CHAPTIR THREE

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

lr( n(l( n(('()n ('\rslrrrg lirrguistitoI |t |t1'P1i()rr Ilrrrl prcvcnts(()lill)lc\itv. l

( ()rrv('r)ti()ns crlc()urrlgcs a " lrabit rn l " I orrrr

us fr()ur l<nowingi the worlcl in its lLrll

l'lris vicw, whiclr parallels that of Greenberg in many ways, emergesi r r t lrc writi rrgs'f vladimir Mayakovskg Sergei Eisenstein, Bertolr Brecht,l'rrvir I)iscator, Dziga vertov, and Aleksandr Rodchenko. However,whcrc cirecnberg's writi'g reflects a basic skepticism about the redemp-r iv. 1'r<lwer of mass culture, the poets, photographers, and filmmakers oft lrc 1-r.strevolutionary period share a more optimistic, and nuanced, per-sPcctivc. They establish a crr-rcial distinction between mass media, suchils nr:linstream cinema, advertisilrg, newspapers, and radio, arrd forms oflropul:rr culture or revolution ary artthat are generated by or for the work-irg class. one of the chief effects of mass media is t. prornurgate ruling-class ideals under the guise of entertainment and disinterested journal-isrn. stage piays, to Llse an exzrmple fro.r Brecht's writing, encourage therrr-rdience to suspend disbelief irrcl prrssively absorb the (typically con,scrvative) values of the playwriglrt. l{cvoluti.nary theater, in contrasr,leads viewers to actively question thc rncanings rctrrrcscrrtcd onstage anclto extend that critical attitr,rcle fo rhc valrrcs tlrcy cncorrntcr in ciaily po,litical life. Mass rnedia are conden'rnccl, not lrccrruse thcy sig,nal thc 6:r<]

taste (or limited leisure time) of the w.rking class, but bccr.rrrsc thcy sr,rp,

press working-class consciousness of the operations of s'cial powcr. Inthis view the capacity for aesthetic discrimination is not an encl in itselfbut is linked to a more expansive critical capacity focused .n rhe br.adersocial and political world inhabited by the viewer. Moreover, the aes-thetic is not defined as a (potentially) universal mode of experience butis differentiated relative to one's social position. The factory worker, forexample, has a much greater stake in challenging the naturalness of thebourgeois worldview portrayed in the mass media than the wealthybanker whose contingent reality it represents.

In contrast to the quietisrn and withdrirwal that we encounter amongAmerican painters in the postwar peri.d (Rothko, Newman, etc.), avant_garde artists during the rgzos acivcly engage rhe viewer, freely employingtechnologies and mode s of presentati()r associated with mass meclia andentertainment (e.g., Brecht's use of sportirrg motifs, stock market prices,and news stories in his plays or Piscator's i'novative use of film projec-tion techniques).2 Key to their work is the experience of "shock," whichcan be produced by something as si'rple as seeing a city street from a

new perspective (as in Rodchenko's photographs) or as complex as Eisen-stein's montage techniques. \fhere Bell, Greenberg, and Fried describe

CRTHOPIDICS AND AESTHETICS

THE poLrncs oF ,HOCK From clive Bell's attack on representationar"pseudo-art," to clement Greenberg's fear of kitsch, to Michael Fried,scondemnation of the salacious "theatricality" of minimalist sculpture,modern critics have displayed a singular hostility ro artworks that solicitthe viewer's interaction in a direct or accessible manner. The purpose ofavant-garde art, in this view, is to point to the inevitabre compromisesentailed in any attempt to represent an cxtcrnal reality, or even to inrrok.that reality as a shared fran.re of refercncc with the viewer. If art is to"communicate" anything, as Bersani ancl r)r-rt'it point out, it is the fail,ur:e of communication itself (or perhaps the identity of the artist as theo'e best qualified to diagnose trris failure). But what happens afrer ourfaith in conventional meaning has bee'r shaken? Do.s G work of artleave us to wander, skeptical and disor:iented, through the modern for-est of signs, or can the assault on conventionar knowredge catalyze newforrns of understanding a'd ap;ency? \x/e find one

"'rr*-., to thi, q,r.r,

tion in the cultural and political ferment sur:rounding avant-garde art i'(iermany and Russia following the First v/orld war. The formalist rin-gr-ristic theories of viktor Shklovsky, Roman Jakobson, and osip Brikcxcrcised a significant influence on poets, filmmakers, and photogrnph.r,rluring this peri.d. In Shklovsky's writing we encounter the characteris-tic call to make art "difficult": to thicken a.d complicate its formal ap-l)c:rrrl.ce in or:der to focus the viewer's attention o. the materiality ofl'rrrq.agc itself. This is necessary, shkrovsky believes, because our de-

I

't l'irttl 'l 'rtPl, t'PiPlrrtltrt t'('sp()tri('t. tlrt'w,r'li.l rr't, llr.t'c.lrt sPt,;rl<s,l

il l)r()(('ss olr"rtlit'lt:ttiorr" irr which tlrc sl'rcctirtor is "rro longt.r rrll6wccltr strbrrrit t. lrr cxpcricrcc urcritically" s, tl-rat..what is..atural, rnusthrrvc tlrc f,rcc .f wlrat is startling."3 And for N7alter Be'jamin, as Davidlirisby n<ltes,

'bjects must be "snatched from the false context of the his-

t'rical continuum" so that we "confront them with surprise and shock.,,4Here aesthetic shock or dislocation counteracts the false realitv c.n-

veyed by dominant cultural forms.5 Although it operates in a somatic or[''odily regisrer. its effecrs are nor purery physicar. Rather. the experienceof shock becomes the catalytic agent for a "heightened presence o? mind,,'as Benjamin contends.6 N7e meet the epistemological challenge posed byaesthetic shock not by abandoning ourselves to the preasuies of onticdislocation but by renewing, and expanding, our efforts to grasp the com_plexity of the surrounding world. "Alienation, " as Brecht writes, is ,.nec-

essary to all understanding. " 7 Thus the experience of shock (which is nec-essary to overcome the anesthetichaze of modern life) is followed by areconsolidation of the subject around a heightened capacity to perceivethe hidden operations of political power. It provides a new discursiveframework through which the viewer can comprehend the underlyingconnection between events or conditions (the inverse ratio between cor-porate layoffs and stock values, for exampre) that would have previouslybeen less comprehensible. Despite these obvious differences, the.. n..

"lsoimportant similarities between this view and the perspective of Green-berg or Fried. In each case the aesthetic is defined n,

"r, i-ro.diate (pre-

discursive) somatic experience (a shock or epiphany) that is only subse,quently "made sense of " in terms of an existing discursive system (thehierarchy of great art for Greenberg or Fried; ihe political analysis ofcapitalism for Benjamin). In each case emancipatory aesthetic knowredgeis equated with that which is prior to or beyond shared discourse. More-over, both of these perspectives appeal to an immed iacy, a simultaneityofexperience (cf. Fried's "presentness"), as opposed to an aesthetic experi-ence defined by duration (although Brecht's work clearly complicates thisdescription). In this sense Greenberg's and Be'jamin's descripiions of theviewer's response to avant-garde art mark two ends of a continuumwithin modernism.8

As I have already suggested, the dialogical projects of v/ochenKlausur,I-acy, and others build on this tradition through their interest in chal-lcrgirrg fixed identities and perceptions of difference. At the same time,tlrcy c.nceive of the relationship between the viewer and the work of art11.itc differently; not simply as an instantaneous, prediscursive flash of

lrln I r )(,1( Al Al ',1 lll I t( '

irrsig,lrt, brrl rts rt tlccctttct'ittg, rt lttovclttcltt outsidc sclf (alld sclf-irltcrcst)

througlr clialogr-rc cxtcncled over time. But a commitment to dialogue, ncl

nri-lttcrr how self-reflexive, signals the reliance of these projects on some

conlmon system of meaning within which the various participants can

speak, listen, and respond. And this in turn brings us back to the long-

established resistance in the modern and postmodern avant-garde to any

concept of shared discourse. It is necessary, then, before elaborating my

model of a dialogical aesthetic, to explore this resistance more fully. I fo-

cus here on the work of Jean-FranEois Lyotard, who provides one of the

most thoughtful contemporary expressions of the avant-garde critique

of discursive meaning.

LYoTARD AND THE suBLlME For Lyotard, discursive systems of meaning,

embodied in the realist tradition in the visual arts' are irrevocably com-

promised by their association with a conventional reason, which negates

or ignores experiences that cannot be ar:ticulated through a fixed set of

conventions. How can the academic painter, steepcd in the static tradi-

tions of neoclassicism, ever hope to capture the ephemeral effects of light

and space so eloquently revealed in a canvas by Monet? Lyotard will turn

to the concept of the sublime in order to elaborate his opposition to real-

ist discourse. In Enlightenment thought the sublime experience is differ-

entiated from the beautiful by virtue of its overwhelming (and potentially

life-threatening) power. The sublime exceeds our capacity to measure, cat-

egorize, or understand, and, importantly, it reduces us to mute awe (it si-

lences our ability to communicate). For I(ant the sublime is specifically as-

sociated with the experience of nature (ocean storms, deep canyons' vast

waterfalls, etc.). Lyotard links the sublime in the eighteenth century with

the gradual erosion of the ideal of an aesthetic "common sense," embod-

ied in a set of rules for addressir-rg a discursively integrated community of

listeners.

According to Lyotard the sublirne rnarks the initial expression of a

fundamentally new view of the function of the artist and the effect of the

artwork on the viewer. Specifically, thc sr,rblirnc replaces a rhetorical aes-

thetic based on shared discourse with an aesthetic based on somatic

shock. The shock of the sublime is not the precursor to a heightened ca-

pacity for critical differentiation; rather, it is in and of itself valuable. For

Lyotard this experience forces us to recognize the lirnits of our cognitive

knowledge and exercises a chastening effect on the arrogant and total-

izing drive of reason.e In contrast to Schiller's classic formulation of the

aesthetic as a mode of experience that can restore ontological wholeness

DIATOGICAL AESTHET CS

. I r r (l i n re srity to a hurnanity torn a sun cler by the forces of modernity, Ly-,r:u'tl rrclvocates "ontological dislocation" as a therapeutic antidote to ar('ntcrccl and dominative Cartesian iclcntity. l0

l,y.tard offers an i'rportant rearticr-r[ati" 'f

fornralist, avant-garderrrt. The task of advanced art is not simply trl reveal the limitations ofconventional r:epresentational systems (throLrgh tlre poetic torsion of lin-gr-ristic or visual material, as in futurism, cubisnr, ctc.) br,rt something farrrrore ambitious. It will represent the "r-rnpresentablc." It becomes theone site in our culture at which the "excess," thart which is beyond dis-c()urse or untranslatable into discursive form, is given refr-rge: an enclavein which the differend, to use Lyotard's rerrr, can be preserved and cr-rl-

tivated.ll Lyotard's use of the concept of the subli'-re, however, elidestl're obvious differences between a raging cataract or bottomless chasmilnd a painting in a museum. The sublime experience produced by anoverwhelming force of nature is unproblernatically shifted ro olrr expe-rience of a specific fabricated object that challenges our preconceptionsabout works of art in general. But the most powerful expressions of thesublime in eighteenth-century thought :rre associated with experiencesin which we perceive the possibility of physical danger and c.me face toface with our own mortality. (Kant and Burke both note thar one's prox-imity to the sublime catalyst must be precisely calibrated; if you step tooclose to the edge of the Grand canyon, sublime awe simply beco'res ter-ror. )

rvhile I rnay have spent a few tedior-rs afternoons in art galleries overthe years, I have yet to encolrnter a work of art that threatened n1y veryexistence.

Ly.tard has difficulty providing a persuasive accolrnr of the actual ef-fects that "sublime" works of art have on a viewer. Moreover, he over-l.oks the extent to which we are already prepared to perceive anomalous.b jects by the institutional frame of the museum or gallery. \fle ofren con-front anomalor-rs objects in daily life, but they do not necessarily pre-cipitate a full-blown ontological crisis. How, then, do we cross the lir-re

frrrrrr sinrple confusion to a consciousness-altering encounter withthe dif-f t'rcrttl? Fr-rr:ther, in the history of the avant-garde, the "unpresentablc"rrl'vrrys, incvitably, becomes the presentable-that which dislocates anclr('iects treclition becomes tradition in turn. For Lyotar:d, as f<lr (irccrr

lrt'rg, rtrt is caLrelrt in an eternal treadmill of (forrral) inn<lvirti.,rr rrptl ,rs-

sirrrilrrtiorr. Morcovcr, to thc crtcnt that r-rlr appropr.irrtivc consciorrsrrt.ssItt'tls .tt tlillt'rcrrcc, thc avrttrf-srrt'rlt' worl< of rrrt crrtls up srrpplvirrri tlrisrcr'\' tt rrtlt rrtr, (t.rrrlrorlit'rl irr tlrt'tlisr.our-sc ol rrr-l lrislor.),), rvitlr its irriti.rllriss'rr ()l r'( \i\riur(( ;urtl ils ('\/('nrlr:rl tonsrrrrlrrrorr .rs lr.ilir.tl srt lt .

DIALOG CAL AESTHETICS

I believe that Lyotard, in his concern to guard against the dominativc

powers of unbridled reason, unfairly clismisses :lll forn'rs of disctrrsivc in-

teraction. He c:rn conccivc of comnrunicrrtion only as an "agonistic" con-

test: "to speak is to fight."tu For Lyotarcl spccch can function only in one

of two ways: as a form of intersr-rbjectivc conflict rrncl potential negation

or as an aesthetically playful (and esscntially solitary) clomination of lan-

guage itself, a kind of forr-nalist man iprrla tion of lingir istic or literary form

for its own sake. The general nlcssrrgc irrrplicit in thc writings of Lyotard

(as well as figures such as Clillcs l)clctrzc) is thrrt rrt thc core of our iden-

tity as conscious, volitional subjccfs witlr tlrt'crrpacity frlr cliscursive in-

teraction is an intensely fearrfLrl, rrralcvolcnt, arrd clcfcnsive force, which

can be held in check only by thc litcrally sclflcss, uondiscr-rrsive powers

of the body. Whenever we engrrljc in cliscur:sivc inter:rctior-rs, speech acts,

or other forms of cornmunicirtion, this Darth Vaderesque dark side threat-

ens to come to the fore, schcrning to rnaxinrize its own evil self-interest

through the conceptual rregation :rnd assimilation of the clther.

Art, for Lyotard, is e serniotic zero-sunr game: thc artist "wins" when

the viewer is deprived of as much of the framework of shared discourse

as possible and left epistemologically bereft. But Lyotard takes forgranted the kind of relationship between viewer and artwork that is im-

plied by both "realism" and "experimentation": a relationship in which

the viewer consumes an experience produced a priori by the artist. The

only parameter open to question is the precise ch:rractcr of this encounter

(easy vs. disruptive). There is no recognition that it might be possible to

redefine the relationship between artist and viewel that is implied in both

of these approaches and to anchor discourse not in some fixed repre-

sentational order but in a process of open-ended diarlogical interaction

that is itself the "worl<" of art.

I have thus far identified two general modes within the broader ten-

dency toward antidiscursivity in modern art and art theory. (It must be

noted that there is significant movernent between these two positions,

often by the same artist.) The first is a modality of indifference (epito-

rnizcd by Fried's "authentic" work of art, or by Rothko's or Newman's

patier.rt anticipation of the viewer-yet-to-be who is sufficiently evolved to

rrppreciate his work). The second is a modality of engagement and the-

atricrrlity (as in the work of Brecht, Vertov, or Rodchenko). lVhereas

I{otlrl<o or Ncwman considers the perceptions of actually existing vicw-

t'r's ,rs l,rrrcly irrclevant to his work, the tl.reatrical appro:rch proclrrccs its

,,rvrr liirrtl ol'rrcsrrtion. Spccificrlly, tlris wrlrl< is pronc to whrtt I'vt'rlc's, rilr,,l .ls ;rn "or-llropt'tli.'" rrt'sllrctic, irr tlrlrt it cottt't'ivt's ol lltt' r'it'r,vct'

-t

I rtAI { j{,tr /\t At ,, I I lt I tr ,,

.t',.ur iltlt(.rt'lrllt, ll.rwt.tl sillr;t.t.t rvlr,,:;,, 1)r.l((.1)ltr.tl :rIP.rr:llUs t.(.(llilt.(.s(()tt(.(tt{)l. lll(,t-(.:u.(. lw() r.t,l:rtt.tl rtssun)l)liorrs lrt,rt.. l,,ir.st is tlrt. lrt.liclllr:tt llrt'vit,wt'r-'s r.()ll,tttvc,1. 1.'i511.;111;lrgiclrl ()ric'tilti()'t. thc w,rltlrs s,rrrrt'lrrw cle fcctivc.'r-lris capturc, o lr,,.ia truth: we are surr.rrrrclccl 6ylrr''.('rroric c.lfural systerxs (in the mass media, jour'alism, .t.. jt[.,"t

"r"lrt'rrvily biased by political ideologies. At the same time, this .rthopedic'r'icrrati.n preserves the idea that the artist is a superior being, abre toll('rlctr:lte rhc veils of mystification that otherwise confuse and disoricrrtthc lrapless modern subject. And second, there is the assumption that thearrist is uniquely suited to both recognize this defect and ,;;6 it. It isinteresting to note that this rhetoric can cross the division between thetheatrical and indifferent m.des I outlined above. ,.It is our function asa.rtists, " according to Gottlieb, Rothko, and Newma' irr rqa3,

-

ro _nt.the spectator see the world our way, not his way.,,13 And Albert Gleizesand Jean Metzinger, in Du Cubisme (r9rz), acknowledge that the ,.ul-timate end" of art is to ..address

rhe masses,,, but only ..;;.;;;;;_"r.,to dominate, to direct, and not in order to be understood. . . . The artistwho abstains from any concessions, who does not explain t_ri_r"f

"rrawho tells nothing, builds up an internal srrength whose radiance shinesall around."la

This belief that the viewer suffers fr.m an epistemorogical lack thatwill be corrected by the artist brirgs the orthopedic aesthetic inro sur-prisirrg proximiry ro rhe rheroric of rrdverrisirrg, which O;;",,r;; "l;;;;,access to a more prestigious or enlightcnecr s,ciar identity if they engagein the requisite act of consumption. Rarher tr'rln wirit for the ideal viewer,these artists seek to activelyprodr,ce hi..r .r r.rcr thr'r-rgh,t.."p..i.rr..of consuming the work itself. \fle are thus rcft with eirher conremp, io. at .viewer ("The ar:tist deserves to be belligcrcnt ro the r-najority,,,as DavidSmith writes) or an evangerical su;re .i,>rity trraf c.nceives of the vieweras a subject-to-be-transformed

1f<rr .r ,rr.,rc rcccrlt exalnpre, considerRichard Serra's definition of his w.rk rrs trrc creatio, of ,,behavioralspace").1t In neither case is the ar:tist c()rfcrt t() cngage with the viewera' he or she acrually is. here antl rr,w. rhr.t,rrrh , ,:.;;;r., ;;;.,lfrL.rr_tive interaction.

I have outlined the gradual cons<>ricrati'. i. rnoder' a'd postmodernart theory of a general consensus trrat thc w'rk .f art must qr.rtro,,

"r.drundermine shared discursive cor.rvcrrri,rs. This 'roder

rr", pr.".a ,"durable because the dynarnic it rirrgcrs crrtinues to operate in our cur-tllre' as we impose reductive stere()typcs or pe.pre

"r.J ."p.ri.rrces that

ll Al |(,lr Al Al ,llll llr

r,vt.tlt'lirrt.:rs tlillt'rt'nl :rrrtl irrrplicitly thlt':rtcrtirrtr t() ()trr owrt static st'll'

itrrrrgt'. Art crtrt irrrlectl challcrrgc olrr pcrceptiotls tlf diffcrcrrcc, llttt, lrs I

Ir,rvt' strl3gcsrecl, this challenge can aiso entail the paradoxical negation

,rf thc vicwer irs a unique individual. Further, as a framework within

which to underst:rnd dialogical art practices this avant-garde tradition

hrrs sorne significant liabilities. First, it promulgates a relatively reduc-

r ive rrrodel of discursive interaction bcsed on a neoromentic opposiriorr

between mind arnd bodS reason and desire, and somatic and cognitive

experience. Second, it restricts the definition of aesthetic experience to

moments of immediate, visceral insight. And third, it is based on the es-

sentially solitary interaction between a viewer and a physical object, pro-

viding no way to comprehend the creative dimension of communal or

collective processes. Is it indeed possible to conceive of an emancipatory

model of dialogical interaction? And is there a way to understand this

dialogue as a form of aesthetic cxperience? I will begin to answer this

question in the second p:rrf of this chapter.

DIALOGICAL PRACTICIS

THE SpECtFIC:TY OF THE AESTHETIC 'l lrt' cortcr'pt oi acsthctic cxperience

developed by early modern philosophcrs sttclt ,ts liattrllgrtrtcrl, l(atlt, irnd

\Wolff is defined in terms of a p<ltcntirrl corrrrrrrrrtic:rbility thrtt is tl()t nec-

essarily related to works of art pcr sc. Iior hrtttt rtrt :tcstllctic cxpcricnce

is as likely to be triggered by a seashcll or rt gt'rrtttirttrr rls it is [y a Rem-

brandt. It is Hegel, as Anthony Clascartli poitrts ()trt, wh() tt:rrrows the

definition of the aesthetic to "a specilic clrtss ol obiccts thilt are regarded

as culturally fashioned objects."l6 [Jr'rt hrtw, prcciscly, flrc we to differ-

entiate these objects from objects in trrrfLtrc. ()r cvcrl lrorn other objects

fabricated by human beings but not rrcccptetl rls "rtrt" ? The answer pro-

vided by modern art theory, as I have suggcstctl, hrts lrcct.t to consistently

define the aesthetic through its dif{erencc fnrrrr tlontinant cultural forms,

leading r-rs to Lyotard and the aesthetics oi thc dil'le.rend.But how can

indeterminateness, or resistance t1l fixity ancl clcfirrition, become a "defini-

tion" or a determinant condition of art?

From one perspective we can understarrtl thc wrlrk of art only as the

product of a given cultural and historical cotltext (modernism) and a

specific discursive system that construct the catcllory of "art" as a repclsi-

tory for values (creative labor, noninstrurner-rtality, nondiscursive forrns

DIALOGICAL AESIHETICS

,,1 lirr.rvlcclge, ctc.) actively suppressed within the drminant culture.'llrt'rc is .othing inhere^r in a given work of art that allows it to play

tlris r,le; rather, par:ticular formal arrargcments tirke on meaning onlyirr rclati.nship to specific cultural moments, institr-rtionirl frames, and pre-c.tli'g artworks. Thus whether I "recclgnize" a Barnett Newman canvasirs ir protest against the dehumanizing effects .f crrpitrrlist labor or as aI.vcly addition to my penthouse decor has everytlri.g to do with rhe co'-fext in which I am viewing it and my own kn.wlc-dgc of art history. Atthc same time, the work of art is presented as ar-r object that rejects contin-ge ncy and frllstrates the grasp of discursive systems of kr-rowleclge throughits relentless formal self-transformation. Thus formal meaning, which isi^ the first instance contingent and context dependent, becomes in thesecond instance the emblem of an immanent, autonomous (and ahistori-cal) drive toward flux and differentiation.

The challenge that the aesthetic poses to fixed categorical systerns andinstrumentalizing modes of thought is irnportant. At the same time, as Il.rave argued above, the te'dency to locate this principle of indetermi-nirteness solely in the physical condition or form of the work of art pre-vents us from grasping a* irnportant aspect of performative, collabora-tive art practice. An alternirtive appr.ach would require us to locate themoment clf indeternrinereness, of opcn-ended and liberatory possibility,not in the perpetually changing form of the artwork qua object, but inthe very process of communication that the artwork catalyzes. This re-quires two important shifts. First, we need a more nuanced accou't ofc.mmunicative experience: one capable of differenriating between en ab-stract' objectifying mode of discourse that is insensitive to the specificiclentities of speaking subjects (the kind targeted by figures such as Ly-.t'rrcl) and a dialogical exchange based on reciprocal openness. This dis-ti'ction, between what Jirrgen Habermas terms an "instrumental" andrr "cornmunicative" rationality, is typically collapsed in moclen-r and post,m.dern art theory. The second important shift requires that we under-stard the work of arr as a process of comrnu'icative exchange ratherthrr' rr physical object. In this description visual art

"pp.,rn.h., the c.r-

cliti.rr .f theater. But while the works of \fochenl(lausur, Lacy, ar-rcl oth-('rs rrre pcrfornrative to the extent that they see the identity of the artisrrrrttl thc perticiprrnt as producecl thr.ugh situaticlnal encorntcrs, thcy art,ll()t srll)stllllilblc into thc trlclitions of theater, to thc cxtcnt thrrt fIcst,tlc-lrt'rttl .rr {lrt'corrccl-rt of tlrc "pcrfonncr" as thc crPr-cssivt. l.t.rrs.l tlrt.ivrttl<. I wrll rry lo tttltkt'tlris rlistirrctiorr sorrrt.wlrrrl tlt,:rrt,r.tlr.our,,lr srrrr.',1)t t ilit , rrurrlrlt s.

A pre-requisite for an art work that narriicsrs rr

coLlnter-collsciousne ss is that t]re scparlrtiorr wlticlt

exrsted between the artist and thc:rrrclicrrcc is closttl,

that they become rxLltllally engrrgccl, to lhr, l.xrint rvlrt'r-t

the :rudience become the rationrtlc irr both Iht' rrr,rliirrg

:rnd leception of the worl<.

Stcpht'n Wi I I rr t s,,\r tt i c t l t Lt n t t t.\l t r\ r l

London-based Stepherr willats is onc of sevcral influential artists in Eu-rope and the Unitecl Statcs wlro used the movernent away from the ob-

;ect initiated by corrccptualism ro develop a collabor:ative, dialogical artpractice in the r96os and r97os. over the past three decades willats hasproduced a number of extended projects with the residents of public hous-ing estates or tower blocks in England, Germany, Finland, and elsewherein Europe. In many cases he returns to these projects and sites over a

period of several years. rwillats is particularly concerned with the socialilnd somatic experience of livir-rg in public housing (especially in isoiatedhigh-rise buildi*gs) and with identifyi'g and facilit:rtirrg rn.des of re-

sistance and critical consciousness among the resiclcr.rts of these cstrtes.He seeks to challenge what he calls thc "Ncw ltcality" pr.'rrleirtcd bythe bureaucratic planning aplraratus tl.rat clcvclol'rcd irr Ilritairr cluring thcpostwar period.17 One of Willats's nrrin gorrls is to rrckrrowlcdge andhonor a process of autonomous clccisi.rr nral<irs rr'cl scli-re{lectionamong communities that are typically trcatccl by the state and privaresector as a kind of inert raw material t'be variously processed and reg-r-rlated, both spatially, in the archirecure of state,subsidized housing, andideologically, through the mechanisms of c.nsur'er society. As he writes,"My practice is about representing the potential self-organizing richnessof people within a reductive culture of objects and possessions. In a so-

ciety which reduces people I''r worki'g to celebrate their richness andconrplexity. I see this as a kind of cultural struggle."18 In his projectswillats shifts the focus of art from the phenomenological experience oft lrc creator frrbricating an exemplary physical object to the phenomeno-l.gica I cxperience of his co-participants in the spaces and routines of theirtlrrili' livcs.

willrrts has p'stLrlatecl a concept of "sociaily interactive" cultr-rre thatrt'rlt'lirrt'srtrt irttcrrrrsof tlrccliscrrrsiverclationshipthatitestablisherswithlltt

"'it u,t t. Irt tltis r'otttr'\( c()r)v('nti()rrlrl lrrt is rrrrclcrstoocl lrs :r proct'ss ol'

t;

/lr1

D ALOGICAL AESTHETICS

STEPHEiV WILLATS AND THE AUDIENCE AS RATI]NALE

li

lrlAl il{,1{ At At ',|il lt( '

FrcuRE 16. Stephen lfiliats, ..A Sociallv

Interactive Model of Art practice,,(c. ry7o). Courtesy of the artist.

object production that occurs in isolation from the actuar viewer and un-der the guidance of presuppositio's about a potentiar viewer that arenever fully tested. (cf. Jack Burnham's description of Hans Haacke,s"real-rime" relationship to rhe viewer.) There r. trttte or no way for theviewer's responses to the work in the gallery to be communicatid to theartist so that he or she might modify future works (except through the pro-fessionalized surrogate of art criticisrn). rJfiilats

argues for a form of aes-thetic exchange in which the artisr's own presuppositions are potentiallychallenged by the viewer's response thro,rgh a process of direct collabora-tion and feedback (figs. r6 and ry). Both \x/illats and his coilaboratorsare able to rransform their consciousness of the world through

" diarogi-

cal encounter that is mediated by the production of imageTtext pieces,often in the form of signboards rocated in the housir.g .Jr",. or'ro*.,blocks themselves.

. . A .:--on strategy in Wiilats's collaborative projects involves the

identification of specific sites at which his co-participants are able to ex-crcise some autonomy from, or resistance to, the bleaL and repressivecr vironments of the housing estate. This concern with spatial polirr., nrd

lrtAl (l(,t( At At "llll

lt( ,

Priot orporirnco,

boliels estsblishsd

Sub$a{uirt erpsrisrre,

!lieNt on intoniirns.

Prior exruricDcr,ilelisls e$ ta bl i$ hed

${l'$hl{{irt fr}s;emqetlc{l onp!ree{fen$.

rtcuRE 17. Stephen'Willats, "Convenrional Relationship of :rn Artworkbetween Artist and Audience" (c. t97ol. (lourrcsy of tlrc artist.

identity is evident in a number of works he produced in the r 9 8os, includ-ingPat Pwrdy and the Glue Sniffers' Camp (r98r-82), which examined

the "reterritorialization" of a wasteland near the Avondale estate in rWest

London; The Kids Are in the Streets (r98r-82), abour a skateboard parklocated near a municipal housing esrate outside Brixton; and Are You

Good Enough for the Cba Cha Cha? ft982), creared with the members

of a punk music club in London.le \X/illats uses the process of collabo-rative interaction with the esrate residents to help them distance them-selves from immersion in the life-world of the estate and to reflect back

critically on the network of visible and invisible forces that pattern thatworld. The aesthetic distance, or "defamiliarization," typically achieved

in a modernist painting through the rnanipulation of represenrational con-

ventions is created here through collaborative production itself. Key tothis is what'\)fillats calls the question: an initial interrogative statement

developed with a given group of participants that is used to provide a

framework for critical reflection: for example (inThe People of CharuilleLane), "\7hat do you think are the everyday pressures on family lifecreated by moving into a house on this estate?" By trying to describe

their life experience to Willats (and to themselves and other residents),

fDIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

FTGURE 18. Stephen \7illats, Fr<tm One Gen-eration to Another (r992-.111, MrirkischesViertel, Berlin, pl.rotographic prints, acrylicpaint, and l-etraset text on paper and card,r z6 x 7 6.5 cm. Courtesy of the artrst.

by bringing it into discursive form via statements, images, and so on, the

rcsidents establish a distance from this experience and situate it withina parallel world in which reflexive examination is more easily facilitated(tig. r tl).20

Ilarrs Herbert I(cigler's The Power of Dialogue: Criticdl Herrncncu-Iirs tf'tcr Cadarner and Foucault GCSg) provides a usefr-rl tl.reorcrical rc

s()urcc for trnclcrstrrncling Willats's approach. I(ogler cxplorcs thc rrrctlr-

otlolosicrrl inrPassc thrrt cxists bctwccn thc worl< oi Michcl liorrcrrull,ivlritlr plivilt'rit's thc philosophcr/tlrcorist rrs tlrt'orrly:rgt'rrl crrp:rlrlt'ol .ur"urrtlrslollttl irrsilllrt" irrlo tlrt'(st'r'rrrilrqly irrrpl:rt:rlrlt.) t.llt.rls ol porr,,t'r

()r \r)(i.rl irrltr:rtli,rr, 'rrrtl

llrt'tr':rtlitrorr ol tlilit;rl lrr.r'rrrr.rrr.1lit., (rt.prt.

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

sented by Gadamer and, later, Habern-rirs), wl.rich terrds to underestimate

the extent to which these same exchirngcs irrc constrairred by forms of

social domination. It is possible to rcconcilc thcse two allalyses, accord-

ing to Kogler, if we replace the corrvcntionel "irrtcrprctcr/outsicler" ilnd

"agent/insider" relationship in thc social scicrrct's witlr rr clialogical r:rp-

prochement between the theolist rrrrrl tlrt' sitrrrrtt'cl agcnt. 'l'hcsc cx-

changes would combine the f hcorist's corrrrrrrlrrrl of " rrrctlroclologicrl :rnd

conceptual tools" with thc subjcct's own conrplcr scli-rrnrle rstrtrrclirrg t<r

challenge both the "hiclclcn synrlrolic ilssunrl)ti()ns" that clclirrc thc sr-rl.r

ject's context and the lirnitations of abstract thcorizatiorr. 'fl'rc rcsrrlt

would be a "dialogicill cr()ss-rcc()nsfruction" or "reciprocerl clucidltion"

of a given social contcxt. "While the theorist helps the agent to get a

clearer understandin g <>f hotu power works," according to Kogler, "the

agent helps the theorist to recognize which structural constraints count

ds power."21

I(cigler's analysis tends to understate the extent to which the theorisr

is also a socially and politic:rlly situated agent, but it demonstrates the

irnportance of a process of triangulation among multiple perspectives in

recovering the "truth" of power relationships in a given context. Thus,

while the projects of Willats still run the risk of prornulgating an ortho-

pedic relationship to the participants (who need the artist/tl-rcorist to re-

veal the hidden symbolic assumptiorls of their life-worlcl), this percep-

tion is seen less as a gift (made possible by the superior critical facr,rltics

of the artist) than as the procluct of a collirboratively generirted ir-rsight.

In dialogical practice the artist, whosc pcrccl-rtious rrr:c informed by his

or her own training, past projccts,:rncl livccl cxperience, cornes into a

given site or cornmunity characterized by its own unique constellation

clf social and economic forces, personalities, and traditions. In the ex-

cl-rirng;e that follows, both the artist and his or her collaborators will have

their existing perceptions challenged; the artist rnay well recognize rela-

tionships or connections that the community members have become in-

rrrccl to, while the collaborators will also challenge the artist's precon-

ccptions about the community itself and about his or her own function

:r\ iln ilrtist. What emerges is a new set of insights. genercted et the in-

rcrscctior.r of both perspectives and catalyzed through the collaborarive

Ir-,,.lrr. tiorr oI a given project.

Anothcr inrportant component of Willats's approach concerns the sig-

nilicrrrrcc that cstr'rtc residents assign to physical objects in their immedi-

:rlt t'rrvir'orrncnt. Agrrilt, rrs witl.r the spirti:rl practices I have cliscussccl, hc

st t'l<s to itlt'ntily points of rcsisteucc in thc rclrttiortshil-rs that rt'sitlcrrts

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

rli:1ill:i:trtlir:l'li,ii:lili:...$. [Pl{fru WILLATS

n+L al^r^L-. 1^l l\l^..^*L^-:::r,,,ll:trl:r,,r.:,l:,::Sth:,0ctuh gf * 2 nd Nove mbe r 1 985'

ll,,i,:,,,11,:,::l,l,i'll.,,,;',;l,,i',.,,'',: i',

., 1,, 1{AfiV[Y H0USt

t,t:i:iitl,t,t.:t.t',i,,,t,t,l',t tt', .. , Gfeen DfagOn Lang,rtit:rr:r',r'rrr.:' ..:l:tii r' . S.fgntfOfd,WeStLOndOn

,ir.,:,,',:'.: . Qver r l*enty*tvo dal period lhe work,,:i,.,.'i,i.,.t .'lBrenllord Towersl, by stephen Wi11als, *i1l:ri :' . evolve as an insialliti.rn inside ihe tolver

:.tr...... . blork, Halvay Louse. Lii:rti*g on 6lh Oclober..: . oir ilre $round lioor, tllc 1'*rk then prollresses

. by ol1e floor eich dry lo ihe lop tweoty-secolxl'i' , i. . lloor, lhetr lhe whole in$iallstion is leit in silu

unlil ?nii Noren:her, Ths residerts o.f H&rvevHuuse hf,r e beerr rr'[i!fly :n!irlreu rl lhe nr.tl:ingol the rv*r*, cr!ating direci connections

... . betveen olljecltt they pcs$!ss inside theii llai$,.:- and lh!,wl)ll{i ofisids rs seer lxom their lif ing

foorn Nlno,rivS.

',,i , 11l c.lllaltoraiion qilh tire A rlil!el Trusl andwitlr the hnrlici,. ii irst.,u,.(. 'l fllr t lcphJnrTrust-

.lr,r ..

F I G u R t 19. Stephen rX/illats, Brentfor d Tbwers,

announcement card (r985). Courtesy of the

artlSt.

stablish with these objects. 'Willats is interested in the ways in which

reople "curate" their living spaces, assigning value to objects in oppo-

ition to a market system that links the consumption of specific consumer

;oocls to a priori models of identity (i.e., owning a sports car symbolizes

rr perirrr virility). Thus in Brentf ord Towers ( t S 8 S ) \X/illats worked with

csiclents to map the interiors of their own apartments, identifying ob-

ccts thirt held a personal significance, which they then related to scenes

rr thc outsidc world that they regularly viewed through their wir.rdows.'lrcsc worl<s typically involve a montage technique thirt c<lrrtbittcs por-

rrrits ol'thc incliviclurrl (posccl in collab<lrati<>n with Willats), strltcrrrerrts

rrl<t'rr llorrt irttcrvicws ("I rlorr't warrt t() hc ottc of flrc lrrcclt'ss tttrtsst's"),

rn,l irnrrgt's tllilt ('()ntlrtst tlrt' privrrtc irtlt'riors, in wlrit lt tltt' lt'sitlt'rtts lt;tvt'

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

I$i &:s,rKl

&'Kl*'

r&$$-!s

FlcURt 20. Stephen'Willats, BrentfordTouers (ry861, display panel, photo-graphic prints, acrylic paint, ink on card, 59 x 84 cm. Courtesy of the artist.

attempted in various ways to mark out the space as a reflection of theirown identities, and the concrete monotony of the surrour-rding environ-

ment (figs. r9 and zo).22 ln Priudte Icons (r gtl 3,), \X/illats collaborated

with a young man who created a refuge in his apartment through the

collection and creative transfor:mation of religious icons.23 And in Pat

Purdy and the Glue Sniffers' Camp he documented abandoned objects

that had been put to use at wasteland camps near a housing estate. Likethe "question" that helps to catalyze self-reflection in \Tillats's otherprojects, the temporary abstraction of these objects from the gestalt oftheir surrounding spatial context triggers interactions among residents

and with V/illats, facilitating a critical consciousness of the function they

perform within a broader ecology of material and ideological signs.

W OCH EN K L ALiSUR AND CONCRET E t NT ERV ENT tOrv Dialogical exchange plays

iln even more central role in the works of the Austrian group \Tochen-

Klrrr,rsur, part of a younger generation of practitioners concerned with com-

rnunicrrtive interaction in nonart settings. As their name suggests (roughly

trrrnslirtccl, it nrcans "weeks of closure" as well as seclusion), their pro jects

,rrt'tlt'lirrt'tl irr tcrrns of rr sct time franre during which they first describe

f

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

.r sl)(,cific problem and then bring together the resources necessary to fa-

t ilitrrte its resolution through a concentrated series of actions. Founding

nrcnrl)cr \Tolfgang Zinggl defines their practice in terms of what he calls

.,c()ncrete interventions" in the field of social policy. As opposed to ear-

licr forms of activist art, which often sougl.rt tg "change everything but

wotlnd up changing nothing," in Zinggl's words, Wochenl(lausur's prac-

tice is to identify specific problems, resolvable through the achievement

of clearly defined and concrete goals.2a

'WochenKlausur's proiects can be generally divided between what

might be termed "collaborative" and "advocacy-based" works' Col-

laborative projects involve the generation of new institutional and spa-

tial arrangements in consultation with specific groups, communities, and

individuals. Examples would include their Interuetttion in Community

Deuelopment of rg97, in which\rochenl(lausur staged a sefies of con-

versations with the residents of Ottensheim, a small town outsideLinz,

concerning their visions for their community. The result was the for-

mation of three interest groups (IGs); one was devoted to the needs of

the town's older residents, one to the town's youth, and one to the gen-

eral development of the town's historic center. The Youth IG constructed

a skateboard ramp with donations from local firms, along with a youth

center. The Town Center IG developed a proposal to stage a weekly

market, and the Elder IG established regulaf meetings between students

at the local Polytechnic and older residents to compile oral histories

and encourage intergenerational relationships. The result of all of these

activities was the creation of a set of proposals to the Ottensheim town

council for expanding future community involvement i1 democratic

clecisign-making processes in the town. A "Pro-Ottensheim" political

party emerged out of this project and is now the third-largest party on

thc town council.\rVochenKlausur's Interuention in d Scbool (tgSS-g6) involved a sim-

iler process of consultation and action organized around the collective

rcthinking of the spaces of everyday life. Here \Tochenl(lausur workecl

with rhe students in a Viennese secondary school, asking them to pro-

1-rosc thcir own vision for the redesign clf their classrooms, desks, cl.rairs,

,rntl so on. "Pupils have no lobby," as \TochenKlausur notes. "They also

Ilrvt,rrlrnost tr<t influence on the design of the classroom spilcc irl which

r lre y spclttl nrrllty ycltrs of thcir lives."25 Through e xtcllsivc rlrcctilrgs witlr

tlrt, sr'lr66l's tw('lvc-ycilr-olcl strrrlcnts, \iTochcnl(lattsrtr clcvt'ltt1'rt'tl rl ttt'w

st.;rlrnli rl t'llnll('nl('nt lrol tht' clltss tltat t'c1-tlrtct'tl tllt' t'xistittl', st':tts, ',t i

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

rlcuRE 21. \(ochenl(lausu4 Interuention in a Schoctl, Urriversity of Applied

Art, Vienna, Austria (November r995 through January r996). Courtesy of\rVochenl(laus ur.

ented to the front of the room, with a series of rounded desks grouped

in concentric rings around the blacl<board (fig. zr). They also created

a cushioned "sitting corner" for the stlrdents irrrcl iutprove d the lighting

system in the room. Due to the resist:rnce ()f thc cclucafion:rl bureau-

cracy to this kind of individualized reconstructiolt tlf classroom space'

Wochenl(lausur was forced to locatc fr-rnding irnd sponsorship outside

the school.

The second area of Wochenl(lausllr's practice involves working

through existing political and administrative systems to change condi-

tions for a given group (typically a group that occupies a disempowered

position relative to dominant cultural or political institutions). These

projects tend to be less collaborative in terms of the perceived beneficia-

ries and instead are developed on behalf of this constituency through a

ne twork of official representatives.In Interuention to Aid Drug-Addicted

'ilfttmen (which I discuss in the introduction), dialogue about pragn.ratic

r'('sp()nses to the drug problem in Zurich amon!l policy makers and others

was corrstrained by the fear that their statements would be taken out of

(()ntcxt ,rrrtl usecl :rgainst them politically. It was necessary for Wochen-

lr. l:rusrrr t() crclrtc r cliscursive space that was to sollle extent insulated

I

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

lr.rrr this r:hetorical effect, in which key participants in the debate over,lr rru policy could converse. The organization of the "boat colloquies,"rv lr ich cve ntually included the secreraries of the nla jor Swiss political par-tics, the police cornmissioner, for-rr .f tl-re eight city cou'cilors, severalc()rporate managers, and the chief eclitors of thc city's rnajor newspapers

rrs well as sex workers and activists, involvecl sonre clcgree of creativityrrs well. Thus \X/ochenl(1ar-rsur askcd tlre

'r:ryor of Zwtch if he would

p:rrticipate, telling him that the leacler of the Socialist Party had alreadyvolunteered but would participate or-rly if the nray.r wirs involved. Aftersecuring his agreement, they rhen mer with the hcacl of the Socialist party

and reversed the story. Tl-re final r:esult was temporary government sup-port, through the Zurich Social Department, f<:tr a pensionhousing fifreenwomen (it was eventually given permanent fundir-rg).

\TochenKl:rustr's Interuention in d De[tortation Detention Facility

ftc;96) focused on conditior-rs ar the Salzburg Police Detention Cenrer,in which immigrar-rts awaiting deportation (but not legally under arrest)were warehoused. Because of conditions therc, as rWocher-rKlausur notes,

the center was "worse than any prison." Inmates were routinely deniedaccess to information abor-rt tl.reir rights as detainees; living conditionsin ternrs of food, shower access, ancl laundry were primitive; and inmatesweren't allowed teievisions, radios, or evcn books, even though they werekcpt in the facility for up to six monrhs. As they did in Zurich, \Tochen-I(lausur createcl a working group of representatives from the media, localchurches, the Interior Ministry, and varior-rs relief organizations to de-

veiop a professional consensus around possible changes in the deten-tion facilities. This consensus was then used to overcorne the facilitydircctor's initial resistancc to the idea of allowing the cletainees access

to social services. \)flith funding from the Pr<ltestant Refugce Service,wochenl(lausur was able to assign caseworkers fo each refugee a'd toprovide them with better living conditions and access to legal services.

They created dayrooms for detainee recreati()n, collecting "games, books,newsp:lpers, fitness equipment, a table soccer unit, a television and radios,"rrs wcll as a card telephone with subsidized access.26

lJoth the collabor:irtive and the advocacy-based projecrs of Wochen-l(lausur involve an intensive pr()cess of dialogue aud discussion to c'lcterr

nrirrc tlrc eppropriate fon.n for a given intervention. Tlrere is potentiellys0rrrt' Pr'oblcril with aclvocacy projects that benefit clisen'r1-rowcrcd poPrr,l;rlrorrs (tlt'tainccs. pr()stitutcs, e'tc.) evc.n rrs thcy tal<c arlr,;rrrt:riic of tlrrrttlrs, nrpo\n,t'r't'rl stlrlus to sl-rt'ltli lor tltt'rn tlrourilr lr plr,rl:rrrr ol rrolr

l'o\'(lllilr(il1:rl or.r',:ilriz;tliorr (N(i())trllcr ts;ln(1 1,,()\,(.r nnr(il1 r(l)r(\(.nl.l

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

tives (a problem l will retur' to i'r the f.il.wirg chapter). However,\TochenKlausur appears to be cognizant .f this pr.,lrl",,, ancl fairly real_istic about the strategic necessity,f thcst's()rrs ()f rcrrrri<l.ships. wolf-gang Zrnggl contrasts their pragnrrrtic, locrrlly rcsp6rrsivr, .ppr,ro.h ,o rh.more grandiose (but less practicar) r'hct.r-ir. .f fis.rcs r,,.r,

", JosephBeuyr, who sought norhing lcss llr;rrr tlr,. 1,,11q,,.,,,.,,,..1 1,,, ,,,lrl,,,iolr,rfart and life' This strategic scrrsibility e xl('n(ls ro rlrt'ir-rrrrirrrtk,r.wrrrcl theprestige value .f art itself: "'r'ht'c.rtt.xt ,r .rr.( ,llt.rs .rrlv.rrrt.rr_lcs whcnacticln involves circrttlvcntirtg s.cirrl ,rncl brrr-t',rucr:rtic hierar.clrics arclquickly mclbilizing peoplc irt 1'r.siti.rrs .f p.litical, aclrnilistrativc ()r ure*dia responsibility t' acc.,tplish c()rcrcto rrerrslrres. A' irvitati.' ir.'.ran art institution proviclcs w'crrcrKlausr-rr with an irfrastructurar framework and cultural capitrrr, whilc the exhibitio'space serves as a studiofrom which tl.re interve'tio'is concructed.,,At th. same time, the real_ism that allows .*ochenl(lausur

ro so effectively respond r.r rp..ii. prot,_lems can also tend ro foreclose a porirical vision that could linr< trreseconcrete solutions to a broader emancipatory movement among thosewho have been strategicalry disempo*"r.d. rtri.

"t,r.r... ', ;l]"rh: -.r.striking given the tradition of autonom ous (Autonomen) porttical nr-

gar-iizing in Austria and Germany (the Hafenstrasse occupatio'r in Ham_burg, for exarnple).27 conversely, one'rigr'rt arguc th,lt trre vision ofwochenKlausur's interventi.'s lies in the *,,rr.i,rg 1",.radig.r .r meth.d-ology that they have evolved, whicr-r car p.rcnriaily ir" ."pri."r".l rry othergroups working in other: contexrs.

In response to those wh. wo'lc{ cqratc trrcir-pr.aericc with social w'rkor activisrn, zinggl is insistent that it bc clcfirccl i, t.rrrs of art. ,,Locar-ized between social work and p.ritics, bcrwcer rncdiil work and man-ag;ement, " as Zinggl writes, "intervcntior.rs are n'nethe ress based on ideasfr:or'the discor:rse of art." These ideas would incrude, first, the capac-ity to thi'k critic:rliy and crearivery acr:rss disciplinary boundaries. .Artlets us think in uncomrnon ways," according to one .f }flochenr(rausur,sstatements, "outside of-the narrow thinkrng of the curture of specializa-tion and outside of the hierarchies we

"r. pr.rr.d int' when we are crn-

Ployed irr an instit'tion, a sociar orga.ization, or a poriticar party.,,Asecrncl and related characteristic, as I have arrerrdy suggest"d. is th. r"-c'ilitatiri. of uniqr-re forms of discursive interacti'' (as in the Zurich boattrilrs)' "'fhis type of art," zinggrwrites, "does not need the Iar:tist aslpr..Plrt't .r' pricst. . . . Instead, it irrises fr-om intersubjective communi-trrti.rr :rrtl

't'fl.cti.rr " thc possibilitics of tal<ing part i, a chargirrst r

, , , r '

I , I . ' ' ' ri

I

t;lil'i

l

i

DIALOGICAL AESIHETICS

.tAY KoH AND THE ART oF L/srE/v//vc I wanr to discuss one:rdclitional set

ol rlialogical projects, by the Singapore-born, Cokrglre-based, artist IayI'..1r. I(oh's early activist work in cennany was fclcused cln health car:e

rrrrcl scientific research. He helped esrablish onc of the first pr-rblic inter'-('st srolrps in Cologne to protest against the clirngcrs of genetic engineering((iologne is a center for genetic research) arcl worl<ecl on the development

ol a patient information system that allowccl hcalth service Llsers to rrron-itcrr and evaluate the performance of doctors. l.n tL)c)2- I(oh founded an

or:sanizational entity called arting that serves irs tl.re basis for a range

of different activities: symposia, artist and critic exchanges especiailyfocused on Asia, exhibitions, demonstrations, arrcl so on. "The idea,"as l(oh wrote, "was to create a platform where I, together with my col-leirgues, could use the medir-rrn of contemporary art to intervene in var-ious social processes and structures."2e In r997 Kc>h founded a smallergroup, the Interr-rational Foundation for Intermedia Arts (IF'lMA), whichmobilizes ad hoc affiliations of artists, activists, and writers in Ger:manyand Asia for the creation of specific projects.l0 Genopoly (r99o) was

one of the first "intermedia" pr:ojects I(oh cleveloped with arting. It in-volved a series of performances, lectlues, and exhibits designed to raiseptrblic consciousness about the dangers of 5;enetic research (especially ofexperiments under way irr Cologne to implant human genes in animal"receptors " ).

Genoytoly would set rhe pattern for a number of subsequent artingprojects. It was based on the creation of collaborative alliances between

various activist and arts organizations in Cologne and elsewhere (fromthe Biirger: Beobachten Perunien to the South and Meso-American In-di:rn Rigl-rts Center). This crucial networking componenr was combinedwith the interdisciplirary focus of the project, which featured lecrures,performances, exhibited artworks, publicatiorrs, a Web site, and so ou.Llnderlying many of arting's projects is the recognition that complex so-

cial and political issues, like those raised by generic research, cannot be

,rclccluately addressed simply by fabricating physical objects (sculprures,

Prrirrtings, and so on) but require polyvalent responses thaf opcrate orr

rrrrrltiplc lcvels of public intcraction. other projects have incluclc cl Aus<.cit

tlcr l)t'ntokrallc, or "Time-Out in Democracy" (,q9; ), rvhich fcatrrrccl crlrilrits, pLrblic works atrcl rrctions, anci a lecturc scrics clcvclol-rctl in lcsporrsc

to llrt'tllrrstic irrcr"crrsc in l<illings ancl rrttacl<s ort t\trsl,'ittdt,r, or-"Iolt.irlnt ts," itt ( it lltt:ttty by l'tst rt qr'()ttlls lollor'virrg lt'urrilit:rliorr. lr.olr lrr-r,rrr,,lrt1o1,,1 1111 1 (l()z('nsol lulisls, vvlt,,,l,'v,.l,rlrtrl |r'r'1,'ll.ut(r.s,toll.rr,,,.,,, lrsl.tll,tltott,,, .ur(l ()llt, r tr,,,r 1., rt flt.. tirrri , r ilr,.tllt ,rr (,r.r rr,rrr r.r'rropllrylrl.q_il

DIALOGICAL AESTHET CS i03

For centuries the rwest has bee^ engagcd ir a c'mplex set .f exchangesir which the countries of Asia are usccl b.tlr as cLrltural or stylistic re-sources (Japonisme and Chinoiserie in the cishtccrrrl-r rrncl nineteenth cen-turies) and as testing sites for thc nrost rrclverrcccl tcclrniclues f6r thc reg-ulation of labor (frorn the tast luclia (ionrparry r. l lewlet packard).r2

Koh's awirreness of this conflictccl history hrrs contributecl to his skepri-cism about the current fascinati.n with Asierr culfrrral cxcl.range in theU.S. r,rnd European art worlcls. For I(oh this intcrcst, although ofter.r wellintended, is highly problcnratic, rrs ir crrrrics with it ccrt:rin neocokrnialrnechanisms of both cxoticizrrtiou ancl honrogcrrization. Morcover, it isoften characterized by an inaclvcrtently patronizinij irttitude on the part.f western organizers, clue to tl'rc discrepancy i' ec'nornic resourccs:rvailable to arts organizations in the \fest versus those in Asia, and South-east Asia in particular. Koh draws a parallel berween the role of power-ful institutions like the Inrernarional Monet:rry Fund in representing \(/est-ern economic inrerests in Asia (under the guise of a benevolent globalisrn)ancl the role of the powerful curatorial/critical system of the .westem artworlcl in representing European ancl Americ:rn cultural interests. He has

written criticirlly about what he calls "the scale," the "universrrl ancl iclcrrl"(and implicitly Western) standirrd er-nployecl by currrfors, rrrtists, rlrrl crifics from the United Statcs irncl F,urope thrrf trerlts rr.rr-wcsfcnr art as lit-tlc more than a s!copy" or rcflection of tcnclcrrcics rrrrrl rrrtribrrt('s thrrt arcseen as originally or more fu lly clcvcloPcrl irr Wcsrcr-n cLrltrrrrr I Precticcs.

i l

I(oh is clearly cognizatrt of thc irotcntial rlarrscls of neseti.,rr irlcl r.1ri-

ver:sality implicit in discr-rrsivc infcractiorr. At thc sryllc tilrer, r.atIer tl-ranreject a communicative aesthetic oLrt of l.rancl, hc rrttcrrpts to producernodes of inter:lcticln and erchange that can minimize these darrgers. Oneof his cerrtral concerns has been the facilitation of :rn ongoir-rg diakrgr_reilrrong Asian artists, historians, and critics. "Cultural imperialism doesnot depend on arms or technological superiority but consists of attacl<sfr.r'n the intellectual side and fhe constant reinforcement of prejudices,,'l(.lr hirs writter.r. 'A lot of Asian people reinforce this way of thinking.'Ihcy

are educated in the wesr, blindly believi.g in its total superioriryrvlrilc th.se :rt home follow the same blind faith."3a I(.h's ongoing Ne/-rt'rrk I'r.jacl involves a series of initiatives developed with artists and:il ls qf()ul)s in Barrgladesh, Myanmar, Hong l(ong, Thailand, and Tibet.'l

lrt st' irrclrrtlc c.llrrborative sponsored exhibitions, exchanges of artists.rrrtl lvlitt'r's lrt'lwt't'rr, for e xirnrplc, Cierr-nany ancl Myannrar or Thailencl,.rrr,l llrt'ot-t',:tttiz:tliott ol corrft'r't'nccs rlcvotecl to thc rlefirrifion of rrrr irr-tlt pt tttlt rrl Ast.ut rrlts pr';rtlitt.. l.,1lr lr:rs tl-:rvt lt'tl t.rl11sir,,t.ly, lrliltlirrri :r

nr'l\\'r,rl' ol torrrrttlr()n''.lnrorrli l\si.rrr,uli:,1:, ul .rrr r.llrlr l l(,l)r,,r,r,l, .rrr

ilr',lrllrlr,,n,tl.ttt.l,lir.tttrti,..tll,.til.tlir,.l,,tlr,.r,,t,,11ilil,.iltl,.t(.\l ((.(rlnoillt(,r, rvt ll :rs rrt('ll('etu:rl) irr Asilrrr :rrt :rrrtl cultur-(' :ln)()ng llrr.o;-rt,rrrr rrrtlAtttt llt:trt N( i()s, sftrtc rlecncics, critics, ancl clcalcls. I(olr lrrrs lrct'rr prrrtit rrlrrrly c()rtce rttocl to supp()rt thc enrergencc ()f an inclcpcrrclcnt critical;rl)Prrrrrtus irr Southcast Asia that can offer an alternative to thc wi.1ys inwhiclr art is valued and evaluared i' the r7est. Tb this end he clevelopecl'l'bt Other Critic (r997-99), an exchange program with critics ancl:lrtists from Bangkol<, Myanmar, irnd Dhaka University in Bangladesh.lris colLabordtion, Networking and Res<turce-sbaring project i' Myan-

'rar (zooz) has led to the fcl'lation of a new artists' communiry, the Aye-

yarwady Ar:t Assembly, and the creation of an independent art center inMyanmar.

Many of the culturai exchanges orchesrrared by or o' behalf of \flest-ern institutions ignore the specificity and complerity of local art and cul-tural production, as well as the political irnplications of the power dif-ferer-rtials between developed and strategically underdeveloped counrries,through an appeal to art as a "universal language" that rrllows peoplefrorn radically different culrures :,rncl bi,rckgrounds (e.g., the United Statesand Myanmar or Indo'esia) to icleutify s()lrle colrllnon gro'nd for inter-action. For l(oh these exchanges havc t' begi' with a frank ack^owl-edgment of existing differe'ces.'fhey rrLrst alsil i'volve a sensitivity ,nthe part of practitioners and organizcrs essociatccl with dominirnt, \rest-ern fine arts institutions to thc ways in which cxch:rnge is constrainedand struct'red by the specific c'ltural arrl p.litical context of a givencolrntry, region, or site and by tl.re broatlcr political :rnd economic inter-relationships between their respectivc corrrrtrit.s.

The problem of this aestheric "ivc'saliry 'vas

usefully illustrated inthe controversy that accornpanicd a Iriglrly pLrblicized cxhibition, "To-morrow ls Another Day," by thc IJ.S.-basccl rrrtist Rirkrit Tiravanija atcologne's I(olnischer I(u'stvcrc'irr ir rlrt' rvirrc' of r.)96-97. Tiravanijais widely viewed as an iconoclastic rrrrsiclc' wlr. cl'rallenges not only artworld conventions but also fixecl rr.ti.ns .f identity. (He was born inBuenos Aires a'd lived rn Bangl<.1< ,rrrl (.lrrrada before relocating to theU'ited States.) His installatiors rrrurssrcss clivisions between the publicand the private through rhe crcrrti.rr .f "parallel spaces" i' which he as-

sembles temporary caf6s, clirirrg r()()'sr rr'd playhouses in galleries andmLlseurns. It should he nofecl, h.wcvc'r, th:rt Tiravanija is also a highlysuccessful and sought-:rfter artist who wrlrks and teaches in New york,the very epicenter of \Testerrr cult'ral privilege. Tiravanija has been in-

vtlt'tl l. l.t t l(:ll('lris "prrrrrllcl sl):lc('s" irr uallcrics lrncl rrrtrscrrrrrs thr.orrglr-,ul l"rrroPt',rrrtl tlrr' Urritcrl Statcs, whcrc tl'rey are celebrated:rs cr-nboclirrrt'rrts of rlrt's powcr to transcend institutional and cultural bouldi,rr:iesrrrrtl ro crcrrte a Lltopiilll space of free and open exchange (of food, con-vt'rsrrtion, etc.).

lr tl'rc winter of t 996, as Tiravanija was reconstructing his New yorkrl[)irrtnlent in the Kolnischer ](unstverein as an "open space" for cook-irrg, eating, and "communal celebration," the cologne police were in theprocess of breaking up and driving our a settlement of homeless peoplenear the gallery, under pressure from a local business group called cityMarketing that was concerned about the threat the homeless would poseto tourism and gentrification in the area.35 while cologne's liberal presslauded the show as a rnodcl of "intcrcultural exchange," a number of lo-ca1 artists and activists for-rncl tl-re juxtaposition of Tiravanija's magnani-rnous spatial gesture (albeit one in which :rclnrissior.r was carefully moni-tored by a stern Hausnrcistet-) aurl thc brrrtrrlity of (brrsiness-rllotivated)police attacks on the homelcss dccply pr.oblc.rrratic.

cologne-based art activist stef:1n ltocrncr proclucccl e viclco critiqucof the erhibition (also titled Tttmorrow ls Antibcr 1)ay) thrrt incluclcdthe following dialogue: "They act as if they are bcirrg s() scr)cr()'s i.'r:rk-ir-rg this room available when they are really doing rrothire at all. Ir is ameaningless statement. At the same time they are n.r:rking this grard ges-ture fifty homeless people are being ordered to clear out their carlp anclgo. . . . [I]t fits perfectly with the rhetoric of globalism, with its empryplatitudes and its commitment to image over real change. "-t6 l(oh's protesttook the forrn of the following nlessage (in Thai), written on the frontdoor of the gallery: "N Sawi,rsdee Khrap, Nong Chail [..Greetings,younger brother," in Thail. Vrur Proccss arrt sounds good, but what aboutthe 'process' in your lThail s.cicty? Thc women and poverty?"37 V/hileTiravanija cannot be blanrccl f'r thc rttrrcks on the h.'reless comm'nirynear the gallery (or for l:rb'r c.rcliti.rs ir Thailand), his project sug-gests the challenges facecl by artisrs who clainr a cledication to clialoguebut ignore the (political, s.cial, ancl culrrrral) c.rrrcxr in which that clia-logue is situated.

F'or Koh the work of art is not sir.ply a physicirl .bject but a specificsocial process: the catalyzation of dialoguc, tlrc excl.range of ideas, andthe collective generation of new aesthetic paracligurs. Thc concept of dis-cursive exchange as an antidote to the violence of ec.nomic exchangeis elaborated rnthe ExchangingThought (rc195-96) project thar Kohdeveloped in chiang Mai, Thailand, in collaborarion with r'embers of

illi

lrlAl I'r,tr At Al ',I |l llI n Al rr,lr n I n I ,,Iit Il ,

wltrtl sltt't:rlls "lltt'rtsstllivt'lrrrtlitrorr ol srtyirrg" tlrlt lrrrs tlorrrirratcclwt'stt'r'rr Plril.s.Plry rrrrrl arr. "we havc little fanrilirrrity with what itil)L'iilrs t0 listcrr," liiurrrrra writes, because "we are... imbued with ir

lrg,cc.tric cultr.rrc in which the bearers of the word are predominatelyinv.lvcd i. speaking, molding, informing."3e It was this instrumentaliz-irg arspect clf language that modern art attempted to circumvent throughits witl-rdr:awal into .pacity and inscrutability. But Fiumara refuses to sur-render the concept of dialogue entirely; instead, she argues that we mustbegin to acknowledge the long-sr-rppressed role of listening as a creativepractice.

For Koh an art practice that privileges dialogue and communicationcannot be based on the serial imposition of a fixed formal or spatial mo-tif (as in Tiravanija's "cafes" and "lounges"). Rather, it must begin withan attempt to understand as thoroughly as possible the specific condi-tions and nuances of a given site. only then can one devise the most ef-fective and responsive forn-ral manifestirti.n, gesture, or event. For Tira-vanija this would have involved taking the time to lear:n what washappening in the neighborhood ar.urc{ the gallery in which his workwas installed or considering the symbolisu'r of stati'r-ring a guard at theentrance of an exhibit based on ideals of openness rrncl accessibility. wellbefore the enunciative act of art making, the rrra'ripr-rlatior-r rr.cl .ccupa-tion of space and material, there must be a periocl .f operness, of non-action, of learning and of listening. For Koh it is eve. more importantthat \Testern artists and institutions, for whom the "assertive traditionof saying" comes so naturally, also learn to begin by listening.

AESTHETICS AND ALTERITY

A DtALoctcAL AESTHET|7 \x/illats, wochenKlausur, and I(oh all definetheir artistic practice through the facilitation of dialogue and exchange.But what kind of dialogue is this, and what exactly makes it aesthetic?I(ant contends that in aesthetic experience our "cognitive powers are infree play. "a0 \(/hen we are no longer required to perform the onerous la-bor of testing each perception against an existing conceptual repertoire,we experience a unique liberatory pleasure. Further, in the very act ofenjoying the unconstrained and harmonious operation of our mental fac-ulties we recognize their implicit universality; we realize that everyonemust experience the world through the same basic cognitive process. Hereis the foundation of aesthetic "common sense": literallv a sense of the

,al.,r:$l$: '&i$!.

r$;

fls

FrcuRt 2.2. Jay Koh, E.T. (ExchangingThought), at pak Tuk Kong Market(November r 99 5 -January r 99 A), Chiang lia;'social f

"rt"ll "tio',lri nrrJCulture Festival, Chiang Mai, Thailand."Cou.t.ry of Jay Koh-

the group Bon Fai. ExcbangingThougbt was held in several differentpublic markets in chiang Mai over a rwo-month period and involvedbringing objects and works produced by artists from seventeen coun-tries, including Germany, Finlar-rd, Iran, Brazil, Turkey, and Eritrea,among others, to the market and offeri'g to exchange them for otherobjects brought for rrade by Iocer residents (fig. zz).lccording to theExchanging Thought catalog, these transactions ..cross cultural andprofessional differences on the basis ofrespect and equality in a processwhere the spectator becomes a participant." objects play a central rolehere as both symbols for and ernbodimenrs of a kini orequitabre ma-terial dialogue intended to chalrenge the instrumentalizing logic of theart market.38

To understand Koh's work it is necessary to shift from a concept ofart based on self-expression to one based on the ethics of communica-tive exchange. The act of establishing networks among Asian artists, wrir-ers, and activists across national boundaries is an i'tegral part ofhis artis_tic practice, constituting a lcind of "aesthetics of listening.,' The Italian;rhilosopher Gemma corradi Fiumara, in her book The other side ofLanguage, notes the etymological origins of the Greek term /ogos inlagcin: to lie with, to gather in, or ro receive. She juxtaposes thil with

oll DIALOGICAL AESTHITICS

-()nuronness of cognition itself. This knowledge is produced at two sites:

hc viewer and the object. As viewers we achieve universality by purg-

rrg ourselves of the (prototypically bourgeois) self-interest that is char-

rcteristic of our "normal" cognitive relationship to things like used cars,

:avioli, and potential employers (i.e., what can this object/person do forne? Is it a threat? Can I eat it? Can I sell it?). To perceive objects aesthet-

ically we must rise above our specific identities as subjects (our desires

lr "interests") and see things from a point of view that is universal. But

what remains of the subject once self-interest is subtracted or suppressed?

Ihe aesthetic subject functions for Kant as a kind of transcendent cipher:

rhe lineaments of a subject, awaiting the specific content of a singular

human being.

A similar fate awaits the object of aesthetic contemplation. Here we

:xperience aesthetic perception by abstracting from the specific condi-

rions of the object qua object to the object as representation, or Darstel-tung.This image acts as a kind of catalyst. seming in motion our cogni-

live operations without the practical considerations that are forced upon

us by objects in the real world. It is our reflective "apperception" of these

operations that allows us to intuit the existence of a ground for com-

munication (and potential unity) with other human beings. Kant's ac-

:ount of the aesthetic contains a radical promise: the calculating and de-

fensive individual has the capacity to become more open and receptive,

to view the world not as a resource to be exploited but as an opportunity

for experimentation and self-transformation. But this promise can be ful-filled only by robbing the object of aesthetic contemplation of its speci-

ficity and its ability to speak to us in turn. How might the position of the

viewer and the object be handled differently in the context of a dialogical

model of aesthetic experience? Is it possible to practice this sort of atti-

rude in our relationships with people rather than representations?

tlABERMA,S AND DTSCOURSE EfHlCS There are two interrelated areas in

which the definition of a dialogical aesthetic must be pursued: an inves-

tigation of speech acts and dialogue and an investigation of intersubjec-

tive ethics and identity formation. First it is necessary to shift from think-ing about discourse primarily in terms of langue, as a fixed, hierarchical

systcur of a priori meaning, to an understanding of discourse as parole

rrrrcl clirrlogr-re. The bri'rcl<eting of the speech act by the Swiss lirrguist F'cr-

rlirrancl clc Saussurc rrs rru unsr.ritable lre:'r for thc clrrborrrti<lrr <lf "sci-

('nlific" or tltcorcticrrl l<nowlcrlgc lccl to rl tcn(lency ()n tlrc prtrt of tlrosc

stlrrr'tru'rrlisl rurtl poslstrrrctrrlrrlisl thinl<t'rs wlro wrolt'rrrrtlt'r lris irrllrrcrrc'r,

DIALOGIC,AL AESTHETICS

(including figures such as Lyotard) to hypostatize langue as the essence

of discourse at the expense of any detailed cor-rsicleration of actual hu-

man dialogue.al A related set of questions circr,rlates around the ways inwhich identity is formed and transformed tlrror-rgh ()ur encounters withother subjects.

Given these concerns, I consider thc writirrg of thc (lerr-nan theorist

Jiirgen Habermas to be an important res()urcc for tlrc cleveloprnent of a

dialogical aesthetic.a2 Habermas's work or.r thc rclationslrip between hu-

man identity and communicative interaction is particr-rlarrly significant.

He differentiates "discursive" forms of cornmunication, in which mate-

rial and social differentials (of power, resources, and authority) are brack-eted and speakers rely solely on the cornpelling force of superior argu-

ment, from more instrumental or hierarchical forms of communication(e.g., those found in advertising, business negotiations, religious sermons,

and so on). These self-reflexive (albeit time-consuming) forms of inter-action are intended, not to result in universally binding decisions, butsimply to create a provisional understanding (the necessary preconditionfor decision making) among the members of a given community whennormal social or political consensus breaks down. Thus their legitimacyis based, not on the universality of the knowledge produced through dis-

cursive interaction, but on the perceived universality of the process ofhuman communication itself. Habermas seeks to preserve the Kantian

subject's ability to transcend self-interest while at rl.re same time avoid-ing the tendency, also evident in I(ant, of abstracting ethical judgment

from the specific social and material contexr within which human inter-action occurs. For I(ant ethical judgment is legitimated by an ostensibly

inherent sense of "duty" that is hard-wired into the human conscious-

ness. In a discursive scenario, on the other hand, "maxims of conduct,":rs Mark \Tarren writes, "relate to individual needs, interests and situa-ti onal commitments- "43

The encounters theorized by Habermas take place in the context ofwhat he famously defined as a "public sphere." Participants in a publicsphere must adhere to certain performative rules that insulate this dis-

crrrsive space from the coercion and inequality that constrain human com-rnunication in normal daily life. Thus, according to Habermas, "everysrrbjcct with the competence to speak is allowed to take part in discourse,""cvcryorlc is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever," "everyoneis lrllowccl to introduce any assertion whatsoeverr" and "everyone is al-Iowcrl to cxprcss his or her attitudes, desires and needs."aa This egali-

l:u'ilrrr irrtt'r'ircliorr crrltivatcs i1 sclrsc of "s<lliclarity" anr{rrrg discursive c<>-

llln I o(,1( Al Al ',Illl Il( '

l),llli(il)iltlls, wll() ilt(',:rs:r r'('slrll, "irrtirrr,rlr'ly lirrlit.tl rrr:rrr rrrlt.r'srrlr;r.rtivt'ly slr:tlt'tl lortrr ttl lift'."lt Wlrilt' tlrcrc is rro lirrrururtt.r' tlrrrt llrt.st. rrr

It't-;tctiotts will rcstrlt itt ir cottscltsus, wc n()nctlrclcss crrrlow tlrcrrr witlr rr

pr'ovisiottal rttrthority that inflr.renccs us towrtrcl rnuturrl unclcrstarrrlirrg irrrcl

lt'corrciliation. Further, the very act of participating in tlrese cxchangcsrrrrrl<cs Lls better arble to engage in discursive encounters and decision-nrrrking processes in the future.a6 In attempting to present our views to.thers, we are called upon to articulate them more systematically, to an-ticipate and internalize our interlocutor's responses. In this way we areled to see ourselves from the other's point of view and are thus, at leastpotentiallg able to be more critical and self-aware about our own opin-i.ns. This self-critical awareness can lead, in turn, to a capacity to see ourviews, and our identities, as contingent and subject to creative transfor-mation. \x/e might relate this dynamic of reflexive distancing to Stephen

\Tillats's collaborations with housing estate residents, in which the act ofproducing a work about their own environment opens a space from whichthat environment can be critically perceived and potentially transformed.

Habermas offers relatively few examples of actual discursive inrerac-tion, except in his early workThe StructuralTransformation of the public

Sphere (1962) and in his discussions of "new social movements" in ther97os.a7 \7hile I do not wanr to suggest that the dialogical projects I have

outlined in this book illustrate Habermas's discourse theory, I do believethat theory can provide one component of a larger analytic system. First,Habermas's concepr of an identity that is formed through social and dis-cursive interaction can help us understand the position taken up by figureslike \Tillats or the members of \TochenKlausur. we typically view the artistas a heroic figure, actualizing his or her will through the transformationof nature or alchemically elevating the primitive, the degraded, and thevernacular into great art. Throughour. rhe locus of expressive meaningremains the radically auronomous figure of the individual artist. A dia-logical aesthetic suggests a very different image of the artist, one definedin terms of openness, of listening (as I have already suggested with refer-ence to Jay Koh), and of a willingness to accept a position of dependence

and intersubjective vulnerability relative to the viewer or collaborator.Habermas's concept of an "ideal speech situation" captures an im-

portant, and related, aspect of these works, evident in I7ochenKlausur's"boat trips" on Lake Zurich. The collaborators in this project (the at-torneys, councilors, activists, editors, and so on who embarked on these

short journeys) were constantly called upon to speak in a definitive andcontentious manner in a public space (the courtroom, the editorial page,

l):u liiun('nr) irr wlrclr rlirrloguc wrrs vicwccl as ir c()lrtcst <lf wills. (cl.Ly.lrrrrl's rrr,clr'l ,l "agonistic" cr>mmunication.) But on the boat tripstlrt'y wcrc ablc t. speal<, and listen, not as deregates and representa-t ivt's chrr rgccl with defending a priori positions, but as individuals shar-irrg rr substantial collecrive knowledge of the subject at hand; at rhe least,llrcsc cxternal forces were considerably reduced by the demand for self-

'cfle xive amenrion created by the ritual and isolation of the boat trip it-

sclf. Moreover, the consensus they reached on a response to the drug prob-lc'r'r in zuich was intended, not as a universally applicabl. ,ol,riio'tothc drug crisis as a whole, but rather as a pragmatic response ro a veryspecific aspect of that problem-the homelessness experienced by pros_titutes. In his book Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy (rggg),I(en Hirschkop argues for the ongoing relevance of Bakhtin's work forcontemporary politics, focusi'g .n his concept of a ,,redemptive

inter,subjectivity."a8 Hirschkop's analysis bears crirectly on the *"y i'which\wochenKlausur was able to creafe a physicar and psychological .,frarne,,

around the boat talks, setti.g them apart fr.m daily conversation andallowing the participants to view dial.gre

'ot as a t.<ll but as a process

of self-transformation. This "ethical dimensi.n " of largu:rge , Hirschkopwrites,

does not so much add depth to the space a'd time of language as reor.derour sense of what it means to participate in it. It is the dilerxion we blotout when we respond to language as "practically interested transrnission,',letting our immediate and individuar needs brind us to those questionswhich are most sharply posed by our intersubjective situation, our'eedi-ness and ultimate vulnerability, the role of the future, and the recognitionof others in determining the meaning of our actions.ae

Habermas's concept of discursive interaction suggests that there aretwo key differences betwee. a dialogical and a conventional model ofaesthetic experience. The first differe'rce concerns claims of universal-ity. Early modern philosophers rejected the idea of an aesthetic consensusachieved through actual dialogue or c.nsurtatio, with other human sub-jects because it would fail to provide a sufficie.tly',objective" or uni-versal standard of judgment. (It was feared that the bulk of society was,as yet' incapable of rational thought.) In large measlrre this was due tothe fact that philosophers such as I(ant and Hurne were writing in theepistemological shadow of a declining, but stilr resonant, theorogicarworldview. As a resulr, the philosophical systems that hoped to comperewith this perspective tended to simply replace one form of reassuringly

lrln I r{,t( At At ,,lIl lt(

lrln t {}(,t( n t At ,.|il ltr

lr,urs(('n(l('nl ;trrllrolity ((iotl) witlr;rrrollrt.r.(rt.,rson,.\(,,r/.\//.\ (()ututuut.\,r'tt.). A tlr:rlogicrtl rrt.stltctic, lor its l'rirr.l, tlot's rrol t.lrrirrr to Pt.ovitlt., orlt'tlttit't', tlris l<irttl ol- trltivcrsalor olrjcctivc lourrtlrrtiorr. l{rrtlrcr, it is basccl

.rr tlrc gcrrcration of a local c()nsensual l<nowlcclgc thrrt is only provi-si.nally birrding and that is grounded instead at the Ievel of collectivein tcrrrction.

Thus the insights rhat emerge from willats's collaborations with es-

tate residents are not presented as enduring truths applicable to all people(as is the case in accounts of the transhistorical aesthetic power of Greeksculpture or the synesthesia evoked by the paintings of Kandinsky orKlee). The underlying assumption here is that it is possible to engage incommunicative interaction across boundaries of difference without thelegitimating framework of a universal discursive system because the nec-essary framework is established through the interaction itself. of coursewe must be realistic about the fallibility of discursive exchange. Like Haber-mas's "ideal speech situarion," the model of a dialogically produced iden-tity I am elaborating is something that these projects tend toward orapproximate, rather than reproduce. At the same time, it is necessary tobelieve that people are at least potentially capable of entering into discur-sive exchange without immediately succumbing to rhe snares of negationand self-interest.

The second difference between a dialogical and a conventional modelof the aesthetic concerns the specific relatio.ship between identity anddiscursive experience. In conventional aestl'retic experience, the subject isprepared to participate in dialogue tl-rrough an essentially individual andphysical experience of "liking." It is o.ly rrftcr passing through the pr'-cess of aesthetic perception that one's crrpacity for discursive interacrionis enhanced (i.e., one's sensory encounter with the work of art makes onemore open-minded or receptive in future social inreracrions). In a dialogicalaesthetic, on the other hand, subjectivity is formed througb discourse andintersubjective exchange itself. Discor-rrsc is

'r.r simply a tool to be used

to communicate an a priori "content" with .ther already formed subjectsbut is itself intended to model subjectivity.

This brings us to a complex point rcgrrrcling the specific way in whichHabermas defines discursive interacri... Several possible criticisms ofHabermas's model relate to the bracketi'rg of power differentials amongspeakers that is a precondition for participation in the public sphere.Habermas tends to underestimate the extent to which the competencenecessary to participate in discourse is itself produced by forms of ma-terial and social power. Thus his account fails to explain how the ef-

It'r'ls.l tullru,rl ol sylrrb,lic capitrrl rulrol)g privilcgccl spcirl<crs, or.oflrt'gt'rrr,rric rr'clcls .f langr-ragc a'd rhetoric, can be prevented from bi-rrsi.g rliscrursc. Further, he denies discursive legitimacy to forms of com-rrrrilricatiOn (emotive, nonverbal, or gestural, etc.) that cannot be artic-ulrrtccl in tcrms of a system of argument. A second criticism, which hasl.'cc.r cleveloped from the point of view of psychoanalytic theory, involvesI {rrbermas's assumption that we are, as discursive agents, capable of bothidentifying and representing our interests in a direct and unmediatedrrtanner.5o

The most relevanr criticism of Habermas from the perspective of di,alogical art practice relares to his definition of the public sphere as a spaceof contending opinions and interests, in which the clash of forceful ar-gumentation results in a final winning position that can "compel" theassent of the other parties. Habermas's discursive participants may havetheir opinions challenged, and even chirnged, b't they enter into, and de-part from, discursive interaction as ontologically stable agents. He as-sumes that as rational subjects we resp<lnci only to the "illocutionaryforce" of the better argument, or "good reas.rrs.".5 I But why should wenecessarily respond to reason? \il/hat rnakes an argulnent..good"? rVithreference to what, or whose, standard, values, or interest is this superiorstrength or legitimacy determined? Further, what incentive do all theseforceful speakers have to suspend their suasive campaigning in order tosimply listen? How do we differentiate an assent won by rhetorical at-trition from true understanding?

This is why I consider Fiurnara's philosophy of listening to be impor-tant. A related concepr emerges in attempts to define a feminist modelof epistemology. In their study Women's \Xlays of IGowing (ryg6), MaryField Belenky and her co-authors identify what they rerm "connectedknowing," a form of knowledge based, not on counterpoised arguments,but on a conversational m'de in which each i'terlocutor works to iden-tify with the perspective of tl.re .thers. t2 This "procedural" form of knowl-edge is defined by two interrelated ele.rents. First, it is concerned withrecognizing the social context from which others speak, iudge, and act.Rather than hold them accountable to sonrc ideal or generalized stan-dard, it attempts to situate a given discursive statement in the specificmaterial conditions of the speaker. This involves a recognition of thespeaker's history (the events or conditions that preceded the speaker'sinvolvement in a given discursive situation) and his or her position rela-tive to modes of social, political, and cultural power both within the dis-cursive situation and outside it (thereby acknowledging the operative

DIAI OGICAI AFSTHFTICS

lolcc of forrns of social domination th:rt are ostensibly bracl<eted-and

lrt'rrcc disregarded-in the Habermasian public sphere). Thus a speal<er

with a r"nastery of grammar, vocabulary, and rhctoric enhanced by a privi-

lcge d education would communicate very differer-rtly from a speaker with-()r-rt such advantages. This does not mean th:lt the insights of the less ed-

rucated are any less valid, only that they n.ray require a different form oflistening.

The second characteristic of connected knowilrg involves the redefi-

nition of discr-rrsive interaction in terms of elnpathetic identification.

Rather than enter into communicative exchange with the goal of repre-

senting "self " through the advancement of already formed opinions and

judgments, a connected knowledge is grounded in our capacity to iden-

tify with other people. It is through empathy that we can learn not sim-

ply to suppress self-interest through identification with some putatively

universal perspective, or through the irresistible compulsion of logical

argument, but literally to reclcllne self: to both knr>w and feel our con-

nectedness with others. Again, the concept of listening is central to a con-

nected l<nowledge. In a follow-r-rp volume to Vlomen's'Way of Knowing

(Knowl e d ge, D iffer ence dnd P ow er, r 9 9 6), Patrocinio Schweickart notes

Habermas's tendency to "overvalue" argumentation as a form of knowl-

edge production and his inability to rccognize that listening is as active,

prodr-rctive, ar-rd complex as speaking: "ITlhere is no recognition of the

necessity to give an account of listening as doing something. . . . [T]helistener is reduced in Haben-nas's theory to the minimal quasi-speaking

role of agreeing or disagreeing, silently saying yes or no."53

EMPATHETTC /ivS/GHr tN LACY AND MANGLANO-O7ALLE The ry99 killings

in :r Littleton, Colorado, high school by two troubled teenagers occa-

sioned an outpouring of vitriol against the young men and against a deca-

dent or permissive culture that could have encouraged them to cornrlitthis heinous act. \fhat was neglected in this response was the extent to

wlrich the social er-rvironment of the high school itself, with its rigid hi-

crirrclries, casual violence, fear of difference, and vindictiveness, piayed

rr rolc in their actions. Although economically and racially priviiegccl,

tlrcsc younu men were also largely ostracized from the school's clr.rnrr-

niurI cultrrrc; thcy werc ror-rtinely beaten, forced to walk thc halls with

tlorvrrc:rst cycs, ancl rttacl<cd as "faggots" by the school's ostcrrsibly rrn

llorrlrlt'tl clitc.'l lris trcrlturcnt clocs rrot justifv thcir rrctiorrs, l)ut wc crur

not lropt'1o urttlt'r-st;ttttl tlrt'rttt'rurittri ol tlrcst'rtcts (;trrtl ltorv lo I)r-('v('r1t

llr,rr rr',rrttcntt)r'rrillrotrl,rr'l.tt,,n,l...ll,,irr1',itstllttts.Alllooolltn()ur'(ul

DIALOG CAL AESTHETICS lt

ture indulges in an entirely punitive mc'tarity t.ward those wh, rrcdefined as different (s.mething thar is everi more painfully eviclent in rhcgeneral public indifference ro the brur:rlizing impact of ,.law

and orde r,,initiatives and prison expansi'n in the United Str,rtes). \fe seem to havelargely lost the capacity for empathy, for inragirg ourselves (or our cir-cumstances) as differe't from who wc rlrcr (,r what tlrey ar:e). Tlris identi-fication can never be co'rpletc-wc crrl rrcvcr clirir-r-r to fully inhabit theother's subject position; but wc carr irrrrgi.c it, arcr this imagination, thisapproxirnation, can r:rclically rrltcr orrr scnsc of who we are. It can be-come the basis for comtnunicatiotr ancl unclerstanding across differencesof r:tce, sexuality, ethnicity, ancl so or-r.

E*pathy is subject t' its .wr kirrcl of ethicar :rbuse-the arroganceof speaking for others-which I wiil examine in the next chapter. How-ever, I also feel that a c.nccpt clf empathetic insight i. n ,r...rr,rry com-ponent of a dialogical aesthetic. Further, I would contend that the pro-cess of collaborative production that occurs in the works I am discussi'g(involving both verbal and bodily interaction) can help to generate thisinsight while at rhe sarle tirne allowing f.r a discursive e"change thatcan acknowledge, rather than exile, tlre nonverb:rl. Loraine Leeson, inher work witlr no'r-F,nglish-speaki'rg str-rdents <:tn \xlest Meets East, de-scribes the i'rportance of collaborative exche'ge frarnecl around imagesand objects. ("[Rlight from the beginni'g you rrave access ro rayers ofembedded mea'ings, and [you] d'n't exclude rh.sc wh'are less confidentor proficie't in langr-rage.")'5a Ernpathetic insight can be pr:oduced alo'gil series of axes. The first occurs in tire r:app.rt between artists and theircollab.rators, especially in those situations in which the artist is work-irg across boundaries

'f race, eth'icity, gender, sexuality, or class (in

Stephen \willats's projecrs, for exarnpre). These relationships can be quitedifficult to neg.tiate equitably, as the artist .ften .perat.. n, or. .utsider,

'ccupying a position of perceived c'ltural authority. The second axis of

cmpathetic insight occurs arxong the collaborirtors themselves (with orwithout the mediati'g figure of the artist). Dialogical projects can en-h:rnce solidarity among individuals who arready ,hn.. n set of materialand cultural circumsrances (e.g., work with rrade unions by artists sr-rcl.r

as Fred Lo'idier in clalifor.ia or carole concl6 and I(arl Bevericlge i.olnaclir). The final axis is produced between the collaborators a'd'thcrc,rilntrnitics of viewers (often subsequent to the actu:rl procluctio, .lrr gi'cr Prrjcct). l)ial'gicirl w.rks can challcngc cr.'ri.rrrt rcr)r(,sr,rtrl(iotts ol :t rlivt'lt cottttttttltity:trrcl crclttc:.1 nr()r'c colrrplt,r rrntlt,r-stlrrrtlirli,1, rurtl ( n)l):rrllv lor, tlr:rr tonrrrrurrir\, :un()n1,, ,t lr.r,:rtlt.r. p1lrli,. Ilr,.s,.

llr, l)ln I {,{,1( n I Al ,, I llt I t( '

tlrrt t ltttt(li()tls solitl,rlity ctt':ttiott, solitlrrr-rty t'rrlrlrrr.t.rrrt.rrt, ;urtl llrt.t'rrnlt'r'lrt'13t'rrorric-seltlorn cxist irr isolation. Arry givt'rr Projcct will ryPi-t:rIIy opcrrrtc irr rrrultiplc rcgisters.

'l'hc work of Slrzanne Lacy and T.E.A.M. (Teens + Educ:rtors + Artists+ Mcclia) provides a useful example of collaboratively generated empa-thctic insight.The Roof Is on Fire (the project in oakland that I discussed

in thc introduction) provided the students with a space from which tospeak to each other and to a broader audience (whether the audiencethat actually attended the performance or the viewing public that sawcoverage of the piece in the local and national media) that functioned as

a rhetorical stand-in for a dominant culture that is far more comfortabletelling young people of color what to think than it is with hearing whatthey have to say. The process of active, creative listening is evident bothin Lacy's extensive discussions with the students in developing the proj-ect and in the attitude of openness encouraged in the viewer/overhearerby the work itself.55 This project generated empathetic understanding be-

tween Lacy and young people from quite different cultural backgrounds(and among the young people thernselves). At the same time, it provideda space for identification between the stlldents and the viewers of thework.

An issue that repeatedly en"rerged dr-rring the rooftop dialogues in thisproject was the conflict between young people of color and the Oaklandpolice. As a follow-up to the performance, [.acy organized a series of dis-cussions between police and high school stuclcnts tl.rat extended over sev-

eral weeks. Her goal was to create a *".rfc'

cliscr-rrsive space (reminiscentof WochenKlausur's boat trips) in whiclr yoLmg people could speak hon-estly to the police about their fears ancl concerns and in which both po-lice and young people could begin to iclcrrrify with each other as indi-viduals rather than abstractions (the "gangst:..r" or the "cop"). Accordingto Lacy, "The changes in body larrguirgc <>f the ten officers and fifteenyouth who met weekly over two months nrarked a transition from stereo-types to dimensional personalities. I founcl rny own perceptions chang-ing as I encountered police ir-r cars ancl younll pe ople in baggy jeans. lWere

they one of my friends, someone I krrow?" This dialogue was followedup by No Blood/No Fowls, a "baskctball ganre as performance" berweenOakland Police and young people thirr combined video, interviews withplayers, dance, and a sound track to cxplore "how differences and con-flicts can be examined without violerce." Lacy subsequently worked withthe city of oakland to develop an c)aklir'd Youth Policy addressing issues

l)lAl r(,1( Al At',|il lt(

ol "ltotttt', lrcrtlth rrrttl sitlcty, r'rlucatiorr arrcl cntploynrcnt, lceclcrship arrcl

tltt:rlts."\(''l'hc "(lr-rlture in Action" exhibition organized by Sculpture Chicago

tltrrirrg 1,2.12 and r993 featured a number of projects concerned with thegcncration of empathetic insight. Curated by Mary Jane Jacob,

.,Culture

ir Acti.n" was a landmark in the development of dialogically based artpractice rn the United states, bringing broader public attention ro a.rrisrs

and groups that had been working in this manner for a number of years.JT

A "Culture in Action" project by Inigo Manglano-Ovalle in Chicago,slargely Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Central American \fest Town neigh-borhood relates directly to the modes of empathetic insight that I outlineilabove. Manglano-Ovalle, who lives in \7est Town, began by proposing a

project that would reclaim the neighborhood's social spaces from thethreat of gang violence. Sereno/Tetulia tnvolved a system of outdoorbenches and streetlights intended to encourage the re-creation of the LatinAmerican tradition of tetulia: rhe comrnunal gathering of neighbors ontheir porches and steps to socialize in the evenings. As Manglano-ovalleworked on this project, he came to realize that the influence of gang cul-ture on the neighborhood had to be addressed more directly. The gangs

were not simply a pathological excrescence on the West Town commu-nity. Rather, they performed a positive function, providing a sense of sol-idarity, collective identification, and respect for young people whose pos-sibilities in life were severely restricted by racism, poverty, and spatialsegregation. Unfortunately, these emotional rewards were won at the costof a self-destructive and violent conflict between rival gangs, each seek-

ing to define itself in opposition to the other.

Manglano-Ovalle decicled to clcvelopr a project tlrat would encoLrrage

empathetic identification betwccrr garrg nrcr.nbcrs ar-rcl neighborhoocl res-

idents across both generational arrcl cultrrral b'urclarics. v7<rrking in col-laboration with \wells High School, lrnrcrsor.r FIousc (ionrnrunity center,Erie Neighborhood House, and Clourrnr.rnity'l'clcvision Nctworl<, he pro-posed the formation of a video crllectivc witlr tlrc inrcrtion of bringingthe members of different gangs together tlrrough rhe process of docu-menting and representing the \West Town corlnrunity. Hc hoped to leadthe various gang factions to envision themselvcs as part of a larger com-munal entity. The collective was named Street l.evel Video (SLV), andtheir firstpro ject,Tele-Vecindario, involved inrerviewing residents of theneighborhood in order to develop an imaginative map of Xfest Town.Tapes were screened at Emerson House and were also shown on a Chi-

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

crrllo cable access station. Tele-Vecindario evolved into a subsequent

pr<rject called Cul de Sac, featuring a block party, a street parade, out-

cloor video installations in neighborhood front yards, murals, and a video

rnemorial (Rest in Peace)with tapes devoted to victims of gang violence.

A crucial component of Cwl de Sac was the process of negotiating among

rival gangs in order to secure spaces to insrall television monitors and

contacting neighborhood residents to provide the electricity to run them.

This kind of collaborative and cooperative interaction was imporratrt in

helping to create new forms of identification among gang members and

the residents. The SLV collective continues to operate in Chicago (as Street

Level Youth Media) with a wide and growing range of programs.5s This

"afterlife," which was also evident in Lacy's work with youth policy in

Oakland, is an important feature of dialogical proiects.

CONCLUSION: LEVINAS, BAKHTIN, AND PERFORMATIVE IDENTITY

The artists I have discussed above begin their work not with the desire

to express or articulate an already formed creative vision but rather, as

Fiumara has suggested, to listen. Their sense of artistic identity is suffi-

ciently coherent to speak as well as listen, but it remains contingent upon

the insights to be derived from their interaction with others and with oth-

erness. They define themselves as artists through their ability to catalyze

understanding, to mediate exchange, and to sustain an ongoing process

of empathetic identification and critical analysis. I want to conclude by

briefly discussing the broader philosophical implications of this approach,

especially as they relate to issues that will emerge in my analysis of dia-

logical projects in the final chapter.

In his study Alterity Politics: Ethics and Performatiue Swbiectiuity

(tgg8), Jeffrey T. Nealon examines the constitution of subjectivity in

terms of communicative interaction, focusing on Mikhail Bakhtin's

model of "dialogical" experience and Emmanuel Levinas's concept of

"responsibility." In each case there is an insistence on preserving the "ir-reducible element in human contact" that resists co-optation by a more

general or abstract conceptual power. Thus our capacity for ethical (and

orre nright also say aesthetic) judgment derives not from the heady van-

tagc point of some transcendent subiectivity but from a given "dialogi-

cal sitr-ration in all its concrete historicity and individuality."se F'or [-c-

vinrrs rrncl llakl-rtirr <>ur willingness to interact in an cthical nrilrurcl'with

othc'rs is rrot flrc rcsrrlt of sorlc lrbstrirct scnsc of cluty; r:rthcr, rtccorclirrg

to Nt':rlon, "t'irclr ol tlrcrrr rrlgrrcs tlrrrt cfhics is cottstittttivt'ly lirrkt'tl ttr

DIALOGiCAL AESTHETICS 119

corporeality, the direct experience of 'lived' tirre and place, and our af-

fective and meaningful relationship with concrete others."60 Levinas de-

scribes intersubjective ethics in terms of the corrcrctc rcality of the other

experienced through a "face to face" encounter.('l This "corporeal" in-teraction is central to a dialogical aesthetic. lt is cviclcrrt in works such

as Mierle Laderman Ukeles's Touch Sanitatirm (19llo), arr cxrended per-

formance in which the artist personally shool< hancls wirh, arrcl thanl<ed,

more than 8,5oo sanitation worl<ers front thc Ncw Ylrl< (iity l)epart-ment of Sanitation. Her intentiolt wils to publicly acl<nowlcclge, tlrroughdirect physical contact, the positivc valuc of worl< that is ofterr either ig-

nored or disparaged as unclean.('2

Levinas and Bakhtin r>ffer alternatives to the violent mastery of con-

ventional Cartesian identity while still preserving a framework that al-

lows the subject to exercise solrre agency in the world. However, Nealon

contends that Bakhtin's model is unable to entirely avoid the instru-mentalizing tendencies of conventional reason. While Bakhtin describes

a subjectivity that is formed through dialogical interaction, the ultimategoal of this interaction is the expansion of the authoring subject, forwhom the other remains a mere vehicle. Bakhtin's subject, "like Odys-

seus," as Nealon observes, "returns home from erperience each time

and finds itself changed and enriched, more open ro its own possibili-

ties as it travels through different worlds of Otherness. . . . In the end,

what is important is authoring my text: the story of my 'independence,

internal freedom, unfinalizability and indeterminacy.''63 According toLevinas, in contrast, we should expect no ontological "payoff" fromour encounter with the other. Rather than conceive of ethics as a set ofbehavioral guidelines to be followed by an already formed subject, Le-

vinas views ethics itself as "first philosophy." For Levinas our very ca-

pacity to identify ourselves as subjects is a gift ro us from the other. As

Nealon suggests, " [T]he ineluctable experience of the other is the found-

ir-rg of selfhood. . . . My ability to think, act, and resist [is] literally fromand for the other."64

Levinas suggests a form of identity that can encounter otherness not

as an opportunity for transcendence (the "imperialism of the ego," as he

dcscribes it) but as a precondition for agency and subjectivity itself, lead-

irrg to a kind of "serial epiphany" that can result in "openness" to the

otl'rcr rirther tl-ran defensiveness and fear.6s According to Nealon, it is Le-

virras's rrltnristic concern with "concrete" others that differentiates himlr'orrr llal<htiu, for whom, clialogics notwithstanding, the other still func-

liorrs irs rr vt'lrrr'lc lor scll-rcrrlizrrtiorr.('r' But Ncalon overlooks a significirnt

DIALOGICAL AESTHETICS

tt'rrsiOtt in l,evinas's account of the other' Levinas does seem to focus on

rhc ruaterial specificity of the other. (Experiences such as "the cafess"

rtnd the .,face to face" encounter play a central role in his work.) I-evinas

fears that this specificity will be s:rcrificed by conventional reason' which

seeks to impose an a priori conceptLlal framework on the potentially

infinite .o-ple*ity of the other. Hcrc thc "I" sees the other as a mere re-

Source' seel<ing in it a reflection, and cclnf]rrnatitln, of self. But to irvoid

this sort ,rf .on..ptunl violence, thc Lcvinasiar-r sr:biect is precluded from

communicating with the other (the act of coultr.tt-tt.ticetion assurnes that

the other occupies a provisionally linite point of elocutionary authority

and receptivity) or, in fact, from having any "krlowledge" of the other

atall(whichwould,again,requirefixingtheother'sidentitywithindeter-minant conceptual or descriptive limits)'

The other is less an interlocutor for Levinas than an intuition: an amor-

phous and undifferentiated event about which we can know nothing and

t.for. which the only forrn of "communication" we can risk is the mute

gesture of submission. Language' as such, is less the basis for reciprocal

.".hnng. between self anJother than a kind of "prayer" or supplica-

tion, in response to which the "I" can expect or enticipate no answer.67

Infact,..reciprocity''itselfisanathema,asitcouldopenthedoortoaninterested or calculating relationship in which we would expect some-

thing from the other in ,.t.rrr-, for our submission before it.68 Even the

,.face to face,, encounter is defined by a necessary temporal disjunction

between the self and the other (it is a "relation without relation," as

Levinas writes), who ciln never be "contemporaneous" with each

other.('e It is particularly interesting to note the opposition that Levinas

establishes between "rhetorical" and "ethical" language. Rhetoric is dis-

paraged because it implies a form of persuasior-r (and hence manipula-

tio,-,iof the other, whiie ethical language is not really language at all (in

the conventional sense) but an act of "saying" directed to an unknown,

and unknowable, interlocutor.T0 Here Levinas recapitulates a fear of dis-

course that has borne the name of kitsch, theater, and now "rhetoric"

(while also echoing Barnett Newman's concept of art as "an address to

thc r-tnl<uown" )'71

Arry cliscursive exchange between self and other raises the dreadecl ptls-

sibility tl.rat the self rnight rnake demands on the other, n-right expcct s()lllc

0rrtic.Prryofi,r|. 1-r"rr,,nr.l gain from thcir etrcotttltcr. As rr rcsttlt, :rlltl itr

(.()1lt-rl(lislilctilrt t<> ltis c6lcr-:rrr witl'r sllccitlcity, tlrc tttllt'l't:tlit's ott lltl

.rlrrrosl lrrt.lrrPlrl,sitlrl slil(US irr l.r'r,ittlts's rvl-itirl1". lt is ltss {ltt ollttt rts:t

ronitrlt ttlti(t sllrr.rlttl trr sl)il((':lll(l litrlt lll'ttr it istllt ttlt t ol llrt olltr'l

DIALOGlCAL AESTHETICS

or of otherness and alterity that concerns hinr. (lonsiclcred from another

perspective, then, Levinas is n9 less guilty tllrrr llal<l.rtin 6f treating the

other as an abstracticln. Moreover, thc othcr is tto lcss sr-rbject to the in-

strumentalizing desire of the self, which rccltrilcs tltt' of hcr ill ofder to es-

tablish its own identity as an ethical str[ricct. l.cvirres's problcmatic re-

lationship to the material specificity ol'tht'olht'r-, lris "llistorictrl and

genealogical deracination," as f-Llcc lrigrlrrry tlt'strilrt's it' is cvitlcrlt in his

treatment of the feminine other, wlriclr lunc(i()ns rts ,t "1.rst'tttlo-rtrtitual-

istic" foil for an ir-rtrinsically "ttrescttlittt"' strbicct. \Wotttrttt is that which

is subject to love (belovecl, <'tr dirtric) bttt ltot th:lt wlrich is capablt: of

love in turn. The fen'rininc in l.cvirras, :ts Iligrlray writcs, "docs llot strrlld

for an other to be resl'rcctecl irr hcr lrurrtatt frccclotrt ,rncl httm,rtl iclcrrtity.

The feminine othcr is lcft withottt hcr owtt spccific f:rce."72

These questiols 9f agcncy lcircl tg a relatecl issue. What is the status

of the self and the sclf-other: relationship as ourlined by l.evinas? Is he

describing the actual process through which we encounter difference or

an ideal form of intersubiective experience tgward which we shor-rld

strive? Or is this meant to be an account of the way in which we would

"naturally" approach otherness were it not for the destructive oltolog-

ical conditioning imposed on us by \X/estern tradition?7:r Does the "T" in

f:rct require the presence of the other as a catalyst to achieve this form

of ethical insight? Nealon speaks of encounters with thc other as "scri:rl

epiphanies." But wh:rt happens in those periorls bchucen ()tlr enc()ullters

with otherness? Do we relapse ir-rt<t egoisn'r ancl c<thcrerrcc? or afe we

simply awaiting a single self-transfortttins cucottttter with thc othcr that

will catapult us, once and for all, intg rr rccggtliti1;rl gf thc "wgncler of

the infinite"?7a Further, how can one tal<e up a position of responsibility

to rhe other without some understancling of its social specificity? Simply

stating that the "I" is defined by a pr:ior sense of obligation to the other

does not tell us what kinds of subiectivity or agency rnight be suhsecluently

mobilizcd on the basis of this responsibility.Ts FIow can we evaluate the

relative benefit or harm caused by our acti<lns on the other's behalf with-

out some way in which to interact with, and learn from, it discursively?

ln short, what would a Levinasian practice look like? This confusion is

cxrrcerbatecl by the fact that Levinas provides few concrete examples of

rhc l<irrcls of interactions he describes.'l lrcr.c appcrrrs to be no possibility in Levinas's analysis that the en-

(()unt(,r'with othcrttcrss conlcl in fact lerrd the self away from tl.re blan-

tlislyrrt.rrls ol rnrrstt'r'y anrl "cgo inrpcrialism" it't sttbsccltrent cllcoLltlters

n,ltlr.r 1t()l(.(()1(t(.(('ilrlt'r'l6crtt6l'.'l'ltt'6tlrt; tttttsl t'ttlr.titt l-t;.l.cttrlrlly

lllrI

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l,r'\'r,rrtl tlisrrrlsivt,r.t'rrr.lr,;rntl tlrt,st,ll rrrust lrt,tlt.rrit.rl llrt,rrst.()l lilrlluilll(.'ttttl t'vt'tt lt'tttP.l'itl c()('\istctcc with thc ()tll..r,()w arrcl f'rcvcr. l. his,rr rrr lysis ,l: tlrc crrr vcrrti.rrr l ()clysscar sr-rbjcct, Nealon clescribes ir pr()cessby which thc i.clctcrmi'ate "excess" of otherness (the infinite cornplex-ity ,f thc self that lies beyond discourse) always ,,accrues,,to

the vam,pi'clikc self at the expense of the other; the ,,I,, emerges from its encounterwith alterity ontologically enriched, more compler, und more expansive,while the other is drained of its materiar specificity

""d ,J;;;ro p"l.

absrracrion. The only way to avoid this o.rr.o*. is to eliminate discur_sive interaction entirely. Flere again, we have the characteristic opposi-tion between discourse and countercliscourse: an unforgiv_, irrrrru_mentalization (defined by rhetoricar manipulatio') on th. 1.,. hand andthe total proscription of intersubjective e*change on the other.

Nealon's analysis assumes a kind of zero-surn economy in which theprediscursive "excess" must be accumulated by a single p"rti.ifnrrt, .i-ther the odyssean self or the other (which becomes, for Levinas, a repos-itory of ontic richness and mystery, even as the self is abased before it).Excess thus takes the form of an ontological currency that can only be"spent" by an individual subject rather than shared between the self andthe other' But Bakhtin argues that dialogical exchange can have preciselythis reciprocal effect: that the result of a dialogical encounter i, to up.r,both participanrs to the "excess" that is made possible by the provisionarblurring of boundaries between self and other. This reciprocar, rather thansacrificial, view of inrersubjectivity is essentiar to a drarogical aesthetic.Rather than seek indeterminateness ancr excess in an object that resistsconceptual classification (as in the traditions of modern nrrd port-od.r.formalism) or in an epistemologically sequestered other (Levinas's other-beyond-discourse), Bakhtin will locate ii ln the a- of dialog.r. itr.lf,

",the u'expected insights achieved via colraborative interactl' p.odrr..new forms of subjectivity. As with Nealon's criticism of Bakhtin, the dia-logical artist will find his or her identity "enriched,, or expanded throughcollaborative inreraction, but so, arguably, wiil his or her coilaborators.Is it possible ro conceive of this ontic payoff not as a singular possessionto be won or lost at the expense of another but as a collectively realizedevent?

Nealon's criticism of the nomadic odyssean subject is useful (I willdevelop a related analysis in chapter 4), and in fact we can locare con-crete examples of it in community-based practices in which the artist func,tions as a kind of tourist of the disempo*..ed, traveling from one siteof poverty and oppression to the ,r."i nrrd allowing his"or her various

lrl/\ I r)r,lr Al Al ',I lll I '

t oll;rlrolrrlor.s t() t('nrporarily inhir[rit thc privilcgecl position of thc cx-prt'ssivc cr'('1ll()r. llut wc also ncecl a way to understand how identity mightr'lrrrrrgc ovcr tintc-r.rot through some instantaneous thunderclap of in-sig,lrt but throngh il more subtle, and no doubt imperfect, process of col-It'ctivcly gerrerated and cumulatively experienced transformation passing

t h lougl.r phases of coherence, vulnerability, dissolution, and recoherence.'l'his seems to me much closer to the spirit of the projects that I am dis-

cussir-rg here. If Levinas reminds us of the pervasive power of "egoicity"in our relationships to others, Bakhtin holds out the hope that this ten-

clcncy can be undone by something other than mute supplication.

Ultimately it may not be possible to square the circle between Levinas

and Bakhtin, between the dangers of domination and the demands ofagency and sociality, and perhaps it is not necessary to do so. The con-

stant trumping of ontological purity (the c{rive to rnove philosophy for-ward by devising more and more elaborate systems for defining a sub-ject entirely purged of the capacity for ontological negation) faces the

law of diminishing returns. While it is important ro locatc ethical rnod-

els for intersubjective experience, it is also necessary, at least for my in-

vestigation here, to bring these models into some strategic relationship

to the quotidian practice of human interaction. It is in the nature of di-

alogical projects to be impure, to represent a practical negotiation (self-

reflexive but nonetheless compromised) around issues of power, identity,

and difference, even as they strive toward something more. In the remain-

ing chapters I will exarnine these negotiations in greater detail, explor-ing the complex relationships that unfold within them between empathy

and negation, domination and dialogue, and self and other.

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