Diamonds or development ? A structural assessment of Botswana’s forty years of success

Diamonds or development ?A structural assessment of

Botswana’s forty years of success

ELLEN HILLBOM*

Department of Economic History, Lund University, P.O. Box 7083,

S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

Email : [email protected]

A B S T R A C T

Due to its four decades of high long-term economic growth and democraticsystem, Botswana has been depicted as an exceptional success story in a regionfull of economic and political failures. In this article, a structural analysis isapplied, and it is argued that Botswana’s success should be understood as one ofpre-modern growth without development. It is claimed that although the countrymay be a growth miracle, it has not yet experienced ‘modern economic growth’,characterised by structural change in patterns of production as well as in socialand political institutions. Such analysis also offers an explanation for the dualityof Botswana’s economy and society, since pre-modern growth, as opposed todevelopment, allows for significant poverty rates and extremely unequal resourceand income distribution to prevail in the midst of plenty.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

At Independence in 1966, Botswana was a poor, undeveloped and seldom

heard of part of the world. Forty years later, it is regarded as a growth

miracle (Samatar 1999), a sign of hope for sub-Saharan Africa, and as an

exemplar of prosperity and success. The country experienced a staggering

GDP per capita increase of 13% per annum in the years 1980–89

(Mpabanga 1997), and a long-run growth over the last four decades that

even surpasses the performance of the Pacific Asian tigers (Leith 2005: 4,

* The research for this article was conducted within the research project ‘The Role of Equity inDevelopment ’, funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Departmentfor Research Cooperation (Sida/SAREC). The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable commentsgiven by her colleagues Christer Gunnarsson, Martin Andersson and Erik Green, and by twoanonymous referees.

J. of Modern African Studies, 46, 2 (2008), pp. 191–214. f 2008 Cambridge University Pressdoi:10.1017/S0022278X08003194 Printed in the United Kingdom

Table 1.1). Simultaneously, the government has managed to establish

one of the longest running multiparty democracies on the continent.

The question is frequently posed how a country that used to be among

the poorest, situated in the most underdeveloped and conflict-ridden

continent in the world, could achieve outstanding growth paired with

political stability. The explanation for the success story is found mainly in

limited colonial influence, good political institutions, wise leaders and

prudent economic policy (see e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2003; Beaulier &

Subrick 2006; Harvey & Lewis 1990; Iimi 2006; Leith 2005; Mpabanga

1997; Owusu & Samatar 1997; Samatar 1999).

In this article Botswana’s economic performance is, however, analysed

not from the viewpoint of stability and growth, but from that of structural

change and development. The position is taken that while commendable

advances have been achieved during the last four decades, these need to

be complemented with technological innovations, significant productivity

increase, change in economic and political structures, a significant rise in

living standards for the poor, and a more equal distribution of resources,

incomes and opportunities, for there to be long-run sustainable opulence

with substance. It is necessary to distinguish between growth and devel-

opment. Botswana’s significant economic and political advances make up

a clear case of growth without development, as long as such change has

not taken place.

The diamond-led economic growth record of Botswana is truly im-

pressive, and the country is presently classified as an upper-middle-income

country with an estimated GNI per capita of US$5,900 in 2006 (World

Bank 2008a). Although average GDP growth rates have been levelling

off and falling below 4% per annum (World Bank 2008b), no immediate

end to further economic expansion is in sight. The most serious socio-

economic threat is the estimated 24% prevalence of HIV/AIDS in

the productive population aged 15–49 (World Bank 2008a), resulting in a

35-year life expectancy, and infant and under-five mortality rates at 87 and

120 respectively (ibid.). This gives the country the unique and deplorable

combination of impressive growth with diving social indicators.

As part and parcel of the successful growth, Botswana is also associated

with political progress. Independence was peaceful, and compared with

other African leaders, the Botswana political elite has shown an ability to

govern both peacefully and prudently (see e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2003;

Beaulier & Subrick 2006; Hill 1991; Leith 2005). The country has a high

regulatory quality, and is considered by many not only to be the least

corrupt country in Africa, but as on par in this regard with Western

Europe (Robinson & Parsons 2006: 107–10). This view is, however, being

192 E L L EN H I L L BOM

contested as increasing mismanagement and corruption on the part of

the power elite has been documented (Makgala 2006).

In the midst of this peaceful growth miracle, there thus exist serious

deficiencies. Apart from a degree of elite capture, these include concerns

over high and unchanging inequalities, poor and neglected rural areas, high

unemployment rates, failure in limiting the AIDS epidemic, discrimination

against minority groups such as the San and a weak civil society (see e.g.

Allen & Heald 2004; Good 1993, 1994; Gulbrandsen 1996; Heald 2006;

Lekoko & van derMerwe 2006;Makgala 2006; Nthomang 2004; Phaladze

& Tlou 2006; Wikan 2004). Dual development and contradictory in-

dicators are typical of a country experiencing pre-modern growth without

structural change and development. A holistic structural analysis that

recognises Botswana’s socio-economic institutional structure as partly

pre-modern underscores the ambiguity in the growth process, and is

necessary for drawing up strategies for turning growth into development.

G R O W T H O R D E V E L O P M E N T

Kuznets (1973) argued that in our time the end goal for any society is to

reach ‘modern economic growth’ (MEG), thereby leaving the pre-modern

growth process behind. This modernisation, which is the equivalent

of development, is characterised by technological advances, high rates

of growth, a rise in productivity, and structural transformation of the

economy, society and ideology. Depending on its causes and character-

istics, growth may be more or less likely to promote such processes of

structural change, and societies can experience growth while staying

pre-modern. Botswana is an example of a small country possessing ex-

ceptionally valuable resources, allowing the state to provide its population

with increasing rents. Such types are not representative in Kuznets’ orig-

inal model of MEG, where they are treated as atypical cases. Building

on Kuznets, using comparative history and comparative economic devel-

opment, Adelman and Morris (1997 : 833) elaborate on the modernisation

argument, taking the position that all processes of economic development

are multifaceted and non-linear. Recognising variations in possible paths

to modernisation and development does not, however, contradict stipu-

lating a uniform end goal. In their categorisation, Botswana falls into a

typology of agricultural, primary-export oriented, sharply dualistic and

land-abundant countries. Within this group, the characteristics of existing

natural resource endowments and degrees of government autonomy

from tribal domestic elites and colonial powers determine patterns and

sequence of structural change.

D I AMOND S OR D EV E LO PMENT I N BO T SWANA 193

A theoretical approach to the potential development process of this

category of economies is offered by a modified Lewis model. Lewis (1954,

1979) stipulates a closed economy, where population is large relative to

capital and natural resources and, consequently, there is an unlimited

supply of labour. As this labour leaves the subsistence sector where mar-

ginal productivity is negligible, zero or even negative, and moves into the

capitalist sector with significantly higher productivity, structural change

and economic modernisation are realised. The industrialisation process

is at the heart of the capitalist sector, but this also includes capitalist agri-

culture, and Lewis was highly concerned with raising agricultural pro-

ductivity in order to prevent the creation of a dual economy. The original

Lewis model must be restated for the analysis of economies of the

Botswana type to an open-economy model, where export incomes from

primary products are invested to achieve industrialisation and agricultural

transformation (Adelman & Morris 1997 : 838). Such substitution for poor

capital accumulation in other sectors, specifically agriculture, is the pri-

mary opportunity for catching up offered to natural resource-dependent

developing countries (Gerschenkron 1962).

MEG marks a distinct economic epoch, and is separated from the pre-

modern structure by six characteristics : (1) high rates of per capita and

population growth; (2) high rate of rise in productivity ; (3) high rate of

structural transformation of the economy; (4) rapid change in social and

ideological structures ; (5) participation in a globalised economy; and (6) a

significant level of modern technology. At the same time as MEG rep-

resents a new structure, it also comprises the continuation of old trends,

albeit in an accelerated form, and this makes the break between the pre-

modern and the modern difficult to identify and analyse (Kuznets 1973:

248–9). The conventional Botswana success story, resting on significant

growth rates due to high earnings from diamond exports, corresponds to

only two of the above stated characteristics. However, the structural

analysis provided in this article is concerned for all of the above presented

characteristics of MEG, the presence of which would signify a break with

the pre-modern growth process.

Technological advance, productivity increase and structural change

in patterns of production raise the income levels, while the distribution

of resources and incomes via a modernised institutional structure leads

to widespread improvements in human welfare. It is in the nature of de-

velopment that all segments of society significantly benefit from economic

gains. With such a demanding definition of development, there is only a

very exclusive group of mostly Pacific Asian countries that have become

developed since World War II. A lesson from the last 50 years is, however,


that economic development of developing countries is possible (Adelman

2003: 17–18). The growth performance and improvements in infra-

structure and human capital that are characteristics of Botswana’s success

are significant, but they depend on export earnings from primary pro-

duction, and the country has not reached development as defined above.

The second issue to be investigated is then how pre-conditions for a

transformation can be created, and whether there are any implications

from the Botswana case for other natural resource-abundant countries

striving for development.

There is a clear connection between theories on MEG on the one hand,

and development on the other. Although Kuznets only used the term

development explicitly in the sense of self-sustained growth, together with

structural change in production and technological advance, the redistri-

bution of resources is implicit in the model. Kuznets (1955) hypothesised

that societies prior to MEG are characterised by fairly equally distributed

low levels of income and a high incidence of poverty. During the process

of structural change, inequality temporarily increases, but in the modern

economy the higher levels of income will be distributed to all levels of

society, leading to significantly improved living conditions. Equity, defined

as equal opportunities for all members of society and an avoidance

of deprivation in outcomes (World Bank 2006: xi), is both a means of

reaching development and the goal of development itself. In the case

of Botswana, the point of departure involved high poverty rates, combined

with high degrees of inequality and growth. Adelman and Morris (1997)

claim that the individual starting point is decisive for the development

process, and for Botswana a conscious strategy of fairness, improvements

of living standards and inclusion would then be imperative for reaching

equity in development.

E C O N O M I C S T R U C T U R A L C H A N G E

Hirschman (1958) argued that in a small country with an economy domi-

nated by a valuable natural resource, growth usually has few linkages to

other aspects of the economy and society, unless there is active govern-

ment involvement to substitute for stagnating sectors. Technological

advance and innovation need to be paired with a flexible and encouraging

institutional structure, in order to produce a significant increase in

productivity. The general technological level of industry in Botswana has,

however, stayed low, and productivity has not experienced any significant

increase with the exception of the mining sector. In fact, the increase in

Total Factor Productivity is brought about mainly by increase in factor


input of capital and skilled and unskilled labour, and less than 10% of the

growth in output in the 1980s and 1990s was due to increases in pro-

ductivity (Leith 1997a: 29–30). Unfortunately, mining employs only 4% of

the labour force, is not complemented by other forms of industry, and has

not encouraged or contributed to technological advance, via either im-

ported technology or domestic innovations (Gaolathe 1997: 412–13;

Mpabanga 1997: 373; RoB 2004a: 12, Fig. 2.4). It mainly has spin-off

effects on the public sector via government employment (Good 1993) and

spending. The service sector has at present expanded to 45% of GDP

(World Bank 2008a), becoming the largest sector as increased incomes

allow for increased demand from government and the public for certain

services and goods. Most consumption goods are imported from the

Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (RoB 2003: 114), which lowers

market incentives for domestic producers.

In 1968 agriculture dominated the economy, representing over 40% of

GDP, only to decline to less than 2% in 2006; it continues to hold a very

modest position. Mining instead expanded from 8% of GDP in 1974/75 to

53% in 1988/89, only to shrink again to roughly 35% in 2002 (Leith

1997a: 24 ; 2005: 5, Table 1.1 ; Siwawa-Ndai 1997 : 343, Table 2; World

Bank 2008a). These changes represent, however, a shift in balance in the

economy, rather than a rise of new sectors, export goods or modes of

production. The industrial sector has grown significantly in relative terms,

but this is mainly due to the expansion of the mining sector, while

manufacturing persists at roughly 4% of GDP, with figures falling over

the last two decades (Mpabanga 1997: 371 ; RoB 2003: 28, Table 3.1 ;

Siwawa-Ndai 1997: 347). Botswana’s contemporary economy is thus not

substantially more diversified than was the case at Independence (Leith

2005: 100; Siwawa-Ndai 1997). The government’s efforts to diversify have

failed, and left the economy vulnerable in the long term.

In 1966, government policy established that the role of the state

would be one of providing infrastructure and education, while it was up to

the private sector to develop manufacturing. The Botswana Meat

Commission (BMC) abattoir completely dominated the manufacturing

sector at Independence, accounting for over 90% of output and employ-

ment. Starting from the mid-1970s there has, however, been an intra-

sectoral diversification and significant overall growth in value added, but

not in relative terms in percentage of GDP; much of the growth can be

attributed to the very low starting point (Harvey & Lewis 1990: 159–69;

Owusu & Samatar 1997: 275). The government did appreciate the need to

expand beyond mining and agriculture into high productivity industry,

and a number of assistance schemes have been launched over the years.


Unfortunately these became subject to increasing abuse and subsequently

failed (Leith 2005: 99–100). When it came to expanding beyond the

traditional and well-established sectors, Botswana exposed itself as

resembling other corrupt African countries from which it is generally

set apart. The inference must be that industry has not experienced

significant technological advance or innovation, achieved much increase

in productivity or undergone structural change, and therefore cannot be

considered as part of a transformation to MEG.

Low levels of technology and productivity unfortunately also charac-

terise the agricultural sector, which is further restrained by a hostile

environment (RoB 2003: 178–82; Silitshena & McLeod 1998, chs. 9–10).

Only 4% of the country’s area is suitable for agriculture (Parson 1984: 4),

and absolute agricultural production could never be expected to become

high in a country that is as climatically challenged as Botswana, with

roughly two-thirds of the country comprising the Kalahari Desert. In the

1930s, Batswana farmers grew 90% of the country’s cereals consumption,

but production decreased and in the 1980s the figure was 50%.

Consequently, in 1991 the Botswana government abandoned its previous

goal of self-sufficiency in food production, and instead adopted a policy

of food security (Silitshena & McLeod 1998: 88–9). The country is

today totally dependent on SACU for imports, while fields and animals

yield even below the requirements for subsistence, and many households

depend on complementary off-farm incomes (Gulbrandsen 1996: 2–3).

The advancement of cattle rearing has been the most prominent

government venture in the agricultural sector, in colonial times and

T A B L E 1

Shares of GDP by sector

1966 1975/76 1985/86 2000/2001

Sector % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP

Agriculture 42.7 20.75 5.6 2.6

Mining & Quarrying – 17.5 48.9 36.5

Manufacturing 5.7 7.6 3.9 4.1

Water and Electricity 0.6 2.3 2.0 2.4

Construction 7.8 12.8 4.6 5.8

Trade, Hotels and Restaurants 9.0 8.6 6.3 10.3

Transport 4.3 1.1 2.5 3.8

Banks, Insurance & Business Services 20.1 4.7 6.4 10.9

General Government 9.8 14.6 12.8 16.0

Social and Personal Services – 2.8 2.5 4.0

Source : Adapted from RoB 2003: Table 3.1.


after Independence. Already in the late 1920s and 1930s, the colonial

administration started borehole drilling schemes, as beef exports were

conceived as the only comparative advantage of the Bechuanaland

Protectorate (see e.g. Carlsson 2003: 153–7;1 Lawry 1983: 2; Parsons &

Crowder 1988; Peters 1994, ch. 3). This assumption turned out to be valid,

in the sense that until the present the country’s only significant agricultural

export has been beef, and it will continue to be so in the foreseeable future.

At Independence, beef represented 85% of Bechuanaland’s total export

earnings, a figure that had dropped to 2% in 2006 (Colcough &McCarthy

1980: 32; Harvey & Lewis 1990: 78–82; Leith 1997b: 530; RoB 2007).

In 1975 the Botswana government negotiated favourable conditions from

the Beef and Veal Protocol of the Lome Convention, which guaranteed

exports to Europe with high profits due to significant reductions in tariffs

(Harvey & Lewis 1990: 78–82; Siwawa-Ndai 1997: 363). The indepen-

dence government has continued in the footsteps of its colonial pre-

decessors : constructing water sources, subsidising veterinary services,

distributing vaccines, building veterinary fences, and setting up the BMC

as a monopsony buyer of cattle and exporter of meat (Acemoglu et al.

2003: 101; Lawry 1983: 14). The livestock sector presently contributes

80% to agricultural GDP, but ranching in Botswana is a low technology

sector, and not much has happened in terms of technological advance

since the introduction of modern boreholes and the establishment of

the Lobatse abattoir in 1954. Despite its decreasing relative contribution

to the economy and low productivity, the cattle sector is continuously

expanding as the numbers of animals increase, although there have been

severe setbacks in drought years. At the same time there is a polarisation in

cattle ownership, with increasing numbers of small-scale farmers without

cattle at the one end, and large holders at the other (Gulbrandsen 1996: 3 ;

Peters 1994: Silitshena & McLeod 1998, ch. 11). The continued striving by

the large cattle-holders to amass more animals can be explained by the

high social status that is still associated with cattle, and by the export profits

channelled to individual cattle holders by the BMC. From a national

economic and environmental sustainability point of view, this expansion

of the cattle sector is unwarranted, as natural resources such as water and

land are being heavily exploited while returns are modest.

In the general model for MEG, productivity increase in subsistence

agriculture resulting in agricultural transformation should generate capital

and free labour that can move over to industry and other capitalist sectors,

thereby becoming a starting point for structural change (see e.g. Lewis

1954; Mellor 1986). However, in the case of Botswana it would not be

realistic to expect the agricultural sector to initiate MEG. In order to avoid


creating a dual economy with a disadvantaged countryside, it is still im-

portant for there to be an agricultural transformation including an adop-

tion of new farming methods, which could increase productivity and raise

standards of living. When the agricultural sector is failing to fill its role as

the engine ofMEG, other more successful sectors – in the case of Botswana

the mining industry – could substitute for its shortcomings in forming

capital, thereby becoming the engine of development (Gerschenkron 1962).

Botswana has been urbanising quickly for the last four decades, and

has moved from 4% living in urban settlements at Independence

(Gulbrandsen 1996: 19) to 58% at present (Leith 2005: 13, Table 1.2 ;World

Bank 2008b). This could be viewed as a sign of structural change, but

although urbanisation entails a profound reorganisation of the population

and has implications for various aspects of human development, it is not

equivalent to growth in the industrial or capitalist sectors in which high

productivity is found. Lewis’ original model is often misunderstood, and

quoted as an argument for economic development centred on a process of

labour moving from agriculture to industry, and urbanisation equalling

industrialisation. Both industry and agriculture are part of the capitalist

sector, and although the subsistence sector is primarily associated with pre-

modern agriculture, it is common in developing countries for subsistence

sectors to expand also in urban areas, the most evident case being informal

self-employment. Botswana’s prime engine of growth, the diamond sector,

is neither located in the urban areas, nor does it have significant links to

other sectors of industry. The urban settlements are instead attracting

labour that finds employment within the government administration,

service sector, household employment, trade, and so on, some of it in the

formal and some in the informal sector. Labour is thus mainly moving from

subsistence agriculture to non-capitalist urban sectors, and provides yet

another indicator that structural change and MEG are not present.

Since the early 1990s, a serious unemployment problem has been

registered, with 18% unemployment in 2005/06 (RoB 2006: 2), and as

long as the industrial sector is not expanding, the figure will probably not

improve significantly. With high urban unemployment rates, as in the case

of Botswana, individuals’ motives for migrating to the urban areas can

be questioned, but also explained in a satisfactory fashion. Urbanisation

becomes rational behaviour at the individual level, as economic models

shift focus from full employment equilibrium to expected rather than

actual contemporary and future urban wages (Todaro 1969) and relative

deprivation (Stark 1991). Instead of being a sign of modernisation, urban-

isation should in the Botswana case be perceived as a symptom of a dual

economy with a poor and neglected rural sector.


Lipton (1977) points out that the most important class conflict in devel-

oping countries today is that between the rural poor, and urban groups

experiencing improvements in living standards and human capital. There

is an urban bias favouring the larger cities and industry at the expense of

the countryside and agriculture, which drives a process creating dual

economies. It is damaging because it is counter-productive to both an

efficiency norm, implying an allocation of resources to maximise long-run

output, and an equity norm, distributing income so as to maximise

welfare. As long as most of the poor are located in the rural areas, and

agricultural production is characterised by low levels of technology and

productivity compared with the urban sector, the highest returns will be

on investments made in the rural sector. Urban bias thus slows down both

growth and development. In Botswana most agricultural production has

been in the private sector, and the government has merely provided a

framework of infrastructure, administration, education and utilities. While

government spending on agriculture has been small compared with that in

urban areas (Harvey & Lewis 1990: 252–3), private investments have not

succeeded in compensating for the lack of government involvement.

Rapid urbanisation can also be explained by historical migration

patterns, revealing that the Batswana have a long tradition of moving in

order to farm, to find pasture, and for wage employment. In the rural areas,

each household may have as many as three dwellings – in the village, at

the arable fields and by the cattle post – and household members move

between them depending on season and assignments. With the colonial era

came the demand for payment of taxes, and new labour migration patterns

were established as the men left in large numbers to find employment in the

mines of neighbouring South Africa (Schapera & Comaroff 1991: 24). This

had severe negative impacts on agricultural production, and caused social

unrest and disrupted family units (Colcough & McCarthy 1980, ch. 7).

These patterns of temporary movement within the rural areas and between

the rural and urban are still in place. As in the case of urbanisation, how-

ever, neither can be associated with labour moving from subsistence to

national capitalist sectors, nor do they promote structural change.

M A N A G I N G N A T U R A L R E S O U R C E S

The economic history of Botswana is to a large extent the story of natural

resource management, generous gifts and limiting scarcity, which thus

have an inescapable place in a structural analysis. It is most unlikely that

the Botswana growth miracle could have occurred unless diamonds had

been found at Independence, and the government had nationalised all


sub-soil mineral resources in 1967, thereby gaining control over future

revenues. Historical circumstances provided a combination of a perfect

resource that is valuable, storable and cheap to transport, and perfect

timing, assuring uncontested incomes to the newly established govern-

ment. Without diamonds, the country could very well have had a func-

tioning institutional structure offering economical and political stability,

but it is hard to imagine any other way of achieving comparable consistent

growth. Parallel with its diamond deposits, the country has severe con-

straints to economic expansion. It is landlocked, resulting in high transport

costs, it has no internationally competitive wage advantage, the climate is

unfriendly to agricultural expansion and intensification, and there are no

other comparatively valuable natural resources.

Until the 1970s, economists in general had a favourable view of

abundant natural resources. Many developing countries that became

independent in the decades after World War II possessed great wealth

in primary products, and this was understood as almost a guarantee for

future growth. The actual outcome, however, was other than expected, as

the following decades saw the economic growth and development of the

Newly Industrialising Economies in East Asia, stagnation in Latin

America and economic and political failure in sub-Saharan Africa. The

empirical evidence from most resource-abundant countries has for the

last 30–40 years included corrupt leaders selling off natural assets and

pocketing the profits, individuals and international companies becoming

wealthy while governments stayed poor, and financial policies unable to

control exchange rates and inflation. Meanwhile, low wages have become

a stronger comparative advantage than resource wealth. In theory,

abundant natural resources are still believed to promote growth by

allowing for investments in infrastructure and human capital (see e.g.

Sachs & Warner 1999), but from the 1990s onwards there has also been a

lively debate focusing on negative aspects such as the natural resource

curse (see e.g. Leite & Weidman 1999; Sachs & Warner 1995), and Dutch

disease (see e.g. Corden & Neary 1982; Hill 1991).

Sachs and Warner (1995) have shown that there is generally a negative

correlation between natural resource endowments and economic growth.

This is a paradox, since incomes from natural resources raises wealth and

purchasing power over imports and, hence, should also raise investment

levels and growth rates. The explanations given for the failure of many

resource-abundant countries vary, and include higher prevalence of

indolence, rent seeking, conflict between stakeholders, corruption, and

predation, compared with economies relying on other comparative

advantages. While being the eighteenth largest resource exporter in the


world (Iimi 2006: 6), Botswana has managed to avoid both the resource

curse and Dutch disease, by creating a long-term plan for the extraction of

natural resources and good policy for continued growth (Hill 1991; Iimi

2006). This achievement makes it a member of a very exclusive group of

developing countries, including only a few others such as Mauritius and

Malaysia (Sachs & Warner 1995).

The standard explanation for Botswana’s successful management of

incomes from its diamonds has some compulsory elements. The govern-

ment has extracted diamonds wisely and negotiated a 50–50% deal with

the South African mining company De Beers, thus ensuring significant

revenues for the country. As a result, diamonds account for roughly 30%

of GDP, 70% of export revenues and 50% of government revenue (RoB

2003: 28, Table 3.1, 205, Table 11.1, 206, Table 11.3). By comparison with

other African states, Botswana’s leaders have mostly been honest, and elite

corruption was rare until the 1990s. The government has shown great

prudence in the management of diamond incomes, keeping expenses

consistent in boom years and building up foreign exchange reserves,

thereby being able to compensate for bust years. This strategy, combined

with proper management of the exchange rate, has also meant that real

exchange rate appreciation has been under control, which has been

positive for the export sector. Through fiscal policy the government has

avoided external debt problems, and has maintained a stable growth rate

over time (Hill 1991). There is a general consensus on the shrewdness of

government fiscal policies, both in building international reserves, but also

in investing in key sectors such as infrastructure, education and health

care. Government actions have been in line with IMF recommendations

and have certainly assured growth. Much praise is given to the govern-

ment for this achievement, but the relevance of the Dutch disease debate

for the structural analysis is questionable. It is agreed that Botswana does

not suffer from Dutch disease, although all the typical pre-conditions are

present. The country has a dominating and lucrative tradable natural

resource sector that supports a growing non-tradable service sector, while

the tradable manufacturing sector is relatively weak. The greater the

income from natural resource exports the higher the demands for the non-

tradable sector, and consequently the less capital and labour is available

for the manufacturing sector (Corden & Neary 1982; Iimi 2006: 5). What

sets Botswana apart from the typical Dutch disease syndrome is the fact

that at Independence Botswana had an insignificant manufacturing sector,

which consequently could not be ruined by the allocation of capital and

labour to other sectors. It would, however, be fair to claim that the country

is caught in a natural resource trap. As long as diamonds dominate


government revenues, there is an indirect discrimination against a diver-

sification of the economy, there are few incentives for industrialisation and

productivity increase, and consequently the process of structural change is

hindered.

Absurd as it may seem, HIV/AIDS may well not lead to economic

collapse in Botswana, because the mining sector may not be too severely

affected, as it needs a workforce of only 8,000 paid employees (RoB 2004a:

24, Table 2.1). Growth could then continue in the midst of human tragedy

and social collapse. Of course, although the mining sector may be un-

affected, the epidemic makes it even less likely that MEG will appear in

the near future, due to the immense stress on society at large and on the

economy outside the mining industry.

Long before diamonds were discovered, the Botswana economy was

centred on cattle. Access to land and water resources was thus the key for

creating wealth, guaranteeing future incomes and setting up patron–client

relationships. The Tswana had a unique settlement pattern, with the

population concentrated in larger villages surrounded by arable fields,

with the grazing ranges situated further away. Natural resources used to

be communally owned, and each household was allocated land and water

resources by the chiefs according to its needs. Individuals were given

private user rights to arable fields and water sources, while cattle were

grazed on communal ranges, and each household privately owned and

controlled its own production (see e.g. Carlsson 2003: ch. 5 ; Colough &

McCarthy 1980: ch.1 ; Peters 1994).

Communal ownership of natural resources, combined with private user

rights to resource units and private ownership of production, is a property

rights system common to rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa (see

e.g. Berry 1994; Carlsson 2003: ch. 5; Ensminger 1997; Perrings 1992).

While the property rights institutions in rural Botswana have not experi-

enced significant structural change, individuals have struggled with one

another within the institutional frameworks, conducting negotiations and

taking advantage of positions of power (Carlsson 2003). These power

struggles have concentrated resources in the hands of the wealthier seg-

ments of society, while at the same time upholding a minimal basic needs

level for the poor that is guaranteed by traditional property rights (see e.g.

Carlsson 2003; Peters 1994).

In customary Tswana land tenure, resources belonged to the tribe and

were kept in trust by the chief, who was also in charge of land policy. In

1968 the implementation of the Tribal Land Act meant that the tribal land

remained as communal property, but the allocation responsibilities were

removed from the chief and assigned to newly established Land Boards


which were to follow traditional allocation principles (Gulbrandsen 1984:

7–9). In the 1970s, the government became increasingly concerned with

the issue of overgrazing, and in 1975 the Tribal Grazing Land Policy

was launched, dividing all land into three categories : communal, private

and wildlife reserves. It was argued that the move of larger herds to

fenced-off private farms would reduce the pressure on the communal

grazing range. With these two land tenure reforms, the government took

over responsibility for land distribution from the tribal authorities and

allocated private land to the largest cattle holders, while not doing much to

promote grazing management among smallholders on communal land

(Lawry 1983: 19–25).

In a dry country such as Botswana, water is a scarce key resource for

all economic activities, both agricultural and industrial. In the densely

populated south-eastern parts of the country, there is likely to be a shortage

in water by the year 2020 if demand continues to increase at the present

rate (Silitshena &McLeod 1998: ch. 5). Still, little is being done to promote

conservation and hinder pollution in rural and urban areas, although

progressive water fees have been introduced primarily in the urban settle-

ments. There may be several reasons for the political unwillingness to be

more forceful in using pricing and command and control measurements in

order to reduce water use. One is a dread of losing political support ;

another is a principle of securing the poor the rights to free clean water for

drinking purposes. Instead of reducing demand and preventing pollution,

the government has relied on increasing supply through various water

development projects, but it can be questioned whether current policy

either represents a sustainable strategy or promotes a more efficient use of

water resources (Carlsson 2003; Rahm et al. 2006).

Traditionally, wealth was measured in cattle and, by controlling cattle

and lending them to kin and other tribe members, chiefs bought political

loyalty and access to labour resources (Lawry 1983: 3). Access to and

income from cattle are still central to both the urban elite and rural

dwellers. Due to the economic elite’s interest in investing in cattle, the

national herd has increased to a point threatening both grazing and

water resources. Colcough and McCarthy (1980: 22) estimate that the

national herd grew tenfold from the beginning of the twentieth century,

reaching 3 million head by 1978. The numbers then decreased during

the 1980s due to droughts, and reached 2 million in the early 1990s

(Silitshena & McLeod 1998: 122,, Table 11.1), only to increase again to 3

million at present (Rahm et al. 2006: 159). The solution to overgrazing

has been to extend further into the Kalahari desert, and to extend

private tenure (Lawry 1983: 11). As the large cattle holders and the


political elite are the same, there is modest political will to protect

natural resources and to inflict efficiency demands on the cattle sector.

The number of animals is increasing and so is production, but pro-

ductivity has not been improved to any significant degree and structural

change is absent.

I N E Q U A L I T Y A N D D E V E L O P M E N T

Growth is valued not because it further enriches the already well-off, but

because it gives an opportunity to significantly and lastingly improve

standards of living for the majority, including the poor. For a country to

achieve the characteristics of development, poverty must be alleviated,

income levels be considerably improved, and resources and oppor-

tunities be distributed by a modern state in order for all segments of

society to benefit (Adelman 2003: 17–18). Traditional unequal distri-

bution of resources and incomes, and a dual economy with dis-

criminated sectors and groups within society, define a society as prior to

MEG.

The systematic relationship between economic growth and income in-

equalities has been discussed theoretically and investigated empirically

ever since Kuznets (1955) presented his inverted U-curve, and there is

today a consensus that no straightforward relation can be established

(World Bank 2006: 44, Box 2.6). There is, however, an inseparable link

between equity, defined as equal opportunities for all, and avoidance of

absolute deprivation (ibid. : 18–19). Equity likewise plays an important role

in promoting development, as it frees people from the poverty trap

and strengthens the political institutional structure. By ensuring higher

overall levels of income and the support of a modern state, the rural poor

can afford to turn away from being risk minimisers and instead become

utility optimisers, contributing to the economy through their human

capital capacities and raised productivity, and bringing considerably in-

creased supply and demand to the domestic market (Lipton 1968). All

members of society represent assets in human and social capital, and in

order to create sustainable prosperity these resources should be made

use of to the fullest. Equitable institutions include all individuals in the

development process, offering them equal opportunities by protecting

their property rights and giving them equal treatment before the law.

Causation, however, runs both ways, and the increased capabilities

of individuals result in higher demands on a well-functioning modern

institutional structure in both economic and political terms (World Bank

2006: ch. 6).


Developing countries with significant mineral resources and abundant

land tend to be less equal in resource distribution than others

(Bourguignon & Morrisson 1990: 1127–8), and Botswana fits this charac-

terisation. By international standards, income divides are high in

Botswana. They have been so in historical perspective, and have probably

increased during the decades of exceptional growth. Today Botswana has

one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, together with

some Latin American and sub-Sahara African nations (Good 1993: 203;

Jefferis 1997: 493–6). The current national GINI coefficient as assessed by

UNDP (2006) is 0.6.

Despite substantial growth, 47% of the population lives below the

national poverty line (UNDP 2006), and there are reports of prevailing

and even increasing rural poverty, at least in certain regions (see e.g.

Gulbrandsen 1996; Wikan 2004). The fact that the divide between the

richest and the poorest groups in society is widening may not in itself be a

severe reason for concern. What is disturbing is that the divergence is

combined with high unemployment, continued high poverty rates and

discrimination against certain groups, specifically the San (see e.g. Curry

1987; Good 1993). Together, this reflects an institutional inequality where

government policies tend to favour elites in various ways, while denying

the majority of the population equal opportunities (Engerman & Sokoloff

2002; World Bank 2006: 107–8). Even worse, contemporary inequalities

appear to be inherent in the socio-economic structure going back in

history (see e.g. Good 1994: 205; Peters 1994; Wylie 1990), and there is no

structural change.

Unemployment rates are important for equity, since a prominent way

of eradicating poverty is through growth, resulting in formal employment

and increasing real wages (Quibria 2002). Much of the explanation

for the Pacific Asia miracle rests on equal opportunities and distribution

of resources. The unemployed in Botswana are primarily youths and

individuals with little or no education, possibly with a higher proportion of

women. A fundamental requirement for making demand meet supply

appears to be to increase the level of education, specifically university

degrees, in the workforce (Siphambe 2003).

There has been both a trickle down from the wealthier segments of

society, and a political consciousness of the need to fight high poverty

rates. As a result, poverty in terms of income levels has improved from

59% of individuals being poor in 1985 (Jefferis 1997: 484, Table 2) to 47%

in 2005 (UNDP 2006). These figures may stand out in a regional context,

but have not been achieved through structural change. It is important to

keep in mind that attitudes towards inequality and poverty are rooted in


normative values, and that distribution of resources and incomes are

subject to conscious government policies. Government policy on distri-

bution of wealth in Botswana has mainly been the equivalent of a basic

needs system, giving support to the poor via food-for-work programmes

that have been running during droughts since 1965 (Colcough &

McCarthy 1980: 133), as well as providing health care and education free

of charge until recently.

During the colonial era, the British spent little in excess of adminis-

trative costs in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The independence

government has, however, spent about 40% of GDP primarily on infra-

structure and human capital, a figure that is one of the highest in Africa

and comparable with Norway (Acemoglu et al. 2003: 85; Leith 2005: 85,

Fig. 3.9). In 1966, there were only 12 kilometres of paved roads (Acemoglu

et al. 2003: 80), while today this figure is almost 9,000 kilometres. There

are 85 airports, over a million telephone subscribers out of a population of

1.7 million, 60,000 internet users (CIA 2008), and 95% of the population

has access to improved water sources (World Bank 2008b). The British

considered education to be a tribal responsibility, and at Independence

there were fewer than two dozen Batswana who had received university

education and 100 who had completed secondary school (Acemoglu et al.

2003: 80–3; Colough & McCarthy 1980: 28). Today adult literacy rates

are 81%, and more than 5% of the population has completed tertiary

education (World Bank 2008a, 2008b). Contemporary health indicators

are severely negatively affected by the rampant HIV/AIDS epidemic,

which makes them difficult to evaluate. It is, however, relevant to point out

that although they were good they were never exceptional, and that less

has been spent on health improvement than on education (Leith 2005: 86,

Fig. 3.10). In the early 1990s, before the impact of HIV/AIDS, the best

figures recorded for life expectancy and infant mortality were 65 years

T A B L E 2

GINI Coefficients

Region

Disposable Cash Income Disposable Income

1993/94 2002/03 1993/94 2002/03

Cities/Towns 0.548 0.513 0.539 0.503

Urban Villages 0.552 0.552 0.451 0.523

Rural 0.599 0.622 0.414 0.515

National 0.638 0.626 0.537 0.573

Source : RoB 2004b. Higher numbers indicate greater inequality.


and 45 out of 1,000 births respectively (Leith 1997a: 23, Fig. 2 ; 2005: 13,

Table 1.2).

Government policy has given better results than can be detected simply

from levels of income poverty, as it has improved human capital and the

capabilities of the poor. In a broader based approach the concept of

capability poverty can be used, in which case Botswana scores much more

favourably, with 30% suffering from capability poverty in 1996 according

to UNDP, as opposed to 46% being income poor in the same year (Jefferis

1997 : 492–3). The actions of the Botswana government in improving

capabilities have thus been commendable, but they have not automatically

generated dynamic processes of increasing productivity and are not

equivalent to equity. Indeed, the reliance on government welfare pro-

grammes has made many rural destitutes passive, and cemented existing

structures (see e.g. Nthomang 2004; Wikan 2004).

In the agricultural sector, poverty is a matter more of access to resources

than of income levels, and since smallholders are mainly subsistence

farmers, their standards of living are difficult to estimate. A minimal access

to resources is generally guaranteed within the traditional property rights

systems, where key resources such as water and land have a strong public

goods dimension (Carlsson 2003: 101–7). Batswana farmers are vulnerable

and prone to poverty due to limiting climatic and soil conditions and

recurring droughts. This weakness of the agricultural sector has implica-

tions for poverty reduction on a national level, as traditional agriculture is

only estimated to be able to support 15–20% of the labour force, thereby

augmenting the pressure on other sectors for offering employment (Jefferis

1997 : 478).

Distribution of wealth is to a high degree associated with distribution of

cattle, which has a long history of being very unequal, with the traditional

chiefs and their relatives being the largest cattle holders (Colcough &

McCarthy 1980: 22 ; Lawry 1983: 6). Cattle continue to be amassed by

a minority of large holders, while the number of cattleless smallholders

is increasing. In the 1940s only 10% of households had no cattle, while

in 1993/94 that figure was 57%. In 1990 33% of cattle holders had

on average six beasts each, while 35 commercial farms, representing 0.6%

of cattle holders, held above 4,000 head on average, and 19 farms

held more than 10,000 (Good 1993: 223–4; Silitshena & McLeod 1998:

127). After Independence, the traditional economic elite moved into the

new state, establishing a strong connection between large cattle holders

and government. In the early years of Independence, two-thirds of the

members of the National Assembly were large or medium sized cattle

owners (Samatar 1999: 69–70).


There is a well-documented and uncontested history of the economic

and political elite being one and the same in Botswana (see e.g. Acemoglu

et al. 2003; Good 1993; Peters 1994; Wylie 1990). Very few Europeans ever

settled in the Bechuanaland Protectorate as they saw little future in either

agriculture or mining, and only 3% of farm land came under European

control (Colcough & McCarthy 1980: 7). This marginal colonial influence

allowed the Tswana political and economical institutional structure to stay

strong, and to guarantee a continuity in the social structure of the pre-

colonial, colonial, and post-colonial era (Acemoglu et al. 2003; Colcough &

McCarthy 1980: ch. 1).

That the political and economic elite are identical is presented by some

researchers as a decisive factor explaining Botswana’s economic success

(see e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2003: 104). Maintaining the status quo has, how-

ever, allowed this elite to protect its own interests, and there is no reason to

assume that it would act according to anything other than its own self-

interest (Kaufmann & Kraay 2002: 204). The political elite is further

connected to the leading bureaucrats, who share common economic in-

terests in cattle and commerce (Good 1994: 499). This overlap between

the wealthy, the political leaders and the bureaucracy explains the lack of

interest in equity in resource and income redistribution.

The theory of MEG, however, implies that growth has to lead to shifts in

the economic position of various groups attached to particular production

sectors. Hence, old economic elites have to be challenged and transformed

or replaced, in order for new production sectors to appear, together

signifying a break with old economic and social structures (Kuznets 1973:

252). Such change may not be welcome in the eyes of the elite. While

pre-modern growth is in their best interest, it is questionable whether they

are motivated to promote development, as this requires structural change

and not the continuity of existing political institutions.

If the elite is interested in maintaining the status quo, the demand

for change and equity may come instead from the grass-roots level, but

this does not appear to be the case in Botswana, as there are no sizeable

social movements or contesting political parties (Good 1994: 518). Political

stability, consensus building and economic growth appear to have

dampened the opposition. Diamonds have kept all content and happy, as

there has been some for all, and a lot for a few.

A N A L Y S I S A N D I M P L I C A T I O N S

As sub-Saharan African countries became independent in the mid-1950s

through to the beginning of the 1970s, there was a great optimism for the


future. Income levels were higher than in many Asian regions and on par

with Latin America, the continent held great riches in natural resources

and Africans were finally free to form their own destiny. Unfortunately,

the continent soon became troubled by ethnic and racial conflict, political

unrest, violent crime, ravaging poverty, economic failure and resignation,

predatory leaders and rampant corruption. Political and economic stag-

nation, decline, and chaos have been widespread experiences since the

1970s, and the overall economic crisis triggered the introduction of

the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s. Since then, the

continent’s aspirations have been lowered. Stability and growth have been

viewed not just as acceptable or sufficient achievements, but even as the

best imaginable result, while development has been reduced to an almost

forgotten utopia.

It is in this context that Botswana has qualified to be depicted as an

exceptional success story. What the country has experienced for the

last 40 years is export-led growth combined with political stability. It is

not enough, however, to rest content with describing only the Botswana

growth miracle, without discussing its fundamental socio-economic struc-

ture and possible future improvements. The key issue is MEG, develop-

ment and structural change.

Despite impressive growth, political stability, improved infrastructure,

prudent financial management, material modernisation and investments

in human capital, Botswana is at present also experiencing a decline in

population, there is no significant increase in productivity, little economic,

social or ideological transformation, and only sporadic introduction of

high levels of modern technology. Hence, four out of six characteristics

of MEG are missing, and the inference must be that Botswana is a case of

pre-modern growth and not development, while the socio-economic

structure is being cemented and hailed as stability. Although continuity

is an active process and may contain dynamic institutional change, it

does not amount to a break with earlier structures, and the lack of struc-

tural change is the reason behind faltering development indicators. The

advances that have been made are indeed very promising, but they are

only pre-conditions for turning growth into development, while there

are few signs that structural change is promoted either by agriculture

or industry, by the elite or the grass-roots level. Neither is equity part

of Botswana’s strategy, although it is a necessary ingredient in develop-

ment.

Botswana has experienced a profound change in factor relative price,

due to a massive increase in capital primarily from diamond exports, and

the success of the mining sector has the potential of becoming a window of


opportunity for development. This sector could substitute for missing

capital formation in the low producing agriculture, and help transform

agriculture as well as diversify industry. In order for this to be realised,

however, the government has to step up and take on the challenge to

become a developmental state.

The success of Pacific Asia provides several important lessons con-

cerning economic development. It shows that development is possible, and

that a developmental state can create the institutional structure necessary

for subsequent development. Through intentional policy choices, coun-

tries such as Botswana can shift from a trade-led, natural resource inten-

sive, limited industrialisation with narrow based growth, to a broader

development strategy. Further, although development is a process

that entails a discontinuous break with earlier structures, it is also path-

dependent in that each country has a unique economic, political, and

social history, and an existing institutional setting. All development stra-

tegies must take this into account. The economic and political institutional

structures are of equal importance in this process of development, and are

closely linked to one another (Adelman 2003: 17–21).

Botswana offers lessons for other natural resource dependent develop-

ing countries, in the importance of prudent management in avoiding the

natural resource curse and Dutch disease, as well as the blessing of leaders

who have been relatively modest in their rent seeking. It can thereby be a

model for how to achieve important pre-conditions for development, but it

cannot be a model for actual development, since there has been no

transformation into modernisation. The progress of Botswana is truly

commendable, but the goal for any society must be development through

MEG, and the next step is to leave the safe haven of stability and growth to

venture into structural change and development. With a developmental

state promoting equity and bringing prosperity to all segments of society,

Botswana could use its diamond wealth to diversify industry, transform

agriculture, and become a modern society. This is necessary for long-run

economic sustainability because it is development and not diamonds that

lasts forever.

N O T E S

1. Published under the maiden name of the present author.

R E F E R E N C E S

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson & J. Robinson. 2003. ‘An African success story: Botswana’, in D. Rodrik,ed. In Search of Prosperity : analytic narratives on economic growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 80–119.


Adelman, I. 2003. ‘Global institutions and economic development – what have we learned?’, inM. Andersson & C. Gunnarsson, eds. Development and Structural Change in Asia-Pacific : globalising miraclesor end of a model ? London: Routledge, 17–47.

Adelman, I. & C. T. Morris. 1997. ‘Editorial : development history and its implications for develop-ment theory’, World Development 25, 6: 831–40.

Allen, T. & S. Heald. 2004. ‘HIV/AIDS policy in Africa: what has worked in Uganda and what hasfailed in Botswana?’, Journal of International Development 16: 1141–54.

Beaulier, S. & R. Subrick. 2006. ‘The political foundations of development: the case of Botswana’,Constitutional Political Economy 17, 2 : 103–15.

Berry, S. 1994. No Condition is Permanent : the social dynamics of agrarian change in sub-Saharan Africa. Madison,WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Bourguignon, F. & C. Morrisson. 1990. ‘Income distribution, development and foreign trade: a cross-sectional analysis ’, European Economic Review 34, 6 : 1113–32.

Carlsson, E. 2003. To Have and to Hold : continuity and change in property rights institutions governing waterresources among the Meru of Tanzania and the BaKgtala in Botswana, 1925–2000. Lund Studies in EconomicHistory, 28. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2006. The World Factbook : Botswana. <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bc.html> accessed 15.12.2006.

Colcough, C. & S. McCarthy. 1980. The Political Economy of Botswana: a study of growth and distribution.Oxford University Press.

Corden, W. & J. Neary. 1982. ‘Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a small open economy’,Economic Journal 92: 825–48.

Curry, R. L. Jr. 1987. ‘Poverty and mass unemployment in mineral-rich Botswana’, American Journal ofEconomics and Sociology 46, 1 : 71–87.

Engerman, S. & K. Sokoloff. 2002. ‘Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development amongNew World economies’, Economia 3, 1 : 41–108.

Ensminger, J. 1997. ‘Changing property rights : reconciling formal and informal rights to landin Africa’, in J. Drobak & J. Nye, eds. The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. San Diego, CA:Academic Press.

Gaolathe, B. 1997. ‘Development of Botswana’s mineral sector’, in Salkin et al., eds. Aspects of theBotswana Economy, 401–31.

Gerschenkron, A. 1962. ‘Economic backwardness in historical perspective’, in A. Gerschenkron, ed.Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 5–30.

Good, K. 1993. ‘At the ends of the ladder: radical inequalities in Botswana’, Journal of Modern AfricanStudies 31, 2: 203–30.

Good, K. 1994. ‘Corruption and mismanagement in Botswana: a best case example?’, Journal ofModern African Studies 32, 3 : 499–521.

Gulbrandsen, O. 1984. ‘When land becomes scarce’, Bergen Studies in Social Anthropology 33. Bergen:Norse Publications.

Gulbrandsen, O. 1996. ‘Poverty in the midst of plenty’, Bergen Studies in Social Anthropology 45. Bergen:Norse Publications.

Harvey, C. & S. R. Lewis, Jr. 1990. Policy Choice and Development Performance in Botswana. London:Macmillan in association with the OECD Development Centre.

Heald, S. 2006. ‘Abstain or die : the development of HIV/AIDS policy in Botswana’, Journal ofBiosocial Science 38, 1 : 1–13.

Hill, C. 1991. ‘Managing commodity booms in Botswana’, World Development 19, 9: 1185–96.Hirschman, A. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Iimi, A. 2006. ‘Did Botswana escape from the resource curse?’, IMF Working Paper 06/138,

Washington, DC: IMF.Jefferis, K. 1997. ‘Poverty in Botswana’, in Salkin et al., eds. Aspects of the Botswana Economy, 469–99.Kaufmann, D. & A. Kraay. 2002. ‘Growth without governance’, Economica 3, 1 : 169–229.Kuznets, S. 1955. ‘Economic growth and income inequality ’, American Economic Review 65, 1 : 1–28.Kuznets, S. 1973. ‘Modern economic growth: findings and reflections’, American Economic Review 63,

3: 247–58.Lawry, S. 1983. ‘Land tenure, land policy, and small livestock in Botswana’, Research paper No. 78,

Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI.Leite, C. & J. Weidmann. 1999. ‘Does Mother Nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption, and

economic growth’, IMF Working Paper 99/85, Washington, DC: IMF.


Leith, C. 1997a. ‘Growth and structural transformation in Botswana’, in Salkin et al., eds. Aspects of theBotswana Economy, 21–35.

Leith, C. 1997b. ‘Botswana’s International Trade Policies’, in Salkin et al., eds. Aspects of the BotswanaEconomy, 529–48.

Leith, C. 2005. Why Botswana Prospered. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.Lekoko, R. N. & M. van der Merwe. 2006. ‘Beyond the rhetoric of empowerment: speak the

language, live the experience of the rural poor’, Review of Education 52: 323–32.Lewis, A. 1954. ‘Economic development with unlimited supply of labour’, The Manchester School 2,

2: 139–91.Lewis, A. 1979. ‘Dual economy revisited’, The Manchester School, 47, 3 : 221–9.Lipton, M. 1968. ‘Theory on the optimising peasant ’, Journal of Development Studies 4, 3: 327–51.Lipton, M. 1977. Why Poor People Stay Poor : a study of urban bias in world development. London: Maurice

Temple Smith.Makgala, C. J. 2006. Elite Conflict in Botswana: a history. Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa.Mellor, J. 1986. ‘Agriculture on the road to industrialisation’, in J. P. Lewis & V. Kallab, eds.

Development Strategies Reconsidered. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, for The OverseasDevelopment Council, Washington, DC.

Mpabanga, D. 1997. ‘Constraints to industrial development ’, in Salkin et al., eds. Aspects of the BotswanaEconomy, 369–87.

Nthomang, K. 2004. ‘Relentless colonialism: the case of the Remote Area Development Programme(RADP) and the Basarwa in Botswana’, Journal of Modern African Studies 42, 3: 425–35.

Owusu, F. & A. I. Samatar. 1997. ‘ Industrial strategy and the African state : the Botswana experience’,Canadian Journal of African Studies 31, 2: 268–99.

Parson, J. 1984. Botswana: liberal democracy and labor reserve in Southern Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview.Parsons, N. & M. Crowder, eds. 1988. Monarch of All I Survey : Bechuanaland Diaries 1929–37. Gaborone:

The Botswana Society.Perrings, C. 1992. ‘Sustainable development of the human and natural resources of sub-Saharan

Africa: the case of Botswana’, report prepared for the Technology and Employment Branch,International Labour Office, Riverside.

Peters, P. 1994. Dividing the Commons : politics, policy, and culture in Botswana. Charlottesville, VA:University Press of Virginia.

Phaladze, N. & S. Tlou. 2006. ‘Gender and HIV/AIDS in Botswana: a focus on inequalities anddiscrimination’, Gender and Development 14, 1 : 23–35.

Quibria, M. G. 2002. ‘Growth and poverty: lessons from the East Asian miracle revisited’, ADBInstitute Research Paper Series, No. 33, Asian Development Bank, ADB Institute, Tokyo.

Rahm, D., L. Swatuk & E. Matheny. 2006. ‘Water resource management in Botswana: balancingsustainability and economic development ’, Environment, Development, and Sustainability 8: 157–83.

Republic of Botswana (RoB). 2003. National Development Plan 9. Gaborone: Ministry of Finance &Development Planning.

RoB. 2004a. Labour Statistics 2002. Gaborone: Government Printer.RoB. 2004b. 2002/03 Household Income and Expenditure Survey : Botswana. Gaborone: Central Statistics

Office. <http://www.cso.gov.bw/> accessed 28.09.2007.RoB. 2006. Preliminary 2005/2006 Labour Force Survey Results. Gaborone: Central Statistics Office,

<http://www.cso.gov.bw/> accessed 25.9.2007.RoB. 2007. ‘Table 3A: Export by Principal Commodities ’, in Trade Statistics. Gaborone: Central

Statistics Office, <http://www.cso.gov.bw/> accessed 28.9.2007.Robinson, J. A. & N. Parsons. 2006. ‘State formation and governance in Botswana’, Journal of African

Economies 15 (AERC Supplement 1) : 100–40.Sachs, J. & A. Warner. 1995. ‘Natural resource abundance and economic growth’, Devel-

opment Discussion Paper No. 517a, Harvard Institute for International Development, HarvardUniversity.

Sachs, J. & A. Warner 1999. ‘The big push, natural resource booms and growth’, Journal of DevelopmentEconomics 59: 43–76.

Salkin, J. S., D. Mpabanga, D. Cowan, J. Selwe & M. Wright, eds. 1997. Aspects of the Botswana Economy.Gaborone: Lentswe La Lesedi.

Samatar, A. I. 1999. An African Miracle : state and class leadership and colonial legacy in Botswana development.Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

Schapera, I & J. Comaroff. 1991. The Tswana. London: Kegan Paul International, revised edition.Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press.


Silitshena, R. M. K. & G. McLeod. 1998. Botswana : a physical, social and economic geography. Gaborone:Longman Botswana, 2nd edition.

Siphambe, H. K. 2003. ‘Understanding unemployment in Botswana’, South African Journal of Economics71, 3 : 480–95.

Siwawa-Ndai, P. 1997. ‘ Industrialisation in Botswana: evolution, performance and prospects ’, inSalkin et al., eds. Aspects of the Botswana Economy, 335–67.

Stark, O. 1991. The Migration of Labor. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.Todaro, M. 1969. ‘A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries ’,

American Economic Review 59, 1 : 138–48.UNDP. 2006. UNPD Botswana: Poverty reduction. <http://www.unbotswana.org.bw/undp/poverty.

html> accessed 4.1.2008.Wikan, G. 2004. ‘The level of living in rural Botswana re-studied’, Norwegian Journal of Geography 58:

1–10.World Bank. 2006.World Development Report 2006: equity and development. Washington, DC: World Bank.World Bank. 2008a. The World Bank Group: Botswana Data Profile. <http://devdata.worldbank.org/

external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=BWA&CCODE=BWA&CNAME=Botswana&PTYPE=CP> accessed 4.1.2008.

World Bank. 2008b. Botswana-at-a-glance. <http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/bwa_aag.pdf> ac-cessed 4.1.2008.

Wylie, D. 1990. A Little God: the twilight of patriarchy in a Southern African chiefdom. Hanover, NH: WesleyanUniversity Press.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Diamonds or development ? A structural assessment of Botswana’s forty years of success

Documents

Transcript of Diamonds or development ? A structural assessment of Botswana’s forty years of success