DH B7 Public Hearing- Improvising Defense Fdr- Tab 4-4- Day of 911 Suggested Hearing Questions-...

8/14/2019 DH B7 Public Hearing- Improvising Defense Fdr- Tab 4-4- Day of 911 Suggested Hearing Questions- NORAD 570

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DAY OF 9/11Suggested Hearing Questions

II. NORAD WitnessesCommander of NORAD and U.S. NorthCom, Ralph E. Eberhart: On themorning of 9/11 General Eberhart was in his office at Peterson Air Force Base inColorado. His office is approximately 30 minutes away from the NORADoperations center, located in Cheyenne Mountain. The highest ranking official atthe operations center was General Findley, a Canadian officer. At 8:45 a.m. EDTGeneral Findley notified General Eberhart of the first reported hijacking. Gen.Eberhart remained in his office for the next hour or so; he told the Commission hearrived at the Mountain shortly after the shoot down order had been passed.Retired Commander of CONR and First Air Force, Larry Arnold: GeneralArnold was in his office at Tyndall Air Force Base in Panama City, Florida whenhe received word of a real-world hijacking in progress. General Arnold phonedthe commander of the Northeast Air Defense Sector, Col. Robert Marr. ColMarrinformed General Arnold that he had placed F-l 5 fighters from Otis AFB onbattle stations and wanted to scramble them to track the hijacked aircraft. GeneralArnold told Colonel Marr "[g]o ahead and scramble them and we'll get authoritieslater." hi his Commission interview, Arnold acknowledged that his testimony inMay 2003 differed from the facts presented to him during the course of theinterview. He explained that his briefing for the May 2003 testimony wascompiled by Col. Scott based onNEADS data, the validity of which Arnold hadaccepted at that time.1. Evolution of the NORAD Mission and the Posture of NORAD on 9/11.When General Eberhart took command of NORAD in 2000, he stated h ispriorities were to: 1) increase radar capabilities; 2) improve the ballistic missiledefense; and 3) find a "way-ahead "for cruise missile defense. General Eberhartalso told us the post Cold W ar threat was determined to be ICBMs and not longrange aviation. The alert sites and air defense assets decreased accordingly.General Eberhart stated air superiority was important, but there was a "ragingdebate "during th e 1990 s over th e mission's relevance. General Eberhartexplained that he had some concerns about th e fact the radar picture available tothe FAA w as in a steady state of atrophy prior to 9/11. During his interview withCommission s t a f f , General Arnold discussed th e impact of th e reductionof alertsites on the mission of NORAD. Specifically, General Arnold stated that NORADcould provide only "token air sovereignty "once th e numberof alert sites werereduced to seven. With only seven alert sites, he believed there were portions ofthe country, particularly along th e southern border, that were vulnerable to airthreats.(a) Given its posture on 9/11, did you believe NORAD was prepared to defend thecountry against all airborne threats? If not, then did you voice your concerns


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about any perceived deficiencies? Did you think NORAD was prepared to defendagainst asymmetric threats to the US? If not, why not? What about theasymmetric threat of attack from terrorists? If not, why not? [Gen. Eberhart orGen. Arnold](b) On 9/11, what did you perceive to be the greatest airborne threats to the US?Did you think NORAD was sufficiently postured to meet these threats? If not,why not? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold]2. Pre-9/11 Contemplation of Use of Hijacked Aircraft as a Weapon. GeneralEberhart told Commission staff that, prior to 9/11, NORAD did not postulateterrorists controlling an aircraft. They believed the pilot in control of the aircraftwould no t comply with terrorist demands to use the aircraft as a weapon.According to General Eberhart, to the extent NORAD considered aircraft asw eapons, the threat was alw ays perceived a s an external threat entering the U.S.from overseas. Under this scenario, NORAD w ould have more time to react tothe airborne threat.(a) Prior to 9/11, was there any discussion within NORAD regarding the threat ofhijacked aircraft as weapons? If so, can you explain who was involved in thosediscussions and what the analysis of the threat was? Did NORAD receive anyintelligence information prior to 9/11 related to the use of aircraft as weapons?[Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold](b) If NORAD knew that terrorists had entered our country and establishedsupport networks prior to 9/11, would that information have changed NORAD'sview regarding the threat of hijacked aircraft as weapons? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen.Arnold](c) If NORAD had learned that terrorists were taking lessons in the US to learnhow to fly commercial aircraft, would that information have changed NORAD'sview regarding the threat of hijacked aircraft as weapons? What actions might thathave prompted NORAD to take? Would NORAD have sought to enhance itsradar coverage? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold]3. NORAD's Training and Exercises Prior to 9/11. General Eberhart toldCommission staff it was "tough "to get the FAA to participate in NO RAD 'straining an d exercises before 9/11. He said the FAA lacked the manpower toparticipate. General Eberhart also told us there w ere pre-9/11 exercise scenariosthat exercised the Rules of Engagement ("ROE") against hijacked commercialaircraft up the chain of National Command Authority for shoot-downauthorization. He further explained these exercises alw ays contemplated therewould be plenty of time to obtain the authorization and the hijacked aircraft w aspresumed to have a transponder co de giving the aircraft's location. GeneralEberhart also stated there w as no air defense training or the National Capital


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Region prior to 9/11, an d that NORAD did not have standing protocols for NCRCombat Air Patrols (CAPs) becauseall air threats -were perceived to be external.(a) Did NORAD ever engage in joint exercises with the FAA prior to 9/11? If so,when was the last joint exercise? What were the lessons learned from any pre-9/11joint exercises? Were there any issues that surfaced concerningcommunications, tracking the aircraft or radar capabilities? If so, how were thoseissues addressed? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold](b) By now, most of us have heard about the real world examples cited to in theJoint Inquiry report by Congress concerning the use of aircraft as weapons priorto 9/11. IfNORAD training includes preparation for the worst case scenario, thenwhy were there no exercises that contemplated the need for immediate NCAapproval to shoot down a commercial aircraft? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold](c) When there were real world events prior to 9/11 that presented an increasedthreat against theNational Capital Region, like a Presidential Inauguration, didNORAD provide an air defense for such an event? If not, why not? If yes, thenwas there any discussion concerning a NCR defense in light of the informationduring the spring and summer of 2001 about an increased threat to the US? [Gen.Eberhart or Gen. Arnold](d) In the planning phases of Exercise Positive Force 01 (PF-01), NORADreportedly proposed an event that included an aircraft crashing into the Pentagon.Were you aware of the NORAD proposal when it was made? If no, are youfamiliar today with the details of the PF-01 proposal?(e) According to a person with knowledge of the Positive Force exercises,NORAD personnel usually do not "come out of the blue [with threat scenarios],they usually have some basis." Was the proposal tied to any real worldintelligence or threat reporting?(f ) Were you informed that the proposal was rejected? If so, what was yourreaction? [Gen. Eberhart]4. Day of 9/11.(a) While you were at NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs what was yoursituational awareness of the events that were unfolding? What were your primarysources of information? Who were you communicating with? What noteworthyactions or decisions do you recall making while you were still at youHeadquarters office in Colorado Springs?(b) What time did you depart for the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center(CMOC)? What time did you arrive? Did you have adequate communications


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during your transit to CMOC? Do you recall making any noteworthy decisionsduring your transit?(c) When you arrived at the CMOC, what noteworthy actions or decisions did youmake?5. Shoot Down Order on 9/11. General Eberhart told the staff he thinks theshoot down order was passed shortly before he arrivedat Cheyenne Mountain.He reacted that to shoot downan aircraft based on its locationwas an extremeact. He communicated to CONR that the pilots would still need to look or a"hostile" act.(1) When and how was the order authorizing the shoot down of commercialpassed to NORAD? Once the order was received, how was it transmitted downthe chain of command within NORAD? Were you involved in the chain ofcommand at that time? [Eberhart & Arnold](2) On the morning of 9/11, did you think the shoot down order had been passedto the pilots patrolling Washington DC? When did you first become aware thatthe order was not passed to the pilots? What was your reaction? [Eberhart &Arnold][NB: General Eberhart told the staff in March that he assumed the VicePresident's direction was passed all the way down to the pilots, and that it wouldhave been "most important" for them to have known. He added, "Rules ofengagement are only good if those engaged know the rules." However, intestimony before Congress in October of 2001 General Eberhart stated, "[T]he[shoot down] authority was from the National Command Authority. We neverpassed that authority, so we never gave a pilot that authority because we did notsee that situation I hate to use the word opportunity, but we didn't see thatnecessity to do that." See Transcript of Senate Armed Services Hearing, October25,2001.](3) Did you speak with the Secretary of Defense or the Vice Chairman about theshoot down order on the morning of 9/11 ? If so, when and can you describe theconversation?(4) On the morning of 9/11 did you know that there were other National Guardpilots patrolling Washington that had very different rules of engagement? Whendid you become aware of this? What coordination -- if any -- was there betweenNORAD and the commanders at Andrews Air Force Base on 9/11?(5) General Eberhart, prior to 9/11 did NORAD conduct training exercises thatinvolved the possible shoot down of commercial aircraft? If so, what was thethreat envisioned in those exercises?


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[NB: In testimony before Congress in October of 2001, General Eberhartindicated that NORAD had trained for such a situation: "[W]e have thought ourway through this [shoot down of aircraft] in exercises and worked with ourlawyers and have decided over time that if we were convinced that the people onboard the aircraft were going to die ~ they're going to die regardless, and if weallow that airplane to continue others are going to die too,then we believe thatthat's persuasive."]5. Post-9/11 Reconstruction Efforts.(a) In the aftermath of 9/11, what steps did you take to learn what had happenedthat morning? Who was tasked with reporting to you on the events of 9/11? Didyou ever review any of the logs maintained at NORAD, CONR, or NEADS? Didyou direct anyone to review those logs? Did you ever receive an oral or writtenreport describing the substance of those logs? [Eberhart orArnold](b) General Eberhart, did you visit either CONR or NEADS in the weeksfollowing 9/11? Do you recall meeting the Sgt.who was tasked with transcribingthe operational tapes at NEADS? Did you ever review the transcripts heprepared? Did you ever receive an oral or written report describing the substanceof those transcripts?(c) General Eberhart, in October 2001 you testified before the Senate ArmedServices Committee. What did you do to prepare for that testimony? Whatmaterial did you review? You stated, in essence, that the FAA reported toNEADS at 9:24that American 77 had been hijacked, and that that reportprompted the scramble of fighters from Langley Air Force Base. The mostperfunctory review of the logs maintained at your headquarters reveals, however,that the Langley fighters were scrambled in response to a report that American 11had not hit the World Trade Center but was heading south. Let me give you a fewexamples: NORAD's own Headquarters Intel Chat Log records at 9:24:39"original aa fit hijack is now headed to Washington scrambled lfi,[i.e., Langley]"and then at 9:25:13 "2 acrft that hit wt bldg not repeat not the original hjk aaacrft." Furthermore, the Air Warning Center log at NORAD, to which you referin your congressional testimony, records, at 9:27,that "The original hijack a/c isstill a/b and head for Washington, D.C. Otis Fl 5 are trying to intercept theflight." It then records, at 9:36, that CONR has advised of the scramble atLangley: "LFI A/B Quit 25/26/27 3 A/B at time 1333 [i.e., 9:33]." TheNORADHeadquarters chat log states, at 9:28: "R[eal] W[orld] Hijacking (originalnotification) assessed by Intel as headed to Washington DC/2XF-15s in tailchase." Why didn't you tell Congress about this report?

1. In preparing for your testimony, did you question the lack of anotification time for United 93? If so, what were you advised? Whydidn't you indicate a notification time for United 93?


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(d) General Eberhart, after your testimony, you subm itted answers to questionsfor the record. You stated that: 'The FA A notified the NEA DS that AmericanAirlines Flight 77 was headed towards Washington, DC. NEADS then passedthis information to NORAD 's Air Warning Center .... At 0925, the NMCCconvened a Significant Event Conference and during that conference, at 0933,NORAD reported one more aircraft en route to Washington, DC." Th e wordingof this answer seems almost too careful. If you believed that the plane reportedon the Significant Event Conference was American 77, why is your answernonspecific? If you knew that the "one more aircraft" reported on the SignificantEvent Co nference was the mistaken report about Am erican 11, why didn't youtell Congress about it?(e) General Arnold, in May of 2003 you testified before this Com mission. W hatdid you do to prepare for your testimony? W ho prepared the timeline that youdiscussed? Did you look at any of the und erlying logs, tapes, or transcriptsyourself, or accept the timeline that was presented to you?

1. Did any of the times listed raise questions in your mind aboutNORAD's response on 9/11? Specifically, did the 9:16 tim e fornotification of the hijacking of United 93 make sense to you? W ere youaware that NORAD's published timeline, issued September 18, 2001, didnot list any notification time for UAL 93? Were you aware that aSeptember 16,2001 draft of that public timeline listed 9:16 as the time forUAL 93, bu t that this time had been removed from the final releasebecause N ORA D had "lost confidence" in it? Were you aware that whenGeneral Eberhart testified before Congress in October 2001, the timelinehe presented did not list a notification tim e for UAL 93? When youprepared to testify, did you question the 9:16 time? Did you questionwhy, if this time w as correct, Lang ley was not scrambled for nearly tenminutes after the notification?2. Of course, we now know that UAL 93 was not even hijacked at 9:16,and that it was not reported to NEADS until 10:07, four minutes after ithad crashed. But in May 2003, you told the Comm ission that the reasonthe Langley fighters did not travel directly to W ashington in response toAm erican 77 was that they were really responding no t to American 77 butto United 93. Here's what you said: "9:24 was the first time that we hadbeen advised ofAmerican 77 as a possible hijacked airplane. Our focus -you have go t to remember that there's a lot of other things going onsimultaneously here ~ was on United 93, which was being pointed out tous very aggressively I might say by the FAA. ... W e were advised[American 77] was possibly hijacked. And we had launched almostsimultaneously with that, we launched the aircraft out of Langley to putthem over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airlines77, but really to put them in position in case U nited 93 were to head thatway." Given that the first report of the flight from the FAA d id not come


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until 10:07, what did you mean when you said the flight was being"pointed out very aggressively" by the FAA beginning at 9:16?3. Why didn't you tell the Commission that the Langley fighters werescrambled in response to the mistaken report that American 11 had not hitthe Trade Center but was heading south to Washington? [cite to logs asnecessary]4. In the aftermath of 9/11, did you coordinate with the FAA in order toestablish when the FAA notified the military of the hijackings? Do yourecall having discussions with Jeff Griffith of FAA about this subject?What do you remember about these conversations? Do you recall tellinghim or anyone else from FAA that the military had not received notice ofthe hijacking of UAL 93, or that NEADS had never located or tracked theflight on radar? Do you recall having discussions in the immediateaftermath of 9/11 with General Paul Weaver of the Air National Guard?Do you recall telling him that the military had received no notice ofUnited 93?

6. Current posture.(a) General Eberhart, what, in your view, were the lessons learned from 9/11?What measures have been taken since to assure (1) better communications withthe FAA, and (2) better execution of the air sovereignty mission?(b) Has the hijacking protocol been changed?(c) In general terms, has the nature and quality of the intelligence you receivechanged since 9/11?(d) You have stated in the past that you believed the posse comitatus doctrine mayhave to be revisited in an age of terrorism. Do you still believe that? If not, whynot?(e) NORAD's mission prior to 9/11 has been described repeatedly as one of"looking out" for external threats, rather than "looking in" for domestic threats.How would you describe the mission today?(f) How do you measure success in the w ar on terrorism? How will you knowwhen and if you have won?

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