Dialectic of Salvation

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title: Dialectic of Salvation : Issues in Theology of Liberation

author: Min, Anselm Kyongsuk.

publisher: State University of New York Press

isbn10 | asin: 0887069088

print isbn13: 9780887069086

ebook isbn13: 9780585059273

language: English

subject Liberation theology.

publication date: 1989lcc: BT83.57.M55 1989eb

ddc: 261.8

subject: Liberation theology.



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Dialectic of Salvation

Issues in Theology of Liberation

Anselm Kyongsuk Min

State University of New York Press



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blished byate University of New York Press, Albany

1989 State University of New York

rights reserved

inted in the United States of Americao part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoeverthout written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied tical articles and reviews.

r information, address State University of New York ess, State University Plaza, Albany, NY 12246

brary of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Datan, Anselm Kyongsuk, 1940-alectic of salvation: issues in theology of liberation/Anselmyongsuk Min.cm.

bliography: p.cludes index.

BN 0-88706-908-8. ISBN 0-88706-909-6 (pbk.)Liberation theology. I. Title.

T83.57.M55 198961.8dc19 88-39150

CIP

0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



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Theology and Solidarity 53

The Disclosive Function of Solidarity 53

Three Models of Solidarity 54

Dialectic of Magisterium, Avant-garde, People 56

The Hermeneutic Circle 58

The Socio-analytic Mediation 58

Scripture and Historicity 61

The Hermeneutic Mediation 65

Responses to Critics 68

Transcendence, Existence, History 68

The Poor as Concrete Universal 70

Praxis as Transcendental Horizon 72

Limits of Pure Reason 75

. Dialectic of Salvation and Liberation 79

Criticisms of Theology of Liberation 80

The Vatican 80

Stanley Hauerwas 83

John B. Cobb, Jr. 84

Dialectic of Salvation and Liberation 84

Transcendence and History: Charge of Reductionism

85

Three Dimensions of Liberation: TheirDistinction

91

Three Dimensions of Liberation: Their Relation 97

Dialectic of Social and Personal Sin 104



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. The Signs of the Times and the Future of eology: Concluding Reflections

157

The Signs of the Times 157

Towards a Foundational Theology of Concrete

Totality163

otes 171

eferences 193

dex 201



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reface

ost of the research for this book was done during my sabbatical year (19885) at Vanderbilt University. I thank its graduate department of religion f

e financial assistance that made my stay at Vanderbilt possible, and itseology faculty, especially Peter Hodgson, Eugene TeSelle, Sally McFague,d Edward Farley for their valuable conversations on the subject of this bogeneral and on the first drafts of some of its chapters. They are not, of urse, responsible for any inadequacies of this book.

also thank Artin Arslanian, my dean at Belmont Abbey College, for hisnstant encouragement and support, and my colleagues on the Faculty

evelopment Committee for finding my project worth supporting by partiallbsidizing my sabbatical leave and funding my research and writing duringree successive years (1985, 1986, 1987).

acknowledge my debt to Professor Paul Lakeland of Fairfield University ane anonymous reviewer for their critical comments on the first version of th

ook. They should know that their suggestions were extremely helpful,though I have not been able to accommodate all of them.

r. William D. Eastman, director of the State University of New York Press, serves my gratitude for his friendliness, patience and promptness during ng process of publication. Also to be thanked is Bernadine Dawes, producitor at the Press, whose meticulous care in the editing process added grethe intelligibility and readability of my otherwise very awkward andnvoluted philosophical prose.

rt of chapter 2 originally appeared, under the title "The Vatican, Marxism

d Liberation Theology," in Cross Currents, 34:4 (Winter 1984-85), 43955rt of chapter 3 was published under the title "Praxis and Theology in Rec

ebates" in the Scottish Journal of Theology, 39:4 (November 1986), 5294ey have been revised for inclusion in this book. I thank the publishers of o journals for their permission to reprint the articles. I also thank the Orb

ooks for permission to quote from Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberad The Power of the Poor in History, and Clodovis Boff, Theology and Prax



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nally, for sharing the burdens of relocation during the sabbatical year andeerfully enduring the countless hours of my silence since, I thank my wife

oonja, and my two children, Jeehey and Kihong.

o all the anonymous sisters and brothers struggling on the liberation frontroughout the world, often languishing and dying in jails, I dedicate this b

ANSELM KYONGSUK MINBELMONT ABBEY COLLEGEBELMONT, NORTH CARLOLINAFEBRUARY 18, 1988



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hapter Iheology of Liberation: Issues and Challenges

story and Theology

eologies, even dominant theologies, come and go. During the presentntury alone we have seen a rapid succession of theologies, each associateth the name of its founder (Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, Rahner) or itsderlying philosophical movement or method (existentialist, dialectical,

anscendental, critical, political, process, or praxis). The pace of change is pid that one often despairs of ever being able to read, digest, and evaluaten a single movement before another appears on the scene, each with it

wn demand for serious, immediate attention. The all-too-natural temptatioder the circumstances is to dismiss all new movements in theology as soany superficial "fads" and to decide to stick with either one of the classicaeologies (Augustine, Aquinas, Eastern Fathers, Luther, or Calvin) or one oe modern ones (Barth, Tillich, Rahner, and others), with the conviction the theology of one's choice is truly enduring and "classical" in its insights.

is temptation, however, is myopic in two ways. It often assumes that

eological pluralism is something unique to our day. It forgets that even instalthough perhaps at slower pacecompetition has always existed among

ominant and emerging theologies, and that the emergence of new theologmpetition between old and new, and coexistence of different theologies hways been a fact of theological history. 1 It also assumes that there is aassical" theology, be it Thomistic, Augustinian, Schleiermacherian orrthian, which, despite its "minor" imperfections, still remains adequate anevent for all ages. This assumption is usually buttressed by the furthersumption that changes in theologyor, for that matter, in intellectual histoa wholeare solely the products of the genius and caprice of the individuanker, and that the



veloped. Any system of ideas, including theology, that seeks to servemanity must prove its power to serve and transform humanity preciselyder the changing and challenging conditions of history that constitute ansential and intrinsic dimension of human existence.

e other aspect of historicity is that history is something made by humansot something purely natural or given. The totality of sociohistorical conditio

nstituting history not only conditions the development of individuals andoups



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t is also conditioned by what humans do as individuals and groups. Histooes not just happen; it is a product of human actions, if not always of nscious human designs. If history does not always correspond to thetentions of either individual or collective actions, it is, nonetheless, a resulman actions and human purposesa result for which humans are responsi

d which they can do something to transform. Just as humans are subjecte historical conditions under which they exist, so these conditions themseo change through the contributions of individuals and groupsin the way anthe degree that their actions and intentions are coordinated and mobilize

r a common purpose.

story, then, is not a neutral and external environment of theology. Historyters into the constitution and development of theology as an intrinsic andsential condition. It provides the basic intellectual horizon that governs thrticular concepts and categories of theology as well as the challenges andsks theology sets for itself in each age. Insofar as history means change, iding horizon and agenda for theology also change with each new epochus, every theology is historically conditioned and necessarily bears the mathe age, while each age provides positive opportunities and challenges foe creativity and energy of the theologian in the endless task of making thospel concretely relevant to the present. The truths of Christian faith must

ove their universality not outside of history but precisely in the concreteanging context of each new historical epoch and thus prove themselvesncretely universal and relevant to all ages. 2

e question to raise in the face of new theologies, then, is not whether weed them or whether they are passing fads like new fashions in dress andtomobiles; rather, we need to ask, given the necessity of new theologicalsks in each age, whether they indeed address the central problems of the

e, and which of them does so in a way that is most faithful to the demane Gospel and the insights of the Christian tradition and is most adequate e urgency and magnitude of the problems posed by the age.3 This requirnstant dialectic of listening to the Word of God in Scripture and tradition scerning the signs of the times. This is a question of a real dialectic betwee past and the present, of illuminating the ambiguities and hopes of theesent in light of the Word of God, and of re-reading the Word of God in thesh light of such present challenges and tasks, not of a unilateral applicatthe wisdom of the past to the present or of the present perspective to th



st.

ne of the theologies to approach the theological task with precisely thisalectical sense of historicity is the Latin American theology of liberation (Tore than perhaps any other theology past or present, TL is self-consciouslstorical. It considers the liberation of the poor and oppressed in the Thirdorld as the central problem of our age and seeks to elaborate a theology

most effective in assisting such liberation while remaining faithful to theessage and demand of the Gospel. Unlike many theologies which claim,plicitly or explicitly, to be the universal truth, TL consciously limits its claimat of



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complishing its particular task for the present moment of history, andsclaims all intention to do theology for all time.

sues in Theology of Liberation

nce its official emergence in 1968, in the documents of Medellin, TL has

oven its impact beyond the borders of Latin America. It has challenged mademic theology in Europe and North America, stirred an outburst of eological effort to create a theology of liberation in a way relevant to thedigenous situation of each country and region in Africa and Asia, andrtainly unsettled the peace of the Vatican enough to have received its nothe form of numerous papal speeches, two major documents of the

ongregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and frequent censures and threcensure for some of its representative theologians. It has also been an

ject of special concern, investigation, and even harassment on the part otegory of people who could not normally care less about anything soademic and speculative as theologygenerals, police chiefs, prime ministerd presidents. This, I think, is something unique about TL. One strains theagination to visualize Hitler becoming upset over the theology of Barth an

ultmann or President Johnson losing sleep over the theologies of the Secuty and the Death of God. In TL we have a theology which does disturb

cular powerswhich, in fact, most disturbs them in particular.part from the distinctly political threats TL has also been challengingntemporary academic theology on a number of fronts. It has questioneden the modern conceptions of God prevalent in theologies of correlation a''revisionary" theologies (Tracy), disputed the dehistoricized Christologies

oth traditional and contemporary Christianity, and criticized the harmonistd authoritarian models of prevailing ecclesiologies. It has also called into

estion the still generally prevailing dualism of transcendent salvation andstorical liberation. It has challenged, above all, the academic and theoretientation of theology and its methods, which has prevailed in Christianity er a millennium. For TL, theology is a practical, not a theoretical, science.ere is no major area of theology that it has left undisturbed. Although no

heology of revolution" in the sense of the 1960s, TL has perhaps shown itbe the most revolutionary theology yet in its impact, challenge, andplication.

e revolutionary character of TL has been perceived by no one better than



official critic, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, the Prefect of the Congregation e Doctrine of the Faith in the Vatican. In a private document preceding thblication of the famous Instruction of August 1984, Ratzinger states thedical challenge posed by TL as follows:

It does not intend to add a new theological treatise to those already existing, i.e., does not wish to develop new aspects of the Church's social ethics. Rather it seesitself as a new hermeneutics of the Christian faith, a new



opian and of leaving no room for divine grace and Christian realism. Theticisms of TL have come



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om all sourcesfrom liberals and conservatives, Marxists and capitalists, thetican and the Heritage Foundation; such criticisms have also been varioueological, political, and sociological in content. 6

ong with these criticisms there have also been those who, while acceptinge fundamental idea of liberation, have tried to develop a theology of

eration on different foundations. These attempts share the urgency of erating the poor and oppressed with those of the Latin American theoristt dispute the latter's theological method. In a world increasingly oppressr the vast majority of humankind, the Vatican and Schubert Ogden, forample, seem to share the need for some sort of a theology of liberation, y

oth disagree with the dialectical approach of TL and seek to provide their oternatives as more authentic or more adequate. The Vatican'sternativespelled out in John Paul II's Puebla address of 1979 and the twostructions of 1984 and 1986 on liberation theologyis based on personalismgden's alternative is based on an existentialist approach to theology.7

this regard the significance of the 1984 Vatican Instruction8 on TL canno exaggerated. In both theoretical and practical sense, TL has been the movocative of all post-conciliar theologies, a veritable sign of contradictionsponsible for the rise and fall of many and revealing where a Christian stath regard to the gravest issues facing Christianity in the present decades orld history. No wonder that the opposition to TLreligious and secular,eological and politicalhas, after a sporadic beginning in the early 1970s,alesced and crystallized around the Vatican position, even as the defended sympathizers of TL have strained their theological and political resourcenimize the document's impact on the survival of their theology. The

ocument is a clear demonstration of how far the Vatican is willing to go ineeting the challenge of historical liberation, as well as of the theological

tlook underlying such a stance.espite the attempt of many liberals to put the best possible interpretatione document, it should be clear that it was in reality a condemnation, not ere "warning" it professed to be. (Whether there was a significant shift oftitude or "about-face," as one journal put it, in the Easter 1986 letter of Jul II to the Brazilian hierarchy and the 1986 Instruction on Christianeedom and Liberation, will be discussed in chapter 5.) It claims to addres

elf only to ''certain aspects" (title) and "certain forms of liberation theolog



ntroduction; vi, 9), but these aspects and forms, however misinterpreted,rn out to be the very heart and substance of TL, that which makes it distiiginal, and challenging. Like the early chapters of Genesis, the documentates first the original sin of TL; i.e., its alleged political and historicalductionism, leading to the denial of the transcendent character of salvatioth, and sin. Second, it points to the cause of the fall, namely, the seductiKarl Marx, his method of sociohistorical analysis, and his ideology of athe

d totalitarianism. Third, in a relentless crescendo of criticism item by itemumerates



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the dogmatic errors resulting from that seduction, in Christology, theologdemption, ecclesiology, and anthropology.

e charges include the exclusively political "re-reading" of Scripture; theduction of Jesus to a revolutionary symbol; the introduction of class strugto ecclesiology; the denial of the objectivity of truth; the advocacy of blind

d systematic violence; and the identification of the poor of the Bible witholetariat of Marx. Judging by the criteria for "authentic" theology of liberad down by John Paul II in Puebla in 1979, the document finds the liberateologians guilty of error on all three counts: the truth about Jesus Christ, uth about the Church, and the truth about humankind (v, 8). In the eyese Vatican, TL is "a perversion of the Christian message" (ix, 1), full of erious ideological deviations" (Introduction), and "actually constitutes aactical negation" (vi, 9) of Christian faith. The indictment of TL is radical a

weeping; the only thing it finds acceptable is the commitment to "theeferential option for the poor," which by itself, of course, is not sufficient rn a theology into a theology of liberation. The errors of TL are so numerod fundamental that one only wonders why the Vatican issued only a

warning" rather than an outright "condemnation" as, for example, in the cModernism.

e responses of the defenders and sympathizers of TL have varied. Someed to dismiss it as not speaking to them, often by minimizing the Marxianement in their theology. Others even tried to welcome it as an approval ofcalling attention to its affirmation of the preferential option for the poor a

smissing its negative criticisms as either peripheral or irrelevant. A thirdsponse has been that of Juan Luis Segundo, for whom such responses bealse confidence." For Segundo, "the document consciously goes beyond tere denunciation of particular, rare, or peripheral excesses." 9 What is at

ake in the conflict is a conflict between two irreconcilably opposed theologSegundo puts it, "my theology (that is, my interpretation of Christian fait

false if the theology of the document is trueor if it is the only true one."10

gain, "in all sincerity, if my theology (which I have formulated in my booksmost twenty-five years, and have practiced pastorally) is correct andmplete, the document's theology is certainly mistaken."11 Furthermore, stheology amounts to a reversal of the logic and dynamism of Vatican II.12

is a theology still in process. It has yet to produce its Summa Theologiae



hurch Dogmatics. As a new theology it has many loose ends to tie up andany gaps to fill, a fact partially responsible for much misunderstanding anticism. The phenomenal, continuing productivity of many of itspresentative theologiansJuan Luis Segundo, Jon Sobrino, Clodovis andonardo Boff, Gustavo Gutierrez, and othershas already gone far towardsing such gaps and developing a comprehensive theological synthesis. As w way of doing theology with new assumptions and from a different

rspective, TL has provoked and will continue to provoke criticisms fromdely different perspectives,



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it continues to vigorously assert itself against intensifying political andigious pressures to suppress it. As TL insists, the problem of thelogy of eration is not, in the final analysis, about theology but about the actualeration of the poor and oppressed, who are an absolute majority in Latin

merica and the world and whose cry for liberation cannot be silenced or

ppressed too long, as witness the events of the past decade in Chile,caragua, Haiti, the Philippines, South Africa, and South Korea. As long asoblem of liberation remains a problem, so long will theology of liberationmain to articulate it. As long as the scandal of the poor continues to provolong will theology of liberation continue to scandalize.

rpose and Scope of this Book

e purpose of the following chapters is both constructive and polemical. I

ant to present in a systematic way the philosophical sources of TL (Marx aegel) and its chief doctrines on theological method (i.e., the dialectic of thrmeneutic and socio-analytic mediations on the basis of praxis) and theation between salvation and liberation, between personal and social sin. in the context of the polemical issues raised by and against TL. In each c

begin with the criticisms of TL, go on to present its position on the issues ake at some length, and end with responses to the critics. The most

portant critic of TL has been the Vatican, whose criticisms will be examind responded to and whose alternative theology of liberation, especially itsthropological assumptions will in turn be subjected to an extensive critiquis also defines the scope of this book. It is limited to the issue of Marxismeological method, and the relation between transcendent salvation andciohistorical liberation. It does not propose a comprehensive survey of all emes, topics, and issues bearing on liberation.

is book is limited in another way. 'Theology of liberation' is a generic termhich there are many variants, ranging from the feminist and black theologNorth America to the liberationist theologies of the Third World. Theseeologies do share certain common concerns and perspectives, but there aso significant differences. This book is limited to the Latin American theololiberation and the issues it has provoked. The theology of liberation (TL)

scussed in this book refers solely to its Latin American version.

addition to this introductory chapter, there are five chapters in this bookhapter 2 deals with the philosophical sources of TL, Marx and Hegel, and



esents the basic philosophical categories operative in TL. It is an essentiaeparation for the discussion of substantive issues in the chapters that folloChapter 3, I discuss the theological method of TL, focusing on theationship between theory and praxis, the historicity and historical task of eology, the theoretical necessity for practical solidarity with the poor, andrmeneutic



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cle. Chapter 4 presents the relationships between God and history, salvatthe transcendent sense and liberation in the politicalhistorical sense, andrsonal and social sin. In Chapter 5, I examine in some detail the Vatican'

wn version of theology of liberation, especially the personalist anthropologderlying its conceptions of the relationships between God and history,

rsonal and social sin, and freedom and liberation. Finally, in chapter 6, Iflect on the larger significance of the confrontation between TL and thetican. At the level of theory the confrontation is one of two opposedthropologies, the dialectical anthropology of TL and the personalistthropology of the Vatican. At the deeper level of praxis the confrontation

olitical and poses a profound challenge to the institutional churchthe mostgent challenge of all, that of the poor and the oppressed of the world. Thal issue is not whether TL or Marxism is compatible with orthodoxy but

hetherand howthe highest leadership in the church is prepared to respone cry for liberation around the world.

t me now present the background of each chapter in some detail. Chapteals with the philosophical sources of TL. Like any theology, TL draws fromany sources, both classical and contemporary, both philosophical andeological: official teachings, biblical studies, and sociohistorical and econoudies. In the area of theology proper, it is indebted to the entire range of

ntemporary theology, from Barth and Bonhoeffer to Karl Rahner, Dorotheölle, Johannes Metz, Jürgen Moltmann, and Wolfhart Pannenberg. 13

ilosophically, it has drawn from the entire range of philosophicalvelopments from Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and Marx to Mauondel, existentialism, critical Marxism, and hermeneutics. TL is thoroughlynversant with the categories and problematics of modern and contemporilosophy and has shown a capacityas great as that of any contemporary

hristian theologyto incorporate and synthesize a wide range of philosophictions. This contact of TL with philosophy, while often direct, is just as ofteediated through its source theologies. Among the diverse philosophicalurces it draws from, however, the Hegelian-Marxian tradition stands out ae dominant influence on the Denkform of TL, a tradition often mediated bch twentieth-century figures as Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Georgkacs, Herbert Marcuse, Karl Mannheim, and members of the Frankfurthool.

is noteworthy that it is precisely around the theological appropriation of t



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gative aspects of these philosophiesKant's subjectivism and agnosticism,egel's pantheism and immanentism, Heidegger's atheism and pessimismao attempt has been made to come to grips with the fundamental questioning raised or the new philosophical horizons and methods opened up byese thinkers.

is no wonder that this fundamental suspicion of modernity on the part official Catholicism should become outright hostility and rejection when thatodernity takes the form of Marxism and finds its way into the philosophicaesuppositions of TL. As is well known, Marxism is not just another philosohich would be relatively harmless, but a philosophy which seeks to changee existing power structures by means of organized political praxis. As ailosophy it has been atheist, and as a political movement it has had a histdeviations and corruptionsjust as has Christianityoften culminating intalitarianism. At the same time, however, it would be difficult to deny thaarxism has been the only major intellectual movement to try to understanalyze, and transform existing societies from the perspective of the poor aploited majority. It is also undeniable that the cry of the poorthe vastajority of humankind todayconstitutes the most fundamental crisis andallenge confronting all those with power, religious or secular. It is quitederstandable, therefore, that the Vatican responds to the challenge of

arxism, modernity at its most cutting edge, with outright rejection. All othsues raised by TL, one might say, are footnotes to this fundamental issue,ow and to what extent Christian theology may appropriate Marxism for itswn purposes and still remain Christian theology.

Chapter 2, I try to confront this issue. Instead of trying to reduce TL toarxism, in the fashion of the ideological right, or to deny the existence of arxian elements in TL, as some liberation theologians do, I try to discuss t

hat extent and how Christian theology can and must use philosophicalurces for its own theological purpose; to what extent Marxism, at least in neralized form, has already become part of the social doctrine of the Cathurch as it has become part of the general intellectual culture of thentemporary world; the nature and scope of the Marxism TL has beenpropriating and the attitude towards Marxism inherent in such appropriatd, finally, the Hegelian element in TL. The Marxian connection of TL hasnerally been well publicized (although not always properly understood anten greatly exaggerated), but the Hegelian connection, I am afraid, has



arcely been noticed. In my view, it is the Hegelian dialectic which mediatand Marxism. This is not a book on Marx, Hegel, or the larger question o

e general relationship between Marxism and Christian faith as such, and mscussion here is limited to the above issues. Once the Marxian and Hegeliements in TL have been isolated, we can see, in the following chapters, hch elements are integrated into TL proper. Since the main purpose of this

ook is not to show how TL integrates such elementswhich would only dive

tention from the real issue raised by



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, namely, the historical urgency of liberationbut to discuss the substantivaims of TL in its own right, my references to Marx and Hegel in the followiapters will be only occasional and limited. One has only to remember thearxian and Hegelian concepts and categories discussed in this chapter to ow they are integrated into TL.

Chapter 3, I deal with the question of the nature and method of theolog issue increasingly important in recent theological debates. Until very rec

mes, theology had been considered to be wisdomi.e., knowledge of thetimate and transcendent finality of human existence, a theoretical sciencehose goal is knowledge of truth for its own sake. As the activity of thentemplative intellect in its transcendent finality, it prided itself on itsparation and autonomy fromoften verging on contemptuous indifferencethe exigencies of human action or praxis in the relative, ambiguous worldstory and society. It claimed its own methodsranging from contemplation editation through appeal to Scripture and tradition to deduction andalysisbut all such methods remained firmly within the realm of theory. 14

enerally, it did not consider its own basis in the concrete historical praxis oman existence; theologians did not consider the "disclosive," epistemolognction of such praxis essential to their own methods, nor did they regardntribution to such praxis as an essential goal of their own activity. TL

allenges this theoretical conception of theology with its claim of the priorid primacy of praxis over theory and insists that theology is a practical, noeoretical science, whose knowledge derives its origin, content, and purpoom historical praxis. This practical conception of theology has in turn beenallenged by many, who may accept the cognitive contribution of praxis ae among other sources of theology, especially in the area of practicaleology, but who do not wish to accord to praxis a foundational and unifyie for all theology, including systematic theology, as does TL.

is well known, a revolution in the conception of the relation between thed praxis began with Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Marx in the nineteenth centd was continued through existentialism, phenomenology, pragmatism, ano-Marxism in the twentieth. A vast literature has grown up on the subjeconly in recent decades, however, that Christian theology began to takerious notice of these developments, and it is natural that the very recenttempts of political and liberation theologies to appropriate suchvelopments have been received with mixed reactions. My concern in this



apter is not to review the entire history of the concept, which indeed goeck to Plato and Aristotle, but only to examine and evaluate the recenteological controversies occasioned by TL. To be discussed are the objectio

osed by the Vatican, Schubert Ogden, and Dennis McCann and Charlesrain, and the possible responses of TL to such objections; my argument issed on a lengthy presentation of the position of TL on such issues as theationship between faith and praxis, the historical conditioning of the orig

ntent, and task of theology, the preferential option for the poor, and thermeneutic circle.



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chapter 4, I go into the theological center of the controversy between TLd the Vatican: the relation between salvation and liberation (or

anscendence and history) and between personal and social sin. Ever sincee Enlightenment critique of the traditional dualism endemic to Christian fae issue of the theological or salvific significance of our earthly existence,

pecially our political efforts to humanize and transform society and historys been the primary challenge to Christian theology. This challenge has beot only theoretical, as in the case of Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Freud, Dewey,rtre, but also practical, as in the case of the various socialist politicalovements of which Marxism has been the chief intellectual inspiration andflection. From the Rerum Novarum of 1891 to the Gaudium et Spes of tican II to the Sollicitudo Rei Socialis of 1987, the Catholic Church has trrespond to the practical challenge by means of social doctrine. 15 Althou

the process the traditional dualism of natural and supernatural, secular acred, has softened significantly, it seems clear that the official theological

osition has always remained ambivalent, as witness the Vatican reactions tenri de Lubac's The Mystery of the Supernatural, Karl Rahner's "supernatuistential," and Teilhard de Chardin's The Phenomenon of Man and The Dilieu.

e controversy between the Vatican and TL is the latest and perhaps the

ost explosive in this series of conflicts between the highest magisterium oe church and a theological movement on the most challenging issue of thy. Since Vatican II it has been generally recognized that there is indeed aation between salvation and liberation; they are neither opposed nordifferent to each other. They are distinct, but not separable. What, then, s distinct but inseparable relation between salvation and liberation? Is it primary and secondary importance (Vatican), or one of formal distinctiond material identity (TL)? Is liberation intrinsic to and constitutive of salvatL), or are they inseparable yet extrinsic to each other (Vatican)? Does the

ositing of an intrinsic and constitutive relation between salvation anderation necessarily lead to reduction of the former to the latter, to "tempoessianism" and "historicist immanentism," as the Vatican charges?rthermore, is our relation to transcendent salvation primarily mediatedrough personal, i.e., individual, conversion or through cooperative socialaxis of structural change? Is personal sin the only sin in the proper sense,

hereas social sin is sin only in the analogical sense? Is social sin merely the



m of personal sins, or is it a sin in its own right with a structure of its ownd in need of something more than the conversion of individual hearts? Thestions, of course, are derived from and are variations on the morendamental theological questioni.e., What is the relationship between Godd history? In chapter 4, I discuss these questions first by presenting thetican's critique of TL and then by elaborating the latter's position.

chapter 5, I discuss the Vatican's own version of a theology of liberation,hich it calls more "authentic," with its emphasis on "integral" liberation. Ba its two Instructions of 1984 and 1986 as well as on other works of Johnul II



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d Joseph Ratzinger, I examine in some detail the Vatican's own conceptiothe relationship between salvation and liberation, personal and social sind freedom and liberation, and its theological justification of the Christian'srticipation in historical liberation. In the process I try to disclose thethropological presuppositionsa personalist anthropology, with an emphas

interiority, transcendence, and individualityunderlying its theology of eration. I conclude that the Vatican's personalist anthropology iscompatible with its own theology of liberation; either it needs a differentthropology for its theology of liberation or the latter is at best inconsistend half-hearted, for the basic reason that its anthropology suffers from an t unresolved dualism despite its claims to the contrary. I also show that tnot much substance to the rumors spread in the media that the 1986struction meant a rapprochement between the Vatican and TL, for the

ndamental difference dividing them, clear enough in the 1984 Instructioncame even clearer in the 1986 document.

chapter 6, I offer concluding reflections on the preceding discussions in ook, especially on the historical significance of the confrontation between Td the Vatican. There are two aspects to the confrontation, theoretical anactical. Theoretically, they represent two irreconcilably opposed theologieSegundo and Ratzinger both admit, largely because of the differences in

eir mode of thinking and anthropological presuppositions. The Vatican'seology is dominated by Thomist and, at best, personalist approaches, witeir classical, dualist emphasis on the primacy of transcendence, interiorityd individuality. TL operates with a dialectical anthropology of concretetality (Hegel and Marx), which tries to see the intrinsic, constitutiveediation between transcendence and history, between the individual andcial existence, without denying their real distinction. The difference,erefore, is ultimately not so much theological as philosophical. If theagisterium has no divinely guaranteed expertise, still less infallibility, inatters of philosophyunless, of course, philosophy directly contradicts basicogmas and doctrines on faith and moralsany more than it does in matters onomics and social analysis, this leaves plenty of justification for a continuscussion between TL and the Vatican.

the practical level, and this is the more significant and decisive of the twe confrontation between TL and the Vatican is a political confrontationtween the global challenge of liberation of the poor and oppressed and th



sponse of the institutional leadership of the Catholic Church. The ultimatesue is not TL as theology, but the political challenge of the huge masses ooor, exploited, and oppressed humanity in a divided world and the adequathe response of the ecclesiastical leadership. The Catholic Church hasmehow weathered the many theoretical challenges of modernity since thelightenmentnot always successfully, to be sure, nor without losing its

tellectual credibility. The challenge of TL is whether it can also survive the

olitical challenge of the existence of degraded but increasingly self-conscioasses of humanity around the globe, without losing its evangelical credibia Christian church. Can the politics of the Vatican be as radical as theallenge of global liberation that it must address?



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hapter IIhilosophical Sources of Liberation Theology

er since the emergence of Marxism as a theory and as a social and politic

ovement in the nineteenth century, the relation between Christianity andarxism has been one of unbending hostility. True, there was somethusiasm for dialogue in the nineteen-sixties in the limited circle of Easterropean Marxist theoreticians and Christian theologians, notably the memthe German Paulusgesellschaft. There was also some very cautious openiwards Marxism in the encyclicals of John XXIII and Paul VI. Nevertheless,cial doctrine of the Catholic Church, from the Rerum Novarum of 1891 toborem Exercens of 1981, has been predominantly hostile and invariably

tical towards Marxism, just as Marxism has been towards Christianty. In tgard the attitude of the Church has been no different from that of thepitalist world as a whole. It is no surprise that the Vatican has recentlycused its critique of TL on the Marxian elements in the latter. 1

arxism is not simply a social theory or merely a philosophy of history. In itswn self-understanding it is more a socio-historical movement for the practialization of certain ideals, a movement self-consciously rooted in history a

eking to transform that history. As such it not only has its own history or evelopment of dogma," from Marx and Engels through Lenin and Kaut-ske critical and humanistic Marxists of today. It also has a history of stitutional and organizational developments, from the first Communistternational to countless labor movements and political regimes in differenuntries of the world, each with its own variation. In this regard Marxism hen precisely what Christianity has been, not a pure theory but a social

ovement, whose theory is itself subject to the dialectic of concrete historyits ambiguities; one must keep this fact in mind in any discussion of Marxeory and Christian theology.



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the theoretical level there are many issues at stake. Theologians and Mailosophers have argued about whether atheism and totalitarianism are

separable from the essence of Marxism, a debate which has not been andy view, cannot be conclusive, given the fundamental differences intellectual horizon among the participants in the debate. 2 Economists and

cial theorists argue whether Marxist analysis of capitalism is valid andevant. Again, for precisely the same reason, the debate has been far fromnclusive. The Marxist critique of capitalism seems no more dead or passé,e ideologues of capitalism have been announcing, than is Christian faith, ght be claimed by atheists. We can also evaluate the history of the attituthe Christian churches towards Marxism and discuss whether such attituve been based more on paranoia than on reality.3

this chapter I cannot go into these complex issues. My purpose here ismited to the discussion of the relation between Marxism and TL in the cont

the issues raised by the Vatican. I discuss three issues in particular. The sue is whether and to what extent one system of thought (i.e., TL) canorrow concepts and categories from another (i.e., Marxism) for its ownrposes. The second issue is the nature and scope of the Marxism that TL

oes accept, whose role in TL I neither want to minimize or exaggerate. Thrd is the role of the Hegelian dialectic, which in my view mediates the

nthesis of Christian faith and Marsixm in TL but whose importance, althouot as great as that of Marxism, has generally been ignored or onlysufficiently appreciated in the current debates. Both Marxism and Hegel'sought constitute the chief philosophical sources of TL.

eological Appropriation of Marxism

e Vatican's basic charge against TL is that it uses Marxist concepts and

tegories as a "determining" principle of its own theology (viii, 1)4

and tharesult it is no longer Christian theology. The response of TL has been thatossible to convert and baptize Karl Marx on condition that he repent and brged of his sins, atheism and totalitarianism, to which the Vatican repliesying that Marx will not repent and therefore remains irredeemable.

it possible, then, to borrow certain categories from Marx and still toansform their meaning by placing them into the new context of Christianth? According to the Vatican, it is not; Christian faith only ends up by beirrupted and perverted by the categories. For the Vatican, the context in



hich a category originates also determines its meaning. For example, thencept of class struggle in the original Marxian context means somethingore than "severe social conflict" in an empirical sense (vii, 8). The documeoes further: "Certain formulas are not neutral, but keep the meaning they the original Marxist doctrine" (ibid.; emphasis added). That is, not only de context determine



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e meaning of a category, but the category is also so indissolubly wedded original context that no divorce is possible. No matter what the new con

category retains its old, original meaning. A critical and transformativepropriation of concepts from another system, then, seems impossible.

e first response to this stricture has been an appeal to the history of

eology itself. Is there any great philosopher whose concepts have not beepropriated by one theologian or another in the last two thousand years?ato, Aristotle, neo-Platonists, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Whitehead, and theistentialists seem to be ready examples of such critical appropriation. If istotle, then, why not Marx as well, as Dom Helder Camara once asked atniversity of Chicago? 5 This response, however, raises two issues. The firstat such appropriation has not always been a happy one. What if suchpropriation has in fact been a corruption of the Christian faith, as many hen saying since Harnack? What if the new context, instead of transformine concepts it borrows, is itself corrupted by them? On the other hand, ans is the second issue, can Christian faith avoid borrowing concepts fromher sources without falling into an impossible biblical fundamentalism? Thsues, however, are too complex to go into here, and I will simply leave theide. Besides, the argument from history is too general and formalistic. It mdicate the general necessity for borrowing philosophical categories, but it

oes not settle the issue of whether it is valid and prudent to borrow from articular philosopher. What if there should be something unique about ailosopher, say, Marx, which makes such appropriation invalid, imprudent,

oth?

is, I think, is precisely the point that the Vatican is making about Marxismarguing for the inseparability of method, which TL does admit that it is

orrowing from Marx, from his ideology, which it claims ro reject, the docum

ys:the thought of Marx is such a global vision of reality that all data received fromobservation and analysis are brought together in a philosophical and ideologicalstructure, which predetermines the significance and importance to be attached tothem. The ideological principles come prior to the study of the social reality and arpresupposed in it. Thus no separation of the parts of this epistemologically uniquecomplex is possible. If one tries to take only one part, say, the analysis, one ends having to accept the entire ideology. That is why it is not uncommon for the

ideological aspect to be predominant among the things which the "theologians of



liberation" borrow from Marxist authors. (vii, 6)

uoting from Paul VI's earlier warning, it goes on to say that

it would be "illusory and dangerous to ignore the intimate bond which radicallyunites them, and to accept elements of the Marxist analysis



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without recognizing its connections with the ideology, or to enter into the practice class struggle and of its Marxist interpretation while failing to see the kind of totalitarian society to which this process slowly leads.'' (vii, 7)

e search for a systematic unity, of course, is not unique to Marxism. The namism of human reason seems to be to seek to comprehend the

ationships among things and organize such relationships according to aifying principle. The goal of every philosophy has been a vision of reality aity, a totality of necessarily interrelated parts. It is also precisely in

aborating these interrelationships, and in the degree of necessity with whe part is related to another in a totality, that a philosophical system rises ls.

is one thing, however, to say that something is necessarily related to othe

rts within a particular system, and quite another to say that it is soseparable from that system that its meaning is exhausted by its place withat system. The meaning a concept actually possesses within a system nee

ot be the only meaning it may have, unless that system is so comprehensivd so penetrating as to exhaust all reality without remainder. Even Hegel'sstem did not claim such perfection. The meaning of a concept may transcparticular embodiment within a given system, just as a different system ow context may disclose a new meaning of the concept not evident or

esent in the old. A concept and a context can enrich and transform eachher in a positive dialectic, just as they can impoverish and corrupt each ota negative. In neither case is a concept inseparable from its old context ameaning simply exhausted by it. In a real sense, the whole history of ilosophy is a history in which parts of a system get separated from their oatrix and emigrate to a new home, a new system with which they enter indialectical relationship. This phenomenon is also evident in the history of t

ationship between philosophy and theology, from the New Testament toul Tillich and Karl Rahner.

hn Paul II himself is, I think, a good example of this dialectic. He takes thncept of 'person' in Boethius, Thomas, Kant, Scheler, and others, criticized transforms its meaning with his own interpretation in his The Actingrson. 6 He also takes terms and ideas, undoubtedly Marxian in origin, suc'labor,' 'social labor,' 'alienation,' 'proletarianization,' 'social subject,' 'the

iority of labor over capital,' 'praxis,' 'exploitation,' and others, andrsonalizes their meaning. It is not merely these concepts but also the



ewpoint and social analysis associated with such concepts that hecorporates into his own analysis of contemporary society. The U. S. bishopoint out in their pastoral letter of 1980 on "Marxist Communism" that "ever Holy Father, Pope John Paul II in his first encyclical, Redemptor Hominirtly appropriates Marx's critique when he writes," and go on to quote from

15 of the encyclical, which says:



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The man of today seems ever to be under threat from what he produces, that is tosay from the result of the work of his hands and even more so, of the work of hisintellect and the tendencies of his will. All too soon, and often in an unforeseeableway, what this manifold activity of man yields is not only subjected to "alienation,"in the sense that it is simply taken away from the person who produces it, butrather it turns against man himself, at least in part, through the indirect

consequences of its effects returning on himself. It is or can be directed against himThis seems to make up the main chapter of the drama of present-day humanexistence in its broadest and universal dimension. 7

ow this passage echoes the young Marx's analysis of alienation in hisonomic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, of course, is all too evident

fact, it should not be too difficult to trace the Marxian origin of the analyscapitalist society common to the encyclicals from Quadragesimo Anno

rough Populorum Progressio to Laborem Exercens.8 The popes have routialyzed capitalism in terms of the profit motive, the inversion of subject an

bject in the economic process, the concentration of wealth, exploitation oforker, increasing power of 'things' over 'persons,' the growing division andnflict between rich and poor, the political and cultural consequences of snflict, international colonialism and imperialism, and the need for collectivtion and structural change, all of which are, without question, Marxian ineir origin. And there is nothing unusual about this. So much of Marxism hcome part of the very intellectual culture of today that we use its categorthout even noticing their origin. As pointed out by Oswald von Nell-Breune former advisor to Pius XI, an authority on Catholic social doctrine and aan whose orthodoxy has never been questioned, "we are all riding on Maroulders."9

e real question, therefore, is not whether particular concepts and even thode of analysis are separable from the overall ideology or world view of thstem in which they originate; they are, as the actual history of philosophyearly shows. It is not relevent to recognize that the method of social analyd the overall ideology (anthropology, ontology) are indeed found mutuallyseparable within the system of Marx, a fact Enrique Dussel, a liberationeologian himself, insists on and which leads him to argue for a non-Marxiahristian socialism.10 In any system and certainly in a dialectical systemegel, Marx), and to the degree to which it is systematic, there is a dialect

mong the parts, where they illumine the meaning of one another, as well a



tween the parts and the whole with their mutual coloring. As I arguedrlier, this does not mean that the meaning the parts have within the systthe only possible meaning they can have. The dialectic recognizes not one necessary interaction or relation among the parts, but also the irreducibutual otherness, or difference among them. This is, after all, why there ca such a thing as the collapse of a system due to its internal contradictionvarious parts refuse



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give up their identity and obey the demands of other parts or of the whohat the thesis of inseparability requires, then, is not to abandon the attemlearn and borrow from other systems, but to do so with caution andticism.

or is the real question whether theology may use philosophy for its own

rposes. Theology must do this, and has always done so. 11 It is not relevhether the ideology of a system one borrows from is atheistic and totalitarquinas did not mind borrowing from Aristotle, although Aristotle's God is ay from the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and he denied the immortathe soul. As Pedro Arrupe, the former General of the Jesuits, put it.

Marxist analysis is not the only analysis mixed with such elements. . . . Especiallythe social analyses commonly used in the "free world" imply a materialistic and

individualistic view of the world, which are likewise opposed to Christian values anattitudes.12

e real question, as the Vatican itself put it, is whether such non-theologictegories and analyses operate as the determining principle (viii, 1) of aeology which uses them, and whether they control the elaboration of theeological content in such a way that the content of faith, the principia of eology, and the horizon of transcendence proper to theology as theology emselves subordinated to the requirements of such categories and analysere much depends on how critical and undogmatic one is in the actualeological integration of such categories, as well as on the nature and intrerit of such categories. In the final analysis, however, the dispute will alwmain as to whether such categories are controlling or being controlled by eological system they inform, for such judgments depend, as I shall argueapter 3, on the horizon of the judge's presuppositions.

e Marxian Moment of Liberation Theologyegarding TL's appropriation of Marxism there are three questions to ask,pecially in view of the fact that the Vatican document makes it appear asough liberation theologians have been buying Marxism lock, stock, andrrel. It repeatedly accuses them of borrowing Marxian concepts "uncriticancepts which are in its judgment "perhaps impossible to purify" in any evntroduction). The three questions are: (1) Why does TL feel the need to

sort to Marxism in the first place? (2) What sort of Marxism is it that TL hen appropriating? and (3) What is the spirit or attitude with which such



propriation is made? Whether TL has actually managed to keep Marxismbordinate to the demands of faith can be answered only after its wholeeology has been examined. I shall attempt an answer in chapter 4.



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hy Marxism?

egarding the first question we can begin with the starting point of TL, whialways the shocking awareness of the contradiction between the demand

hristian love, with its preferential option for the poor, and the sense of humowerlessnessoften concealed as the virtue of resignationregarding the

uation of poverty and marginality. This consciousness, along with its senssponsibility, compels the intellectual and practical search for ways of makotherly lovethe center of the message of Jesushistorically effective. Thisvolves getting to know the actual situation of poverty and oppression, noterely its appearance but also its structural causes, in order to developfective strategies to respond to it.

here, then, should one turn for this knowledge? Sciences are not neutral.

e picture and analysis of society produced by the intellectuals of the rulinass tend to cover up the most decisive characteristics of social reality,pecially its conflictural, discriminatory and exclusivistic aspects, even wheey are most sincerely Christian and well meaning, a fact of which the Boffothers reminded us in their critical analysis of the U.S. bishops' pastoral le the economy. 13 The dominant analyses tend to attribute the poverty ofasses to a sad but inevitable fate. In this situation it becomes clear tommitted Christians that love for the poor involves taking sides in thestorical conflict. This taking of sides is certainly a matter of praxis and ethoice, but there is also an intellectual or theoretical aspect to it, the decisilook at society and history from the standpoint of the oppressed, from thderside of history. At this point it is not surprising that Christian activists Marxist theory, which has historically been the only major theory to doecisely that. It is not that the poor of the Gospel are simply identified withe proletariat of Marx, as the Vatican claims. Rather, it is a question of, in

rardi's words, "perceiving the connection between them, in the dynamics hristian consciousness which seeks to live according to the Gospel of Jesuse midst of history."14 In short, the discovery of Marxism is a result of thearch for efficiency and coherence of praxis in meeting the demands of

hristian faith and love, a love which goes beyond the sentimental moralismat may be subjectively gratifying but is incapable of changing the objectivuation of the poor it means to love.15

e Marxism of Liberation Theology



hat, then, is the scope and content of the Marxism appropriated by TL?ere, I think, the answer is not easy. First of all, Marxism is not as monoliththe Vatican document makes it appear to be.16 The sheer variety of Mar

octrine existing today makes it as difficult to define its essence as it is tofine the essence of Christianity. Secondly, the Marxian content varies frome liberation theologian to another. My presentation is based on certainncepts, generally considered Marxian, that are accepted as such by the

ajority of the liberation theologians.



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's appropriation of Marxism has, I think, been generally critical and selectlthough, understandably, not critical and selective enough in the eyes of tican and the right-wing critics). 17 The ultimate criterion for suchpropriation is the dynamics of faith in its search for historical ways of ctualizing" Christian love. Marxism is accepted "precisely to the measure t

hich it corresponds to the demands of such search."18

In this sense therever been a question of accepting Marxism as a ''systematic totality," noten implicitly.19 Theologians of liberation reject its atheism, metaphysicalaterialism, and historical determinism. They also reject, quite contrary to ttican's accusation (iv, 15), the tendency of dogmatic Marxism to reduce rms of alienation to the economic as the source of all alienation. They agrth the Vatican that "sin" is the "most radical form of slavery" (iv, 2) and "urce of all evils" (x, 7) and that all other forms of slavery and alienation

erive ultimately from sin" (Introduction). For TL, sin is the "basic" alienatihe ultimate root of all injustice and oppression,"20 and "the cause of allil."21 Against Marxism's purely immanentist horizon, TL accepts theschatological reservation": salvation is not simply reducible to historicaleration, and no achievement of liberation is immune from the eschatologitique.22 It does not share Marx's confidence that history by itself containmanent and necessary dynamism which will negate its negativities and

ansform them into a "kingdom of freedom." As Gutierrez put it, "the proceliberation will not have conquered the very roots of oppression and theploitation of man by man without the coming of the Kingdom, which is aba gift."23 TL also points out that historical materialism is not itself empiricrifiable and thus requires transhistorical faith for its justification.24 It does

ot like Soviet totalitarianism any more than does John Paul or Michael Novad looks for different models of socialism more appropriate to the indigenonditions of Latin America and its different regions.

hat, then, are the aspects of Marxism TL finds worth appropriating for itswn historical task? According to the combined list of Clodovis Boff and Joséguez Bonino, there are six such interrelated basic concepts. They are: (1)e concept of society as a totality; (2) the economic interpretation of histo) the sociohistorical understanding of human existence; (4) the concepts ass struggle and of the revolutionary role of the proletariat; (5) the primacaxis within the unity of theory and praxis; and (6) the utopian vision of th

alectic of history.25 Let me elaborate on each of these in order, adding my



wn reflections where helpful.

ociety as Totality. The conventional approach to society is to divide it intoparate spheres or areas of activity, such as politics, economics, and cultuconsider each sphere as autonomous and independent of one another,ated to one another at best accidentally or extrinsically; and thus to regaciety as the resulting sum of such extrinsically related spheres. This is bas

a social division of labor, where each sphere is left up to the interpretatiod decision



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professionals with their specialized training in that particular sphere.ckness is left to the doctors of medicine, politics to the professionaloliticians, business to the men and women in business, morality to the cled ethicists, and so forth. A sense of the whole is lacking, and the result hen the fragmentation and alienation of human existence and a prevailing

nse of powerlessness to change this. In contrast, following Hegel's dialecproach, Marxism sees society as a 'concrete totality.' 26 Society is concrete sense that it is internally differentiated into relatively autonomous spheractivity as well as groups and classes of people, each of which is intrinsicr 'constitutively') related to or conditioned by one another and shapes itsedialectic of appropriation and contradiction in relation both to other parts the whole. Society is a totality in the sense that it is both the a priorindition for the process, or 'becoming,' of the parts and the a posteriori re

aped in its turn by such becoming, often collapsing as a totality as when n no longer sustain the conflicts and contradictions among its parts. Thisew insists on the need to study each sphere in itself, according to its ownatively autonomous logic of operation, but it also stresses the primecessity of informing and guiding such study at the same time (not after itmpletion) with a vision of the whole and other spheres. This view makes

ossible to understand a society as society in its structure, function, andovement. Thus, it corresponds not only to the inherent dynamism of humasonoften called "architectonic" or "speculative" (Hegel)but also to the nesociopolitical action geared towards the structural change of society.

e Economic Interpretation of History. History is constituted by the dialectsociety as a concrete totality. In this dialectic, not all spheres have equal

fluence on the shaping of the whole or in relation to other spheres. Likeegel, for whom the (absolute) spirit is identical with itself yet "overreachesnditions its Other and thus serves as the unifying or totalizing principle (crtre) in this dialectic of identity and difference, but unlike Hegel, who loce unifying and shaping principle of history ultimately in the Absolute Spiritd then in the cultural objectifications of that Spirit in the sphere of ilosophy, religion, and art, Marxism sees one particular sphere as exercisich a totalizing role, but locates it in the economic sphere with an internalalectic between the means and relations of production, not in God or in thigher" regions of culture and politics.

e economic sphere, of course, is first of all the sphere in which humans



oduce and reproduce the material conditions on which they depend for thry existence. It is the sphere in which our materiality as humans and ourpendence on nature become most manifest, a sphere without which theruld be no human existence, still less the "higher" things of life, a factpressed in the powerlessness of the poor and the greed of the wealthy asell as suppressed by those who pretend to be indifferent to such "materiangs in their pursuit of the higher things of life. The economic sphere,

owever, is also



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mething more. It is not only the sphere of the production of material thint also the sphere of social interdependence, in which we can produce sucngs only in mutual dependence on our fellows. It is the juncture of ourpendence on nature and our dependence on other humans, at once theaterialization of our social relations and the socialization of our material

ations. We depend on our fellows not only for the things on which wepend for our very existence, but also for the very possibility of our politicadependence and our cultural self-expression. The economic sphere,erefore, is not just one sphere among others; it is also a unifying, totalizinhere, in its own way, with a shaping power over other spheres and thehole. It conditions not only the production and distribution of material thint also, through such production and distribution, the relations of power

mong and over human beings (politics) and the quality and availability of

rtain types of culture (ideology). This economic conditioning of politics anlture, of course, means precisely that, conditioning, not mechanisticterminism. 27

is economic interpretationknown as 'historical materialism'is a deliberatejection of idealism in the broad sense, including rationalism, intellectualismluntarism, and spiritualism; these perspectives look at human life frombove,' whereas the economic interpretation looks at it from 'below.' As Mig

onino puts it, "history is not primarily the unfolding of man's consciousnesshis ideas but the dynamics of his concrete activity, the main form of whice work through which he transforms nature in order to respond to the tothis needs."28 This is in clear contrast to the traditional model of humanture that has ruled both theology and philosophy, for which the humanrson is basically a consciousnessa thinker, a 'feeler,' or at most a 'willer,' te neologisms, still more or less confined within the circle of inwardness. Todel, of course, did not deny that the person is also an actor in the concreorld or that he or she has to make a living, but this dimension of humantivity in relation to the transformation of the material world, along with its

olitical and ideological implications, remained at best peripheral, anterthought, to its understanding of the person. The economic interpretatiakes this transformative activity the essential, unifying principle of ourmanity without denying the reality or importance of our spiritual and

tellectual life. In doing so, it denies that reason or thought is totally

tonomous or separable from the concrete totality of human existence.



uman life is not an aspect of thought; rather, thought is an aspect of hume. It also recognizes our basic, internal dependence on nature and ouritude as material beings. Angelism belongs to the angels, not to humans

e Sociality of Existence. Human existence is essentially social in the mostncrete, historical sense. Humans are born into a determinate society withterminate economic structure, political institutions, and cultural horizons.

in a dialectic with the pressures and challenges of that society that humavelop their individuality. Capitalist individualism ignores this social a priori



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individual existence. It considers society as only an aggregate of isolateddividualsisolated in the sense of having no antecedent relations and tiesanaims both the power and the right of such individuals to be self-sufficient,hile in reality individuals can be individuals only in manifold forms of terdependence on others, individualism itself being a social product of a

rticular culture. Christian spirituality likewise regarded our social relationseither harmful to our salvation or at best an occasion of good works, andvocated withdrawal into the inwardness of our souls where we couldesumably establish a direct relationship with God. In contrast, TL, along warxism, insists that "man is not the single individual but a communal unitye form of a concrete social formation with its structures, relationships andlf-understanding (ideology)." 29 This need not deny that humans have aanscendent dignity or that they are subjects of their own thought. It does

ean that such dignity is necessarily bound up with the concrete socialructures for the possibilities of both its promotion and oppression, and thae thoughts which are indeed our own are also conditioned, positively orgatively, by our social environments.

is insight also provides all the more reason why a critique of ideology andansformation of social structure are necessary, although not sufficient, fortainment of truth and the promotion of our transcendent dignity. Advocat

individualism and privatism affirm the transcendence of human dignity anuth, but too often fail to recognize those conditions that nurture them. Thlure can lead them to accept the grossest violations of this dignity and tocome unconscious, uncritical dupes of ideologies. It is obvious that the

ossibility of this critical transcendence of ideological conditioning and thetainment of objective truth are subject to the basic historicity of humanistence and available only within its limits; the objectivity of humanowledge can never be that of a suprahistorical being, any more than the

anscendent dignity of humans can be based on an actual capacity toanscend all history.

ass Struggle and the Proletariat. The concepts of class struggle and thevolutionary role of the proletariat have perhaps been the most scandalousd offensive of all the elements of Marxism to the traditional Christiannsciousness. Due to its peculiarly individualistic conception of sin andiritualistic understanding of conversion as a purely interior act, coupled wbasically ahistorical vision of social reality as something immutable, the



eological and philosophical tradition confined its ethics to that of thedividual, regarding social ethics as at best an extension of individual ethicled to perceive the theological meaning of basic social divisions and conflto recognize the social evil of oppressive institutions and structures whichnerate and conceal such conflicts. Instead, it generally tended to accept ality of the status quo as a divine, immutable order of things. It could notrceive the ethical demand of structural evil, still less believe in the possib

a structural change for the better. That the Church has been basicallyactionary in the face of the many modern revolutions, therefore, is norprise.



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this regard the role of TL is both similar to and different from that of erkegaard and existentialist theology. Both stress the reality of rupture inman life, but the nature of the rupture remains different. In an age

ominated by bourgeois smugness and easy rationalism, Kierkegaardcentuated the character of Christian faith as epistemological rupture, an

ffense" and "absolute paradox" demanding the "crucifixion of thederstanding." In the contemporary world, fraught with explosive classnflicts and their globalization between North and South yet complacentough to conceal them in a harmonistic vision, TL accepts without apologye sociological rupture of class struggle and the necessity of revolutionaryiructuralchange in all their sting and scandal. Neither Marx nor TL inventedass struggle or advocates it for its own sake. It is simply a question of cognizing a historical reality which has always been there and reflecting, f

e viewpoint of effective faith and love, on what is to be done about thatality. Class struggle is no more than a sociohistorical expression of that banflict which is in some sense built into the situation of concrete humanistence as we know it. Given the scarcity of material resources upon whicmans so deperately depend, the social relations that always govern theoduction and distribution of such resources, and the reality of the varyinggrees of human greed recognized by both Christianity and capitalism, tho

ho possess those resources also necessarily acquire and exercise a socialower over those who do not possess but need them. This relationship of ruggle and domination eventually becomes objectified into social institutiod structures and develops appropriate ideologies to justify and legitimateem.

ose with power and privilege will not voluntarily share their power with thho are without, not necessarily because they lack good will as individuals cause the weight of reified structures based on a division of classes willerrule such a good will. Appeal to the conversion of their individual hearts

ot unimportant, but such conversion, unless made concrete and effective ganized political solidarity with the oppressed majority, would prove only aeffectual gesture, perhaps consoling to their individual conscience but leae situation of oppression just as it was. Likewise, history has shown nognificant example of a ruling class abolishing itself as a class in a massnversion.

hat, then, does this situation of class conflict, often as explosive as in Lati



merica and much of the Third World, require of Christian faith and love? Ty that we must wait for the mass conversion and voluntary self-abolition oe ruling class as a class would be to accept the oppression of the majoritye eschaton. To say that we must remain neutral and impartial in the facech conflicts would be both to accept the moral claims of the respective

asses as equally valid and to legitimate the status quo of oppression in facot in intention. The only option, therefore, is the preferential option of

lidarity with the poor and oppressed, who together suffer basic social conits most degrading form and therefore also have, objectively, both the

rongest motivation for and a shared interest in organizing for their ownmancipation.



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thus accepts the reality and dynamics of class struggle and the necessityrevolutionary class in a broad, general way, without the dogmatism oftensociated with them in the Marxist tradition. It is fully aware of the ongoinnamics of capitalism and the subtle changes in the relations between

asses. It does not accept Marx's nineteenth-century explanation as it was

d does not simply identify the agent of revolution with the industrialoletariat. It insists on the necessity of continuing empirical analyses andoadens the meaning of the proletariat to refer to the "poor" as such, the ot as an isolated and hapharzard phenomenon, but in their organic andructural existence as oppressed classes." 30

macy of Praxis. For Marxism the essence of human existence does not lieimarily in thought, rationality, or any form of inwardness, as in much of aditional philosophy stemming from Plato and Aristotle, or in 'existence' inerkegaardian or Heideggerian sense. It lies in action, activity, or praxis,hereby humans objectify, activate, and actualize their subjectivity,otentialities, and inwardness so as to become concretely free. To act, at thme time, is always to act in a determinate sociohistorical situation. Actione locus of the dialectic of thought and being, subjectivity and objectivity,dividuality and sociality, the weight of the past which necessitates the actd the promise of the future it hopes to actualize. It is above all through

tion that the human essence becomes concrete and effective. The dialectaction thus captures in itself all the dimensions of human existence both eir concrete density and in their mutual relatedness, such as the subjectivthought and self-determination, the historicity of social relations in whichch subjectivity must become actual, and the necessity of social cooperatiod social transformation. The actual human subject, then, is not the thinklling, or feeling subject but the acting subject, of which thinking, willing, eling are aspects or dimensions. In this sense praxis or action is the unifytalizing principle of all the dimensions of concrete existence.

is this acting subject, shaped by the challenges and pressures of thencrete objective situation, which thinks, wills, and feels. The distinctiontween thinking and acting, theory and praxis, is a distinction made and

osited within the unity of the subject, which is essentially the acting subjesubject of praxis. As an intrinsic dimension of this acting subject, theory

kes its origin, impetus, condition, and goal from the exigencies of concretterminate sociohistorical praxis. There is, of course, a dialectic between t



lf-transcending and self-critical dynamism of theory and the confiningessures and challenges of historical praxis, but this unity in difference is aity within praxis as the unifying and totalizing principle and in this sensethin the primacy of praxis. In this anthropological view, theory is essentiaented towards praxis in history and society; the task of theory is not mereinterpret the world but to change it, as Marx said in his famous eleventhesis on Feuerbach. At the same time the praxis of changing the world un

nstant exposure to its contradictions



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d ambiguities also has the epistemological function of disclosing or reveatheory those aspects of the social reality that are inaccessible to ahistoricstract, merely contemplative theory.

is no surprise that TL should find in this Marxian view, which takes humanistence at its most concrete, a sorely needed corrective against traditiona

thropology, which regarded the person as basically a thinker, and traditioistemology, which regarded truth as a static correspondence between thntemplative mind and objective reality. When these are introduced into

hristian theology, the result has been to confer primacy on the intellectuanowing' aspect of faith over the 'doing' of faith, and to relegate such doinaxis to a secondary position as merely an application of a faith antecedennstituted in its own right apart from praxis. The emphasis, therefore, hasturally been on orthodoxy, often leaving orthopraxis, as Schillebeeckx we

ointed out, to non-Christians. 31 The relation between knowing and doing th, as well as the relation between the theory of theology and the praxis th, must be radically reconceived and brought closer to the concrete realthe believing and theologizing subject.

e Utopian Vision History. Whether Marx really thought of the total abolitioclasses as a real historical possibility is still a much debated issue. Hertainly has been accused by his critics of harboring such a utopian dream

evertheless, it would be difficult to deny that Marx's historical vision of aconciled society achievable by human effort, a society of sisters and brotherated from the artificial barriers of class domination, has provided a

owerful inspiration and impetus to the many modern movements of liberat the part of the exploited and oppressed masses around the world. It hasought hope to the despairing masses and awakened confidence in historition where apathy and resignation, long preached as virtues, have

ppressed the human powers of active self-liberation into oblivion. It hasrved as a powerful corrective against the fatalism and ideology of grace,hich has so long thrown a damper on the collective human will to liberatioe name of human depravity and dependence on God, as though suchpendence ever dispensed with the necessity of human initiative. It is notrprising that TL, faced with the tragic reality of Latin America, should findch a utopian vision a source of hopeful action and historical confidence, aelcome antidote against the despairing passivity so often characteristic of ploited peoples.



is thematic classification of the Marxian contribution to TL, I think, can beefully complemented by another approach, that of Ignacio Ellacuria, who

assifies the contribution in terms of ethics, epistemology, and philosophy.3

is brings out the dialectic among the themes as well as between the themd Christian theological concerns. First, the ethical contribution of Maxism awakening the consciousness of social injustice as the most important moallenge of today. Marxism gives ethical meaning to the historical praxis ofstice and historical content to our ethical commitments. In doing so, it see



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overcome the dualism of personal ethics and political praxis: one must finrsonal fulfillment in political praxis and fill such praxis with ethical meanin

y giving a concrete, materialistic, and political meaning to the poor, who aten considered victims of unavoidable fate and mere accidents, it callstention to the structural causes of poverty and overcomes the long history

e 'spiritualization' of the poor. Its utopian vision gives historical content toope and lends itself to the reconceptualization of God as a power in historye power of effective utopia.

the area of epistemology, the Marxian critique of ideology sensitizes us toe hidden interests lurking in prevailing theories, including theology. Interpreting history from below, from the standpoint of the exploitedoletariat, it invites theology to also look at history from the standpoint of t

oor. There is a convergencea relation, not a direct transferencebetween tholetariat as the locus of the knowledge of history and the poor as the locueological interpretation. The doctrine of the unity of theory and praxismpels a reconceptualization of the theoretical status of theology itself, annfers on orthopraxis the status of a necessary, if not sufficient, condition e authenticity of theological theory. The fundamental importance attributMarxism to the struggle in the economic sphere assists TL in overcomingrely spiritualistic conception of salvation and giving it concrete historical

ntent. In contrast to the traditional deductivemetaphysical, transcendentd phenomenological methods, the dialectical method enables theologiansderstand reality in its totality, dynamism, and conflicts, and thus to be mevant and effective in their historical task.

e basic philosophical contribution of Marxism lies in its interpretation of ality as history. In looking at history as a process in which reality isanifested, it opens up new perspectives which enable theology to see hist

a history of salvation, as the locus in which God manifests herself/himseld humans must work for their salvation, in a way similar to the perspective Old Testament. Marx's historical materialism can lead to a new appreciathe materiality of human existence and guard us against the traditionalmptations to false spiritualism and transcendentalism which have longntributed to the legitimation of injustice and domination. It can also lead althy realism in looking at reality, avoiding irrelevant moralism and impoteealism. Marx's vision of a new humanity created by transformed 'history' ae long dark night of the 'prehistory' of mutual domination can help us



discover the Christian vision of utopia, the 'New Heaven' and the 'New Eaening up new perspectives for the praxis and theory of theology and savifrom the excessive pessimism and passive understanding of the doctrineginal sin. Above all, the rediscovery through Marxism of the conflictualaracter of sociohistorical existence gives a new, historical dimension to thruggle against sinso often reified and removed from concrete historyas weto the concepts of the cross, suffering, persecution, and love, which

nceforth can



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o longer be spiritualized and idealized as in the past. It also sensitizes us tstitutional and structural violence so that we may unmask it for what it rea

ese, then, are the basic concepts and categories of Marxism that TL admhas taken over and in fact insists that it must. I have tried to present the

e context of intellectual history and theological concerns. The list is by noeans exhaustive, and much depends on one's classification. It does give uowever, a sufficient indication of the extent to which TL is indebted to thearxist tradition. As should have been noticed, these ideas are taken over nthe precise technical formulation that they have received in the Marxian

adition but rather in their generality as basic ideas or perspectives whichow us to look at human existence and human history in a new way. Thisads us to the third question, namely: What is the spirit or attitude with wappropriates these concepts and categories?

titude of TL Towards Marxism

stated earlier that the appropriation of Marxism by TL is critical and selectrejects those elements of Marxism that are clearly incompatible with thesic affirmations of Christian faith, such as its atheism, totalitarianism,storical determinism, and immanentism. Let me now add that TL retains it

tical approach even with regard to those elements which it admits it hasken over from Marxism. This critical approach, which I think is shared byeologians of liberation as a whole, is summed up in their insistence on theimacy of faith over all human theories and of the faith imperative to liberae poor over all interpretations of the sociohistorical reality, as well as in thnsequent deabsolutizing of the status of Marxism from an absolute, closestem to a scientific method or perspective subject to all the limitations of man sciences.

odovis Boff has recently formulated, on the basis of the actual practice of rtain "rules for the theological use of Marxism," which I find extremely heunderstanding the spirit or attitude with which TL takes Marxism. 33 Thee is to treat it as science, not as religion, prophecy, gnosis, or holy scriptue must guard against the temptation to elevate it to an absolute, closedstem of comprehensive, immutable truths. The second rule is to take thisience in the sense of the scientific method. A method, by nature, ismething flexible and open to further testing, verification, and reformulatio



certainly does not dispense with the need for ongoing empirical analysis oe dynamics of particular situations. What it does is to provide certain wayproaching, interpreting, or dealing with social reality.

e Marxian elements discussed above constitute the content of this methohich means that it is not merely a method of social analysis in the usual sewhich it is distinguished from ideology. It does include certain philosophi

terpretations of human existence and history as a whole, or, if one prefersetaphysics in the broad sense. At the same time, these metaphysicalterpretations are to be taken not as an absolute, immutable system butecisely



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perspectives, horizons, or as medium quothat in light of which reality isoked at. It is as a perspective of this sort that Marxism helped TL in itsdiscovery of certain basic themes of Scripture, such as the theologicaleaning of oppression, the historically enduring conflict between rich andoor, the identification of God and Jesus with the oppressed in society, the

hristian vision of a redeemed society based on justice, equality, and love, teaning of Jesus' conflict with the status quo for Christology, and manyhers. These elements have always been there in Scripture, but it has takee shock of the experience of massive oppression and human degradation e Marxian dialectical perspective on history to rediscover and appreciateem as something central to Christian faith.

e third rule is to use Marxism as a theory of historical reality, not toaggerate its competence as some sort of mathesis universalis or universaeory. As every science has its own formal object, so does Marxism, whoseject is the social and historical dimension of reality and whose competencerefore limited to that dimension. To claim universal competence in all ared dimensions of reality would be a sign of arrogance. Even within the areits own competence there are, we must recognize, many domains of soci

e Marxism has yet to investigate. As Gutierrez adds, we should also recogat Marxism is not the only social science there is. 34

e fourth rule is to treat Marxism as a tool, and therefore only for itsstrumental value. What is important is not Marxism for its own sake but thderstanding of reality that it opens up, more precisely of the reality of pression and the possibilities of liberation. It is only an instrument at thervice of higher ends. As an instrument it is always open to correction andprovement. As knowledge it is subject to the 'epistemological breach,' theeducible gap between knowledge and reality; contrary to the view of

eocracy, the knowledge of something is never identical with its reality. It is instrumental use of Marxism which gives theology a certain flexibility inaling with the claims and issues of Marxist theory as well as in using it for

wn theological purpose.

e fifth and last rule is to use Marxism as a mediation of faith, not as faithelf. It is a mediation which begins from faith and is controlled by faith. Thth in the absolute sovereignty of God and the Gospel must always remain

critical and relativizing principle for all finite mediations of faith. As God is



solute measure of all that is finite (science, Marxism, revolution, history, aon), so does faith have the power to 'detheologize' totemistic Marxism,

etotalize' totalitarian Marxism, and 'deabsolutize' absolutized Marxism.

its own self-understanding, then, the relationship of TL to Marxism is atical, selective, and instrumental one. Some critics may, of course, questihether TL has always observed such a relationship in its actual theological

actice of appropriating Marxism for its own synthesis. It is the burden of tlowing chapters (3 and 4) to show how TL actually integrates the Marxiaurces into its theological construction.



al synthesis of Christian faith and Marxism.

is properly Hegelian moment in TL, unlike its Marxian moment, is moresumed and hidden than explicit and elaborated. As I shall try to show,

owever, its presence is real and of substantial theological significance to thhristian integrity of a TL that seeks to be Christian theology, not sociology.is is no place to go into all the problems of Hegel interpretation, as

ntroversial as in



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e case of Marx. I shall confine myself to those aspects of Hegel relevant tocording to my own interpretations elaborated elsewhere. 35 In any eventems essential to call attention to this Hegelian presence in TL, first becauimportance has generally been neglected and unacknowledged in the

ging debates on TL, and secondly because it provides a significant

eological corrective against the conservative exaggerations of the Marxianesence in TL, which are intent on accusing it of historicist reductionism anndemning it as Christian theology.

t me begin with a summary of the relevant aspects of Hegel's dialectic. Aethod of dialectical reason it begins with a recognition of the otherness orvision among things, parts, or dimensions of reality, but goes on, as analyason''understanding"does not, to show the inner relatedness of things thae other within the unity of the whole, which both renders the totalityncrete and provides an immanent teleological thrust towards reconciliatiothe self-sublation (Aufhebung) of its inner contradictions. The totality asch, then, is a movement resulting from the inner mediation both among trts themselves and between the parts and the whole, in which theovement of the parts concretizes and makes actual (wirklich) that of thehole but does so precisely within the unity of the whole and thus as inneroments of the self-mediation of the whole whose efficacy and teleology as

tality transcend those of the parts as parts. Otherness or negativity,ternality of relations, unity of and within the whole, contradiction and itseological sublation in reconciliation, the concretizing self-mediation of the

hole through the parts; these are the basic categories of dialectical reasonr Hegel, these are not merely the subjective tendencies of human reasont also the aspects of the very structure, come to consciousness in humanthe objective reality which is the Absolute Spirit.36

cording to Hegel, the essence of God or the Absolute Spirit lies in action,hich means both actualization and manifestation of divine subjectivity byeans of an Other. To act is to actualize what otherwise would remain merotential and abstract, and it is also to reveal what otherwise would remaindden and opaque. This self-actualizing and self-expressive activity constite eternal life of the immanent Trinity. Because God is the pure act in thisnamic sense, God also can and does create a world and a history as hisher in relation to which he actualizes and reveals himself. God is reallyated to and involved in human history, and reveals who he is through his



storical action. Transcendence and history are not two independent, mututernal realities. They are indeed distinct; the infinite is not finite. But theyso dialectically united through God's own activity which overreaches the fihis Other, that is, through God's unifying and totalizing power. God cread appropriates the finite as his own Other from within. It is God's own prcreating, redeeming, and reconciling which constitutes history as history

is important to note here the way in which Hegel tries to reconcile theaditional dichotomy of God and creature, transcendence and history, infin



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d finite. For him, an infinite which is only opposed and external to the finnot truly infinite. It still has something outside itself and thus remains limthe latter. By the same token, the finite ceases to be truly finite when it posed to the infinite as something external to itself. For Hegel, to be finiteans to be dependent on the infinite and this as a matter of an intrinsic

tological characteristic of finitude as such: by itself the finite cannot evenite. The opposition, originally motivated by the desire to preserve theanscendence of the infinite over the finite, ironically ends up by finitizing tfinite and infinitizing the finite. The "true" infinite requires that the finite it construed not as something outside the infinite but as something internathat is, as something posited by the infinite itself as an Other and therefoin some sense really distinct from the infinite, but also as its Other which

osits and through which it manifests and incarnates itself, and which

erefore is ultimately subject to its own transcendent efficacy and finality. s view, then, the intrinsic striving of the finite towards the infinite is botht of the finite and the self-mediation of the infinite to itself. In this sense,ue infinite must be construed as Absolute Spiritabsolute because it is notnditioned by anything external to itself but is instead inclusive of the finitOther without losing its own transcendence over the finite as finite. In sh

e true infinite is possible only as a concrete universal or concrete totality.

egel's philosophy of history interprets history as a process in which thebsolute Spirit becomes a concrete totality through the inner mediation of ite spirits in the realm of contingency and externality. The essence andmanent telos of spirit is freedom; that is, it seeks to actualize its

anscendent dynamism and become itself concretely, not abstractly;jectively, not merely subjectively. As a historically conditioned, situated

eedom, however, it can do so only by sublating the contradiction betweenwn ever-transcendent ideals and the limitations of existing institutions, anus by objectifying and concretizing such ideals in ever-new institutions anructures at once historically concrete and socially effective. In the immaneder the agency of historical transformation belongs to certain 'world-storical' individuals and states, who have both the passion and receptivitytualize the newly emerging 'spirit of the times' but whose historical destinways temporary and relative to the needs of a particular time. Their agencbject to the transcendent agency and telos or 'providence' of the Absolut

ho inspires and effects the self-liberation of finite spirits and, through such



eration, its own concretion in history, while also transcending any of itsrticular historical embodiments. For Hegel, then, history is a history of eration, with a twofold meaning: in its historical content, it is political, buabsolute finality it is also religious and transcendent, and the one cannotist without the other. The political content is meaningful only as thestorically particular concretization of the absolute finality, as the absolute solute, not another particular finite, only by virtue of its



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ower to concretize itself through such historical particularity without losingower to transcend such particularity in its historical limitation. 37

ese, then, are some of the salient points of Hegel's theology which I thine important for an understanding of TL, especially its attempt to connectanscendent salvation and historical liberation without falling into

ductionism. The notion of God as an absolute, true infinite inclusive of theite, the dialectic of the concrete univesal actualizng itself through therticular and of the particular as the incarnation of the universal, the

mphasis on action as both actualization and manifestation, history as thecus of the dialectic of the divine universal and the historical particular,ncrete liberation as the effective, immanent telos of that history: these areful to keep in mind in the following chapters, especially in chapter 4 as wscuss the relationship between salvation and liberation or transcendence story. As always, the appropriation of these Hegelian categories by TL is nse of direct transference but one of transformation for its own purpose anits own context.



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hapter IIIheology and Praxis

e Problem of Theory and Praxis

ne of the many challenges of TL has been the need to rethink the relationtween theory (theology) and praxis. Are theory and praxis two coequalmensions of human existence, or is the one derivative from the other? Whactly is the relation between the two? Are they parallel activitieseach with

wn object, end, and sphereor is there a dialectic of mutual constitution anteraction between them, even as they remain mutually distinct andeducible?

the religious sphere proper, TL has challenged us to ask whether Christiath is primarily a matter of theory, belief, and truth or primarily a matter oaxis, action, and justiceis it only a reflection on faith or a reflection in faithell? What is the relation between theology and contemporary historicalaxis? Does theology have to remain external to that praxis because suchstorical praxis is simply irrelevant to the transcendence of theology in its god) and foundation (revelation) and/or because theology must preserve i

tical objectivity and ensure its ideological neutrality vis-a-vis all ideologiesstorical praxis? Or should we say that participation of theology in that praxthe very condition of its transcendence and objectivity? In the latter casehat is the proper role of theological theory in and for the praxis of faith, anow can it preserve its transcendence and objectivity against the ideologicaessures of that praxis? How does the a priori "preferential option for the

oor"so insisted on by TLnot vitiate but confirm the integrity of theology? Ilieve that these questions, with their assumptions about the relationtween theory and praxis, are central to theology as such; they have to do

ot so much with the truth or validity of particular affirmations of theology ath the very foundation



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least the anthropologicalfor the possibility of theology as such. The challeTL in this regard is not, as I stated at the beginning, 'one of the manyallenges' but the challenge to contemporary Christian theology.

e problem of theory and praxis is as old as philosophy and implicitly as olman life itself. As such it contains all the basic problems of philosophy, su

subject and object, consciousness and reality, transcendence and historyeality and actuality, philosophy and politics. This comprehensive charactere implications of the problem is quite understandable, given the structureman existence as a unity of transcendence and history, from which arise e relations and contradictions between the polarities of existence. Humane not simply merged in and with the given but are burdened with the tasanscending the given in view of their ends, of both rendering it intelligibleought and humanizing it in action.

r the classical tradition of Aristotle, which has ruled the relation betweeneory and praxis ever since, this task generally takes three forms incordance with their respective object and end. The first consists in 'makinpoiesis. Its object is material things in nature; its end, to transform them

to instruments of human needs. Poiesis thus covers the entire sphere of aterial production. The second consists in action or praxis, whose object isot material things but human actions in society and history and whose endtransform and order human actions ethically so as to make possible ammunity (polis) of free citizens. The human need for transcendence,

owever, is not confined to the transformation of material and politicalistence in history, with all its contingency and variability. It also manifestself in the need to know and attain what is necessary, immutable, andconditioned, and this for its own sake, not as a means to material and

olitical ends within history. From this need follows the third form of human

istence, theoria. Its object is the unchanging and necessary, and its end joyment of truth for its own sake. This is the sphere of theology (knowledGod as the ultimate, unchanging source and end of all changing things),

etaphysics (knowledge of the universal, necessary structures of all beingsing), and, by extension, the 'theoretical' aspects of the empirical sciences

sofar as they are 'disinterested' inquiries into the (relatively) stablegularities and uniformities in nature and society.

is classical conception of three forms of life, of course, was not free of



eology. It arose from the existing social divisions in the ancient and medieorld among three classes of peoplethe manual laborers, holders of politicaower, and the intellectuals (philosophers and theologians)and, in turn, ser

legitimate the hierarchical organization of society. Based on the dualisticthropology of the material and the spiritual, it ignored the essential sociad historical context of human existence taken as a concrete totality whichcessarily introduces a disturbing dialectic into the relation among the

onomic, political, and intellectual spheres of human activity, undermining-too-neat



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stinctions according to formal object and specific end by which suchstinctions were made and justified.

briefly indicated in the preceeding chapter, it is this social and ideologicavision of labor that was radically challenged by the historical materialism oe Marxist tradition. As far as Christian theology is concerned, however, it

en as though the Marxian critique had never existed. Until very recently, evailing conception of theology as primarily a theoretical, contemplativeence, and separate from the critical problems of economic exploitation an

olitical oppression, went largely unchallenged. It has been left to TL toallenge this dominant conception and save theology from its lofty isolatio

om historical praxis and integrate it into the concrete totality which is hume. Why theology, otherwise so sensitive to the contributions of existentialisenomenology, personalism, analytic philosophy, and process thought, har so long remained oblivious of the contributions of ideology critique remafertile territory for a sociology of knowledge to explore.

e purpose of this chapter is neither to review the entire history of thencepts of theory and praxis nor to discuss their contemporary developmed their ramifications in theology, philosophy, and the empirical sciences.y purpose is limited to the presentation and discussion of the specific issused by and against TL. Ever since Gutierrez challenged contemporaryademic theology with his new definition of theology as "a critical reflection

hristian praxis in the light of the Word"2 and his claim that "the theology oeration offers us not so much a new theme for reflection as a new way toeology,"3 the challenge has been met with critical counter-challenges fromfferent quarters, each with its own conception of theology and its owneological agenda. In what follows, I shall first present three importantticisms of TL, those of the Vatican, Schubert Ogden, and Dennis P. McCa

d Charles R. Strain; then will go on to discuss, at some length, the positioTL, covering such topics as the historicity of theology, solidarity with the

oor, and its theological method, i.e., the "hermeneutic circle''; and finally wspond to the critics.

iticisms of Theology of Liberation

e Vatican

its virtual condemnation of TL4, the Vatican points out that TL subordina



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lue" (ix, 6). It also seems clear that such a "partisan" conception of truthould discredit in advance all views which do not share the same commitmthe class struggle and make impossible real dialogue with other points of

ew "with objectivity and attention (x, 1 & 3). Other positions, considerednly reflections of class interests,'' would not have to be examined "in

emselves" (x, 1).5

hat, then, is the Vatican's understanding of the theological significance oaxis, especially the political praxis of solidarity with the oppressed? Thetican does recognize that there is a kind of "practical orientation, which ioper to traditional theology in the same way that speculative orientation id which should not be confused with the "privileged priority" given to thevolutionary praxis "as the supreme criterion for theological truth" (x, 3). Ae Vatican puts it:

A healthy theological method no doubt will always take the praxis of the church intaccount and will find there one of its foundations, but that is because that praxiscomes from the faith and is a lived expression of it. (ibid.)

addition to the Gospel, the social teachings of the church, and contributitheologians and other thinkers to the reflection of the church, the Vatica

ates that

likewise the experience of those who work directly for the evangelization and for tadvancement of the poor and the oppressed is necessary for the doctrinal andpastoral reflection of the church. In this sense it is necessary to affirm that onebecomes more aware of certain aspects of truth by starting with praxis, if by thatone means pastoral praxis and social work which keep its evangelical inspiration.(xi, 13)

axis, then, is authentic only insofar as it "comes from the faith and is a livpression of it" or "keeps it evangelical inspiration," and becomes relevant theological method or as "one" of its foundations by making us "more awacertain aspects of truth" in "simply drawing attention to the consequenced political implications of the truths of faith, which are respected beforehr their transcendent value" (ix, 6). For the Vatican, faith is primarily a mattruth or orthodoxy, and praxis is only a subsequent "expression" of faith.axis must respect the truth of faith "beforehand," and its only contributioth as truth lies in drawing the "consequences" and "implications" of the

tter and making us "more" aware of them. In short, praxis is neither an



trinsic moment of faith itself, which is primarily a matter of truth, nor ansential moment in the very disclosure of the content of faith, which issically already known apart from praxis.

hubert Ogden

ne of Ogden's many criticisms of TL6 is that it confuses the witness of faithich is indeed binding on the theologian as believer, with critical



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flection on that witness, which distinguishes the theologian as theologianisting theologies of liberation "are not so much theology as witness," and

hey tend rather to be the rationalization of positions already taken than thocess or product of critical reflection on those positions." 7 They are guiltyncritically assuming that the claims of the Christian witness are true" and

hat the liberation it promises is one and the same with that for which mend women today are asking."8 As a result, they are, along with the vastajority of theologies in the past, "Christian ideologies, in the precise sensetionalizing the prior claims of the Christian witness instead of criticallyquiring as to their meaning and truth."9 The only critical function of aditional theology "has been restricted to criticizing particular witnesses ofth by reference to whatever has been understood to constitute normative

hristian witness, whether Scripture and tradition, or, rather Scripture

one."10 It did not try to ask, and answer, "the radical question" about theuth of that normative witness itself.11

r Ogden, liberal theology, of course, took one step further and tried toticize traditional Christian faith on the basis of human experience and reaunderstood in the context of modernity. Nonetheless, it too remained mo

rationalization of positions already taken than a critical reflection on the trthose positions insofar as it originated in "a prior option and commitment

cular self-understanding" which it simply took for granted and in terms ofhich it tried to rationalize the Christian witness.12 Theologies of liberationpically charge that all pre-liberationist theologies are ideological; they claiat the liberation of theology from ideology is possible only on the basis of ior option and commitment to an effective solidarity with the oppressed, aat theology is truly liberated only as a reflection in and on the praxis of

olitical emancipation. This claim of theologies of liberation, however, is "sime more proposal for the bondage of theology."13 Even though the term o

ondage has shifted from the oppressor to the oppressed, the bondage to ttter still remains bondage. What is necessary is a reconceiving of the verysk of theology from the rationalization of positions already taken to the crflection on such positions.14 A "radically free" theology is free "from" all

ositions so that it may be free "for" all positions. Theological reflection is frresult in positions reflecting solidarity with the oppressed, as does Ogden

wn reflection, but it is not in such solidarity that theology should originate

Ogden, then, advocating the possibility of a wholly presuppositionless



eology, a theology without any prior option and commitment? He is awareat such a theology is not possible. He does distinguish, however, betweenst-order commitment to a particular position as given in tradition or praxishich he rejects as uncritical, and a second-order commitment to the criticarch for truth as such and to human beings who seek the truth, which hecepts as the indispensable and only valid commitment for the theologian.e only prior option of theology is "simply the prior option and commitmen

y and



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critical reflectionnamely, human existence as such in its profound exigenr the truth that alone can make us free." 16 In fact, "theology as such exiove all, to respond to this deep human need for truth."17 To put it

fferently, theology as a process of reflection

is committed simply to understanding the meaning of the Christian witness and to

assessing its truth, and, therefore, to any and all human beings insofar as, beinghuman, they are somehow moved by the question of the ultimate meaning of theiexistence to which this witness presents itself as the answer.18

a product or result of such a critical process, theology is committed not othe truth of the Christian witness but also to

giving reasons for the claim that this witness is true. As such, it is, once again, acommitment to any and all human beings insofar as, being human, they not only

ask about the ultimate meaning of their existence but are also bound to seek onlythe truth in doing so.19

gden distinguishes between theology as critical reflection and theologydertaken as a Christian vocation. Insofar as a theologian assumes theolosponsibilities as his or her vocation as a Christian, a theologian too mustake the same prior first-order commitment that must be made by any othhristian. Even in this case, however, it is not the commitment of faith oneares with other Christians but the element of critical reflection on the trutat faith that makes one a theologian. An involvement in the process of eration is necessary if the work of a theologian is to remain a Christiancation, but what makes it concrete and scientific is the critical testing of tuth of the claims implied in such involvement. Without the latter, theologymains a reflection in faith, but not a reflection on faith, which theologyould be. The connection between theology as a Christian vocation andeology as critical reflection, for Ogden, is "contingent," and the error of T

confuse a contingent with a necessary connection. In short, praxis of faitcessary for the Christian believer but contingent for the theologian aseologian.20

e service of theology to praxis, then, "can be only the indirect service of tically reflecting on the positions that such praxis implies," which is "the orvice that a truly free theology is in a position to perform."21 A direct servthe Christian witness and political praxis would turn theology into a

tionalizing ideology.22 Theology is itself a way of bearing witness to faith,



e way it does is neither the "explicit" one of proclaiming the Gospel nor thmplicit" one of liberating praxis23 but that of subjecting to critical reflectioone's beliefs, including the very belief that we are saved not by our own

ood works but solely by God's grace accepted in faith, and thereby



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knowledging that our beliefs are at best our own intellectual good works.nly a theology that is itself genuinely free can bear witness to "a God whoft and demand are radical freedom." 24

cCann and Strain

third criticism of TL comes from Dennis P. McCann and Charles R. Strain,ho in a way combine the criticisms of the Vatican and Ogden. For McCannd Strain, as for Ogden, TL lacks a formal, theoretical reflection on the trud validity of its own substantive claims, and, as for the Vatican, it is guiltysolutistic dogmatism. But whereas Ogden proposes as a remedy criticalflection on the meaning and truth of the substantive Christian beliefs from

osition committed only to human existence in its need for truth and thetican insists on obedience to the magisterium of the church, McCann and

rain's remedy lies in founding practical theology on a public discourse freeom domination and constraint as well as from commitment to all substantiositions, the only justifiable commitment being the "readiness to reasongether."25

e central problem of practical theology, for McCann and Strain is how tocide on the appropriate political programs (e.g., socialism vs. capitalism)

olitical strategies and actions to achieve such programs. The trouble with T

at of Segundo and Gutierrez in particular, is that it dogmatically opts forcialist praxis as the only form of orthopraxis without providing a procedurechanism whereby such an option could be arrived at without violating thlues of pluralism and tolerance. TL brands all other forms of praxis asteropraxis and makes absolutistic and exclusivistic claims for its own positdoes not allow theory, i.e., intersubjective rationality, to inform praxis, thcognizing no genuine dialectic of theory and praxis. Religious praxis is hel

ostage to the political strategies of whatever group happens to have theower to define it. Ironically, according to McCann and Strain, the so-calledimacy of praxis in TL perpetuates the primacy of theory in a new form,erely transferring sacral authority from doctrines to political strategies andctics. The sacralism, which used to attach to orthodoxy with its pretense clusive moral validity and religious absolutism, now clings to orthopraxis areatens totalitarianism as an ever-present possibility.26

ow, then, does one avoid this theological totalitarianism? For McCann andrain, practical theology is a "discourse about the religious foundations of t



s publica,"27 and the only way for practical theology to avoid totalitarianis"by adhering to an ideal of public discourse that transcends all the particummunities with a pluralistic culture."28 Drawing on the thought of Jürgen

abermas,29 who had to grapple with the similar problem of orthodoxy andthopraxis in Marxism, McCann and Strain propose to shift the discussion fbstantive issues and positions to the formal conditions and criteria for the

ossibility of authentic discourse about such issues. Such authentic discour

discourse "among all qualified participants,"30 free from all distorting exte



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nstraintsincluding that of the immediate pressures of actionand committeo substantive prejudgments and class interests, the only commitment beinhe formal commitment to providing publicly scrutable reasons" 31 in a freemmunity of rational inquirers. The norms and criteria derived from theanscendental analysis of such discourse would then guide all critical reflec

praxis, on political programs, strategies, and actions. The foundation of actical theology must be sought in a theory of public discourse. Only in thay is it also possible to preserve the integrity of theory and a genuine dialtheory and praxis. For "praxis is not blind activism. It is action generatedmmunities self-consciously constituted through public discourse."32 It sho noted here that for McCann and Strain, theory is not conceived as an

trinsic moment of praxis itself; it is external to and coequal with praxis, anly as such could it guide orthopraxis. The dialectic of theory and praxis

volves the interaction of two elements, each constituted independently ofher.33

storicity of Theology

ith and Praxis

eferring to the basic challenge facing theology today, Gutierrez quotes frohann Metz:

Properly speaking, the so-called hermeneutic problem of theology is not the probleof how systematic theology stands in relation to historical theology, how dogmastands in relation to history, but what is the relation between theory and practice,between understanding the faith and social praxis.34

e challenge today, in other words, is not one of integrating the history ofeology into contemporary systematics or one of understanding thevelopment of dogma or even of founding theology on a critical basis in

gden's or McCann's sense, but one of understanding faith in relation to soaxis and its demand. Systematics, historical theology, dogma, criticaleology, and their mutual relationship: these are problems within theologythin the realm of theory. The essential challenge today, however, is nottratheoretical; it has to do with the very relationship between theory andaxis.

response to this challenge Gutierrez defines theology as "a critical reflect

oth from within, and upon, historical praxis, in confrontation with the Word



e Lord as lived and accepted in faith," "a reflection in, and on, faith aseration praxis," "an understanding of the faith from an option and ammitment," "from a point of departure in real, effective solidarity with theploited classes," "from a commitment to create a just society,'' "a theologflection that



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comes true, verified, in real and fruitful involvement in the liberationocess." 35 How are we to understand this radically different definition of eology and its uncomfortably close marriage with praxis?

begins with a full recognition, as does any theology, of the irreduciblyanscendent dimension of faith, the primary object of its reflection. In its

gin faith is a product of divine grace, not human work. In its fides quae itrected to transcendent realities as to its object, the Trinity, the Kingdom,eation and redemption, grace, and so forth. As Clodovis Boff puts it:

Faith, as a theological virtue, a "gift of God," signifies an absolute openness to anabsolute meaning: the Meaning of meanings. Faith is not and cannot be adequatelidentified with any of its possible or real human expressions, be they in thetheoretical order or in the practical. Exuberant dynamism that it is, faith is notexhausted in any of its manifestations.36

is transcendence defines the "essence" of faith. This essence, however, iver found in its pure transcendence. In its concrete, historical "existenceman faith, Boff claims that

faith is nothing without the particular realizations of its aim and intent. It exists inconcreto only in altogether determinate structures. Apart from its historicalconcretizations, faith, for a human being, is but an abstraction, or, better, only thetranscendental possiblity of particular realizations.37

is not only the inevitable historicity of human existence in which faith mu incarnated if it is to be human faith which necessarily renders theanifestations of faith historically particular and determinate. It is also the vurce of faith, God's grace inviting us to accept God, and the very nature oe object of faith, the Trinity, the Kingdom, creation and redemption of story, which demands the concrete realization of our faith, which can onlystorically particular. The very element of truth in faith, as Kierkegaard point, is something salvific and existential, with an intrinsic demand forpropriation and realization in historical praxisnot some existentially neutrarely objective piece of information or a set of propositions meant only for derstanding, as the classical intellectualist tradition would have it.38 The

uth of faith precisely in its objective reference to the transcendent reality od is meant to be a "basic life option" or orientation and a transformation e totality of our existence. It is "the intrinsic dynamism of faith that

cessarily impels it to assume concrete 'incarnations',"39 and it is only in a



rough such incarnations that faith is historically real.

e transcendence of faith this side of the eschaton, then, does not lie in thanscendence of all history but "in the form of realizations ever to be renewdicalized, and deepened"40 in history. Inherent in faith is a dialectic of



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anscendence and immanence, and the locus of such a dialectic is notmewhere between heaven and earth but history itself called to transcendansformation. This dialectic of transcendence and history in history, of couitself theologically meaningful only because it is posited and legitimated be dialectic of divine existence, the absolute sovereignty of God, and thus

n the horizon of transcendence."41

(I shall deal with this self-incarnatingalectic of divine existence in the following chapter.)

is in this dialectical sense that the relation between faith and praxis is to derstood. Faith and praxis are not, as the Vatican would have it, two

dependent, mutually external realities that must be brought togetherlowing their constitution as independent realities, where the one is conceas the "consequence," "implication," or "expression" of the other. Theiration is mutually internal and ''constitutive."42 Faith by its own naturemands actualization in praxis, as (Christian) praxis by its own nature isnstituted by the informing and transforming demand of faith. Praxis is noplication of faith, an application extrinsic to faith but the realization of fai

wn intrinsic demand. For praxis is precisely "faith qua operataqua lived,alized."43 This demand for the unifying realization of faith by praxis alsontains the moment of opposition between the two: the transcendence ofth challenges the self-complacency and reifying tendency of praxis and c

to constant self-transcendence, just as praxis challenges the apoliticalcapism of faith into pure privatism and interiorism and calls it to historicalalization and relevance.

bstractly, "essentially" or undialectically considered, faith corresponds to theoretical dimension of subjective inwardness and divine transcendence, waxis refers to objective concreteness and historical realization; however,xistentially" and dialectically, they are two moments of an intrinsic totality

hich may be called faith from the teleological horizon of transcendence oraxis from the perspective of the historical realization inherent in faith itsele special danger today, according to liberation theologians, is apoliticalcapism in the name of faith. Hence their emphasis on faith as praxis, ased. The point of TL is to preserve the existential integrity of faith that "worough charity" (Paul), not to glorify the deed divorced from faith or tovocate justification by works. In this sense, "true orthodoxy is orthopraxis

here the "is" must be taken dialectically. "In the final analysis what basicaunts is the deed."45 "After all, apart from works, faith is only words! Faith



thout practice is sermonizing."46 Worse, "a 'pure' faith, faith devoid of allncrete mediation, is hypocrisy pure and simple."47

eology and Praxis

a critical reflection on the content of faith, theology also shares in thealectical structure of faith. It has, first of all, a theoretical and a transcendmension. As theory, it has its own autonomy and consistency, a logic and

rpose of its own not reducible to the immediate pressures and demands oaxis. The



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mediate end of theology is the discursive, systematic, and critical cognitiothe transcendent content of faith. It is not itself faith, praxis, revelation, lvation, just as its immediate function is not to preach. This critical distantween theology and its object must be preserved, precisely for the sake oe integrity of its objecti.e., to understand the object in its true identity an

ot to reduce it either to theology (theory) or to ideology, mindless activismolatry, and narcissism, the many practical perversions to which faith in itsmediacy is always prone. The best theology is the most rigorously theorescientific theology. 48 TL does not confuse the critical function of theologth the immediacy of witness any more than Ogden does.

e transcendent dimension of theology is constitued by its reference to thntent of faith, the absolute sovereignty of God and the primacy of thengdom, which is not reducible to any particular historical reality. Theeological dimension of theology lies in this "horizon of transcendence," inhich the Kingdom remains "ever the proton in intention and the eschaton ope."49 In both the epistemological locus or horizon from which it speaksi.velationand the meaning it seeks to disclose of temporal realities sub specei, theology is transcendent.

is theoretical and transcendent dimension, however, is not all there is toeology. Like faith and everything else human, theology too shares in thestoricity of human existence, and it is within the conditions of history thateology must perform its function as a critical instrument of faith. Theologyhuman science is inevitably a dialectic of theory and praxis, of transcended history. Let me now look at this dialectic a little more closely, largely onsis of the sophisticated analysis found in Clodovis Boff's Theology and Prarhaps the best treatment of the subject in TL.50 Boff discusses this dialecder three headings, the topos, kairos, and telos of theology; these are th

ree mediating categories of the relation between theory (theology) andaxis.

rst to be considered is the topos or locus of theology. Theology is done byncrete human beings and thus within history, not outside, not within histken abstractly and generally but "within a determinate socio-historicaluation."51 When they do theology, they do so "in and from someterminate social locus, make use of the means society offers them, and

rmulate cognition and meaning endowed with a determinate social existe



d finality."52 Even before a theologian may consciously and subjectively tpolitical position and option, this is the objective sociological situation andtum: all theology, like all theory, is sociohistorically situated. By virtue of sertion into the historical situation and the role it plays objectively in thatuation, every theology, whether conservative or liberal, consciously historahistorical, politically committed or indifferent, has its political and

eological consequences, and in this sense the most traditional theology is

ss politically "committed," at least indirectly, than the most radical theologliberation. This is simply the



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mitation imposed by the concrete sociality and historicity of human existen all theology and theory. The only question is whether and to what extenrticular theologian is subjectively conscious of it and what kind of a positioption he or she consciously takesfor whom? for what cause? for whose

terest and power? and on what basis? 53

is general relation between theology and its sociopolitical locus, however,s to be understood dialecticallyi.e., as a unity in difference. Theology is th

ork of the human mind, whose basic capacity is that of critical self-anscendence. It has its own autonomous logic and dynamism notechanistically determined by the needs and pressures of an order differenom itself. The theologian as an epistemological subject and the theologiansocial subject, cognition and power, epistemology and sociology of owledgeall belong to two different orders or levels, and "there is no directmediate, continuous relationship"54 between the two. There is anpistemological breach" posed by the human mind with its own dynamismnerative originality. In this sense, labels such as 'theology of the center,'eology of the periphery,' and 'Third World theology' point to the topos anen the ideological and political functions of such theologies, but they do nthemselves settle the analytic and evaluative questions concerning the tsuch theologies.55

ere is, however, an essential, although mediate, relationship of unitytween the two different orders. This is due to the concrete historical unitytality of the two orders, cognition and action, knowledge and politics, theeological subject and object, and the political subject and object. After ale subject of theological cognition is also the subject of political commitmee mind of the thinking theologian is always an incarnate, situated mind, " absolutely free, creative mind or spirit like the divine mind."56 It is from

wn situation that the theological mind receives its impulses and pressures eologizing, just as we can comprehend God "only within the purview of oustorical possibilities."57 The transcendence of all history is possible only aschatological hope, not as a present achievement. It is thus that each ageaves its mark on the theologian and one theology is differentiated fromother, as one's political options leave their marks on one's choice of eological style, vocabulary, subject matter, and basic emphasis. The sameue of the object of theological reflection and political commitment. Ouractical position furnishes us with materials for our theoretical reflection, a



e tend to choose our theoretical object in view of our political commitmene political object becomes the theological object.

is mediate relation between one's theological reflection and one's politication is of course not a mechanistic or causal, but a reflective relation in

hich the political option pressures the reflection in a certain direction andus 'permits' the theologian to see the relevance and urgency of certain iss

d themes and 'prohibits' him or her from entertaining the possibility of hers. Thus, the political option is an antecedent epistemological conditionveloping a certain



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nd of theology. As such, it is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition; ork of reflection, once oriented in a certain direction, must still be performcording to its own logic. 58

cond, Boff examines the kairos, or historical relevance, of theology. Theoheory) and history are not coequal, mutually independent realities, as we

ten led to believe under the linquistic spell of the word "and," any more thstory can be reduced to concepts or be substituted for by ideas, aseoreticism, "that aristocratic form of idealism,"59 would have it. Theory iself rooted in our primordial experience of 'being,' 'life,' 'world,' or 'history' e totality of our existence and praxis, and emerges from this totality only sult of a self-conscious breach and abstraction, without, however, everaving that totality or being able to reduce the totality to its ownnceptualities. As in classical critical realism, reality, being, and world are pcognition, logic, and awareness. Although there is no reality simply givenart from interpretation, such interpretation is itself a function of the priorallenge of reality as perceived in the pre-theoretical or pre-reflectivensibility of the Lebenswelt.60

is as a response to the challenge of this lived, historical world that theologses. It tries to respond to the kairos, the propitious moment, the 'signs ofe times' of each historical epoch, and thus to acquire its relevance. Doeological questions address the historical moment and its real crises,fficulties, and contradictions, or do they deal with only trivial, peripheral,elevant issues? What are the problems demanding the theologian's attenday? What is the contemporary task of theology? What are the theologianeologize about? The answer varies from age to age. What is relevant in one becomes irrelevant in another. Theological interest changes as a functiothe historical context of each theology, as witness the different concerns

e fathers of the church, the medieval scholastics, and contemporaryeologians. Even within the same age, not everyone is interested in the saeology. What one group considers relevant is dismissed as irrelevant byother. Implicit in the debate on the relevance or irrelevance of a theologysociological interpretation of the needs and urgencies of a society. In thisnse, even the most conservative theologies are relevant (at least indirectls-à-vis the prevailing social order that they try to justify, although suchevance often remains tacit until and unless they are challenged, by the rcompeting social forces, to declare their political position. Strictly speakin



o theology is totally irrelevant. Relevance is always a function of a givenuation, set of interests, or political causes. The real question to ask, then,

elevant to what social situation, for which political cause, to the interest ofhich class?61

ow, then, does one go about answering these questions? For Boff, theswer would depend on the dialectic of two things, ethical or prophetic

nsibility and social analysis. Prophetic sensibility refers to the pre-theoretiobal experience of a situation, born of the concrete praxis of life in aterminate



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cial position. As the lived 'feel' of the situation in all its painful contradictiopermits the perception of what is relevant in the situation. It is expressede language of indignation, criticism, denunciation, and demands for chanis prophetic sensibility, with its capacity for discerning real historical crised problems, is possible only through the lived experience of such crises a

nfronted in praxis. For a genuine insertion into this 'flow of history,' howee also needs the capacity for social analysis and criticism. The demand focial change must be based on an objective analysis of the realities of theuation to be changedits contradictions, their causes, the real possibilities

ansformation, the historical dynamics of the situation, and so forth. Withoch analysis, sensibility remains blind and ends up in empty illusion andeffective protest, just as analysis without sensibility can degenerate into pchnique and cynicism. What is necessary is a ceaseless dialectic of the tw

oments, theory and praxis, reason and experience. 62

e third aspect is the telos or finality of theology, or the practical interestsd causes in view of which theology is done. Here again, it is not to be deat theology as theory has its own theoretical telos, knowledge. It has its onceptual finality and mode of operation, an epistemological interestmanent in and constitutive of the theoretical inquiry. In this sense theolo

heory) is an end in itself, disinterested or neutral with regard to non-

eological, practical ends and objectives. On the other hand, at a differentvel, as sociology of knowledge has shown, every theory is also a social reath its own social functioneven if not subjectively intended by theholarwithin a determinate social totality. There is no body of knowledge thnot socially situated and politically oriented, in one manner or another. "Aowledge is, in fact, power, in virtue of its factual insertion into the fabric cial interests,"63 a fact well confirmed in the massive attempts of

overnments and organized groups to control the production and distributioknowledge and information. As a form of social power, then, no theory is

olitically and ideologically neutral and impartial. This does not mean that tactical social finality exhausts the theoretical, immanent finality of theory.epending on the merit of a theory, its "truth," it may transcend the merit

historically conditioned sociopolitical function. Still, theory does have sucactical function, which it cannot ignore in the name of pure neutrality. Thhile we may still learn from the theology of Aquinas with its theoretical

ality, we cannot remain indifferent to its objective ideological function in



fense of feudalism.

e relationship of theory and praxis, however, is far more intimate andalectical than mere coexistence at two different levels. Theory is itself amension and activity within the concrete historical totality of human existed cannot be divorced from praxis and its end, the solution of the problemat existence. Ultimately, it is praxis and its finality that "get theory going,

at "fire the logical mechanism of the cognitive process."64 It is the challend pressure of praxis that motivate and orientate the process of theoreticaflection.



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is within the pervasive finality of praxis that theory pursues its relativelytonomous course, asking new questions and arousing new interests. Thealectic of theory and praxis is itself a dialectic within praxis. Within thealectic of historical praxis, "the immediate end of theory is cognition, but ediate and terminal end is praxis itself." 65

ven this ultimate primacy of praxis over theory, the question for theology ot whether it is interested or disinterested, but where its objective interests, for what cause it is being done, and, further, how to narrow "the gulf paratingon the social planesubjective interests and objective interests, god outcomes, conscience and consequences,"66 truth and justice. Theswer, as discussed earlier, can only lie in a living synthesis of a religious,oral sensibility and critical social analysis of the historical realities of auation.

e Historical Particularity of Theology

is on the basis of this analysis of the dialectic of theory and praxis and of storicity of that dialectic that we have to understand the insistence of TL lf-conscious acceptance of the historical particularity and provisionalaracter of all theologies, including TL, and the necessity of pluralism ineology. TL is systematically conscious of its own historicity. As Gutierrez p

it "springs up out of the material foundations of society,"67 and "addressfrom a precise location, speaks the Word of the Lord to us in thernacular."68 Likewise, to recognize this historicity is also to recognize thatery theology is "transitional" in its task, as Hegel clearly saw that noilosophy transcends its own time.69 If the intellectual challenge of the

onbeliever was the historical basis of modern liberal theology, the historicasis of TL is the practical challenge of the 'nonperson,' the oppressed of third World.70 TL is "only the new consciousness, in communion with theurch, that one Christian generation has of its faith in a given moment instory,"71 as, for Hegel, philosophy is ''its own time comprehended inought."72 It is precisely under the challenge of contemporary history thateology renders its critical service to faith, making the praxis of faith morelf-critical, more prophetic, and thus more radical, profound, andficacious.73

is does not negate the transcendence and universality of the Word of Gotended by theology. Rather, the historical particularity of theology is an



trinsic demand of that very transcendence and universality. If faith in itsanscendence and universality is to be concretely meaningful for all ages, ntside of all ages, and if each age has its own intellectual horizon andstorical tasks, it is imperative that faith enter into a dialectic with each agaking itself intellectually credible and proving its transcendence by liberatd transforming human praxis according to its own demand, and thusncretely show its transcendence and universality. Faith must demonstrate

uth by being tested in praxis, "the proving ground of all theory,"74 This is e more urgent today when, for TL, the challenge is not onlyistemologicali.e., how to make faith intelligible to modern consciousness oe basis of an existentialist or



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anscendental "critique" of traditional theologybut also and primarily social axicali.e., how to make faith in the goodness of God and the Kingdomedible by transforming the sinful, oppressive structures of power. 75 Thentent of faith is essentially a "concrete universal"; it is universal, not as anstraction from all history, but as a concrete transforming power operative

ery age. To incarnate faith in and for a particular age is not to deny itsanscendencefaith is not exhausted by a particular historical expression of but rather to fulfill the demand for historical concretion inherent in itsntent.

e relation between theology and history, then, is neither contingent (Ogdor external (the Vatican) but necessary and internal. History enters into thry interpretation of the very content of faith and its praxis which wouldcarnate faith in that history. Theology does not merely "apply" universaluth, somehow apprehended apart from historical context, to a particularuation, but rethinks that universal truth itself in light of the particularuation and tries to make it concrete, as it also reflects on the particularuation in light of the universal. Every generation must rethink the dogmasth, incorporate them, and make them true in their historically conditionedaxis.76 Theology, then, is an essentially historical dialectic, a dialectic of anscendence and history, universal and particular. In this sense, the chur

istorical and social coordinates, its here and now, have a bearing not onlye adequacy of its pastoral methods. They also should be at the very hearteological reflection."77 That is, the particularities of a historical situation aevant not only for the evaluation of pastoral practices, social doctrines, o

ractical theology,' which are often considered practical applications of meless truth to particular circumstances, but also for the rethinking of thismeless truth itselfi.e., including Scripture, creeds, and systematic or dogmeology.

is imperative of faith as a concrete universal means not only that everyeology is and must be historically particular but also that no human theolon exhaust the universal and transcendent content of faith and claim to bee theology for all times and places; every theology is necessarily provisiond must remain open to other theologies in other historical circumstances.eology must give up its pretensions to absolute, ahistorical, universal trutwell as its attempt to remain above the conflicts of concrete history in thme of timeless truth. Such a claim is at best "phony," "ideological," and



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every theology develops de facto as a particularand in some way politicaltheology.The theology that recognizes this condition, and presents itself as what it is defacto, at the same time acknowledges the transcendence that belongs to the faithby right and permits it a potentially infinite manifestation of concrete possibilities,as well in the theoretical as in the practical order. By contrast, a theology thatignores its historicity and political nature, and presents itself as theology itselfthe

rigid, dogmatistic expression of the meaning and imperatives of faiththis theology,which claims that it coincides with the voice of revelation itself, can only be anideology. It adopts an erroneous position, be it in the area of theory (illusion) orpolitics (lie). 79

eology and Solidarity

e Disclosive Function of Solidarity

ow, then, does TL pursue its contemporary theological task? How does itate to Scripture and the theological tradition on the one hand and to theallenge of contemporary Latin American history on the other? How does iate these two relations into a theological synthesis? How does it settle thestion of the social locus, historical relevance, and political objective of eology without reducing theology to ideology? In short, what is the methoTL?

e method of TL lies basically in the dialectical circleguided by propheticnsibilityof the hermeneutic mediation, the interpretation of Scripture and eological tradition, and the socio-analytic mediation, the critical analysis oe dialectic of contemporary history, its contradictions and possibilities of ansformation. Let me begin with the prophetic sensibility.

e basic challenge to the contemporary task of theology is how to findncrete access to the central crises and contradictions of our time so as tole to reflect on faiththe hermeneutic mediationand to produce relevant

carnations of that faiththe socio-analytic mediationfrom the perspective ore horizon internal to that crisis. A purely external and abstract approach d

ot provide a real access to the concrete, lived situation of praxis with itsses, challenges, and ambiguities. A theology that reflects on a situation frtside without a real inner experience of that situation will imposestractions on the concrete, abstractions which have not grown out of thencrete, which miss the real lived crisis of the concrete, and are ultimately

nored or resisted by the concrete as irrelevant or, worse, ideological. In th



al analysis such a theology would be as guilty of extrinsicism as was theaditional dualistic theology now rejected by humanists and contemporaryeology alike. The whole anthropological turn in modern theology has in faen an attempt to reflect on faith precisely from the viewpoint of modernnsciousness. However, today's



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imary challenge, as least as seen by TL, does not come so much fromodern consciousness as from modern reality.

is as a way of acquiring the inner standpoint or perspective of contemporses as a condition for theological reflection that TL insists on participatione praxis of concrete solidarity with the oppressed in their struggles for

eration. 80 This participation or lived experience concretely discloses truthout the human situation under contemporary historical conditions, and pestions to the traditional interpretations of faith and the prevailingstifications of the existing social structurean epistemological function witheological and political cutting edges not accessible to purely theoreticaleology, which merely observes the crises from outside. It "affords arception of aspects of the Christian message that escapes otherproaches."81

Involvement in the liberation process introduces Christians to an altogetherunfamiliar world. They must make a quantum leap. They must now subject thesocial order and its familar ideology to a new, radical questioning. In a word, theymust break with the old ways of knowing.82

ch an experience makes one aware concretely, not abstractly, of the pligthe oppressed, the irrationality and inhumanity of the system of which the victims, and the urgency of structural change. Confronted with the poo

my world changes,"83 and I acquire a new perspective, a perspective fromnderside of history." The problem with the theologies of development andvolution in the 1960s was that they merely tried to 'apply' theology to auation from outside. They were "not theology done from within and uponth as liberating praxis. But when theology is finally done in this locus,rspectives will change."84 In this sense, then, just as, for Kierkegaard, thubjective'' thinker was "a thinker with a relation to existence,"85 so the

eologian becomes "a thinker with a relation to social existence," that is, "aganic intellectual" (Gramsci), "a thinker with organic links" with the populruggle and the community of faith sharing in that struggle. Theologycomes a reflection with a concrete sociohistorical base.86

ree Models of Solidarity

ow directly should the theologian participate in the struggles of the poor?hat degree of solidarity with the oppressed is required of the theologian oeration for the authenticity of his or her theology? The question, perhaps



ost discomfiting aspect of TL to the academic theologians of the First Woroes not admit of a single definite answer. The basic thrust of TL in this regs clearly been some sort of 'real' participationthat is, a participation concrd painful enough to effect a conversion of perspective. How this would aindividual theologians in the concrete particularities of their situation has

ways been clear. Here again I would like to rely on Clodovis Boff, the only



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eologian that I know of who has done systematic reflection on the subjecn the basis of the actual praxis of liberation theologians, Boff mentions throssible models: the specific contribution model, the alternating momentsodel, and the incarnation model.

the specific contribution model, the theologian makes a contribution to t

ruggles of the poor not in a directly political way but in a way specific andoper to the theologian as theologianthat is, within the realm of theory. It eoretical synthesis of theology and politics, in which the theologian takes

olitical position and fights political battlese. g., criticizing and unmasking teologies of dominant theologieswithin theology itself, according to its ownes and from its own locus. The political identification of the theologian wie poor will be reflected in the choice of theological themes and styles. Forme this would entail genuine intellectual conversion in terms of issues,emes, and language. The assumption here is that in the dialectic of thecial totality the theoretical activity of the theologian would also have its ef politics just as politics affects theory. In this model the theologian as anistemological subject coincides with the theologian as a social subject. Onhalf of a group or political movement, the theologian performs

the specific task of reflecting upon its activity precisely in its theological meaning.Thus, in and by the intellectual or scholarly profession itself, the theologian

performs social work and exercises a political option. 87

ven the ultimate conditioning of theory by praxis, however, this model can realized in a pure form. The theologian cannot remain solely within thealm of theory and still acquire the prophetic sensibility to the issues of

olitical praxis. The theoretician must enter into relations with the extra-eoretical realm, through, for example, meetings, collaborative projects, orher contacts with a given political movement. "A more or less direct

rticipation in concrete practices is necessary for the well-being of the theelf."88 This model would have to incorporate some of the elements of thelowing models.

cording to the alternating moments model, the theologian alternatestween being a scholare. g., a seminary professor for six monthsand being

olitical militante. g., working directly with the poor for the other six. As aolitical subject, the theologian synthesizes theology and politics by taking a

olitical position in the political arena itself, not within the realm of theory. I



e unity of an all-embracing project or basic option, undertaken by one ane same person, that provides unity to the theologian's alternating activitie

the incarnation model, the most complex and most demanding of the the synthesis of theology and politics takes the form of social insertion in anganic, even physical way, sharing in the life conditions of the poor. Thisistential identificationsolidarity at its strongestinvolves dislocation of the

eologian in terms of class and even space. The synthesis will result in aeory



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oted in praxis in the most intimates sense, incarnating itself as the self-nsciousness of praxis. This model is generally meant when TL speaks of thcial commitment of the theologian as a condition of theology. The mainoblem here, of course, is whether the theologian, in working and living we poorest and as the poorest, would have even the minimum material

nditions necessary for doing theology at all, let alone doing good theologyquite possible that the theologian may give up theology as irrelevant andve himself or herself totally to a given pastoral or political activity in view oe urgency of a particular situation. 89

ese models, however, are not meant as prescriptions. The specific modelpropriate for a theologian depends on the particularities of subjective andjective situations, for each model is "a living synthesis of a person and a

cus," which "must remain open to modification, in accordance with thentinuous, enigmatic circularity prevailing between its terms."90 Furthermoe actual choices made by liberation theologians have been made not as aatter of purely theoretical reflection but as a result of ''the dynamics of ents, operative within a given conjuncture, that has placed them in thatuation, and led them, as a result of personal existential views and optionske such and such a concrete political position."91 The important thing is tmain sensitive and committed enough to the dialectic of situation and opt

bjective and subjective conditions, so as to acquire and maintain a prophensibility with which to reflect on faith "from within concrete praxis itself."9

alectic of Magisterium, Avant-garde, People

though TL characteristically stresses identification with the poor as thermeneutic locus of theology and defines theology as reflection on the prathe poor, it is important, for a balanced picture of TL, to note that the prthe poor is not the only source of theological reflection, and that liberatioeologians are fully aware of the danger of absolutizing and idealizing the such. In this sense Juan Carlos Scannone speaks of theology as a critica

flection on a three-dimensional dialecticwherein the poor maintain indeedivileged but not the only positionamong the pastoral praxis of the church institutional body, especially the episcopate; the political praxis of thetivist Christian elite; and the praxis of the poor, the believing masses, orople in their totality.93

e pastoral praxis of the institutional church refers to the prophetic role of



oclamation and denunciation as witnessed, e.g., in Medellin. This praxis ispressed theoretically in countless official documents issued by episcopalnferences and individual bishops. The theology inspired by this praxis

mphasizes 'integral' liberation and its 'evangelical' content, and considers tolitical implications of pastoral activity but almost always from the viewpoine heirarchy. In the reciprocal interaction of the three dimensions of liberaaxis, the theological, anthropological, and political (more on this in the ne



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apter), it stresses the non-reductive identity of each dimension more thae interaction as such. This position tends to forget that the function of thshops is not the only function in the church, and thus neglects to developeologically the salvific substance of liberating praxis, which as such is prothe laity who must heed the signs of the times in the midst of daily politi

ruggle and experimentation with new social forms.contrast, members of the Christian avant-garde, politically the mostnscious and active, opt for the praxis of radical social change and live theth in terms of this praxis. Their tendency is to overemphasize the interact

mong the three dimensions of praxis over and against their irreducibleecificity. Some of them make use of Marxian categories for social analysisd social change, although they do sonot always successfullycritically and

om the Christian perspective. The danger of this position has been itsndency to separate itself from the praxis of the mainstream of the peopleproject an abstract utopia and an abstract negation of the social totality,stract because not mediated by the concrete history of the people and thurch and not based on real possibilities and concretely realizable strategieliberation. A theology solely based on the political praxis of this group tenlose in complexity of perspective. It fails to grasp the total scope of erating praxis as integral praxis by identifying liberation as political in the

rrow sense, which is indeed an important dimension but not the only oneof course, the merit of this theology to remind us that there is a political

mensionthe ordering of society to the common goodto all other aspects ofcial existence, such as the religious, educational, socioeconomic, andltural.

e third approach is based on the praxis of the believing peoplewhere theoor are the majorityas an organic, historical community. These people pos

deep sense of their own dignity and justice. Faith plays a decisive role in tstorical experience and their historical projects for justice and freedom. Thk wisdom resulting from their historical struggles, informed by faith, can btically reflected on by theologians in light of the Word of God. This appro

owever, has its own dangers, which the other two approaches may help tooid. It may confuse the different dimensions of praxisthe theological,thropological, and politicalwith one another by stressing the incarnation oe people of God in a particular people as understood in the civic and cultunse. Fixed on the local situation, it may also lose sight of the universal. It



ay likewise run the danger of hypostatizing 'the people' romantically oropulistically by idealizing them as though they were free from sin andenation, placing them outside history and its ambiguities. Here the firstproach can serve as a corrective by reestablishing a contact between the

cal and the universal church as well as between the present praxis of theople and the eschatological hope. The second approach, on the other han help the theologian recognize the alienations of the people by means o

e critical theory and praxis of the elite and in light of the liberating, propeediated utopia. 94



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ese three approaches are not mutually exclusive. Not only do they enriche another; they also can lead to mutual critique through reciprocalediation. Among them there can be a three-dimensional dialecticrresponding to the organic unity of the people of God, in which the poorve their privileged place. Today, the emphasis must be placed on the thir

proach, which is at the heart of TL, without denying the magisterial functthe authorities in the church or the critical function of the politicized eliteovided neither of them are separated from the people. After all, liberationust serve the people, the main subject and object of liberating praxis.rthermore, the practical wisdom of the people, which grows out of theirstory and their praxis of liberation, must be reflectively and critically tapper its theological substance and theoretically formulated in theology. In facat remains the primary hermeneutic locus today.

e Hermeneutic Circle

e Socio-Analytic Mediation

stated earlier, the method of TL consists in the dialectic of the hermeneuediation and the socio-analytic mediation, under the historical horizon of tsis of the times as embodied in the poor and oppressed majority andrceived by a prophetic sensibility. Let me now turn to the socio-analytic

ediation. As a theology of the concrete praxis of liberation, TL, more than her theology, finds itself under the necessity of defining the relationshiptween theology and social praxisi.e., of answering the question of howeology is to guide praxis. There are, according to Clodovis Boff, five ways hich one is not to relate theology and praxis; these must first be discussedd dismissed before going on to suggest a correct relationship. They are:

mpiricism, purism, theologism, semantic mix, and bilingualism.

e empiricist approach takes historical reality as it is given in the intuitivemediacy of consciousness and proceeds to interpret it theologically withotempting a prior analysis of it. It is not aware that all human knowledge isediated, consciously or unconsciously, by numerous assumptions andeologies. As a result of this epistemological naivete, it mistakes appearancr reality and ultimately reduces theology to ideology. It is strong onnunciation, sincerity, and struggle, but weak on critique, logic, and rigor,

hich are essential to any truly "concrete" theology. 95 Methodological purithe epistemological equivalent of the dogma of sola fides. It insists on the



lf-sufficiency of theology and feels no need to appropriate the results of osciplines. It is not aware that the content of faith and revelation is itself ediated by human concepts and categories, our historical and culturalperiences.96 Theologism considers theological interpretation as the only trsion of reality and substitutes itself for social analysisassuming its ownterpretation is total



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d adequate, it sees other interpretations as partial and inadequate. As theoretical correlative of the practical attitudes commonly known asupernaturalism' and 'spiritualism,' it is critical of materialism and is contentth stating timeless truth as the theological response to all situations. Thisproach is implicit in the ideologies of 'Christendom,' 'apoliticism,' and 'fait

thout ideology.' It is clear that its dualistic indifference to history concealseology of its own. 97

hile these approaches exclude the socio-analytic mediation in one way orother, semantic mix accepts it but fails to criticize and properly assimilatecial theories it works with. Characteristic of many of the pronouncements e Catholic magisterium on social issues, it does not define the relationshiptween theology and social science with any methodological rigor. The two

nguages are neither intrinsic nor extrinsic to each other but simply 'mixedot properly integrated and mediated. Yet the resulting mixture is alwaysganized under the logic of religious language. Dualistic in its assumptionsgards timeless truth as the only essential, important truth and denigratesstorical reality and empirical existence as merely contingent and secondarmptying the latter of their proper content so as to fill them with a spirituale. When it makes judgements on historical reality, its analysis remains

mpiricist, its explanation moralistic.98

ingualism juxtaposes socio-analytic discourse and theological discourse aeks to play two language games on the same field at the same time. Thisxtaposition of two interpretations and approaches at first seems proper anr; however, the possible tension and contradiction between the twoterpretations will often lead to confrontation. One discourse may beminated by another, or, as in the case of semantic mix, a compromise masult. Sustained bilingualism is another form of compromise, in which "the

ntradiction is not dialectically resolved, yet the terms abide in mutualnfrontation."99

hat, then, is the proper relationship between the two discourses, betweeeology and social science? It is, according to Clodovis Boff, a constitutiveation between a "material" and a "formal" object. TL seeks to interpret an

ansform concrete historical praxis, and as such, it has to do not so much we abstract nature of power or society, the concern of traditional theology

story, as with "that altogether determinate power or society in or under



hich Christians and human beings generally live, struggle, and die."100 Theologian as such, however, does not know this concrete history and itsecific challenges to praxis. It is the province of the social sciences tovestigate and critically analyze social reality in its concrete dynamics of tuality and possibility, and thus to "prepare the text for theology to read,w material for it to transform."101 Without this mediation, theology wouldmain ignorant of what it is supposed to reflect on, guilty of ignoratio elenc

d prone to a religiouspolitical rhetoric which may sound pious but which itimately empty and irrelevant. This socio-analytic mediation is an integral the theological process.



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e social sciences provide the raw material or "material object" for theologsimilate according to its own theological perspective or form and thus toansform into its "proper object." This relationship is not an extrinsic relatiopplication" between two separate things but one of "constitution," whichnsists of "an organic interchange in which each of the terms of the

ationship shares in a vital way in the whole of which it is a part,''102

not "affixation or superimposition" but one of "vital assimilation, a kind of etabolism."103 The articulation of this relationship should occur under thegime of theology; otherwise, it would not be theology. The gathering of cial-scientific information does not, as such, constitute theology. Suchformation remains pre-theological until it has been reworked "by proceduroper to theologizing, in such wise as to issue in a specifically theologicaloduct."104 The sociological and the theological do not exist in the same

ntinuum. The transition from the one to the other constitutes a qualitativpistemological breach or rupture."105 At the same time the theologicalsimilation of the social sciences must proceed with both respect for theirtonomy and their own rules and methodologies and a critical attitudewards the implications of those claims and conclusions which often goyond their particular sciences, especially their tendency towardsductionism.106

hich social theory, among the numerous existing theories, should a theololiberating praxis choose? More importantly, by what criteria should such aoice be made? These questions have already been broached in thescussion of the preference of TL for Marxian analysis in the preceding chaWhy Marxism?"). Given that the value of a theory lies in its capacity to sheht on concrete problems proposed for its explication, the logically priorestion is: What are the concrete problems demanding explication andsolution? The choice of a theoretical explication and of practical meanssucprograms, strategies, and actionsis dependent on a prior determination o

e concrete problems to be solved.

ere the criterion is clearly ethical. Is the primary problem one of maintainie order and harmony of a social system or one of resolving basic socialnflicts and raising the poor and oppressed majority to a level of socialistence in which they too can enjoy liberty, equality, and justice? On thevel of the content of Christian faith, there is also the evangelical criterioni.sus' own identification with the plight of the poor and oppressed. From th



hical and evangelical perspective, then, the only problem to be resolved isot how to maintain the harmonious functioning of a social system as givenong with its inequitable distribution of privileges and powers, but how toprove the lot of the poor and resolve the basic social divisions and conflicis this ethical and evangelical option which has led TL to prefer a dialecticeory of society to a functionalist one, the former stressing the idea of connsion, and struggle in a vision of society considered as a complex,

ntradictory whole, the latter stressing order, harmony, or equilibrium andnsidering society as an organic



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hole with complementary parts. This does not imply that the ethical optionsocial theory necessarily validates every particular conclusion of the theorye validation of a conclusion depends on the validity of the analysis, a taskhich cannot be substituted for by the ethical option and which must procecording to the intrinsic criteria of the social science itself. 107

y the very nature of the case, TL does not and cannot provide a precisechnique or a manual of technical rules for conducting this socio-analyticediation of theology. Instead, it suggests two things for its actualplementation. The first is the development of socio-analytic habitus as antellectual virtue, which implies not only critical social consciousness but alsossession of a significant amount of social-scientific knowledge in its ownht. The theologian must know enough about the dynamics of society toercome sociological naivete, unmask current ideologies, and evaluate thelidity and implications of new theories. Preferably, the theologian must bele to produce, not merely consume, social-scientific knowledge. The secothe practice of interdisciplinary collaboration. Theology is neither a totalence nor a complete guide to action. If it is to avoid abstract generalizatiten merely verbal, ineffective, and demobilizing, it is imperative that theeoretical elaboration of political programs and strategies be done by a teathose who, Christian or not, share a common front in the struggle for

eration.108

ripture and Historicity

t me now turn to the hermeneutic mediation or theological assimilation ofe socio-analytic mediation. How does TL interpret Scripture and the Chrisadition and relate that interpretation to the demands of contemporarystory, thus giving theological form to the matter of the social sciences? Woes the phrase "in light of the Word of God" mean when TL typically defineelf as "a critical reflection on Christian praxis in the light of the Word?"109

interesting to note that in this regard TL has been accused by its critics oerything from arbitrary interpretation to arbitrary selection of themes to andamentalist reading innocent of the historicalcritical method.110 Let megin, therefore, with the approach of TL to biblical interpretation.

hristian faith is objectively bound up with Scripture as its norma normans.is is the positivity of Christian faith, its objective givenness, which defines

mits within which an interpretation must remain if it is to be considered



hristian. At the same time, it is clear that Scripture is the embodiment of tord of God in human words, and as such it is not a brute fact withoutediation. It is also a product, the literary objectification, of centuries of thed experience of God under very determinate cultural, political, andonomic conditions. This imposes on us the enormous task of hermeneuticbridging the distance of twenty centuries and more, of 'decoding' andappropriating the original sense of the written Scripture. In this regard TL

s been suggesting the method of a "hermeneutic circle" or dialecticalteraction as guide to biblical interpretation.



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cording to Clodovis Boff, the following circles occur: between the Word ood and Scripture; between creation of meaning and acceptance of meanintween structure and meaning; between present and past; and betweenchnique and interpretation.

egarding the first circle, it is important to note that the Word of God is not

mply identical with Scripture, the historically conditioned embodiment of tord of God; they are on two different levels. The divine meaning of Script

oes not interpret itself to us, and this is why the Christian tradition investsorm of faith, the regula fidei, not simply in Scripture but in Scripture as reathe church. The sense of Scripture can be apprehended only in relation te sensus fidelium, the living spirit of the living community. Scripture is notly norma normans but also in some sense norma normata, i.e., authenticthe Word of God by the community of the faithful, as witness the history

adition criticism and the process of canonization. Strictly speaking, then, tord of God is found neither in the letter of Scripture nor in the spirit of thearing community. It is "precisely between these two, in their mutual,namic relationship, in a back-and-forth that is never perfectly objectifiable1

e second hermeneutic circle is that of the creation and the perception ofeaning. The meaning of Scripture cannot be created arbitrarily, as is the cth hermeneutic improvisation, or perceived purely passively, as semantic

ositivism would have it. Both of these tendencies are guilty of reifying andeezing one pole or the other of the interpretive relationship. The trueeaning can be deciphered only in the sustained, dialectical relationshiptween creation and perception, between reader and text, between questd answers. The same dialectic obtains between structure and meaning, trd hermeneutic circle. As in the case of any written text, the autonomous

ructure of the letter of the text must first be explained and grasped before can comprehend or understand its sense and meaning. "Meaning needructure for support. Structure serves meaning as its vehicle of mmunication, thus imposing upon it the confinement of its ownterminations."112

e fourth circle is that between present and past. The meaning of a text iot exhausted by the 'original' meaning at the time of its composition. The

ists to be read and reread as a channel of a meaning through a successio



storical moments. The meaning of a text is in a real sense the history of itterpretations (its "tradition"). It is in relation to the present, the readers'ntemporary history, that the meaning of a text comes alive, rejuvenates iality, and fulfills its telos.

Although in a first moment, a basic one, to be sure, sense or meaning is obtainedunder sign, word under writing, spirit under letternow, in another moment, sense isobtained in the present, word in time, spirit in history.113



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egesis is a complex process bearing on the reader's present moment, inhich "word ceases to be simply text to be interpreted, and itself becomesterpretive code. Now word is no longer world to be seen but eyes to see, nger landscape but gaze, no longer thing but light." 114

e fifth and last hermeneutic circle is that of hermeneutic technique and

terpretation. The essentially dialectical nature of the preceding circles maplain that it is impossible to construct a technique of interpretation whoseplication to a text would uncover and exhaust once and for all its ultimateeaning and foreclose all further questions in advance, which is the dream usion of hermeneutic positivism. The meaning of a text cannot be fixed ond for all. By the same token, however, the meaning cannot be purelybitrary, and it is the function of a hermeneutic technique to "fix the spatia

mits of the appearance of meaning or sense,"115 beyond which anterpretation would become purely arbitrary and unfounded. Within such

mits the discernment of the right meaning also requires an act of creation nngebung, "a decision and determination of meaning in the space thatermeneutic reason' has opened and circumscribed."116 For example, in thationship between Scripture and the reading community, Boff notes that

Scripture evokes an appeal, an invitation, a provocation, and interrogation. Its textis persuasive. It persuades acceptance, openness, availability. But there remains t

task of the one invitedpersonal response, for meaning is realized only in and byresponse. Further: it is only in concrete life that meaning unfolds, and "comes toitself." And here hermeneutics flowers into ethics.117

e essential reference to the historical present of the reader as a constitutoment of biblical interpretation requires further observations, especially inew of the unique (ephapax) character of the salvific events described inripture and the traditional notion of the 'closure' of revelation. In order to

derstand this reference of Scripture to the historical situation of the readnsider three things. The first is the general anthropological condition,mely, the historicity of human existence which governs all human praxiscluding the activity of interpretation. The interpreter always and necessarings along the presuppositions and expectations of his or her historicalesent to the work of interpretation, just as the written text remainssentially open to future readings. It is an illusion to think that one has dirmediated access to the 'original' sense of Scripture. "The present is not o

at which is read, it is also that by which the reading is done."118



addition, as contemporary biblical research has shown, the formation of ooks of Scripture was a function of the historical present of the variousmmunities, their contemporary cultural presuppositions, their historical crd needs, their Sitz im Leben. The Scripture is itself "the result of anpdating,'



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going-beyond the 'letter' in favor of a free amplification of the 'spirit'." 119

ere are also specifically theological or dogmatic reasons. One of the centressages of the New Testament is that of the risen Christ present in themmunity of his disciples in the generations to come as the inspiring andrecting Spirit of that community. The meaning of Scripture, by its own

essage, is not confined to the generation of the first disciples. In this sense texts of Scripture

cry out in every word for their own effacement, erasure, Aufhebung, sending us bato the Risen One, whose currency renders the sense of these scriptures current aswell. They send us to the voice of the Spirit present in the community.120

this sense, then, revelation is never closed. The Word of God continues teak to each new generation. At most, it is canonized, and canonized

ecisely as a model, exemplar, or code for interpreting the Word of God,hich indeed rules out certain meanings but by the same token does noteeze any one meaning as the definitive and ultimate one. Scripture is a mterpretation. "an interpreting interpretation, a norma mormans utormata."121 As a hermeneutic paradigm Scripture grows richer through thry interpretations it permits and engenders, which, in turn, in some senserther determine its "letter." Tradition is precisely the totality of theseterpretations and meanings historically generated by the hermeneutic

radigm. To be taken up and given historical contemporaneity and relevaneach new generation, then, is ''a principle woven into the very writing of ripture itself."122 The hermeneutic circle of past and present is not acious" but a "virtuous" circle.

this view, the living historical present has a certain primacy over the pashich also necessitates a certain hermeneutic "vigilance" against theeological and manipulative usesin view of present needsto which Scripture

ways prone. For this reason, a rigorous scientific exegesis which respects ctual density" of the texts will always remain indispensable. Nevertheless,ord of God continues to speak to each new generation, demanding freshterpretation and realization of its message in the ever new historical preseientific exegesis, oriented to the past, therefore, is not enough. There is nssence' of Scripture which is given once and for all and which can thus befinitively unconvered by scientific exegesis. If there were, there would beed for ongoing theological reflection. The text of Scripture, then, is more ring of meaning than a cistern, more a focus of energy than a traffic light



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e Hermeneutic Mediation

ow does this dialectical hermeneutic bear on contemporary praxis? How deology reflect on such praxis "in light of the Word of God"? How does oneaw a dialectical correlation between Scripture and contemporary history?ere Clodovis Boff rules out two models, the Gospel/politics model and the

rrespondence of terms model, and opts for the correspondence of ationships model as the most appropriate. 124

e Gospel/politics model posits an immediate correspondence betweenripture and our political situation. It seeks to apply Scripture withoutrmeneutic mediation to contemporary political situations withoutcioanalytic mediation. It thus ignores the internal complexity of bothripture and politics. In its uncritical naivete, this model is open to the

eological manipulation of the Gospel as well as to the mystification of politality. In hermeneutics it wavers between improvisation and positivism.storically, this model has led to the justification of theocracy and theedieval ideal of Christendom, using Scripture as a kind of map for socialganization, or, as in modern theories since Machiavelli, to the dismissal ofospel as politically impracticable. The basic flaw of this 'application' model

historical innocence, its insensitivity to the historical context of each of thrms of the relationship.

e correspondence of terms modelalso called parallelismis more sophisticad richer than the application model in that it includes the historical contessing in the latter. It seeks to establish correspondence between Scripturd contemporary theology and draw political inferences based on thatrrespondence. Theology today must be in our political context what Scripas in its political context. On this basis the model goes on to drawrrespondences or parallels between the Exodus and contemporary liberate enslavement of the Hebrews and the oppression of the peoples of the Torld, the Roman power and contemporary imperialism, the power of thedducees and that of dependent bourgeoisies, the Zealots and thevolutionaries of today, and of Jesus and Christians. The Christian communust do today what Jesus did in his political context. Thus, if Jesus could bown to have been a Zealot, as Brandon argued, this would justify ourrticipation in revolutionary movements, If Jesus could be shown to have

en a pacifist, as Cullman and Hengel argued, this would rule out such



volutionary politics. If Jesus could be shown to have had no interest inolitics whatsoever, as the eschatological interpretation would have it, it wocessitate the withdrawal of all Christians from the arena of politics.

r all its popularity, however, this model lends itself to a number of criticismegarding the figure of Jesus, it fails to pay sufficient attention to theiqueness of his human destiny, the religious, political, and cultural condit

hich influenced him, and the degree of politicization of his humannsciousness. It also too readily assumes similarity between his politicalntext and our own and tends to take the figure of Jesus in a mythical,istorical way.



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egarding the parallelism between his political stance and ours, it assumesat Jesus is a model for us today in the sense of an example to be copied iery detail, and seeks to deduce a model of political conduct valid for todaclusively from an analysis of Jesus' own conduct. In assuming a term-for-rm correspondence between Scripture and our situation, it does not take

riously enough the extreme complexity of contemporary society or thegree of political consciousness, at the level of both analysis and ideology,hich has developed during the twenty centuries separating us from theents of the Gospel. 125

e alternative model advocated by Boff is that of correspondence of ationships, bound to one another by 'creative fidelity' (Marcel). This modekes its inspiration from the manner in which the primitive church dealt wite words and deeds of Jesus. As various forms of biblical criticism havemonstrated, the primitive church did not look for or merely repeat thesissima verba of Jesus but tried to interpret them in view of the concreteuations and the needs of the various communities, the Sitz im Leben of th

ew Testament in its final form. In doing so they were guided by creativeelity to the Jesus tradition and attributed to Jesus even the latervelopments and interpretations of his original message and work, fullynvinced of the identity of the Christ of glory with the historical Jesus. This

rt of development has been repeated by the post-biblical communities ineir changing historical contexts, and continues to occur in the everydayrmeneutic practice of contemporary communities, as witness the content

omilies, catecheses, liturgy, and other symoblic or discursive practices.ripture continues to be lived and commented on by successive generationChristians, in a dialectic in which the text and the situation are not reduceach other, each instead being taken in its respective autonomy.

cording to this model, the relationship between the message of Jesus ans context corresponds to the relationship between the message of the Neestament church and its context, which in turn corresponds to theationship of the post-biblical tradition and its varying historical contexts, t

hich the relationship between our message and our context shouldrrespond. The correspondence or identity posited in this model is not onentext or one of message; it does not imply that the context of Jesus is theme as our context or that the message for the New Testament church is tme as the message for us. The correspondence refers to the relationship



tween context and message, which remains the same in different historicriods. This identity is not a mechanical identity but one of creative fidelitye Gospel in a diversity of historical situations.

hat accounts for and guarantees this creative fidelity to the Gospel? It is elity to this or that particular text of Scripture corresponding to a particuluation with a resulting obligation to act in a particular way. It is fidelity to

e "global, and at the same time particular 'spirit'" of the Gospel.126 What be looked for in Scripture is not formulas to copy or techniques of plication.



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What Scripture will offer us are rather something like orientations, models, types,directives, principles, inspirationselements permitting us to acquire, on our owninitiative, a "hermeneutic competency," and thus the capacity to judgeon our owninitiative, in our own right"according to the mind of Christ," or "according to theSpirit," the new, unpredictable situations with which we are continually confrontedThe Christian writings offer us not a what, but a howa manner, a style, a spirit. 12

is kind of "pneumatic" hermeneuticsimilar to Rahner's "instinct of th"presupposes our "compenetration with the meaning that informsripture, and a sustained familiarity with the Word indwelling in it."128 Thas sort of hermeneutic practice is not immune to abuse and manipulation ite clear, but by the same token it should be accepted as an invitation anallenge. It goes without saying that this pneumatic approach does notspense with the normal application of exegetical methods and social-scien

alysis.n the basis of these methodological reflections we are now in a betterosition to understand the dialectical character of TL's self-definition as "criflection on Christian praxis in the light of the Word of God." TL is necessarvolved in a hermeneutic circle with an inner dialectic between the socio-alytic and the hermeneutic mediations, between what is reflected on andrspective or horizon from which it is reflected on. What is reflected onthe

ject of theological reflectioncomprises the traditional forms andterpretations of faith, the actual empirical praxis of faith, and the historicantexts of that praxis as analyzed by the social sciences. The perspective fhich the theologian carries on this reflection comprises the living Word of d Scripture, the history of its interpretations, and the prophetic sensibilitye plight of the poor and their perspective acquired through participation ieir struggles. The relation between object and perspective is always fluid lf-reversing: object becomes perspective, and perspective becomes objec

dynamic interaction. To put this circle in simpler terms, as Gutierrez does:

This is the basic circle of all hermeneutics: from the human being to God and fromGod to the human being, from history to faith and from faith to history, from love oour brothers and sisters to the love of the Father and from the love of the Father tothe love of our brothers and sisters, from human justice to God's holiness and fromGod's holiness to human justice, from the poor person to God and from God to thepoor person.129

o put it in another way, following Segundo, the hermeneutic circle is



rmeneutic in that "it is the continuing change in our interpretation of theble which is dictated by the continuing changes in our present-day realityoth individual and societal," and circular in that "each new reality obliges u



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terpret the Word of God afresh, to change reality accordingly, and then tock and reinterpret the Word of God again, and so on." 130 Segundo

aborates on this circle in terms of four stages: (1) "our way of experiencinality, which leads us to ideological suspicion"; (2) "the application of oureological suspicion to the whole ideological superstructure in general and

eology in particular"; (3) "a new way of experiencing theological reality thads us to exegetical suspicion, that is, to the suspicion that the prevailingterpretation of the Bible has not taken important pieces of date intocount"; and (4) ''a new hermeneutic, that is, our new way of interpretinguntainhead of our faith (i.e., Scripture) with the new elements at oursposal."131

often speaks of praxis, the commitment to the poor, as the 'first act' oritial experience,' and of theology as the 'second' act. In light of the basiccularity of the hermeneutic situation, it should be clear that the word 'firsitial' does not signify a blind commitment or experience without theediation of thought; it is meant to stress the primacy and impact of praxiser mere theory, a praxis which preserves its own dialectic with Scripture,

adition, and critical social science. The four stages of Segundo form a circecisely in that they are dialectically internal to one another, and denote thsential components of such a circle, not self-contained, mutually discreet

omic entities that merely succeed one another chronologically.132

esponses to Critics

anscendence, Existence, History

t me now turn to the critics. Could theology link itself so closely with praxpecially with the political praxis of and for a particular group, without beinartisan" and "classist"? Is the critical distance between praxis and

rspective, between reflection on praxis and reflection in praxis, great enoensure the objectivity and universality appropriate to theory? Isn't there

a media between the ahistorical universality attributed to traditional theolod the historical particularity insisted on by TL? Doesn't TL rule out allalogue with other points of view in too dogmatic a fashion?

rst, regarding whether TL is critical enough as theory, it seems caughttween two horns of a dilemma. The Vatican charges that TL turns praxis

e "supreme criterion" for theology, "re-reads" its traditional content, and



nies the transcendence of the truth of faith. This is so by virtue of itsstorical and ideological critique of tradition. TL is too critical. Ogden andcCann and Strain, on the other hand, accuse it of uncritically assuming thuth of the particular contents of faith and the normative basis of suchntents and thus failing to inquire into their truth, the primary task of eology. To them, TL is not critical enough.



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does not deny the transcendence of the truth of faith, nor does it conside perspective of the oppressed the only or supreme criterion of theology, nk the preceeding discussion should have made quite clear, although som

atements of TL, taken out of the total context, might create such anpression. Faith as praxis is not blind activism but contains truthsfides qua

objective content and referent, truths whose meaning is indeed universaot reducible to their meaning for contemporary history. This is precisely wheology is a reflection on praxis "in light of the Word of God." In addition toe historical perspective of the oppressed, TL includes the truths of faith art of the horizon of theological reflection, the horizon of transcendenceoper to theology as theology. It is precisely out of respect for thisanscendence and universality of faith that TL, unlike many other theologielf-consciously recognizes its own 'transitional' character: TL does not exha

e universal meaning of the truths of faith. By the same token, it also insisat this very universality and transcendence of faith requires that it becomncrete and effective in the particularities of history: the Christian faith in ngdom poses an inherent demand for historical actualization. Likewise, thth at issue is not angelic but human faith, and as such must be understoits concrete historical actuality and thus against the historical conditions e development of its self-understanding, which often involves ideologicalstortions. A universal which is only transcendent and in no way concretelymbodied in historical particularity would be not only, like Hegel's 'bad infinifeless, abstract, empty universal, but also inaccessible to humans asncrete historical beings. The task of theology is to find the appropriatestorical mediation of this universal and transcendent faith.

oes this mean, then, accepting Ogden's charge that TL uncritically assume truth of the traditional content of faith in its universality andanscendence? If Ogden's point is that TL fails to institute a transcendentatique of the very meaning of God, Christ, and faith in the manner of istential and transcendental hermeneutics, he is quite right. In anothernse, however, TL does engage in a more radical critique of the basic contfaith than the existentialist and transcendental theologies; this is precisee reason why the Vatican finds TL too critical. The political hermeneutic oquires not so much into the transcendental conditions for the possibility aeaning of Christian faith in relation to existence, in its search for authentic

d transcendence towards God in the midst of sin, mortality, and finitude,



to the sociohistorical possibility and meaning of that faith in relation toncrete historical existence, which suffers precisely that very sin, death, anitude in the most concrete and painful ways, and apart from which there

ould cease to be human sin, human death, and human finitude. (I think ife to assume that these alone are at issue in human theology; I confessnorance of what the sin, death and finitude of angels would be like and ththe a priori condition for the possibility of angelic theology.) After all, the

eologies of Bultmann, Tillich, Rahner, and



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gden do not ask why human existence as transcendence, not as a historicncrete totality, should be the anthropological, transcendental condition arrelative of faith, nor are they critical of the very basis of theory, includingistentialist theology, in the historical conditions of human praxis. They simsume the validity and telos of theory and truth independent of their conc

storical contexts.133

gden's own procedure is an excellent illustration of this pre-critical stanceaware of "modern historical consciousness" and claims that contemporaryeology in its content must become a theology of liberation in the Latinmerican sense in order to make the Christian witness to God's boundless loredible" to that consciousness. He thus introduces historicity into the confaith as an object of theological reflection, that on which theology reflects

e fails, however, to introduce historicity into the act of theological reflectioelf, as though theology as theory could be so independent of the historicauation, or into the content of human existence as the correlative of faith,ough existence were separable from historical praxis.134 TL, on the othernd, institutes a transcendentalhistorical critique of the very basis of theoraxis and seeks to reconstitute the whole of theology, including the initialthropological starting point, on that basis. In doing so, however, TL procealectically. It is not a question of "reducing" the universal content of faith

e particular demands of immediate praxis or to its perspective, but one ofbjecting both the content of faith and the historical perspective to a mututique. The received content of faith and the perspective of the oppressednstitute the horizon of theology in such a way that there is a dialecticternal to the horizon itself.

e Poor as Concrete Universal

e question remains, however, why a prior preferentialalthough notclusivecommitment to the oppressed is a necessary condition of ntemporary theology. Isn't such a commitment another form of bondage?hat gives the oppressed such an epistemological privilege and makes theirspective a norm for the theologian? What about the charge of classism?ven the basic historicity and historical task of theology, it should not be tofficult to construct an argument in defense of such a prior commitment. Tallenge to theology, it was pointed out, is to reflect from within history, n

om outside, and it is essential, therefore, to find, not just any perspective



at perspective which in some way captures the essential crises and conflithe time. Whose perspective, then, would fulfill this function and providecessary access to history for theology? Whose perspective, moreover, wo

o so without an ideological class bias and self-interest, as the Vatican rightsists? Insofar as all human perspectives are necessarily concretized in articular group, the perspective we are seeking must be particular. Insofar

owever, as that perspective embodies the essential human crisis of the tim

hich all groups are



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volved, it is also universal, at least within the limits of that epoch or societe perspective must avoid both sheer particularism and ahistoricaliversalism; it must be concretely universal.

e quest for objectivity in historical knowledge has been the classic problesociology of knowledge. It is informative to contrast here the approach of

rl Mannheim, one of the founders of that sociology, and that of TL.annheim locates such an objective perspective in the intelligentsia. Thetellectuals certainly belong to particular classes, as does everyone else, anthat extent their perspective is likewise historically conditioned, partial an

mited. At the same time, however, they have an advantage over non-tellectuals by their common education, which both makes possible certainflective distance towards class interests and makes them open to theterests of the diverse classes from which they originate, whereas non-tellectuals are generally preoccupied with the immediacy of their lives andd to the interests of the classes to which they respectively belong. Thetellectuals, therefore, are capable of a perspective which is at once rootede particular classes of their respective individual origins and sensitive to thurality of conflicting class interests in societythus, a concretely universalrspective. It is important to add here, however, that this search forjectivity is motivated by the desire for a comprehension of history and its

namics as a possible basis of "a science of politics." The search is for thestorical bearer of the intellectual synthesis of diverse ideologies andrspectives, with Hegel as the historical model. The point of Mannheim is much to 'change' reality as to 'understand' its dynamics. 135

, on the other hand, is not so sanguine about the capacity of the 'free-ating' intellectuals for historical objectivity, and is much more interested ianging the oppressive structures than in comprehending their dynamics,

though neither TL nor Mannheim denies the intrinsic connection betweenanging and comprehending. As the preceding discussion makes clear, soiences are not neutral, and the perspective from which they carry on thei

mpirical research is crucial to the result. The question still remains, therefohose perspective comes closest to being concretely universal.

locates such a perspective in that of the poor and oppressed, who, asctims of the injustice of the social structure, embody and suffer in their ow

e the universal human crisis of the time. The poor embody the universal



eologically, ethically, and structurally. Theologically, they are, as even thetican recognizes, the object of God's preferential love, to which the rest oe summoned in faith. Ethically, the universal dignity of humans asmanswhich is the viewpoint of the ethical and thus the concern of us all mansis most at stake in the poor. The degradation of the poor, furthermonot the result of merely 'natural' poverty or accidental exploitation on thert of isolated individuals, but that of 'artificial' poverty rooted in structura

usticeboth regional and now, increasingly, international, an injustice inhich, therefore, all are involved directly or indirectly. This poverty is due



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the unjust structural monopoly of the major means of production of thesic needs of life, and the resultant inequitable distribution of power andportunity which also leads to political oppression and cultural deprivation6 The perspective rooted in the objective life situation of the poor, then, iiversal: in their suffering is also at stake our contemporary human destiny

gardless of all our contingent differences in status, race, sex, profession, aforth. It is not exclusive. Insofar as the universal human destiny isncretely embodied in the particularities of the poor and commands speciatention from all of us, it is also preferential.

this description of the poor as a concrete universal is correct, and we do wremember that the poor make up the absolute majority of humankind todd if, as TL insists, theology must enter into the crisis and challenge of mtemporary history and reflect from the horizon or perspective of that criseems difficult to deny the poor their 'epistemological privilege' as a grouprough which theology can gain concrete access to contemporary history. storically situated being, the theologian is bound to reflect, implicitly orplicitly, from a particular historical perspective; the only question is wheth or she does so consciously, as a result of reasoned choice, and whether rspective can indeed claim universal significance. The alternative would b

ther an ahistorical conception of theology or a frankly relativistic pluralism

hich accords equal ethical value to all experiences and equal epistemologilue to all viewpoints rooted in such experiences. To opt for the perspectivoted in the experience of a particular group is not necessarily partisan andassist. To think so and to thus demand transcendence of all particular groperiences and perspectives would be to deny the sociohistorical origin of man knowledge and revert to the ahistorical conception of humanrspectives; the latter, however, is not without its ownalthoughacknowledged and hiddenideological content and consequences.137

axis as Transcendental Horizon

hat, then is the exact epistemological value of this perspective of the pooferred to earlier as prophetic sensibility? Here I think it is essential totroduce a distinction, not always clearly made by TL, between the two sen'praxis'between praxis in the empirical sense of particular actions andinions and praxis in its "disclosive" function, i.e., in the relatively a priori o

asi-transcendental sense of the perspective or horizon of the oppressed t



generated in the process of praxis in the empirical sense. It goes withoutying that there is an intense inner dialectic between the transcendental

orizon and empirical praxis. It is through the empirical praxis of liberation te may acquire the perspective of the oppressed, as it is in light of thatrspective that the truth, validity, and effectiveness of empirical praxis is taluated.

er since Plato, and much more self-consciously since Descartes and Kant,ere has been a general recognition of the relational character of human



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owledge: true knowledge is a function of the conformity or agreementtween subject and object, and thus depends on the nature of the subjec

ell as of the object. In the language of the Thomist tradition, whatever isown is known according to the mode of the knower; this sets an a priorindition and limit to the knowledge of the object or objective knowledge. H

e understands the nature of the knower, therefore, is crucial. Does onederstand the human subject as a soul (Plato), a synthesis of body and soristotle and Aquinas), a thinking ego (rationalism), a subject of senserception (empiricism), a transcendental subject (Kant and idealism), abject of existence (existentialism), a being-in-the-world (Heidegger), abject constituted by intersubjectivity (phenomenology, personalism of Johul II and Cardinal Ratzinger), or a concrete totality of sociohistoricalistence (Hegel, Marx, Dewey, TL)? If the object is not given except in

ation to a subject, whose structure constitutes the a priori condition for tossibility of objective knowledge, it is essential to be clear about thethropological presuppositions of any epistemological discussion. The

mphasis of TL on involvement in history at its most critical and on the needquiring the perspective of the poor as the condition of objective knowledgthe historical situation must likewise be understood in thisthropologicalepistemological context. It is the logical extension of the

assical relational view of human knowledge in accordance with its ownthropology of concrete historical totalitya conception of the human subje

ho can know only through praxis in history and society. 138

e important thing to note here is that the horizon of the poor fulfills theme transcendental or critical function in TL as the a priori categories of thderstanding in Kant and the understanding of being-in-the-world in

eidegger. The difference is that in Kant those categories are ahistorical anocial, and in Heidegger the understanding of being is indeed historical bustorical only in its subjective, existential significance as temporality, whereTL the horizon of the poor is derived from our involvement in concretestory and its social conflicts. For the latter, it is an understanding of actinge-world precisely as a world ridden with class conflicts and demanding thblation (Aufhebung) of such conflicts for the sake of the humanity of all,ong with the hope in the possibility of such sublation. In this quasi-anscendental sense, then, the horizon includes the global experience of

pression, a generalized pre-understanding of its social causes, the collect



ll to sublate it, and the hope in the real possibility of its sublation. It is atical counterpart of ideology, which also functions as an a priori horizon,cept that ideology is used to maintain the status quo and exclude the hostructural change.

a transcendental condition, this horizon, as TL fully admits, does notarantee either the truth of our empirical judgments or the efficiency of ou

mpirical praxis, any more than the transcendental category of causality innt assures the infallibility of our empirical judgments concerning particulausal relations. In this sense, then, the particular judgments and actions oe poor



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d of the theologians who participate in the praxis of their liberation may bite fallible and ineffective. The possession of the horizon is not a sufficienndition to guarantee the infallibility of our empirical judgments and theficiency of our practices; this is precisely the reason why TL so insists on tcessity of empirical social analysis and interdisciplinary cooperation with t

cial sciences. However, the latter would be impossible without the horizonst as, for Kant, it is only the a priori category of causality which makes itossible for us to perceive or recognize anything as cause or effect at all, anerefore without it no empirical judgments are possible in the first place, stss true or false, so, for TL, it is the moral perspective of the oppressed aloat enables us to perceive the moral dimension of oppression with somethore than an abstract pity, assess the social reality in terms of the possibilitd urgency of its elimination, and propose solutions and answers relevant

e situation of the poor.

thout that perspective, the moral crisis of poverty is not recognized as mocritical, the social reality is studies from the purely technical, instrumenta

oint of view, and attention is diverted from the structural sources of socialustice in the name of anti-utopian "realism." The relevant issues are not esed or recognized; hence, no solution is proposed which then might be

ther true or false in relation to the issues. By the demand of their objectiv

uation, not always because of conscious ill will or hypocrisy, the privilegedembers of society do not see the moral urgency or social necessity of ructural change. The oppressed and the privileged see different things in me social situation because their transcendental horizons are different.

is distinction between empirical judgments and the transcendentalrspective both justifies and invalidates the Vatican's critique that TLsolutizes the "partisan" consciousness as the only "true" consciousness,

nies the objectivity of truth, and makes impossible all dialogue between Td other theologies. If we take praxis in the empirical sense and thus partnsciousness in its immediacy and claim it as the criterion of truth, we do fto egregious nonsense. Every partisan would be right, in that case, byfinition, and the inevitable result would be an impossible subjectivism. Th

ould indeed make all dialogue impossible, not only between a partisan andhers but also among the partisans themselves. And yet it is also a fact thaeration theologians do disagree and dialogue, as do Marxists, amongemselves as well as with others.



y the same token, it is also true that a meaningful dialogue is not concreteossible between different transcendental horizons. Such dialogue is not aatter of the truth or falsity of a particular opinion, or even of a set of opinit one of the very perspectives in which particular opinions assume theireaning precisely as true or false. That the difference in perspective andiorities leads to different assessments of the historical situation and itsallenges and sets a definite limit to the possibility of dialogue should be q

ear from the debates



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tween capitalists and socialists, Continental philosophers and Britishalysts, Thomists and Whiteheadians, theists and atheists, and indeed thetican and TL itself. A dialogue only becomes concretely possible either if orty converts to the horizon of the other or both parties rise to a 'higher'

orizon which they can share. In either case, it is a matter of conversion, as

htly insists.e Limits of Pure Reason

nally, McCann and Strain's charge is that TL fails to institute a transcendealysis of the conditions for the possibility of authentic public discourse, ascourse among free, unbiased, rational agents committed to the values ofuralism and tolerance and intent on achieving a consensus with regard tourses of political praxis to be taken. It is this failure which, for McCann an

rain, leads TL to theological totalitarianism in theory and blind activism inaxis. TL does not allow a genuine dialectic between theory and praxiscause it does not allow theory, in its independent integrity as intersubjecblic, democratic rationality, to inform the political praxis of the communit

e basic problem with McCann and Strain's criticism is their conception of ation between theory and praxis, which they consider "dialectical" but whrns out to be anything but that. They assume the existence of theory and

axis each independent of the other and construe the dialectic as theteraction between the two subsequent to such independent constitution.us, they postulate an ideal speech situation and the conditions of such a

ossibility according to the demands of pure theory, out of which will emergey hope, democratic consensus which in turn will guide praxis. A genuinealectic, however, would consist in the mutual constitutionperichoresisof eory and praxis, their mutual oppositionchorismosand the process in whicch opposition is aufgehoben into reconciliation, however partial andovisional. 139 Human theory is anything but pure; it is always conditionede needs, contexts, and horizons of praxis, just as praxis is never blind actt is always mediated by some theory. McCann and Strain take theory outs living contact with praxis and seek to impose the demands of pure theo praxis from outside, as though the empirical reality of praxis could beduced to such demands. Their reason is pure reason divorced from praxistogether, outside of all history, not empirical reason or reason in history.

onsider the ideal speech situation of McCann and Strain and Habermas,



here humans gather for a dialogue, each of them an autonomous andsponsible self committed to no particular tradition but only to "a partisans behalf of reason," to a norm of social praxis "transcendentally presupposthe struggle of all persons and groups to see and say what is true, to do

hat is right, and above all, to remain truthful to themselves and to theirlows."140 These are, of course, admirable idealsideals, in fact, shared by

am even willing to accept the validity of their transcendental deduction. In

orld increasingly



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agmented and incapable of any consensus on substantive issues yet anxioavoid violence and dictatorship, there is an understandable temptation totreat into the purely formal and procedural conditions of genuine dialogue respected by all parties despite all their substantive differences; John

awls's A Theory of Justice is one of the recent examples.

owever, what if not all the parties to the dialogue agreed to those procedunditions or were capable of committing themselves to either such conditiothe conclusions of such a dialogue? What if these disagreements and

abilities were themselves productsto a great extent at leastof a socialteraction "distorted" by the conflicting political and economic interests of rticular society, from which speech should not be isolated and reified? Win short, our empirical reason operates under conflicting horizons, at odden with its own transcendental conditions? Do we wait until these conflicve been reconciledi.e., until we have achieved justice and equity in politid economicsi.e., until we no longer need such dialogues? How can partieth radically different horizons engage in a real dialogue, not merely thepearance of one?

abermas and McCann and Strain, of course, are aware of the fact that suc ideal speech situation is precisely an "ideal," nowhere fully realized.

evertheless, they insist that it is an ideal worth striving for. But on whatsis? Is there any basis for the actualization of such an ideal in the historic

orld with all its ideological and class divisions? If there is no such basis, is ll meaningful as an ideal? Are they not in fact, if not in intention, defendine status quo by insisting on an ideal that is in principle incapable of alization as the condition for any social change? Basically, their difficulty irived from postulating the existence of a human being who is purely ratioistorical, and universal à la Kant, a total abstraction from the concrete

storicity and particularity of real human existence, and trying to impose su abstraction, demanded by pure theory, as a condition for transforming t

orld of concrete historical praxis, which has a logic and rationality of its ow1

course, I do not mean to reject the value and necessity of dialoguetogether. I reject dialogue or public discourse only and precisely in its claibe the foundation of practical theology. Once a basic horizon is shared on

e basis of a common commitment to praxis, there is room for dialogue, an



s is precisely what is going on among the theologians of liberation in mattheological construction and social analysis. Indeed, the shared horizon oe preferential option for the poor does not dictate any particular politicalategy or action; these can be determined only empirically. The socialisttion shared by theologians of liberation is the result of longstanding debaalysis, and observation regarding the particular historical situation of Lati

merica. The charge of dogmatism and exclusivism regarding this option,

erefore, is a totally misplaced one. It is, of course, not a result of a dialogth the generals,



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ndlords, and the multinational corporations, any more than capitalism is asult of a dialogue with blacks, the unemployed, or those living under the

overty line. Should Cardinals Lorscheider and Arns have entered into dialoth Cardinals Trujillo and Obando, the Somozas and the Pinochets? 142



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hapter IValectic of Salvation and Liberation

the heart of Christian faith is the reality and hope of salvation in Jesus

hrist. Christian faith is faith in the God of salvation revealed in Jesus of azareth. The Christian tradition has always equated this salvation with theanscendent, eschatological fulfillment of human existence in a life freed frn, finitude, and mortality and united with the triune God. This is perhaps ton-negotiable item of Christian faith. What has been a matter of debate isation between salvation and our activities in the world. What is the salvifieaning of our existence and activities in this world? On this matter optionve ranged from straight dualism, which opposes the sacred and the profa

duality, in which the natural and the supernatural coexist side by side, eath its own autonomy; and then to a unity of intrinsic relation, which sees perience in this world as in principle salvific by virtue of the Incarnation.

is the latest and certainly the most radical attempt to integrate and unifylvation and our secular experience, faith and our praxis of life in this worldodovis Boff puts the perspective of TL as follows:

The theology of liberation seeks to demonstrate that the kingdom of God is to beestablished not only in the soulthis is the individual personal dimension of thekingdomand not only in heaventhis is its transhistorical dimensionbut inrelationships among human beings, as well. In other words, the kingdom of God isto be established in social projects, and this is its historical dimension. In sum,liberation theology is a theology that seeks to take history, and Christians' historicaresponsibility seriously. 1

ke the two natures of Christ within the hypostatic union according to

halcedon, salvation and liberation are neither to be confused nor to beparated. They are not to be confused and simply identified, for salvationanscends



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eration. Nor are they to be separated, for salvation includes liberation.rtially identical with salvation, liberation is nonetheless subordinate tolvation. 2 This position of TL has come under attack, notably from thetican, and has been accused of harboring Pelagianism, politicizing faith, aducing the transcendence of faith and salvation.

this chapter I begin, as in the preceding chapter, with criticisms of TL,pecially those of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Stanley Hauerwas, and John

obb. In the second section I discuss the dialectical relationunity infferenceof salvation and liberation, of transcendence and history, asaborated in the works of liberation theologians. In the third section I go ovelop my own concept of social sin, in accordance with the spirit of TL. Tncept of social sin and its theological correlative, the conversion anderation of social structures, have been among the distinguishingarcteristics of TL; and yet, judging by the literature available in English, items clear that the notion of social sin is more assumed than elaborated,hich is not necessarily to the discredit of TL. The concept of the social, of cial structure and structural contradiction, has long been elaborated andcome familiar in the intellectual tradition of Hegel, Marx, neo-Marxism, antical social science, which is also the intellectual milieu of TL; liberationeologians may therefore see no compelling reason to belabor the familiar.

e North American milieu. however, which is still burdened with the legacyomistic individualism, such a concept still seems to be in need of elaboratd defense. Responses to the critics will be integrated into the second andrd sections. This chapter, then, deals with the much-debated, oftentacked theological substance of TL, which involves issues of criticalportance.

iticisms of Theology of Liberation

e Vatican

cording to Cardinal Ratzinger in his 1984 Instruction,3 TL is guilty of thenial of the integrity of salvation in its three dimensions; transcendence,dividuality, and wholeness. First, we will examine the first chargethe deniae transcendence of salvation. For Ratzinger, ''some are tempted to

mphasize, unilaterally, the liberation from servitude of an earthly and tempnd" and to "put liberation from sin in second place and so fail to give it theimary importance it is due" (Introduction).



To some it even seems that the necessary struggle for human justice in theeconomic and political sense constituted the essence of salvation. For them, theGospel is reduced to a purely earthly gospel. (vi, 4)

denying the distinction between salvation history and profane history anfirming "only one history," TL falls into "historicist immanentism," which



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nds to "identify the Kingdom of God and its growth with the human liberaovement" (ix, 3) and to "misunderstand or eliminate" ''the transcendenced gratuity of liberation in Jesus Christ . . . the sovereignty of grace, and t

ue nature of the means of salvation, especially of the Church and thecraments" (xi, 17). It makes "history itself the subject of its own

velopment, as a process of the self-redemption of man by means of the cruggle" (ix, 4). In short, TL is a "temporal messianism," "one of the mostdical of the expressions of secularization of the kingdom of God and of itssorption into the immanence of human history," and in giving such priorite political dimension it is also led to deny the "specific" character of salvathich is "above all liberation from sin" (x, 6, 7).

e second error of TL is its denial of the interiority and transcendence of rsonal existence. TL tends to "localize evil principally or uniquely" in "socia

n" or "structural evil," and ignores "the full ambit of sin" or the totality of fects of sin, of which social sin is only one dimension. It fails to recognize n, which is always primarily personal, not evil structures, is the source of ails (iv, 14, 15). It demands "first of all a radical revolution in social relatiod "criticizes the search for personal perfection," but this is to deny "theeaning of the person and his transcendence, and to destroy ethics and itsundation" (iv, 15). Considering that the source of social injustice lies in th

man heart, truly humane social change can be brought about only by thearch for personal perfection, "only by making an appeal to the moral

otential of the person and to the constant need for interior conversion" (xistead, TL resorts to "the systematic and delibarate recourse to blind viole, 7). By the same token, TL is guilty of a double illusion. It believes that

hese new structures will of themselves give birth to a 'new man' in the senthe truth of man," and forgets that "it is only the Holy Spirit" "who is theurce of every true renewal" (xi, 9). It also believes that the revolutionaryerthrow of an old structure is "ipso facto the beginning of a just regime" rgets the threat of totalitarianism, which is "a major fact of our time" (xi,

is reduction of transcendent salvation to political liberation on the one had of personal sin to structural, social sin on the other also leads to the thiror, which sums up the essence of the first two, namely, the destruction oe "wholeness" of salvation. Ratzinger does not deny the necessity of politructural liberation: in his own way, he insists on it. What he does findacceptable, he states, is that TL selects this one aspect of salvationpolitic



d social liberationand makes it the "uniquely" or "exclusively" importantmension, which reduces the whole essence of salvation to the political andmporal, or else makes it the "principal" dimension of the whole, distortingoper hierarchy of order and rank. TL subordinates the transcendent agenGod to the Pelagian effort of autonomous humans and places what is

undamental" and "primary," sin and personal interior conversion, after whly "secondary," political servitude and structural change. Sin, the cause o

il,



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subordinated to structural evil, which is only a consequence and result ofhat is "higher", the religious and spiritual, is placed below that which isower," the temporal and political. This process postpones the theologicallysentialevangelization, the Word of God, the sacramentsfor the sake of aterial 'bread' and the satisfaction of temporal needs (vi, 3).

order to appreciate the logic behind the rather bald assertions of thestruction, it would be useful to take note of a lecture given by Ratzinger ae Rheinisch-Westfalische Akademie in July of 1985, in which he presents ore systematic critique of Gutierrez's A Theology of Liberation. 4 Ratzingergins by admitting Gutierrez's "personal" orthodoxy, acknowledging that

utierrez does not personally intend to reduce the Kingdom of God to a newciety on earth or Christian salvation to the process of political liberation instory. For Gutierrez, the "one" history of salvation is a complex unity withfferentiation of three levelshistorical liberation in its economic, social, andolitical aspects; creation of new humanity in a utopian society of solidarity;d liberation from sin as condition of communion with God and othermansto which correspond three distinctive types of rationality respectivele scientific, philosophical, and theological. Despite the orthodoxy of utierrez's peronal or subjective intention, however, Ratzinger questionshether Gutierrez objectively preserves the unity in difference without fallin

to reductionism, whether he really preserves both the logic of the whole ae distinctive rationality of each level. Objectively, Gutierrez ultimately redu

oth the empirical rationality of historical liberation and the theologicaltionality of faith to a utopian philosophy of history on the model of Saintmon and Marx. How is this so?

rst of all, Gutierrez reduces the proper claims of faith and theologicaltionality to nothing by preempting theological content and transferring it

e utopia. The forgiveness of sins and the reconciling communion with othmans are comprehensively anticipated in the utopian vision of new humad a society in solidarity; forgiveness of sins effects nothing and adds noththis vision. Faith provides no ethical criteria, which are already containede utopia of a classless society, as God too is encountered in the engagemthe process of historical liberation towards such utopia. To hope in Christly to believe in the adventure of history. Nothing specific is reserved for Gth, and theology, which are rendered "totally functionless."5 Likewise,

utierrez fails to provide any empirical analysis of society, something one w



pect of someone who interprets faith in political terms and suggests concrectives for political action. Instead, he replaces concrete social analysis wgeneral, abstract philosophical sociology based on a utopian conception oman existence. There is no concrete, empirical content to economic, socid political liberation. Thus, only the second plane, the utopia of culturaleration, remains as both the methodological justification and the real conthe entire project. Both historical liberation and theological rationality are

bordinated to the historical project of utopia, which becomes the motivatd unfying power of the whole.6



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cond, Gutierrez fails to give any justification of this utopian principle itselfthough the utopia is made to serve as a synthesizing principle of theologyd politics and to provide a new content and a new praxis to the doctrine lvation, he merely takes it as a presupposition of the whole accepted in fahich, however, appeals to history, not to God. History becomes the divinity

opia, claiming not only the attributes and power of the divine but also thevine right to unconditioned obedience and promises. It stands for the totaehind this historicist immanentization of God lie Marxian presuppositionshich are taken over without question; however, the real father of such a fhistory is Saint Simon, who saw history as an irreversible process of cessary progress and of messianic political projects based on such faith. H

so saw religion as the basis of social organization and enlisted its power inrvice of social progress, refusing to see any separation between temporal

iritual power. It is no wonder that this political messianism has found stroelcome and support in the soil of Latin America, a continent itself burdeneth a long history of a theopolitical tradition. The theology of Gutierrez,chewing both scientific and theological rationality, merely utilizes the powpopular religion as justification of the irrational faith in the utopia of histoe utopia then becomes totalitarian, creating a world where there exists one right politics. Politics orders not only the political but also the culturalvolution, the factory of new humanity. In short, Gutierrez's theology isilosophically irrational. 7

ird, Gutierrez is also guilty of a properly theological error. This error consiinserting the politicalsocial problem into the doctrine of redemption whereeologically speakingin terms of the logic and possibilities of theologyit hasoper place. He understands redemption as ontology or metaphysics of hothe not-yet-being, which under the presuppositions of Saint Simon become physics of the not-yet-being. This degeneration of metaphysics to physiavoidable as long as redemption is closely bound up with politics. For if demption lies on the plane of being and must become concrete in the

omain of the political, then being must be controllable, and human affairsust contain a necessity that can be designed and manipulated. Metaphysust be capable of being transformed into the physics of humans. Thus, thsertion of the political problem into the doctrine of redemption intrinsicallyads to such systems of thought as Saint Simonism and theologized Marxis

ere is an intrinsic, systematic connection between them which arises from



ginal relationship and which is unavoidable.8

anley Hauerwas

om a different perspective, Stanley Hauerwas objects that the concept oferation in Gutierrez's theology is at best sociologically and theologicallyadequate and at worst "profoundly anti-Christian."9 The concept is deriveom the ideal of individual autonomy in Kant and the Enlightenment.

ociologically, it abstracts from the notions of power and equality, and leade liberal capitalist



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stification of the power of some and the powerlessness of others. Unless tncept of freedom is made concrete in the context of the equalization of

ower, both political and economic, and unless this equalized power is enlisot so much in the service of making each individual "an artisan of his ownstiny" as in the service of making the individual more capable of cooperat

the creation of a fraternal society, the ideal of liberation remains anstraction liable to ideological manipulation. When used as the singleominant category of social analysis and strategy, it is antithetical to the vaequality and fraternity. Theologically, such liberation distorts the Christianncept of liberation in Christ, which is precisely a means to service andlowship, not a pretext for individualism and domination. The function of t

hristian churches is to be "a body of people who have found freedom throarning to serve one another and the world." 10

hn B. Cobb, Jr.

third source of objection to TL is John B. Cobb, Jr., whose basic objectionom the Whiteheadian perspective of ecological theology, is directed to thenthropocentrism" inherent in the political theology of Johann Metz inrticular but also in any sociological theology in general, and whose criticiserefore, may be considered relevant to TL as well. For Cobb, the basicoblem of any sociological theology is its anthropocentrism, the heritage ofnt and German idealism, which makes too sharp a distinction betweenature" and ''history" and subordinates the former to the latter. Nature isderstood only within the horizon of history, only in its appearance to humbjectivity and its utility to human purposes, not in its own right anddependence. It ignores the fact that humans are only part of nature, whicsuch transcends human subjectivity.

e result of the preoccupation with and the exaltation of the human specie exploitation of nature, leading to ecological deterioration and the constareat of nuclear suicide. The transformation of oppressive social structuresdeed necessary and urgent, but "changing the structures of human socied the attitudes of human beings to other human beings in itself is unlikellve the environmental problem."11 What is required is a fundamental breath the Kantian tradition and the recognition of the "inherent reality andorth of our fellow creatures," of the fact that "the rest of the creation shou

so be treated with respect and recognized to have reality and value quite



art from usefulness to human beings," for "other creatures are of value inemselves and for God." To do otherwise would be "profoundly false to theblical vision."12 In short, we need a shift to a wider cosmological or ecologorizon for the "indivisible salvation of the whole world."13

alectic of Salvation and Liberation

TL guilty as charged? Regarding Ratzinger's criticisms the answer, I thinkquires more than a simple yes or a simple no, more than even a partial ye



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d a partial no. This sort of answer presupposes the existence of a commoorizon of understanding between the disputants, which alone makesreements and disagreements possible and meaningful. Between Ratzinged TL no such horizon seems to exist. Instead, we have two different

orizons, two radically different modes of thinking, hence two different

eologies in conflict. This radical difference of horizon should become quiteident in the next chapter where I present Ratzinger'sand Pope John Pauls"authentic" or "integral" theology of Christian freedom and liberation, ane concluding chapter where it will be the subject of extended reflection ammentary. In this chapter let me respond to the charges as simply as

ossible, without further commentary on the deeper implications, as I presee positive doctrine of TL along with the underlying horizon of its thinkinggarding the relationship between salvation and liberation.

anscendence and History: The Charge of Reductionism

rhaps the best place to begin is the charge of reductionism, which hasrdened TL from its very inception. Does TL reduce salvation to politicaleration in history? Is it guilty of denying the transcendence of the Kingdod the sovereignty of grace, of temporal messianism and historicistmanentism? On this matter the response of TL, I think, has sometimes bevalier. Clodovis Boff, for example, calls it "a precipitant, simplisticandrrifiedinterpretation to "read 'political too' as 'political only,' 'earth too' asarth only,' or 'also, and especially, the poor' as 'only the poor,' and so on."e goes on to state:

It would be an interesting experiment to respond to the allegation of reductionismwith the classic riposte: What about the reductionisms of classical theology,especially in a later, essentialistic scholasticism, that great, vaunted "totaltheology"? What about its reduction of major biblical themes, such as physical

poverty, physical liberation in history, social transformation, justice for the laborer,and the like, to "spiritual" poverty, liberation, righteousness, and so on?15

is all very true, of course, that 'also' or 'too' is not the same as 'only,' andat classical theology was reductionistic in its own way. There is likewise artain partiality in picking on TL for its alleged reductionism while remaininnd to or at least not as concerned with the reductionism of the classicaleology of the Church. In light of the crucial importance of praxis in relatio

scourse discussed in the preceding chapter, Boff's appeal to the praxis of sic communities, I think, also deserves serious attention:



When this imputation of "reductionism" is subjected to verification in the livingpractice of the theology of liberation in the communitiesof which, after all, thistheology seeks to be the reflex and reflectionthere can no



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longer be any doubt. One need only watch the people reading the Bible and prayintheir faith to realize that this allegation is pure myth. Never in the history of LatinAmerica has there been as much praying as in today's basic church communities. 1

e relationship between salvation and liberation "is not always worded in arfectly satisfactory manner" in TL; nevertheless, Boff asserts:

this means that we in Latin America are better at practice than at theory. But afteall, does life not "say" more than discourse does? On our continent transcendence practice, not rhetoric.17

is clear, however, that the emphasis of TL on political liberation in historyso affirms far more than what might be implied by the connective 'also.' Itoes not merely affirmnor equallythe three dimensions of salvationpersonal,storical, and transhistorical. After all, the emphasis on the sociohistorical

mension is the most distinctive aspect of TL, in contrast to other theologiedoes not merely say that there is "also" a historical dimension to salvationere is "also" a personal and "also" a transhistorical dimension to salvation.not enough, therefore, to insist on the truism that "also" does not meannly." It is incumbent on TL to demonstrate the systematic connection andity among the three dimensions, the specific importance of the political

mension within that unity, and how this unity does not reduce the persond the transhistorical dimensions of salvation. As I shall try to show, TL on

holeand certainly Boffdoes try to demonstrate these. I am here only referrcertain polemically motivated simplifications, of which opponents of TL arrtainly not less guilty.

e position of TL on the irreducible transcendence of the Kingdom and thevereignty of grace, I think, has been unambiguously affirmative. Accordin

utierrez, the Gospel is

a message that can never be identified with any concrete social formula, howeverjust that formula may seem to us at the moment. The Word of the Lord is achallenge to its every historical incarnation and places that incarnation in the broaperspective of the radical and total liberation of Christ, the Lord of history.18

hristian hope "keeps us from any confusion of the Kingdom with any onestorical stage, from any idolatry toward unavoidably ambiguous humanhievement, from any absolutizing of revolution."19 In the same vein, Enriussel recognizes that "some day, we may have to demythologize the notio

e 'new man' too, lest it oppress us and prevent us from continually movin



ead in the process of liberation."20 As Ignacio Ellacuria writes:



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the Liberator God, who transcends history, has been made present in history in asignifying way by man, and now man proclaims and affirms in history somethingthat goes beyond history. History and that which lies beyond history are notidentical. 21

egarding sin, TL agrees with Ratzinger that salvation from sin is not simply

entical with political liberation, and that it is, in fact, only in the theologicarspective of salvation and sin that the true dimension and meaning of olitical liberation and oppression can be disclosed and appreciated. Forutierrez, "sina breach of friendship with God and othersis according to theble the ultimate cause of poverty, injustice, and the oppression in which me."22 It is the "fundamental alienation" "present in every partialenation.''23 "Liberation from sin is at the root of political liberation. Thermer reveals what is really involved in the latter,"24 and thus "the very

eaning of the growth of the Kingdom is also the ultimate precondition for st society and a new man."25 This coming of the Kingdom, however, "isove all a gift," "the gift which Christ offers us."26

e charge of reductionism, then, seems groundless, but Ratzinger is certastified in asking whether TLGutierrez in particulardoes justice objectively te transcendence of the Kingdom, whether it merely affirms suchanscendence subjectively while betraying that transcendence in the actua

aboration of its theology. This question is only fair. After all, it is a commoenomenon in intellectual history for a thinker to affirm something only togate it in practice either by neglecting it altogether or by failure to accorde weight or importance it deserves in his or her actual reflection andaboration. How seriously does TL take the transcendence of the Kingdom e sovereignty of grace? Does it preserve that transcendence, and what ro

oes the transcendence play in its actual theological reflection?

hat is at stake here, however, is not simply whether TL does or does noteserve the transcendence of God, as though there were only one simplencept of transcendence given once and for all, but alsoand moreportantlywhat conception of transcendence is more in accord with the

ormative tradition of Christian faith and is philosophically more consistent aequate. For TL, it is indeed essential but not sufficient to stress, as does

atzinger, the irreducible transcendence of God and salvation over history aman liberation; it is also necessary to show a positive connection, an inneediation between the two, if we are to avoid an impossible metaphysical a



eological dualism and to remain true to the historical and incarnationalnception of God so pervasive of Scripture. For TL, God is transcendentecisely as the totality, and all the distinctions between divine transcendend historical immanence, eschatological salvation and historical liberation,

osited and mediated within the unity of God's salvific will and by virtue of ttalizing function of the Kingdom. The position of TL in this regard is shapetwo thingsthe Hegelian



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nception of God as self-differentiating and self-unifying totality, as discuschapter 2, and the historical, incarnational conception of God in Scripure

rst, we will discuss the Hegelian conception. The basic issue here has to dth the concept of divine transcendence itself and the way one can do justhat transcendence. Does one promote the true transcendence of God b

nstantly stressing God's irreducible difference from history, that God is noman? Is this not in fact in danger of reducing the divine to one pole of thation and thus to an object at the same level as creatures to which it is ogatively related? Does it still maintain, or in fact only reduce, the sovereiggrace when it excludes the whole realm of history from the scope of its

ower and activity? For Hegel, as, in a similar although different way, for thter Barth, the apostle of "radical otherness,"28 an infinite being which is oposed and external to the finite is not truly infinite or absolute, because itll has something outside itself and thus remains limited by the latter, justfinite being which is external to the infinite and not intrinsically dependenceases to be finite. The infinite must be conceived as the totality whichfferentiates itself into itself, the infinite, and its Other, the finite. Thefference is real, but it is something posited by the infinite itself and thustimately subject to the unity and totality of the infinite and its transcendeality. It is the result of the internal self-differentiation of the divine, not a

tonomous power external or opposed to it. The divine infinite thus unifiesoth infinite and finite, both transcendence and history in itself. The alternaould be a metaphysical dualism to which even the divine is subject.rthermore, such self-differentiation of the divine, for Hegel, is the result ovine "activity," which always means both "actualizing" and ''expressing" thvine finality. If a 'real symbol' means for Rahner a reality which at oncepresses an Other constitutive of its essence and realizes what it expressee finite, for Hegel, would be precisely such a real symbol of the infinite.29

ow we come to the historical and incarnational interpretation of the God oripture in TL, for which this Hegelian dialectic of the divine totality is ansential background. For TL, the God of the Bible is God who acts in histord thus unifies transcendence and history in his own historical action.cording to biblical faith, "God makes himself known in his works."30 "Thery essence of Christian revelation" is not "some abstract knowledge of Gome doctrine" but "a manifestation of God in action," "the historical andstoricized love of God."31 The God so revealed is



a God who not only governs history, but who orientates it in the direction of justiceand right. He is more than a provident God. He is a God who takes sides with thepoor and liberates them from slavery and oppression.32

e work of creation is "the first of God's salvific deeds," which reveal him ahe liberator of human existence in its totality."33



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rthermore, "in Jesus God not only reveals himself in history, he becomesstory." 34 As a result, "the liberating action of Christ" "is at the heart of thstorical current of humanity."35 It is also the history and historical praxis osus of Nazareth that reveals the divinity of the Son and through it the divthe Father. "The historical life of Jesus is the fullest revelation of the

hristian God."36

TL stresses the historical Jesus not because it wants toduce Jesus to a revolutionary symbol, as Ratzinger claims, but because it ecisely through his historical praxis that God chose to reveal who he is. Thternative would be a subtlely disguised docetism and monophysitism and troduction of alien (i.e., Greek) conceptions of the divine into the Christiannception of God. It is in light of "the historical Jesus who is the key providcess to the total Christ''37 that we have to understand the Christ of faith e risen Christ as well.

od's relation to history is best captured in the central biblical symbol of thengdom or Reign of God, where 'reign' is to be taken in the verbal sense ofe activity of reigning. There are two elements to this potent symbol. The fits historicity. It symbolizes God's will to transform history and his

mpowering presence in history. The Kingdom of God does not mean God'se over history from an ahistorical point of view but his transforming and

mpowering immanence in history. The relation between God and history is

ternal but internal, and it is God himself who posits this internal relation, ediates himself through history to his own transcendent agency and finaliverreaching" history as his own other (Hegel). It is through God's owntiative, not because of some 'immanentist' attempt to 'reduce' God's

anscendence and deify history, that the liberating transformation of historch becomes an intrinsic dimension of salvation itself.

e second element is its totality. God is the sovereign, the Lord of all histo

o area of human life is exempt from God's sovereign demand foransformation. God is not only the God of the sanctuary, the Sunday worshthe interiority of the believing heart, but also of the marketplaces, factorid capitol hills. All areas of human existence stand under God's judgment

od's call for transformation. As an impediment to salvation, sin meansjection of God and others, but it is not a purely interior but a concretelystorical reality, part of the daily events of human life. The removal of sin aconsequences in history, therefore, is an essential condition of salvation.

"totality," salvation "embraces all human reality, transforms it, and leads i



fullness in Christ."38 It "embraces all men and the whole man."39 Theospel proclaims "total" liberation in Christ, which "includes a transformatioe concrete historical and political conditions that men and women live in,t also "leads this same history beyond itself, to a fullness that transcendsope of all human doing or telling."40 The true "sovereignty of grace" requ

othing less than this "radicality" and "totality" of the salvific process, thatothing is outside the pale of the action of Christ and the gift of the Spirit.

e Kingdom is indeed



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n eschatological totality," but "precisely because of that it is encounteredstory," 42 "in its historical mediations.''43 The Kingdom is not only "not yett also "already" operative in the world. The eschatological Kingdom begind through the embodiment of its values in history, not apart from it. Toempt history from God's salvific activity would be in fact to deny his

vereignty. "If an absolute is unwilling to immerse itself in the relative, itases to be absolute; indeed it fails to attain even the value of that which latively' alive and operative."44

om the standpoint of faith, then, history is no longer merely profane histoternally opposed to sacred history. It is itself an inner moment of thengdom, the divine agency and finality which as such transcend it, an intrimension of sacred history. The meaning of historical liberation can berasped in all its depth only when one knows that this liberation leads thisme history out beyond itself."45 The salvific process "gives human historyofound unity,"46 and "faith reveals to us the deep meaning of the historyhich we fashion with our own hands."47 By the same token, "salvation hisnot some history different from human history; it is history as interpreted e message which enables us to comprehend its profundity and destiny"; ict, "the elevation of grace is the most profound dimension of human histoelf."48

e relation between salvation and liberation, then, is a thoroughly dialectication. The order of creation and history, as mentioned, is distinct from anus irreducible to the order of salvation; each has its own agency and finalstinct from that of the other. Still, the relation is internal, not one of twoerely juxtaposed, parallel, or even convergent paths which still remainutually external. History has been overtaken, assumed, or overreached bylvific agency and finality of God herself/himself, immanent in history, and

us become an inner moment of salvation history. The Kingdom of God unanscendence and history in an intrinsic, mutually mediating relationship, asuch it is "a single unifying reality," "a unifying unity," or "the unity thatifies and is not itself only subsequently united."49 The distinction, therefo

rictly speaking, is not between historical liberation and transcendent salvatwo mutually external spheres but between liberation and salvation withi

e unity of salvation itself. They are internally united, but the principle of tity is not, contrary to Ratzinger, liberation or utopia but salvation, not hist God. It is God herself/himself who posits the history of liberation with it



tonomy, which as created autonomy could never be total, and subjects itr/his own transcendent agency and finality. In Hegelian terms, God posite otherness of human history yet also "sublates" (aufhebt) it, that is, purieserves and elevates it to the level of her/his own intentionality. God posistory in its autonomy, purifies it of every idolatrous self-absolutization, andansforms it into a symbol which at once concretizes and points to thengdom.50



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lvation, then, transcends liberation as a totality transcends its parts, and s sense liberation is only partial, not total, salvation. Insofar as liberation

ternal to salvation, however, this partial salvation is still partial salvation os an intrinsically salvific significance. TL seeks to maintain "the correct

artial' identification of social liberation with salvation, and the correct

bordination of the former to the latter," and "to maintain the unity of thestory of God with, and within, its vehicle, the history of men and women, e spirit of Chalcedon: 'without confusion, yet without separation." 51 Forere is

only one human destiny, irreversibly assumed by Christ, the Lord of history. Hisredemptive work embraces all the dimensions of existence and brings them to thefullness. The history of salvation is the very heart of human history.52

us "the growth of the Kingdom is a process which occurs historically ineration," and "the historical, political liberating event is the growth of thengdom and is a salvific event," although "it is not the coming of the Kingdot all of salvation.''53 In this sense, "those who reduce the work of salvatioe indeed those who limit it to the strictly 'religious' sphere and are not awthe universality of the process,"54 just as, for Hegel, those who reduce th

anscendence of the infinite are precisely those who separate the infinite fre finite in a purely external relationship and are not aware of the totalizing

ower and function of the 'true' infinite.

ree Dimensions of Liberation: Their Distinction

is unity and totality of the history of salvation, however, is not andifferentiated unity. It is a single process, with inner differentiation. Withs unity of salvific history, TL generally distinguishes three distinct dimenslevels. The first level is that of the historical praxis of social, political, andonomic liberation; the second is that of the transformation of culture, of man self-consciousness based on a utopian philosophical anthropology wes history as a process of human self-liberation for the realization of the

ossibilities of authentic existence; and the third is the theological dimensioth, liberation from sin, and reconciliation with God and other humans.55

ow, then, are these dimensions distinct from one another, and how are thso mutually related? Furthermore, does TL relate them without, as Ratzingspects, reducing their distinction to nothing?

rst, consider the real difference or distinction among the three dimensions



e first dimension is the political praxis of liberating and transformingpressive structuressocial, economic and politicaland creating a just societ

ere 'liberation' serves as a key concept, as is clear from the very naming oheology of Liberation." Originally derived from the various phases of theodern EnlightenmentKantian, Marxian and Freudianit is also used as an



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tithesis to the concept of 'development,' which has been much touted aslution to the problems of the Third World since the fifties. 56

ere are three aspects to the concept of liberation which must be noted. Tst is that it is revolutionary, in the sense of structural change. In contraste notion of development, which implies gradual, evolutionary improvemen

e standard of living within the structure of capitalism while maintaining thpressive dependence of the poor on the wealthy, of the Third World natio the First World, liberation stresses the necessity of changing the structudependence and creating a new social order free of oppression and injuscond, unlike the reified and individualistic notion of freedom in capitalistcieties, liberation implies a constant and ongoing process of collectiveruggle against the forces of oppressive structures. Liberation is not sometven once and for all when it receives legal recognition, as are the freedomourgeois capitalism; it is something to be fought for and deepened ever anrough social collaboration. Third, while developmentalism assumes armonistic vision of society and conceals the existence of social divisions antradictions, liberation is predicated on an explicit recognition of suchvisions and conflicts and seeks to create a classless society, which necessaplies struggle against the privileged class that has a vested interest in theaintenance of the status quo. In this struggle neither pious exhortations t

oral conversion nor rhetorical appeals to the common good will do. What eded is political actioni.e., mobilization of the poor masses in confrontatioth the powers that be.

political liberation has to do with the transformation of conditions andructures, the second dimension, cultural revolution or liberation, is concerth the transformation of our self-consciousness as humansi.e., our basictitudes towards ourselves and others and our vision of what it means to b

man. Capitalism and socialism are themselves embodiments of a basicman option regarding the ideals of authentic human existence and humaations. Human liberation is not completed with the liberation of structure

so requires the liberation of enslaving and oppressive mentalities and theeation of a new image of humanity and humane social existence. The goaeration for TL is not, as in the vision of "developmentalism" or as Ratzingeems to charge, the production of an economically affluent and politicallygitimate society. For Gutierrez, "beyondor rather, throughthe struggle agasery, injustice, and exploitation the goal is the creation of a new man."57



umans must appropriate new attitudes, new outlooks, and new ideals, inrticular the ideals of autonomy instead of dependence, of fraternal solidastead of divisive individualism. Here it is essential to stress the importancelf-liberationnot, of course, in the sense intended by paternalism andformism, that individuals should seek their own liberation in an individualiay and afterwards perhaps struggle for the liberation of others, as thougheration of some individuals as individuals were possible in a generally

pressive society. Self-liberation



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stressed in the sense that one must become aware of the fact that onennot be truly liberated as an individual when society as such remainsenated and oppressive, and that one should identify with those who bearunt of oppression. The self to be liberated from dependence to autonomy

ot the isolated and individualistic self, but the self conscious of itself as a

ember of an interdependent humanity and therefore in solidarity with oth

umans must be liberated from naive consciousness, which takes thepressive status quo as given, to politically mature, critical consciousness,

hich sees the status quo as a product of a process of interaction amongman interests and groups. They must be liberated from passivensciousness, which takes their present condition as an immutable fate, totive consciousness, which sees human history as something made bymans and therefore as something that can be humanized by self-consciollective human effort. What is required, in Hegelian language, is a transit

om consciousness to self-consciousness, from a despairing acquiescence instory to a hope and confidence in the liberating possibilities of history. Hisnot the past, the repetition of the same, but the future open to qualitativw and different possibilities of being human.59 This cultural liberation, of urse, is no more a 'once and for all' affair than is political liberation; it is ju

much a process to be ever renewed and deepened. This is all the more sven the historical fact that liberators often turn into oppressors once thevolution is over. The temptation to domination and oppression is alwaysesent, and so is the necessity of constant vigilance against the possibilitiew modes of oppression.60 In this sense, the goal "is not only better livingnditions, a radical change of structures, a social revolution; it is much moe continuous creation, never ending, of a new way to be a man, armanent cultural revolution."61

e third dimension is that of faith, the realm of human relationships with Gd one another as interpreted in light of God's gracious self-revelation insus of Nazareth. It is the realm of sin and grace, of rejection of God andighbor and salvation from sin and communion with God and others, of thchatological finality of human existence, the horizon of transcendence frohich everything human and historical must receive its ultimate interpretatd judgment. It is the realm of the Kingdom of God, God's free initiative in

eation and redemption, God's judgment and promise regarding the ultima



stiny of the human creature. The dimension of faith is a dimension beyonhuman knowledge and achievement. "The Kingdom must not be confuseth the establishment of a just society."62 Just as "a social transformation,atter how radical it may be, does not automatically achieve the suppressioall evils,"63 so historical liberations ''do not establish the eschatological

ate."64 As sin, alienation from God, is the ultimate root of all injustice andthe world, so salvation or liberation from sin is "the ultimate precondition

ust society and a new man," a precondition available "only through theceptance of the liberating gift of Christ, which surpasses all expectations.



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egarding the real distinction between the theological dimension of faith anman experience, which must always be understood in the context of thesic unity mentioned earlier, Jon Sobrino brings out another aspect of the

stinction from the perspective of an anthropology of concrete totality. Forobrino, there have been three ways, throughout history, of affirming the

anscendence of God, each of which presupposes a different kind of thropology. The classical, metaphysical approach, based on an intellectuathropology, consists of a theoretical affirmation of God's otherness by wayalogical predication. It seeks to know God "in himself" by means of etaphysical attribution. The 'other' to which God's otherness is addressed e human being taken as an intellect. The second, existentialist approach,at of Kiekegaard and his followers, is based on an anthropology which takman life as personal existence responsible for itself and to be accepted in

mmitment amid the ambiguities of life. Reason is not independent of but mension of this existence, which as such transcends it. God's transcendenen, is not so much to be intellectually affirmed as to be accepted andperienced in existence, and thus as a scandal to human reason demandinucifixion of the understanding.' God is 'other' not to theoretical reason bue personal subject of existence as an individual totality.

e third approach to divine transcendence, that of TL, is different from bo

e classical metaphysical and the modern existentialist approaches. For TLman subject is neither the cognitive nor the existential individual but ancrete totality, a subject who must pursue his or her cognitive and existeanscendence to God only in and through concrete society and history, amcial contradictions and historical conflicts. The negativity to be overcome anscendence is not primarily that of intellectual ignorance, or of existentiambiguity and personal suffering, but precisely that inherent in the historicauation of poverty, injustice, and oppression. What is required, therefore,

ot merely the acquisition of knowledgeeven through revelationor the sacrifthe intellect, but the crucifixion of human life as a concrete totality: the

ansformation of oppressive structures, in accordance with the demand of ngdom, and the suffering entailed in the following of Jesus in political praod's otherness or transcendence is not addressed primarily to the intellectrsonal existence but to the subject of concrete totality and praxis, which firm that transcendence not only by changing our knowledge or personal

istence but most importantly by transforming, i.e., concretely transcendin



e oppressive status quo of contemporary history. The transcendence of Gnot simply an object of theoretical contemplation or a call to personalpentance; it is primarily a call to concrete historical transcendence of sin ail on the basis of the eschatological hope in the definitive Kingdom of Gode future. 66 As Clodovis Boff put it earlier, in TL, "transcendence is practic

ot rhetoric."

ch of these three dimensions, political, cultural, and eschatological, whosstinction is clear enough, likewise has a distinctive rationality of its own to



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ide and evaluate our actions and experiences in each dimension. The prapolitical liberation is to be guided by scientific rationality, the rationality oe social sciences, political, economic, and sociological, with emphasis on ttical analysis of social structures. I have already elaborated on thiscioanalytic mediation in the preceding chapter.

o respond briefly to Ratzinger, who criticizes Gutierrez for not providing anmpirical analysis despite his talk about its necessity and for not givingncrete empirical content to liberation, it can be said that both charges, wey may seem factually true, are unfair. It is true that there is not much

mpirical social-scientific analysis of the situation in Gutierrez and TL inneral, but this is not to say that they reduce the autonomy of empiricaltionality to nothing. They generally presuppose the results of the socialalyses already given by many Latin American social scientists, notably theeorists of dependence. Furthermore, they are primarily theologians, not soentists: they do not presume to substitute for the work of the latter,ecisely out of respect for their autonomy. In general, TL tries to integratesults of critical social science to a degree never attempted by any traditioeology. In this regard the relation between TL and social science isalogous to the relation between contemporary European theology, such aat of Rahner and Ratzinger himself and philosophy. Both Rahner and

atzinger stress the necessity of philosophy in and for theology, but neitherem would consider it an absolute condition for doing theology to engage plicit philosophical analysis of all the concepts and categories they do

orrowand simply assumefrom contemporary philosophers; and yet no oneould thereby think of accusing them of denying the autonomy of philosophd reducing it to theology.

or is it fair to assail Gutierrez for not providing concrete empirical content t

eration. In general terms, the praxis of political liberation consists of obilizing the poor so as to transform the structure of society such that allould be guaranteed basic human rights, political and economic, through astem of political representation and socialization of major industries. Thestem Gutierrez and TL favor, in this respect, approximates that of democrcialism. Beyond this general outline of a future society, however, it would possible to give any more specific political and economic content to the liberation. By its very nature, political praxis is always relative to theanging dialectic of the historical situation, and to demand more than suc



tline would be to demand the gift of prophecy regarding the future yet toaped and to lack a sense of the contingencies of history, as though politicaxis ever claimed to eliminate such contingencies. Strategies and programe meant to be elaborated in a constant dialectic with the changing situat

ot predetermined for all situations.

e praxis of cultural liberation is to be guided by the rationality of philosop

pecially a philosophical anthropology which not only spells out the essentructures and constitutive relations of human existence but also



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tegrates these into a "utopian" philosophy of history that views history as ocess of the actualization of the ideals and hopes of human liberation. Thnamic, historically oriented anthropology sees a dialectic between essentructures and sociohistorical developments, and thus avoids the ahistoricalocial, and static essentialism so characteristic of traditional philosophical

thropology, as well as the latter's fatalistic, conservative reification of histsomething simply independent of collective human efforts and aspiration

hat is and is not possible for human existence is not something simply givce and for all; it is something ultimately to be decided by history. There a

ossibilities of transformation in historyas witness the many epochal andvolutionary transitionswhich are usually unsuspected and often covered ureigning ideologies, and which become actualities in times of critical cha

o explore the liberating possibilities inherent in history, therefore, requires ediation of creative imagination which is rooted in the unsuspected potenthe present yet transcendent and subversive of its reified phenomenalityis is the sort of creative imagination found in all genuine sciences; it is alsesent in the utopian element that underlies the rationality of liberatingthropology. The ability to project new possibilities is not contrary totionality but constitutes the dynamic and mobilizing element of truetionality. 67

egarding this philosophical anthropology, Ratzinger accuses Gutierrez of mply assuming, not justifying the utopian principle; of having an irrationalth in history; and of reducing the metaphysics of human beings to a physmechanistic necessity. That Gutierrez assumes the utopian principle, Ilieve, must be granted; he did not produce a metaphysics of hope à la

arcel, a theology of hope à la Moltmann, or a grand historical speculation e role of hope à la Bloch. Nevertheless, he does elaborate his anthropolog

me length, in dialogue with traditional thought and drawing on the insighHegel, Marx, Marcel, Moltmann, and Bloch. Again, it is to be wondered

hether it is fair to ask someone who is primarily a theologian to produce aesh justification of the philosophical insights he or she borrows fromofessional philosophers. Of course, some theologians, such as Tillich andahner, do this, but most do not. As far as I know, Ratzinger has not produ independent justification of the dialogical personalism underlying his owneology. The issue, therefore, is not whether a theologian does or does notovide his own justification of the philosophical foundations of his theology



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between freedom and utter contingency on the one hand and determinisd necessity on the other. 68 He is not aware of a third possibility, thenstruction of a new future which depends on two things: free collectiveman effort to shape history according to desirable ideals and the hope thch shaping of history is truly, not just abstractly, possible.

is need not mean that humans can plan or predict every detail of history;ter all, as Hegel pointed out, there is such a thing as unintendednsequences, not only of individual action but also of collective action. It dean that insofar as history is a product of collective human action, it isossible to try to shape at least its outline in the direction of liberating idealcording to the best scientific insights available regarding the concretenamics of history and the real possibilities of change latent in it. This sort tempt, in turn, would not be possible without hope in the future, a hopehich, unlike mere 'wish,' does not dispense with the need for concrete actch action is in part based on the past experience of actual achievementsman hopes while also projecting itself towards the future. This hope need

ot be predicated on the assumption that there are no retrogressions, failurdefeats in historypast history invalidates such an assumption, as Hegel

mself knew; by the same token, it is precisely hope which sustains humanruggles in the midst of the setbacks and failuressome temporary, some

otractedwhich are inevitable in any attempt for structural change, as histmply shows. The alternative would be to leave our common future not justutral chance or accident, but to the forces of oppression, who are indeed

ways planning and manipulating the course of events to maintain themsepower.

e praxis of faith is to be guided by the rationality of theology, which, as ascussed in the preceding chapter, consists not only of interpreting the dat

th and revelation but also of reflecting on the contemporary demand andeaning of those datathe dialectic between the Word of God in Scripture antemporary experience.

ree Dimensions of Liberation: Their Relation

ow are these three distinct dimensions of liberation mutually related? For Telaborated earlier, in a general way, in this and the preceding chapters,

eir relation is one of mutual intrinsic mediation as moments of an essentiatality, not one of contingent, extrinsic connection as among parts of an



cidental totality. The distinctions of the dimensions arise from the basic uone history, a 'Christo-finalized' history, and must be understood on thatsis: "the salvific action of God underlies all human existence. The historicastiny of humanity must be placed definitively in the salvific horizon."69

onsider, first, the relation between political liberation and cultural liberatioe praxis of political liberation which seeks to transform and humanize

pressive structures is pregnant with the future in a number of ways. Themmitment to such praxis presupposes negation of present reality andnunciation



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the existing order by affirming and announcing new, alternative possibilitd ideals of human existence, which serve as both the criterion for theticism of the present and the goal to be achieved by present praxis. It is firmation of these critical norms of new and alternative modes of existenchich makes it possible to recognize the present as dehumanizing, unmask

eology, and mobilize human action to transform it. Such affirmation,owever, presupposes a creative hope in the future or utopia (Ernst Bloch) e sense of an imaginative break with the reified present in favor of new,eative possibilities and of a confidence in the future as capable of actualizch qualitatively different possibilities. Without this utopian hope, politicalaxis would lack the existential energy to sustain it in the midst of conflictsd protect it against the ever-present temptations to despair. It would remthe grip of the present, evolutionary and reformist at best, and at worst

ways liable to a lapse into reactionary nostalgia for the past or a closedeological dogmatism which absolutizes a particular historical achievementithout that hope and the concurrent implementation of that hope in theltural liberation of new human and social consciousness, the politicaleration of structures alone is likely to betray its original purpose and turn e creation of a new structure of oppression, an inhuman bureaucracy.ultural revolution must inform, guide, and be pursued simultaneously withot postponed until after, political liberation. 70

the utopian principle of cultural liberation mediates political liberation as anamic and mobilizing factor, as a principle of critical, historical

anscendence, concrete political praxis in turn mediates the utopia as ainciple of concretizing realism. In order to fulfill its subversive, mobilizingntion, the utopia must maintain its orientation not only to the future but athe present. After all, it is the present which must be transformed. Theopia is effective only to the extent that it transforms the present, and thuust be verified in terms of present political praxis. Likewise, the possibilitieansformation the utopia projects into the future must be rooted in thestorical present; not everything is possible at all times. Present political prus concretizes the utopia by testing its efficacy in the realities of the presd by plumbing its unsuspected yet real possibilities of transformation.ithout this concretizing mediation by political praxis the utopia would bectopian' in the usual, pejorative sensethe empty and ultimately evasive

ealism dismissed by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the "utopian,"



cientific," socialism in Engels's sense, a futuristic illusionof which Moltmanope tends to be guilty.71

hat, then, is the mutual mediation or contribution between the utopianthropological vision and Christian faith, between the hopeful projection ofer more authentic possibilities of human existence within history and theperience of God? First, we consider the utopian mediation of faith. Perha

e best way of defining this mediation, not as clearly presented in TL as are mediations between political praxis and utopian hope and between poli



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axis and faith, is to use an analogy with the concept of 'transcendence' ine theology of Karl Rahner. For Rahner, whose concern has been to avoidaditional dualism and extrinsicism, transcendencein the sense of thetological drive towards the 'more,' absolute being or mysteryis both an

xistential' of human existence and the point of contact with divine revelat

d grace. It is the human correlative and the human conditionitself positeodfor the possibility of the "supernatural existential" or God's offer of gracethrough this existential transcendence that humans can "hear" the Wordod, that God is known and anticipated. 72

, of course, works with a different anthropology. For TL the human subjecot, as for Rahnerat least the early Rahnerprimarily the subject of cognitivetological transcendence but that of a concrete totality, i.e., transcendencwards God through concrete history. Nevertheless, transcendence througstory, symbolized by the utopiai.e., the striving towards ever more authenossibilities of existence in history which is at the same time aware of its owmits and points beyond itself towards the transhistoricalis the humanrrelative and condition for the possibility of divine revelation and faith. Thopian hope in a society of solidarity and love is an implicit yearning for thechatological Kingdom of justice and love and a historical, not merelygnitive, anticipation of that Kingdom. It implies a yearning for total

eration, liberation from all that alienates humans from one another, and tso from sin and death. At the same time, just as, for Rahner, transcendeneology keeps Christian revelation from lapsing into mythology so the utoptical principle of self-transcendence in history, prevents eschatologicallvation from falling into idealism and escapism, as it also keeps political prom the danger of ideology and political messianism. Thus, as the inspiringd critical telos of political liberation within history but also by pointing to t

anshistorical fulfillment of the human hope in the eschatological Kingdom,opia mediates between political praxis and Christian faith.73

ontrary to Ratzinger's charge that TL renders Christian faith "totallynctionless," it is faith that in turn mediates the utopia by opening up a

orizon that gives salvific meaning, moral motivation, self-critical principle, aanscendent hope to the utopian struggles for political liberation. To be sue Gospel does not provide a recipe for a utopia or norms and criteria forrticular political options at a particular time. The utopian projections musided by philosophical rationality, political actions and strategies by rationa



alysis of the structural dynamics of a particular society. In this sense, theation between faith and the utopian struggle for liberation is not a direct mediate relation, which would ignore the mutual autonomy or 'othernessth and politics and only result in dangerous politico-religious messianism re-critical' sacralization of politics. This does not mean, however, that theye merely juxtaposed or unrelated, which would often lead to opportunisticgnment of faith with any political option.74 Rather, the relation lies at a

eper level, the level



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ultimate meaning and transcendent motivation. Through the mediation oe utopian dimension, the horizon of faith, the unifying, totalizing dimensiothe three as mentioned earlier, transforms the profane meaning of liberat

ruggles into events with transcendent, salvific significance. "Faith reveals the deep meaning of the history which we fashion with our own hands."

e salvific process "gives human history its profound unity,"76

and "seeingman history as a history in which the liberation of Christ is at work broader outlook and gives the political commitment its full depth and genuineeaning."77

ore specifically, faith provides theological, moral motivation to political prae ultimate motive for participating in the struggle for liberation is "thenviction of the radical incompatibility of evangelical demands with an unjud alienating society."78 The promise of the Kingdom "reveals to society ite aspiration for a just society and leads it to discover unsuspectedmensions and unexplored paths," and thus "the political is grafted into thernal."79 After all, the basic obstacle to the Kingdom and our eschatologilvation is sin, the selfish rejection of God and neighbor, which is not anstraction but manifests itself in historical realities concretized in unjust an

ppressive institutions and structures, and which constitutes the ultimateurce of injustice and oppression. ''Behind an unjust structure there is a

rsonal or collective will responsiblea willingness to reject God andighbor."80 "For freedom Christ set us free" (Gal. 5:1), and "the freedom t

hich we are called presupposes the going out of oneself, the breaking dowour selfishness and of all the structures that support our selfishness."81 "

ruggle against exploitation and alienation," therefore, "in a history which indamentally one, is an attempt to vanquish selfishness, the negation of ve."82 In this sense, the struggle to build a just society "has an indirect bfective impact on the fundamental alienation. It is a salvific work, althougnot all of salvation."83 It is "not simply a stage of 'humanization' or 'pre-angelization'" but "part of a saving process which embraces the whole of an and all human history."84 "Every human act which is oriented towardsnstruction of a more just society has value in terms of communion with Grms of salvation," just as, inversely, "all injustice is a breach with him."85

ith also provides a self-critical principle to the praxis of liberation. It not oakes us critically sensitive to the presence of sin in oppression and injusticalso makes the praxis of liberation critical of its own motives, strategies, a



e temptation to absolutize itself. It makes sure that "evangelical motiveseside over that praxis,"86 and "keeps us from any confusion of the Kingdoth any one historical stage, from any idolatry toward unavoidably ambiguoman achievement, from any absolutizing of revolution."87 Thus, faithmultaneously demands and judges" our political praxis.88

e eschatological perspective of faith likewise gives transcendent support

e utopian hope in the possibilities of historical liberation. The divine promithe eschatological fulfillment of human existence is indeed a projection



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wards the future, the end of history; however, as studies of Old Testamenophets make clear, it is not merely a future event, a "not yet," which hasspired so much escapism and historical pessimism in the past, but also anlready," with a demand on the present to begin to conform to the values pectations whose complete realization doubtless lies in the future. Prophe

essages are proclaimed in the present and for the present even whileojected beyond the present. The future promised by God demands andspires actions in the present. This attraction of what is yet to comenstitutes the driving force of history, its constant mobility. God's action instory and God's action at the end of history are inseparable. As Gutierrez

The full significance of God's action in history is understood only when it is put in iteschatological perspective; similarly, the revelation of the final meaning of history

gives value to the present. The self-communication of God points towards thefuture, and at the same time this Promise and Good News reveal man to himself and widen the perspective of historical commitment here and now. 89

is eschatological hope in the Lord of history, of the present as well as of tture, provides divine support to the utopian hopes of historical liberation. otects against despair, and inspires the conviction that a just society ismething "possible," that the struggle for liberation "is not in vain," that "G

lls us to it and assures us of its complete fulfillment."90 Thus, "to hope inhrist is at the same time to believe in the adventure of history, which openfinite vistas to the love and action of the Christian."91

e praxis of political liberation, in turn, mediates faith by "concretizing" instory the demand and perspective of faith. As mentioned earlier in thisapter, this is not a question of "external" mediation of faith by political prthough the two were originally (ursprünglich) mutally independent realit

t one of internal "self-mediation" of faith through a praxis internallymanded and inspired by it. For faith, or its object, God, remains the unifytalizing power of all the dimensions of human existence and history. Withs divine totality the role of political praxis, as elaborated in some detail ineceding chapter, is to "respond" and ''attest" to the eschatological valuesd demands by concretizing, incarnating, and "symbolizing" them in concr

storical situations.92 For God's love for all humans, especially the poor, "m given substance in history and must become history," and in this sense "

olitical dimension is inside the dynamism of a Word which seeks to become



carnate in history."93 It goes without saying that this concretizing praxis, entioned in the preceding chapter, also "discloses" new meanings andmensions of faith even while illumined by it.94

TL, then, the theological dimension of salvation and faith mediates thestorical dimension of the utopian struggles for political and cultural liberat



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the unifying or totalizing principle of the latter, while the latter mediates rmer as its concretizing principle, which makes salvation historically effectthe conceptualization of salvation as transcendent yet also inclusive of storical liberation is due, at least in its Denkform, to Hegel's dialecticalnception of God in history, not to speak of the biblical tradition, the utopi

nception of history as a process of collective self-liberation of humanity ane imperative to make human liberation real and effective in concrete histoe clearly traceable to Marx. If the emphasis on salvation as total liberationreaction to the traditional tendency to 'spiritualize' salvation by limiting itsope to the 'religious' dimension, the emphasis on political praxis as a meamaking salvation historically and socially concrete is a reaction to thendency of tradition to stress the importance of ulitimate endstranscendenlvationand neglect that of concrete ways and means to make such ends

fective and actual. 95

rhaps another way of putting this mediation between the historicalmension of politics and the transcendent dimension of faith is to compare d Ratzinger in their respective interpretation of the event of the Exodus.

atzinger recognizes that the Exodus is a political event ("represents freedoom foreign domination and from slavery," iv, 3), but insists that this politicntent is not its "specific" significance, which comes from "its purpose," ''t

undation of the people of God and the covenant cult" (iv, 3) and ultimatefigure of baptism" (x, 14). Thus, "the liberation of the Exodus cannot be

duced to a liberation which is principally or exclusively political in nature" . Ratzinger thus opposes the historical political "content" of the Exodus tolvific "purpose" and insists on the specificity and irreducibility of the lattere former. He ignores the fact that precisely that "purpose" became concred actual through that "content," and fails to state the positive connectiontween the two, which he leaves merely juxtaposed.

if to anticipate this charge, as early as his Theology of Liberation, Gutierrreed with Ratzinger that throughout the whole process of liberation fromypt "the religious event is not set apart," that this religious event is "itsepest meaning," namely, that "Yahweh liberates the Jewish people politicorder to make a holy nation," that "the Covenent gives full meaning toeration from Egypt."96 Yet Gutierrez does not merely juxtapose the politicntent of the Exodus and its religious meaning. Rather, he sees a mutualner mediation between the two: "one makes no sense without the other,"



d they are "different aspects of the same movement."97

The Exodus affords a grasp of the perspective in which the covenant is situated, anthe covenant in turn gives full meaning to the liberation from Egypt. Liberation leato communion. This is the process by which the "people of God" is built.98



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r TL the question is not one of keeping the political and the religiousparate for fear of reductionism, although such separation would resultecisely in reducing total salvation to the religious, but one of accentuatinge respective significance of both within the unity of the event. To ask hether the exodus is "principally" or even "uniquely" either "political" or

eligious" in nature would be to commit the "category mistake,'' reducing tternally unified totality of the event to an entity of mutually separablemensions or parts to which one may then selectively assign "principal" orarginal significance. For TL the event of the exodus is both wholly politicad wholly religiousthe former as the concretizing, the latter as the finalizininciple of the whole. Without the political liberation in the order of historicficacy, the religious meaning of the Covenant in the order of transcendenality would have been only an abstraction imposed on concrete historical

istence from outside, just as the political liberation would have lost itstimate significance without the religious meaning. To separate or merelyxtapose them would be to do justice neither to the politics of the exodus its theology, reducing all the pain of political liberation to a mere show atst accidental to the covenant, and the Covenant itself to an event which

story yet without significance for that history. Segundo puts the relationshccinctly: "the God of liberation revealed and transmitted his word throughtivity of freeing the Hebrews from Egyptian imperialism." 99

is important at this point to stress the kind of unity TL attributes to the thmensions or levels. Enough has been said about the theological dimensionlvation as the unifying principle of the three. It is likewise necessary to pot that they are not to be taken as merely parallel or chronologicallyccessive dimensions, which would lapse into idealism and immediatism.10

e three dimensions are not three separable realities but one and the samality considered from three formally different points of view. What ispressive inequality from a sociological point of view is the moral vice of ustice from the philosophical and the sin of hubris and hatred from theeological perspective, which looks at all reality sub ratione salutis et peccasymbols of grace and sin. The political act of educating and mobilizing th

oor is a concrete embodiment of both a philosophical vision of authenticistence and a theological virtue of charity. In this sense, the threemensions are formally distinct but materially identical.101

kewise, the unity of the dimensions does not imply either mechanical



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the openness of history and the possibility of shaping it according to humpirations under the providence of the Lord of history. By the same token,ere is no absolute agreement among the three dimensions in the sense ofe-to-one correspondence. As the lower dimensions are concretizing symbthe higher, and as symbols are always multivalent and multidimensional,

ey symbolize the higher in an open form. The perspective of faith is nothausted by any one utopian vision of authentic existence in history, anyore than it could be exhaustively realized by any one political action, stratsystem, just as it does not dicate any one political option, although this d

ot mean that all options are equally legitimate or prudent. 102

alectic of Social and Personal Sin

e Social and the Personal

salvation thus transforms the very meaning of history into an inner momesalvation history, it is through historical liberation that salvation becomes

storically effective. If salvation is the totalizing principle for the unity of lvation and liberation, liberation is the concretizing principle of that unity.lls special attention to social sin and to the praxis of political liberation as ntral, although not the only, dimension of this liberating process. In thisgard it is worth recalling Ratzinger's charge that TL wholly forgets the

anscendence of human dignity and personal freedom and the need forterior conversion, reducing them to the social and political as somethingtithetical to the personal.

egarding this charge, I think two things must be said. On the one hand, itmply not true that TL ignores the transcendent claims of personal dignity eedom or the need for personal conversion. What it does is to place suchncerns in the concrete social context of personal existence in which they

se; only there can they be effectively met, if at all. On the other hand, it ue that TL does ignore or at least has nothing important to say about theistential problems that have so preoccupied Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, therly Heidegger, Bultmann, and Tillich. Insofar as the problems of "existence not simply reducible to those of "history" it remains incumbent on TL toow their inner relationship and mutual mediation. What will not do is merjuxtapose existence and history side by side and to ignore the concrete iity of the person, the subject of both.



espite this difference between Ratzinger and TL, however, what is really aake in the dispute is a more fundamental difference in the way of conceive very relation between the individual and society. For Ratzinger, sin isimarily an affair in the inwardness of the individual, and social sin only aonsequence" or "effect" of individual sins. By the same token, the inwardnversion of individuals, it is assumed, will necessarily result in the reform cial structures as its effect. What is implicit in this view, then, is a concep



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ciety as, in Segundo's expression, "the end result of juxtaposing alreadynstituted individuals," 103 a mere collection of individuals with no antecedations constituting the conditions of their existence. Social sin is not greaan the sum of individual sins. It is sin only in an analogous, not a propernse. (See the following chapter for a fuller discussion of Ratzinger's positi

r TL, on the other hand, as for much of contemporary thought in theadition of Hegel, Marx, and Dewey, society is "from the very first a systemman reactions and interrelationships that constitute the individual and fort of his total human condition."104 Individuals neither come into existenc

or shape their existence in isolation; at all stages they are dependent on tlows and are internally constituted by these relations of interdependence

ready there as the very condition of their individual existence. 'Being-withMitsein), not in the abstract, ahistorical phenomenological sense but in thense of always and already being involved with others in a particular societparticular time as the inner environment of one's own life, is an "existentiaall human existence. By the same token, society is not an impersonal thinposed to the personal; it is precisely "a system of human reactions andterrelationships'' of individuals in their constitutive interdependence whichs been objectifiedoften, indeed, reifiedinto political, economic, and culturstitutions and structures. It is individuals themselves, not in isolation but i

eir togetherness, who constitute the subject of society, its relations andjectifications, and who are therefore collectively responsible for both its gd evil. The proper contrast, then, is not between individuals on the one hd society on the other, but between individuals considered in their (relati

olation and individuals considered in their concrete association. By the samken, society and its institutions should not be seen as merely a "means"ternal to the individuals, to be exploited for private ends, as bourgeoisdividualism would have it. Such institutions are actualizing expressions,owever dialectical and ambiguous, of the very ends and social subjectivity e associated individuals who remain the ultimate subject of society.105

rsonal freedom, whether civic, intellectual, or existential, is always situates sociohistorical context. The transcendence of the person in the inwardnhis or her free act is always a transcendence within this society and histoe relation to transcendence and the relation to society are not merelyxtaposed and external; they are mutually mediating, although not reducibmensions within the unity of the person. It is the whole person who is



anscendent as a free being, and it is likewise the whole person whoseistence is concretely mediated by the historically given social relations,eologies, and institutional structures. Both the freedom to sin and theeedom to reform one's life are acts of the whole person as a concrete totatranscendence and history, not of some purely spiritual, angelic interiorityt of concrete subjects already immersed in and reacting to the pull and pexisting social conditions; these conditions generate the need for such fre

ts, challenge them positively or



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gatively, and in any case determine their limits. The anxiety in the presendeath, condemnation, and meaninglessness, respectively the absolute foontic, moral, and spiritual experiences of non-being and finitude accordinTillich, is itself mediated and qualified by the relative forms of fate, guilt,

mptiness, each varying according to the dominant conflicts and contradict

a particular society.106

is is not to deny the possibility of free self-determination or metaphysical igious transcendence, but simply to recognize the sociohistorical limits of man freedom and human transcendence as a finite being. Human finitudeans not only that our existence depends on the creative causality of Godso that it depends on others in history and society. This sociohistoricalterdependence is but a relative expression of the absolute dependence onod. In this sense individuals and society, or, more accurately, individuals adividuals and individuals in their organized social interdependence, are noequal powers. The freedom of the individual is conditioned by society, whpact far surpasses that of the individual as such.

e Concept of Social Sin

r TL, two consequences follow from this. First, as "a human, social, andstorical realilty which originates in a socially and historically situated

eedom,"107 sincannot be touched in itself in the abstract. It can be attacked only in concretehistorical situationsparticular instances of alienation. Apart from particular, concretalienation, sin is meaningless and incomprehensible.108

at is to say, even though there is indeed a transcendent dimension to sindistorted relation to God, the subject of that relation and sin is the concreman subject, and it is imperative to understand sin as a reality expressive

d affecting the concrete sociohistorical totality of human existence, not tofy it by isolating it as a phenomenon of pure inwardness. Whether one

olates sin from God, as in true secularism, or from history, as in truepiritualism,' the result would be reifying reduction of sin to an abstraction.utierrez, sin

is not something that occurs only within some intimate sanctuary of the heart. It"always" translates into interpersonal relationships . . . and hence is the ultimate

root of all injustice and oppressionas well as of the social confrontations andconflicts of concrete history.109



n, while the primary source of all evils, as Ratzinger rightly insists, is not aenomenon of pure interiority but a reality of situated freedom in thencrete totality of existence. By the same token, the fundamental alienatiohich is sin cannot be removed either in toto or as a purely interior reality.



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n be removed only in the form of its concrete historical and thus partialediations, just as the Kingdom is "not found in its totality but in its historicediations." 110 To oppose the "radical slavery to sin" as of "fundamental" rimary importance'' and servitudes of an "earthly" and "temporal" kind asecondary" (Introduction) and to fault TL for "reducing" the former to the

tter, as Ratzinger does, would be to commit a "category mistake" at best, worst to fall into an inhuman dualism. It would be a category mistake inewing sin and oppression as two entities on the same level to which one msign differential importance, rather than as two dimensions of one and thme realitysin as the dimension of transcendent meaning, oppression as thmension of its historical concretion; it would be dualistic in ignoring thencrete totality and unity of the subject of sin, ultimately reducing sin to astraction and depriving oppression of its theological significance.

e second consequence is the primacy of social sin among sins and of theaxis of political liberation among the means of salvation. Sin does involve use of human freedom and does call for interior conversion, but it is alsocessary to distinguish between personal and social sin, in accordance wite structure of the human subject of freedom and sin. The subject of persn is an individual in his or her (relatively) separate existence, and so is itsject, the victim. The consequence of personal sin is private, in the sense

does not seriously affect the life of individuals in their interdependence asmmunity. The extent of responsibility for personal sin is defined by the limthe subject's personal knowledge and his or her power to affect the courevents. The subject of social sin, on the other hand, is any number of

dividuals as associated, interdependent beings with power over the destineir community, regardless of whether they are government officials or notdividuals as citizens are also responsible for the social sin of their governmsofar as the latter depends on their democratic consent, as privatesinesses can be subjects of social sin to the extent that they control andploit the mode of economic interdependence or structure in the communr their selfish ends. The object of social sin is the community of individualsd the structural and institutional objectifications of that community. Thetent of responsibility for social sin, therefore, is defined by the extent tohich individuals, as members of an organized community and thus togetheth others, can know and control the consequences of their communal

tions.



social life becomes increasingly interdependent and enables even (relativparate individuals to affect the communal destiny of others, it is likewisefficult to draw a sharp distinction between personal and social sin.onetheless, such a distinction is crucial in assigning proper agency andsponsibility for different kinds of action. Social sin is committed by individutheir associated existence who together produce consequences that goyond their separate individual intentions and wills and thus their separate

dividual responsibilities. The mere fact that individuals are not responsiblech sins as



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parate individuals, however, does not mean that they can simply disowneir responsibility. What they are not responsible for as separate individualey are responsible for as associated individuals, for they remain the subjesocial sin, which expresses their "collective will" 111 and which is objectifd often reified into degrading institutions and oppressive structures. This

so means that social sin is sin in the most proper sense of the term, noterely by analogy with personal sin, with its own subject of freedom andsponsibility.

milarly, social sin is not merely, as Ratzinger claims, the "consequence" anffect" of a sin which is primarily that of the individual in his or her separatistence. It lies in the rejection of God through the abuse and perversion o

eedomcommissions and omissions, actions and passionson the part of dividuals precisely in their communal existence. Individuals are responsiblr and guilty of what they do or fail to do communally, not only what they fail to do separately. Social sin likewise transcends the mere sum of

dividual sins and as such is a cause and source of sin in its own right. Jussocial structure is more than the sum of its component individuals, so its etweighs by far that of merely personal sin or even a collection of such sinscope, duration, and penetration. The structural evils of unjust economied totalitarian political structures, as Ratzinger himself so well recognizes

without, however, drawing the logical conclusion), are more devastating thrsonal greed or personal ambition taken in isolation.

ructural sin and personal sin, then, are not two coequal realities; rather,ructural sin functions as the totalizing context and condition within whichrsonal sins occur. Contrary to Ratzinger's accusation, TL fully recognizes tructural change does not automatically abolish all personal sins, but it doeolish the effect of social, collective sin and provides a positive incentive a

holesome pressure for doing good as well as a negative pressure for avoidil. In this sense, "changing social and cultural structure is a way of change human heart,"112 and "the individual can only be liberated within the toman condition, within his social context."113 Total liberation requires thenversion not only of individuals but also of "the whole network of their acationships that keep them bound to socioeconomic and political realities aeir structured sinfulness."114 In a continent such as Latin America, wheree majority remain in a state of 'non-persons' and lack the minimum materd political conditions of 'personal' existence, a genuine concern precisely



e dignity and freedom of persons will make all the more imperative thisruggle against structural sins with all their degrading and depersonalizingnsequences.

e Meaning of the Political

structural evil is more than the sum of individual sins, it also follows that tsponsibility for it is the collective responsibility of a community of individua

ot that of isolated individuals, and that the action required is a collective,ganized action, not the private, separate action of individuals. Whatdividuals



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nnot accomplish as individuals, they can and must try to as a communityue community, however, presupposes a shared perception of a common gd a shared willingness to engage in cooperative action for it. In existingcieties, however, this is precisely what is lacking, as they are based on clatagonisms. What passes for the 'common good' is in reality a cover for th

lf-interest of those in power. The agency for the liberation of oppressiveructures, therefore, necessarily falls on the oppressed class as a class, whn liberate themselves only by abolishing the structure of power and thus liberating the oppressors as well from that structure. The agent for socia

ansformation, for TL, is not Hegel's 'world-historical' individuals and statesarx's 'industrial proletariat,' but the oppressed poor of the Third worldtheoor as a class, the collective victim of global capitalism. 115

is collective action for the removal of social sin and the creation of structunditions worthy of human dignitythe 'polis' of free personsis preciselyolitical' action in the best, classic, and salvific sense of the word. Just asatzinger seems to fail to appreciate the gravity of social sin, so he also failsderstand the true meaning of the political, as when he speaks of "the me

olitical." For TL, politics is not something one does occasionally as when onoes to the polls or out on the campaign trail. It is not an activity reserved particular occasion or a particular class, the professional politicians and

bbyists. It certainly does not mean the use of manipulative techniques, asrty politics.' To think of politics in this way would be precisely one of the

ourgeois mystifications which renders the majority apolitical and thus servee interest of the ruling class by immunizing and protecting it from allallenges from below.

e political sphere is a sphere in which the distribution and use of socialower, power over others, is at stake, where the basic quality of human

ations and self-determination is decided. Politics ultimately decides whethmans will live in reconciling solidarity or in sinful antagonism, whether thell treat one another as subjects of dignity or as objects of exploitation. Asutierrez argues;

it is within the context of the political that the human being rises up as a free andresponsible being, as a truly human being, having a relationship with nature andwith other human beings, as someone who takes up the reins of his or her destinyand goes out and transforms history.116



this sense, politics is "a dimension that embraces, and demandinglynditions, the entirety of human endeavors," "the global condition, and thellective field, of human accomplishment."117

at is, the political is not simply one particular dimension alongside of othemensions of human existence, as Ratzinger seems to assume when hecuses TL of stressing "only" the political dimension, but a dimension whic

e same time overreaches all others, a totalizing condition and context tohich



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her dimensions and spheres of human life are subject although not simplyducible to it. The spheres of material and cultural production also both

mbody and affect the relations of power and can be humanized only througanized, collective actioni.e., political action. The emphasis of TL on politius highlights the pervasive influence of the relations of power, of dominat

d subjugation, in all spheres of human life, its consequences for humangnity, and the necessity and possibility of transformation through politicaltion. As the cooperative action of the poor as a class, aimed at the creatioliberating structural conditions, then, the praxis of political liberation is thincipal means of making the salvation of concrete human existence real afective in history: it seeks to convert the principal, i.e., structural, socialurce and consequence of sin.

assigning priority among the "means of salvation," Ratzinger waverstween two alternatives. On the one hand he seems committed to both thcramental life in the Church and the praxis of social justice and liberationeing them as two "equally" important means. On the other, he leans in fathe sacramental practice as something "special." In either case, thennection between the two is not clearly stated; they are merely juxtapose, on the other hand, does consider the praxis of liberation as the principaeans of salvation without denying the importance of orthodoxy, cultic

orship, and participation in the life of the Church as a whole. The praxis oscipleship through participation in political liberation is

the most original and all-embracing reality, far more so than cultic worship andorthodoxy. Rather than being opposed to these latter, however, the following of Jesus integrates and crystallizes them. 118

other words, the praxis of political discipleship is the unifying andncretizing principle of which the sacramental life is an inner moment, into

hich it is meant to be integrated, and which it must serve by encouragingncrete praxis of love and in turn expressing and celebrating that love. Th

hurch and the sacraments are not ends in themselves; these are valuableecisely and only as the "effective sign" of concrete praxis, inspiring thethful towards efficacious action and sacramentally celebrating that action

hich it is meant to be a sign. They should not be reified as entities inemselves, apart from the service of the praxis of faith, the praxis of love aconciliation in concrete history. This would indeed be, as Ratzinger chargechallenge to the sacramental and hierarchical structure of the Church" (i



), but only if one would reify and separate such a structure from its histossion of service "willed by the Lord himself" (ibid.).119

word of clarification is in order at this point. In the preceding section of thapter I called salvation the unifying, totalizing principle of salvation anderation. In this section I used the same concept to describe the function



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the political in relation to other spheres and dimensions of human existenwhat sense are both the dimensions of salvation and political praxis the

talizing principles of human existence? The answer, I think, is that the sation of God in history is the totalizing principle from the theologicalrspective of ultimate meaning and efficacy, which gives meaning and

ficacy to the relative sphere of human history, whereas the political is thetalizing principle from the anthropological perspective of our historicalrticipation in God's own meaning and efficacy. God's meaning and efficacmain the totalizing principle in the absolute sense, while politics may be sly in the relative sense, only on condition that it is overreached, elevated,d empowered by God to share in God's own meaning and efficacy.

esponses to the Critics

hat, then, can be said in response to the critical concerns raised earlier byistentialism, Hauerwas, and Whiteheadian ecological theology? Regardinge existentialist objection, TL does not deny the subjectivity of the subject,e irreplaceable responsibility of the subject for the authenticity of his or h

wn existence, or the reality of the experience of sin and finitude. The quesnot whether humans are subjects but what they are to do precisely totualize their subjectivity in authentic existence in a world of sin and finituven the historicity and sociality of existence and the Christian emphasis onlf-sacrificing love and the hope in the Kingdom.

om this historical and theological perspective, TL is indeed critical of thendency of existentialism to individualism, its indifference to the fate of fellmans, and its historical and political pessimism. 120 TL argues that it isecisely in shifting the center of our life from our own existence to that of her that we attain true authenticity, that it is in the concrete response to eds of the marginalized Others of history that we realize our responsibilityrselves, and that the proper Christian response to sin and finitude is not t

well on one's own theological guilt and ontological impotence or on theiversal futility of human effort ("vanity of vanities, and all is vanity"), whic

ould only lead to unChristian despair and repressive tolerance of historicalustices, but to sublate them (Aufheben) into active responses to themands of the Kingdom in the overcoming of the historical sources andnsequences of sinful finitude, sustained by hope in God's own absolute

ture. In concrete imitation of the crucified yet risen Lord, the Christian is



e to one's own self and live to the divine Other by living to the human Othhistory in which God is especially present. We search for our own perfect

ot by commitment to our own existence but by commitment to the liberatioppressed sisters and brothers. The ontic, moral, and spiritual anxiety

herent in sinful, finite, and mortal existence (Tillich) cannot be overcome treat into ahistorical inwardness or a preoccupation with the asocial self; n only be overcome by accepting it as a burden of a concrete totality and

ruggling to save and redeem that totality under God's liberating grace.



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light of the preceding discussion, it should be easy to see that Hauerwastique of Gutierrez is based on a misreading of A Theology of Liberation. Fo

auerwas, the notion of 'liberation' is too individualistic, innocent of the reathe struggle for power, and unworthy of the Christian notion of freedom e service of fraternal love and fellowship. For Gutierrez, on the contrary, t

man subject of liberation is not the egoistic self of bourgeois individualismt the social and historical self who shares a common structural destiny anlidarity with others and who can be fully liberated only when others areerated as well. Gutierrez, along with other liberation theologians, is also oo painfully aware of the reality of power in society; this is precisely the reahy he so insists on the necessity of political struggle in the midst of conflicstory for the transformation of power relationships and the creation of aassless society. Furthermore, the true meaning of Christian freedom does

the service of fraternal love and fellowship, not in the enjoyment of self-fficiency, still less in the domination of others or anarchistic "rule of capricth which Ratzinger identifies the notion of liberation in TL. 121

sically, Hauerwas's misreading, I think, is due to his hasty and exhaustiveentification of the notion of liberation in Gutierrez with the ideal of individutonomy in the Kantian phase of the Enlightenment, which leads him toerlook the broadening integration of the notion of freedom into both the

ciohistorical conceptions of the HegelianMarxian phase of the Enlightenmd the Christian theological conception of freedom as service. Hauerwasroneously directs against Gutierrez precisely the same critique that Gutierrects against 'developmentalism' and its individualistic, harmonistic, andonomistic assumptions.

nally, it must be conceded to Cobb, Ogden, and other Whiteheadianological theologians that TL, along with other sociological theology, does

ve much to say about the ecological crisis posed by environmental pollutid nuclear threats. TL has, thus far at least, been precoccupied with thedemption of history and society and concerned with nature only insofar asters into human concerns in the economic process of production and

stribution. Its philosophical perspective has largely been anthropological, e tradition of Hegel and Marx, not cosmological in the sense in which proeology is.

oes this mean, however, that TL is so wedded to anthropocentrism that it



uld neither recognize the intrinsic and autonomous value of nature nor samething relevant about the liberation of nature? I don't think that there iy incompatibility, theoretically at least, between TL and a concern withology and the intrinsic value of nature. After all, TL fully recognizes theeatureliness of human existence and the basic idolatryabsolutization of lfishness and rejection of Godinherent in human sinfulness: God, notmans, is the Lord of creation and history. There is no reason why the call

pentance and conversion, from selfishness to selflessness, which underliee transformation of



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ppressive relationships and structures into liberating ones, could not betended to the liberation of nature from the human will to domination. As

obb himself recognizes, the oppression of fellow humans and the exploitatnature "deeply influence each other." 122 Both are rooted in the sameurce, the self-absolutizing adolatry of selfishness. It is true that the domin

orizon of the philosophical sources of TL, Hegel and Marx, is anthropocentthough the young Marx did show an appreciation of nature as a value in id criticized capitalism precisely for subordinating even nature to utilitarian

omination.123 As Christian theology, however, TL is also determined by theanscendent horizon of faith with its emphasis on the sovereignty of God aeator and redeemer and the relativity and creatureliness of human existench philosophical sources are themselves to be integrated and sublated ins transcendent horizon of faith. That this integration has not occurred is

ct, but is it also evidence enough that such integration is in principlepossible?

is question, however, presupposes another questionnamely, must a theo comprehensive, as Cobb seems to assume when he talks about the neede integration of sociological and ecological theology in "a truly comprehen

olitical theology"?124 Historically, of course, comprehensiveness has been iving ideal of all systematic theologies, and yet we also know that such

mprehensiveness not only is historically relative but may also suffer fromstractness and irrelevance to the concrete problems of historical existenchat we need is not comprehensiveness for its own sake butmprehensiveness relevant to historical existence. As pointed out in theeceding chapter, TL does not claim to be a universal theology valid for all

me; its modest claim is to serve the praxis of faith by enlightening it with atical reflection which, of course, must include all relevant considerations bust also remain within the limits of historical knowledge and practicalevance. The question, then, is whether ecological concern should be pary 'relevantly comprehensive' TL and what place such concern should have hierarchy of relevant concerns.

ere, I think, we have to consider the difference in the Sitz-im-Leben of Latmerican TL and First World theologies. A First World theology which alsoeks to be a theology of liberation should indeed have a horizonmprehensive enough to include ecological concerns. After all, the First Wust assume the main responsibility for the pollution of the environment an



e threats of a global nuclear suicide, often exporting them to the Thirdorld. It is the capitalism of the First World and its exploitative ethos whichve dominated not only human relationships and social structures, in the Forld and increasingly in the rest of the world, but also our attitude towardture as such. The problem originates in the First World, and it is also therat a real solution must be found. A 'relevantly comprehensive' politicaleology of the First World, then, clearly must integrate the ecological

ncerns.

e problems of environmental pollution and nuclear suicide, of course, areelevant to Latin America and the Third World in general; these too



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e involved in them, at least as victims and often as collaborators. It is cleaowever, that in terms of both impact and the capacity to do anything aboem they are not the most urgent problems confronted by the countries inird World. These countries are faced with the more elementary problem oeating a social structure that can guarantee the basic minimums of huma

istence. The main problem indeed remains that of social change, whichould also have the side effect of putting restraint on capitalist greed, theurce of both social and ecological exploitation, notprimarily at leastthat ofotection of nature. In terms of relevant comprehensiveness, then, it is nolf-evident that the lack of ecological concern in TL should be such aramount issue, given its sociohistorical situation.

rthermore, even assuming that TL is crucially deficient because of its lackological concern, it must be conceded, I think, that such concern can riseove empty moralism and impotent idealism only if it can be concretely anfectively implementedthat is, only through political praxis. Implementationch concern requires consciousness-raising on a large scale and mobilizatiopressure groups against the reified structures of exploitation, as does the

ruggle against racism and sexism. To be effective, ecological theology neee mediation of TL.

o conclude, through the mediation of Hegel's dialectic of concrete totality organizing principle, TL tries to produce an integral synthesis of Christianth in salvation and the Marxian dialectic of liberating praxis. In this synthth serves as the totalizing principle within the unity of salvation anderation, while political praxis, itself an inner moment and demand of lvation itself, serves as the concretizing principle of that unity. As Clodovis

off puts it, "it is the faith that assimilates or subsumes elements of Marxismen, and not the other way about," and "the elements assimilated are

ofoundly transformed in the very assimilation, in such a way that the resuo longer Marxism but simply a critical understanding of reality." 125 To putatter a little differently, one could say that TL is no more or no lessarxianand Hegelianthan, say, Rahner's transcendental theology is eitherntian or Heideggerian. In both instances, I submit, it is the theological

orizon of faith which subsumes and sublates the philosophical sources fromhich they borrow.

e resulting relation between salvation and liberation in TL is no longer on



o juxtaposed planes or orders of creation and redemption, profane histord salvation history.126 It is one of mutual immanence requiring "mutuallightenment and reciprocal demands."127 As a causality derived "from th

rength of God himself who promotes it," liberation has a "genuinely causaaracter with respect to the definitive Kingdom of God. This causality isrtial, fragile, often erroneous and having to be remade," but it is more thnticipations, outlines or analogies of the Kingdom." What is at stake in th

ruggle for liberation ''is the eschatological Kingdom itself."128 To see sin inructural



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il is "not horizontalizing sin," but on the contrary, "transcendentalizing whhers want to maintain on a purely horizontal level, thus bringing it intoationship with God." 129

rough this mutually internal yet non-reductionistic relationship, TL seeks oid all the conventional dualisms as well as one-sided reductionist monism

eks to avoid "both the reductionism of a disincarnate spiritualismasquerading as 'religion,' and the reductionism of a political action approaat ignores the reality of the people's faith."130 The approach of TL is neithecularism" nor "spiritualism,'' neither "horizontalism" nor "verticalism."131

lvation is neither a "purely immanent process" nor a "purely transcendentocess," as it could not be identified with either "subjectivist interiority" orhistorical transcendentalism."132 It does not remain passive and interior oe ground that all historical achievements are merely 'relative.' It seeks toake itself effective in the midst of historical struggles and its ambiguities bming to grips with the structural sources of oppression and injustice and cessity of political action. It does not withdraw into the impotent inwardnHegel's 'beautiful soul' in order to remain pure from the taint of action. Be same token, it does not, like Prometheus, 'absolutize' the relative and thman, but subjects them to the eschatological reservation.133



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hapter Vhe Vatican's Theology of Liberation: A Critique

at a new theology on the horizon should face criticisms is both an entirely

ormal and a constructive phenomenon in the history of human thought. Evnce its inception in the 1960s, TL too has had its share of criticisms from ipponents. In this regard it is safe, I think, to single out the Vatican,presented by Pope John Paul II and Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, as the moportant among the critics. The Vatican's position on TL deserves specialtention for a number of reasons. It has been the most persistent critic of Tom a well-defined theological position since 1978, the inauguration of ardinal Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II. It has also proposed an alternative

eology of liberation, a way, according to some, of "coopting" andreempting" the voice from Latin America.

e significance of the Vatican position, however, goes beyond the merelyeoretical merit of its criticism and its proposed alternative. The theologica

osition of the Vatican is not simply one position among other positions, atast for Roman Catholics. It expresses not only ideas and arguments, whicay be judged like any others on the basis of their intrinsic merit, but also

actical institutional weight of the highest teaching authority of the Church authority with enormous power to impose its own position on the rest of

hurch and even to eliminate all competition and dissent within it. This goer beyond the normal "ecclesial" constraint facing any Christian theology,tholic, Orthodox, or Protestant, which is always rooted in a particularmmunity whose life it is meant to serve and whose response, therefore, iscisive, in the long run, for the life of a theology. The significance in this

gard of the Vatican position on liberation cannot be overestimated. Asonardo Boff's 1985 compliance with the Vatican ban on his public activitimply suggests, it is often a matter of the very survival of a theologian. 1 Tture of TL and the kinds of tribulation it may face depend, at least to agnificant degree, on the position the Vatican has taken and will take in thears ahead.



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is with this practical institutional as well as its theoretical significance in mat I have decided to devote a full, independent chapter to an analysis of eology of the Vatican on the subject of freedom and liberation. I haveready commented on its position on the relationship between theology anaxis (chapter 3) and that between transcendence and history (chapter 4)

s chapter I begin with a brief discussion of whether there was indeed, asedia speculation would have it, a change in the Vatican attitude toward Ttween its two Instructions (1984 and 1986) on the subject, then go on t exposition of its own theology of sin and salvation, its anthropology of rsonal existence, and its conceptions of social sin and social doctrine, andally point out the inherent limits of the Vatican's personalist theology as aeology of liberation (which it claims to be), largely on the basis of ailosophical critique of its personalist anthropological presuppositions. It is

portant to note in this regard the difference between the Vatican and TLeir respective philosophical presuppositions. The difference is one of basic

orizon, not of particular opinions within the same horizon, and the relationtween TL and the Vatican, therefore, is not simply a matter of somessident theologians in conflict with their ecclesiastical superiors but a conftwo irreconcilably opposed theologies.

as The Vatican Changed Its Mind?

e Vatican has issued two Instructions on the subject of liberation theologe first, called "Instruction on Certain Aspects of the 'Theology of LiberatioLibertatis Nuntius (LN), was issued on August 6, 1984. The second,omised in the introduction of LN, was issued on March 22, 1986 under the, "Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation" or Libertatis ConscieC). 2 Each time an Instruction appeared, reactions varied.3 What isteresting is that soon after the publication of LC, there also appeared Pop

hn Paul II's Easter letter to the Brazilian hierarchy with his comments onrious aspects of TL along with his "explicit approval'' of the two Instructio

gnificantly adding to the media speculation about a possible change in thetican attitude towards TL. Was there indeed a change between the two

ocuments? If there was, was it a substantial change, a change in matters sic theological and anthropological perspectives and assumptions, or onlycidental change, a change in matters of tone and purpose?

early, there are some minor or accidental differences between the two. Th



sic underlying difference is that of purpose. The purpose of LN was to "wainst "deviations" from the Christian faith and thus was basically negative

hile that of LC was to "detail in a positive fashion" a theology of freedom aeration, to "highlight the main elements of the Christian doctrine on freedd liberation" and to indicate "its principal theoretical and practical aspectC, 2). By its very nature LN was full of warnings, criticisms, and accusatioordering on condemnation. By contrast, LC contained fewer such



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gations and concentrated more on elaborating what the Vatican consider "authentic" TL to be. Apart from the first paragraph, which reaffirms therlier "warning" against "deviations" as "ever more timely and relevant" (LC, LC's negative remarks seemed more general and more brief than those o

N and directed to adversaries whose names remained unmentioned. It

emed even to go out of its way to say something positive about the basichristian communities, calling them a "treasure for the whole church'' (LC, d described the theological method of praxis as "a very positive contributasmuch as it makes possible a highlighting of aspects of the Word of God,e richness of which had not yet been fully grasped" (LC, 70).

e tone of John Paul's Easter letter to the Brazilian bishops was alsonciliatory and encouraging, so much so that when the letter was read, soports Peter Hebblethwaite, "the Brazilian bishops sang joyous alleluias anded tears." 5 John Paul even went so far as to say that "the theology of eration is not only opportune, but useful and necessary."6

is, however, is also the extent of the difference and change of attitudetween LN and LC. To show how minor and in fact superficial such changeally was, I must hurry to add that those apparently encouraging remarksout the basic ecclesial communities, the method of praxis, and the theololiberation as such, came loaded with so many limiting conditions that the

ct died "the death of a thousand qualifications." Consider the remark aboue base communities being "a source of great hope for the Church" or "aeasure for the whole Church." In a short paragraph containing fourntences, three have to do with the conditions under which alone themmunities could become such a source and treasure:

The new basic communities or other groups of Christians which have arisen to bewitnesses to this evangelical love are a source of great hope for the Church. If they

really live in unity with the local Church and the universal church, they will be a reaexpression of communion and a means for constructing a still deeper communion.Their fidelity to their mission will depend on how careful they are to educate theirmembers in the fullness of the Christian faith through listening to the Word of God,fidelity to the teaching of the Magisterium, to the hierarchical order of the churchand to the sacramental life. If this condition is fulfilled, their experience, rooted in commitment to the complete liberation of man, becomes a treasure for the wholeChurch. (LC, 69; emphases added)

ese, it must be noted, put in much stronger terms the concern for "the



ality and the content of catechesis and formation" in the base communiti, 16) and the invitation to theologians to "welcome" the "word" andirectives" of the magisterium "with filial respect" (xi, 4) expressed in therlier LN.



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kewise, "a theological reflection developed from a particular experience canstitute a very positive contribution," but

in order that this reflection may be truly a reading of the Scripture and not aprojection on to the Word of God of a meaning which it does not contain, thetheologian will be careful to interpret the experience from which he begins in the

light of the experience of the Church herself. This experience of the Church shineswith a singular brightness and in all its purity in the lives of the saints. It pertains tthe pastors of the Church, in communion with the Successor of Peter, to discern itsauthenticity. (LC, 70)

gain a comparison with the earlier criticism of the method of praxis in LN (xi, 13) reveals no change in the Vatican's position. In speaking of "anportant and delicate role" of the Brazilian church in "creating a space andnditions" for developing a theological reflection as a response to the

allenge of our time, John Paul also insists that such reflection must be "inrfect accord with the rich doctrine contained in the two above mentionedstructions [LN and LC]" and

fully adherent to the constant teaching of the Church in social matters, and at thesame time apt to inspire an efficient praxis in favor of social justice and equality, tdefense of human rights, of the construction of a human society based on fraternitharmony, truth, and charity. 7

r John Paul, the theology of liberation "is not only opportune, but useful acessary" and "should constitute a new stage" of theological reflection, bus is so only on condition that such a theology remain "consonant andherent with the teaching of the Gospel, of living tradition and of therennial magisterium of the Church" and

in strict connection with earlier stages of that theological reflection begun with theApostolic Tradition and continued with the great fathers and doctors, with the

ordinary and extraordinary magisterium, and in most recent opochs with the richpatrimony of the Social Doctrine of the Church, expressed in documents that gofrom Rerum Novarum to Laborem Exercens.8

e goes on to urge the pastors

to keep constant vigil so that the correct and necessary liberation theology will bedeveloped in Brazil and in Latin America, in a homogenous and not heterogenousway, with relation to the theology of other times, in full fidelity to the doctrine of tchurch, with a preferential and not exclusive or excluding love for the poor.9



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ong with LC's reaffirmation of LN, its dismissal of the Latin American TL aseviation," and John Paul's "explicit approval" of both LN and LC, thesemarks should make it clear that the TL which is "useful and necessary" isything but the Latin American TL, which certainly is not in ''perfect accorth either LN or, as will be shown, LC. Certainly, the concept of praxis still

ident in the remarks quoted remains a far cry from that of the Latinmerican TL. For John Paul and LC as for LN, praxis remains subsequent anternal to theory, i.e., the magisterial doctrine of the church, which must bfirmed prior to and merely "applied" in "practice." It is more "practice" tharaxis," whereas praxis, for TL, is itself a source of disclosure and actuality ters into a mutually mediating, dialectical relation with theory. Likewise, tncept and function of the basic ecclesial community in LC and LN are notose of TL. Both LC and LN see the community only as a good example of

mmunion and even this much on condition of strict obedience to theerarchy, whereas TL sees it as a living model of what the church as a whoould bea church of the people, a popular and democratic church, which d

ot deny the need for authority in the church but by the same token does nsolutize or reify such an authority either, seeing in the authority a means

hich serves the poor and is open to their praxis as constitutive of its owneoretical magisterium.

comparative look at the Vatican's interpretation of the Exodus in LN (iv, 3d LC (44) also clearly shows what little change or difference there had between the two documents. Superficially, there is some difference betweee statement of LN that "the specific significance of the event comes from rpose, for this liberation is ordered to the foundation of the people of Godd the Covenant cult celebrated on Mount Sinai" and that of LC that "theajor and fundamental event of the Exodus therefore has a meaning whichoth religious and political." The first, as discussed in the preceding chapteresses the 'religious' meaning of the Exodus, while the second seems tofirm both the 'religious' and the 'political' meaning. A warning against poliductionism, however, is sounded in both documents. "The liberation of thodus cannot be reduced to a liberation which is principally or exclusively

olitical in nature" (LN), and "one cannot therefore isolate the political asper its own sake" (LC). Furthermore, LC likewise takes pains to subordinate olitical" to the "religious": "God sets his People free and gives them

scendents, a land and a law, but within a Covenant and for a Covenant."



e political aspect itself "has to be considered in the light of a plan of aigious nature within which it is integrated," i.e., "communion with their G

nd just as LN was critical of the "inversion of symbols," i.e., turning theodus, "a figure of baptism," into "a symbol of the political liberation of theople" (x, 14), so, two years later, commenting on LC, Ratzinger expresseactly the same fear that "baptism is becoming a symbol of the Exodus ane Exodus a symbol of political and revolutionary action in general," that

esus is



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terpreted backwards with reference to Moses. Moses, however, is interprerwards with reference to Marx." 10 The fear of reductionism and the concth preserving the distinction between the political and the religious areually evident in LN and LC.

e Vatican's Theology of Liberation

eology of Sin and Salvation

ter all the controversies of recent years on TL it should be clear by now the heart of the issue has to do with the relation between salvation, in theanscendent, eschatological sense, and liberation, in the immanent, historinse, or, more precisely, with the transcendent, theological meaningor lacereofof historical liberation. Both TL and the Vatican insist on the theolog

cessity of liberation, but they differ as to the basis of such necessity and bsequent relation between salvation and liberation. In this regard, whichncerns the theological center of the controversy, I think it must be said there is no change, not even an accidental one, between LN and LC. We hatake seriously Ratzinger's statement soon after the second Instruction th

he two Instructions together form an indissoluble unity that one onlyderstands if one reads and considers them as a coherent whole."11 Theode of thinking in LC, as will become clear, remains essentially as dualist a

N, in contrast to the dialectical thinking of TL.

C is just as anxious, as was LN, to distinguish between transcendent salvatd historical liberation, or, using the term 'liberation' in a broad sense,tween "salvific" and "temporal" liberation. For LC, the "first" and

undamental'' meaning of liberation is the "salvific" one: "man is freed frome radical bondage of evil and sin" (23); just as, for LN, the "specific"aracter of salvation or "true" liberation (xi, 16) means "first and foremost

eration from the "radical slavery to sin" (Introduction). "Liberation in therongest sense of the word" means the "redemption" brought about by Chrough his cross and resurrection, because "it has freed us from the mostdical evil, namely sin and the power of death" (LC, 3). The "primary"eaning of liberation is "salvific" (LC, 99). The "essential" mission of thehurch lies in evangelization, i.e., "the proclamation of salvation," which isediated "through the Word of God and the sacraments" (LC, 63).

o be distinguished from this "radical liberation" (LC, 71) in the "transcende



C, 62) and "supernatural order" (LC, 80) of salvation is the "temporal" ordhuman life (LC, 80); "temporal liberation," i.e., "all the processes which asecuring and guaranteeing the conditions for the exercise of an authentiman freedom" (LC, 31); "integral liberation from everything that hinders velopment of individuals" (LC, 63); or "human promotion" in the "temporder" (LC, 64). In the words of LN, this is liberation from servitude of an



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arthly" and "temporal" kind, whereas liberation from sin is liberation fromhe most radical form of slavery" (iv, 2), which remains of ''fundamental" arimary" importance (Introduction). It is "important to make a carefulstinction between earthly progress and the growth of the Kingdom, whichot belong to the same order" (LC, 60), just as the latter "cannot be confus

th the progress of civilization, of science, of human technology" (LN,onclusion). The "salvific" dimension of liberation "cannot be reduced to thecio-ethical dimension" (LC, 71). Commenting on this passage of LC, Johnul insists:

liberation is, above all, soteriological, (an aspect of salvation fulfilled by JesusChrist, Son of God) and ethico-social (or ethico-political). If we reduce onedimension to the otherpractically suppressing bothor if we put the second before thfirst, we subvert and distort true Christian liberation. 12

espite this "distinction," LC likewise insists on the "unity" of the twomensions and claims that liberation in the temporal order is part of thession of the Church, which "takes great care to maintain clearly and firml

oth the unity and the distinction between evangelization and humanomotion" (LC, 64). The "distinction" of the dimensions is "not" meant to beparation" (LC, 60). The work of "salvation" is "indissolubly linked to the timproving and raising the conditions of human life in this world" (LC, 90;

mphasis added). Thus, the Church is "firmly determined to respond to thexiety of contemporary man as he endures oppression and yearns for

eedom" (LC, 61). This is quite consistent with the earlier position of LN, wconfirmed Medellin's "preferential option for the poor" (Introduction),cognizing "the acute need for radical reforms of the structures which con

overty" (xi, 8), and issuing "a great call" to "all the church" to "hear the crr justice" and "to respond to it with all her might" as "a matter of the highiority" (xi, 2 & 3). Liberation from sin, "as a logical consequence," "calls foeedom from many different kinds of slavery in the cultural, economic, socid political spheres" (LN, Introduction). In the Old Testament "justice asgards God and justice as regards mankind are inseparable" (LN, iv, 6), justhe New Testament "the commandment of fraternal love extended to allankind" "provides the supreme rule of social life" (LN, iv, 8).

e question to ask, however, is not only whether the Vatican affirms thenity" of salvation and liberation, but, more importantly, on what grounds ch a unity be affirmed and what kind of relationship can result from such



ounds. Given the Vatican's constant emphasis on their "irreducibility," whould be the grounds for their unity? Would such a unity be consistent witheir "irreducible" distinction? In order to answer these questions it iscessary to consider in some detail each of the two key concepts, salvationd liberation, focusing especially on the theological and anthropologicalsumptions both implicit and explicit in the two documents.



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rst, we examine the concept of salvation. Salvation means "the most radiceration" (LC, 22) or liberation from "the most radical evil, namely sin and

ower of death" (LC, 3) or from "the radical bondage of evil and sin" (LC, 2rough the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. What, then, is sin? Sineans "breaking away from God" (LC, 37). How does this come about? By

use and perversion of personal freedom in the "hearts of men'' (LN, xi, 8)umans are created free with a destination to communion with God andaring in God's divine life. Human freedom is essentially the limited,pendent freedom of the creature created in the image of God, whichnstitutes the "truth" of the human being (LC, 27). Authentic freedom liesrmonizing the will with this truth and observing the moral limits of thatture.

e actual history of human freedom, however, shows the "tragic paradox" at freedom: "God calls men to freedom. In each person there lives a desir free. And yet this desire almost always tends towards slavery and

ppression" (LC, 37). Why this paradox? Because of sin. Humans are indeelled to be like God, not through total self-sufficiency and arbitrary capricerespecting the truth of their being as creatures loved by God. In sinningainst God the person succumbs to the "temptation to deny his own naturrgets his or her finitude, and claims to be a god. This is the "profound nat

sin": "man rejects the truth and places his own will above it. By wishing tee himself from God and be a god himself, he deceives himself and destromself. He becomes alientated from himself" (LC, 37). This "alienation frome truth of his being as a creature loved by God is the root of all other formalienation" (LC, 38). For the Vatican, as for Augustine, sin is contemptus

ei, false attachment to creatures, conversio ad creaturam now substitutede infinite. In this disordered love of self" one tries to rely on oneself alonechieve fulfillment by himself and to be self-sufficient in his own immanencC, 40). In "rejecting God" and seeking infinite happiness in himself or herd in other creatures incapable of yielding such happiness, the personestroys the momentum of his aspiration to the infinite and of his vocationare in the divine life" (ibid.).

is conception of sin and freedom dictates a corresponding conception of lvation. Salvation means liberation from the slavery of sin and communionth God. It calls for "interior conversion" (LN, xi, 8), "conversion and renew

n the depths of the heart" (LN, iv, 7). How do we attain this salvation?



It is above all by the power of his Paschal Mystery that Christ has set us free.Through his perfect obedience on the Cross and through the glory of hisResurrection, the Lamb of God has taken away the sin of the world and opened forus the way to definitive liberation. (LC, 51)

rough Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit we are offered forgiveness andconciliation with the Father. Through faith and the sacraments weperience the



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ace of justification. We receive "the new life of grace," which is "life in thepirit" (LN, iv, 2), so as to "live and act as new creatures" (LN, iv, 15).lvation is "an essentially religious experience: it is from God alone that onn expect salvation and healing," resulting in ''spiritual" liberation andrification (LN, iv, 5). In Christ, therefore, we can conquer both sin and th

ower of death (LC, 52). The capacity "to love God above all things and remcommunion with him" (LC, 53), once taken away by sin, is now restored.We are set free from disordered self-love, which is the source of contempt

ighbor and of human relationships based on domination" (ibid.). Thiseedom, of course, remains incomplete in this world and awaits itschatological fulfillment "at the end of time with the resurrection of the ded the renewal of the whole of creation" (LC, 58).

is, then, essentially (though briefly), is the concept of freedom, sin, andlvation evident in the two Instructions. The concept itself, of course, is quaditional, and I do not mean this in any pejorative sense. Certainly, itsntent is basic to the identity of Christian faith, which would be inconceivaart from the belief in human sinfulness and the need for transcendentlvation. The question is whether this basic content receives adequatenceptualization, especially whether its underlying anthropologicalsumptions are adequate. An examination of the Vatican's anthropology is

portant not only in itself but also in view of the fact that Ratzinger himselants the "anthropological foundation" in the first four chapters of LC to beken seriously, not neglected as by the media in favor of the fifth chapteraling with the social doctrine. 13

nthropology of Personal Existence

e important question is not simply whether humans are sinful and in needanscendent salvation. Equally important is the question of who these hume who are sinful and in need of redemption, and that of how these humane subjects of freedom and sin, are conceived and characterized. Upon thiestion hangs the question of the relation between transcendent salvationd historical liberation. A dualistic conception of the human subject of sin lvation would see only hostility between salvation and liberation; should ity chance affirm a positive connection between the two, it would do so wieat diffidence and have a difficult time justifying such a connection in any

se.



ho, then, according to the Vatican, is the human subject who is free, sinfd in need of redemption? The human subject is essentially a person, in thnse of an individual with the capacity of self-determination and a destinyhich is transcendent, both the capacity and the destiny exercised andperienced chiefly in subjective inwardness. There are three characteristicman subjectivity thus conceived: The true subject is basically individual, cial; internal, not external; transcendent, not historical, Let me consider

ese characteristics in some detail.



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rst, consider the individual and the transcendent conception of the humanbject. The discussion of freedom, sin and liberation from sin in LC (2542,54) is conducted exclusively in terms of the relationship between the

dividual and God. The basic categories are "each person," "his will," "mastone's own act and self-determination," ''his free action," "decides for him

d forms himself," "master of his own life," "his free personality," "disorderve of self," "free himself of God," and "alientated from himself." Thesetegories, reflecting the personalism of John Paul's The Acting Person,derstand the subject solely as "a person responsible for himself and his

anscendent destiny" (LC, 32), i.e., solely in relation to oneself and to one'od. The subject of sin, freedom, and salvation is not the subject as a concstorical totality of all the essential relations but the individual isolated fromations except the relation to God, a transcendent, not historically concret

bject.

e anthropology of the Vatican in this regard is not significantly different fat of the Kierkegaardian 'individual before God' with its emphasis on theoral isolation of the individual and her or his direct relationship to God. I sot significantly different" because, although the Vatican does possess antensive 'social' doctrine, which Kierkegaard lacks, the basically individualnception of the essence of freedom, sin, and salvation remains the same

oth. While references to the social dimension of human existence are notcking, they are, as will be noted, chiefly concerned with the consequencenditions, and other circumstances of freedom, sin, and salvation, not witheir essence.

John Paul put it in his Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation and PenanP) of December 2, 1984, 14 the essence of sin lies in the individual'sxclusion of God, rupture with God, disobedience to God" (14) without an

trinsic mediation by one's sociohistorical relations. "Sin, in the proper sensalways a personal act, since it is an act of freedom on the part of andividual person, and not properly of a group or community" (16). A persoay be conditioned and influenced by such "external" factors as structures stems, which may attenuate one's freedom and responsibility, but "it is auth of faith" that "the human person is free" (16). To deny this would be ny not only such a truth of faith but also the dignity of the person, whichhn Paul, depends on the capacity to transcend such "external" factors antermine oneself for oneself.



e underlying anthropology of John Paul and Ratzinger is not only personaindividualistin the metaphysical, not psychological or ethical, sensebut al

teriorist. The subject of sin and freedom is not the concrete subject of prathe historical world but the subject of the inner "heart," "spirit," oronscience," the "inner man" of the Augustinian tradition. Freedom consistimarily in the "interior" mastery of one's own acts (LC, 27). The hardenedeart" is the "source" of repeated sins (LC, 46), just as the Spirit who dweour "hearts" is the "source" of true freedom (LC, 54). The cause



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sin lies in the "hearts of men" (LN, xi, 8), not in evil "structures" (LN, iv, 1e ''heart full of evil" is the "source of man's radical slavery and of the formoppression which he makes his fellowmen endure" (LC, 39). Salvation fro

n thus requires "interior conversion" (LN, xi, 8) "in the depths of the heartN, iv, 7). Just as the "heart" is the efficient subject of sin, so

sin has its first and most important consequences in the sinner himself; that is, inhis relationship with God, who is the very foundation of human life; and also in hisspirit, weakening his will and clouding his intellect. (RP, 16)

n destroys the individual's "internal" balance and generates contradictionswithin himself" (RP, 15).

eedom and sin in their essence, then, are traits and activities of the persoan individual in his or her inwardness, where he or she encounters the

anscendent. Both Instructions and RP abstract altogether from the social,ternal, and historical relations in their account of the essence and origin o

eedom and sin, just as John Paul deals with human "action" in totalstraction from the concrete sociohistorical context in his The Acting PersoThey include such relations only in their account of the "results,"

onsequences," and "effects" of freedom and sin. The sociohistoricalmension of human existence does not mediate the very essence or origin

eedom and sin in an intrinsic, constitutive way; it is only a "result" of sucheedom and sin already constituted in their proper reality apart from societd history.

is is indubitably clear in the numerous statements of the documents.emporal forms of slavery are "by-products" (LN, Introduction) and "effectsN, iv, 14) of sin, "the root of all other forms of alienation" (LC, 38). Evilructures are "the result of man's actions and so are consequences more tuses" (LN, iv, 15). Although "there are structures which are evil and whicuse evil," we cannot locate evil "principally or uniquely" in them (ibid.). In

oth theological significance and causal efficacy, then, temporal forms of avery are quite "secondary" to sin, sin as a phenomenon of the inwardnesanscendent subjectivity. Hence, "the first liberation, to which all others make reference, is that from sin" (LN, iv, 12).

rsonal and Social Sin

ow, then, does sin in the inwardness of the individual bring about "the sin



e world"? According to LC, the sinner, by denying God, disturbs not only wn order and interior balance but also those of society and even of visibleeation" (38; emphasis added).

Culpable ignorance of God unleashes the passions, which are causes of imbalanceand conflicts in the human heart. From this there inevitably come disorders whichaffect the sphere of the family and society: sexual license, injustice and murder.(39; emphases added)



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e causal sequence in the etiology of social disorder could not be clearer:om the sin against God through the passions of conflicts in the heart to thsorder in the family and society.

Having become his own center, sinful man tends to assert himself and to satisfy hidesire for the infinite by the use of things: wealth, power and pleasure, despising

other people and robbing them unjustly and treating them as objects orinstruments. Thus he makes his own contribution to the creation of those verystructures of exploitation and slavery which he claims to condemn. (42; emphasesadded)

isordered self-love" is "the source of contempt of neighbor and of humanationships based on domination" (53). Poverty is "the result andnsequence of poeple's sin and natural frailty" (67). The ''social-ethical"mension of liberation is "a consequence" of the "salvific" dimension, whicherefore, "cannot be reduced" to the former (71), just as a "cause" cannotduced to its "effect."

hn Paul puts this hierarchical etiology of sin even more clearly: "the resultn is the shattering of the human family" (RP, 15; emphasis added). Theation between personal sin and social disorder is a relation of "cause andfect" (ibid.). Social and historical alienations are "signs and effects of intesorder" (ibid.). Every sin is "social, insofar as and because it also has socia

percussions" (ibid.; emphases added).

hn Paul elaborates further on the relation between person and structure,tween personal and social sin, by distinguishing four meanings of 'social sthe first sense, "by virtue of a human solidarity" "every sin" committed by

dividual is a "social" sin in that "each individual's sin in some way affectshers" (RP, 16). "There is no sin, not even the most intimate and secret one most strictly individual one, that exclusively concerns the person

mmitting it," for every sin has "repercussions" on the entire world (ibid.).ere the subject of sin is an individual, but the consequence is social in thafects others in some indeterminate way, in a "communion of sinners," agative counterpart to the "communion of saints."

the second sense, social sin refers to sins which "by their very matternstitute a direct attack on one's neighbor" (ibid.). It also includes every sainst "justice in interpersonal relationships," "the rights of the human

rson," "others' freedom," and "the dignity and honor of one's neighbor" a



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divudals as well as "leaders" "who though in a position to do so do not woigently and wisely for the improvement and transformation of societycording to the requirements and potential of the given historic moment,"

workers" who ''through absenteeism or non-cooperation fail to ensure thateir industries can continue to advance the well-being of the workers

emselves, of their families, and of the whole of society" (ibid.). Nor does hstinguish between actions whose consequences are temporary, limited, anus "private" and those whose consequences are enduring, extensive, andus "public." 16 He seems to include all the examples mentioned under thecond sense because they are variations on "a direct attack against one'sighbor."

ocial sin in the third sense refers to the evil attaching to the relationshipstween various communitiesi.e., groups, classes, nations, and even blocs otions. Here the situation is so general and often anonymous, and the cauevil so complex, that it is difficult to assign moral responsibility to anyrticular person. For this reason social sin in this sense has only annalogical" meaning, although this should not lead us to underestimate thesponsibility of the individuals involved. What exactly is the subject and theject of social sin in this sense remains unclear.

the fourth sense, social sin is used in contrasty to personal sin with therpose of watering down and even abolishing the latter. Derived from non

hristian ideologies and systems, it reduces every sin to social sin "in the seat blame for it is to be placed not so much on the moral conscience of andividual but rather on some vague entity or anonymous collectivity, such ae situation, the system, society, structures, or institutions" (ibid.). This seboth illegitimate and unacceptable. Such an anonymous collectivity "is noelf the subject of moral acts. Hence a situation cannot in itself be good o

d" (ibid.). When various church documents in recent decadesMedellin,ebla, LN, LC, and so onspeak of "situations of sin" or "social sins,"17 theyould really mean that "such cases of social sin are the result of thecumulation and concentration of many personal sins" (ibid.).

It is a case of the very personal sins of those who cause or support evil or whoexploit it; of those who are in a position to avoid, eliminate or at least limit certainsocial evils but who fail to do so out of laziness, fear, or the conspiracy of silence,through secret complicity or indifference; of those who take refuge in the supposedimpossibility of changing the world, and also of those who sidestep the effort and



sacrifice required, producing specious reasons of a higher order. (ibid.)

e real responsibility for social sins always lies with "individuals," who alonen be subjects of moral acts. The problem with the fourth sense of sin, thethat it reifies situations, groups, and structures into independent entitiesart from the individuals who compose them. "At the heart of every situat



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sin are always to be found sinful people," so much so that a structuralange "proves to be incomplete, of short duration, and ultimately vain andeffectivenot to say counterproductiveif the people directly or indirectlysponsible for that situation are not converted" (ibid.). If the advocates of urth sense reduce every sin to social sin, John Paul reduces every sin to

rsonal sin. All sins in the proper sense are "personal" sins, sins of ndividuals," and when it becomes difficult to identify the individual subjectsin as in the third sense involving the behavior of a group, it is a sin only i "analogical" sense. The fourth sense is in fact only a variation on the soc

ns in the second sense.

e Vatican's insistence on the causal primacy of the individual in relation te social and its reduction of the latter to the former may give the impressat it does not see any causal significance of the social for the life of dividuals. The Vatican does recognize the social dimension of personalistence. LC acknowledges that the person is a "social" being. Social life isot exterior" to a person, who "can only grow and realize his vocation ination with others" (LC, 32). The person "belongs to different communitied "it is inside these communities that the must exercise his responsible

eedom'' (ibid.). A just society provides "irreplaceable assistance" in realizine free personality, while an unjust society is "a threat and an obstacle wh

n compromise his destiny" (ibid.). It is the task of the state to "create thenditions necessary for man to be able to achieve his authentic and integrelfare, including his spiritual goals" (LC, 84). Because the relationshiptween the person and work is "radical and vital," just work relationships anecessary precondition" for "the integral development of every individuald can bring about "a profound and peaceful revolution in people's outlooC, 83). Just institutions and laws "are the guarantees of people's freedomd of the promotion of that freedom" (LC, 74). These statements would lee to believe that social relations are not merely factual or accidental but t

trinsic ("not exterior"), "irreplaceable," "radical," "vital," and "necessary"nditions and components of personal existence as such, which would affee origin, exercise and content ("outlook") of freedom itself.

ot so curiously, however, in light of the Vatican view of the primacy of thedividual, LC immediately hedges these statements with reservations andalifications. As cited earlier, "temporal liberation" has to do precisely withe processes which aim at securing and guaranteeing the conditions need



r the exercise of an authentic human freedom" (31). LC, however, hurriesadd:

It is not liberation which in itself produces human freedom. Common sense,confirmed by Christian sense, knows that even when freedom is subject to forms oconditioning it is not thereby completely destroyed. People who undergo terribleconstraints succeed in manifesting their freedom and taking steps to secure theirown liberation. A process of



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liberation which has been achieved can only create better conditions for theeffective exercise of freedom. Indeed a liberation which does not take into accountthe personal freedom of those who fight for it is condemned in advance to defeat.(ibid.; emphases added)

st as, for John Paul, "a situation cannot in itself be good or bad" (RP, 16;

mphasis), so, for LC, "structures established for people's good are of emselves incapable of securing and guaranteeing that good" (75: mymphasis). It is an "illusion'' to think that "the abolition of an evil situation iself sufficient to create a more humane society" (LC, 78; my emphasis). Evradical revolution in social relations" does not create "new man" (LN, iv,

o give priority to structures over persons is "the expression of a materialistthropology" (LC, 75). Technical and economic conditions "cannot help bufect to some extent cultural and even religious life. However, by reason of

eedom man remains the master of his activity" (LC, 35). Unjust socialructures "always depend on the responsibility of man, who can alter themd not upon an alleged determinism of history" (LC, 74). The "root" of unjructures is "sin," which "is in a true and immediate sense a voluntary acthich has its source in the freedom of individuals" (LC, 75). The efficientusality of individual freedom is "prior" to that of structures, and likewiseersonal" sin alone is sin in the proper and primary sense, "social" sin or siructures being so "only in a derived and secondary sense" (ibid.).

e Vatican's insistence on the primacy of individual freedom in one's interid transcendence also dictates a hierarchy of means in the pursuit of

storical, social liberation. The individual is prior to the social in both finalityd efficiency: the social must serve the transcendent dignity of the individits end and is itself only the "result" or "effect" of individual causality. In

eking the liberation of social relations and their structural objectifications,erefore,

the first thing to be done is to appeal to the spiritual and moral capacities of theindividual and to the permanent need for inner conversion, if one is to achieve theeconomic and social changes that will truly be at the service of man. (LC, 75) (alsocf. LN, xi, 8)

the same section LC goes on to say that it is "necessary to work multaneously for the conversion of hearts and for the improvement of ructures," but it is clear that this "simultaneously" does not assign equalportance in either value or efficacy, only in chronology. Precisely because



dividual conversion is prior, and "moral integrity is a necessary condition foe health of society" (ibid.), liberation of sinful structures requiresmultaneous changes in individual existence, apart from which structuralange can not in itself be a true liberation at the service of human dignity in fact always in danger of merely substituting another form of oppressionch as totalitarianism.



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is insistence on the freedom and responsibility of the individual leads to tthical" approach of Catholic social doctrine, with its special emphasis on te of education and culture (cf. LC, chapter V). In this regard Ratzinger pchoice between two models of political philosophy, the mechanistic modele utopian tradition from Saint Simon to Ernst Bloch and the ethical mode

e realist tradition from Plato and Aristotle onwards, each with its owneological counterpart, represented by Eusebius of Caesarea on the one had Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther on the other. The mechanistic model li

olitics and metaphysics without any mediation and thus reduces metaphysphysics, a determinate and determinable quantity. Politics is subordinatee doctrine of being, and being is conceived on the model of a machine.hoever speaks of collective historical projects as necessarily producing theew man" denies human freedom and reduces politics to the determinism

ysicalist model. The tradition of Plato and Aristotle, on the other hand,bordinates politics to ethics, not metaphysics, and operates with ampletely different understanding of human freedom and responsibility assic components of political action. 18

hich of these two models of political philosophy is more compatible with tblical tradition is clear. For Ratzinger, only the ethical tradition of Plato anistotle could salvage the biblical image of the human being as an individu

th freedom and dignity, which cannot be integrated into a "physics" of ogress. Only that tradition can also preserve the rationality of politics from

mpty empiricism. The task of faith here is not so much to promise anddergird a historical future as to discover moral truth which cannot be der

om merely empirical analysis and which is at the same time the condition othentically human and social action. True, this ethical approach cannot o

ther exclusively valid political directives or promises of political salvation wcessity and finality. When politics rests on human freedom and moralsponsibility, it rules out the prospect of necessary progress and the securpolitical salvation. Such politics requires constant renewal of education an

oral effort: humans must learn to become human again and again and live power of their empirical and moral reason, which must be renewed withnse of responsibility before God.19

erein also lies the importance of the tradition of Catholic social doctrine. Iteks to relate the ethos of faith to economic and poltical reason and tovelop models of action on the basis of such a synthesis, fully aware that s



odels "cannot produce redemption but can open up conditions of redeemistence."20 Such a social doctrine has been accused of political inefficiencd evolutionary reformism, playing into the hands of the status quo. Refor

owever need not always be on the reactionary side. In fact, both evolutiond revolution are categories of deterministic thinking, whereas reformesupposes ethics and freedom. Ethical politics is not concerned either wite finality of a system once posited or with the expectation of the totally

her; it is content with the



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er new effort towards a more humanly worthy form of political and social Catholic social doctrine has historically been ineffective, which is onlyrtially true, the reason lies in the fact that the dialogue between moral an

mpirical reason has not been pursued energetically enough and that theoral intuitions of faith have lacked the courage to face the challenge of

mpirical, quantitative reason. In this respect it is only fair to say that theremething valid about the attempt of TL to use the concept of utopia as theediation of empirical reason and faith. However, it has been applied in therong way, devouring reason on the one hand and rendering faith objectle the other. What is absolutely necessary today is to extend our concept oason, recognizing both the limits of the merely quantitative approach andality of careful reflection on the data of faith. 21

odels of action which emerge from such synthesis of faith and empiricalason no doubt have the weakness of not being exclusivistic and remainingen to pluralism in their prescriptions. They do not have the definitivenessd clarity of the political programs advocated by TL. Their promises areither total nor final, for they are always subject to moral tension and the

mits of the human. They have, however, the advantage of being honorableey are predicated on the truth that humans are humans, not God, that

story is not divine. The divinization of humans and their history only lead t

e destruction of the human, a distorted image of redemption, and slaverye human works of politics neither justify nor redeem. Faith, of course, ne

orks, but the works it needs are paideia in the Greek sense of the term, i.eoral education or formation (Bildung), which alone, in the final analysis, cansform the human. This human work of education, however, needs toceive its directions and starting points from faith, the education which coom God. It also needs dialogue with reason in its proper claims, withouthich moral formation would remain contentless. Thus, the work of moralrmation enters into the conditions of redemption; it not only changes theman but also makes it possible for us to experience what transcends it.22

ocial Doctrine of Liberation

ven the Vatican's conception of sin and salvation and its underlyingdividualist, interiorist, and transcendentalist anthropology, the questionmains imperative: Why should the Christian also engage in the pursuit of

storical liberation at all? What is the theological or salvific ground for such



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e preaching and hearing of the Gospel, the frequent reception of thecraments, meditation on the Cross and Resurrection, and other forms of ety aimed at the conversion of individual hearts not sufficient for Christianistence as Christian? If the demand for historical liberation is a "logical"nsequence of salvation (LN, Introduction), what precisely is this logic?

elaborating this logic the Vatican takes essentially three approachesthepeal to God's will and love, the moral application of the causal relationtween personal sin and social consequences, and the argument from unie unity of human existence and God's plan to recapitulate all things in Chonsider first the appeal to God's will and love. According to the Vatican,eration from oppression and injustice is the will of God, who endowedmans with a transcendent dignity by creating them in God's image andlling them to the grace of divine sonship, "the foundation of justice" (LN, . God and Jesus show special concern for those in need and distress (LN, LC, 4647, 50, 6768). Then there is the Great Commandment, themmandment to love God and neighbor (LC, 45, 5557, 62, 7172), the souChristian moral praxis:

By restoring man's true freedom, the radical liberation brought about by Christassigns to him a task: Christian practice, which is the putting into practice of thegreat commandment of love. The latter is the supreme principle of Christian social

morality. (LC, 71)

beration is an "ethical requirement" of evangelical love:

It is from the most radical evil, from sin and the power of death, that he [theRedeemer] has delivered us in order to restore freedom to itself and to show it theright path. This path is marked out by the supreme commandment, which is thecommandment of love. Liberation, in its primary meaning which is salvific, thusextends into a liberating task, as an ethical requirement. Here is to be found the

social doctrine of the church, which illustrates Christian practice on the level of society. (LC, 99)

e "essential" mission of the Church is "the proclamation of salvation," whe does "through the Word of God and the sacraments," but

in this mission, the Church teaches the way which man must follow in this world inorder to enter the Kingdom of God. Her teaching therefore extends to the wholemoral order, and notably to the justice which must regulate human relations. This

part of the preaching of the Gospel. (LC, 63)



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hy love of neighbor in either interpersonal or structural relations is "theuchstone of love of God" (LC, 56), why the great commandment should bacticed "on the level of society" and "regulate human relations," and whysk of historical liberation is ''part of the preaching of the Gospel." It issically a positivistic appeal to the mere fact of God's love and moral will. W

ve to love others because God says so. But why does God say so? Why dood make love of God instrinsically dependent on love of neighbor? Why shve of neighbor also take the form of structural justice? After all, the Greatommandment was there throughout the history of the Church, withoutwakening in its consciousness the need for structural change until verycently. What would be the theological justification for this shift of position

rthermore, why does God will in the first place that our salvific relation tood be mediated by our temporal concern for structural justice, when thengdom of God is not of this world in any event? Why is the commitment toncrete historical liberation an intrinsic necessity of salvation or "radicaleration" if it is primarily a matter of our individual relationship with God interiority of our hearts? Or perhaps such a commitment is not really intrinse preaching of the Gospel, not, as the Synod of Bishops declared in 1971nstitutive" dimension of such preaching? 23 On the other hand, if thereould indeed be an "indissoluble" link between salvation and liberation as t

tican insists, one would also think that the work of liberation, "the way wust follow in this world in order to enter the Kingdom of God," also belongr se to the order of "salvation," at least as much as do meditation on theord of God and reception of the sacraments. The Vatican, however, insisteping the two "orders" of salvation and liberation "distinct" and foreverarns against identifying the two.

speaking of revelation, Karl Rahner once pointed out that traditional

ndamental theology was guilty of extrinsicism and a positivism of revelatioe cannot say that humans have an obligation to listen to the Word of Godhen God speaks simply because we are finite creatures with a creaturelybligation to obey the creator. Such an argument is not only abstract becaus based on a general obligation of the creature as a creature, and positivcause it appeals to the bare historical fact of revelation. It is also extrinsiccause it does not inquire into the a priori conditions for the specificallyman possibility and necessity of hearing God's revelation in the very

ructure of human existence. What is there about human existence that w



ake the hearing of God's word spoken in history not only an imposition "frtside" but also a possibility and necessity on the part of humans, a respoand a fulfillment of something "intrinsic" to the human spirit while alsoeserving God's freedom to speak or not to speak the divine word in historyahner located such a possibility, our "obediential potency," in the dynamisintellectual transcendence which, however, could transcend only in andrough history.24



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a similar, non-positivistic, "critical" spirit, it is necessary to ask what thereout the very structure of human existence and our relationship to God whcessarily makes love of neighbor, interpersonal and structural, a touchstolove of God. Perhaps God commands us to love one another as a concretpression of love of God precisely because human existence is not primaril

rsonal and transcendent interiority but a concrete totality with an intrinsiediation between transcendence and historicity, personal interiority andcial exteriority, transcendent salvation and historical liberation? Certainly,ore is needed than the Vatican's positivistic appeal to the fact of God'smmandment. We need a transcendental anthropological rationale for theity of love of God and love of neighbor in its structural form in something anthropology of concrete totality. Such a rationale is all the more urgentcause the entire social doctrine of the church depends on it.

e second part of the Vatican's "logic" lies in the moral application of theusal relation between personal sin and its social consequences. Havingduced all sin to personal sin and disregarded the reality of structural injusd oppression as a source and origin of personal sins in its own right, thetican at the same time insists that personal sins do produce socialonsequences" which "ridicule" and "scorn" human dignity (LN, i, 2) and "sten prevent people from living in a manner befitting their dignity'' (LN,

troduction). In order to stress the "radical" character of salvation grantedhrist, "the New Testament does not require some change in the political ocial condition as a prerequisite for entrance into this freedom" (LN, iv, 13)

evertheless, "the new freedom procured by the grace of Christ shouldcessarily have effects on the social level" (ibid.). In other words, participahistorical liberation is not really "a prerequisite" or an essential condition lvation, but insofar as personal sins, through their social consequences, dhumanize human beings, we should also pay attention to structural injusd oppression.

ow logical and how strong is this "logic"? Does this justify concern forstorical liberation as a "matter of the highest priority" or an "indissoluble"ationship between salvation and liberation"? I think not. Why should a

hristian also be concerned with and engage in the liberation of unjustructures when these are basically "results," "effects," and "consequences"n, which is always personal in any event, when structures are at best extrnditions of personal existence with only a marginal causality over the latte



hy is the individual's inward struggle to be liberated from sin, the root anduse of all forms of temporal slavery, not sufficient to bring about historicaeration as its "effect"? Wouldn't the elimination of the individual cause byfinition also automatically eliminate its social effects? Isn't this precisely we causal relation means? Why, then, not concentrate on the elimination orsonal sin, the primary and radical cause of all social sins, through converindividual hearts?



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rhaps the Vatican would reply that if one were truly serious aboutnversion, one could not be indifferent to the necessary social consequencone's personal sin and that there is a difference between interior sin andnversion and their social effects; that is, the removal of social effects does

ot automatically follow from, but requires a separate act in addition to, the

terior act of repentance. This would amount to the recognition of thefference between personal interiority and sociohistorical reality, but onlythin the overall primacy of the personal over the social. This might perhapstify the indissoluble relation between personal conversion and socialeration insofar as personal sin has a necessary social consequence, butould not amount to a recognition either of the transcendent, autonomoususal reality of the social in relation to isolated personal existence or of antrinsic relation between salvation and liberation. The "necessity" the Vatic

cognizes is the necessity of the unilateral causal relation proceeding from rsonal cause to its social effects, not also that of the reciprocal relationoceeding from the structural conditions of society to personal consequenc

hile there is therefore an intrinsic relation between salvation and personaterior conversion, the relation between salvation and the conversion of sinructures (the consequences of personal sins) remains extrinsic insofar as tuse remains external to and distinct from its effect. As mentioned earlier,

axis of structural liberation cannot produce 'redemption,' which is a functpersonal conversion under divine grace, but only the 'conditions' of deemed existence. Moreover, these conditions in themselves neither prod

or destroy human freedom; they only facilitate its exercise. Freedom, and e possibility of personal conversion, remains fundamentally untouched bynditions, no matter how oppressive these might be. The "indissoluble"ation the Vatican posits between salvation and liberation, therefore, is noally so indissoluble; even without structural change, humans still remain fom the theological point of view, the necessity to remove the socialnsequences of the necessary causality of personal sin is at best a secondacessityi.e., through the mediation of the primary and essential relationshitween salvation and personal conversion, which "also" requires removal oe social consequences of personal sinsnot a primary necessity of an intrination between salvation as such and social liberation as such.

e third and perhaps the strongest part of the Vatican's logic, I think is foits argument from unity, the unity of human existence and that of God's



tention to recapitulate all things in Christ. It must be pointed out at thetset, however, that this argument occurs only in three passages which arther of minor significance in the overall argumentation of LC and come rate in the text. "The Church desires the good of man in all his dimensions, all as a member of the City of God, and then as a member of the earthlyy" (LC, 63; my emphasis). There is "unity" between evangelization andman promotion "because she [the Church] seeks the good of the whole

rson;



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stinction because these two tasks enter, in different ways, into her missioC, 64: my emphasis). In exhorting the laity to involve themselves in sociaeration as their specific vocation, LC states:

the purpose of the Church is to spread the Kingdom of Christ so that all men may bsaved and that through them the world may be effectively ordered to Christ. The

work of salvation is thus seen to be indissolubly linked to the task of improving andraising the conditions of human life in this world. The distinction between thesupernatural order of salvation and the temporal order of human life must be seenin the context of God's singular plan to recapitulate all things in Christ. (80; myemphases)

ese passages, I think, contain the kernel of a solution to the problem of ity, but they are also inconsistent, I am afraid, with the underlyingteriology and anthropology of the Vatican. The passages invoke two

inciples of unifying totality, the theological principle of the Kingdom andod's "singular" plan to "recapitulate all things in Christ," and thethropological principle of the totality of the dimensions of human existenc

he good of man in all his dimensions" and "the good of the whole person.'e theological principle is inconsistent with the soteriology and the doctrin

n discussed earlier. If indeed there is only one or "singular" divine plan forngs as part of the Kingdom, then, it would seem that neither salvation no

n could be merely a matter of the relation between the interiority of persoistence and God: they must include the totality of human existence asncrete, social, historical beings, essentially and from the very beginning,hich the Vatican does not acknowledge. It would also in principle abolish stinction between supernatural salvation and temporal liberation andbstitute total and partial salvation in mutual dialectic, as discussed in theeceding chapter.

e principle of the Kingdom should likewise include the anthropologicalinciple of unity, "the good of man in all his dimensions" and "the good of hole person," as a principle internal to the principle of the Kingdom andsing from its demand, for otherwise, the anthropological principle wouldmain outside of and implicitly coequal with the theological principle of thengdom. In LC, however, the anthropological principle is brought in purelyoc, merely added to the theological principle from outside; it is neithermployed in the systematic elaboration of soteriology and the doctrine of sin

or generated by and intrinsically linked to the theological principle of unity



deed the person is a whole person, a unity of all one's dimensions and of anscendence and history, not merely the internal, individual subjectivity n external juxtaposition of contrasting "dimensions," one would also think ere is an intrinsic mutual mediation between internal and external, individd social, transcendent and historical. The latter pole of the relation, then

ould not be merely the result or effect of the former but also its reciprocaturce



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d cause. The anthropological principle of unity, in this sense, remainsconsistent with the underlying dualism or, perhaps more accurately,rsonalist interiorist monism that reduces the social to the personal.

e Vatican's Anthropology: A Critique

eduction of the Social to the Personale preceding analysis of the Vatican's conception of freedom, sin, salvatiod the relation of personal existence to society and history makes it all too

ear that its anthropology is essentially individualist, spiritualist, andanscendentalist. Its analysis begins and ends with this conception,troducing social and historical relations and structures only in its account e sinful effects of actions which are basically personal and inward. God's

ation to humans seems confined to transactions within the inwardness ofdividuals, not also operative in the totality of our political, cultural, andonomic history. To think otherwise seems to jeopardize the transcendenc

oth God and humans, God's transcendence because it would deny thestinction between the "political" and the "religious" as well as the causalimacy of salvation over liberation, transcendence of the person because itly within the inwardness of intellect, will, and heart that the person

anscends and relates to God.

is in order to preserve God's transcendence and the possibility of humananscendence in freedom and sin that the Vatican insists on the primacy atonomy of individual inwardness and freedom vis-a-vis society and history

o introduce the sociohistorical elements into the interior of personalistencenot just as its subsequent, external effectsseems to deny the

ossibility of freedom and sin. To exalt the dignity of the person is not only firm the ultimate finality of personal existence as a value and end rooted i

e's relation to God and transcendent of anything empirical, but also to ase causal transcendence and autonomy of the person with respect toerything historical. To assert the transcendent value of the person in theoral order of final causality is possible only because the personprecisely inher individual inwardnessis capable of transcending the external pressure

e social and historical in free self-determination, in the metaphysical orderficient causality.

y way of an overall evaluation, let me begin with the Vatican's tendency to



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d therefore an accidental being," "accidental to each and all." 25 Thecognition of the sociality of personal existence amounts to no more than tcognition of something purely factual. It means "simply the multiplicity ofman activity and existence,'' that there are "many people as subjectsisting and acting,"26 that "in fact man acts 'together with others'," that

suallyif not alwayshe in one way or another acts 'together with others'."27

ocial sins are no more than "the result of the accumulation and concentratmany personal sins" (RP, 16).

ere is nothing constitutive or irreducible about the social as such.dividuals, already constituted in their proper reality and free in their atomolation, somehow enter into relations with others and produce structures,uations, and systems, good and bad. They may suffer the consequences eir individual actions by creating unjust structures, just as they may beneom creating just ones. But these evils and benefits of structures are only aosteriori, factual, and external to the constitution of persons in theirdividuality and freedom, not a priori, constitutive, and intrinsic as well. It rd to imagine, therefore, why individuals, already constituted free in their

olation, would want to enter into all the manifold social relations, create sostitutions which more often than not seem to harm and oppress theireedom, and then try to liberate themselves from such institutions and

ructures. The Vatican is concerned with the social only in two senses, as tecessary" effect of personal acts and as the factual, extrinsic condition foe exercise of such acts, just as it looks on the personal subject solely fromove and from within, as subject of religious transcendence and moralwardness. It ignores the a priori, intrinsic, constitutive dependence of rsons on the social for their very existence and for the very consciousnessntent, and development of their freedom and individuality.

espite all the talk about how "irreplaceable," "necessary," "vital," and "radcial relations and institutions are to the exercise of freedom, the Vaticannstrues such relations and institutions as "conditions" in a non-dialecticalnse, as something accidental to freedom. Such conditions "can only creattter conditions for the effective exercise of freedom" (LC, 31; my emphasey are, after all, not necessary or irreplaceable; they are helpful only as ad thus ultimately dispensable. Being only extrinsic conditions, which have

o with the "effectiveness" or facilitation of the exercise of freedom alreadynstituted as freedom even apart from such conditions, they are not intrin



either the very exercise or the very origin and genesis of freedom as suchberation "in itself" does not produce human freedom, for "even when freesubject to forms of conditioning it is not thereby completely destroyed"; ict, "people who undergo terrible constraints succeed in manifesting theireedom and taking steps to secure their own liberation" (ibid.).

ne may wonder, however, whether it is really possible to consider structur

d structural change "in themselves" at all as the Vatican frequently does.ch a conception would be possible, of course, if we were to reify socialructures



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to autonomous entities wholly independent of those individuals who inrying ways contribute to their creation, something neither John Paul nor

atzinger would like to do. Such conceptual separation of structures from thmans involved in them seems possible, then, only because one sees, as t

o, the ontological relation between structures and humans as at best extri

d accidental. Such a relation abstracts from all the collective suffering,trage, excitement, enthusiasm, hope, and actions of interdependentdividualspersons who create a new structure against the challenges andessures of an already existing system, or those who suffer from the systemd who are necessarily affected in their personal inwardness by theirvolvement in such experiences. A structure or system taken concretely, nostraction from the experiences and struggles of those involved which aresential to the genesis and maintenance of such a system, is already, in its

ther good or badin varying degrees, of coursefor those who are inseparabvolved in it, depending on whether it is liberating or oppressive. A structuver so extrinsic to the humans subject to that structure that we can consmerely neutral, neither good nor bad in itself, like a harmless tool (e.g., ae), which would be extrinsic to an end and could be used for a good endused for a bad.

is more than curious to note that, while the Vatican thus reminds us that

elf, structural change does not produce individual freedom and may evencome a tool of oppression, it never says that individual freedom in itself, i

olation from society, is neither possible nor actual. This peculiar blindness rhaps not unrelated to the sociological fact that many in already establishmocracies or in positions of power in non-democracies tend to take their

eedom for granted, as well as to the historical fact that problems continuecur even when one's freedom is guaranteed either by the political systemone's social position. Hence one is inclined to dismiss such structuralarantees as unimportant because they do not, as indeed they could not, emselves ensure either personally meaningful freedom or the solution of acial problems. One fails to appreciate not only the immense sense of eration originally experienced when the old oppressive structures wereppled but also the fact that the very indifference to structural protectionseedom, the continuing search for more meaningful freedom, and the rise lution of social problems all presuppose a social, structural context that

ows such indifference and such search in the first place as well as genera



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d one wonders how valid it is to base a social doctrine of the church mear all on the assumption of such heroism. Second, would the heroes still beroes if they were born, raised, and confined in such concentration campseir lives? To think they could be would only hide a purely spiritualist or Stonception of human existence in all its un-Christian dualism.

rthermore, depending on the degree of conditioning, these heroes mightve died and their freedom been indeed completely destroyed, as witness llions of people who did die in concentration camps, torture chambers, anought-ridden areas. If the heroes did survive, it was due not only to theirner strengththeir "freedom"but also because, fortunately, the pain andffering inflicted on them did not exceed certain objective limits required frvival. Likewise, if "people who undergo terrible constraints succeed inanifesting their freedom and taking steps to secure their own liberation," ould only mean that the "causality" of "conditions" is not mechanical (mor this later), although beyond certain limits, as just mentioned, such causa

oes operate. After all, both Maximilian Kolbe and Dietrich Bonhoeffer did dcould not mean that social conditions are not essential to freedom. If nothy would they want to take steps to secure their own liberation? Likewise,not precisely the challenges and threats posed by the conditions which,ong with the inner integrity of the individuals involved, make the heroes

roes and which are therefore intrinsic to heroism as heroism?ocial Conditions of Freedom

exalting the freedom of the individual, the Vatican empties social sin of itstinctive analytic meaning by either reducing it to a cumulative sum of dividual sins or dismissing it as sin only in an analogical sense. Social ethicerely an extension of individual ethics. Just as social structures andnditions are no more than the sum of the results of individual actions, sohey always depend on the responsibility of man, who can alter them, and pon an alleged determinism of history" (LC, 74). Society or history as suchoes not "act"; only individuals do. These raise three questions about theation between the individual and society. (1) In what sense do individualeate or produce their society through their actions? (2) Is it really true to at institutions and structures never "act" except through the individuals wther represent them as officials and/or promote or exploit them? (3) How

ossible to transform social structures?



rst, in what sense do individuals produce or create society through theirtions? Certainly not in the sense in which God creates the world accordin

assical metaphysics, i.e., out of nothing. The creative actions of individualesuppose many things, which are therefore intrinsic to and constitutive och actions. Just as individuals do not give birth to themselves, so theirtions presuppose a set of preexisting economic, political, and culturalnditions. It is against the challenges and pressures of this already existing

ructure, as well as by the



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e of the means already explicitly or implicitly available in it, that individuantribute their share of actions to the transformation of society; even theney do not do so equally but in infinitely varying degrees. Even so, it wouldfficult to attest that the resulting form of society and its structure correspactly to the varied intentions of millions of individual agents. To suppose

ould be to presuppose a miraculous degree of homogeneity and consensumong individuals widely separated from one another in time, space,cupation, origin, and class; one would also have to ignore both the confli

mong sexes, classes, races, and nations that have historically burdenedman relations and the short-sightedness of individuals whose subjective

terests do not always coincide with their objective interests.

ocial structures are the results of human action insofar as such structures ot drop down from heaven but are in some infinitely complex way depend the actions and passions, commissions and omissions, of numerous

dividuals who support or exploit the structure for conflicting purposes. The not results of human design in the sense that such results correspond te conscious knowledge and willi.e., freedomof all individuals taken eitherparately or collectively. At best, they are results of the designand thuseedomof groups, not isolated individuals. These groups, precisely througheir common position in the existing social order, have developed common

terests and organized themselves into a power sufficient to impose theirllective interests on the rest of society in an ongoing struggle for power wher groups and classes; however, the Vatican does not want to recognizes struggle as a fact of history. Even then, we must wonder to what extene result of the collective action of the winning group or class correspondse intention and freedom of that group. Certainly, there remains a gap, antradiction between its intention and the result of its collective action, astness the frustrations of capitalists, socialists, and communists alike. Evene collective action of a group is subject to the preexisting conditions of ciety, its ongoing dialectic, and the basic ontological contingency whichrvades all human actions. What Kierkegaard said about the irreducibility ersonal) "existence" to "thought" is equally true of our social existence,hich remains irreducible even to collective thought. To think otherwise wodeed be idealistic.

o say, then, that society and its structures are the result of free individualtions, or that social sin in the sense of unjust structures is merely the



mulative result of individual sins, is at best misleading and at worst simplyse. It is misleading to say, as does the Vatican, that unjust structureslways depend on the responsibility of man, who can alter them and not u alleged determinism of history" (LC, 74) or that sinful structures areducible to the sum of the unjust acts of individuals. The statements are togue and general ("man") and fail to specify the groups and classes to whncrete individuals always belong or to note the struggle for power in whic

me groups are more powerful than others, as though all individuals asdividuals somehow possessed the



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eedom and responsibility to "alter" such structures. The statements are faattributing an almighty power for social change to isolated individuals and

noring the reified weight of structures already existing prior to the initiatioange.

ch a view, also characteristic of modern social contract theorists and thin

ch as Jeremy Bentham and Milton Friedman, is ultimately based on anthmetical conception of human beings in which the whole is not greater te sum of its parts and where the partsdead numbersare devoid of all dialeth others in their isolated self-sufficiency. Even the so-called 'world-histordividuals, such as Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Gandhi, and Martin Luther Kincame world-historical not only because of their individual daring, wisdomd insight, which I do not want to minimize, but also because of the socianditions which demanded such leadership and the cooperation of classesd groups whose objective situation made them open and responsive to it

kewise, those "leaders" who, according to John Paul, "are in a position tooid, eliminate or at least limit certain social evils" or to "work diligently ansely for the improvement and transformation of society" (RP, 16) are in thosition" precisely because such a position is supported and needed by the

ower structure of a society already there prior to their respective individualls. Ronald Reagan did not create the presidency of the United States any

ore than John Paul created the papacy. Their individual freedom in theirositions, therefore, is derived from the existing power structure of their socd limited by the interests of that structure. They are, of course, free to foeir personal convictions even against the dominant interests and ideologieat structure, at least in the sense that the structure does not mechanicallntrol their actions; by the same token, of course, they also pay for suchnvictions.

is is not to deny the importance of individual leadership or to close off theossibility of structural change, but only to show the falsity of the atomisticdividualist approach to social phenomena and the inherent conditioning otempts at structural change by the reified facticity of the preexisting situahe given), its ongoing dialectic, and the basic ontological contingency whes the totality of our existence, both individual and social.

is important at this point to raise the second question, namely, whether i

ue to say that structures as such do not 'act,' that only individuals do. If b



ction' we understand the efficient causality of conscious, deliberate actsacmanus, not actus hominisas does the Vatican, it is clear that only individut. It is on the basis of this conception of causality and action that the clais been made that society and social sins are "results" and "effects" of dividual actions and personal sins, not also "causes" and "sources" of thetter. It is both narrow and superficial, however, to consider the meaning oman action only at the level of conscious, deliberate acts of the individua

d to forget the depth dimensions of such acts, namely, the very social anstorical conditions of which individuals, usually confined to the immediacyeir



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tions, are not always conscious but without which such actions would sim impossible. Human action as concretely exercised, not merely thoughtout, is always situated in a particular social, historical context, which indets both on and in the lives of individualschallenging them to act; providine material means of such acts, as well as the guiding intellectual and cult

orizon of what is important and desirable and what is not; and in certain lises (extreme physical and psychological torture, lack of basic material ned so forth) literally causing the subjects of such acts to die.

e kind of "action" proper to structures as "conditions" of individual action ten anonymous and unconscious, but no less important. In a real sense te more important than individual acts both because their influence on thetter is far more enduring and extensive than the influence of one individuapon another, and because, through that influence, they affect precisely theedom and dignity of persons that the Vatican so cherishes. As conditionsdividual acts they are intrinsic to such acts, not merely "not exterior" (LC, "external" (RP, 16). Without such conditions individual actions are deprivall motivations and material means, which provide the psychological origincrete specificity, and a determinate range of possibilities to such actionse socio-historical conditions are intrinsic to actions precisely in the sense

oth the very possibility and the concrete particularity, both the existence a

sence of an actwhether there can be an act at all and what kind of an acll bedepend on such conditions. These conditions are both a priori, in thense that such conditions provide the general necessity of action, the guid

orizon of values and ideas, and the broad limits of what is possible and whnot, and a posteriori, in the sense that they co-constitute the concreterticularity of an act along with the creative element of personal subjectiviwhich they remain the a priori condition.

ese conditions do not act in the same way that mechanical causes act. Ine case of mechanical causality, the relation between cause and effect istrinsic. The cause literally determines its effect in a unilateral way; the eff

oes not react on the cause or enter into the specificity of the result excepte sense that even the unilateral causality of the agent must respect thevenness of the nature of the object. The conditions, on the other hand, dot unilaterally determine individual actions except in limit cases mentionedrlier. Individuals do and can respond and react to such conditionsnot, of urse, from a position outside such conditions, but as agents already



ternally subject to and shaped under their challenges, ideologies, andaterial limitations. Attempts at structural change presuppose the facticity mands of the existing structure, are subject to the ambiguities of its ongoalectic, and remain constrained and limited by the possibilities implicit orplicit in it. Structural change never means starting all over with a clean sl novo. By the same token, structures do not cause individuals to act in ththat way. Within the general, objective, and basic limits imposed by the

ructure, individual



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tions also depend on the perceptions, interpretations, courage, and initiathe agents themselves.

this sense of mutually intrinsic and mutually mediating relationship betwe 'conditioning' and the 'conditioned,' the concept of 'condition' is essentidialectical concept, as opposed to the mechanical concept of unilateral

usality and the Vatican's use of condition as something extrinsic to thesence of freedom. Contrary to the claims of John Paul and Ratzinger, theructures and institutions of society are not only "results" or "effects" of man action in the sense of the collective action of the winning groups an

asses in the struggle for powernot in the sense of the conscious, deliberattion of all individuals taken separately or collectivelybut also themselvesndition such collective and individual actions, influencing them to aofounder degree than could any causality of individual action, by promotiinhibiting the very possibility of such action and in any event setting its

mits. To focus on the causality of conscious individual freedom, at the expethe dialectical conditions which make such causality possible and actual,

ould be to take a very narrow and partial view of the concrete totality whihuman existence, indeed a pre-critical view in the sense in which pre-ntian metaphysics was pre-critical for Kant.

onditions of Structural Change

is leads to the third question: How is it possible to transform (unjust) socructures? Who can be the agents of such transformation? The precedingscussion of the dialectic between individuals and social conditions does noean to rule out the possibility of structural change. History does constraind limit: we cannot make history arbitrarily, de novo, or in a vacuum. By thme token, history is neither closed nor fixed: it also contains openings an

ossibilities, which it is the task of the agents of liberation to discern andvelop. It is the existing conditions which generate the need for change ineir ongoing dialectic and make available, at least potentially, the materialeans for actualizing such change even while setting broad limits for its scohat are the signs of the times demanding such change; what change wou liberating or oppressive; what means are actually available, and what limere are to the projected changesthese cannot be decided a priori or pureom outside. Hence the constant need for social analysis with a high sensit

the shifting dialectic of history. Besides, the contingencies of history, whi



errule both collective and individual intentions and projections, often contpredictable surprises, which are knowable only after the fact. Who, unde

us XII, could have predicted the revolution of Vatican II, or foreseen theparture of Ferdinand Marcos from power immediately after the fraudulentipino election of February 1986? Hence also the need for courageous actisting the limits of the possible even against the apparent immobility of reiructures, and the hope which, for all its realistic humility, never ceases to

ope against the impossible. The 'utopian'



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inciple of hope remains indispensable both in discovering the openings anacks in the seemingly closed and fixed systems and straining the possibilitchange to their very limit.

ho, then, are the agents of such transformation? The need for change alwses amid social conditions which both generate such need and threaten t

ock its fulfillment. Some oppressed groups demand liberation; others regach demands as a challenge to their privilege. Likewise, some groups areore powerful than others in imposing their interests on the rest of society.under these conditions of opposing interests and differentiated power thacial changes are proposed, attempted, and/or achieved. Individuals asdividuals, then, as mentioned earlier, can not be agents of social change. ch, they do not possess the power to impose their purely individual will one rest of society, nor can there be an agreement among such individualsatural harmonywith regard to the goal of such change, which is alwaysrticular in its content (e.g., the Equal Rights Amendment, socializededicine, transfer of power from military to civilian rule) and thus will notpeal to all individuals or groups. Only a communityi.e., individuals organizth a sense of interdependence for the realization of a shared purpose andobilized to acquire sufficient power to override the powers of opposingterests and impose their will on the rest of societyis capable of accomplish

ch structural change.oreover, the structural change at issue is not just any change; we arencerned with only such changes that would be liberating under the givennditions of a particular society and history. The urgent practical question

ow to locate, organize, educate, and mobilize a collective agent of liberatinansformation. It must be a group within which the individuals share ansciousness of their common dignity, their common plight of oppression,

eir common need for collective actionin short, a sense of common destinych a group is not found ready-made but must be located, educated

conscientized"), organized, and mobilized. It is here that the basic ecclesimmunities assume their historical significance.

hn Paul and Ratzinger frequently speak of the need for "solidarity," but sulidarity is understood only as something factual or as a moral virtue yet toalized in the furture, 28 not as a permanent "existential" (cf. Heidegger) o

man existence which is already present as an a priori characteristic of tha



istence and is capable of becoming self-conscious, purified, and liberatede integral enrichment of that existence. They speak of a social structurehich embodies such solidarity as at best a means to individual dignity andten as something separable ("in itself") from such dignity. They do notcognize solidarity in the very constitution of dignity, experience of oppressd the activity of liberation. They tend to think of human dignity as primare dignity of the individual as individual, not as a dignity intrinsically share

dividuals in their interdependence or solidarity, constituted as such by mucognition and support. Such dignity, of course, has and must have aanscendent basis



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our relation to God; however, as something proper to humans as historicaings, as an attribute of a concrete totality, it is also intrinsically mediated lidarity. Human transcendence towards God is possible only asanscendence in solidarity, not as transcendence of solidarity by the isolatedividual or as the sum of such isolated transcendences. Liberating structu

ange presupposes a consciousness of human dignity, not as something edividual possesses for himself or herself but as something which can be trossessed only in the solidarity of mutual recognition and supporti.e., ancept of human dignity as a truly common good, which is both more andher than the sum of individually pursued goods.

berating change also requires a common consciousness of solidarity inpression and the task of liberation. The agents must become aware thateir oppression is due to a common cause, structural injustice, to which the subject together, not as isolated individuals, and from which, therefore,ere is only one way of liberating themselvesnamely, collective action or acsolidarity for a just structure. What is necessary for liberation, then, is noe inner conversion of an individual, or even of individuals as individuals, bnversion of individuals with and to a sense of common destiny in history. ecisely this sense of common destinytheological in its transcendent basis,etaphysical-anthropological as an existential of human life, and political in

storical actualizationwhich the personalism of John Paul and Ratzinger findifficult to accommodate because of its dualism and metaphysical

dividualism. Personalism might be helpful in illuminating the dynamics of alogical' or 'interpersonal' relations in abstraction from the dialectic of therger society. It does not have the theoretical resources for understanding alectic of history, still less for illuminating the basis of a theology of structueration of motivating liberating praxis, however the Vatican might call its

wn theology a theology of "integral," "definitive," and "authentic" liberation

eyond Abstract Personalism

uman existence, I have argued many times thus far, is a concrete totality the essential relations, broadly the relation to transcendence and theation to history and nature. As moments within a totality, these relations deed distinct, but as moments of concrete totality they are also mutuallyediated and mediating in a constitutive relationship; each can neither exis

or develop apart from the mediation by the other. The human relation to



ture and history is human, not animal, because it is intrinsically mediatedr relation to transcendence; similarly our relation to transcendence is hum

ot angelic, because it is mediated by our relation to history and nature. Anst as human existence as such a totality cannot be reduced to pure naturor can it be reduced to pure transcendence. Our relationship to God as aman relationship is intrinsically conditioned by the mediation of the natur



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d the historical, our dependence on nature, our social interdependence, e objectification of our natural and social dependences in economics, polid culture.

e Vatican never ceases to emphasize the finitude of human existence aseated by God, and in this they are only joining the long line of classical

eologians, spiritual writers, and contemporary existentialists. Sin manifestelf in the revolt of the finite creature against the creator and the denial oe's own nature as a finite creature. It is important to note, however, thats finitude has consistently been understood only metaphysically, asntingency or lack of ontological self-sufficiency, and only in our verticalation to God. It is as though human finitudeI don't know about the finituangelsconsisted only in the ontological dependence on God, as if humans

ere self-sufficient in relation to others in society and history. What has noten adverted to is the fact that our natural and social dependences inncrete history are simply the other side of the same coin, the humanly finpression and mediation of our ontological dependence on God. We aretrinsically dependent not only on God but also on nature and our fellows. trinsically finite beings we do not cease to be finite in our sociohistoricalations. Our double dependences on God and on finite creatures in natured history are the two sidesmutually mediated and mediatingof one and th

me ontological fact: the contingency of our existence (esse).hn Paul and Ratzinger abstract totally from this sociohistorical dimension eir account of sin and freedom, which as a result ultimately renders sin aneedom incomprehensible as realities of concrete human existence. Theynstrue sin as a transaction in the inwardness of the individual before Godd freedom as the act of a person without essential social mediation. Thebject of sin and freedom is not the person as a concrete totality, already

mersed in history where one must act and thus discover and develop onensciousness of self, freedom, the need for God and salvation, and the sensin through the experience of the manifold historical forms of ontologicalntingency. Instead, the subject of sin is identified with the "inner" personrectly confronted with God and God alone. As LC put it earlier;

Culpable ignorance of God unleashes the passions, which are causes of imbalanceand conflicts in the human heart. From this there inevitably come disorders whichaffect the sphere of the family and society: sexual license, injustice and murder(39).



e causal sequence is always from the transcendent to the historical, fromrson to society, from the inner to the outer.

onsider, however, the a priori conditions for the very possibility of such aquence and whether the fundamentally asocial subjectthe "worldlessbject" (Heidegger)of John Paul and Ratzinger could fulfill such conditions

ow



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it possible to be even culpably ignorant of God? This presupposes, of cour need for God and our capacity for knowledge of God. After all, mineralsants, and animals do not have such a need and capacity. This, however, iot sufficient. If it is true that we do not have an innate idea of God, that wnnot even develop an intuitive knowledge of God in her essence in this lif

Aquinas insists, then we must derive our knowledge of God from thealogy with creatures; this necessity presupposes our exposure to society.also in the midst of our social existence in history that we develop the neer God and salvation, through the experience of sickness, frustrations,pressions, the beauty and fragility of love, the possibility of death, alienatd reconciliation, the grandeur and misery of nature, and the tragedies of

ar, poverty, and starvation. To say that we acquire a knowledge of Godrough our social existence and its culture is also to acknowledge that our

owledge of God is exposed to the relativities of the dominant ideologies alues of a particular society, which often distort our knowledge of God. Inher words, both our need for and our knowledge of God as a human needd human knowledge presuppose, as their a priori condition, our involvemsociety and history. John Paul's and Ratzinger's abstract subject, unsituad withdrawn from the necessities of social life, could not even get an idea

od, contingency, and sin, still less be culpably ignorant.

onsider also the a priori conditions for the possibility of passions, imbalancd conflicts in the human heart. These presuppose something like what thomists call the powers of the soulintellect, will, irrational appetities, orssionsas the essential potentialities of the person. In their humanncreteness, however, they also presuppose more. As the phenomenologisve been telling us, intellect, will, passions, imbalances and conflicts in theart are always 'intentional': they are directed to specific objects, through

hich they also become actual and concrete. A passion which is not a passr or against something is no passion, as conflicts which are not aboutything in particular can not be real conflicts. These objects come to usoduced, interpreted, and evaluated by the culture and society in which we. It is in society that we develop the power to discriminate among differejects, and it is through society that objects become available to fulfill or

ustrate the passions of the heart. The dominant values of society, as Johnul never ceases to point out in his encyclicals and addresses, also pressur

in favor of certain values, such as material comfort, easy sex, indifferenc



e value of life, worship of money and profit, and so forth, and thus reinforr passions, imbalances, and disorders in these areas. The powers andssions of human interiority need the mediation of society for both theirecificity and actuality.

onsider, finally, the a priori conditions for the possibility of the sins singled LC: sexual license, injustice, and murder. These presuppose not only cer

aracteristics on the part of the personsuch as sexual desire, the need andower to assert oneself against another, and the physical and psychologica



anscendence. Both the transcendent dignity of humans in the order of end the power of freedom to transcend in the order of efficient causality areemselves discovered, realized, and in any case always in the process of coming, in a dialectic of co-constitution of the individual and the manifoldcial relations to which he or she is subject as a concrete totality. It is trueat "man becomes free to the extent that he comes to a knowledge of trutd to the extent that this truthnot only other forcesguides his will" (LC, 26

t this knowledge of truth is not independent of or



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mply prior to our praxis in society and history. It is precisely in and througch praxis that we acquire and grow in the knowledge of truth.

ontrary to John Paul and Ratzinger, then, it is not possible to eitherpreciate or defend the reality of freedom, sin, and human dignity byaximizing the capacity of the individual for self-determination and minimiz

e conditioning power of situations and structures over that capacity; suchew only denatures these experiences and attributes of humanly finitetures, either by exalting them to the angelic level or by emptying them ofeir humanly necessary historical content and historical dialectic. Thisstorically dialectical conception rejects both mechanistic reductionism, whnies the possibility of human freedom altogether, and the exaltation of man freedom to the unsituated, ahistorical freedom of angels, which dene humanly finite character of that freedom. It preserves both the possibilid humanity of human freedom. It is precisely because of the challenge asistance of social reality that heroes can become heroes, that people canffer oppression and demand liberation. Human dignity is precious notcause humans can determine themselves for themselves in any arbitrary

ay, in a historical vacuum, or over all historical situations, but preciselycause it is primarily rooted in God's loving transcendence of her

anscendence towards us in history, to which we only respond in a

anscendence appropriate to our human, historical mode, not in an ahistoranscendence towards God, and because it always remains fragile, demandnstant reaffirmation and structural protection against the negativities of story.

e abstract personalism of John Paul and Ratzinger, which lacks this sensestorical mediation of human existence as a concrete totality, not onlynatures the human reality of sin, freedom, and dignity but also tends to

stort the nature of the poor, the salvific significance of the death andsurrection of Jesus Christ, and the meaning of the Magnificat. It does so nsistently emptying them of their concrete, often painful historical contend thus 'spiritualizing' them. Let me confine myself to the interpretation of

oor in LC.

r LC, it is "one of the principal errors" since the Enlightenment and "asunderstanding of the depths of freedom and its needs" to think that

provements in the material conditions of life "should serve as a basis for



hieving freedom" (21). Why? Because "the little ones and the poor,'' whock such conditions, experience "the liberating joy" which comes from theirthknowledge that "they are the object of God's infinite love," which givesem "the dignity which none of the powerful can take away from them"bid.). In an assertion of the "hermeneutic privilege" of the poor in the conthe popular devotion to the Cross, LC goes on to state:

Here we have a fact of fundamental theological and pastoral significance: it is thepoor, the object of God's special love, who understand best and as it wereinstinctively that the most radical liberation, which is liberation



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from sin and death, is the liberation accomplished by the Death and Resurrection oChrist. (22)

The "poor of Yahweh" know that communion with him is the most precious treasurand the one in which man finds his true freedom. For them, the most tragicmisfortune is the loss of this communion. Hence their fight against injustice finds itdeepest meaning and its effectiveness in their desire to be freed from the slavery osin. (47)

hy did Christ identify himself with the poor? Because such misery is "thevious sign of the natural condition of weakness in which man finds himse

nce original sin and the sign of his need for salvation" (68).

st as LC consistently separates sin in its essence from its sociohistoricalnditions and content and thus reifies and spiritualizes it, so does it do the

me with the poor. Material conditions are not even a basis of freedom. Thoor of LC are indifferent to the experience of a lack of basic necessities, in concrete pain, anxiety, and helplessness, although this experience, one

ould think, is precisely what makes them poor. They "understand best" thrue freedom" lies in "liberation from sin and death" in their communion wiod, not also in the overcoming of their material poverty. The reason whysus had compassion on them was that poverty was a sign of our need forlvationnot also because poverty was poverty, i.e., the painful lack of

ementary physical needs without which they would literally die. That is, thoor of LC are not really poor. They do not care about poverty; they alreadyjoy true freedom in a direct communion with God. They are only concerneout sin against God and God's salvation from that sin. LC suppresses all tspecific about the experience of poverty as poverty, even while talking abe poor as poor.

ne only wonders, then, how it is possible at all for the poor to engage in th

ght against injustice" with concern for "its effectiveness" (47). Why do thoor, who are poor but do not suffer the consequences of poverty, fight, any to fight effectively, against the injustice that makes them poor? Whatactly is it from which "they live in hope of deliverance" (ibid.), if not their

overty? Why do they have such hope and "place their trust in Yahweh" (iball unless they suffer the pain, helplessness, and despair as a result of

overty? How is it possible to experience injustice as injustice except in its

ncrete social forms, such as denial of basic needs, forced seizure of land, ages, systematic discrimination in employment, excessive taxation, robber



d slaveryall of which do hurt the poor as poor in the most materially painfays? How could injustice to the poor be a ''grave sin" which destroysmmunion with God" (46) when it does not really touch them as poor? Hopossible for the poor to "understand" that the "liberation from sin and dea"the liberation accomplished by the Death and Resurrection of Christ" (22cept through the experience of their own poverty, which constitutes theiristential and historical



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uation, unless, of course, one supposes an unmediated, direct, almostgelic intuition on the part of the poor? If the poor experience the "liberaty," what exactly is it a liberation from, if not from the degradation andlplessness of poverty as well? Why are the poor "the object of God's spec

ve," if they are not really helpless, dependent, and not really different from

her groups of people? How is poverty a sign of our "need" for salvation whs poverty only in name?

y systematically abstracting from the concrete material and social experienpoverty which make the poor poor, LC spiritualizes poverty and ends up bnying the concretely human reality of the poor and making its ownsertions incomprehensible. Again, it refuses to acknowledge the concreteciohistorical mediation as the essential human condition for the very

ossibility of the spiritual experience of injustice, sin, liberation from sin, ane knowledge of radical liberation through Christ which it attributes to the

oor. For LC, as for TL, the poor possess both theological and epistemologicivilege over other groups, but whereas TL attributes such privilege to the

oor precisely in their material, historical reality, LC does so by consistentlynoring such human reality and emphasizing instead a spirituality unmediathe experience of poverty in its most ordinary sense. In order to affirm th

anscendent meaning of poverty, it transcendentalizes poverty itself and

nies poverty as poverty.oth John Paul and LC use the language of totality, such as 'unity,' 'whole'rson, and 'all' dimensions of human life. 29 Their use, however, is formal stract: 'unity' means no more than the sum of all the dimensions in theirrmal distinction, without a sense of a totality mediating and mediated by mensions or of the dimensions mediating and mediated by one another. Ibest an extrinsic unity and thus an abstract, not concrete, totality. Histor

oes not intrinsically mediate our transcendence to God in freedom and sin.e contrary, freedom and sin unilaterally 'cause' our history as their 'effect,hile also preserving their transcendence over history and their distinctnessom history. The whole person, therefore, is reduced either to transcendenbjectivity without an essential relation to history, as in the account of sin,

eedom, and poverty, or to an incomprehensible juxtaposition of anscendence and history, accomplished by the addition of the word "and"argument for liberation ("first of all as a member of the City of God, and

en as a member of the earthly city") (LC, 63; my emphasis).



ven the Vatican's abstract personalism, then, which wavers between airitualist monism and a not-so-covert dualism, it is no wonder that itsmmitment to liberation often appears ambiguous and half-hearted. Onennot avoid the impression of a dilemma: on the one hand its deepernviction seems to lean in the monist direction, but on the other it seems d it impossible to ignore the weight and challenge of unjust structures ane demand for liberation. Even when LC insists that the Church's speakingout the promotion of social justice "is not going beyond her mission," it do

ot forget to warn that



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his mission should not be absorbed by preoccupations concerning themporal order or reduced to such preoccupations" (64). Even while assertiat the "temporal" task of serving one's neighbor and society is "urgentlymanded", it also tempers this urgency by warning against "an unrealisticinous search for a perfect world, 'for the form of this world is passing awa

2), just as LN combines the strongest appeal yet for the social commitmethe entire church with a simultaneous warning and reservation aboutemporal messianism" and "historicist immanentism" (xi, ix, and x). If indeestorical and social forms of love of neighbor are "indissolubly" linked to theork of salvation as part of God's "singular" plan, it is curious why the Vaticforever so anxious to issue such a reservation. It certainly does not worryout "preoccupations" with the love of God, sacramental piety, and individnversion, even though the possibility of deviation or excess in these areas

story is any evidence, is certainly not less.

o conclude, the Vatican's own version of theology of liberation suffers fromrvasive dualism in its view of transcendence and history, which renders itteriological, Christological, and anthropological doctrines incomprehensibld irrelevant to our human reality in its concrete historical existence. Therems no doubt that the Vatican feels the need for a theological developmethe direction of some sort of a theology of liberation. It even insists that s

development "remains constantly open to the new questions whichntinually arise" (72). It also insists, however, as we saw earlier in thisapter, that it must be in "strict connection" with and "fully adherent" to t

adition of the magisterium, to the "principles that are always valid" even ine midst of "the changing circumstances of history" (ibid.). Unless thisadition and its principles are somehow disengaged from the underlyingthropological assumptionswhether neo-Platonist, Augustinian, Thomist, orsonalistand unless we are allowed to rethink the tradition on newthropological bases, the range of possibility of development, I submit,mains severely restricted. Certainly, a theology of liberation developed onaditional anthropological foundations, as I have been arguing all along, wo at best a half-hearted attempt, always in the grip of a dualistichizophrenia.



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hapter VIgns of the Times and the Future of Theology: Concludingeflections

us far I have convered some of the major issues having to do with thentral themes of TL. Beginning with a survey of the issues and an outline oe book in the first chapter, I presented the Marxian and Hegelian sources(Chapter 2) and discussed the relation between theology and praxis

hapter 3), the dialectic of salvation and liberation (Chapter 4), and thetican's own version of a theology of freedom and its social doctrine of eration (Chapter 5). In each case, I tried to take the criticisms very seriod to respond to them as fully as possible from the perspective of TL. Frome very beginning, my intention, I think, has been clear: it was to save TLom many of its distortions and defend it against some of its critics. Whethve succeeded in doing so is not for me to judge. Doubtless, some issuesmand further elaboration and discussion, while a host of others have noten been broached.

this concluding chapter, I would like to reflect on the larger significance e confrontation between TL and the Vatican, its official critic. Over andyond the particular issues that have been discussed, the confrontation ra

wo fundamental questions: How does Christianity respond to thentemporary "signs of the times"? and How adequate is a theology to suchsk? Both are questions of Christian praxis in the contemporary world: the a question about the challenges facing that praxis, the second about thesk of Christian theory in responding to such challenges.

gns of the Timescloud has been hanging over humanity for some time. Sometimes it seem gathering, at other times to be dispersing. Sometimes it turns into a stor



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unimaginable disaster, often into merely uncomfortable rain and snow;ways it casts long shadows of gloom over the planet Earth and alwaysreatens to become a tornado ready to hit us all in our moments of uneasymplacency and feigned peace. What Matthew Arnold said of the nineteenntury seems truer of the twentieth. The world

Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;And we are here as on a darkling plainSwept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,Where ignorant armies clash by night.

(From "Dover Beach")

ot all of us, of course, are so "confused" or so "ignorant." Many, especiallyose with power and privilege, seem to know exactly what they are doinghen they struggle to maintain and extend their power over the rest of socd the world. The result of such struggles for power and domination hasdeed been "a darkling plain,'' which "has really neither joy, nor love, nor lior certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain."

is is how the contemporary world might appear to a sensitive andmpassionate observer from the First World. The world is gloomy andpleasant indeed. The threats of tornados and storms and earthquakes

ways seem to be there. Still, the world is tolerable. After all, the threats ofolitical repressions, military conflicts, and economic disasters seem to remaly threats. If they flare up, they do so only in regions so far away that the

o not seem to touch us with the immediacy of the concrete, only in countrhose cultures seem so strange to our own. We do not suffer the disastersrselves. Nor are we really responsible for them. The problems are, after ait seems, theirs, not ours. The picture of the world is depressing, the tur

ents disheartening, but overall, life remains quite tolerable, occasionally ejoyable.

o the absolute majority of humanity today, however, many of them in the d Second Worlds but mostly in the Third, the disasters are not threats bu

oody realities of the everyday world. From the Palestinians in refugee camthe women and children slaughtered by the Nicaraguan contras; from thught in the brutal struggle between Hindus and Buddhists in Sri Lanka an

tween Hindus and Sikhs in India to the victims of the conflict betweentholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; from the victims of the war



tween Iran and Iraq to the oppressed black majority in South Africa; frome displaced refugees and victims of death squads in Central America to th

prooted Cambodians in Thai camps; from the starving campesinos in Latinmerica to the victims of drought in Africa; from the slum dwellers of Manilae exploited workers of Seoul; from the political criminals silently languishind 'disappearing' in the jails of right-wing regimes to the silenced majoritie

ft-wing



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gimes; from the blacks, Hispanics, whites, and the elderly living under theoverty line in the United States to the "guest workers" in Germany; from tomen and racial and religious minorities in all the regions of the world whofferings are compounded by sexism, racism, and discrimination to the moan one billion humans in absolute poverty and on the verge of starvationa

e list could go on endlesslysuffering and oppression are not abstract threathe future but concrete realities of the immediate present. They are victimeconomic exploitation and political repression, of the colossal indifferenceose with power and privilege, of the structural inequities of an increasinglterdependent world, of economic, political and military imperialism and itscal cronies. Some of the victims muster enough courage and hope to screthe television sets of the First World, while the majority, it seems, feel

owerless and languish in quiet despair. 1

ow should Christians respond to these horrors of massive poverty and brupression throughout the world? How should they heed these signs of the

mes? Many Christians, individually and collectively, have been responding eat personal and institutional cost. Many courageous leaders and groupsve arisen to speak and act prophetically for the silent, suffering majority omanity. In recent years the vigorous statements and activities of such bothe World Council of Churches, the National Council of Churches in the

nited States, the Methodist and Roman Catholic bishops, the Presbyteriantional assemblies, the Friends Service Committee, and a host of others haen most encouraging. It is clear, however, that these efforts, laudable asey indeed are, are scarcely adequate to the screaming needs of the world

oor and oppressed. It is equally clear that Christians committed to the praprophetic responsibility are all too few and powerless even in their ownnominations. The conversion of the churches as institutions still awaits itsalization,.

e challenge of theology of liberation is not primarily a challenge of theologliberation or even some of its outspoken theologians. It is primarily theallenge of liberation, the screaming demand of these billions of 'nonpersor liberation from the conditions which literally kill them. In this respect thenfrontation between TL and the Vatican is not a matter of church disciplitween some rebellious theologians and their highest authority, nor is it evmatter of academic dissent and freedom, which might be relevant only toademic theologians. Neither is it a mere product of media sensationalism:



as not created by the media, and it is not likely to go away because theedia lose interest in it. Individual liberation theologians may come and go,t the problem of liberation will remain as long as the conditions of oppresrsist, and so long will it remain a challenge to the Christian conscience anurch leadership. In the final analysis, the confrontation between TL and ttican is a confrontation of a Christian church with its own evangelical

entity. Is the church going to treat the problem of global poverty simply a

e of the corporal works of mercy, something which may make us betterhristians but without



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hich we could still be Christian, something which is therefore ultimatelyripheral to the Gospel? Or is the church going to take the problem of eration seriously and take it as a challenge to reexamine its own theologicentity and radicalize its evangelical praxis? Is liberation a matter of the sooctrine that applies and follows from a theology centered on personal sin a

lvation, or is it an integral part of the very theology of sin and salvation? Iher words, do we have only a social doctrine or a theology of liberation?

e Catholic Church in the modern world has faced a number of crises, frome Reformation through the Enlightenment to the "apostasy" of the workinass. Through internal self-discipline and external expansion by missionarytivity, the church weathered the storm of the Reformation. After anqualified rejection of the spirit of the Enlightenment and the ideals of theench Revolution in the Syllabus of Errors and the condemnation of odernism, it has, some one hundred and fifty years later, finally come torms with the challenge of modernity, political liberty, and critical reason. Ipersonalist moral theology it tried to meet Kant's demand for the autonothe person as an end in itself, and in the transcendental Thomism of

arechal, Rahner, and Lonergan it also tried to accept his demand for aritical" approach in dogma. In the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in odern World and the Declaration on Religious Liberty of Vatican II and in

olitical theology of John Countney Murray, the church also placed itself onde of political modernity, with the acceptance of basic human rights. In eastance the adjustment has not been without cost. The response to theeformation was accompanied by internal rigidity and siege mentality. Theng-delayed response to the challenge of the Enlightenment was precedede triumphalism and absolutism of Vatican I, not to speak of the loss of tellectual credibility of Catholicism and the massive alienation of Europeantellectuals from the church.

for the challenge of the working class in the nineteenth and twentiethnturies, it seems clear that this challenge was simply not met. With a feustocratic mentality, the Church could not appreciate the historical

gnificance of the industrial revolution, and when it did try to respondRerumovarum, Quadragesimo Anno, the worker priests, the Young Christianorker's movement, and so onit was too little, too late. There can be littleonder, therefore, that the largest communist party in the West has sprungItaly, right in the heart of Catholicism, or that the magnificent cathedrals



rope have been turning into museums. If the church somehow muddledrough the first phase of the Enlightenment and its demand for politicaltonomy and critical rationality, a demand confined to the bourgeoisie ande intellectuals, its response to the second phase of the Enlightenment anmand for critical social praxis, as represented by Marx and the socialistovements, was nothing short of disastrous.

e present challenge of liberation is far more serious than that of theropean working class in the nineteenth century. The problem of the poord oppressed has since then become global, no longer confined to onentinent.



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e challenge, therefore, is the challenge of otherness in two forms, theherness of poverty and that of non-Western cultures. The challenge of eration is a challenge to enter into the strangeness of the other in its mosinful form. Whether the church leadership could meet the present globalallenge any more effectively than it did the older European one would

pend on whether they appreciate the full gravity and magnitude of the cwhich regard there does not seem to be much ground for optimism. Neittheir theory nor in their political practice do Pope John Paul II and Josep

ardinal Ratzinger seem to show a convincing evidence that they appreciate gravity of the signs of the times. Their intellectual horizon is still largelyedieval with a dash of modern personalism, their political preference forolutionary reformism too clearly on the side of the political and economicatus quo, despite the occasional radicalism of their rhetoric.

the discussion in the preceding chapter should have made clear, theirnking remains essentialist in the classical tradition, in contrast to the

alectical thinking of TL in the tradition of Hegel and Marx. They stress thesential specificity and distinctions among the different dimensions of realihile TL stresses the inner relation and dynamic interaction among them.here TL sees mediation in process within a concrete totality, they find onleducible differences within a unity that is at best extrinsic and accidental

eologically, this leads to their primary concern for the transcendence of tngdom over the historical, of personal freedom and dignity over the sociantrast, TL's basic conern is the actualization of salvation through and for storical praxis of humans here below, just as Hegel stressed the active

wirklich) immanence of the Absolute in history against agnostics andanscendentalists, and as Marx stressed the actual (wirklich) liberation thaould make human freedom concrete and effective in history and society aposed to the merely ideal. The Vatican's main fear is reductionism andmanentism, that of TL idealism and spiritualism. Whereas TL tries to see alectical, historical, inner mediation between transcendence and history,tween the personal and the social, the Vatican locates the very essencethecific distinctionof Christian faith in their irreducible difference. Hidden inrsonalism of the Vatican is a profound contempt of the social and thestorical, which equips it to appreciate the gravity of the sociohistoricaldercurrents about as well as does Kierkegaardian existentialism.

their approach to the problem of political involvement, therefore, John Pa



d Ratzinger are either frankly dualistic or always on the verge of dualism.hn Paul does preach a strong commitment to social justice and structuralange but immediately goes on to warn about the danger of reducing fait

olitical liberation; he does not see an inner mediation between the two. Hecognizes "labor" as a "fundamental" dimension of human existence, 2 but

oes not use it consistently as a totalizing principle of his theology. He too tpraxis and action, but he means them in the Kierkegaardian sense of

rsonal moral



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mmitment to which social commitment is at best extrinsic and accidentalatzinger habitually opposes personal freedom and historical determinism,hics and history, as though they were exhaustive alternatives and there wo mediation between personal freedom and historical conditions. Both Johul and Ratzinger reduce the social to the personal, the global structural c

that of personal sins.3 They recognize structural injustice but see it only byproduct of personal sins, not also as their cause. They virtually admit th

istence of an ongoing class struggle by calling attention to the "shockingequality between the rich and the poor" (LN, I, 6) and the realities of neolonialism and neoimperialism, but they are not willing to accept the mora

mbiguities of the struggle and insist on moral purity at all costs. We are evged to struggle "for" justice but never "against'' others.4 The differencetween the Vatican and TL, then, is clearly not a matter of differences of

inion on particular issues but one of the very horizon and basic mode of nking underlying such opinions, not a matter of "contingent" but "structusunderstanding between two radically opposed theologies.5

n the more practical level of politics, both ecclesiastical and secular, Johnul has been launching a forceful conservative offensive marked by empha narrowly conceived orthodoxy of doctrine, a return to traditionalcramental and personal piety, and centralization of authority. Both the

ackdown on dissenting clerics and theologians in recent years (Archbishounthausen of Seattle, Schilleebeckx, Küng, Boff, Gutierrez, Curran, andhers) and the project of theological purification of seminaries have been wblicized in the press. What is perhaps not as well known but far more

gnificant is the use of the papal power of episcopal appointment, the greaotential threat to the future of theology of liberation in Latin America, throhich John Paul, having already appointed fully one-third of all active bishobout 1,200 of them), has been reshaping the Catholic Church throughoue world in his own conservative image.6 Efforts also seem under way todermine episcopal collegiality and the authority of national episcopalnferences,7 stifling the constructive interaction between the universal ane local churches as well as the creativity and flexibility of the regionalurches in responding to their regional crises. The Church of John Paul is aurch increasingly turned inward, to the past, and directed from the cente

o wonder, therefore, that some see the papacy of John Paul as a movemeward a 'church of Neo-Christendom.' While always warning clerics against



olitical involvements, the Vatican has been quite active in supporting thetraconservative political agenda of such organizations as Opus Dei,ommunion and Liberation, and the Order of Malta; all of these groups arearked by a strong anti-communist ideology, and some are suspected to hannections with the CIA and the conservative and neo-conservativetablishments in the United States. In this regard one could not overlook t

olitical significance of the convergence of interests between the Vatican an

e conservative political



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rces in the United States, especially the ideology of anti-communism, atta theology of liberation and clerical involvement in 'radical' politics, supporften disguised) of the Nicaraguan contras, and the emphases on personad family morality and "justice with freedom." 8

of these seem to argue for a certain pessimism with regard to the capac

the Catholic Church to respond adequately and swiftly to the gathering cglobal liberation. As long as the See of Peter is occupied by persons of thsentially medieval, authoritarian, and traditionalist mentality of John Paul

atzinger, one might be tempted to give up all hope. It is clear, however, te challenge of the present crisis to Catholicism is not a matter of thentingent mentality of those who happen to govern the Church at the pre

me. It is, more basically, a matter of the very structure of authority in thehurch, so centralized in the person of the pope, without any procedure of countability, and so affirmed even by Vatican II, whichnot accidentally buructurallymakes the fulfillment of the evangelical mission of the church, torve the poor and oppressed of this world, contingent on who happens to the chair of Peter. Should the mission of the whole church remain sopendent on the accidents of papal personalities? The present crisis pressth an urgency greater than ever before an issue endemic to Catholicism, examination of its ecclesiology in light of its evangelical identity.

owards a Foundational Theology of Concrete Totality

ow should a Christian theology respond to the screams and cries of 'theretched of the earth'? What changes are required in its theoretical structuas to respond to such screams adequately? I have already indicated,

roughout the book, the importance of the anthropological presuppositionstheology and my preference for an anthropology of concrete totality. In th

al section, let me outlineand no more than outlinethe significance andntent of an anthropology of concrete totality as a foundation of theology oundational theology of concrete totality.

every critical juncture of history a new theology has arisen in response toe emerging signs of the times. Such a new theology has always begun wtique of what it considers to be the fundamental defect of its predecessod ended with a systematic reconstruction of the content of faith on a newundation. Where one locates this central defect and the new foundation,erefore, and whether such an alleged foundation is indeed foundational,



ve been crucial tests of every new theology. For Barthian neo-orthodoxy,iating defect of both Thomistic and liberal theology was the subordinatione sovereignty of the self-revealing God to the demand of 'natural theologyd the new foundation was the restoration of the sovereignty of grace. Fo

ultmann, Tillich, and Rahner the main culprit was extrinsicism and dualismd the new



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undation a hermeneutic of faith in correlation with the structural necessithuman existence. Process theologians have found the culprit in theetaphysics of 'substance' underlying classical theologies and the newundation in Whiteheadian process. In recent years both political theologye many varieties of theology of liberationblack, feminist, and Latin

mericanhave been finding traditional, transcendental, and existentialisteologies guilty of intellectualism, individualism, ethnocentrism, sexism, aneological indifference to the crying problems of historical liberation.

I have argued all along in this book, I consider the anthropologicalsumptions of a theology as among the foundations of a Christian theologyong with biblical and other traditions and contemporary experience. If an eology proves fundamentally inadequate, the source of that inadequacy m looked for, perhaps above all, in the inadequacy of its anthropology, as aw theology should build its new synthesis only on a foundation that isthropologically adequate. In this regard I consider it a permanentntribution of modern liberal theology, pace Barth, to have revealed thesential correlativity of faith and existence. Without denying the importance reciprocal dialectic among the sources of Christian theologytradition,ntemporary experience, and contributions of contemporary philosophy anher sciencesI stress the importance of adequate anthropology for a numb

reasons.the history of biblical exegesis clearly shows, how one interprets andpropriates Scripture into theology is itself a function of one's anthropologsumptions. Aristotelian theology (Aquinas) interprets Scripture in Aristotethropoligical 'categories,' as existentialist theology interprets it in terms othropological 'existentials.' The same text of Scripture, which has been thr two thousand years and longer, has been interpreted monistically and

alistically, as demanding both the salvation of the soul and that of the whrson, as justifying both triumphalistic theocracy and the separation of igion and politics, all in function of the anthropological assumptions of theterpreter. In this regard it should not be too difficult to expose thethropological assumptions underlying the variety of approaches inntemporary biblical interpretation, such as literary, form, tradition, redactructural, and, most recently, sociohistorical or materialist criticisms.

hat is true of biblical hermeneutics, of course, has been true all along of



stematic or dogmatic theologies. How the anthropological categories of evailing philosophies have shaped the theologies of the Trinity, Christologn and grace, faith and justification, divine providence, the sacraments,iritual life, the Church, and the responsibility of Christians in and for theorld is clear enough from the prevalence of such categories as 'person,'ature,' 'soul,' 'body,' 'intellect,' 'will,' 'spirit,' and 'matter' in the theologies e Fathers and the Medieval Scholastics, as it is from the prevalence in

odern and contemporary theologies of such categories as 'feeling,' 'moralll,' 'transcendence,' 'existence,' 'intersubjectivity,' 'person,' 'sinner,'ommitment,' 'hope,' 'praxis,' 'narrative,'



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d others. How one interprets the signs of the times and the nature of theallenge they pose to Christian faith and theology is likewise conditioned be's anthropological assumptions. The moral personalism of John Paul and

atzinger reduces the challenge to one of individual moral conversion, just ae existentialism of Baltmann reduces it to one of existential "authenticity"

d as Rahner's transcendental theology sees it largely in terms of renderinhristian faith intelligible and credible by reinterpreting it as transcendentfillment of the transcendental structures of human existence.

nd there is nothing surprising or in principle untheological about this. As tassical epistemological principle states, whatever is known is known accorthe mode of the knower. The knowledge of Godwhether through reason rough revelationis still human knowledge, and is necessarily reflectiveevenay of analogyof the structure of human existence as a condition of both itossibility as human knowledge and its relevance as salvific knowledge.eology presupposes our 'obediential potency' and salvific need to know oar God, and thus an essential relation to the structure of human existenccognitive subject who is at the same time in need of salvation. This does nny, as no Christian theology should, that the initiative must come from Gothat such a potency and need is itself something posited by God, but it dny that we can theologize from a purely divine point of view, from outside

story altogether.some sense the anthropological assumptions are even more important th

e metaphysical-cosmological ones, although an adequate anthropology mo doubt, be based on an adequate metaphysics. The general conception oing as being and its universal structure is largely dependent on one'snception of human being; even the demand for transcendence of thropocentrism, as in process theology, implies a relationat least a negati

eto human being as one understands it, unless, of course, one takes refuHeideggerian Gelassenheit and seeks to transcend even the attempt to

anscend anthropocentrism.

e decisive question, therefore, is not whether a theology can do without thropology but whether that anthropology is adequate to both the norma

adition of Christian faith and the task of theology to interpret that traditionew of the central crisis of the time. In this regard, without going into the

estion of whether the various anthropologies of modern and contempora



eology have been adequate to the normative tradition of faith, it is safe toy, as I have tried to show in preceding chapters, that many of them haveen inadequate as hermeneutic tools for interpreting and responding to thses of contemporary history. Typically they are asocial and ahistorical; whey do not deny the sociality and historicity of human existence, they do nke them seriously enough as constitutive dimensions of that existence. The basically anthropologies of individual inwardness and individual

anscendence.



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etz recently pointed out that there are three basic challenges facing Chriseology today. The challenge of Marxism means the end of theology'sstorical and social innocence. The challenge of the Jewish Holocaust meane end of unsituated and subjectless systematics. The challenge of the Thorld means the end of theology's cultural monocentrism. In response, Me

gued for a "post-idealistic" paradigm of theology beyond neo-Scholastic,istentialist, and transcendental paradigms, for which we would need a crd productive confrontation with Marxism. In this regard the attempt of Ts a significance for the whole church. 9

have used the term concrete totality throughout the book to indicateecisely the 'post-idealistic' anthropology that underlies TL without alwaysing explicitly formulated by liberation theologicans. By keeping all thesential relationshipstranscendence and historyin mutual dialectic, it keepsom the one-dimensional view of human existencewhat Hegel callednderstanding"as well as from a preoccupation with 'specific differences'hich forgets their intrinsic unity and mutual mediation. By taking the dialeall its concrete historicity, it also keeps us from taking human existence astract universal and alerts us to the historical relativitynot relativismof ourdividual and collective perspectives. It views a human being as one who hmake a living, live with one's fellows, create a world of values and ideals,

d who must, through such experiencesnot just 'also,'become aware of hes need for God's salvation, all in a particular society with a particular strucd a particular set of social conflicts at a particular point in time. It is as ancrete historical totality of these essential dimensions and relationships thmans relate to God, just as their relationship to God also mediates theiristence as a concrete totality.

nd the bearer or locus of this dialectic of concrete totality is praxis or actio

r a human being, to be is to act. To act is always to act in a definitenstellation of sociohistorical conditions, economic, political, and cultural,ven from the past yet also in process towards the future. To act is to affirmese conditions as internally constitutive of my subjectivity, not accidental To act is also to judge and protest against them as they are and to affirme possibility of transcending them towards what they should be. To act is-act or co-labor with other subjects on whose action I depend for the very

ossibility of my own, and thus to affirm community or interdependence asnstitutive of my subjectivity. To act is to actualize myself in community w



hers within these conditions and against their pressures and challenges, bjectifying my inwardness, my intellect and will, and my motives and

tentions, and thereby also to affirm my subjectivity as self-determining anus transcendent over the given. I not only affirm my transcendence but a-affirm the absolute future as the horizon of that transcendence. If theoblem of human existence is essentially a problem of action, the problem tion is essentially a problem of cooperative action in society and history: i

llective action of



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dividuals as a self-conscious community of interdependence for the sake oeating the sociohistorical conditions of human existence under theorizonitself historically conditionedof what transcends history, the problemitude, mortality, and final salvation.

this sense the problem of liberation is not something superimposed on th

oblem of action from outside but an intrinsic necessity of the latter. Themand for liberation arises out of oppressive social relations and structures

hich obstruct the actualization of humane existence and which could berceived as oppressive only by subjects of action in society, and implicitlyfirms the common value and dignity of human beings as attributes whichanscend the instrumental values of oppressive structures for those who prom them. Liberation can become actual only through political action whichualizes the social power of one individual or group over another by anuitable distribution of the material embodiments of power, freeing thehere of culture for its own intrinsic ends from the alien encroachments of

oth economic and political power. Liberation thus presupposes a communiaction with a sense of collective agency, responsibility, and destiny. It alsesupposes sensitivity to the dialectic of shifting power arrangements inncrete history, in which it must locate the source of oppression and in whmust discern the real possibilities of social transformation. To liberate is to

otest against a given historical status quo and to transform it within its rethough concealed or not perceived, possiblities, not to transcend all histor

e concept of actionin the Hegelian sense of Begriff, the intelligible structuaction as actus exercitus, not merely as a bare 'idea,' something merelyought aboutthus brings together all the essential dimensions of humanistence in their historical concreteness and dialectical tensions. It keepsgether transcendence and history; thought and reality; interiority and

teriority; intentions and consequences; subjectivity and objectivity; persod social existence; the facticity of the past and the demands of the futureateriality and spirituality; oppression and liberation; the existential problemfinitude, mortality, and sin; and the social problems of poverty, opressiond liberation in history. It does so intrinsically and simultaneously, nottrinsically or purely factually, and thus avoids the traditional dualisms and

agmentations of existence, not by denying the importance of the dimensiomphasized in the tradition but by integrating them into the context of livedaxis in which they originate, in which they become concrete, and for the



which they fulfill their properly human function. Apart from this conceretetality of lived praxis, subjectivity, inwardness, transcendence, and reasoncome angelic, no longer human, attributes; they slide into subjectivism,

teriorism, transcendentalism, and rationalism, so many routes of escape fre burdens and responsibilities of lived human existence; and 'history' andociety' become unintelligible as human history and society. From therspective of the concrete totality of praxis, the cardinal sin of anthropolog

ould be "reification"i.e., considering a



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rticular dimension in isolation from its place in and its inner, dialecticalation to the totality, absolutizing it as sufficient unto itself, and thusnaturing it as human reality and dehumanizing the human subject of thetality both in thought and ultimately in practice.

is this anthropology of concrete totality, formulated here all too briefly, w

argue must be the anthropological foundation or correlative of all theologirmeneutics if theology is to remain truly human and humane, not a subtlsguised angelic and dehumanizing theology. Elaborated more systematicad with its implications for theology spelled out, without its actual integrat

to the elaboration of particular theological topics, such a theology would a what I earlier meant by 'foundational theology.' By foundational theologyrtainly do not mean 'foundationalism' in the epistemological sense, thesically Cartesian search for an indubitable, presuppositionless, absolutelyior epistemological basis and starting point from which all else could logic derived, which would not be humanly possible if humans are concretetalities with a built-in hermeneutic circle. Nor do I mean 'fundamentaleology' in the traditional sense, a philosophical discipline that deals with teambula fidei, the rational demonstration of God's existence and themortality of the human soul, the credibility of revelation, and the extrinsicman basis of faith, which remains both preliminary and external to dogm

eology proper. I use 'foundational' in the sense of Bernard Lonergan andancis Fiorenza, for whom "foundations present, not doctrines, but the horthin which the meaning of doctrines can be apprehended." 10

at is, foundational theology is foundational in the sense that it elaboratessic horizon that governs the interpretation of particular dogmas and raiserther questions about existing interpretations. It is both intrinsic to andnstitutive of the very content of dogmatic theology and is transcendent a

gulative of its ongoing elaboration. The initial hermeneutic option is notmething that occurs at the beginning of theological construction and then

mply left behind, as is traditional fundamental theology, as that constructiogresses. It continues, implicitly or explicitly, to exercise both a "constitutd a "regulative" (Kant) function for the subsequent phases of theologicalflection and thus infects the whole of theology, both its content and itsrection. In this sense the choice of a basic horizon is a matter of decisiveportance for all theologies. To put my argument thus far in another way,en, much traditional and contemporary theologizing is inadequate, among



her reasons, precisely because its anthropological horizon is inadequate. Aequate dogmatic or systematic theology must be based on a foundationaeology whose basic horizon includes an anthropology of concrete totality.

dogmatic theology proceeding against the horizon of concrete totality woways ask about the conditions of possibility, meaning, and demands of articular dogma (God, Trinity, Christ, sin, salvation, grace, church,

craments, and so on) in and for the human subject to whom the dogma



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dressed and who is to be taken as a concrete totality. What does 'God'or lvation, gracemean for and demand of a human being who has to make aing, live with her or his fellows, and search for meaning and value underncrete historical conditions, suffering their contradictions in the mostncrete way and screaming for liberation from such contradictions? From t

ry beginning, this sort of dogmatic theology of concrete totality would enjbuiltin antidote against the dualisms and reifying fragmentation of humanistence often perpetuated in the name of Christian faith. Theology of eration, as elaborated and interpreted in this book, already demonstrates

otential of a dogmatic theology of concrete totality. I have tried to show h anthropology of concrete totality guides its reconstruction of the veryethod of theology, the conceptions of God, faith, sin, and salvation, as webiblical hermeneutics.



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otes

hapter One

On the theological problem of pluralism, see David Tracy, The Analogical

magination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York:ossroad, 1981) and Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hopan Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987); also Claude Geffre et al. (eds.),

oncilium 171 (January 1984) ("Different Theologies, Common Responsibilabel or Pentecost?").

On the dialectic of essence and history, the universal and the particular, nd Ernst Troeltsch's essay still one of the most succinct and profound

atements; see his essay, "What Does the 'Essence of Christianity' Mean?" nst Troeltsch, Writings on Theology and Religion, translated and edited bobert Morgan and Michael Pye (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1977), pp. 124or a recent discussion of the theological implications of modern historicalnsciousness, see Trutz Rendtorff, "The Modern Age as a Chapter in thestory of Christianity; or, The Legacy of Historical Consciousness in Presentheology," Journal of Religion 65:4 (October 1985), 47899.

For a discussion of the criteria for Christian theology, see Schubert Ogdeith and Freedom: Towards a Theology of Liberation (Nashville: Abingdoness, 1979), pp. 267, 467, 1223, and his essay, "The Concept of a TheoloLiberation: Must a Christian Theology Today Be So Conceived?" in Brian

ahan and L. Dale Richesin (eds.), The Challenge of Liberation TheologyMaryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981), pp. 1323.

Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, with Vittorio Messori, The Ratzinger Report, t

lvator Attanasio and Graham Harrison (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press985), p. 175.

Ibid., pp. 1767.

For an overview of conservative critiques of liberation theology, see Ronaash (ed.), Liberation Theology (Milford, MI: Mott Media, 1984), whichntains articles by, among others, Michael Novak, James V. Schall, Edward

orman, Carl F. H. Henry, and Richard John Neuhaus. For a sympathetic butical account of theology of liberation from the Latin American evangelica



erspective, see Emilio A. Nunez, Liberation Theology, translated by Paul E.ywulka (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1985). For a conservative Protestanttique, see Gerard Berghoef and Lester DeKoster, Liberation Theology: Th

hurch's Future Shock (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian's Library Press, 1984);



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for a critique by a conservative Catholic ecclesiastic, see BonaventureKloppenburg, The People's Church: A Defense of My Church (Chicago, ILFranciscan Herald Press, 1978). For a critique from the Europeanperspective, see Johann Baptist Metz (ed.), Die Theologie der Befreiung:Hoffnung oder Gefahr für die Kirche? (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1986),

especially the articles by Peter Ehlen and Walter Kasper. For an excellentintroduction and survey of theology of liberation, see Phillip Berryman,Liberation Theology (Oak Park, IL: Meyer Stone Books, 1987); also RoberMcAfee Brown, Theology in a New Key (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Pr1978), and Rebecca S. Chopp, The Praxis of Suffering: An InterpretationLiberation and Political Theologies (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986).

See Schubert Ogden, Faith and Freedom (cited earlier) and The Point ofhristology (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982).

See the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Instruction on Certaspects of the 'Theology of Liberation'," Origins 14:13 (September 13, 198494-204; all references in parentheses in this chapter are to this documentction and paragraph.

Juan Luis Segundo, Theology and the Church, translated by John W.erckmeier (New York: Winston Press, 1985), p. 13.

0. Ibid., p. 14.

1. Ibid., p. 66.

2. Ibid., pp. 6885.

3. On the difference between theology of liberation and political theology, ancis Fiorenza, "Liberation Theology and Political Theology," in ThomascFadden (ed.), Liberation, Revolution and Freedom: Theological Perspecti

ew York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 329, and Chopp, The Praxis of Suffering.

4. For example, on the nature and method of theology in Aquinas, see Yveongar, History of Theology, translated by Hunter Guthrie (Garden City, NJoubleday, 1968), pp. 91114; Marie Dominique Chenu, Is Theology aience?, translated by A. H. N. Green-Armytage (New York: Hawthorn Boo

959), pp. 4896; Per Erik Persson, Sacra Doctrina: Reason and Revelation quinas, translated by Ross Mackenzie (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press,

970).



5. On the controversy of whether Catholic social doctrine is deadoccasioney M. D. Chenu's critique of social doctrine as ideologyand on John Paul II'tempt to revive it, see Peter Hebblethwaite, "The Popes and Politics: Shiftterns in 'Catholic Social Doctrine'," Daedalus 111:1 (Winter 1982): 8599

hapter Two

For a review of the relation between Christianity and Marxism, see Fernaastillo, "Die Christen und der Marxismus: Ein Problem mit Geschichte," ineter Rottländer (ed.), Theologie der Befreiung und der Marxismus (Münstedition Liberacion, 1986), pp. 2336. All translations from this book are mine



Page

For a recent discussion of this issue, see the special issue of Journal of umenical Studies, 22:3 (Summer 1985), which is devoted to the questionhether atheism is essential to Marxism. See also Arthur F. McGovern,arxism: An American Christian Perspective (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1980)p. 24577, and René Coste, Marxist Analysis and Christian Faith (Maryknoll

Y: Orbis Books, 1985), pp. 2763. For a most recent study of the Marxian vreligion, see David McLellan, Marxism and Religion (New York: Harper & ow, 1987).

For a history of the attitudes of recent Popes towards Marxism, see ChrisGudorf, Catholic Social Teaching on Liberation Themes (Washington, DC

niversity Press of America, 1981), pp. 167248; McGovern, Marxism, pp.0131.

All references in parentheses in this chapter are references, by section aaragraph, to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, ''Instruction oertain Aspects of the 'Theology of Liberation'," dated August 6, 1984 andublished in Origins 14:13 (September 13, 1984): 194204.

See Quentin L. Quade (ed.), The Pope and Revolution (Washington, DC:hics and Public Policy Center, 1982), pp. 789.

See Anselm Min, "John Paul II's Anthropology of Concrete Totality," in thoceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 58 (1984):

2029.

The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Pastoral Letter on Marxistommunism (Washington, DC: U. S. Catholic Conference, 1980), p. 9.

On the use of Marxism in John Paul II's Laborem Exercens, see Gregoryaum, The Priority of Labor (New York: Paulist Press, 1982); Yves Ledure,

'encyclique de Jean-Paul II sur le travail humain," Nouvelle Revueheologique 105:2 (MarchApril 1983); 22627; John F. Kavanaugh, "The Moalectic of Laborem Exercens," Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annualonvention of the Jesuit Philosophical Association (April 1984): 1727; Clodooff, "Die ambivalente Haltung der 'Instruktion zur Theologie der Befreiungegenüber dem Marxismus," in Rottländer, Theologie, p. 115.

Quoted in Jose Porfirio Miranda, Marx and the Bible (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis

ooks, 1971), xiii.



0. See Enrique Dussel, History and the Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, rbis Books, 1976), pp. 13537.

. On the relation between theology and philosophy, see Karl Rahner,heological Investigations, VI (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1969), 7181,

(New York: Seabury Press, 1972), 2863.

2. Quoted in Boff, p. 112.

3. See Clodovis and Leonardo Boff, The National Catholic Reporter (Augus8, 1987), pp. 14 and 2325, where the Boffs criticize the U.S. bishops forcking a sense of "class" conflict, the "structural" defect of capitalism, and eed for "political" action.

4. Giulio Girardi, "Die Gegenwärtigen Auseinandersetzungen um Marxismuheologie der Befreiung und 'Kirche des Volkes'," in Rottländer, Theologie,

28.



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5. Ibid., pp. 12729.

6. For a critique of the Vatican's monolithic conception of Marxism, see ibip. 13137.

7. For right-wing criticisms of the "Marxism" of liberation theology, see Daee, "'Christian Marxists': A Critique," in Quade, The Pope and Revolution,

746; Gerard Berghoef and Lester DeKoster, Liberation Theology: Thehurch's Future Shock (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian's Library Press, 1984), 970; Bonaventure Kloppenburg, The People's Church: A Defense of Myhurch (Chicago, IL: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), p. 95.

8. Girardi, op. cit., p. 130.

9. Ignacio Ellacuria, "Theologie der Befreiung und Marxismus: Grundlegen

eflexionen," in Rottländer, p. 97.0. Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbooks, 1983), pp. 62 and 147 respectively.

. Hugo Assmann, Theology for a Nomad Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Bo976), p. 55.

2. See Gutierrez, p. 69; his A Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis

ooks, 1973), p. 238; and Dussel, p. 143.3. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 177.

4. See Juan Luis Segundo, Faith and Ideologies (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Boo984), pp. 14042.

5. This is based on Jose Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists (Grandapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976), pp. 9194, and Clodovis Boff, "Zum Gebrauch

es 'Marxismus' in der Theologie der Befreiung: Einige Thesen," in Rottländheologie, pp. 3740.

6. For a contemporary account of the concept of "concrete totality," see Kosik, Dialectics of the Concrete (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976); my review,arel Kosik, The Dialectics of the Concrete," The New Scholasticism 55:2pring 1981): 24754; Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality (Berkeley, CA:niversity of California Press, 1984).

7. On the relation between the economic base and the ideological



perstructure, see Michael Harrington, The Twilight of Capitalism (New Yomon and Schuster, 1976), pp. 6082; John McMurtry, The Structure of Maorld-View (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 157239.

8. Miguez Bonino, p. 92.

9. Ibid.

0. Ibid., p. 93.. See Gutierrez, Theology, p. 10.



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2. My presentation here is based on Ellacuria, pp. 8894. This article contaproposition-by-proposition response to the Vatican's 1984 Instruction.

3. See Clodovis Boff in Rottländer, pp. 3944; see also ibid., p. 34 (Castillo)p. 5059 (Gutierrez), pp. 9496 (Ellacuria), and pp. 12930 (Girardi); alsoudorf, p. 172.

4. See Gutierrez, "Theologie und Sozialwissenschaften: Einertsbestimmung," in Rottländer, p. 52; see also ibid., pp. 12729 (Girardi) a96 (Ellacuria).

5. On my interpretation of Hegel with responses to the usual objections toegel (atheism, pantheism, rationalism, and so on), see my articles, as folloegel on the Foundation of Religion," International Philosophical Quarterly

4:1 (March 1974): 7999; "Hegel's Absolute: Transcendent or Immanent?"urnal of Religion 56:1 (January 1976): 6187; ''Hegel's Retention of Mystea Theological Category," CLIO 12:4 (Summer 1983): 33353; "The Trinity

nd the Incarnation: Hegel and Classical Approaches," Journal of Religion 6pril 1986); 17393.

6. For an exposition of Hegel's dialectic, see the preface in hishenomenology of Spirit and the last chapter ("The Absolute Idea") of hisience of Logic. Since this is not a book on Hegel, I do not want to cite the

umerous commentaries on the Hegelian dialectic.

7. For a recent discussion of the theological meaning of politics in Hegel, sdger Oeing-Hanhoff, "Das Christentum als 'Religion der Freiheit,'"

heologischer Quartalschrift 164:1 (1984): 1634, and Paul Lakeland, Theolitics of Salvation: The Hegelian Idea of the State (Albany, NY: SUNY Pres984).

hapter ThreeFor a history of the concepts of theory and praxis, see Nicholas Lobkowic

heory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx (Notre Damniversity of Notre Dame Press, 1967); Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Actontemporary Philosophies of Human Activity (Philadelphia, PA: University oennsylvania Press, 1971); and Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practiceoston, MA: Beacon Press, 1973). On the significance of praxis for

ntemporary theology, see Dermot A. Lane, Foundations for a Social



heology: Praxis, Process and Salvation (New York: Paulist Press, 1984). Fopology of the relation between theory and praxis in contemporary Christiaeology, see Matthew Lamb, "The Theory-Praxis Relationship in Contempohristian Theologies," Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of merica 31 (1976): pp. 14978.

Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,

973), p. 13.Ibid.; my emphasis.

See the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Instruction on Certaspects of the 'Theology of Liberation'," Origins 14:13 (September 13, 198494204. All references in the body of this chapter are to this document byction and paragraph.



Page

This fear of "classism" in theology of liberation is also shared by James Mustafson, Ethics From a Theocentric Perspective, I (Chicago, IL: Universityhicago Press, 1981), p. 74.

For an evaluation of Ogden's "more adequate" alternative to theology of eration, see my article, "How Not to Do a Theology of Liberation: A Critiq

Schubert Ogden," The Journal of the American Academy of Religionorthcoming).

Schubert Ogden, Faith and Freedom: Toward a Theology of Liberationashville: Abingdon Press, 1979), p. 33.

Ibid., p. 34.

Ibid., p. 33.

0. Ibid., p. 116.

1. Ibid., p, 117.

2. Ibid., p. 118.

3. Ibid., p. 120.

4. Ibid., pp. 11921.

5. See ibid., p. 123.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ogden, "The Concept of a Theology of Liberation: Must a Christianheology Today Be so Conceived?" in Brian Mahan and L. Dale Richesin (edhe Challenge of Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981), p

31.

9. Ibid., pp. 13132.

0. Ibid., p. 134.

. Ogden, Faith, p. 123.

2. See Ogden, in Mahan and Richesin, p. 134.

3. On the distinction between "explicit" and "implicit" witness of Christian



tness, see Ogden, Faith, p. 60.

4. Ibid., p. 124.

5. Dennis P. McCann and Charles R. Strain, Polity and Praxis: A Program fmerican Practical Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Winston Press, 1985; Aeabury Book), p. 54.

6. See ibid., pp. 3, 5, 9, 16, 40, 43.7. Ibid., p. 4.



Page

8. Ibid., p. 9.

9. For a discussion and evaluation of Habermas from the perspective of actical theology, see Charles Davis, Theology and Political Societyambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 79103.

0. McCann and Strain, Polity, p. 36.

1. Ibid., p. 25.

2. Ibid., p. 14.

3. See ibid.

4. Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbooks, 1983), p. 42. The quotation is from Johann B. Metz, Theology of the

orld (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), p. 112.5. Gutierrez, Power, p. 60; my emphasis.

6. Clodovis Boff, Theology and Praxis (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), 8.

7. Ibid.

8. For a critique of the intellectualist conception of salvation, faith, and

velation, see ibid., pp. 105107 and 116.

9. Ibid., p. 38.

0. Ibid.

1. Ibid.

2. Jon Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books

984), p. 74; also, pp. 73 and 28283.3. Clodovis Boff, Theology, p. 203.

4. Gutierrez, Power, p. 60.

5. Ibid., p. 17.

6. Boff, Theology, p. 37.

7. Ibid., p. 39. On the problem of the absolute and relative, the universal articular in faith and the necessity of concretization of faith, see Juan Luis



egundo, The Liberation of Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976), p7124 ("Ideologies and Faith") and 15482 ("Ideologies and Relativity").

8. On the autonomy of theology and its critical mediation of faith, see furtodovis Boff, Theology, pp. 10914; Gutierrez, Theology, p. 12.

9. Boff, Theology, p. 40. On the transcendent dimension of theology, seerther pp. 3841.



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0. Boff's Theology and Praxis was originally the author's doctoral dissertatiesented at Louvain in 1976, and was translated into English only in 1987gret the ten-year delay between the dissertation and the translation. If it

een translated in the 1970s, I think it would have gone a long way towardeventing many of the misunderstandings of TL in the English-speaking wo

his extremely fine work, rich with relevant distinctions and sophisticatedalyses, would have silenced many of the charges of methodologicalnocence and conceptual confusion often hurled at TL. As should be clearom the notes in this chapter, I am heavily indebted to Boff for much of thscussion.

1. Ibid., p. 159.

2. Ibid., pp. 16061.

3. See ibid., pp. 15962.

4. Ibid., p. 166.

5. See ibid., pp. 16264.

6. Ibid., p. 165.

7. Ibid., p. 167.

8. See ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 176.

0. See further ibid., pp. 17677.

. See ibid., p. 182. Boff here makes an important distinction betweenelevance" and "pertinency." The first is a category of the relationship of eory with praxis, of knowledge with power, of a theory with a given histor

oblematic. The second is a category of the intratheoretical relation of auestion with a given theoretical problematic.

2. See ibid., pp. 18284.

3. Ibid., p. 187.

4. Ibid., p. 190.

5. Ibid.



6. Ibid., p. 191.7. Gutierrez, Power, p. 91.

8. Ibid., p. 213.

9. See G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. KnOxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 11.

0. See Gutierrez, Power, p. 93.

1. Ibid., p. 66.



Page

2. Hegel, Philosophy, p. 11.

3. See Gutierrez, Theology, pp. 12, 14, and Power, pp. 16, 61, 65; alsoonardo Boff, Liberating Grace (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1979), p. 80.

4. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 32.

5. See Gutierrez, Theology, p. 11; see further Charles Davis, "Theology anaxis," Cross Currents 23:2 (Summer 1973): 15468; and Jon Sobrino'suminating comparative discussion of the theoretical orientation of traditionuropean theology and the practical orientation of Latin American theology s The True Church and the Poor (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984), pp.38, and "Theologisches Erkennen in der europäischen und derteinamerikanischen Theologie," in Karl Rahner (ed.), Befreiende Theologie

Mainz: Kohlhammer, 1977), pp. 12343.

6. See Jon Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads (Maryknoll, NY: Orbisooks, 1978), xxi and p. 13; Roger Haight, An Alternative Vision: Anterpretation of Liberation Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), pp.

356.


8. See Sobrino, Christology, p. 22; Hugo Assmann, Theology for a Nomadhurch (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976), p. 121; Clodovis Boff, Theology0.

9. Clodovis Boff, Theology, p. 40.

0. For a brief account of the historical reality of Latin America, see Rebecchopp, The Praxis of Suffering (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), pp. 814nrique Dussel, History and the Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbi

ooks, 1976), pp. 75109.. Gutierrez, Power, p. 197.

2. Ibid., p. 58.

3. Ibid., p. 44.

4. Ibid.; on the change of perspective brought about by the experience ofoverty, see further Sobrino, True Church, pp. 12559 ("The Experience of G

the Church of the Poor").



5. See Sören Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated byavid F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pr941), p. 296.

6. See Gutierrez, Power, p. 103, and Theology, p. 14.

7. Clodovis Boff, Theology, p. 169.

8. Ibid.9. See ibid., pp. 17071.

0. Ibid., p. 171.



Page

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 173.

3. My presentation here is based on Juan Carlos Scannone, "Das Theorie-axis Verhältnis in der Theologie der Befreiung," in Rahner (ed.), pp. 7796milar but simpler account of the three levels of liberation theology,ofessional, pastoral, and popular, is given in Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Btroducing Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), pp. 11

4. See further Dussel, p. 148.

5. See Boff, Theology, pp. 2024.

6. Ibid., pp. 245.

7. See ibid., pp. 267.8. See ibid., pp. 279.

9. Ibid., p. 29.

00. Ibid., p. 30.

01. Ibid., p. 25.

02. Ibid., p. 30.03. Ibid., p. 31.

04. Ibid.

05. For a similar view, see Gutierrez, "Theologie und Sozialwissenschaft: ertsbestimmung," in Peter Rottländer (ed.), Theologie der Befreiung und darxismus (Munster: Edition Liberacion, 1986), pp. 5558.

06. See Boff, Theology, pp. 5155.

07. See ibid., pp. 5760.

08. See ibid., pp. 6061.


0. On the Biblical foundation of theology of liberation and liberationist

ermeneutics, see Norman K. Gottwald (ed.), The Bible and Liberation: Pold Social Hermeneutics (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983); also his The



ibes of Yahweh (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1979); Walter Brueggemannope Within History (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1987); Fernando Belo, aterialist Reading of the Gospel of Mark (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981chel Clevenot, Materialist Approaches to the Bible (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis

ooks, 1985); Walter E. Pilgrim, Good News to the Poor (Minneapolis, MN:ugsburg Publishing House, 1981); Juan Luis Segundo, The Historical Jesue Synoptics (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985) and The Humanist

hristology of Paul (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986); Jose Porfirio Mirandarx and the Bible



eologians. See Segundo, Liberation p. 117; Gutierrez, Theology, p. 226, aower p. 4; Rosemary Radford Ruether, To Change the World: Christology ultural Criticism (New York: Crossroad, 1985), pp. 718; Sobrino, True Chup. 21727.

26. C. Boff, Theology, p. 149.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 150.




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30. Segundo, Liberation, p. 8.

31. Ibid., p. 9.

32. This is in response to Gregory Baum's sympathetic critique of Segundoermeneutic circle; see Gregory Baum, "The Theological Method of Segundhe Liberation of Theology," Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Societymerica 32 (1977): 12024. See also Segundo's more recent elaboration of ermeneutic circle in his Historical Jesus, pp. 3239.

33. See Dorothee Sölle's critique of Bultmann in her Political Theologyhiladelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1974) and Johann Metz's critique of Karl

ahner in his Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamentalheology (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), pp., 6264, 15766.

34. I elaborate on this criticism in my article, "How Not to Do a Theology oberation: A Critique of Schubert Ogden," Journal of the American Academeligion (forthcoming).

35. See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to theociology of Knowledge, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (Nework: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936; a Harvest Book), pp. 14763.

36. This is no place to discuss the relative weight of class, race, and gendfactors of oppression, but it seems clear, without reducing the racial and

xual differences to purely economic terms, that both racism and sexismcrease their historical weight and social significance as modes of oppressioecisely because of their economic origin and expression, with all its dialecnsequences at the political and cultural levels. Should all the races and sejoy real, not merely formal, economic equality, and acquire real, not mere

gal, equality of opportunity for political and cultural self-expression, both

cism and sexism would certainly lose much of their significance as socialsues. Economic oppression is a kind of "infrastructural" expression of all otrms of oppression. Furthermore, as the Boff brothers point out, in a class-vided society the struggle between economic classes remains the "main"rm of struggle because it embodies an ''antagonistic" contradiction that c

e resolved only if each would cease to be what it is in the relationship, i.e.nly if the exploiter would cease to exploit and the exploited cease to beploited, i.e., only if the wealthy would cease to be wealthy and the poor

ase to be poor, whereas sexism and racism are "nonantagonistic"



ntradictions that could be resolved without women ceasing to be womenthout blacks ceasing to be black. See Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff,troducing, pp. 2830.

37. On the Biblical and explicitly Marxian basis of the hermeneutical privilethe oppressed, see Lee Cormie, "The Hermeneutical Privilege of the

ppressed: Liberation Theologies, Biblical Faith, and Marxist Sociology of

nowledge," Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 33978): 15581.

38. In an illuminating discussion Karl Mannheim distinguishes "relationismom "relativism," and tries to show how sociology of knowledge is the logictension of the classical bipolar conception of human knowledge to thethropology of human existence conceived as a historical totality. See hiseology and Utopia, pp. 7879, 8487.



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39. See further Clodovis Boff, Theology, pp. 20620.

40. McCann and Strain, Polity, pp. 4950.

41. For a trenchant critique of Habermas on this point, see Rudiger Bubneabermas's Concept of Critical Theory," in John B. Thompson et al. (eds.),

abermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1982), pp. 42

42. For a further critique of "pluralism" in a divided church and a dividedorld, see Sobrino, True Church, pp. 194227.

hapter Four

Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Liberation Theology: From Confrontatioalogue, translated by Robert R. Barr (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row,

986), pp. 1314.See Ibid., pp. 2425.

See "Instruction on Certain Aspects of the 'Theology of Liberation'," issuey the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and dated August 6, 1984llow the English version published in Origins 14:13 (September 13, 1984)

94204. All references in parentheses in this chapter are to this text accordsection and paragraph.

See Joseph Ratzinger, Politik und Erlösung (Opladen, Westdeutscher Ver986), pp. 736.

Ibid., p. 16 (my translation).

See ibid., pp. 1617.

See ibid., pp. 1820.

See ibid., pp. 2021.Stanley Hauerwas, "Some Theological Reflections on Gutierrez's Use of beration' as a Theological Concept," Modern Theology 3:1 (October 1986

9.

0. Ibid., p. 76.

. John B. Cobb, Jr., Process Theology as Political Theology (Philadelphia,

estminster Press, 1982), p. 126.



2. Ibid., p. 132.3. Ibid., p. 117. Basically the same charge of "anthropocentrism" oromocentrism" resulting in the instrumentalizing exploitation of nature isared by Schubert M. Ogden, Faith and Freedom: Toward a Theology of beration (Nashville, IN: Abingdon, 1979), pp. 97124. Ogden directs thearge explicitly against the theologies of liberation.

4. Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Liberation Theology, p. 20.5. Ibid., p. 21.



Page

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbooks, 1983), p. 69.

9. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), 38.

0. Enrique Dussel, History and the Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY:rbis Books, 1976), p. 143.

. Ignacio Ellacuria, Freedom Made Flesh: The Mission of Christ and Hishurch Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976),p. 108.

2. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 35.3. Ibid., pp. 1756.

4. Ibid., p. 263.

5. Ibid., p. 176.

6. Ibid., p. 177.

7. The relationship between salvation and liberation is a contemporary varn the classical issue of the relation between nature and grace, an issue Innot go into here. On the history of this issue, see Henri de Lubac, Theystery of the Supernatural, translated by Rosemary Sheed (New York: Hend Herder, 1967); Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, IV, translated evin Smyth (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1966), pp. 165188 ("Nature anrace"); Gutierrez, Theology, pp. 4572; Juan Luis Segundo, Grace and theuman Condition, translated by John Drury (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,

973), pp. 6274; Leonardo Boff, Liberating Grace, translated by John DruryMaryknoll: Orbis Books, 1979), pp. 3946; Edward Yarnold, The Second Gifudy of Grace (Slough, England: St. Paul Publications, 1974).

8. In a doctrine not widely recognized, the later Barth also holds the basicegelian theory that the "true" infinity and freedom of God requires not onlat God is not finite but also that God has the power to transcend his ownanscendence and "overreach" the finite in creation, redemption, and

ovidence. See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/2, translated by G. T.



hompson and H. Knight (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956), pp. 3132; 2/1,anslated by Parker, Johnston, Knight, and Haire (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,957), pp. 298305, 465468; The Humanity of God (Atlanta, GA: John Knoxess, 1960), pp. 4852.

9. On Rahner's ontologically oriented theology of the symbol, see hisheological Investigations, 4, translated by Kevin Smyth (Baltimore, MD:

elicon Press, 1966), pp. 221252 ("The Theology of the Symbol"). I am nourse, arguing here that Hegel's theology as a whole is compatible with thormative tradition of Christian faith, which is a separate issue. I am fullyware of the traditional objections to Hegel on the part of the existentialist homist theologians, although I am not convinced that their



Page

objections are based on an accurate understanding of Hegel. I amconcerned here only with the Hegelian Denkform which I think underliesthat of TL. On my interpretation of Hegel, see Chapter 2, n. 35.

0. Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books983), p. 4; emphasis added.

. Jon Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads ((Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books978), p. 391; emphasis added.

2. Gutierrez, Power p. 7.

3. Ibid.; emphasis added.

4. Ibid., p. 13; emphasis added.

5. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 168.6. Ellacuria, p. 27.

7. Sobrino, Christology, p. 352; also p. 352; also p. 275. On the importancthe "historical Jesus" in Latin American Christology, see further Sobrino,sus in Latin America ((Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), p. 5577.

8. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 151; emphasis added.

9. Ibid., p. 168; emphases added.


. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 177; emphasis added.

2. Leonardo Boff, "Salvation in Jesus Christ and the Process of Liberation,"oncilium 96 (1974): 89 (emphasis added).

3. Ibid., p. 88.4. Juan Luis Segundo, Faith and Ideologies ((Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,984), p. 129.



7. Ibid., p. 237.

8. Segundo, Grace, pp. 9596.



9. Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,984), pp. 73, 74, and 283.

0. See Juan Carlos Scannone, "Das Theorie-Praxis Verhältnis in der Theoloer Befreiung," in Karl Rahner (ed.), Befreiende Theologie (Mainz:ohlhammer, 1977), p. 82.



Page

. Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, Liberation Theology, pp. 2425.

2. Gutierrrez, Theology, p. 153; also Power, p. 31; emphasis added.


4. Ibid.

5. See Gutierrez, Theology, pp. 3637; Leonardo Boff, Liberating Grace, pp980; Scannone, p. 79.

6. On the significance of the Enlightenment in TL, see Gutierrez, Theologyp. 2832; Sobrino, Christology, p. 19; and True Church, pp. 1015. On thefference between liberation and development and a critique of the ideologdevelopment, see Gutierrez, Theology, pp. 2627, 3637 and 8284.

7. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 146.8. See ibid.

9. See ibid. p. 33.

0. See ibid. pp. 36, 146, 23536; Boff, Liberating Grace, pp. 7980.

. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 32.

2. Ibid. p. 231.3. Ibid., p. 35.

4. Boff, Liberating Grace, p. 155.


6. See Sobrino, Jesus, pp. 1929; Gutierrez, Power, pp. 9596.

7. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 234.8. This dichotomy, opposing personal freedom and mechanistic necessity,hics and history, seems characteristic of Ratzinger's thought as a whole. Ss "Freedom and Liberation: the Anthrological Vision of the Instructionibertatis Conscientia'," Communio 14 (Spring 1987): 5657, 70.

9. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 153; emphasis added.

0. Ibid., pp. 15, 21314, 233, 237.



1. Ibid., pp. 234 and 217.2. See Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes: Zur Grundlegung einereligionsphilosophie, edited by Johann Baptist Metz (Munich: Kösel Verlag,963).

3. See Gutierrez, Theology, pp. 23638; Leonardo Boff, Liberating Grace, p980, 153; and Scannone, p. 83.



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4. Gutierrez, Theology, pp. 221 and 236; also see Scannone, "Das Theorieaxis Verhältnis," pp. 7980.


6. Ibid., p. 177.

7. Gutierrez, Power p. 63.8. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 145.

9. Ibid., p. 23132.

0. Ibid., p. 35.

1. Ibid., p. 36.

2. Ibid., p. 176.3. Ibid., p. 177.

4. Ibid., p. 160.

5. Ibid., p. 238.

6. Segundo Galilea, "Liberation as an Encounter with Politics andontemplation," Concilium 96 (1974): 22.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 165.

0. Ibid., p. 237.

1. Ibid., pp. 238239.

2. See Scannone, pp. 8283.

3. Gutierrez, "Liberation, Theology and Proclamation," Concilium, 96 (197473.

4. See further Scannone, p. 85.

5. On the importance of effective means and method ("ideology") for faithelf, see Segundo, Faith, pp. 12030.



6. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 157.7. Ibid.

8. Gutierrez, Power, pp. 910; emphasis added.

9. Segundo, Grace, p. 128; emphasis added. For different approaches to tterpretation of the Exodus, see the special issue of Concilium, 189 (Febru987), entitled "ExodusA Lasting Paradigm," and Michael Walzer, Exodus a

evolution (New York: Basic Books, 1985).



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00. See Gutierrez, Theology, p. 37.

01. See Leonardo Boff, Liberating Grace, pp. 8082.

02. See Scannone, pp. 8183.

03. See Segundo, Grace p. 38.

04. Ibid.

05. For a further discussion of this basic "sociality" of human existence andpplication to the theology of sin and grace, see ibid., pp. 3739; Boff,berating Grace, pp. 825, 28, 8486, 124127, 141143.

06. See Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (New Haven: Yale University Press952), pp. 4063.



09. Ibid., p. 147.

0. Leonardo Boff, "Salvation in Jesus Christ and the Process of Liberationoncilium 96 (1974): 88.

1. Gutierrez, Theology, p. 35.2. Gutierrez, Power, p. 47.

3. Segundo, Grace, p, 39.

4. Boff, Liberating Grace, p. 153; see also Ellacuria, p. 106.

5. See Jose Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists (Grand Rapids, MI:erdmans, 1976), p. 93.


7. Ibid.; see further Segundo, The Historical Jesus of the SynopticsMaryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985), pp. 8085, 17888.

8. Sobrino, Christology, pp. 39192; emphasis added.

9. For an interpretation of the meaning of ministry and authority within a

olitical ecclesiology of concrete totality, see Leonardo Boff, Ecclesiogenesishe Base Communities Reinvent the Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,



986), pp. 6198.

20. For a critique of existentialism on this point, see Georg Lukacs, Marxismnd Human Liberation (New York: Dell, 1973), pp. 243266; and Theodor Wdorno, The Jargon of Authenticity (Evanston, IL: Northwestern Universityess, 1973).

21. Joseph Ratzinger, "Freedom and Liberation," p. 61.

22. Cobb, p. 128.



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23. See Karl Marx, The Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, editey Dirk J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 139.

24. Cobb, p. 128.

25. Boff, Liberation Theology, p. 22.

26. See Gutierrez, Theology, p. 173; Joseph Comblin, "Freedom andberation as Theological Concepts," Concilium 96 (1974): 96.


28. This and the preceding quotation is from Segundo, "Capitalism-SocialiTheological Crux," Concillium 96 (1974): 123.

29. Ellacuria, p. 106.


31. Alvaro Barreiro, Basic Ecclesial Communities (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Boo982), p. 32.

32. Ellacuria, pp. 104 and 105.

33. See Dussel, p. 170, and Sobrino, True Church, pp. 18592.

hapter FiveFor an account of Leonardo Boff's relationship with the Vatican, see hisummons to Rome: A Personal Testimony" in Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Bberation Theology (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986), pp. 7591. For ascinating recent account of the controversy between Boff and Josephardinal Ratzinger and an evaluation of the controversy from an ecclesiologerspective, see Harvey Cox, The Silencing of Leonardo Boff: The Vatican a

e Future of World Christianity (Oak Park, IL: Meyer Stone Books, 1988).See respectively the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,

nstruction on Certain Aspects of the 'Theology of Liberation'," Origins 14:eptember 13, 1984), and "Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberatioatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1986). In this chapter I use the

bbreviations LN and LC from their respective Latin titles, Libertatis Nuntiusnd Libertatis Conscientia. All references in the body of this chapter are to

ese two instructions by section and paragraph (LN) or by paragraph (LC)



Page

Peter Hebblethwaite, The National Catholic Reporter (May 9, 1986), p. 6

Ibid., p. 14.

Ibid.; emphasis added.

Ibid.

Ibid. The same stringent qualifications for acceptable theology of liberatiere stated by Pope John Paul II in his March 13, 1986 address to a meetiBrazilian bishops at the Vatican; see Origins 15:42 (April 3, 1986), 6846

s recently as his May 1988 visit to Peru, he also warned of the errors of soeologies of liberation and told a closed-door meeting of Peru's fifty-threeshops to adhere closely to the two Vatican Instructions; see National Catheporter (June 3, 1988), p. 20.

0. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, "Freedom and Liberation: The Anthropologicsion of the Instruction 'Libertatis Conscientia'," Communio 14 (Spring 1984. This is the text of a paper presented in Lima, Peru on July 19, 1986.

. Ibid., p. 58. Pope John Paul II also reaffirms the criticism of TL containthe Instruction of 1984 in his latest encyclical, Sollicitudo Rei Socialisatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1988), para. 46.

2. The National Catholic Reporter (May 9, 1986), p. 6.3. See Ratzinger, "Freedom and Liberation," p. 55.

4. See Pope John Paul II, "Apostolic Exhortation on Reconciliation andenance" (Reconciliatio et Paenitentia), issued on December 2, 1984, insponse to the controversy on "social sin," and found in the specialpplement to the January 17, 1985 issue of The Wanderer, pp. 316. This

e referred to in the body of this chapter by RP, followed by paragraph

umber.

5. See Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person (Boston: Reidel, 1979).

6. John Dewey makes this necessary distinction between private and publs The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt, 1927; reprints by Oniversity Press, 1980, 1981, and 1985), pp. 1236.

7. The language of 'social sin' was also used by the Roman Catholic Bishop

the United States in their Economic Justice For All: Pastoral Letter on



atholic Social Teaching and the U. S. Economy (Washington, DC: U.S.atholic Conference, 1986), p. 49 (para. 77). The personalist understandinocial sin' is reaffirmed in the most recent encyclical of Pope John Paul II,ollicitudo Rei Socialis, para. 36.

8. See Joseph Ratzinger, Politik und Erlösung (Opladen: Westdeutschererlag, 1986), p. 21.

9. See ibid., p. 22.

0. Ibid., p. 23; my translation and emphasis.

. See ibid., p. 23.



Page

2. See ibid., p. 24. On the importance of education as "the core of everyaxis of liberation," see Ratzinger, "Freedom and Liberation," p. 62.

3. Synod of Bishops, "Justice in the World" (1971) (Introduction), found iavid J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (eds.), Renewing the Earth: Cathocuments on Peace, Justice and Liberation (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday,

977), p. 391.

4. This, of course, is the main thesis of Karl Rahner's classic work onhilosophy of religion, Horer des Wortes: Zur Grundlegung einereligionsphilosophie, edited by Johann B. Metz (Munich: Kosel Verlag, 1963anslated by Michael Richards as Hearers of the Word (New York: Herder &erder, 1969).

5. Karol Wojtyla, "The Person: Subject and Community," Review of etaphysics 33:2 (December 1979: 289.

6. Wojtyla, "Participation or Alienation?" Analecta Husserliana 6 (1977): 7

7. Wojtyla, The Acting Person, p. 315.

8. On the purely factual or moral (but not ontological) use of "solidarity" ine Vatican documents, see LC, 8991; John Paul II, On Human Work

Washington, DC: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1981), para. 8; The Actingerson, pp. 284287; Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, paras. 3840.

9. For a detailed discussion of John Paul II's use of the term 'totality,' seenselm K. Min, "John Paul II's Anthropology of Concrete Totality," Proceedithe American Catholic Philosophical Association 58 (1984): 12029. I mus

ote here that in this article I did not go into the kind of ciritical evaluation am making in this chapter.

hapter SixFor a brief but essential description of the dimensions of the global and U

omestic economic crises, see the National Conference of Catholic Bishops,onomic Justice For All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and thS. Economy (Washington, DC: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1986), paras. 2

See Pope John Paul II, On Human Work (Washington, DC: U.S. Catholiconference, 1981), para. 1.



Much more "communal," concrete, and biblical than the two Vaticanstructions on liberation is the U.S. Catholic bishops' Pastoral Letter; seeonomic Justice For All, especially paras. 5, 25, 28, and 6467, on themmunal understanding of human existence.

See Pope John Paul II, On Human Work, para. 20.

See further Giulio Girardi, "Die gegenwartigen Auseinandersetzungen um

arxismus, Theologie der Befreiung und 'Kirche des Volkes' (iglesia popularTheologie der Befreiung und Marxismus, edited by Peter Rottlander

Munster: Edicion Liberacion, 1986), pp. 13742.



Page

See Peter Rottländer, ''Zur Einfuhrung," in his edited volume, Theologie defreiung und Marxismus, pp. 817, where he discusses the Vatican's doublrategy regarding theology of liberation, the strategy of confrontationxemplified by the Instruction of 1984 (Libertatis Nuntius), and the campai

conservative Latin American and West German bishops and professors of

ocial doctrine,' the strategy of integration exemplified in the Instruction of986 (Libertatis Conscientia) which tries to integrate theology of liberation e church's social doctrine. On the reshaping of the Catholic Church throue appointment of conservative bishops, see John Thavis, "The Bishops:

haping the Hierarchy," North Carolina Catholic (January 31, 1988), pp. 2 a2.

See Arthur Jones, "Vatican Document Targets Collegiality," National Catheporter (February 19, 1988), pp. 1 and 5.

For a documentation of these trends, see Ana Maria Ezcurra, The Vaticannd the Reagan Administration (New York: Circus Publications, 1986), pp.1136.

See Rottländer, pp. 17579 ("Politische Theologie und die Herausforderunes Marxismus: Ein Gespräch des Herausgebers mit Johann Baptist Metz").

0. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder & Herd972), p. 131; and Francis S. Fiorenza, "Political Theology as Foundationalheology," Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 32977): 14243. For a critique of foundationalism and the historical backgrothe concept and discipline of fundamental theology, see Francis S. Fioren

oundational Theology: Jesus and the Church (New York: Crossroad, 1984)p. 555 and 247321. I am not here ready to comment on the differenceetween Fiorenza's conception of foundational theology as "reconstructive

ermeneutics" and my conception of the same as an anthropology of concrtality. I share the same formal conception of a foundational theologyi.e., tits function in relation to the whole of dogmatic theologybut differ with hthe content of such a theology.



Page

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Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope. San Francisco, CAarper & Row, 1987.

oeltsch, Ernst. Writings on Theology and Religion. Translated by Robertorgan and Michael Pye. Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1977.

ojtyla, Karol (Pope John Paul II). The Acting Person. Boston: D. Reidel,979.

The Person: Subject and Community." Review of Metaphysics 33:2December 1979): 273-308.

Participation or Alienation?" Analecta Husserliana 6 (1977): 61-73.



Page

ubject Index

nthropocentrism, 84, 112-113, 183n. 13

nthropology (philosophical)

as presupposition of theology, 164-165

dialectical, 13

of concrete totality, 13, 24, 27, 70, 73, 94, 95-96, 105-106, 136, 151-15166-168

asic ecclesial communities, 119, 121, 147

blical hermeneutics, 61-64, 164

ack theology, 8, 52, 164, 182n. 135

auses and conditions, 144-146

ass, race, and gender, the respective role of, 182n. 136

ass struggle, 25-27, 147, 162

ommunion and Liberation, 162

oncrete totality

anthropology of, 13, 24, 27, 70, 73, 94, 95-96, 105-106, 136, 155, 166-

epistemology of, 72-73

faith as, 46

God as, 33-35, 88-91, 101

human existence as, 69-70, 99, 104-106, 148-155, 166-168

politics as, 109-110



praxis as principle of, 27, 166-167

salvation and sin as, 89-91, 99-100, 106-111, 149-152

society as, 22-23

alectic

Hegelian, 33

in hermeneutics, 61-64

of empirical praxis and transcendental horizon, 72

of finite and infinite (See also God, Finitude), 33-34

of magisterium, avant-garde, and people, 56-58

of personal existence and social conditions (See also Person, Sociality,Society, Structural Change), 142-146

of social reality, 60, 144-146

of theology and social sciences, 59-61

of theory and praxis (See also Praxis, Theory), 48-51, 75-77

of transcendence and history, (See also God, Transcendence), 33-35of universal and particular, 69, 70-71, 171n. 2

basic structure of, 33

alogue, limits of, 74-75, 76-77, 85

onomyhuman meaning of, 23-24

relation to politics, 24

pistemology

as a function of anthropology, 73

basic structure of, 72-73



conflict of horizons, 74-75xistentialist theology, 26, 69-70, 94, 104-106, 111

xodus, the, 5, 102-103, 121-122



ermeneutic circle, the

socio-analytic mediation, 58-61, 82, 95

hermeneutic mediation, 61-68

storical materialism, 24

storicity (history)

of faith (See also Faith), 69

of the Kingdom of God, 89

of Scripture, 61-64

of theology (See also Theology), 3, 69

two meanings of, 2-3, 96-97

eology, 19, 25, 29, 38-39, 41, 52, 53, 73

finity, ''true," 34, 88, 184n. 28

nstruction on Certain Aspects of 'Theology of Liberation,'" 4, 6, 12, 13, 179-40, 80-82, 118-155 passim, 172n, 173n, 175n, 183n, 189n

conflicting interpretations of, 7

nstruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation," 6, 12, 13, 118-155 pass89n

interpretations of, 13

sus Christ, 7, 21, 31, 65-66, 79, 81, 86, 89, 93, 101

borem Exercens, 15, 173n

beration (See also Salvation)

and ecology, 84, 112-114

and freedom, 130



and salvation, 12, 79-83, 84-106, 122-123, 125, 133-139

challenge of, 8, 13, 159-163

concept of, 83-85, 91-92, 122

cultural dimension of, 92-93, 95-96

political dimension of, 91-92, 95

social conditions of, 142-148

theological dimension of, 93-94, 97, 103

unity and relation of the three dimensions of, 56, 82-83, 86, 91-104, 114115

the Vatican's social doctrine of, 127-155

beration theology (See also Liberation)biblical sources of, 180n. 110

criticisms of, 5-7, 16, 39-44, 80-84, 171n. 6

differences with the Vatican, 4, 13, 117-122, 159-162

Hegelian elements of, 10, 32-35, 102, 114

historicity of, 3impact of, 4-5, 11, 37-38

Marxian elements of, 10, 20-31, 102, 114

method of, See Hermeneutic Circle, Praxis, Solidarity

philosophical sources of, 9, 15-35

theological sources of, 9

arxism (See also Marx)

epistemological contribution of, 29

ethical contribution of, 28-29

metaphysical contribution of, 29



relation to Christianity, 15-16, 21rules for theological use of, 30-31

theological appropriation of, 10, 16-31

the Vatican's critique of, 17-18

Marxist Humanism" (U. S. Bishops' Pastoral Letter on), 18, 173n

njung theology, 52odernity (Enlightenment)

challenge of, 9-10,

responses of the Roman Catholic Church to, 10, 13, 160

two phases of, 112, 160



Page

ature and grace, 12, 184n

pus Dei, 162

erson (See also Personalism, Sociality, Society) and sociohistorical conditio22-25, 104-110, 125-155

as concrete totality (See Anthropology, Concrete totality)

as transcendent, individual, and interior, 125-132

ersonalism, 9, 13, 18, 125-127

abstract, 148-155

uralism, 1, 52, 75, 133

olitics (See also Liberation)

as concretizing mediation of faith, 101-102

as totalizing principle, 110-111

meaning of, 108-111

two models of, 132-133

oor, the (See also Solidarity)

as concrete universal, 70-72

dialectic of solidarity with, 56-58

hermeneutic privilege of, 53-54, 72-75

preferential option for, 26, 70-72

three models of solidarity with, 54-56

opulorum Progressio, 19

axis (action)



and theory, 11, 27-28, 37, 43-44, 47-51, 75-77, 121

as transcendental horizon, 72-75

basic structure of, 27, 167-168

epistemological function of, 40, 53-54, 72-75, 152-153

liberation as goal of, 167

of the Christian avant-garde, 57

of the magisterium, 56-57, 120

of the people, 57-58

of solidarity with the poor, 40, 53-54, 72-75, 152-153

the Vatican's conception of, 39-40, 121

ocess theology, 1, 112, 164

uadragesimo Anno, 19, 160

eason, limits of pure, 75-77

Reconciliation and Penance" (Apostolic Exhortation), 126-127, 140, 144,90n

edemptor Hominis, 18

eductionism, charge of, 5, 80-83, 85-91

eification, 105, 167-168

erum Novarum, 12, 15, 160oman Catholicism

and challenge of liberation, 13, 160-163

and modernity, 10, 160

and philosophy, 9-10



lvation (See also Liberation)

concept of, 122-125

and liberation, 12, 79-83, 84-106, 122-123, 125, 133-139

ripture

hermeneutics of, 61-68

historicity of, 61-64

gns of the times, 157-159

as situation of contemporary theology, 47-51, 163

Christian response to, 159

Responses of the Roman Catholic Church to, 160-163

n

personal and social, 12, 81-82, 106-108, 126, 149-151

personalist conception of social sin, 127-131

personalist theology of, 122-125

ocial doctrine, 12, 15, 59, 120, 132-134, 136, 160 172n. 15

ociality

and individuality, 104-106, 111, 130-131, 139-155

as anthropological a priori, 24-25, 105, 145, 147-148, 151

ociety

as a concrete totality, 22-23

ontology of, 22-25, 105ociology of knowledge, 71

olidarity

alternating moments model of, 55

as an existential and as a virtue, 147-148

incarnation model of, 55-56



specific contribution model of, 55theology and, 53-58

three models of, 54-56

ollicitudo Rei Socialis, 12

ructural change 146-148; See also Liberation, Person, Politics, Sociality,

ociety



Page

heology

and philosophy (See also Anthropology), 9-10, 18-20

and praxis, 39-44, 54-56, 58-61

and prior commitment, 41-42, 47-51

and social sciences, 21, 58-61

and solidarity with the poor, 41-42, 54-58

as theory, 11, 46-48

critical function of, 5, 40-44, 51-52, 68-70

dialectic of theory and praxis in, 48-51

ecological and sociological, 84

hermeneutic mediation of, 65-68

historicity of, 1-4, 44-52

method of, 11, 37, 44-45, 58-68

particularity of, 3, 51-53

pluralism in, 52

practical, 43

socio-analytic mediation of 58-61

topos, kairos, and telos of, 47-51

heory

and praxis, 11, 27-28, 37-38, 43-44, 47-51, 75-77, 121

theology as, 11, 40-44

anscendence

nd history, 33-35, 69-70, 80-83, 85-102

ncepts of, 33-35, 87-88



anscendental theology, 69-70, 98-99, 135

opia, 28-30, 82-83, 96-98, 100-101, 146-147



Page

uthor Index

dorno, Theodor, 188n

thusser, Louis, 9

quinas, Thomas, 1, 18, 73, 132, 164, 172n

nold, Matthew, 158

istotle, 17, 27, 38, 73, 132, 164

rupe, Pedro, 20

ssman, Hugo, 174n

ugustine, 1, 124, 126, 132, 155

arreiro, Alvaro, 189n

arth, Karl, 1, 4, 9, 163, 164, 184n

aum, Gregory, 173n, 182n

elo, Fernando, 180n

entham, Jeremy, 144

erghoef, Gerard, 171n, 174n

ernstein, Richard J., 175n

erryman, Philip, 172n

och, Ernst, 96, 98, 132

ondel, Maurice, 9

oethius, 18

off, Clodovis, 7, 21, 30, 45-51, 54-56, 58-60, 62-67, 79, 85-86, 94, 114,

73n, 174n, 175n, 177n, 178n, 179n, 180n, 181n, 182n, 183n, 186n, 189



off, Leonardo, 7, 21, 117, 162, 173n, 179n, 180n, 182n, 183n, 184n, 1886n, 188n, 189n

onhoeffer, Dietrich, 9, 142

own, Robert McAfee, 172n

ueggemann, Walter, 180n

uber, Martin, 9

ubner, Rudiger, 183n

ultmann, Rudolf, 1, 4, 104, 164, 165

astillo, Fernando, 172n, 175n

henu, Marie-Dominique, 172n

hopp, Rebecca S., 172n, 179n

evenot, Michel, 180n

obb, John B. Jr., 80, 84, 112-113, 183n, 189n

ongar, Yves, 172n

oreth, Emerich, 9

ormee, Lee, 182n

oste, Rene, 173n

ox, Harvey, 189n

oatto, J. Severino, 181n

urran, Charles, 162

avis, Charles, 177n, 179n

eKoster, Lester, 171n, 174n

escartes, Rene, 72

ewey, John, 12, 73, 105, 190n



onahue, John R., 181n

ussel, Enrique, 19, 86, 173n, 179n, 184n, 189n

hlen, Peter, 172n

acuria, Ignacio, 28, 86, 174n, 184n, 185n

ngels, Friedrich, 98

usebius of Caesarea, 132

curra, Ana Maria, 192n

euerbach, Ludwig, 9, 12, 27

orenza, Francis Schussler, 168, 172n, 192n

eud, Sigmund, 12

iedman, Milton, 144



Page

alilea, Segundo, 187n

effre, Claude, 171n

rardi, Giulio, 21, 173n, 175n, 191n

oldstein, Horst, 181n

ottwald, Norman K., 180n

ramsci, Antonio, 9, 54

udorf, Christine E., 173n, 175n, 181n

ustafson, James M., 176n

utierrez, Gustavo, 7, 22, 31, 39, 44, 51, 54, 67, 82-83, 86-93, 95, 99-10306, 109, 112, 162, 174n, 175n, 177n, 178n, 179n, 180n, 181n, 184n, 1886n, 187n, 188n, 189n

abermas, Jurgen, 43, 75-76, 175n, 177n, 183n

aight, Roger, 179narnack, Adolf von, 17

arrington, Michael, 174n

aughey, John C., 181n

auerwas, Stanley, 80, 83-84, 111-112, 183n

ebblethwaite, Peter, 119, 172n, 190n

egel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 32-1, 69, 73, 80, 88-89, 90, 96, 97, 98, 102, 105, 109, 113, 114, 157, 161,66, 175n, 178n, 179n

eidegger, 9, 17, 27, 73, 104, 114, 147

elder Camara, Dom, 17

enry, Carl F. H., 171n



y, Martin, 174n

sus Christ, 7, 21, 31, 65-66, 79, 81, 86, 89, 93, 101

hn Paul II, Pope, 6, 7, 12, 18, 22, 73, 85, 117-155 passim, 161-163, 1672n, 190n, 191n

nes, Arthur, 192n

ant, Immanuel, 9, 17, 18, 72-74, 84, 114, 146, 160, 168

asper, Walter, 172n

avanaugh, John F., 173n

erkegaard, Soren, 9, 26, 45, 54, 94, 104, 126, 143, 161, 179n

oppenburg, Bonaventure, 172n, 174n

olbe, Maximilian, 142

osik, Karel, 174n

ung, Hans, 162

keland, Paul, 175n

mb, Matthew, 175n

ne, Dermot A., 175n

dure, Yves, 173n

bkowicz, Nicholas, 175nnergan, Bernard J. F., 160, 168, 192n

bac, Henri de, 12, 184n

kacs, Georg, 9, 188n

ther, Martin, 1, 132



annheim, Karl, 9, 71, 182n

arcel, Gabriel, 9, 96

arcos, Ferdinand, 146

arcuse, Herbert, 9

arechal, Joseph, 9, 160

arx, Karl, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 27, 28, 28, 73, 80, 3, 96, 105, 109, 113, 114, 157, 161, 189n

cCann, Dennis P., 11, 39, 43-44, 68, 75-76, 176n, 177n, 183n

cGovern, Arthur, 173n

cLellan, David, 173n

cMurtry, John, 174nedellin, 4

etz, Johann Baptist, 9, 44, 166, 172n, 181n, 182n, 192n

guez Bonino, Jose, 24, 174n, 188n

n, Anselm Kyongsuk, 173n, 174n, 175n, 176n, 182n, 191n

randa, Jose Porfirio, 173n, 180noltmann, Jurgen, 9, 96, 98

ouroux, Jean, 9

urray, John Courtney, 160

Dialectic of Salvation

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