Dialectic and Dialethic

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Dialectic and DialetheicAuthor(s): Graham PriestReviewed work(s):Source: Science & Society, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Winter, 1989/1990), pp. 388-415Published by: Guilford PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40403028 .

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SciencefSociety,ol. 53,No. 4,Winter 989,388-415

DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEICGRAHAMPRIEST

Introduction:ialectics equires ialetheismESSAY ARGUES FOR an intimate onnection e-tween ialecticsnd dialetheism.ialectics, willnot at-tempt o definehere;norwill attempto discuss ll theuses that have been made of that notion.Rather, will con-centrate n the use thatHegel and, later,Marx made of it.Dialetheism1equires littlemore omment. dialetheiasa truecontradiction,here "contradiction"as its ordinary,ogical,sense.Thus,a dialetheias a true tatementfthe formA&-A.Dialetheisms,consequently,heview that here re true con-tradictions.n modern orm, ialetheisms a somewhatovel ndas yetunorthodox osition. ypically,hosewhoaccept t havebeen driven o itbyconsiderationf the ogicalparadoxes ndconnected roblems.2he burden f this rticles,however,hatalthoughhenamemay enovel, heviewtselfsbynomeans o.In particular, egel'sandMarx'sdialecticss based on dialethe-ism.With hebenefit f historicalindsight emaynot,perhaps,find his verwhelminglyurprising.orno one before his en-tury riedharder hanHegelto thinkhroughheconsequencesof thought hinkingbout itself, r of categories pplying othemselves. nd this s ustthekindofself-referentialituationthatgivesriseto the ogicalparadoxes.

1 The word is a neologism.For itsgenesis,see the prefaceto Priest, tal, 1989.2 For example, see Priest,1979. The first artof Priest, 1986, contains a discussionofdialetheism nd further eferences.388


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DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEIC 3891 Whyt Is NecessaryoArgueThis

Despite his,t svery ecessaryna contemporaryontext oarguethatdialecticss dialetheic.rima acie,Hegel'sand Marx'sdialetheisms an open-and-shutase.Forexample,ntheScienceofLogic 1969) Hegel says inthis nd all subsequent uotationsitalics re in theoriginal):. . . commonexperience . . . saysthat . . theres a host f contradictoryhings,contradictoryrrangements,whose contradiction xists not merely n externalreflection, ut in themselves. 440.)And asserts oldly few ines ater:External sensuous motion is contradiction'smmediate existence. Somethingmoves,not because at one moment t shere and at anotherthere,but because atone and the same moment t is here and nothere,because in this"here," t atonce is and is not.Yetmany,fnotmost,nterpretationsfHegelassert hatwhereHegel talks f contradiction,nd evenasserts ne, he mustbeunderstood s meaningsomething lse. For example,Acton(1967a, 444):Hegel did notregardformal ogicas a philosophicalscience,and he thereforerejected any view that its categoriesshould dominate philosophicalthought.Thus, the factthatthe word "contradiction"s used in a certainwaybyformallogicianswas notfor him a reasonforconfining imself o thatmeaning.WhenHegel was advocatingthedialecticalmethod,he had inminda method nwhichopposites,conflicts, ensions nd refutationswerecourtedratherthan avoidedor evaded.Marxist hilosophers ave been ust as content o interpreti-alectical ontradictionsn a similarway.Thus,Cornforth1971,92):The key conceptionof dialectics s this notionof contradiction nherent n theverynatureof things. . . But whatexactlydo we mean by "contradiction"?If we consider the real, complex movements nd interconnectionsf real,complexthings, hen we find thatcontradictoryendencies an and do exist nthem.For example, if the forcesoperatingin a body combine tendenciesof


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390 SCIENCE ? SOCIETYattractionnd repulsion,hat s a realcontradiction.ndifthe movementfsociety ombines hetendencyo socialiseproduction ith hetendencyopreserveheprivate ppropriationftheproducts,his sa realcontradictiontoo.AndNorman Norman nd Sayers, 980,49):The term contradiction"s usedtoreferothe nterdependencef pposedoncepts.. . . The term contradiction"s also]usedtoreferocertain inds fconflict.. .If the conflicts an internalonflict ithin hepurposivectivityfa humanindividual ra human ocietyrsocial nstitution,hen he onflictan be seenas a self-contradiction.Moreover,t is notonlyWestern hilosophers ho have sub-scribedto a non-literalnterpretationf "contradiction."ororthodox ovietphilosophers,ntil heearly1950s "contradic-tion" eems o havebeentaken o mean varietyfthingsoftennot clearlydistinguished),ncluding pposingtendencies, i-ametricallypposedconcepts,nd ogical ontradictionsseeWet-ter, 958, 49). Itwas,however,rthodoxo holdthat ll ofthese,including he ogical ontradictions,btain n reality. fter heearly1950s,however,he dea that contradiction" ightmeanlogical ontradictionecamemuch essorthodox.3husSheptu-lin 1978, 259):Aspectsn whichhangesmove nopposite irectionsnd which aveoppositetrends ffunctioningnddevelopmentre calledopposites, hile he nterac-tionofthese spects onstitutes contradiction.Andwheremodern ovietphilosophersre prepared o admitthat dialecticalontradictionsa logical ontradiction,heyhar-acteristicallyssert hat hesemay ccur inthought,"utnot inreality." hus,belief ystems,rwhatever,maybe inconsistent;butdialetheias annotoccur.Thus,Narskii1965, 33; see alsoNarskii, 970):Contradictorytatements n the pattern is and is not" eithercompriseerroneous ssertionsrformulationsfproblemsequiringolutionhroughprocess fmodification.3 Some fthehistoricaltorystoldnLobkowicz,961. ee alsoComey,966.


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DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEIC 391Now,while there re certainly xamplesofHegel and Marxusingthenotion of contradictionnother than ts ogicalsense,to insistthattheynevermeant whatthey aid literallywhentheyclaimedthat contradictions ccur in reality, r even when theyassertedcontradictions,nflicts uch violence on theirdialecticsthatthedistortedproduct s but a pale shadowof itsproper self. For thecentral heoreticalnotionof contradictionn Marx and Hegel isprecisely he logical one. Other uses are derivative, nd usuallyderivetheir ignificance rom he centralnotion.So I shallargue;and in doing so, takeon orthodoxy,East and West.2 TheArgumentgainst hisnterpretation

I willmountthecase forthethesis nsubsequentsections.Butfirstt snecessary oexplain why o manyhaverejectedthisview,and see whythis s mistaken.Hegel distinguished,uiterightly,etweendialectics nd for-mal logic- whichwas forhimtheAristotelianogic of his day.The law of non-contradiction olds in formal ogic; but formallogic scorrectly pplicableonly na limited nd well definedarea(notably he static nd changeless); in dialectical ogic,whichap-plies in a much more general domain, the law of non-contradiction ails.Subsequentdialecticians ccepted Hegel's dis-tinction.But formal ogic has now maturedinto modern Frege/Russell logic. This is immenselymore powerfulthan syllogistic,and has broughtthescienceof reasoningto age. Whetheror notjustified in doing so, most modern dialecticians East andWest- see Frege/Russellogic as givinga definitive ccount ofthe most abstractnorms of correctand scientific hought.Di-alectical ogic,whatever lse it s,mustat leastbe compatiblewiththis,which,of course, rules out dialetheias. Thus Hegel's andMarx's rejection of the law of non-contradiction, nd, con-sequently,their notion of contradiction,have had to be in-terpretednon-literally,n pain of a chargeofbeingunscientific,or of irrationalism.For the former ee, e.g., Colletti,1975, 28.For the lattersee Norman, in Norman and Sayers, 1980, 50.)Nor has the supposed significance f modern formal ogicbeen lost on anti-Marxistwriters.While defenders of dialectichave been doingtheirbesttoexplainthatHegel and Marxdid notmean whatthey aid, Popper (1940, 317; see also Acton, 1967b,


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392 SCIENCE6? SOCIETY392),with haracteristicharity,ssumed hatHegeland Marxdidmean whatthey aid,and used this ssumption ogetherwithsomebaby ogicto reducedialectics o absurdity:... itcan easily e shown hat fone weretoaccept ontradictionshenonewouldhavetogiveup anykind f scientificctivity:t wouldmean completebreakdownf science.This can be shownby provinghat ftwo ontradictorystatementsreadmitted,ny tatementhatever ust eadmitted;or from couple ofcontradictorytatementsny tatement hateveran be validlynferred.Thus,modern ialecticians, ost fwhom now eryittle ormallogic,haveallowed hemselvesobe intimidated,nd evenbrow-beaten, ntoreinterpretingialectical ontradictions.Thisreaction,hough nderstandablenthe ight f the uc-cessstorywhich s modern ogic, s rather aive.Someonewhoacceptsthat there are truecontradictions,nd therefore hatsomethingsre bothtrue A) and false ~A) is hardly oingtoaccepttheunargued ssumptionfFrege/Russellogicthat ruthand falsityre mutuallyxclusive.Truth and falsity verlap;whence t spossible or hings f theformA&-A tobe true. tfollows,hen, hatPopper'smuchvaunted nference A&-A;henceB - is quite nvalid, incethepremisemaybe truewhiletheconclusionmaynotbe. Frege/Russellogic s,after ll,onlytheoryf thenorms f reasoning and like mosttheories t isalmost ertainlyalse. t is notable hat20thcentury ogiciansthemselves as opposedto thosewhomerely uote it havebeenunder no illusionsbout the contentiousnd often hakynatureof some of theassumptionsuilt nto theFrege/Russelltheory.houghthemutual xclusivenessf truth ndfalsity aynot have been questioned untilrecently),manyotherpre-suppositionsavebeenquestioned,nd often ejected: hat ruthand falsityre exhaustive; hat ll terms enote;thatthe con-ditional s truth unctional;hat existentialuantification"asexistentialmport; nd so on.Dialecticians,ven thosewhomade theaboveobservation,wouldhavebeenhamperednstanding p tobeingbludgeonedwith hePrincipia athematicaue to the fact hat herewas noarticulated ormalheoryf ogic atisfactoryor heir urposes.Thishas nowchanged.Though onlyust startingoreceive heattentionhey eserve, araconsistentogics logicswherePop-


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DIALECTICANDDIALETHEIC 393per's inference ails have undergone very mpressive e-velopmentn the last20 years.4 houghthispaper is not onformalogic, will ndicate heoutlines fat leastone oftheselogics in factthe one I take to be the mostsatisfactoryordialetheic urposes), o that ven thosewho know ittle ormallogicwill t eastbe ableto seethroughhe laim hat ormalogicshowsdialetheismo be false, r eventhatFrege/Russellogicprovides heonly imple,ntuitive,ogical emantics.3 Dialetheic ogic

Frege/Russellogic ssigns o each sentence ne of thetruthvaluesT (true) ndF (false).Dialetheicogic:may ssign,naddi-tion,bothvalues trueand false). Thus, technically,emanticvalues renon-emptyubsetsf T,F}.)The fact hat sentencestruedoes not, hereforeuleout itsbeingfalse, nd viceversa.Giventhe truth aluesof basicsentences,he truth aluesofcomplex entencesanbeworked utby truthable" onditions.So, forexample, hetruth onditionsfnegation re:

~A is trueust if A is false-A is falseust ifA is trueAnd thoseforconjunctionre:

A8cB s trueust ifA is true ndB is trueA8cB s falseust ifA is falseorB is falseThesetruthonditionsre,ofcourse, uiteorthodox. he truthconditionsordisjunctionrealsoexactly hat newould xpect.Notice hat fA is true nd false, o is -A; and so,moreover,sA&c-A. n particular,t strue, s dialetheistslaim.Logical ruthand logical onsequence re also defined n the orthodox ash-ion:

A is a logical ruthust if A is (at least)trueunder allassignmentsfvalues

4 An introduction o thesecan be found n Priest nd Routley,1984. Furtherdiscussioncan be found nch. 3 ofPriest nd Routley, 983,which sreprinted s the ntroductionto part 2 of Priest, tal, 1989.


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394 SCIENCE 6fSOCIETYA is a logical onsequence fB just fevery ssignmentof valuesthatmakesB (at least) ruemakesA (at least)true

It maybe interestingonotethatA is a logical ruthf A is atwo-valuedautology.hus,these emanticsivethesame setoflogicaltruths s does orthodox ogic.Thus, bothAv~A and-(AJk-A) re logical ruths. he secondof thesemay eemsur-prisingnitially. ut if a certain ontradiction,8c~A,maybetrue, there is no reason whythe "secondary ontradiction"(A8c~A)8c~(A8c~A) hould not also be true.The semantics o,however, ive notion f ogical onsequence ifferentrom heorthodox ne. In particular,nd asmight e expected, is notconsequence fA8c~~A,s maybe seenby implyssigning thevalueF, while ssigning bothT and F.It is an entirelytraightforwardatteroextend hesepro-positionalemanticso a semanticsorfull irst-orderogic. willnotgivedetailshere they an be found, .g., nPriest, 987, h.5),but forfuture eferencewill ay littlemore bout dentity.Identitytatementsftheform = bmaybe both rue ndfalse,like ll other tatements. little arehas to be taken oncerninghow, xactly,ruth aluesare assigned;butprovidingne doesthis, ll the standardprinciplesf identity,uch as the law ofidentitya = a) and the ubstitutivityf denticals,reassured.Asusual, willwrite b for~a = b.One final, nd non-standard,ieceof ogicalmachinery illalsoproveusefulnthe ubsequent iscussion.Wehave, nEng-lish nd other aturalanguages, way fnominalizingentences.The most niform ay fdoing hisssimply yprefixingthat"to the sentence. hus the sententialhrase Johns happy"be-comesthe nounphrase that ohn shappy."But there re alsootherways: or xample, urningheverb nto gerund. hus, ntheexampleat hand we obtain John's eing happy."Thoughorthodoxogichas noformalnalogue fthisnominalizing,uchisnecessaryndquite tandardndiscussionsfthe emanticsfpropositionalttitudes.5or our purposes,we need to assume5 See, forexample, the discussion n Montague, 1973. Note thatMontague has a verysophisticated heory f the behavior of A.What we requireof thenotionwillbe muchsimpler, though quite compatiblewithhis account. In particular,on Montague'sapproach, M=A~A is true providedthatA is not T and F at all worlds.


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DIALECTICANDDIALETHEIC 395very ittle boutthenominalizer. ll we need is an operator,which willwrite sA(andwhichmay e read as "that")uch hatifA isany entence, Asa nounphrase,nd thereforeenotes nobject.Which bject tdenotes,wemay ssumeveryittle bout.However, t is fairlylearthat n some senseAAand A~A areopposites.Think fJohn's einghappy ndhisnotbeinghappy;orJohn's oving ill ndJohn's ot oving ill, tc.)Since nobjectis not the same as its opposite, t is naturalto requirethat

As willnow be clearto thosewho have a modicum flogic,with heexceptionf theAoperator,he boveaccount s almostexactlyhe sameas theorthodox ne. In fact,fwe weretoaddtheconditionhatno sentencesassigned othT and F thenwewouldhave xactly rege/Russellogic. hus these emanticsre ageneralizationf orthodox ogicwhichust covera case thatorthodoxogic gnores; nd conversely,rthodoxogic s ust aspecial aseofthese emantics hichgnores dialecticallympor-tant ase. n particular,f he ituationboutwhichwe are reason-ing is a consistentne, so that there re no dialetheias, henclassicalogic s quiteapplicable.The preciseunderstandingfthis laim s,however, sensitivessue, n which eePriest, 987,ch. 8.) Thus we maystretchHegel's claima little s follows:(Frege/Russell)ormalogic s perfectlyalid n itsdomain,butdialecticaldialetheic)ogic s moregeneral.Butwhat s thedomainof classicalogic?An easyanswer s"the onsistent."utthis sfairlyacuous ntilwe have aidwhichareasare,ormay easonablyeexpected obe,consistent.heremaybe roomfordebate boutthis, ut dialecticiansavehad astandard ine here: the static s consistent;nlywhenchangeenters hepicture o contradictionsrise.Atanyrate, t squitecompatible ith heclaim hatdialecticss basedon dialetheismthat ialecticians,uch sMarx, hould astigatetherwriters orcontradictinghemselvesn certainontexts.0hose contextsrejustnotof thekindwhere contradictions tobeexpected.Thecritical se ofreductiod absurdums discussed urthern Priest,1986.)6 Thus Marx: "But then he [Adam Smith]suddenlychanges the whole basis of hisdistinction nd contradictswhat he startedthe whole investigationwith a few linesearlier" (Capital, Vol. II, 273). That Marx sometimes riticizespeople forbeing in-consistents used againstthe dialetheic nterpretationfdialecticsbyHavas, 1981. Seealso Norman and Sayers, 1980, 49.


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396 SCIENCEfSOCIETYDialetheicogic s certainlyotdialectics; ut t s quitesuf-ficient oshowthatdialetheismscompatible ith herigor f anon-trivialormal ogic.7And protectedby the above con-siderationsgainst heslings nd arrows f outrageous ogicalclaims,we can moveon to dialectics roper.

4 Motion:An IllustrationIt willbe useful, o startwith, ogive simplellustrationfthewaydialetheicogicmay eapplied o dialectics.et us take san example hequotation romHegel nsection above, hat obein a state f motionorchangengeneral)s to both e andnotbeina certainpot ta certainime. uppose body, , ccupiescertainpot, ,at a certain ime.What sthe nstantaneousiffer-ence between tsbeing nmotionnd itsbeing trest?A Russellwould say "none": beingin motion s not an intrinsic,ut arelational tate.Hegel wouldsay"consistency."8et A be thesentenceb satspot " Then f is atrest, istrue, nd true nly(T). If b s nmotion,henAistrue, ince does ndeed ccupy hespot ; but, qually, ince t s inmotion,t hasalready tarted oleavethat pot;henceb s not till here: A is true. husAis bothtrue nd false T and F). Whetherr notHegelwasright boutthis s an issue I will not discusshere (see Priest, 985). Therelevant oint s ustthat ialetheicemanticsives s a perfectlyliteralwayofunderstandinghatHegel says.Some dialecticians ould rguethatHegelian ontradictionscannot e of thekind llustrated ere.For this ontradictions amerely xtensionalontradiction: logical ontradictionf theformA&c-A,where here s no essential onnection etween heconjuncts. ne can,forexample,nfer achof A and -A fromthiscontradictionnd assert ach independently. y contrast,dialectical ontradictionsre intensional. here is an internalrelation etween heconjuncts hich s notcaptured ya mereextensionalonjunction.hus,dialectics

7 In particular, t does not "obliteratethe distinction etween truthand falsity" r"abandon . . . the idea of entailment nd deductiveargument," s Norman claims(Norman and Sayers, 1980, 49).8 The contrast s discussed in Priest, 1985, which also elaborates on the dialetheicconnections.For more formaldetails see Priest,1982.


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DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEIC 397lays stresson the fact that this two-fold nterrelation f opposites is to beconceived,not"eclectically,"s mereconjunction r succession,butdialectically,in the sense thattheseoppositesare so far ntertwinedhatthe one cannot existwithout he other.Notonlydo theynot excludeeach other, heypresupposeandreciprocally onditioneach other. Wetter,1958, 340.)In particular,t s notpermissible o detacheitherconjunctfromthe other and assert t,withoutfalsifyinghe description. Thiscriticisms made in Havas, 1981.)To a certainextentthisobjectionis simplyanswered. Lessthan thewhole (relevant) ruth an itself e quite misleading ndgivea falsepictureof the situation.Thus, suppose yourcar runsout of petroland you ask me where the nearestgarage is. If Idetach and assertonly the first onjunctof "There is a garagearound the corner but it is closed" my answer will be highlymisleading.There is a conversationalmplicature, o use the no-tionof Grice 1975), thatrelevant nformation as notbeen omit-ted. But in dialecticalcontexts,the distinctionbetween some-thing'sbeing true (only) and its being true and false is quitecrucial. Thus to assert only A when A&-A is true is equallymisleading.As Hegel himself uts t 1969, Vol. I, book 1,section1, ch. 10, 91):The commonest njusticedone to a speculative i.e., dialectical]content s tomake tone-sided, hat s,togiveprominence nlytoone ofthepropositionsntowhich it can be resolved. It cannot then be denied that this propositionisasserted;but he tatements ustasfalse s it strue, oronce one of thepropositionsis takenoutof thespeculative ontent, heother mustbe equallyconsideredandstated.Nonetheless, s Hegel and mostother dialecticianshave stressed,dialecticalcontradictionsre no mere "accidental"conjunctions.In some sense thecontradictoryonjunctsdepend on each other,so thatthe one could not existwithoutthe other. Thus, thereshould indeed be a more intimaterelationbetween dialecticalcontradictoriesthan mere extensional (external) conjunction.What this s, we will be in a positionto see by section8.5 TheHistory fHegel'sDialectic

I can now no longer put offthe promised argumentthatdialecticalcontradictions re dialetheias, nd that thisnotionof


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398 SCIENCE sfOCIETYcontradiction s the central ne indialectics. ince much of what sat issue is the interpretationf what Hegel and Marx said, nomerequotingof texts an suffice orthis. will rgue historically:giventhephilosophical nfluences ctingon Hegel and Marx,andwhatHegel, in particular, aysabout them, here s no otherverysensible nterpretation.9Let us start withHegel.10 An importanttradition that in-fluencedHegel wasthat fthe medieval and especiallyChristian)Neo-Platonists nd theirRenaissance successors see Kolakowski,1978, Vol I, ch. 1). But the Neo-Platonists ertainlyheld thatcontradictory hingswere true of theOne. For example,Plotinussaysthat t is everythingnd nothing, verywhere nd nowhere{Ennead,V. 2, 1; see also Gilson, 1972, 43ff).Eckhartsays thatGod is being and yet,beyondbeing,and thusnotbeing (Smart,1967,450). Cusa saysthatGod isthe reconciliationfall opposites{De Docta gnorantia, ,XXII). All things re thus true and false)of God:... in no waydo [distinctions]xist nthe absolutemaximum the One]. . . . TheAbsolutemaximum .. is all things nd,whilst eingall, s none of them . . (Ibid1, IV, in Heron, 1954, 13.)In theNeo-PlatonistOne (or God), which reatedman,finally orthe atter and, accordingtosome,the former lso) to find fulfill-ment in the other,Hegel saw his Absolute. As he puts it in theLectures n theHistory fPhilosophy1895, 548): "The thoughtoftotality,he ntelligibleworld, s the concrete dea as we have seenit withthe Neo-Platonists." t is natural,then,thatHegel shouldalso take over the dea thatthe Absolute s literallyontradictory.Still, incemore prosaic commentatorswilltry o argue that theNeo-Platonists id not intend their ontradictionsiterally,r, atleast,that ftheydid,Hegel emancipatedhimself rom he oonieraspects of his predecessors, et us move forward n time to theproximate nfluence n Hegel,whocertainlymeantcontradictionwhenhe said it,and whodoes not (?) have a loonyfringe:Kant.9 Some otherarguments re given by Sayers,one Marxistwhomostcertainly oesmeancontradictionwhen he saysit, n Norman and Sayers, 1980 (see especiallych 4).10 The material n the nextthree ections rawsheavily n Priest nd Routley, 983,chs. 1and 2,reprinted s the ntroductoryhapters fpart1 ofPriest, t i, 1989.Myaccountof Hegel's and Marx's dialecticshere does, however,differfrom thatgiventhere nsome important espects.


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DIALECTIC ANDDIALETTI IC 399The relevant artof Kant forourpurposes s thesection ftheCritiquef ureReasonalled heTranscendentalialectic,ndinparticularhatpart f t calledtheAntinomyfPureReason.In this,Kantproduces our airs farguments,ach for pairofcontradictoryonclusions. owever, eitherfeachpairofargu-ments s fallaciousnany imple ense;rather,hecontradictionsare an outcomeof reason tselfA297; B354ff;A339; B397).Now, fsuchargumentsre sound,their onclusions re true.

Thus,Kant ssailing losetothedialetheic ind.Close,perhaps,butnotwith. or Kantdiagnoses he ame ubtle lawnallofthearguments:heapplication f a category utside tslegitimatebounds e.g.,A498,B526ff). orexample,nthe firstrgumentof the first airthere s a stepfrom everythingas a cause" to"theWorld i.e.,totalityfexistents)as a cause." Kantsuggeststhat lthoughheprinciplehat veryvent asa cause strue, he"every"anrefer nly oobjects given o us in ntuition,"hat s,experienced. he World,beingan unboundedtotality,s notgiven o us in thisway,butmerely pprehended yreason.The cruxof Kant'spositions thatreason nd itscategoriesaredependent or ontent ponexperience.ndeed,that s whathe takesthe antinomieso show. t is difficulto find directargumentsor his ssumption,ther han omeverytrong ormofpositivismsuchas Hume's).And oncethis s rejected andreason, arfrom eingparasiticnexperience,s admittedo eada lifeof itsown Kant'sposition n theantinomiesollapses.Reason,by unimpeachablerguments,roduces ontradictions,whichmust hereforee true.Thisisexactlyhe ine thatKant'ssuccessorsook. n virtue f thecentralityf this or hepoint tissue, will uoteHegelon themattert some ength. iscussingKant,he says 1975,section 8, 76-77):In the ttempt hich easonmakes ocomprehendheunconditionedature ftheWorld,tfalls ntowhat re calledAntinomies.n otherwords,t maintainstwo pposite ropositionsbout he ameobject,ndinsuch way hat ach ofthem astobemaintained ithqualnecessity.rom his tfollowshat hebodyof cosmical act,he pecifictatementsescriptivefwhich un nto ontradic-tion, annot ea self-subsistenteality,ut nly nappearance. heexplanationofferedyKantalleges hat hecontradictionoesnotaffect heobject n itsproper ssence, ut ttachesnly o theReasonwhicheeks ocomprehendt.In thisway he uggestion asbroached hat he ontradictionsoccasionedbythe ubject-mattertself,rbythe ntrinsicuality fthe ategories. nd to


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400 SCIENCE f SOCIETYoffer he dea thatthe contradiction ntroduced nto the world of Reason bythecategoriesof theUnderstanding s inevitable nd essentialwas to make one ofthe most mportant teps n theprogressof Modern Philosophy.But themoreimportanthe ssue thusraised,the more trivial he solution. tsonlymotivewasan excessive tendernessforthethings f the world.The blemishof contradic-tion, t seems,could not be allowed to mar theessence of theworld; but therecould be no objectionto attaching tto the thinkingReason, to the essence ofmind. Probablynobodywillfeeldisposed to deny that the phenomenal worldpresentscontradictions o theobservingmind; meaningby "phenomenal" theworld as it presents tself o the senses and understanding, o the subjectivemind. But ifa comparison s instituted etween the essence of world and theessence of mind, it does seem strangeto hear how calmlyand confidentlythe modest dogma has been advanced by one, and repeated by others,thatthoughtor Reason, and nottheWorld, s the seat of contradiction. t is no es-cape to turnround and explain that Reason falls nto contradictions nly byapplyingthe categories.For thisapplicationof the categories s maintained tobe necessary. . .

Thus, Kant's evasionof the contradictionss noton. These mustbe true of the World.That there are true contradictionswas also concluded bythelast of the nfluences n Hegel that willconsider,Fichte.Fichte,likeHegel, startedfromKant,and likeHegel criticized he Kan-tianpostulation f thething-in-itselfTaylor, 1975, 36, 77). Thisleft nlythe otherpartof theKantianontology: he transcenden-tal ego. The nature of the ego, or self, s to think;but there isnothingto think bout exceptitself; nd it is impossibleto thinksomething nless there s something lse to contrast t with. So atleast thoughtFichte.) Hence, the self had to create somethingdifferent,henon-self,gainstwhich t could conceive tself.ThisispreciselyReason leadinga lifeof tsown.) It therefore roducescontradiction. pecifically, he non-selfmust also be self,sincenothingelse exists. As Fichteputs it (quoting fromHeath andLachs, 1982, section3, 106): ". . . insofar s thenot-self s posited[intheself], he self s notposited n theself; but "... insofar sthenot-selfs to be posited [in the self], he selfmust be positedtherein."Thus, the self s bothpositedand not posited,and theposited s bothself nd not-self. r,morepithily,s Fichteputs ta few lines later: self = not-self nd not-self self.As regularreadersofFichtewillknow, hestory ndshappily.The self thesis),byitscunning postulation f thenot-selfanti-


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DIALECTICAND DIALETHEIC 401thesis),omes o understand hat t s,viz.both, nd thetwo ivetogether appilyver ftersynthesis),vengiving irth o a newlittlentithesis, hich erpetuateshe tradition.Hegel, of course,criticized ichte.But his onlycriticismswere, ssentially,wofold: irst,hatFichtehad notelevated hetranscendentalgo intosomething rander,Geist; nd second,thathe had misunderstoodhe nature nd significancef thefinal ynthesis1895, 499). This aside,Hegel tookover Fichte'sdialecticwholesale, nd, particularlyorpresentpurposes, hecontradictoryature f thealienated tate fthe self.As Hegelhimself,houghhardly ellucidly,ut t 1895,549-50):... inbeing elf-consciousself-consciousness]s independent,utstillnthisindependencet has a negative elation o what s outside elf-consciousness.This s nfiniteubjectivity,hichppears t one time s the ritiquefthoughtinthe ase ofKant, nd atanotherime,nthe aseofFichte,s the endencyrimpulse owards heconcrete.Absolute, ure, nfinite orm s expressed sself-consciousness,heEgo.. . . Self-consciousnesshus . . recognizestspositiveelation s itsnegative,and itsnegatives itspositive, or, n otherwords, ecognizeshese ppositeactivitiess the ame, .e., trecognizes ureThought rBeing s self-identity,and this gainas separation.Hegel'sdialetheisms thereforestablished.6 ContradictionnHegel'sDialectic

This beingso, letus nowlook at the central ole thatdi-aletheias lay n hisdialectics.t will euseful odistinguishhreeaspects fHegel'sdialectic. irst,here s thefundamental ove-ment fGeist.will allthis heglobal ialectic. hen there rethelocaldevelopmentsywhich his s achieved.One of these on-cerns hedevelopmentf thecategories;heother oncerns hedevelopmentfpeopleand societies. will all these he ogicaland historicalialectics espectively.The global ialecticsHegel'sversionf Fichte. he transcen-dental go,orspiritGeist)s it hasbecome,has as its ssence, rtelos,othink. ince t sall theres, tmust hink bout tself. ndsince tcannotdo thiswithout contrast,tmust reate tsop-posite,nature Taylor,1975, 89). Exactly s withFichte, hisgenerates situationhat sliterallyontradictory.orspirit,, s


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402 SCIENCE6fSOCIETYthen bothspirit nd not spirit. n the notation f section3:(s=s)&(s^:s). Alternatively,ature, ,which s not pirit,sspirit:(n=s)&(n=s). he existencetruth) f this ontradictionllowsspirito thinkunderstand) hat t s:spiritndnature,piritndnotspirit; nd thus to achieve tstelos,n whichform t is theAbsolute. t shouldbe notedthat the Absolute s still con-tradictorytate.Nature nd spirit o not annihilate achother;each still xists, equiring he other. n the final tateof thedialectic,he contradictions saidto be resolved; r aufgehoben;but as Hegel is often t painsto pointout,the statewhich saufgehobenontinues o exist.Resolution,n this ontext,smorelikethe resolutionf a puzzle:we know heanswer. he puzzledoes not ease tobea puzzle; tustceases opuzzleus. Ariddlesstill riddle ven f we all know heanswer.)The achievementftheAbsolutentheglobal ialecticsnot,however,rrived t ina trice.Rather, heproductionf a cate-gory hat llows pirito thinktselfsachieved nly fter periodofconceptual volution,he ogicaldialectic. he mostprimitivecategory,eing, roduces contradiction.his contradictionro-duces novel ategory, hich s tselfontradictory.his, nturn,produces novel ategory. nd so itgoes,untilwe arrive t theAbsolutedea (Taylor, 975,339)- a category hich ppliestothebiggest ontradictionf them ll,theAbsolute. his allowsthoughtothinktself.The inspirationor he ogical ialectics Kant'sAntinomyfPure Reason.As we noted n the astsection,Hegel concludedthat heprinciplesfreasonwhich overn heuseofthecatego-ries nKant's ntinomiesntail contradiction:he ategoriesrethereforenconsistent.oreover,heKantianntinomiesre,forHegel,but he ipofaniceberg. llcategories orat east ll theimportantnes arecontradictory.t s ustthiswhich roducesthe ogicaldialectic.See Taylor's xcellent iscussion f all this;Taylor,1975,228.)The arguments sed in theLogicto showthatthe variouscategoriesre inconsistentrea motleyndrather nconvincingcrew.The same maybe said of the ways n whichthe con-tradictionsnonecategory iverise o another.However,tmayhelpto llustrateheprocesswith neexample, hat fbeing ndbecomingHegel,1969,Vol. I, book1, ection ,ch. 1).Considerbeing.f something,, weremerely o be, that s, to have no


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DIALECTICAND DIALETHEIC 403properties therthanbeing,then therewouldbe nothing odistinguishtfrom nobject hathas nopropertiestall, .e.,thatis not. t would hereforeoth e and notbe,Ba&c~Ba where istheone placepredicate fbeing).Thus,we areled toa categoryofthings,,whose eings their on-beingBa=*~Ba. These arethethings hat re coming ntobeingor out of it. (Recallthediscussionfchange nsection .) This s thereforehecategoryof becoming.

The logicaldialectic,hough development,s nota processin time. t is,however,onnectedwith ne that s. For spiritsembodiednnature, nd,particularly,umankindnd itssocialinstitutions;nd thesechange n the historical ialectic. achsocial nstitution,eing fragmentfGeist,eflectstspropertiesto a certain xtent.Rather s thewholeof an image s visiblenanyfragmentf a hologram.)n particular,t is contradictory.Thus, it also has itsownteloswhich tmusttry o achievebyproducing contradictorytate.However, nlike he imilarma-neuverwith hewhole, hismaneuver esultsn the destructionand replacementf thesituation. ontradictionsre thereforefatal oparts f thewhole finite eings);not so the whole tself(Taylor, 975,105ff).tfollowshat he tatewhich ucceeds heold doesnot transcendaufhebt)t nquitethe ameway hat heAbsoluteranscendshe pirit/natureontradiction.n particular,theoldcontradictions nolonger rue though ewoneswillbe).Hegel'smost amous xample fthiskind f situations thatofthemaster/slaveelationshipTaylor,1975,153-7).At a cer-tainstage,peopleneed therecognitionf othersfor theirde-velopmenttelos).incethey avenot earned ocooperate rop-erly, heonlywaythatthisrecognitionmaybe achieved s byforce.Othersmustbe enslaved nd made torecognize. ut theenslavementf others ehumanizeshem; ndthus, ven ftheyare forcedto recognize he master, heycannotprovidetherecognitionhatthe masterrequires.By a dialectical rony,however,hesituationoes provide or hedevelopmentftheslave.Fortheslave,unlike hemaster,s required o labor. Be-cause of this, he slavegainscontrol vertheworld,which sfreedom.Moreover,he lave ivesna precariousosition:tanymoment emaybe killed; hushis self-awarenesssheightened,andhe becomes ware fhisfreedom. hispaves hewayfor heoverthrowftheslavery.


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404 SCIENCEfcfOCIETYBefore heoverthrow,he tate fthe lave sliterallycon-tradictoryne: he is bothfree nd bound notfree).The con-tradictorytate f forced aborhas,ofcourse,been stressed yMarxists,nd wewill ake his p inthenext ection. utperhapsthepersonwhohasbroughtut thecontradictoryature fthefreedom roducedby oppressionmostvividlys Sartre. orex-ample,he says 1949, 12,mytranslation):

Neverhavewe been freer hanunder heGerman ccupation.Wehad lost llourrights,ndprimarilyhat fspeaking;wewere nsultedoourfaces veryday nd we had to be silent.We weredeportednmasse,sworkers,sJews,spolitical risoners;verywherenwalls,nnewspapers,nthe creen, ewouldmeet hevile nd nsipid ace hat uroppressors ishedogiveusofourselves:Becauseof all thatwe werefree. incethe Nazipoison lipped ntoourverythoughts,very urethought asa victory;ince n all-powerfulolice oughtto constrain s to silence, achwordbecameprecious,ikea declarationfprinciple; ince we weresurrounded,ach gesture arried heweight f acommitment.. .It s ikelyobeobjected hat his ontradictorytate s not iterallyso, since theoppressedperson s free and bound in differentrespects.Moregenerally,t soften laimed hat ialecticallyon-tradictorytates re neverdialetheias incetheapparentlyon-tradictoryredicatesre true ndifferentespectssee,e.g.,Nor-man and Sayers, 980,30-1). Severalpoints re relevant ere.The firsts that hegeneral laimhaslittle oingfor t.There snothingosupportt ave dogmaticssertionhat ialetheiasreimpossible.Moreover,his s the firstontradictione have metwhere this charge looks even remotely lausible.Secondly,however,tmust e admittedhat ome ontradictionsignaled ydialecticians o seem to be onlyapparentcontradictions,heappearancebeingdispelled nce therespectsnwhich he con-tradictoryredicatespply re spelledout.The third oint s that, espite his, hecharge hat con-tradictions only pparent toftenmuchharder omake stickthan ssupposed.The quotationrom artrellustrateshis.Whatare thesenses nwhich heoccupiedpeoplewerefree nd not?Theywerenotfreenthat hey ouldnot, ecauseoftheoccupa-tion, o exactlys they hose.But,as Sartre tressed,hismadethem ealize hat heyould o exactlys theyhose.Butthiss noconsistentisambiguation:t s ustas contradictory.ne maybe


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DIALECTICANDDIALETHEIC 405temptedosaythat heywerenot free nthesensethat, houghthey ould do exactlys they hose, heywouldbe punished ordoingmanyof the things heywantedto do. But this s ustplaying ast nd loosewith henotion fdoingas one chooses.The situation here ne must esilent r beshot s a paradigmfone whichwouldcorrectlye described s involving o realchoice.The trouble ere sthat henotion fhaving choice oesnot have thecrystal recision f,e.g.,mathematicalredicates.We useseveral riteriaor ecidingwhether free hoice s made.Each is normallyufficientorthe correct ttributionf thephrase;yet ometimeshesemaynot ll lineupon the amesideofthefield.Andifthey o,theonly dequatedescriptionf thesituationmaywellbe a contradictoryne. Neitherwill t do toinsist hat hemany riteriafapplicationhow hat hephrase sipsoacto mbiguous. orquiteunambiguoushrases,uch s "hasa temperaturef 700C,"mayhavemanydifferentriteria fapplication; nd theseare by no means logically uaranteedcoincidence.11 hus, a summary ismissalof putativecon-tradictionsn the groundsof "differencen respect" s quitesuperficial.7 Contradictionn Marx'sDialectics

HavingdiscussedHegel, et us now turn o Marx,whoin-herited isdialectic romHegel.Marx'sdialecticnvolves some-what radicalre-interpretationf Hegel's,and certainly as arather ifferentmphasis. utstructurally,t svery imilar.Wemay, s inHegel,distinguishetweenheglobaldialectic nd thetwo ocaldialectics,ogical nd historical.Underthe nfluencefFeuerbach,heyoungMarx reinter-pretedHegel'sGeist s Manor, better, umanity. egel's globaldialectic herefore ecamethe dialectic f humanity. o be apersons to have certainelos, hich sself-development.his sto be achievednotbythinking,utbyworking,abor. But thelabor lienatestself ndcomes o existncontradictionopeople.Alienatedabor objectifiedabor) s,ofcourse,ust capital es-sentiallyheheart f the abor heoryfvalue)existings private11 For a furtherdiscussionof contradiction nd multicriterialerms,see Priest andRoutley,1983,ch. 3, section1,and ch. 5, section2. These chapters re reprinted s theintroductions o parts2 and 4 of Priest, tai, 1989.


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406 SCIENCE & SOCIETYproperty.hus we have the fundamentalontradictionetweenpeople (labor)and capital dead labor).The contradictions re-solvedbytheproductionf a communistocietywhereprivatepropertyisappears, eople aborfor hemselves,husfulfillingtheir telos.Despitethe re-interpretation,he similarity ithHegel isobvious.Moreover,s in Hegel,thealienated tate s literallycontradictoryne.Humanity,,while till einghumanity,=h,loses its essence "species ife"),becomes dehumanized.Thus,humanitysnothumanity,ih. Marx ometimes akes hepoint,notwithrespect o humanity,ut withrespect o itsessential,defining,haracteristic:abor.Forexample,he says 1977, 110):EstrangementAlienation] s manifested otonly nthe fact hatmymeans of ifebelong to someone lse . . butalso in the factthateverythings itself omethingdifferentrom tself thatmy activitylabor] is somethinglse ...

Ofcourse, he abor s stillmy ctivity;therwisetwouldnotbe differentromtself. hus the abor s both dentical o itselfand differentromtself:/=/)&(/=/).The most mportanttructural ifference etweenHegel'sand Marx'sdialectics orthepresent oncerns that nthefinalstage f Marx's ialecticheresolutionf the ontradictionctual-lyremovest;there s nocontradictionetweenabor ndcapitalin a communistociety.Marx'sdiscussionf theglobaldialectic ccursmainlynhisearlierworks,nd especiallyheEconomicndPhilosophicalan-uscripts.ButseealsoCapital, ol. I, ch.32.) Hisdiscussion f thelocaldialecticssmoreprominentnthe aterworks, otablyheGrundrissend CapitalOf thesedialectics,he ogicaldialecticsperhapsoflesser mportance.n his ogicaldialectic, egel de-duced the categoriesof Thought by considering he con-tradictionsneach. n the ameway,Marxdeduces ategories,utthis timethey re the categories f Man, and particularlyfeconomics. his smost videntntheearly hapters f Vol. I ofCapital Startingwiththe basic notionof a commodity, arxarrives t the notions fmoney, apital nd so on. (See the ex-cellent iscussionn lyenkov,960, h.5; see also lyenkov,977,essay10.)How plausible ll this s I need notdiscuss, utan example


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DIALECTICAND DIALETHEIC 407will larifyhe ituation: arx's eductionf thenotion fmoneyfrom hat f the ommodity.uman rtifacts ay e used ortheymaybe exchanged. ut fthey rebeingusedthey re notbeingexchanged, nd viceversa.Marxrecords hisbysaying hat nobject, ,maybe a usevalue,Ua,oran (exchange) alue,Va,butnotboth, (Ua8cVa): "The samecommodityannot, herefore,simultaneouslyppearin bothformsn thesameexpression fvalue.These formsxclude achother s polaropposites"1976,140). But in theexchangeof a commodity,hecommoditysrelated o anothersboth se and exchange) alue; t sthereforeboth:Ua8cVa. he contradictoryropertysacquired tthepointof (ex)change 1976, 152):A commoditys a use-valueor objectofutility,nd a "value." It appears as thetwo-fold hingthat t really s as soon as its value possesses itsown particularformof manifestation,which is distinctfrom ts natural form. This formofmanifestations exchangevalue, and thecommoditynever has thisformwhenlooked at in isolation,butonlywhen it is a value-relation r exchange relationwitha second commodity f a different ind.Thusweare led totheexistencefsomething,, whosebeinguse value is exactly tsbeingan (exchange)value *Ua=*Va,money,whichmediates nd thereforellows heexchange ela-tion 1976, 198):We saw . . that heexchangeofcommoditiesmplies ontradictorynd mutuallyexclusive conditions.The furtherdevelopmentof the commoditydoes notabolish these contradictions, ut ratherprovides the form withinwhichtheyhave roomto move.This is, n general,theway n whichreal contradictionsreresolved.

The historicalocaldialecticsundoubtedlyhemostmpor-tant ne n Marx's aterwritings.achsocialpracticer nstitutionhasa telosnow houghtf s animmanentendency).he realiza-tionofthisforcest nto contradictorytate,which annotbesustained;whence tdisappears.Perhapsthe mostfamous x-ampleof this s the contradictionetween he forces fproduc-tion nd therelationsfproductionnthePreface o theCritiqueofPoliticalconomy.he forces fproduction avea certain elos.In order ofulfillhis,t a certaintagentheir evelopment,heyproducethe social relations f capitalism. ut ultimatelyhe


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408 SCIENCEfSOCIETYforces ndercut hosevery elations, hich hereforeease.Thecapitalisttate f affairssliterallycontradictoryne forMarx.In fact,trealizes number fcontradictions.orexample, ro-duction s social ndyetprivateCapital, ol. II, ch.27); and thelaborerslikeHegel'sslaves) re bothfree nd bound.Again, he ccusationmaybe leveled hat hese tates renotliterallyontradictory,ince hecontradictoryredicatesretrueindifferentespects.n response othis, hepointsmade nreplyto the amecharge gainstHegelarepertinent.he chargemayhave some ustice;but to supposethatthis s always o is ustwishfulhinking.n the ast ectionwe saw that twas not o easytoseparate reedom rom ondage nthecase of the slave.Thispointwill be reinforcedfwe considerMarx'sanalysis f thesimilar redicamentf thewage-slave. or the freedom f thewage-laborersnotseparable rom isbondage, ut s inextrica-bly oundupwith t.As Marx xplains,t s thenature fhis aborwhichmakes he aborer oth ound ndfree,o that isfreedomis hisbondage.Withunemploymentn a world cale a chronicreality,with hemiserable ryof theperpetually nemployedringingn our ears,thefollowing ordsof Marx have an un-mistakable erisimilitude"Adam Smith:Workas Sacrifice,"Marx,1973,611):In thesweatofthy row halt hou abour! wasJehova'scurseon Adam. And thisis labour for Adam]Smith, curse."Tranquillity"ppears as theadequate state,as identical with"freedom"and "happiness." It seems quite far fromSmith'smindthat the individual, in his normalstateof health, trength, ctivity,kill,facility,"lso needs a normalportionofwork, nd ofthesuspensionoftranquil-ity.Certainly,abour obtains tsmeasure fromoutside,throughthe aim to beattained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining t. But Smithhas noinklingwhatever hat thisovercoming f obstacles s in itself liberating ctiv-ity and that,further, he external imsbecome strippedof thesemblance ofmerelyexternalnaturalurgencies,and become positedas aims whichthe in-dividualhimself osits hence as self-realisation,bjectificationf thesubject,hence real freedom,whose action is, precisely,abour. He is right, f course,that, n its historicforms s slave-labour, erf-abour and wage-labour, abouralwaysappears as repulsive, lwaysas externalorcedabour; nd not-labour,bycontrast, s "freedom nd happiness."This holdsdoubly:forthiscontradictorylabour. . .The forced utself-creatingature fwage-labors nottheonlycriterialension xistingn this ontradiction.here is also that


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DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEIC 409between the legal positionand the harshreality f the laborer'ssituation.Again Marx (1976, ch. 10, 415-6):Itmust e acknowledgedhat ur workermerges romheprocess fproduc-tion ooking ifferentlyromwhenhe enteredt. n themarket,s owner facommoditylabourpower," e stoodfaceto face with ther wners f com-modities,neowner gainstnother wner. he contractywhich e soldhislabour ower othe apitalistrovedn black ndwhite,o tospeak, hat e wasfreeto disposeof himself. ut whenthe transaction asconcluded,twasdiscovered hathe wasno "free gent,"hat heperiod f time orwhich e isfree o sellhis abour-powerstheperiod ftime orwhich e s forced o sell t,that n fact hevampirewillnot etgo "while here emains singlemuscle,sinew, ropofblood, obe exploited." or"protection"gainst he erpent ftheir gonies, heworkers aveto puttheirheadstogethernd,as a class,compel hepassing fa law, n all-powerfulocial arrierywhich hey anbepreventedromelling hemselvesnd their amiliesnto laverynd deathbyvoluntaryontract ith apital.

These tensions n thecriteria or freedommean that heonlyaccuratewayofdescribing hewage-laborer's ituation s as beingboth freeand not free.The quotationsmake itquite clear whatconsiderations roundeach oftheseattributions;ut it n no wayfollows hatfreedomfalls partneatly nto differentspects, ikean over-cooked hicken.Rather, s with rawchicken, eparationcan onlybe done byviolence.Before we leave Marx, a word about Engels. Engels has amuchplainer iterary tyle haneitherMarxor Hegel. Because ofthishe is,of thethree, heone whose commitmento dialetheismis least gainsayable.Thus, he says (1975, ch. 12, 139, 140):Motion tselfsa contradiction:ven implemechanicalhange fplace anonlycome bout hroughbody toneand the amemomentftime eing othnaplace nd in another lace,being n oneand the ameplace ndalso not nit.Life onsistsreciselynthis, hat livinghingsateachmomenttselfndyetsomethinglse.Life tself,herefore,s a contradictionhat sobjectivelyresentinthingsnd processes,nd is constantlyssertingndresolvingtself.Engels' evidentdialetheismhas not found favorwiththosewhohavewantedtointerpret ialectics n sucha wayas towrite ut itsdialetheism.This has led tocriticism,nd even some abuse, from


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410 SCIENCE & SOCIETYwesternwriters:Engels' views are crude and unsophisticated. tshould be clear now that thisdoes Engels a great injustice;hisviews on contradiction re no different rom hoseof Hegel andMarx: he just expressesthem n a language that the man on theClapham omnibus can understand.WhereEngelsisdue for omecensure sin hisenthusiasm orseeing contradictionwhere it does not exist an enthusiasmwhich has carried over to many subsequent Marxists.For ex-ample, the claim that the square root of -1 is a contradictoryentity 1975, 141) demonstrates n unfortunatenaivete aboutmathematics.Though modern critics hould rememberthathe,unlike they,had not had the opportunity o read Weierstrass,Dedekind and the other 19th-centurymathematicianswhohelped sortout the morass nthe foundations fanalysis.)Even inseeingcontradictions nder thebed, however,Engelswas merelyaccentuating tendency hat was alreadypresent n the subject.Hegel was already straining o show thatmanyof the so-calledcontradictionsn the ocal dialectics re literallyo; and Marx wasnever one to letpedantryget n thewayofa good bitof rhetoric(Povertyf Philosophy,h. 2, section5, quoting fromMcLellan,1977, 215):Meanwhile theantagonismbetween theproletariatnd thebourgeois s a strug-gle of class againstclass,a strugglewhich arried out to itshighest xpression stotal revolution. ndeed, is it at all surprising hat a societyfounded on theoppositionofclasses should culminate nbrutal ontradiction,he shockofbodyagainstbody,as its final denoumenti8 IdentitynDifference

Having discussed the occurence and role of dialetheias inMarx's and Hegel's dialectics, now want to returnto the ques-tion, efthangingat the end of section4, of the exact nature ofdialecticalcontradictions.Many of the dialetheiasthatwe havecome across in the preceding discussion are of the form(a=b)8c(ab), something's eingboth denticalwith, nd differentfrom something (else?). This is Hegel's (in)famous notion ofidentityndifferenceTaylor,1975,80). Though manyhave beenpuzzled bythisnotion t s,as we see, quite transparent nce oneceases to tryto reinterpretHegel in a consistent ashion. I willnow argue thatthis s theform of a dialecticalcontradiction, owhich all othersreduce.


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DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEIC 411First,we have metcontradictions f the form a=a)8c(aa).These are obviouslyof this form. Anothermain formof con-tradiction hat we have come across in the precedingsections swhere a thing s identicalwith tsopposite: AA=A~A Thus, forexample, thatsomething, , is free Fa) is identicalto itsbeingbound (not free): *Fa=*~Fa. This, too, is a special form ofidentityn difference. or, as we noted in section3, it is alwaystruethat Ata~A. Thus, identityfopposites s ust theidentity

in differenceAA=A~A)&(AA*A~A).In fact,the identity f opposites *A=*~A is doubly con-tradictory,ince it also givesrise to thecontradiction 8c~A. ForeitherA or ~A; without oss of generality, uppose the former.Then AA s true,bythe T-scheme (AA s trueiffA). But if AA=A~A, AA is true implies A~A is true (by the substitutivityfidenticals).Hence A~A is truetoo. It follows hat A, againbytheT-scheme. Thus, bothA and -A.Some doubt maybe caston thisargumentbythe fact that tuses the lawof excluded middle,Av~A, a law of logicthatHegelsometimes hootsat. But first, ote that the law is quite valid onthesemantics f section3, as I noted there.Secondly,whenHegeldoes shootat the aw, t s not because he thinkst failsto be true;in fact t "is so trivial,t is hardlyworththe trouble of saying t"(1969, Vol. I, book 2, section1,eh. 2C, 438). Rather, t s becauseitmaybe false (as well)!Two particularcases of the identity f opposites are worthcommenting n. First,Hegel oftendescribes dentityndifferenceby sayingthatsomething'sbeing identicalwith tself s itsbeingdifferent rom tself.This is ust theidentity f opposites (Aa=a)= (Aa=a). econdly,to return o the dialectics f motion thatwediscussed nsection , this, oo,canbe seen as a case ofthe dentityof opposites. For we may take the instantaneouscontradictionproduced in a stateof motionto be thatthe body's being in acertainplace is its not being in thatplace, *A=*~A. This willimply hat t both s and is notin thatplace,A8c~A, as I have ustobserved.Moreover,because thistypeof contradictions identi-fiedas a stateof change,it is naturalto describeanystate of theform*A=*~A as a statewhereAA s changingintoitsoppositeA~A, or vice versa. Thus, the identity f opposites is frequentlydescribed nthisway, s,for xample,theoppositesgoing ver ntoeach other.


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412 SCIENCE & SOCIETYWe have now seen that all the dialecticalcontradictionswehave met are instances fidentityndifference:a=b)8c(ab). Wemay therefore ake this to be the general formof a dialecticalcontradiction. his isan excellentwayofdoing usticeto thepointwe noted in section4, thatthepoles of a dialectical ontradictionmust have a tighter elation than mere extensionalconjunction.For thepoles of the identityn differencea=b)8c(ab), a and b,are actually dentical with though different rom)each other;

(dialectical) identity s thereforethe relationshipbetween thepoles of a dialecticalcontradiction.9 Dialectics and Epistemology

I have discussed the role and formof contradiction n di-alectics. There is, of course, much more to dialectics than this.Much of the interestn Hegel's and Marx's dialectics s in theiranalyses of the nature of concrete contradictory ituations.Moreover,the identityn difference f variousnotions,such asbeing and nothingness,matter nd consciousness,freedomandnecessityhave many consequences and ramifications. cannothope to explore them all here, in what is already a verylongpaper. But letme,as a taste, xplorebrieflyne example: thatofbeing-in-itselfnd being-in-consciousness.This is taken fromSayers,1985,part 1,where a full nd non-formal iscussionmaybe found.)An object,a, may existin consciousnessCa, or out of con-sciousness (in itself), Ca. Let us writec forACa, its being inconsciousness, nd c* for tsbeing in itself,A~Ca. Suppose thatthese are related by the identity n difference of opposites:(c=c*)&(c=c*).Then variouspeople in thehistory f philosophyhave seen only one side of this contradiction, nd have thuslanded themselves n awkwardphilosophical problems.Dualists(such as Locke) argued thatthe thing n itself nd the thing nconsciousness re merely istinct =c*. his raises theproblemofhow knowledge is possible,since there is, ipsofacto,no way ofturning heobjectofknowledge, hething nitself,nto theobjectof consciousness. Non-dialecticalmonists,on the other hand,argued merelythat c=c*. This positioncomes in two varieties.Traditional idealists such as Berkeley)denied the autonomousexistence of a mind-independent eality, nd thuswished to re-


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DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEIC 413duce e* toc. This leads to a variety f nsolubleproblems oncern-ingtheobjectivityfknowledge, heproblemofotherminds, tc.Traditional materialistssuchas central tatematerialists) ycon-trast,denied the autonomous existenceof matter-independentthought, nd thus tried oreducec to c*. This leads to a variety fproblems;forexample,those stressedbyfunctionalists,ut morecrucially,hoseposed bythephenomenological spectsofthought(whichstillplague functionalism).

The dialecticalmonist,however,has seen both sides of thecontradiction. ike the traditional ualistthey ssert the distinct-ness of c and c*9and thus avoid the problemsassociated witheither of the reductionist rograms.Like the traditionalmonist,however,theyassert the identity f c and c*, thus avoiding theproblemof the disjuncturebetween the two. The contradictionc=c*9 indeed, marks the transition f the object in itself ntoconsciousness, nd thus of cognition tself.Thus, the dialecticalmonistsees the recognition f the identityn difference f thething-within-consciousnessnd the thing-without-consciousness,(=*)&(=*),s central to an adequate understandingof thenature of cognition.There is an objectionhere reminiscent f Eulathus' famousreply to Protagoras; namely that since the dialectical monistasserts that c=c* hen theyare still stuckwith the distinctionbetweenc and c*; and since they ssertthat c=c* theymuststillhave the problemof reducingone to the other.Thus the con-tradictory ositiongivesrisetothe worstfbothpositions,notthebest.Though thereply s a cleverone, it does notwork.For it isnot the merefactthatcc* thatgivesrise to theproblemfor thedualist,but the fact that there is no way of bridgingthe gapbetweenthe twopoles. For the dialecticalmonist, hisbridge isprovidedbythecontradiction,which marksthe transition f theobject ntoconsciousness.And the mere fact hatone acceptsthatc=c* does not require ne to reduce eitherto the other. Indeed,giventhatthey re also distinct,here hould be no temptation odo this.10 Conclusion

With this ratherbrief look at an application of dialectics,whichshowsvery learly hedialetheicnatureofdialectics, will


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414 SCIENCE tf SOCIETYend. Knowledgeable ialecticians ill, n a sense,have learnednothingmuchfrom hispaper:a rose,by anyothername, s arose;yet rose,by nother ame,might edecidedlymisleading;I hope,at anyrate, hatdialecticians ill t leasthave learnedfrom hispaperthat t s a spade hat s called "a spade."12TheUniversityfQueenslandQueensland, ustralia12 1 amgratefulor ommentsn an earlier raftf his aper oRichard ampbell, wePetersenndespeciallyeanSayers. art f that raftwas readatthe econdHegelconferencet theUniversityfNewcastle, ew SouthWales,November 986.

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397.Colletti,L. 1975. "Marxismand the Dialectic."NewLeftReview, 3, 3-29.Comey,D. 1966. "Current Trends in SovietLogic." Inquiry, . 94-108.Cornforth,M. 1971. Materialism nd the DialecticalMethod.New York: In-ternationalPublishers.Edwards, P., ed. 1967. Encyclopaedia f Philosophy.ondon: Macmillan.Engels, F. 1975 (1894). Anti-Dhring. oscow: ProgressPublishers.Gilson,E. 1972. L'tre t 'essence. rin.Grice, H. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." n TheLogicofGrammar,ds. D.Davidson and G. Harman. Dickenson,64-75.Havas, K. 1981. "Some Remarkson an Attempt t FormalisingDialecticalLog-ic." Studies n SovietThought,2, 257-64.Heath, P. andJ.Lachs, transi.1982. Science fKnowledge. ambridgeUniversityPress.Hegel,G. W. F. 1895 (1840). LecturesntheHistoryfPhilosophy.ol. III. London:Kegan Paul, Trench and Trbner.Hegel, G. W. F. 1969 (1812). The Science f Logic.London: Allen and Unwin.Hegel, G. W. F. 1975 (1830). Lesser ogic.London: Oxford University ress.Heron,G., transi.1954. De Docta gnoratia. ondon: Routledgeand Kegan Paul.Ilyenkov, . V. 1982 (1960). TheDialectics f heAbstractnd theConcreten Marx'sCapital.Moscow: ProgressPublishers.Ilyenkov,E. V. 1977 (1974). Dialectical ogic.Moscow: ProgressPublishers.Kolakowski, . 1978. MainCurrentsfMarxism. xford: OxfordUniversityress.Lobkowicz,N. 1961. "The Principleof Contradictionn Recent Soviet Philoso-phy."Studies n Soviet hilosophy,, 44-49.Marx, K. 1973 (1858). Grundrisse. ew York: Penguin.Marx, K. 1976 (1867). Capital.Vol. I. New York: Penguin.


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DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEIC 415Marx,K. 1977 (1844). EconomicndPhilosophical anuscripts. oscow: ProgressPublishers.Marx, K. 1978 (1885). Capital,Vol II. New York: Penguin.McLellan,D., ed. 1977.Karl Marx: SelectedWritings.xford: Oxford UniversityPress.Montague, R. 1973. "The Proper Treatmentof Quantification n OrdinaryEnglish." n ApproachesoNaturalLanguage:Proceedingsf he tanfordWork-shopon Grammarnd Semantics,ds. J. Hintikka, tal Reidel.Narskii, . 1965. "The ProblemofContradictionn Mechanical Motion and theDiscussion in Filosofskieauki."Studiesn Soviet hilosophy,, 24-33.Narskii, . 1970. "Hegel and Contemporary ogic." StudiesnSoviet hilosophy,,355-373.Norman, R., and S. Sayers. 1980.Hegel,MarxandDialectic:A Debate.HarvesterPress.Popper, K. 1940. "What s Dialectic?"Mind,49. 403-26. Reprinted s ch. 15 ofK. Popper, ConjecturesndRefutations,outledgeand Kegan Paul, 1963.Priest,G. 1979. "Logic of Paradox."Journal f Philosophicalogic,8, 219-41.Priest,G. 1982. "To Be and Not to Be: DialecticalTense Logic." StudiaLogica,41, 249-68.Priest,G. 1985. "Inconsistenciesn Motion."Americanhilosophicaluarterly,2,

339-46.Priest,G. 1986. "Contradiction, elief nd Rationality."roceedingsf heAristote-lian Society,6, 99-116.Priest,G. 1987. In Contradiction.ijhoff.Priest,G., and R. Routley.1983.OnParaconsistency.esearchReport13,Depart-mentofPhilosophy,ResearchSchool of Social Sciences,AustralianNationalUniversity.Priest,G., and R. Routley.1984. "Introduction:Paraconsistent ogics." StudiaLogica,43, 3-16.Priest,G., etal, eds. 1989. Paraconsistentogics.PhilosophiaVerlag.Sartre,J.-P. 1949. Situation,II. Gallimard.Sayers, . 1985.Realitynd Reason:Dialecticndthe heoryfKnowledge. lackwell.Sheptulin,A. P. 1978.Marxist-Leninisthilosophy. oscow: ProgressPublishers.Smart,N. 1967. "Eckhart,Meister." n Edwards, 1967, Vol. II, 449-451.Taylor,C. 1975. Hegel London: CambridgeUniversity ress.Wetter,G. A. 1958. DialecticalMaterialism.ondon: Routledgeand Kegan Paul.

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