar Sripal Singh, 22

E.L.R. 47.Sec. 98.

Radha Krishna Shukla v. Tara Chand Maheshwar, 12E.L.R. 378.

Bhudhar Lai v. Bansidhar Shukla, 13 E.L.R. 399.Madan Lai v. Syed Zargham Haider, 13 E.L.R. 456.Virendra Pati Yadav v. Jai Deo Singh, 13 E.L.R. 476.

404 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 98— (Contd.)Sardar Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad, 13 E.L.R.

478.Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur, 14

E.L.R. 13.Gian Chand v. Om Prabha Jain, 16 E.L.R. 384.Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Partap Singh Kairon v. Kartar Singh Chadha, 17 E.L.R.

236.Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v. Paul Singh, 17 E.L.R. 282.Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur (No. 2),

18 E.L.R. 69.Gian Chand Puran Chand v. Smt. Om Prabha Jain, 18

E.L.R. 136.Jagannath Dalai v. Ramachandra Nahak, 18 E.L.R. 305.Radha Kishan v. Election Tribunal, Amritsar, 20 E.L.R.

321.Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand, 21 E.L.R. 54.Chandrika Prasad Tripathi v. Shiv Prasad Chanpuria, 21

E.L.R. 172.Sec. ))'•).

A. Sreenivasan v. Election Tribunal, Madras, 11 E.L.R.278.

Brij Sundar Sharma v. Electional Tribunal, Jaipur, 12E.L.R. 216.

Dr. V. K. John v. Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes,Madras, 12 E.L.R. 329.

Dr. A. Srinivasan v. G. Vasantha Pai, 12 E.L.R. 453.Hafiz Moh. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow, 13

E.L.R. 262.S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami, 14 E.L.R. 394.Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Partap Singh Kairon v. Kartar Singh Chadha, 17 E.L.R.

236.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 105.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 321.

Sec. 99(1).Amjad Ali v. B. C. Barua, 13 E.L.R. 285.Parshottamdas Talshibhai Patel v. Lilubhai Kishorebhai

Patel, 14 E.L.R. 403.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 405

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sees. gg(i)(a)(ii).Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh, 11 E.L.R. 192.T. Nagappa v. T. C. Basappa, 11 E.L.R. 203.Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder, 11 E.L.R. 208.K. P. Kariyappa v. H. M. Channabasappa, 11 E.L.R. 484.Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh, 12 E.L.R. 1.

Sec. 99(2).Yamuna Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad Khare, 13 E.L.R. 1.

Sec. 100.Jamuna Prasad Singh v. Shri Ramnivas, 18 E.L.R. 145.Tajuddin Ahmed v. Dhaniram Talukdar, 18 E.L.R. 193.

Sec. 100(1).Dr. V. K. John v. Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes,

Madras, 12 E.L.R. 329.Radha Krishna Shukla v. Tara Chand Maheshwar, 12

E.L.R. 378.Krishna Rao Maharu Patil v. Onkar Narayan Wagh, 14

E.L.R. 386.Parmeshwar Kumar v. Lahtan Chaudhary, 14 E.L.R. 444.Ramnarain v. Ramchandra, 15 E.L.R. 100.Maganlal Bagdi v. Hari Vishnu Kamath, 15 E.L.R. 205.Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219.Motilal v. Mangla Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 425.Champa Devi v. Jamuna Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 443.Rup Lai v. Jugraj Singh, 15 E.L.R. 484.Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.Buggaveti Krishnayya v. Lakshmikantamma, 18 E.L.R.

476.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan Sharma, 21 E.L.R. 320.L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 21 E.L.R. 376.S. Kandaswami v. S. B. Adityan, 21 E.L.R. 435.

Sec. ioo(i)(a).Lai Shyam Shah v. V. N. Swami, 16 E.L.R. 74.Narasimha Reddy v. Bhoomaji, 17 E.L.R. 207.Ahmedmiya Sherumiya Shaikh v. Chippa Ibrahim Nuraji,

17 E.L.R. 218.Sec. ioo(i)(b).

Vasantha Paiv. Dr. V. K. John, 12 E.L.R. 107.M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan (No. 2), 14 E.L.R

432.Din Dayal v. Beni Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 131.

406 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGESf

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—{Contd.)

Sec. ioo{i)(b)—(Contd.)Chhattar Singh v. Kewal Singh, 15 E.L.R. 162.Madan Mohan Upadhya v. Hari Datt Kandpal, 15 E.L.R.

331-Savitri Devi v. Prabhawati Misra, 15 E.L.R. 358.Dr. Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh Pal, 16 E.L.R. 45.Lai Shyam Shah v. V. N. Swami, 16 E.L.R. 74.'Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103.Ghayur Ali Khan v. Keshav Gupta, 16 E.L.R. 154.Khagendranath Nath v. Umesh Chandra Nath, 16 E.L.R.

207.Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 435.Jayalakshmi Devamma v. Janardhan Reddi, 17 E.L.R. 302.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.Dharanidhar Mohapatra v. Pradipta Kishore Das, 17

E.L.R. 427.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, 18 E.L.R. 209.Raja Vijai Kumar Tripathi v. Ram Saran Yadav, 18 E.L.R.

289.Kataria Takandas Hemraj v. Pinto Frederick Michael,

18 E.L.R. 403.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.Nani Gopal Swami v. Abdul Hamid Choudhury, 19 E.L.R.

175-Abdul Rahiman Khan v. Radha Krushna Biswas Roy, 19

E.L.R. 278.Sardar Dayal Singh v. Sardar Surjit Singh Majithia, 19

E.L.R. 305.V. Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju, 19 E.L.R. 358.Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand, 20 E.L.R. 221.Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal, 20 E.L.R.

443-Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R. 64.Anjaneya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy, 21 E.L.R. 247.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, 21 E.L.R. 286.

Sec. IOO[I)(C).

S. Norata Singh v. S. Dharam Singh, 11 E.L.R. 57.Dalip Singh v. Surendra Nath, 11 E.L.R. 120.Dr. Brijendra Swarup v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow, 11

188.A. Sreenivasanv. Election Tribunal, Madras, 11 E.L.R. 278.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 407

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. IOO(I)(C)—(Contd.)Ratan Shukla v. Dr. Brijendra Swarup, 11 E.L.R. 332.K. P. Kariyappa v. H. M. Channabasappa, 11 E.L.R. 484.Gadipalli Parayya v. Boyina Rajayya, 12 E.L.R. 83.Basawaraj K. Nagur v. B. R. Shidlingappa, 12 E.L.R. 168.Surendra Nath Khosla v. Dalip Singh, 12 E.L.R. 370.Raja Nainar v. Velusami Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 231.H. H. Maharani Vijaya Raje Scindia v. Motilal, 14 E.L.R.

251.Chiranji Lai v. Lahri Singh, 15 E.L.R. 397.Suraj Bhan v. Randhir Singh, 15 E.L.R. 460.Badrivishal Pittie v. J. V. Narsingh Rao, 16 E.L.R. 183.Ramkishun Singh v. Tribeni Singh, 17 E.L.R. 81.Chandra Shekar Prasad v. Jai Prakash Singh, 17 E.L.R.

126.Veluswami Thevar v. Raja Nainar, 17 E.L.R. 181.Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath, 21 E.L.R. 459.Jwala Prasad v. Brijendra Gupta, 21 E.L.R. 485.

Sec. ioo(i)(d).Shridhar Mahadeo Joshi v. Rajbhoj Pandurang Nathoji, 13

E.L.R. 430.H. H. Maharani Vijaya Raje Scindia v. Motilal, 14 E.L.R.

251.Gopalan v. Kannan, 14 E.L.R. 458.Ghayur AH Khan v. Keshav Gupta, 16 E.L.R. 154.Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj, 17

E.L.R. 321.Prabhudas v. Jorsang, 18 E.L.R. n o .Kataria Takandas Hemraj v. Pinto Frederick Michael, 18

E.L.R. 403.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.S. Kandaswamy v. S. B. Adityan, 20 E.L.R. 410.Soowalal v. P. K. Chaudhury, 21 E.L.R. 137.

Sec. ioo(i){d){i).Lai Shyam Shah v. V. N. Swami, 16 E.L.R. 74.Sri Krishna Agarwal v. S. M. Banerji, 19 E.L.R. 466.S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, 22 E.L.R. 64.

Sec. ioo(i)(d)(ii).Pottekkat Krishnan Sukumaran v. Kunjuvareed Joseph

Mundasseri, 14 E.L.R. 313.

408 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. ioo(i){d){ii)—{Contd.)M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan (No. 2), 14 E.L.R.

432.Din Dayal v. Beni Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 131.Chhattar Singh v. Kewal Singh, 15 E.L.R. 162.Madan Mohan Upadhya v. Hari Datt Kandpal, 15 E.L.R.

331-Savitri Devi v. Prabhawati Misra, 15 E.L.R. 358.Dr. Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh Pal, 16 E.L.R. 45.Khagendranath Nath v. Umesh Chandra Nath, 16 E.L.R.

207.Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103, 435.Jayalakshmi Devamma v. Janardhan Reddi, 17 E.L.R. 302.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.Dharanidhar Mohapatra v. Pradipta Kishore Das, 17

E.L.R. 427.Raja Vijai Kumar Tripathi v. Ram Saran Yadav, 18 E.L.R.

289.Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand, 20 E.L.R. 221.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R.

64.Anjaneya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy, 21 E.L.R. 247.Ramdayal Ayodhyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 20

E.L.R. 13.

Sec. ioo{i)(d)(iii).Ramdayal Ayodhyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 20

E.L.R. 13.Sec. ioo{i)(d)(iv).

Ram Abhilakh Tewari v. Election Tribunal, Gonda, 14E.L.R. 375.

Lai Shyam Shah v. V. N. Swami, 16 E.L.R. 74.Ramdayal Ayodyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 18 E.L.R.

378.Chandra Shekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 19 E.L.R.

490.Ramdayal Ayodhyaprasad Gupta v. K. R. Patil, 20 E.L.R.

13-Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal, 20 E.L.R.

443-Naunihal Singh v. Kishorilal Paliwal, 21 E.L.R. 33.S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal, 22 E.L.R. 64.Lachman Singh Gill y. Harparkash Kaur, 22 E.L.R. 249.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 409

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. ioo{2).Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh, 12 E.L.R. 1.Radha Krishna Shukla v. Tara Chand Maheshwar, 12

E.L.R. 378.Maganlal Bagdi v. Hari Vishnu Kamath, 15 E.L.R. 205.Motilal v. Mangla Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 425.Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103.Ghayur Ali Khan v. Keshav Gupta, 16 E.L.R. 154.Mangal Sain v. Shanno Devi, 17 E.L.R. 263.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.Nani Gopal Swami v. Abdul Hamid Choudhury, 19 E.L.R.

175-Anjaneya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy, 21 E.L.R. 247.

Sec. ioo(2)(a).Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyricherla Chandra Chuda-

mani Dev, 13 E.L.R. 66.Sec. ioo(2)(b).

S. Norata Singh v. S. Dharam Singh, 11 E.L.R. 57.Dalip Singh v. Surendra Nath, 11 E.L.R. 120.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, 18 E.L.R. 209.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, 21 E.L.R. 286.

Sec ioo(2)(c).Dr. Brijendra Swarup v. Election Tribunal (Lucknow), 11

E.L.R. 188.A. Sreenivasan v. Election Tribunal, Madras, 11 E.L.R. 278.Ratan Shukla v. Dr. Brijendra Swarup, 11 E.L.R. 332.R. Subbanna v. S. R. Guru, 12 E.L.R. 201.Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.

Sec. 101.Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande v. Keshav Lakshman Borkar,

13 E.L.R. 334.Keshav Lakshman Borkar v. Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande,

21 E.L.R. 466.Bhim Rao v. Ankush Rao, 22 E.L.R. 385.

Sec. ioi(a).Jagadananda Roy v. Rabindranath Sikdar, 14 E.L.R. 99.Basaviah v. Bachiah, 17 E.L.R. 293.

Sec. ioi(b).T. Nagappa v. T. C. Basappa, 11 E.L.R. 203.Ashfaq Ali Khan v. Darshan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 136.

Sec. 101(1).Kushwaqt Rai v. Karan Singh, 11 E.L.R. 1.

ELD—52

410 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. iog.Ganpatsingh v. Brij Mohan Lai Sharma, 20 E.L.R. 374.

Sec. no.Ganpatsingh v. Brij Mohan Lai Sharma, 20 E.L.R. 374.Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Krishi Pandit Rishabkumar, 20

E.L.R. 401.Narayan Yeshwant Nene v. Govind Sonu Katkari, 21

E.L.R. 168.Sec. uo(c).

Heersingh v. Veerka, 15 E.L.R. 92.Sec. uo(3)(c).

Kashi Nath Pandey v. Shibban Lai Saxena, 15 E.L.R. 389.Sec. 116 A.

Raja Nainar v. Veluswami Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 231. v

Bhudhar Lai v. Bansidhar Shukla, 13 E.L.R. 399.Madan Lai v. Syed Zargham Haider, 13 E.L.R. 456.Virendra Pati Yadav v. Jai Deo Singh, 13 E.L.R. 476.Sardar Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad, 13 E.L.R.

478.Gulsher Ahmed v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur, 14

E.L.R. 13.Shivaprasad Chandpuria v. Chandrika Prasad, 14 E.L.R.

328.U. M. Trivedi v. Manaklal, 15 E.L.R. 88.Heersingh v. Veerka, 15 E.L.R. 92.Siya Ram v. Pertap Bahadur, 15 E.L.R. 128.Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219.Chakrapani v. Chandoo, 15 E.L.R. 271.Gian Chand v. Om Prabha Jain, 16 E.L.R. 384.Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Baru Ram v. Prasanni, 16 E.L.R. 450.Mohan Singh v. Bhanwarlal Natha, 17 E.L.R. 1.Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra, 17 E.L.R.

65-Jayalakshmi Devamma v. Janardhan Reddi, 17 E.L.R. 302.Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj, 17

E.L.R. 321.Jagannath Dalai v. Ramchandra Nahak, 18 E.L.R. 305.Sarla Devi Pathak v, Birendra Singh, 20 E.L.R. 275.Radha Kishan v. Election Tribunal, Amritsar, 20 E.L.R,

321,

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 4 H

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951) — (Contd.)

Sec. 116A—(Contd.)Ganpatsingh v. Brij Mohan Lai Sharma, 20 E.L.R. 374.V. B. Raju v. V. Ramachandra Rao, 21 E.L.R. 1.Ram Swarup v. G. D. Sahgal, 21 E.L.R. 42.Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand, 21 E.L.R. 54.Narayan Yeshwant Nene v. Govind Sonu Katkari, 21

E.L.R. 168.Chandrika Prasad Tripathi v. Shiv Prasad Chanpuria, 21

E.L.R. 172.Sanjeevi Reddi v. Kondayya, 22 E.L.R. 92.Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, 22 E.L.R. 273.Abdul Hamid Choudhury v. Nani Gopal Swami, 22 E.L.R.

358.Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain, 22 E.L.R. 469.

Sec. n6A{2).Champa Devi v. Jamuna Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 443.Tajuddin Ahmed v. Dhaniram Talukdar, 18 E.L.R. 193.

Sec. 116 A(3).Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Yadav Tamaskar, 15

E.L.R. 260.Gulsher Ahmad v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur [No. 2],

18 E.L.R. 69.Sec. 116B.

Narayan Yeshwant Nene v. Govind Sonu Katkari, 21E.L.R. 168.

Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain, 22 E.L.R. 469.Sec. IIJ.

Bhudhar Lai v. Bansidhar Shukla, 13 E.L.R. 399.Sardar Harihar Singh v. Singh Ganga Prasad, 13 E.L.R.

478.Bhola Manjhi v. Das Guru Ram, 13 E.L.R. 486.Biren Ray v. Bejayes Mukherjee, 14 E.L.R. 83.Sudhansu Sekhar Panda v. Narendra Nath Das, 14 E.L.R.

223.

Muti Ahmed Jafari v. Virendra Singh, 14 E.L.R. 241. .Nand Kishore Prasad Singh v. Election Tribunal, Patna, 14

E.L.R. 246.Pottekkat Krishnan Sukumaran v. Kunjuvareed Joseph

Mundasseri, 14 E.L.R. 313.Shivaprasad Chandpuria v. Chandrika Prasad, 14 E.L.R.

328.

412 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. ny—{Contd.)U. M. Trivedi v. Manaklal, 15 E.L.R. 88.Dhananjoy Mahto v. R. K. Singh, 16 E.L.R. 99.Gian Chand v. Om Prabha Jain, 16 E.L.R. 384.Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar, 16 E.L.R. 393.Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Mohan Singh v. Bhanwarlal Natha, 17 E.L.R. 1.Rulya Ram v. Chaudhri Multan Singh, 17 E.L.R. 6.Biren Roy v. Bejoyesh Mukherjee, 17 E.L.R. 466.Gian Chand Puran Chand v. Smt. Om Prabha Jain, 18

E.L.R. 136.Jagannath Dalai v. Ramachandra Nahak, 18 E.L.R. 305.Chandrika Prasad Tripathi v. Shiv Prasad Chanpuria, 21

E.L.R. 172.Budhi Nath Jha v. Manilal Jadav, 22 E.L.R. 86.Kaushalendra Prasad Narain Singh v. Nand Kishore Prasad

Singh, 22 E.L.R. 484.Sec. 119 A.

K. P. Kariyappa v. H. M. Channabasappa Venkate Gowda,11 E.L.R. 484.

Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Yadav Tamaskar, 15E.L.R. 260.

Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Sec. 123.

K. P. Kariyappa v. H. M. Channabasappa, 11 E.L.R. 484.Sec. 123(1), Expl. (1).

Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R. 64.Sec. 123(1).

Mast Ram v. S. Iqbal Singh, 12 E.L.R. 34.Pyari Mohan Das v. Durga Sankar Das, 14 E.L.R. 338.S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami, 14 E.L.R. 394.Maganlal Bagdi v. Hari Vishnu Kamath, 15 E.L.R. 205.Akshaya Narayan Praharaj v. Maheswar Bag, 16 E.L.R.

337-Balwant Rai Tayal v. Bishan Saroop, 17 E.L.R. 101.Ahmedmiya Sherumiya Shaikh v. Chhippa Ibrahim Nuraji,

17 E.L.R. 218.Biresh Misra v. Ram Nath, 17 E.L.R. 243.Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj, 17

E.L.R. 321.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 413

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)Sec. 123(1)—(Contd.)

Dharanidhar Mohapatra v. Pradipta Kishore Das, 17E.L.R. 427.

Gokulananda Praharaj v. Jogesh Chandra Rout, 18 E.L.R.76.

Gangadhar Maithani v. Narendra Singh Bhandari, 18E.L.R. 124.

Kataria Takandas Hemraj v. Pinto Frederick Michael, 18E.L.R. 403.

V. Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju, 19 E.L.R. 358.Sarla Devi Pathak v. Birendra Singh, 20 E.L.R. 275.Gurbanta Singh v. Piara Ram, 20 E.L.R. 350.Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Krishi Pandit Rishabkumar, 20

E.L.R. 401.Soowalal v. P. K. Chaudhary, 21 E.L.R. 137.

Sec. I23(i)(a).Braj Bhushan v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah, 22 E.L.R. 225.

Sec. 123(1)$).Din Dayal v. Beni Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 131.

Sec. 123(2).Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra, 11

E.L.R. 222.Ratan Shukla v. Dr. Brijendra Swamp, 11 E.L.R. 332.Mast Ram v. S. Iqbal Singh, 12 E.L.R. 34.Basawaraj K. Nagur v. B. R. Shidlingappa, 12 E.L.R. 168.Radha Krishna Shukla v. Tara Chand Maheshwar, 12

E.L.R. 378.N. Sankara Reddi v. Yashoda Reddi, 13 E.L.R. 34.M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan (No. 2), 14 E.L.R.

432.Maganlal Bagdi v. Hari Vishnu Kamath, 15 E.L.R. 205.Dr. Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh, 16 E.L.R. 45.Ghayur AH Khan v. Keshav Gupta, 16 E.L.R. 154.Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Biresh Misra v. Ram Nath Sarma, 17 E.L.R. 243.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.Dharanidhar Mohapatra v. Pradipta Kishore Das, 17

E.L.R. 427.Gokulananda Praharaj v. Jogesh Chandra Rout, 18 E.L.R.

76.

414 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—{Contd.)

Sec. 123(2).

Jamuna Prasad Singh v. Shri Ramnivas, 18 E.L.R. 145.Md. Ibrahim Ansari v. M. R. Masani, 18 E.L.R. 160.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, iS E.L.R. 209.Nazmul Haque v. Amjad AH, 18 E.L.R. 253.Kataria Takandas Hemraj v. Pinto Frederick Michael, 18

E.L.R. 403.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.Radhakanta Mishra v. Nityananda Mahapatra, 19 E.L.R.

203.Abdul Rahiman Khan v. Radha Krushna Biswas Roy, 19

E.L.R. 278.Ram Dial v. Sant Lai, 19 E.L.R. 430.Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal, 20 E.L.R.

443-Ram Dial v. Sant Lai, 20 E.L.R. 482.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, 21 E.L.R. 286.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan Sharma, 21 E.L.R. 320.Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar, 21 E.L.R. 409.

Sec. I23(2)(a).Brij Sundar Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, 12

E.L.R. 216.Sec. 123(3).

Vasantha Pai v. Dr. V. K. John, 12 E.L.R. 107,Datla Suryanarayana Raju v. Ammanna Raja, 12 E.L.R.

156.Madan Lai v. Syed Zargham Haider, 13 E.L.R. 456.Chhattar Singh v. Kewal Singh, 15 E.L.R. 162.Tej Pal Singh v. Jagbir Singh, 15 E.L.R. 349.Karan Singh v. Jamuna Singh, 15 E.L.R. 370.N. L. Verma v. Muni Lai, 15 E.L.R. 495.Ghayur Ali Khan v. Keshav Gupta, 16 E.L.R. 154.Shivaram Sawant Bhonsale v. Pratap Rao Deorao Bhon-

sale, 17 E.L.R. 37.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.Dharanidhar Mohapalra v. Pradipta Kishore Das, 17

E.L.R. 427.Md. Ibrahim Ansari v. M. R. Masani, 18 E.L.R. 160.Nazmul Haque v. Amjad Ali, 18 E.L.R. 253.Raja Vijai Kumar Tripathi v. Ram Saran Yadav, 18

E.L.R. 299.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 415

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 123(3)—(Contd.)Kataria Takandas Hemraj v. Pinto Frederic Michael, 18

E.L.R. 403.Nani Gopal Swami v. Abdul Hamid Choudhury, 19 E.L.R.

175-Abdul Rahiman Khan v. Radha Krushna Biswas Roy, 19

E.L.R. 278.Ram Dial v. Sant Lai, 19 E.L.R. 430.Lakshmi Narain v. Balwan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 76.D. Venkatraraiah v. E. Narayana Gowda, 20 E.L.R. 101.Ashfaq AH Khan v. Darsan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 136.Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand, 20 E.L.R. 221.Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Krishi Pandit Rishabkumar, 20

E.L.R. 401.Ram Narain Prasad Yadav v. Subnath Deogam, 21 E.L.R.

108.

Amjad Ali v. Nazmul Haque, 21 E.L.R. 345.Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar, 21 E.L.R. 409.Shubnath Deogam v. Ram Narain Prasad Yadav, 22

E.L.R. 1.Babu Rao v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 321.Bhim Rao v. Ankush Rao, 22 E.L.R. 385.Khilumal Topandas v. Arjundas Tulsidas, 22 E.L.R. 404.

Sec. 123(4).Ganga Prasad Pathak v. Saligram Jaiswal, 11 E.L.R. 415.Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh, 12 E.L.R. 1.Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyricherla Chandra Chuda-

mani Dev, 13 E.L.R. 66.Shrinivas v. Rukmini Raman Pratap Singh, 14 E.L.R.

190.

Pottekkat Krishnan Sukumaran v. Kunjuvareed JosephMundasseri, 14 E.L.R. 313.

Maganlal Bagdi v. Hari Vishnu Kamath, 15 E.L.R. 205.Kanhaiyalal Tiwari v. Shy am Sunder Narayan Mushran,

15 E.L.R. 284.Madan Mohan Upadhya v. Hari Datt Kandpal, 15 E.L.R.

331-Savitri Devi v. Prabhawati Misra, 12 E.L.R. 358.Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das, 16 E.L.R. 405.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.Dharanidhar Mohapatra v. Pradipta Kishore Pas, 17

E.L.R. 427.

416 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 123(4)—(Contd.)Rawal Narendra Singh v. Smt. Kamla Beniwal, 18 E.L.R.

28.Kamdeo Prasad Singh v. Badri Narain Singh, 18 E.L.R.

59-Gangadhar Maithani v. Narendra Singh Bhandari, 18

E.L.R. 124.Jamuna Prasad Singh v. Shri Ramnivas, 18 E.L.R. 145.Md. Ibrahim Ansari v. M. R. Masani, 18 E.L.R. 160.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, 18 E.L.R. 209.Raja Vijai Kumar Tripathi v. Ram Saran Yadav, 18

E.L.R. 289.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.Nani Gopal Swami v. Abdul Hamid Choudhury, 19 E.L.R.

175-Abdul Rahiman Khan v. Radha Krushna Biswas Roy, 19

E.L.R. 278.Ram Dial v. Sant Lai, 19 E.L.R. 430.Amar Singh v. Balbir Singh, 19 E.L.R. 457.Sarla Devi Pathak v. Birendra Singh, 20 E.L.R. 275.Ashfaq Ali Khan v. Darshan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 136.Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand, 20 E.L.R. 221.Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Krishi Pandit Rishabkumar, 20

E.L.R. 401.Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal, 20 E.L.R.

443-Naunihal Singh v. Kishorilal Paliwal, 21 E.L.R. 33.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R. 64.Soowalal v. P. K. Chaudhary, 21 E.L.R. 137.Anjaneya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy, 21 E.L.R. 247.Amir Chand v. Smt. Sucheta Kriplani, 21 E.L.R. 286.Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar, 21 E.L.R. 409.Ram Binode Singh v. Sheobachan Singh, 22 E.L.R. 53.T. K. Gangi Reddy v. M. C. Anjaneya Reddy, 22 E.L.R.

261.Bhim Rao v. Ankusrr Rao, 22 E.L.R. 385.Khilumal Topandas v. Arjundas Tulsidas, 22 E.L.R. 404.

Sec. 123(5).Madan Singh v. Ladhu Ram Chaudhary, 11 E L.R. 99.Mast Ram v. Iqbal Singh, 12 E.L.R. 34.Vasantha Pai v. Dr. V. K. John, 12 E.L.R. 107.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 417

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd).

Sec. 123(5)—(Contd.)Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyrieherla Chandra Chuda-

mani Dev, 13 E.L.R. 66.Madan Lai v. Syed Zargham Haider, 13 E.L.R. 456.Din Dayal v. Beni Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 131.Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103.Prananath Patnaik v. Banamali Patnaik, 16 E.L.R. 357.Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 435.Narasimha Reddy v. Bhoomaji, 17 E.L.R. 207.Biresh Misra v. Ram Nath Sarina, 17 E.L.R. 243.Jayalakshmi Devamma v. Janardhan Reddi, 17 E.L.R.

302.Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj, 17

E.L.R. 321.Jamuna Prasad Singh v. Shri Ramnivas, 18 E.L.R. 145.Md. Ibrahim Ansari v. M. R. Masani, 18 E.L.R. 160.V. Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju, 19 E.L.R. 358.Ghenna Byre Gowda v. S. R. Ramiah, 20 E.L.R. 37.Lakshmi Narain v. Balwan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 76.Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal, 20 E.L.R.

443-V. B. Raju v. V. Ramachandra Rao, ai E.L.R. 1.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R.

64.Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, 22 E.L.R. 273.

Sec. 123(6).Bhagwan Datt Shastri v. Ram Ratan Gupta, n E.L.R.

448.Mast Ram v. S. Iqbal Singh, 12 E.L.R. 34.Ram Abhilakh Tewari v. Election Tribunal, Gonda,

14 E.L.R. 375.Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Election Tribunal, Chhatarpur,

15 E.L.R. i n .Lai Chandrabhan Shah v. C. B. Kekre, Member, Election

Tribunal, 15 E.L.R. 125.Madan Mohan Upadhya v. Hari Datt Kandpal, 15 E.L.R.

33i-Savitri Devi v. Prabhawati Misra, 15 E.L.R. 358.Karan Singh v. Jamuna Singh, 15 EX.R. 370.N. L. Verma v. Muni Lai, 15 EX.R. 495.Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103.

ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—{Contd.)

Sec. 123(6)—{Contd.)Ghayur Ali Khan v. Keshav Gupta, 16 E.L.R. 154.Shivram Sawant Bhonsale v. Pratap Rao Deorao Bhonsale,

17 E.L.R. 37.Giani Kartar Singh v. Election Tribunal, Chandigarh,

17 E.L.R. 148.Biresh Misra v. Ram Nath Sarma, 17 E.L.R. 243.Prabhudas v. Jorsang, 18 E.L.R. n o .Gangadhar Maithani v. Narendra Singh Bhandari, 18 E.L.R.

124.Md. Ibrahim Ansari v. M. R. Masani, 18 E.L.R. 160.Kataria Takandas Hemraj v. Pinto Frederick Michael, 18

E.L.R. 403.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.Sardar Dayal Singh v. Sardar Surjit Singh Majithia, 19

E.L.R. 395.V. Ramachandra Rao v. V. B. Raju, 19 E.L.R. 358.Lachhman Singh v. Harparkash Kaur, 19 E.L.R. 417.C. R. Narasimhan v. M. G. Natesan Chettiar, 20 E.L.R. 1.D. Venkatramiah v. E. Narayana Gowda, 20 E.L.R. 101.Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.M. S. Sourimuthu Udayar v. K. Pandiaraj, 20 E.L.R. 256.Pandit K. C. Sharma v. Krishi Pandit Rishabkumar, 20

E.L.R. 401.S. Kandaswami v. S. B. Adityan, 20 E.L.R. 410.Jagan Prasad Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal, 20 E.L.R.

443-V. B. Raju v. V. Ramachandra Rao, 21 E.L.R. 1.Naunihal Singh v. Kishorilal Paliwal, 21 E.L.R. 33.Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R.

64.M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 21 E.L.R. 215.Anjaneya Reddy v. Gangi Reddy, 21 E.L.R. 247.S. Kandaswami v. S. B. Adityan, 21 E.L.R. 435,Chandrashekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 22 E.L.R.

206.Lachhman Singh Gill v. Harparkash Kaur, 22 E.L.R. 249.

Sec. 123(7).Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder, 11 E.L.R. 208.Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra, %x

E.L.R. 222.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 419

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 123(7)—(Contd.)Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh, 12 E.L.R. 1.Vasantha Pai v. Dr. V. K. John, 12 E.L.R. 107.H. H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, 12 E.L.R.

421.Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 E.L.R. 461.Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyricherla Chandra Chuda-

mani Dev, 13 E.L.R. 66.S. Pratap Singh Kairon v. Gurmej Singh, 14 E.L.R. 412.Balwan Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kanpur, 15 E.L.R.

199.Madan Mohan Upadhya v. Hari Datt Kandpal, 15 E.L.R.

331-Tej Pal Singh v. Jagbir Singh, 15 E.L.R. 349.Karan Singh v. Jamuna Singh, 15 E.L.R. 370.Motilal v. Mangla Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 425.Dr. Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh Pal, 16 E.L.R. 45.Biresh Misra v. Ram Nath Sarma, 17 E.L.R. 243.Jayalakshmi Devamma v. Janardhan Reddi, 17 E.L.R.

302.

Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj, 17E.L.R. 321.

Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.Amar Singh v. Balbir Singh, 19 E.L.R. 457.Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand, 20 E.L.R. 221.Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar, 21 E.L.R. 409.Chandrashekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 22 E.L.R.

206.

G. Vasantha Pai v. A. Srinivasan, 22 E.L.R. 221.Lachhman Singh Gill v. Harparkash Kaur, 22 E.L.R.

249.Sec. i23(y)(c) Expln. 2.

Baru Ram v. Prasanni, 16 E.L.R. 450.Sec. 123 (y)(J).

Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103.Prabhunath Tiwari v. Janardan Singh, 18 E.L.R. 1.

Sec. 123(8).Kushwaqt Rai v. Karan Singh, 11 E.L.R. 1.Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra,

11 E.L.R. 222.

420 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of tine People Act (43 of 195l)~~(Contd.)

Sec. 123(8)—(Contd.)Ganga Prasad Pathak v. Saligram Jaiswal, n E.L.R. 415.Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh, 12 E.L.R. 1.Mast Ram v. S. Iqbal Singh, 12 E.L.R. 34.Matadin Chaurasia v. Mahendra Kumar Manav, 12

E.L.R. 144.Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, 12 E.L.R. 461.Hafiz Moh. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow,

13 E.L.R. 262.Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.

Sec. 124(1).Kushwaqt Rai v. Karan Singh, 11 E.L.R. 1.S. Norata Singh v. S. Dharam Singh, 11 E.L.R. 57.

Sec. 124(4).Kushwaqt Rai v. Karam Singh, 11 E.L.R. 1.S. Norata Singh v. S. Dharam Singh, 11 E.L.R. 57.Mast Ram v. S. Iqbal Singh, 12 E.L.R. 34.Vasantha Pai v. Dr. V. K. John, 12 E.L.R. 107.Chikati Parasuram Naidu v. Vyricherla i Chandra Chuda-

mani Dev, 13 E.L.R. 66.Sec. 124(8).

Madan Singh v. Ladhu Ram Chaudhary, 11 E.L.R. 99.Sec. 125(3).

Dr. V. K. John v. Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes,Madras, 12 E.L.R. 329.

Sec. 128. ,'••-

Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.Sec. 130.

Radha Krishna Shukla v. Tara Chand Maheshwar,12 E.L.R. 378.

Sec. 137(7).Sardar Dayal Siagh v. Sardar Surjit Singh Majithia,

19 E.L.R. 305.Sec. 140.

T. Napappa v. T. C. Basappa, 11 E.L.R. 203.Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder, 11 E.L.R. 208.Ratan Shukla v. Dr. Brijendra Swarup, 11 E.L.R. 332.K. P. Kariyappa v. H. M. Channabasappa, 11 E.L.R. 484.Ahmedmiya Sherumiya Shaikh v. Chhippa Ibrahim Nuraji,

17 E.L.R. 218.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 4*1

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(Contd.)

Sec. 141.Raghunath Misra v. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj,

17 E.L.R. 321.Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh, 11 E.L.R. 192.Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder, 11 E.L.R. 208.Amjad AH v. Nazmul Haque, 21 E.L.R. 345.

Sec. 142.Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh, 11 E.L.R. 192.Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder, 11 E.L.R. 208.

Sec. 143.Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat, 11 E.L.R. 175.Tirath Singh v. Bachitar. Singh, 11 E.L.R. 192.T. Nagappa v. T. C. Basappa, 11 E.L.R. 203.Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder, 11 E.L.R. 208.Sadasheo Jagannath Barapatre v. Hemaji Hiraman Bakde,

18 E.L.R. 20.

Sec. 144.Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh, 11 E.L.R. 192.

Sec. 147.Shridhar Mahadeo joshi v. Rajbhoj Pandurang Nathoji,

13 E.L.R. 430.Sec. 152.

Brij Behari v. Mirza Ahmad Ali, 22 E.L.R. 455.

Sec. 153.

Pandit Ram Nath Kalia v. Hem Raj, 21 E.L.R. 161.

Sec. 160(2).

Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 435.

Sec. i6g.Prabhu Charan v. Shiv Dutt, 14 E.L.R. 108.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 21 E.L.R. 376.L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 95.

Sec. i6g(3).

Champa Devi v. Jamuna Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 443.

Form 2A.

Parmeshwar Kumar v. Lahtan Chaudhary, 14 E.L.R. 444.

Form 2B.Ramayan Shukla v. Rajendra Prasad Singh, 16 E.L.R. 491.

432 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951)—(ContdJForm 2C, 2D, 2E & 2F.

Parmeshwar Kumar v. Lahtan Chaudhary, 14 E.L.R. 444.

Form 5A.Ranbir Singh v. Beant Singh, 11 E.L.R. 182.S. Gurbhajnik Singh v. S. Bhagwant Singh, 11 E.L.R. 272

Form 28.

Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.

Sch. VI.Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra,

11 E.L.R. 222.

Representation of the People Act, 1951 (as amended in 1956).

Sec. 7(d).M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 13 E.L.R. 201.

Sec. 33(2).Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao, 16 E.L.R. 477.

Sec. 38.K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, 14 E.L.R. 270.

Sec. 38(1).Kamraj Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 159.

Sec. 46.Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh Paul, 16 E.L.R. 483.

Sec. 54.Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao, 16 E.L.R. 477.

Sec. 55A.Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 13 E.L.R. 139.Kamraj Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 159.K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, 14 E.L.R. 270.

Sec. 70.Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao, 16 E.L.R. 477.

Sec. 72.Dr. V. K. John v. Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes,

Madras, 12 E.L.R. 329.

Sec. 74(1) & 74(2).Sadasheo Jagannath Barapatre v. Hemaji Hiraman Bakde,

18 E.L.R. 20.

Sec. 77.Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao, 16 E.L.R. 477.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 423

Representation of the People Act, 1951 (as amended in 1956)—(Contd.)Sec. 81.

M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 13 E.L.R. 201.

Sec. 82.Sita Ram Khemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru, 13 E.L.R. 126.Rattan Singh v. Ram Kishan Gupta, 13 E.L.R. 135.Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 13 E.L.R. 139.Kamaraj Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 159.Sita Ram Khemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru, 13 E.L.R. 322.

Sec. 82(a).Shah Alim Uddin v. Satish Chandra Agarwal, 14 E.L.R.

199.Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, 14 E.L.R. 270.

Sec. 82(b)S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami, 13 E.L.R. 246.Durga Prasad Chowdhary v. Mukat Behari Lai Bhargava,

14 E.L.R. 471.Sec. 83.

Maulana Abdul Jalil Choudhury v. Rathindra Nath Sen,13 E.L.R. 290.

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, Jabalpur, 14E.L.R. 147.

Sec. 83(1).M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 13 E.L.R. 201.

Sec. 83(3).Habibur Rehman v. Shiva Gopal Tewari, 13 E.L.R. 377.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan, 16 E.L.R. 93.

Sec. 84.Dr. V. K. John v. Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes,

; Madras, 12 E.L.R. 329.Sec. 85.

Sita Ram Khemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru, 13 E.L.R. 126.Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 13 E.L.R. 139.S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami, 13 E.L.R. 246.Sita Ram Khemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru, 13 E.L.R. 322.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, jabalpur, 14

E.L.R. 147.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan, 16 E.L.R. 93.

Sec. 86{3).Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji, 13 E.L.R. 328,

434 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Representation of the People Act, 1951 (as amended in l9&b)—(Coittd.)Sec. go.

Maulana Abdul Jalil Choudhury v. Rathindra Nath Sen,13 E.L.R. 290.

Sec. 90(1).Hari Vislinu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, Jabalpur, 14

E.L.R. 147.Sec. go(2).

M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 13 E.L.R. 201.Sec. go(3).

Sita Ram Khemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru, 13 E.L.R. 126.Rattan Singh v. Ram Kishan Gupta, 13 E.L.R. 135.Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 13 E.L.R. 139.Kamaraj Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 159 ; 14 E.L.R.

270.S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami, 13 E.L.R. 246.Sita Ram Khemka v. Jawaharlal Nehru, 13 E.L.R. 322.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, Jabalpur, 14

E.L.R. 147.Shah Alim Uddin v. Satish Chandra Agarwal, 14 E.L.R.

199.Durga Prasad Chowdhary v. Mukat Behari Lai Bhargava,

14 E.L.R. 471.Sec. go(4).

Rattan Singh v. Ram Kishan Gupta, 13 E.L.R. 135.Chunnilal Ken v. Radhacharan, 16 E.L.R. 93.

Sec. go(5).Sangappa v. Shivamurti Swamy, 13 E.L.R. 365.Habibur Rehrnan v. Shiva Gopal Tewari, 13 E.L.R. 377.Babulal Sharma v. Brijnarain Brajesh, 14 E.L.R. 72.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, Jabalpur, 14

E.L.R. 147.Nirbhayadas v. Gulab Bai, 14 E.L.R. 186.

Sec. 92.M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 13 E.L.R. 201.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal, Jabalpur, 14

E.L.R. 147.Sec. gg.

Durga Prasad Chowdhary v. Mukat Behari Lai Bhargava,14 E.L.R. 471.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 425

Representation of the People Act, 1951 (as amended in 1956)—(Contd.)Sec. 100.

M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 13 E.L.R. 201.Sec. ioo(i)(b).

S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami, 13 E.L.R. 246.Sec. 116 A.

M. A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Saw. Ganesan, 13 E.L.R. 201.Shah Alim Uddin v. Satish Chandra Agarwal, 14 E.L.R.

199.Durga Prasad Chowdhary v. Mukat Behari Lai Bhargava,

14 E.L.R. 471.Sec. 117.

Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, 13 E.L.R. 159; 14E.L.R. 270.

Sec. 123(1).Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao,! 16 E.L.R. 477.

Sec. i23(i){a).S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami, 13 E.L.R. 246.

Sec. 123(2).Maulana Abdul Jalil Choudhury v. Rathindra Nath Sen,

13 E.L.R. 290.Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh Paul, 16 E.L.R. 483.

Sec. 123(3).Maulana Abdul Jalil Choudhury v. Rathindra Nath Sen,

13 E.L.R. 290.Sec. 123(4).

Maulana Abdul Jalil Choudhury v. Rathindra Nath Sen,13 E.L.R. 290.

Sec. 123(7).Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh Paul, 16 E.L.R. 483.Kishore Chandra Deo! Bhanj v. Raghunath Misra, 19

E.L.R. 1.Sec. I23(7)(j).

Partap Singh Khairon v. Rama Prasad Mookerjee, 21E.L.R. 46.

Sardar Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, 21E.L.R. 471.

Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and ElectionPetitions) Rules, 1951.r. 2(2).

Dalip Singh v. Surendra Nath, 11 E.L.R. 120.Yamuna Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad Khare, 13 E.L.R. 1,

PLD-54

426 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. (Conduct of Elections & Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—(Contd.)

r- 2(5).Dalip Singh v. Surendra Nath, n E.L.R. 120.

rr. 5 & io.Prabhu Charan v. Shiv Dutt, 14 E.L.R. 108.

r. 20.N. Sankara Reddi v. Yashoda Reddi, 13 E.L.R. 34.

r. 2Q.

A. K. Subbaraya Gounder v. K. G. Palanisami Gounder,11 E.L.R. 251.

r. 40.Dalip Singh v. Surendra Nath, 11 E.L.R. 120.

r.44.Gopalan v. Kannan, 14 E.L.R. 458.

r. 45(iii).Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.

r. 46.Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra, 11

E.L.R. 222.rr. 46(i)(v), (vi), (viii) & 46(2).

Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.r.47.

Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra, 11E.L.R. 222.

r. 47(i)(a).Shah Sankalchand Motilal v. Shukla Damubhai Chhaganlal

12 E.L.R. 184.rr. 48 & 50.

Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati Nehru, 16 E.L.R. 234.rr. 92(a) (b), & (c).

Shah Sankalchand Motilal v. Shukla Damubhai Chhaganlal,12 E.L.R. 184.

rr. 92(i)(e), {2)(b).R. Subbanna v. S. R. Guru, 12 E.L.R. 201.

r. 114(4), (5) & (6).Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat, 11 E.L.R. 175.

r. ny.Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder, 11 E.L.R. 208.

r. 118.Rajendra Prasad Yadav v. Suresh Chandra Mishra, 11

E.L.R. 222.Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh, 12 E.L.R. 1.H. H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, 12 E.L.R,

421.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 427

R. P. ( Co nduct of Elections & Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—(Contd.)

r. ng.Matadin Chaurasia v. Mahendra Kumar Manav, 12 E.L.R.

144.Radha Krishna Shukla v. Tara Chand Maheshwar, 12

E.L.R. 378.H. H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, 12 E.L.R.

421.Sch. V.

Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder, 11 E.L.R. 208.Sch. VI.

Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh, 12 E.L.R. 1.H. H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, 12 E.L.R.

421.r. 2(i)(b).

Dev Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath, 15 E.L.R. 66;21 E.L.R. 459.

Netram v. Lakshman Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 266.Ramayan Shukla v. Rajendra Prasad Singh, 16 E.L.R. 491.

r. 4, Forms 2A to 2F.Chiranji Lai v. Lahri Singh, 15 E.L.R. 397.

r. 4.Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.

r-5-Ram Chandra Shukla v. Election Commission, India, 13

E.L.R. 105.Ramayan Shukla v. Rajendra Prasad Singh, 16 E.L.R. 491.

Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.r- 5(2).

Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.Ramkishun Singh v. Tribeni Singh, 17 E.L.R. 81.Ramswaroop Prasad Yadav v. Jagat Kishore Prasad

Narain Singh, 17 E.L.R. no .r. 10.

Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao, 16 E.L.R. 477.r. 16(2).

Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 15 E.L.R. 292.Mubarak Mazdoor v. Lai Bahadur, 20 E.L.R. 176.

t. 20(l){b).Kamal Basu v. Purnendu Sekhar Naskar, 15 E.L.R. 292.

r. 21.Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao, 16 E.L.R. 477,

428 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. (Conduct of Elections & Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—{Contd.)r. 22(2).

Buggaveti Krishnayya v. Lakshmikantamma, 18 E.L.R.476.

r. 27(2).Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219.Radhakrishnan v. Muthukumaraswami Naidu, 19 E.L.R.

481.r. 2g.

A. K. Subbaraya Gounder v. K. G. Palaniswamy Gounder,11 E.L.R. 251.

r. 38(2).Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao, 16 E.L.R. 477.

r. 40.Dalip Singh v. Surendra Nath, 11 E.L.R. 120.

rr. 41A to 48J.Vinaya Kumar Diwan v. Raghunathsingh Kiledar, 22

E.L.R. 425.r. 47(2) & 50(2).

Champa Devi v. Jamuna Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 443.r- 57-

Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande v. Keshav LakshmanBorkar, 13 E.L.R. 334.

Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.r- 57i2)-

Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219.Radhakrishnan v. Muthukumaraswami Naidu, 19 E.L.R.

481.r. 58.

Dr. Deorao Lakshman Anande v. Keshav LakshmanBorkar, 13 E.L.R. 334.

Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219.Sudhir Laxman Hendre v. S. A. Dange, 17 E.L.R. 373.

r. 64(2).Basaviah v. Bachiah, 17 E.L.R. 293.

r. 64(6).Bhim Sen v. Chattar Singh, 15 E.L.R. 175.Champa Devi v. Jamuna Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 443.

r. 118.Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao, 16 E.L.R. 477.

r. 119.Matadin Chaurasia v. Mahendra Kumar Manav, 12 E.L.R,

144.

INDEX fO STATUTES REFERRED TO 42 §

R. P. (Conduct of Elections & Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—(Contd.)

r. 125(7).Mariswamy Hirematha Gangadharaswamy v. B. Chikkan-

naswamy, 20 E.L.R. 114.r.13-

Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra, 16 E.L.R. 103.Saw. Ganesan v. M. A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 E.L.R. 16.

L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 22 E.L.R. 95.r. 131(2).

L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 21 E.L.R. 376.

L. M. Chakradeo v. M. S. Aney, 21 E.L.R. 376; 22E.L.R. 95.

y. 136-Ramnarain v. Ramchandra, 15 E.L.R. 100.

Sch. VI.Jhumaklal v. Ambika Sao, 16 E.L.R. 477.

R. P. (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1956.

r-5-Netram v. Lakshman Prasad and Others, 15 E.L.R. 266.

• r. 6.

Netram v. Lakshman Prasad, 15 E.L.R. 266.r. 21(3).

Chandra Shekhar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh, 19 E.L.R.490.

r. 23.Bhawani Prasad Tiwari v. Jagdish Narayan Awasthi, 16

E.L.R. 143.Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.

r. 24.Bhawani Prasad Tiwari v. Jagdish Narayan Awasthi, 16

E.L.R. 143.r. 26

Ramswaroop Prasad Yadav v. Jagat Kishore PrasadNarain Singh, 17 E.L.R. no .

Chandra Shekar Prasad v. Jai Prakash Singh, 17 E.L.R.126.

r. 26(4).Manzoor Ahmad v. Budhi Lai, 16 E.L.R. 470.

ELD-55

430 ELECT ION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Scheduled Castes and Tribes List (Modification) Order, 1956.

Sch. I, Part VI, Cl. 2.Naunihal Singh v. Kishorilal Paliwal, 21 E.L.R. 33.

Sec. 2(21).Chheda Lai Gupta v. Niranjan Singh Deo, 17 E.L.R. 97.

Stamp Act (II of 1899).Sec. 35.

Chheda Lai Gupta v. Niranjan Singh Deo, 17 E.L.R. 97.

States Reorganisation Act (XXXVII of 1956).

Sec. 35(3).Dr. V. K. John v. Chairman, Madras Legislative Council,

12 E.L.R. 345.Sec. 41.

Naunihal Singh v. Kishorilal Paliwal, 21 E.L.R. 33.Sec. 101.

Inayatullah Khan v. Diwanchand Mahajan, 15 E.L.R. 219.Sees, ng, 120.

Shirur Veerbhadrappa v. Shankaragouda Basangouda, 17E.L.R. 117.

Supreme Court Rules, Chap. XXXVII-A.Dr. N. B. Khare v. Election Commission of India, 13

E.L.R. 318.

U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901.Sees. 4(3) & 4(9).

Madan Mohan Upadhaya v. Hari Datt Kandpal, 15 E.L.R.33i-

U. P. Land Utilisation Act, 1948.Kushwaqt Rai v. Karan Singh, 11 E.L.R. 1.

U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.Ganga Prasad Pathak v. Saligram Jaiswal, 11 E.L.R. 415.Tej Pal Singh v. Jagbir Singh, 15 E.L.R. 349.

U. P. Panchayat Raj Rules, 1947.Shri Krishna v. Rajeshwar Singh, 12 E.L.R. 1.

U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.Sec. 23(1).

Allah Bux v. Ratan Lai Jain, 15 E.L.R. 407.