DEVOLUTION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT · Devolution in Natural Resource Management 4 Table of...
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DEVOLUTION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND POWER SHIFTS
A synthesis of case studies from southern Africa
Sheona Shackleton and Bruce Campbell
with Michelle Cocks, George Kajembe, Evaristo Kapungwe,
Dennis Kayambazinthu, Brian Jones, Sissie Matela, Gerald Monela,
Alfons Mosimane, Nontokozo Nemarundwe, Ntale Ntale,
Nico Rozemeijer, Conrad Steenkamp, Bev Sithole,
Jana Urh and Corjan van der Jagt
June 2001
Funded by USAID SADC NRM Project No. 690-0251.12
through WWF-SARPO, EU’s “Action in Favour of Tropical Forests”
through CIFOR and the Common Property STEP Project, CSIR
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Table of Contents
List of Acronyms
4
Executive summary
6
1. Introduction 11
2. Approach, methods and case studies
12
3. Institutions and stakeholders involved in CBNRM 3.1. Overview and conceptual framework 3.2. National policies and legislation supporting CBNRM 3.3. Role of regional, district and sub-district organisation in CBNRM 3.4. Local level and village organisations involved in CBNRM 3.5. The role of traditional authorities in CBNRM 3.6. Role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors in CBNRM 3.7. Role of the private sector in CBNRM 3.8. Within the “community”: community differentiation and dynamics
16 16 18 22 25 30 34 37 38
4. Where is the new locus of devolved power and what are the benefits of that power? 4.1. Grassroots or extensions of the state: Who has received devolved authority
and control? 4.2. How is CBNRM benefiting the community?
45
45
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5. What are the problems to be overcome in the move to local empowerment 5.1. National level policy and legislative issues 5.2. Local level issues and facilitating the CBNRM process
55 56 60
6. Summary and lessons
6.1. Summary 6.2. Lessons and some recommendation for CBNRM implementation 6.3. Conclusions
63 63 67 69
7. Acknowledgement 70
8. References 71
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List of Acronyms
ADC Area Development Committee – Malawi/Zambia
ADMADE Administrative Management Design for Game Management areas –
Zambia
AGM Annual General Meetings
ANC African National Congress – South Africa
CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
– Zimbabwe
CBNRM Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBO Community Based Organisation
CHA Controlled Hunting Area – Botswana
CMC Conservancy Management Committee - Namibia
CPA Communal Property Association - South Africa
CRB Community Resource Board – Zambia
DA District Assembly - Malawi
DDC District Development Committees - Malawi
DFID UK Department for International Development
DNPWS Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services- Zambia
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation
GMA Game Management Area - Zambia
GTZ German Agency for Technical Development (Gesellschaft fuer
Technnische Zusammenarbeit)
KNP Kruger National Park – South Africa
LIFE Living in a Finite Environment Project – LIFE - Namibia
LLC Local Leaders Committee - Zambia
MPs Members of Parliament
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development
NRM Natural Resource Management
RDC Rural District Council – Zimbabwe
RDC Resident Development Committee - Zambia
RMA Range Management Area - Lesotho
SANP South African National Parks
SLAMU South Luangwa Area Management Unit – Zambia
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SNV SNV/Netherlands Development Organisation
TLC Transitional Local Council – South Africa
TRC Transitional Rural Council – South Africa
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VDC Village Development Committee – Botswana/Malawi/Lesotho
VFA Village Forest Area - Malawi
VFC Village Forest Committee - Tanzania
VGA Village Action Group – Zambia
VIDCO Village Development Committee - Zimbabwe
VNRMC Village Natural Resource Management Committee - Malawi
WADCO Ward Development Committee - Zimbabwe
WDC Ward Development Committee – Zambia/Lesotho
WMA Wildlife Management Authority – Zambia
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
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Executive summary
Throughout the region there has been a move to empower communities to manage natural resources
(wildlife and forestry). This paper provides a comparative analysis of the devolution and empowerment
process in 14 case studies drawn from eight countries in southern Africa. Each case study examined the
extent to which policy and legislation devolves significant control over decision making and benefit flows to
communities; the legitimacy and power of different community institutions and their relationship with other
stakeholders such as local authority structures, NGOs, donor agencies, and the private sector; and lastly
the relationships and divisions between different actors and groupings in the community. The impacts of
devolution were found to differ considerably among case studies both within and between countries. Many
of the cases cannot therefore be interpreted as representative of the countries. The study revealed that
while some empowerment schemes appear to be marked successes others appear doomed to failure, or if
one is more optimistic, have resulted in the development of capacity within certain organisations but are
unlikely to result in sustainable systems of natural resource management (NRM).
The community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) cases covered in this study can be
classified into four main types or “institutional models”. (1) In some cases the empowerment process has
resulted in district structures being the new loci of power. These may be local government structures, such
as the Rural District Councils in the Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE case, or multi-stakeholder forums aligned to line
ministries, and with strong representation by traditional leaders, as in the Zambia cases. In all these cases
there is little community involvement in planning or decision-making, and a large percentage of the revenue
is retained at district level. Consequently, people on the ground rarely identify with these initiatives, and,
indeed, few have a clear understanding of their purpose and objectives. This paints a bleak picture for the
future of CBNRM in these areas. (2) In other cases, line department-sponsored organisations at lower
levels, such as Village Forest Committees in the Tanzania case and Village Natural Resource Management
Committees in the Malawi case are the new loci of power. Many of these committees appear relatively
successful as CBNRM institutions, provided they do not become elitist but remain accountable to the
community at large (mechanisms to ensure this need to be in place). Furthermore, the greater the authority
and power such committees receive and the more the state is willing to let go, the more likely they are to
succeed. Thus, in Malawi and Tanzania the committees, in consultation with the community, can formulate
their own by-laws, while the Resource Management Committees in the Zimbabwe Gokwe case are weak
and still largely controlled by the Forestry Commission. (3) The third case is when there is very little
“imposed” NRM at the lower level, but what does exist is largely derived through structures and systems
outside of the state hierarchy, such as traditional customs and norms in the Zimbabwe Chivi case and
Resident’s Associations in the Fish River case. In these cases, the lack of external support and the absence
of any clear policy and legal framework for CBNRM is limiting the achievement of sustainable NRM. (4)
Finally there are cases that can be considered to be truly community-based, where legally recognised
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organisations consisting of community members themselves are the new locus of power, for example
Trusts, property associations, and user associations in the cases of Botswana, Namibia, Makuleke and
Lesotho. In these cases local residents or resource users have been devolved user or proprietary rights
over resources. This provides them with the authority, through their elected executives or boards, to make
rules, to approve developments, to enter in
partnerships with the private sector, to receive revenues and to distribute benefits. There is very little state
interference in any part of the process, and 96-100% of the cash benefits are returned to the community.
Analysis of attitudes towards CBNRM has shown that community-members are particularly behind the
scheme in these cases, and in some countries a demand-driven movement to establish further such
CBNRM initiatives is emerging.
The state and communities are not the only stakeholders in CBNRM. Indeed, having appropriate policies
and institutions for CBNRM that empower communities to manage resources is insufficient to guarantee
success. All the studies have demonstrated the key role that NGOs and donor agencies play in facilitating
the CBNRM process and building the capacity of local organisations. Given the social complexities at a local
level, the high potential for conflict and the lack of experience in running business partnerships, the more
successful CBNRM initiatives, such as in Botswana, Namibia, and the Makuleke in South Africa, have
received long-term “light-touch” support from dedicated NGOs. A number of these NGOs have also acted
as mediators or power brokers between communities and the state, helping to level the playing field and
ensure true community participation. This is particularly important in co-management situations, and the
Gokwe case in Zimbabwe may have benefited from such input. Funding from donor agencies is essential to
cover the costs of facilitation, as the governments of the various countries simply do not have the resources
for this. The danger is that an unhealthy dependency on these external funds is created, often resulting in
the collapse of the initiatives when the funders withdraw (as happened in Lesotho). It is also unclear
whether such high levels of funding would be available for new initiatives within the same country. Donors
often prefer to support “pilot” projects and would be unlikely to fund a nation-wide programme. This
presents problems for “replication” and the expansion of CBNRM programmes to new areas. A further role
for NGOs and donors is in advocacy and lobbying. This sometimes places them in an adversarial role with
the state (e.g. in the Lesotho and the Makuleke cases). Donors are, however, in a fairly powerful position in
that they can attach conditions to their funding which forces the state to re-look at its policies and
implementation approaches. In most of the countries studied, NGOs and donors have been instrumental in
driving the agenda towards greater local level control of natural resources.
Another important stakeholder in the CBNRM process is the traditional leadership. In all case studies, with
the exception of those in Tanzania and the Fish River in South Africa, where this institution has been almost
totally displaced, the traditional authorities have continued to play a role in NRM with varying degrees of
authority and control. In Zambia, chiefs assert a disproportionate degree of power as chairpersons of the
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sub-district wildlife management structures (a position that allows them to divert some of the benefits of
CBNRM to building their own power base). A similar situation applies in Lesotho. On the other extreme, the
exclusion of traditional leaders from new CBNRM structures in Namibia resulted in conflict and delays, and
their subsequent co-option onto the conservancy committees. Since traditional authority structures have
long played a role in the management of natural resources and are likely to remain an important institution
at the local level, the key to success appears to be in achieving a balance regarding their relative power and
influence in CBNRM. Providing traditional leaders with an ex-officio or non-executive role (e.g. as patrons)
has been one way forward for a number of cases. In others, e.g. Malawi, the CBNRM organisations report
to the traditional leaders who remain external to the committee. Another solution is to leave it to
communities themselves to elect whether or not the hereditary leaders are
represented on the CBNRM structures. Where the traditional leadership is strong and legitimate it will be
supported, and can have a very positive impact on CBNRM as discussed in the Malawi, Makuleke and
Lesotho case studies. Where it is weak or biased towards certain ethnic groupings, as in the Botswana
case, chiefs and other lineage leaders will have little support or role.
The private sector provides the key for income generation in many CBNRM initiatives. This applies
particularly in cases where valuable wildlife resources are involved, and where there is high potential for
tourism and safari hunting. In Namibia and Botswana, CBOs enter directly into partnership with the private
sector, and hold the rights to retain all revenues from tourism and hunting for later disbursement to the
community. The same process is expected to apply in the Makuleke case. In contrast, in Zambia, the
community benefits little from private sector involvement other the opportunity for employment. All
negotiations take place directly with the Department of National Parks and Tourism (DNPW) after selection
of the tourism company by the National Tender Board. Fees and levies are retained by the Wildlife
Conservation Revolving Fund. Furthermore, private sector operators are able to obtain title deeds to
communal land via a procedure that involves a whole range of stakeholders (local chief, District Council,
DNPW, the Zambian National Tourism Board and Commissioner of Lands) except the community
themselves. Once title is transferred, the private operator is under no obligation to share revenues with the
community. In Zimbabwe private operators deal mainly with the Rural District Councils, similarly isolating
communities from any discussions and decisions in this sphere. Indeed, the community in Sengwe,
Zimbabwe complained about a lack of communication with the private operator.
Another type of private operator is the individual entrepreneur. Whilst they can bring in revenue via permit
fees and other levies, a number of studies have highlighted that entrepreneurs from both inside and outside
the community are posing a serious threat to effective community management of resources. This
particularly applies to woodcarvers and charcoal producers in the forest management cases of Malawi and
Zimbabwe. These powerful actors tend to ignore local regulations and controls, undermining the authority
of community institutions and appropriating the resource base at the expense of local community members.
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Where CBNRM institutions have attempted to take action, they have received threats and warnings from the
perpetrators. In these situations, government law enforcement agencies have been relatively ineffective in
providing back-up support. Under such scenarios, there is often a fine line between promoting strategies
that enhance the value and benefit of natural resources as an incentive to manage them better (one of the
principles of CBNRM), and the potentially negative impacts that enhanced commercialisation may bring
especially when the opportunities are recognised and exploited by more powerful groups outside the local
community.
In all the case studies problems arose regarding the issue of “who is the community”. In many cases these
related to defining the membership of the group to participate in the CBNRM initiative, as well as the
boundaries to the management area. For example, in Mumbwa GMA, Zambia, the “community” who
benefits from wildlife management is much larger than the “community” who is directly affected by wildlife.
As a result the benefits from wildlife management are severely diluted and seldom outweigh the costs for
households living within the GMA. This provides little incentive to participate in the programme and
“poaching” is still rampant. In Namibia, establishment of many of the conservancies was delayed due to
conflicts over land and boundaries. However, because the legislation requires that communal area
residents themselves define the conservancy boundaries and membership, most of these problems could
eventually be resolved with the aid of external mediators. The Namibian wildlife authorities also accept that
“community “ is dynamic, and recognise that conservancies will shrink and expand as boundaries are
adjusted to fit with more appropriate social and ecological scales. This flexibility is far more likely to lead to
successful CBNRM than the rigid approaches used in other countries.
Highly stratified and differentiated communities are a feature of all the case studies. As a result, intra-
community power struggles and conflicts, between, for example, different ethnic groups, groups with
varying allegiances to modern and traditional structures, the youth and the established leaders, different
user groups, and so on, are not uncommon and were mentioned for most countries. Many of the case
studies also referred to a community “elite” who are strong, educated and articulate with the capacity to link
in with the state apparatus or private operators and thereby control decision-making and the flow of
benefits. These local level complexities need to be recognised and taken account of by CBNRM
implementers. It is here that external facilitators such as NGOs can play a critical role. The building of
CBNRM institutions that are representative of the different interests amongst local actors and sensitive to
the dynamics and power relations in the community is an intensive and time consuming process. It involves
bringing all local actors, regardless of socio-economic background, together in a negotiation process.
Differences and conflicts of interest need to be worked through, and collective stakes should be
strengthened through a social learning process. It was strongly argued in a number of cases that any
attempt to speed up implementation and ignore the social process would condemn the initiative to failure
from the start.
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Conflicting policies or a lack of complementarity and integration between policies and implementation
across natural resource sectors is another factor affecting the success of CBNRM. As outlined above, most
countries have policies that attempt to empower local people to manage resources, but in many countries
these policies may be empowering for one sector (often wildlife), while command and control policies
continue to apply in other sectors (often forestry resources other than wildlife). The principles of CBNRM
need to be extended to cover all natural resources in a manner that ensures integration with, rather than
further complicates, the already multifaceted institutional set-up. There are also instances where policies
may be promoting contradictory outcomes. For example, in Lesotho, Grazing Associations are empowered
to manage grazing areas, but other policies give rights to all citizens to use the resource, even if they are
not part of the Association. This undermines the common property base of Grazing Associations.
Multiple structures operating at the same level, but guided by different policies and legislation, are a feature
in most countries. Many of these have unclear mandates and overlapping functions and responsibilities in
NRM (with Zambia and Lesotho probably being the most complex). This applies particularly to the parallel
hierarchy formed by local government and the traditional leadership. The result of this institutional ambiguity
is a great deal of confusion on the ground, contestation and power struggles between structures, and a
weakening of authority all round that often creates an institutional gap that can be exploited by those with
vested interests. It is clear that policies that explicitly devolve power to communities, as in the case of the
Makuleke, Botswana and Namibia, or to village level state-sponsored
structures, as in the case of Tanzania and Malawi, help to avoid some of these complexities and associated
conflicts. However, the opposite concern now applies, in that there is a danger that these new community-
based institutions become isolated enclaves that are dissociated from the wider district or regional
development context, as is happening in Botswana. One of the consequences of this is a loss of support by
the broader community and political structures.
In conclusion, this study has shown that the move to CBNRM within the region has taken many different
forms and pathways, and has been influenced by a variety of factors and contexts at both a national and
local level. Environmental, political and social-economic conditions vary widely between countries and case
studies, affecting quite dramatically the conditions and incentives for devolution, collective action, and
effective CBNRM. All the cases highlight the complexity of the local situation in terms of history, socio-
economic setting, the range of stakeholders involved, the parallel structures of local governance, and the
high potential for conflict, pointing to the need for flexible and adaptive approaches to CBNRM. Overall,
policies and implementation approaches that provide community members with the authority to make
decisions regarding the use and management of natural resources appear to have a greater chance of
succeeding than those transferring control to higher levels, providing attention is paid to capacity building.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, coinciding with the mainstreaming of participatory approaches in development theory and
practice, there has been a policy shift to advocate that local resource users and their organisations play a
much more active role in the protection and management of land and natural resources (Jodha and Bhatia
1998, Ainslie 1999). Concomitant and complementary to this was a recognition that state control has been
largely unsuccessful, costly and financially unsustainable requiring a new more decentralised approach to
local level natural resource management (NRM).
As a result, over the last 10-15 years community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) has
received considerable policy, development and research attention (Getz et al. 1999, Christofferson et al.
1998) and the move to local control is now well advanced in most countries (Matose and Wily 1996, IIED
1994). There has been considerable progress in devolving power over forests from the state to local
communities in Asia, and there are now also numerous examples within Africa1. Within the wildlife sector,
there has been much activity in the last decade, especially in southern Africa, where almost all countries
have examples of programmes designed to empower communities to manage and benefit from wildlife.2
Focusing on southern Africa, a range of different policies, sectors, agencies and processes have driven the
emergence of a diversity of CBNRM models and initiatives. In Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and Namibia,
the conservation sector, through a wildlife management focus, has provided the major initiative for CBNRM,
resulting in, amongst others, CAMPFIRE3 in Zimbabwe, the Communal Area Conservancies in Namibia,
and the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project in Zambia. In South Africa, the land reform
process, in particular land restitution, has been the major driving force for more equitable and participatory
forms of natural resource management, as evidenced by the Makuleke and San-Kalahari agreements with
South African National Parks, and the Ngome State Forest and Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve co-
management initiatives (Shackleton and Willis, 2000). In contrast, in Lesotho, the need for
more effective rangeland management provided the primary impetus for CBNRM. In other countries, such
as Malawi and Tanzania, forestry has provided the focus for efforts in devolution.
In all these initiatives effort has been made to devolve at least some responsibility and authority over natural
resources from a central level to a lower level, whether to local government structures or direct to the
communities themselves. This transfer of authority, and associated power, may manifest as the control of
decision-making; the control of income, expenditure and benefits; the control of developments such as
tourism ventures; the transfer of ownership and property rights; and improved status amongst the individuals
and organisations involved. It is frequently accompanied by competition for the benefits of the power. This
1 Examples within the forestry sector include those described by Diouf (1994), Dunn (1994), El Din and Shanks (1992), Hagberg (1992), Nurse et al. (1994), Sjoholm and Wily (1995), Skinner (1988), Wily (1999). 2 Child (1984), Christofferson et al., (1998), Dalal-Clayton (1989), Lewis et al. (1990), Masoka Community (1997), Murphree (1993).
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may take place between the organisation/s receiving devolved authority and existing organisations (e.g.
between tribal authority structures and newly formed community-based organisations - CBOs), or between
the body devolving the authority (usually the state) and the receiving structures or community, or it may
emerge amongst different actors within the community.
This paper investigates the shifts in authority, decision-making and power that have accompanied the move
to CBNRM in a number of southern African countries. The objectives of the study were to determine the loci
of power within different models of CBNRM; to understand the systems and institutional arrangements that
define who asserts control and authority and under what conditions; and then, from this, pinpoint the
institutional models that provide good opportunities for successful CBNRM.
The next section outlines the approach and methods used in the study, and introduces the case studies.
Section 3 provides a detailed description of the policies, institutions and stakeholders involved in CBNRM in
each of the case study contexts. Section 4 explains the new locus of power that has emerged as a result of
devolution, and describes some of the results of that power shift, in terms of attitudes towards CBNRM and
benefits derived. Section 5 focuses on the emerging problems in the empowerment process and Section 6
provides a summary and conclusion.
2. Approach, methods and case studies
Fourteen case studies were completed in eight southern African countries, namely Botswana, Malawi,
Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia (Figure 1, Table 1). The case studies
were compiled by researchers with substantial knowledge of and direct experience in CBNRM in their
respective countries. Authors drew mainly on existing literature, although some fieldwork was undertaken
where required to cover under-researched areas. Most of the case studies span the period from initial
implementation of the CBNRM project to the end of 1999 when the write-ups were completed4. Each case
study was structured using a common framework designed to examine the extent to which policy and
legislation devolves significant control over decision-making and benefit flows directly to communities and
community organisations; the relationships between community organisations, the state and other actors
such as local authority structures, NGOs, donor agencies, and the private sector; and lastly the relationships
and divisions amongst different groups within the community including any conflict that has
3 Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources. 4 It is possible that for some cases studies the legislation and institutions may have changed between write-up of the case studies and publication of this synthesis report. For example CBNRM in Zambia was under going a process of change at the time of write-up, as was local government in Malawi and South Africa.
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emerged over CBNRM issues. The full case studies are published separately in Shackleton and Campbell
(2000).
The case studies covered a diversity of sectors from wildlife management to range and forest management,
and involved both co-management and common property arrangements (Table 1). Most of the studies were
based on specific sectoral and donor initiatives, whilst others described situations without any direct project
intervention. Environmental, political and socio-economic conditions varied widely both between and within
countries, influencing the approaches and implementation of CBNRM (Table 1). For this reason, case
studies cannot be taken as representative of the countries from which they are drawn.
Table 1. Case studies forming the basis of this paper.
Country
Specific cases studies
Sectoral focus
Key characteristics of study sites
BOTSWANA Rozemeijer and van der Jagt (2000)
KD1 – a Controlled Hunting Area (CHA) consisting of 3 settlements in Kgalagadi District.
Wildlife management in the Khaa Wildlife Management Area
KD 1, in northwestern Kgalagadi district, covers about 12,000 km2. The CHA is designated as a multi-purpose community area and forms part of a buffer zone north of the Kgalagadi Trans-Frontier Park (KTP). The three settlements, Ukhwi, Ncaang, and Ngwatle, are inhabited by members of a San group (Western !Xo) and a Bantu group (Bakgalagadi). Approximately 850 people live in KD 1, of which 70% are of San origin. Livelihood strategies consist of a mix of activities including livestock and small stock rearing, subsistence hunting and gathering, labour intensive public works, and handicraft production.
MALAWI Kayambazinthu (2000)
Chimaliro Hills – Group Village Boni Chakuchanya in Kaluluma Traditional Authority.
Forest and woodland management on state (forests reserves - co-management blocks) and communal land (Village Forest Areas).
The study area lies midway between Lilongwe and Mzuzu. The population density is 74 persons km-2. Rainfall varies between 800 and 1600 mm. There are 9 villages each with a Village Forest Area. Chimaliro Forest Reserve is divided into 3 co-management blocks managed by groups of 3 villages. Most households are smallholder commercial and subsistence farmers. Ethnic groups include the Thumuka and Chewa tribes.
Mangweru Hills Village Forest Area in Group Village Jamali in the area of Traditional Authority Lundu.
Woodland management of a village forest area (VFA) on communal land.
Mangweru Hills VFA lies 30 km from Blantyre. Population densities are 200 persons km-2. There is 700-800 mm rainfall. Smallholder farming community. Scattered settlement. Mixture of tribes dominated by the Yao.
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SOUTH AFRICA Cocks (2000)
Fish River, former Ciskei, Eastern Cape Province, consisting of 9 villages.
Management of common pool resources in a communal area and co-management of local nature reserves.
The area borders the Great Fish River Reserve Complex. Population densities are about 70 people km-2. The vegetation is semi-succulent thorny wood and scrubland known as Valley Bushveld. Rainfall - 434 mm. There are high levels of poverty and environmental degradation, and a heavy dependency on urban earnings and welfare payments. Crop production is virtually non-existent although many households own livestock. The 9 villages have different histories of land occupancy and tenure, which has impacted on settlement patterns and land and resource management.
Steenkamp and Urh (2000)
Makuleke in northern Kruger National Park, Northern Province.
Land restitution claim within a national park. Conservation, wildlife and tourism.
In 1969 the Makuleke community was evicted from approximately 25 000 ha of land in northern Kruger National Park and were resettled some 60 km to the south. In 1998, they successfully regained ownership of their land under a restitution claim. A condition of the agreement was that they would not resettle the area but could have exclusive commercial rights to the land.
ZIMBABWE Campbell, Nemarundwe and Sithole (2000)
Chivi Communal Area - Romwe catchment
Management of common pool resources in a communal area.
Situated in south central Zimbabwe the Romwe catchment is some 10 km from the Masvingo- Beit Bridge road, linking South Africa and Harare. Rainfall - 548 mm. Vegetation - miombo woodland confined to hill and ravine areas. Population density - about 60 people km-2. Most people in Romwe are of Ndebele descent, although Chivi largely consists of Shona people. Woodcraft production in the area has increased over the last 10 years.
Chikwarakwara and Sengwe wards.
Wildlife management through CAMPFIRE.
Situated in the south east corner of Zimbabwe bordering Mozambique and South Africa. The area lies between the Gonorhezou National Park in Zimbabwe and the Kruger National Park in South Africa. Rainfall is 500 mm p.a. Vegetation is mopane woodland. Population densities are approximately 20 people km-2 with most people being Shangaan.
Gokwe Communal Area - Chirima Ward, Mateme VIDCO.
Forest management on state land through a co-management arrangement.
Situated in west central Zimbabwe. The co-management arrangement involves the joint use of resources in Mufangabusi State Forest (82.1 km2). The forest is largely miombo woodland with elements of Kalahari sand forest. Rainfall averages 819 mm per year and population densities are about 35 people km-2. The original people in Gokwe were of the Shangwe tribe, but the area is now dominated by the Shona.
ZAMBIA Kapungwe (2000)
Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA)
Wildlife management on communal and state land. Part of the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) programme, a national programme implemented in more than 20 GMAs.
Mumbwa GMA (3 395 km2) is located in Mumbwa District about 270 west of Lusaka bordering Kafue National Park. Population density is 1.79 people km-2. 3 chiefs have portions of the chiefdom in the GMA. Rainfall is 1300 mm and the vegetation is miombo woodland. Agriculture and consumptive use of wildlife are the main sources of livelihood. Luba forest reserve is located within the GMA. The area is well endowed with natural resources.
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Country
Specific cases studies
Sectoral focus
Key characteristics of study sites
Lupande GMA
Wildlife management on communal and state land. Part of the South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU), previously the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP). This is an integrated approach to resource management implemented in the South Luangwa National Park and Lupande GMAs.
Lupande GMA (4 080 km2) is located in the Mambwe district in the Mfuwe area of Eastern Province of Zambia. South Luangwa National Park borders it on the west. 35 000 people or 9 355 households live within the GMA. Population density is 8.57 people km-2. Six chiefs control the area. Rainfall is 700 mm and the vegetation is dominated by mopane woodland. The area is rich in wildlife and other resources that generate revenue for the GMA.
NAMIBIA Jones and Mosimane (2000)
One emerging (Sesfontein) and two established (Torra and #Khoadi//hoas) conservancies in the Kunene Region in northwest Namibia.
Wildlife management on communal land. Conservancy programme.
Sesfontein and Torra Conservancies: Semi-desert/desert environment. Arid - < 50 mm - 240 mm rainfall. Low population densities of < 1 person km-2. Scattered settlement. Livelihoods derive from semi-nomadic pastoralism or sedentary livestock farming at low stocking rates. Mixed population consisting of Herero, Himba, Damara, Nama and Riemvasmaker ethnic groups - the result of forced removals and relocations by previous governments. Inter-group tensions and rivalries not uncommon. High tourism potential. #Khoadi//hoas Conservancy (registered in 1998) lies between commercial farmland in the east and the escarpment in the west. Rainfall - 230 -300 mm. Sedentary livestock farming. Mainly Damara with some Herero speakers. Organised community with a strong farmer’s association. Lower tourism potential and wildlife densities.
Three emerging (Kwandu, Mayuni and Wuparo) and one established (Salambala) conservancies in Caprivi Region northeast Namibia.
Wildlife management on communal land. Conservancy programme.
Rainfall up to 600 mm. Savanna. Population density of 4.2 people km-2. Many ethnic and political divisions. Tribal conflicts, differing allegiances to political parties and secessionist groups have affected community cohesion. Main groups are the Basubia, who support SWAPO, and the Mafwe, who support the opposition DTA. Wildlife densities low although improving. The Salambala Conservancy is under the Basubia whereas the Kwanudu Conservancy falls under the Mafwe but suffered when most of its committee fled with the secessionists. Both the Mayuni and Wuparo Conservancies have been formed by breakaway Mafwe groups. Both border national parks.
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Figure 1. The southern African region showing the localities of the 14 case study areas.
3. Institutions and stakeholders involved in CBNRM
3.1. Overview and conceptual framework
Figure 2 displays the key institutional features found in most of the case studies. National legislation and
policies set the broader institutional framework (Sections 3.2), within which lower level government
organisations operate – the most pertinent level in many of the cases being the district level (Section 3.3).
This in turn usually plays a major role in defining the governance structures at the village level (variously
termed as local, community or village). There are a wide variety of structures at this level, many of which fall
within the state institutional framework (Section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3), but some of which fall outside of this
framework (Section 3.4.4). Apart from these structures for land and resource management, there are the
traditional institutions (Section 3.5) that, depending on the case, may fall within or outside of the state
structures or may have disappeared completely.
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Figure 2. Framework for institutional analysis of the cases from Southern Africa (derived from Doré 1997;
Painter and Durham 1995).
Setting the framework for village management
Joint ventures with communities and local government
Village government
Setting the broader institutional framework
Facilitating local capacity
Government policies and legal instruments
District councils – by-laws, regulations, benefit
sharing provisions
Households and individuals, including groups and individuals
commercialising natural resources
Private sector - outsiders
NGOs, International agencies
Setting the framework for household behaviour
Promoting policy reform
Building civic society
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NGOs and international agencies operate at a number of levels of the governance hierarchy, promoting
policy reform, facilitating local capacity or building civil society (Section 3.6). In most of the cases private
sector operators from outside the community are involved in resource use and management, building
partnerships or ventures with the district authorities or local communities (Section 3.7). There are also
entrepreneurs from outside the community that attempt to use resources from community woodlands and
forests, but are unwilling to compensate local villagers for this use. In addition, but usually playing a very
different role, are local entrepreneurs from the community.
Lastly, there is stratification and differentiation within local communities themselves, that is rich as opposed
to poor households, male-headed versus female-headed households, various kinds of local elites,
members and non-members of user groups, and so on (Section 3.8). The different cases have specific
make-ups and different contexts, which influence the nature of control at the local level.
3.2. National policies and legislation supporting CBNRM
3.2.1. Overview and general trends
In all the countries studied there has been effort to devolve authority and control for NRM, in at least some
sectors, to a lower level. In general, this is supported by national policy and legislation. In most cases these
policies are relatively recent, often coinciding with periods of independence and democratisation, and tend
to focus on highly visible and politically important resources such as wildlife, and forests. Scant attention is
paid to those resources used for everyday subsistence. Only in a few countries and for a few sectors does
the legislation remain in the old command and control style (e.g. the Communal Lands Forest Product Act
of 1928, amended in 1987, for Zimbabwe).
This section briefly outlines the policy and legislative frameworks for devolution in each of the case study
countries, and draws out important differences and implications for CBNRM.
3.2.2. Policies devolving NRM to community-based organisations: Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho
and Malawi
In Namibia there is a strong policy and legal framework that devolves authority and rights over wildlife,
forests and tourism directly to CBOs. Following independence in 1990, changes in the Ministry of
Environment and Tourism’s wildlife policy and legislation resulted in communal area residents gaining use
and management rights over wildlife, and associated tourism and hunting activities, provided that a legal
entity know as a Conservancy is registered. A Conservancy consists of all residents in a conservancy area,
and is administered and managed by an elected committee. The Directorate of Forestry has followed this
example and has developed draft legislation that makes provision for the creation of Community Forestry
Committees with similar attributes to those of Conservancies. These committees would gain rights to
manage and benefit from designated community forests. Recognising the potential for competition and
Devolution in Natural Resource Management
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conflict, a policy decision has been taken that both structures should not be set up in the same area. Where
a Conservancy exists, the Department of Forestry should support this organisation with forestry
management.
Botswana has seen a decade of policy development aiming at achieving community-based control,
especially in the wildlife sector. The Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 laid the
foundation for CBNRM. The follow up CBNRM policy, drafted in 1998, provides guidance for the
implementation of CBNRM. Community Hunting Areas defined by the Department of Wildlife and National
Parks and the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing are the “units of production” for which
CBOs can apply for leases. The community has to organise itself into a representative and legal body such
as a trust or co-operative. A clearly laid constitution should be developed and appropriate by-laws defined.
After the community has prepared a land-use and management plan conforming to the Wildlife
Management Area regulations, a 15-year lease can be obtained. While the policies and regulations for
wildlife use are highly progressive, those for other resources are not. Few comprehensive development
strategies have been designed for community tourism (under the Department of Tourism) or for woodlands,
fisheries and other wild products (Ministry of Agriculture).
The only other country covered in this study, where legislation allows community members to hold secure
tenure over natural resources is South Africa, but in this case it is not only resources such as wildlife and
forests that are involved, but also land. Land restitution, in cases like the Makuleke, has effectively placed
ownership of land and resources back in the hands of the claiming community through a legal land holding
entity known as a Communal Property Association (CPA Act 1996). The restitution process made it possible
for communities who were evicted during the apartheid era to lodge a claim for restoration of their land
through the Land Claims Commission. Many of these claims are for areas under conservation management
as in the Makuleke case.
Malawi has progressive policy and legislation for forest management (National Forestry Policy of 1997,
Forestry Act of 1997) that removes restrictions on the access and use of woodlands and promotes equity
and participation in management. The policy promotes co-ordination with other government departments,
and specifically targets women as key resource users. However, unlike the Namibia and Botswana, the
legislation does not provide local level organisations with statutory authority. Furthermore, de jure rights
over communal resources remain vested in the state, and there are no moves to transfer ownership of
forest reserves to the community (which contrasts with South Africa where land claims are forcing this
approach).
The situation in Lesotho is somewhat ambiguous, and conflicting legislation is undermining the
effectiveness of CBNRM. Members of Grazing Associations are allocated grazing rights to Range
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Management Areas, and the Societies Act No. 20 of 1966 empowers associations to enforce these rights
and obligations. However, Range Management Areas constitute communal land, and cattle owners from an
area who choose not be part of the Grazing Association cannot be excluded from grazing their cattle
(Clause 8 of the Range Management and Grazing Control Regulations of 1980). This results in open
access use by some residents and acts as a disincentive for association members to comply with grazing
regulations. Separate legislation also gives powers over rangeland management to both chiefs and local
government structures creating a complex institutional environment.
3.2.3. Policies devolving NRM to district structures: Zimbabwe and Zambia
In Zimbabwe the Rural District Councils Act of 1988 (and its precursors) places decision-making over NRM
at the district level. Control, authority and tenure rights over wildlife are devolved to Rural District Councils
through the granting of “appropriate authority” under the Parks and Wildlife Act (1975). By contrast, forestry
legislation makes no such provision for local management. The Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (of
1928, amended in 1987) confines the use of forest products in communal lands to “own use”, requiring
permits for commercial exploitation.
Wildlife is state property in Zambia (National Parks and Wildlife Service Act no. 10 of 1991), but the Wildlife
Policy of 1993 bestows user rights to land holders. This means that local people who reside in Game
Management Areas (GMAs) are eligible to a share of revenues generated from wildlife utilisation. However,
the institutional framework for wildlife management does not allow communities to derive much control and
decision-making power from these rights, and all authority still ultimately lies with the state.
Like other countries, the more progressive policies of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife
Services in Zambia are not reflected in other natural resources sectors such as fisheries, forestry and land,
which are administered by a range of different departments, each with their own separate policies and
legislation. The National Parks and Wildlife Services Act makes provision for the creation of Integrated
Resource Development Committees, but the Forestry Act does not have any framework for community-
based forestry management in GMAs (Chilomo et al. 1995). The Local Government and Housing Act of
1995 firmly places local control in the hands of District Councils, but chiefs and other lineage leaders
continue to play a key role in wildlife management. The Zambia Wildlife Authority Act No. 12 of 1998 has
recognised these contradictions and has proposed the establishment of Community Resource Boards
(CRBs) (their title is somewhat of a misnomer as the CRBs are at the level of the district not the
community). These will replace the current district structures (see Section 3.4) as a way of rationalising and
harmonising the different approaches to game area management. Proposed changes include transferring
proprietary rights to villagers within GMAs and the return of 100% of benefits to the community.
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3.2.4. Absence of NRM policies: South Africa
South Africa stands out as being somewhat different from the other countries in that the presence of the
state in communal areas has been virtually non-existent (see also Ainslie 1999). Communities have been
left to manage their resources in the absence of clear policy, legislative and institutional frameworks. The
consequence, especially with the erosion of the power of chiefs, has been a dissolution of arrangements for
NRM and de facto open access systems in many areas.
3.2.5. Some policy and implementation issues: Is the state prepared to let go?
Even though appropriate policy and legislation may exist, there can be large differences between the stated
intent of government, and how bureaucracies apply this intent in practice. In some parts of the world the
lack of political will to implement more progressive NRM policies, and a reluctance of the state to let go of
power, have been identified as some of the major stumbling blocks to the success of community-based
initiatives (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Datta and Varalakshmi 1999, Jodha and Bhatia 1998, Anderson et al.
1998). In other instances, vacillation and bureaucratic delays result because government has not yet
realised the practical and logistical implications of its new policies, and is poorly prepared and ill equipped to
deal with implementation aspects. A parallel problem relates to financial and capacity limitations within
departments, and the officious attitude and poor ability of many government officials to work with local
communities and engage in participatory processes (Fabricius 1999).
Within the case studies, most governments have demonstrated a commitment to decentralising decision-
making authority, and have moved beyond the policy rhetoric into the realm of concrete action on the
ground. The most convincing of these are Botswana and Namibia, where a number of functioning
conservancies and wildlife management trusts exist. It is of note that in the early days of CBNRM in
Namibia many conservation officials were sceptical of the approach and little field support was provided. In
Malawi, the Department of Forestry facilitated several training and skills development workshops in the case
study areas, building the capacity of the community organisations to become involved in NRM. However,
long delays in approving regulations and management plans has resulted in dissatisfaction and a loss of
interest by the communities in participating in CBNRM. The reluctance of the South African government to
take the step of legalising its tenure reform proposals is having a major negative impact on NRM in
communal areas. In Zambia, the limitations of the country’s wildlife programmes have been recognised and
there are moves to devolve tenure rights, to increase transparency and accountability, and to ensure a
much greater percentage of revenue reaches communities (see also Wainwright and Wehrmeyer 1998).
This appears to be more than Zimbabwe has achieved given that problems with the Rural District Councils
have been articulated extensively over the last few years.
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3.3. Role of regional, district and sub-district organisations in CBNRM
3.3.1. Overview and regional structures in Namibia
In all the countries studied, with the exception of Namibia, district structures have a role to play in NRM, a
role that varies from pervasive, as in cases from Zimbabwe and Zambia, to facilitatory, in the case of
Malawi. The exception, Namibia, has regional structures. These have few powers and no revenue
generating authority, although a new policy proposes to devolve further functions and budgets from the
central government to regional level. The regional governor must approve conservancy applications before
they move up to central state, but the Minister of Environment and Tourism can override the governor’s
decision as happened with the Salambala conservancy.
3.3.2. Situations in which elected district councils and structures are primary stakeholders:
Zimbabwe and Lesotho
In the Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE case studies control and authority over wildlife lies at the level of the Rural
District Council (RDC). This is despite the fact that CAMPFIRE is advocated as “a grassroots movement that
empowers rural people to undertake their own wildlife management and to receive benefits from it” (Martin
1998). Villagers from a Ward (usually about 1000 households) are represented by a single councillor at
RDC level, and s/he is only one of a number of councillors many of whom may be from areas poor in
wildlife and therefore have little interest in wildlife management initiatives. All decisions are made at district
level, including those concerning quotas, the granting of concessions, problem animal5 control, and rules
and regulations regarding wildlife utilisation.
In Lesotho, local government has a long history and was first established under colonial rule in 1948.The
main district structures were District Development Councils (now Rural Councils - Local Government Act of
1997) that included chiefs. Unlike many countries, the Councils’ boundaries follow the chieftainship
boundaries. The Development Councils were initially established to deal with local governance and
development issues of a different nature to those dealt with by chiefs. They also served as a link between
central government and local communities and authorities. However, these councils soon took on a role in
range management and became responsible for issuing grazing permits, impounding trespassing stock,
issuing fines and setting aside maboella or closed areas. The new Act charges each local authority, within
its administrative limits, with the control and administration of, among others, natural resources, physical
planning, land/site allocation, grazing, water resources and fire management.
5 Wildlife that threatens the livelihoods of local communities by destroying their crops or killing their livestock.
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3.3.3. Situations in which elected district councils and structures exist but play little active role:
Botswana and South Africa
The government of Botswana has a long history of decentralised planning and development.
Democratically elected District Councils guide local development but do not play a very active role in wildlife
management (see below). Another structure at district level is the Land Board, which is an independent
body, partly elected by the population, and is responsible for the management and administration of land.
Amongst other duties, it approves the land use and management plans for tribal land – these are needed
when a CBO applies for a lease on land in a Controlled Hunting Area.
District Councils, Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) or Transitional Rural Councils (TRCs) form the primary
local government structures in South Africa. The TLCs/TRCs consist of elected representatives and operate
on a sub-district basis, responsible for up to 20 or more villages. TRCs do not have executive powers and
function primarily as advisory bodies to District Councils. TLCs, on the other hand, are independent
authorities. The problem with rural local government in South Africa is that it is fairly removed from the
communities it serves, necessitating the establishment of village level structures or the continued role of the
traditional authorities in day-to-day administration. Tension between traditional and modern structures is
occurring in many parts of South Africa, especially regarding issues such as land allocation. But, in other
areas both structures are managing to co-exist, partly due to the limited implementation capacity of local
government (e.g. in the Makuleke case). Certainly, at the moment, local government has little role in NRM
in South Africa, although the fact that it exists is undermining the ability of the traditional leaders to enforce
existing rules and regulations and creating an institutional gap that is being exploited by a range of
individuals and groups.
3.3.4. Situations in which multi-stakeholder district structures aligned to line departments are
primary stakeholders: Zambia, Botswana and Malawi
A variety of multi-stakeholder forums at district level were identified in the different case studies. Some of
these structures have broad mandates, addressing a wide range of local development issues including
NRM (e.g. Malawi), whilst others are constituted specifically to deal with CBNRM and wildlife management
(e.g. Zambia and Botswana). The latter tend to have greater decision-making power and influence over
CBNRM than the former. The key players in these forums include traditional leaders, district councillors and
officials of line departments working at the local level. Community is rarely adequately represented.
In Zambia local government district (District Councils) and sub-district structures (Ward Development
Committees) have little direct involvement in NRM. Instead this responsibility is assumed by a set of
organisations aligned to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services (DNPWS). These
organisations differ between different GMAs resulting in a very complex and confusing institutional set-up.
In the Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA) case study the Wildlife Management Authority (WMA)
caters for stakeholders at district level and consists of district councillors, park wardens, chiefs, indunas,
Devolution in Natural Resource Management
25
members of parliament, prominent personalities, district representatives of line ministries, and unit leaders.
The unit leaders are government officers from the DNPWS trained to administer the programme in GMAs.
They play two conflicting roles (Chilomo et al. 1995, Kapungwe 1996). On one hand they perform the duty
of community extension officer through conducting sub-authority meetings and coordination of development
projects, and on the other they are law enforcement agents on behalf of the state. Consequently, they are
seen as extensions of the state whose functions are to arrest and pacify local people. The WMA decides on
the annual programmes and the budgets for wildlife management and community development projects in
the GMA, and thus has considerable authority and power over NRM. The situation is much the same in
Lupande GMA under the South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU). The highest-level management
structure, the Local Leaders Committee (LLC) is dominated by chiefs, SLAMU personnel, district councillors
and members of parliament. Their main role is to monitor and collate audited financial and project reports
from the lower level structures (see next section).
At the district level in Malawi, traditional authorities (chiefs or sub-chiefs), representing Area Development
Committees (at the tier below the district level), become members of District Development Committees
(DDC), which consist of a wide range of stakeholders including the district commissioner, elected district
councillors and departmental heads of ministries represented at district level. These committees deal with a
range of development issues and not just forest management. In the post independence Banda era there
was little separation between the functions of the ruling party and local government, with most
representation on the various levels of committees being by nomination. Under the new Local Government
Act (1998) these structures are now being phased out and replaced by new structures at a district level
based on democratic principles, accountability, transparency and local participation. Traditional leaders will
be ex-officio members of the new district assemblies (DA).
Despite having strong local government (see above), most activates related to CBNRM in Botswana are the
responsibility of the line ministry, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. There is a Technical
Committee at district level, established by the wildlife department. This is composed of central government
officers, Land Board and District Council officers and sometimes a representative of an NGO. This
organisation has a fair degree of power – in the case study area the committee presented the synthesis of
the bids to the residents in a general meeting, so that the residents could select a private operator to
conduct the hunting. This committee is not sufficiently embedded in the District Council, with the result that
CBNRM programmes have tended to become profitable enclaves, with rapidly growing trust accounts, while
the District Council, which receives only 4% of total trust income, remains responsible for social and
community development. For this reason the CBNRM activities are viewed ambiguously by the local
authorities and a lack support by the Councils may ultimately endanger the CBNRM concept.
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3.4. Local level and village organisations involved in CBNRM
3.4.1. Overview and typology of local level structures
There is a great complexity of governance structures at the local or village level, which varies from case to
case (Figure 3). These may be broadly classified as (i) traditional structures that lie outside the state
hierarchy (e.g. some Zimbabwe cases); (ii) traditionally-aligned structures that are within the state hierarchy
(e.g. Malawi, Zambian and Lesotho cases); (iii) state-sponsored organisations that have no grounding in
traditional institutions, sometimes aligned to party political organisations (e.g. Tanzania); (iv) community
corporate entities (e.g. a property association in the Makuleke case, trusts in Namibia and Botswana,
villages in Tanzania); or (v) community-derived structures having no legal status (e.g. Fish River case
study).
Figure 3. Organisations involved with village-level NRM in the case studies.
A typology of village level organisations can be based on a number of different variables. One important
distinction that emerges between the cases with respect to village level-governance is related to whether
communities can themselves be viewed as corporate entities. In a number of cases communities can be
regarded as corporate entities, i.e. they can sue and be sued, hold property, enter into business contracts,
State-sponsored organisations
- not corporate entities
Traditionalinstitutions
Corporate entities
NGOs, International agencies
Village governancestructures
Community-derived structuresnot linked to the state
Devolution in Natural Resource Management
27
etc. Other possible ways that the organisations could be classified is whether or not they have political
affiliations, are supported by local government structures or by line ministries, are specifically for natural
resources or include a broad development focus, and whether they are embedded within traditional
systems or not. A common feature of many village organisations is their alignment to ruling political parties
(e.g. Zimbabwe VIDCOs, and Malawi, Lesotho, and Fish River case studies). As found for district structures,
in some cases village organisations include a broad development focus (e.g. VIDCOs in Zimbabwe), while
in others they are primarily for natural resources (e.g. VNRMCs in Malawi). In most cases the former type of
organisations are facilitated by the district councils and local government, whereas in the latter cases the
key facilitators are departments of wildlife, forestry and natural resources.
In most countries, local government structures were created as a channel for central and district
government to reach communities. The state has attempted to have a presence at the village level through
some type of village committee that reports to the district authority (or the regional authority in the case of
Namibia), either directly or through several layers of the hierarchical structures. In the cases from a number
of countries the state village structures have no formal connection to the traditional authorities (e.g.
Tanzania, Zimbabwe) while in others the traditional structures have been formalised to be the functionaries
of the state (e.g. Malawi, Lesotho).The efficacy of these village organisations varies from case to case, with
strong village organisations in the Tanzania, Malawi, Botswana, Namibia and Makuleke cases but weak
state-sponsored village structures in Zimbabwe and Zambia.
3.4.2. Local and village committees linked to the state hierarchy or line departments:
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho
In Zimbabwe, the lowest level of the state hierarchy is the Village Development Committee (VIDCO),
consisting of elected persons from the administratively defined village. Chairpersons of the VIDCOs make
up the Ward Development Committee (WADCO). The chairperson of the WADCO is an elected councillor.
All councillors from the wards within a district make up the Rural District Council (RDC). This state hierarchy
exists side-by-side with traditional institutions, which, although not having the legal mandate to manage
resources, tend to be the institution with the most power over resource decisions at the village level, except
for those resources with high value, which are managed by the RDC. VIDCOs tend to play an insignificant
role in NRM.
In Botswana, the lowest level of district administration is the Village Development Committee (VDC). Given
that much of the focus of activity for CBNRM in Botswana lies with the community-based legal entities
(trusts, see next section), the VDC has little to do with NRM. In resource-rich areas the trusts are much
more powerful than the VDCs.
In Malawi at village level there is a Village Development Committee (VDC), consisting of members of the
community and chaired by the village head (from the traditional hierarchy). However, the main organisation
Devolution in Natural Resource Management
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responsible for CBNRM is the Village Natural Resource Management Committee (VNRMC). This
committee reports to the VDC. The VNRMCs are responsible for assisting the village heads in the
management of Village Forest Areas (VFAs), woodlots, reforestation programmes and government
protected forests close to the village. These committees are elected by the community, but are usually
constituted under the auspices of and with the facilitation and advice of the Forestry Department. Village
Forest Areas are controlled by the VNRMCs exclusively, whereas forest reserves are jointly managed by
the committees and the state, with the state making most of the rules, monitoring resource use, and
accruing the greatest benefits in the form of taxes and fines. The duties of the VNRMCs include making and
enforcing rules and by-laws (Section 33 of the Forest Act 1997), regulating the utilisation of forest products,
organising fire patrols and fire fighting. The formulation of rules must be done in consultation with entire
community, and should include schedules for protected species, prices of forest products, and the penalties
incurred by transgressors. As the VNRMCs are mostly initiated by the Forestry Department, the rules made
and enforced at community level are still open to the influence of government. Village Forest Committees
(VFCs) in Tanzania are similar to the VNRMCs in that they are linked to the Forestry Department and are
responsible for defining rules, enforcing these and collecting revenues from the use of village forests. In
having these powers of by-law formulation, both of these village committees are more powerful than the
above-described VIDCOs in Zimbabwe, where by-law formulation is carried out at the district level.
The lowest level of organisation in the district in Zambia is the locally elected Resident Development
Committee (RDC) whose primary function is to identify development needs and projects at the local level.
At the next tier Ward Development Committees (WDC) approve suggested development projects and either
seek funding or pass them up to the District Council. However, these structures are not functioning in many
parts of Zambia including the Game Management Areas (GMAs) used as case studies in this project.
Instead, there are various tiers of wildlife management organisations that link to the district level (see
Section 3.3.4). In the Lupande case study under SLAMU, there are six Area Development Committees
(ADCs) run by chiefs from the six chiefdoms that form the GMA. The Village Action Groups (VGAs), the
lowest level structures, consist of elected members and are guided by a constitution developed by
community members. One of the main functions of the VGA is the allocation of wildlife revenues to projects
or household cash at general meetings. The lowest structure in the ADMADE programme is the Wildlife
Management Sub-Authority. This caters primary for chiefs. There is no village level structure.
The old local government structures in Lesotho consisted of elected Village Development Councils (VDCs)
at the lowest level, of which the chief was initially chairman and then an ordinary member. Ward
Development Councils (WDCs) at the next tier up are responsible for collating development proposals from
VDCs for recommendation to the District Development Councils (DDCs). The principal chief is a
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member of the VDCs and WDCs. Since 1997 these councils are being phased out and their functions will
be taken over by Community Councils (includes one or more gazetted chiefs).
3.4.3. Corporate entities at local and village level: Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa
(Makuleke) and Tanzania
In a number of cases, NRM can be said to be truly community-based, with most of the rights over NRM
vested firmly in CBOs. In two of the case study countries, Namibia and Botswana, the key organisations in
control of NRM appear to be highly successful, and are both established as legally-constituted trusts. A
similar CBO has been established in the case of the Makuleke in South Africa. A legally recognised entity,
a Grazing Association, is also apparent in the Lesotho case, but here success has been elusive as all
members of the community are not members of the Grazing Association, and there are overlapping and
conflicting responsibilities between these structures and local government. Tanzanian villages enjoy a
similarly strong corporate status.
In the Namibian cases, rights, control and decision making over wildlife and tourism are devolved fully to
community level. Legislation allows communal area residents to register a conservancy in which
membership and physical boundaries must be defined, a representative committee elected, a plan for the
distribution of benefits agreed on, and a legally recognised constitution adopted. This conservancy then
receives conditional ownership over “huntable” game and use rights over other species through a permit
system. It can also register as a hunting farm to gain rights to trophy hunting, although in this case quotas
are set by the state in consultation with the conservancies. All decisions regarding tourism development lie
with the conservancy. The Conservancy Management Committee (CMC) is the highest authority at
community level in the management of the conservancy, and in the absence of administrative units below
the region, the lowest governance structure in a region. The people elected to the CMC are local
community members. In some conservancies, e.g. Caprivi, this may include traditional authorities. The
committee takes decisions about day-to-day administrative matters and purchases of low cost equipment.
Major decisions such as benefit distribution and expenditure on capital items are made in consultation with
all conservancy members including traditional authorities. This may be through an AGM or special meeting
and quorum requirements must be met. Rules and regulations are developed through the committee and
traditional structures in consultation with residents so that they are tailored to the specific needs and
conditions of the conservancy. The rules are included in a NRM plan. National government may provide
technical advice in this process. In some conservancies, e.g. Mayuni and Wuparo, these rules are enforced
by anti-poaching units formed by the traditional authorities and management committees of the
conservancies. Neither regional nor central structures of the state have influence on the formation of
conservancies other than to approve applications. NGOs, traditional authorities (e.g. in Caprivi) and
communities themselves are playing the leading role in conservancy establishment.
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There are no blue prints for CBNRM in the policy framework in Botswana with respect to community
management structures, constitutions, and by-laws. However, most communities involved in CBNRM follow
the model proposed by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, which is to establish a community
trust. Community trusts are legal entities usually composed of all people who have lived in the concerned
village/s for more than five years. The Board of Trustees is the focal point for decision-making regarding
quotas and benefit distribution, business deals with the private sector and agreements with supporting
agencies such as donors and NGOs, making it a powerful institution. In some communities the Board of
Trustees have started to take on a life of their own, forming close alliances with the safari operator and
losing contact with their constituencies. In such circumstances a community elite has become the substitute
for the previous extracting role of the state. Fortunately, such examples are the exception rather than the
rule. In the Botswana case, it could be argued that there is less community control than in Namibia for the
following reasons. (i) The lease agreement is only for 15 years, which does not promote long-term
investment decisions. (ii) The lease agreement covers the use of the resources, and not the land. The land
remains under the control of the Land Boards. (iii) The community cannot control the subsistence use of
non-wildlife products. The use of forest products, fish and grazing is theoretically controlled by the state but
is in effect open access. (iv) The wildlife quota is set by the wildlife department and not the community.
In the restitution process in South Africa, the Makuleke community successfully regained ownership of land
that they had been removed from in Kruger National Park in 1969. However, conditional to the transfer of
ownership was agreement that the land would continue to be managed as a protected area by the South
African National Parks in the form of a contractual park. Land title and all commercial rights were
transferred to the Makuleke Communal Property Association (CPA), a legal land holding entity
compromising of all rights holders (CPA Act of 1997). This structure has a written constitution agreed on by
all members and an elected executive committee in which traditional leadership, including the chief, is
represented. Certain mechanisms within the constitution ensure the accountability of the executive structure
to the community. All decisions to develop the tourism potential of the area lie with the CPA, and all benefits
from the process will accrue to the members of the CPA (i.e. the entire Makuleke community). In this case,
although property rights, authority and control are vested at community level, the National Parks Board is
still a powerful actor and a key decision-maker on the joint management board. However, the issue of land
ownership and the possibility of resettlement have provided the community with a very powerful stake, which
cannot easily be ignored by the wildlife authorities.
In Lesotho, CBOs such as Grazing Associations (GAs) are important in the management of grazing areas
but have a less clear legal status. These associations are formed in Range Management Areas (RMAs),
which are areas of land in which improved range management and livestock production practices are
introduced. Formation of the GA is usually driven by a chief or Ward Development Council. GAs consist of
rangeland users resident within the RMA (which may cover several villages and several traditional
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authorities) including the chiefs of the area. They generally operate with the support and advice of an
extension officer. These CBOs are, in theory, responsible for the management of grazing resources, but
their operational powers depends on the delegation of management powers by the Village Development
Councils (see above). Members of a Grazing Association are allocated grazing rights in the RMA after
payment of a once off joining fee and yearly subscription. Members must abide by the policies and grazing
plans guiding the association. Grazing permits, whose purpose it is to regulate access based on commonly
agreed regulations, are issued to members by the Grazing Association committee and stamped by the
chief. The Grazing Association committee consists of elected members as well as traditional leaders
representing each village in the area. Generally, the Village Development Council and other local
government representatives are invited to the Grazing Association committee meetings. However, counter
legislation (Clause 8 of the Range Management and Grazing Control regulations of 1980) fails to protect
the rights of members of Grazing Associations. This makes it difficult to prevent use of the better-managed
RMAs by non-association community members.
Tanzanian villages enjoy a peculiar legal status in that they can sue and be sued, hold property, etc. This is
unlike village level structures in the state hierarchy in most other countries. The village government plays an
important role in the management of the Duru-Haitemba forest of the case study area. Actual management
is organised through externally facilitated, local structures know as Village Forest Committees (VFCs),
which report to the village government. These committees set the rules and organise enforcement and
collection of revenues and fines. Village management plans and use rules are reframed as by-laws that are
approved by the District Council.
3.4.4. Community-derived structures: South Africa (Fish River)
Of all the cases, the Fish River case study in South Africa is exceptional in that a civic grouping is a key
player at the local level. Resident’s Associations have taken over many functions, such as land allocation
and NRM, previously attributed to the tribal authority. Whilst the Resident Associations have attempted to
assume these responsibilities within their respective communities, they do not have any formal or legal
recognition to do this. The Resident’s Associations are aligned to the ANC, the major political party in South
Africa and work closely with local government, especially in matters of land allocation. In terms of NRM, the
Residents Associations are primarily responsible but their lack of legal status is undermining their
effectiveness in enforcing rules and regulations.
3.5. The role of traditional authorities in CBNRM
3.5.1. Overview and complexities
The post-colonial era in all the countries studied has resulted in parallel or dual local authority systems
consisting of the traditional authorities on one hand, and the government established structures on the
other. In general, the powers of the traditional leaders have been eroded by colonial and post independent
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political processes (e.g. very marked in Tanzania). The dual structures compete with each other for power
and influence, often resulting in a power vacuum that may be exploited by powerful vested interests. Later
changes in government, often from one party rule to democracy, and the creation of a set of new local
government structures have also exacerbated this situation. In many instances potential conflict between
modern structures and traditional structures has been avoided by incorporating traditional leaders into the
new structures (e.g. Malawi, Lesotho and Zambia). In other situations traditional authorities have been
deliberately excluded as being undemocratic, corrupt and agents of the previous regimes (e.g. South Africa,
Zimbabwe until recently). The situation is also highly dynamic. Recent legislation in Zimbabwe (Traditional
Leaders Act) and Namibia may see the resurgence of power in traditional structures, but the new legislation
has perhaps given legal status to another hierarchical layer without clarifying the overlapping nature of the
traditional and modern structures. In Malawi, where the traditional structures have always been strong, the
recent legislation has gone the other way, towards reducing the role of traditional authorities and making
them more accountable to the populace. A similar shift appears to be occurring in Zambia.
The case studies cover the whole spectrum of involvement of chiefs and other traditional leaders, from
situations where traditional authority structures have been almost completely removed (e.g. Fish River) to
cases where these institutions exert considerable control over CBNRM (e.g. Zambia).
3.5.2. Situations in which traditional leaders have been largely sidelined: Botswana, Tanzania
and South Africa (Fish River)
Of the cases studied, the Tanzania and the Fish River case studies have local governance structures that
have almost no elements of the traditional systems. Even so, in Tanzania in a number of villages, the
traditional ritual structures still play a significant role, either complementary to or in competition with the
Village Forest Committees. The transfer of powers away from the traditional authority structures to civic
organisations is fairly unique to the Eastern Cape of South Africa and has been influenced by a range of
local political and historical factors. In other parts of the country, traditional authorities are still the principal
actors in NRM in communal areas, albeit their authority has been greatly eroded by past political processes
and the establishment of local government councils.
In Botswana, the Land Boards have taken over most of the powers of the chiefs in relation to land and
NRM, and the Trusts control all aspects of wildlife management. At village level, the headman plays a
representative role and administers a customary court for minor offences. Headmen still wield power over
use of subsistence resources using values and customs derived from traditional practices, though these
traditions are being eroded with the modernisation trend.
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3.5.3. Situations in which traditional leaders are incorporated into the new CBNRM structures:
South Africa (Makuleke) and Namibia
In Makuleke, South Africa traditional leaders are integrated into the new Communal Property Association
(CPA), although the roles of the CPA executive versus the tribal council are becoming blurred. In theory, the
tribal council is still responsible for ‘tribal matters’ whereas the CPA executive’s role is primarily in land claim
issues and now the development of the Pafuri Triangle in Kruger National Park. However, what exactly falls
into each of these broad roles is not clear, and the CPA executive is increasingly assuming functions that
originally fell under the tribal council. This is partly because of the chief’s position as chairperson of the
CPA. This lessening of the role of the traditional authority is likely to increase when the Makuleke gain
tenure rights of the land they currently occupy (part of the agreement) and ownership becomes vested in
the CPA. However, because traditional leaders have been an integral part of the land
claims committee and then the CPA there is little disruptive competition between the two structures at this
stage.
Traditional authorities are generally members of the Conservancy Management Committees in Namibia,
sometimes in an executive capacity and other times as patrons or non-voting members. In most cases this
is because these leaders were elected to the committee, but in other cases they were co-opted as a
solution to potential conflict (e.g. in the #Khoadi//hoas, Torra and Sesfontein conservancies). The
emergence of the conservancies has meant that responsibilities for game guards and wildlife management
has shifted from the sole domain of chiefs and headmen to include young people and women. Some
headmen and chiefs resent the benefit this brings the committee members in terms of training, workshops,
receipt of allowances, etc. In Caprivi, the traditional structures are particularly well integrated into the
conservancies, both in the Conservancy Management Committees and as advisors at village level. The
strength of the traditional leaders in the conservancies can be seen in the strength of traditional rules, which
continue to regulate the use and access to natural resources (see also Katjiua 1998, Mosimane 1998a,
1998b, 1999a, 1999b). Because there is no governance structure at district level in Namibia, there is little
threat to traditional structures although there has been some friction in the Kunene region. This has been
partly suppressed by the fact many of the regional councillors are chiefs and headmen. In the future
though, the proposed Land Boards will remove land allocation powers from the chiefs, which is likely to
cause major resistance.
3.5.4. Situations in which traditional authorities continue to play a central role in CBNRM:
Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia
In Lesotho, chiefs are empowered by legislation to play a central role in range management (Range
Management and Grazing Control Regulations (Land Husbandry Act No. 22 of 1969)). These regulations,
plus an addition to them (Legal Notice No. 39 of 1980), gives chiefs control over grazing land and the power
to set aside special grazing/rest areas, apply restrictions on who can graze and when, and to impound
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trespassing livestock. Chiefs are thus vested with substantial powers in range management implementation
and have considerable influence in their permanent constituencies. Indeed, the success or failure of
CBNRM depends a great deal on the goodwill, accountability and motivation of individual chiefs. However,
at the same time local government councils, on which chiefs are represented, have been given similar
powers (see Section 3.3). Indeed, these structures have the legal mandate over natural resources. It is the
District councils that provide Grazing Associations the authorization to operate. Chiefs are often represented
on the Grazing Associations, giving them a fairly direct role in range management. In the Pelaneng/Bokong
range management area, traditional leaders are members of both the Grazing Association Management
Committee and the Grazing Association Executive Committee, whereas the local government
representatives are invited to attend meetings as non-executive members. Thus, the relationship between
local government and the traditional structures in Lesotho is complex and confusing due to dual
responsibilities and powers as legislated in the Acts of different departments. Given the numerous changes
in government in Lesotho and the multiple structures that are presently operating, the one constant has
been the traditional authorities. They have been able to maintain their autonomy and some power, and have
been represented within the different structures that have been in operation at different times. This has
given people a degree of security that would not otherwise be there, and the chiefs are still seen as the
institution to co-opt to gain community acceptance for new developments. The co-option of chiefs onto local
government councils has recognised the powers chiefs have and the importance of their participation and
cooperation, but at the same time has diminished their authority and decision-making powers.
Traditional authorities have a more influential and powerful role in decision making around wildlife
management in Zambia than in most of the other countries studied. The district level Wildlife Management
Authority and Local Leaders Committee have representation from traditional leaders, but it is particularly the
Wildlife Management Sub-authority and Area Development Committees (ADCs) that cater for stakeholders
at chiefdom level. Sub-authority and ADC members comprise the chief as chairperson, councillors,
indunas, representatives of line ministries and unit leaders. In Mumbwa GMA there are three Sub-authorities
corresponding to the three chiefs in the area, whereas in Lupande GMA there are six such structures. Given
this authority, it is not surprising that the traditional leadership is feeling threatened by new proposals to
remove some of their power on the wildlife management organisations. The new
Community Resource Boards are proposing the chiefs as patrons of the boards rather than executive
members.
In Malawi, at village level the village head deals with village issues with the aid of a Village Development
Committee (VDC). A tier above this is the group village head, who looks after several villages grouped
together, and then the sub-chief or chief (often called the Traditional Authority). A group of VDCs form the
Area Development Committee (ADC) that is chaired by a chief. Thus, traditional leaders play an important
role in local governance structures. In fact, the effectiveness of the committees depends largely on the
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calibre and influence of the traditional leaders. This is illustrated in the case studies where the Village
Natural Resource Management Committees (VNRMCs) in Chimaliro are more successful than in
Mangweru, because, in the former, the traditional leaders are still held in deep respect by the community.
Overall, the village head has supervisory control over Village Forest Areas, as well as co-management
blocks of forest reserves, and has to be approached for permission to access the forests. The village head
is also the person with the final say about management rules. Thus, although authority and control is
devolved to community-level, much power is vested in a single individual. Since the modern structures have
incorporated the traditional leaders in Malawi there was never serious competition between the traditional
and modern structures, although the power of the traditional leaders was greatly diluted and weakened
through the process. This was especially the case during under the dictatorial rule of the one-party state
when the traditional leadership and its structures had to modify their own rules and by-laws to toe the party
line.
3.5.5. Situations in which the role of the traditional authorities is variable and ambiguous:
Zimbabwe
The situation in Zimbabwe is variable and partly dependent on resource endowment. In parallel to the state-
supported system in Zimbabwe is the traditional system of chiefs (often in charge of an entire communal
area), headmen and, at the lowest level, kraalheads. The number of households under a kraalhead is often
fewer than that falling within the state-sponsored VIDCO. The Rural Council Act of 1988 ensured that
control of natural resources at a local level was placed in the hands of the RDCs, rather than chiefs and
other lineage leaders. This has undermined the authority of the chiefs but not necessarily their support. In
all the study sites, the traditional authorities in the villages have maintained a degree of authority over NRM,
but because of the dual structures, there are many examples of individuals going against the traditional
authorities and using the ambiguous situation existing between kraalheads and VIDCOs as the rationale for
such action.
3.6. Role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors in CBNRM
3.6.1. Overview of the importance of NGOs and donors
In most of the cases, CBNRM initiatives have been driven by projects, often with funding from international
agencies and local facilitation by NGOs. Experience from the case studies indicates that assistance from
NGOs and international donor agencies can complement and enhance government efforts at devolution.
Indeed, NGOs and donors have emerged as significant contributors in fostering CBNRM at the local level.
NGOs have played an important facilitatory role in CBNRM, a role that government often does not have the
human resources or skills to do. In some countries NGOs are being used as project implementers by
government departments. In other instances, NGOs may be the power brokers or mediators between
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communities and government, or may contribute to developing income generating activities from natural
resources.
3.6.2. How can NGOs and donors contribute: Evidence from the case studies
An important service provided by the “Friends of the Makuleke” to the Makuleke community was to level the
playing field between the community and the more powerful South African National Parks. In Namibia an
NGO, known as Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation, was responsible for pioneering
community-based conservation in Namibia. NGOs involved in CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe and others in
Malawi have been instrumental in driving the agenda or facilitating the movement towards greater local
control of natural resources (see also Nhira et al. 1998). In Botswana an international NGO (SNV) and a
national NGO (Thusano Lefatsheng) have been the key players in community-based wildlife management
in the case study. They engaged in a process of community capacity building for three years before the
management structure, a constitution, and a land use and management plan were developed. This involved
a full-time advisor working with the community. The NGOs also undertook extensive lobbying on behalf of
the community to get the Trust registered (in 1998). It remains to be seen whether such an intensive and
expensive facilitation process can be replicated elsewhere, and to what extent it is necessary for success.
An emphasis on opportunities for income generation from forest and woodland products has made NGOs
in Malawi essential partners to government in CBNRM efforts. The Wildlife Society of Malawi (WSM) was
instrumental in mediating access to Chimaliro Forest Reserve for local communities to practice bee-
keeping. This NGO has also provided the training, marketing and back-up support to make the bee keeping
project a success. Other NGOs have offered intensive training programmes on environmental education,
soil and water conservation, wildlife utilisation, fuelwood saving devices, gender issues and so on and have
integrated and linked the wider needs of community with land and NRM concerns.
NGO involvement in wildlife management in Zambia is limited compared to other countries, although aid
from NORAD, WWF-US and USAID has provided much of the funding basis for the programmes. The
Village Forestry Committees in the Tanzania case received considerable support from a donor-funded
initiative, but in this case it was project personnel funded by the donor rather than NGO staff that facilitated
the process (see also Wily 1999).
It is often argued that high donor inputs contribute to initiatives that are unsustainable and frequently
collapse following withdrawal of the donors. This was, to a large extent, the case when USAID stopped
supporting the Lesotho range improvement programme. However, the establishment of CBNRM
programmes in all the countries studied would have been impossible without donor support, and all boast
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a long list of international donors (e.g. UNDP, USAID, DFID, EU, GTZ, FAO) concerned with development,
livelihoods and NRM. The possible exception is communal area management in South Africa.
3.6.3. Approach and process issues
Generally NGOs working in Namibia and Botswana are providing what has been called consistent and
persistent “light touch” community empowerment and facilitation (Jones forthcoming). This approach
involves working directly with communities (rather than through other structures), regular field visits, follow-
up, staying in touch with community power shifts and internal dynamics, and training and capacity building.
Communities are “nudged” into taking action so that facilitators are not taking a decision for or on behalf of
communities. This requires assisting communities and community organisations to identify key issues and
potential problems, and helping them work through these issues and develop appropriate decisions,
solutions and actions - a necessary process so the NGO does not become the community’s gatekeeper to
the world.
Striking this balance is important, as NGOs are potentially powerful actors. They receive funding and can
allocate and withhold this. They can push communities into certain decisions and can provide material
benefits and employment. If NGOs are good facilitators their role will diminish as the community's capacity
increases. This is not always the case and some NGOs have a vested interest (i.e. further funding) in
continuing a relationship with a community. During the Makuleke restitution claim, NGOs and donors
competed with one another to become part of the process and, as a result, had a very disruptive effect,
contributing directly to conflict in the key community structures. In Malawi, some NGOs have had a tendency
to pursue their own agendas without considering the wider consequences of their actions. For example, in
the Mangweru study area income generation projects requiring a constant supply of fuelwood were
implemented without consideration of the impact of this on forest management and future wood supplies.
Furthermore, there was no attempt to link with the Forestry Department.
In Zimbabwe in the Gokwe case study, the community Resource Management Committees were set up by
the Forestry Commission to facilitate and manage the resource-sharing scheme. In some areas the
committees were viewed suspiciously and regarded by villagers as spies for the state. The Forestry
Commission had a long history of conflict with local people in this region, and one wonders whether the
situation would have been improved if the project had been implemented by an NGO.
3.6.4. Relationship between NGOs and the state
Sometimes governments are reluctant to engage NGOs in a CBNRM process due to perceptions that
NGOs are radical organisations that have potential to cause disruption. This has happened to some extent
in Lesotho and South Africa and is to the detriment of effective CBNRM implementation. Zimtrust, an NGO
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that provided technical support to Rural District Councils at the inception of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, is
advocating for benefits and management of CAMPFIRE to go below Council level. Consequently, it is now
viewed suspiciously by Councils and has been, to large extent, replaced by the CAMPFIRE Association – an
association with representatives from all Councils involved in CAMPFIRE. In contrast, recognising the very
crucial and complementary role of NGOs, the government of Malawi has entered into a number of
collaborative partnerships with NGOs, and a number of official policies, strategies and forums exist which
clearly demonstrate the partnership role of NGOs in supporting and implementing development policies.
3.7. Role of the private sector in CBNRM
3.7.1. Overview: Where does the private sector fit in?
The private sector provides the key to income generation in many CBNRM initiatives and consequently is an
essential partner in the process. In this section we consider the role of entrepreneurs who are external to
the community, but who attempt to work with the community or its supposed representatives (such as
district councils). There are three other classes of entrepreneurs. Firstly, there are community members
that are themselves entrepreneurs, generally involved in small-scale operations (Section 3.6.4). Secondly,
there are entrepreneurs from outside the community that usually work through specific community
households (e.g. charcoal makers) (Section 3.8.4).Thirdly, there is the situation where the community itself
is the entrepreneur, as in Namibia, Botswana and Makuleke, and enters into business arrangements with
private companies.
3.7.2. Benefits of private sector involvement: Evidence from the case studies
The importance of the private sector has been particularly emphasised in situations such as the Makuleke
where the ultimate success of the initiative depends on private sector investment and the delivery of levies
from this. In Namibia and Botswana private operators are increasingly becoming the tourism and safari
hunting partners of conservancies and trusts, providing capital, expertise and market access. Leases and
concessions have been transferred from government to conservancies or trusts and any new
arrangements are made directly with these corporate entities. In most of the more established
conservancies and trusts reviewed, substantive income has been generated.
There are, however, many examples where the community benefits little from private sector involvement.
For instance, in Zambia, tourism partnerships have provided little more than an opportunity for employment
to a very small number of community members. This is partly because communities themselves do not
negotiate directly with the private sector and because title to the land for development is transferred to the
tourism operator. Safari companies deal directly with the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund after being
selected by the National Tender Board. The chief is the only local level member on the selection panel. He
also maintains the power to allocate communal land for tourism enterprises without any consultation with
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the community, although the District Council must provide final approval of the site. If the business plans for
the proposed development are approved by all relevant authorities (District Council, Department of National
Parks and Wildlife Service and the Zambia National Tourist Board), then full title deeds may be transferred
to the private sector operator by the Commissioner of Land. This effectively isolates the community and
means that the operator is under no obligation to share revenues with the community except in special
circumstances where a token of appreciation may be provided to the chief. Thus it can be seen that the
private sector, in alliance with other players, can shift the balance of power away from communities.
This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where safari operators usually deal directly with the Rural District
Council or its CAMPFIRE committee, effectively isolating the community from any discussions. Thus while
councils may be highly positive towards CAMPFIRE, local people often express disenchantment with
CAMPFIRE, as in the Sengwe case study.
The private sector is a powerful actor with a high degree of self-interest and considerable knowledge of the
tourism industry. This puts community organisations at a distinct disadvantage and sometimes a third party
broker is required to ensure a fair and equitable arrangement. This broker could be the state as in Namibia,
or an NGO as in the cases of Makuleke, Namibia and Botswana.
3.8. Within the “community”: community differentiation and dynamics
3.8.1. Defining the participating group - overlapping boundaries and rights
In all CBNRM initiatives there needs to be a recognised group of people who are eligible to participate in
NRM activities and to receive the benefits from use. However, defining the group can be a very complex
process. Some of the problems relating to defining “community” that have arisen in the different case
studies are discussed below. This area remains one of the most difficult aspects in the implementation of
community-based programmes.
In Zambia there are clearly problems relating to the definition of the beneficiary community in Mumbwa
Game Management Area (GMA). The participating community was defined by the boundaries of the
chiefdoms of the three chiefs rather than by the actual GMA itself. As a result families resident outside the
GMA are eligible to benefits accruing from wildlife management. However, these households are seldom
victims of crop damage and bear little of the costs associated with living with wildlife. Certainly, the ability to
provide household dividends would be more viable if emphasis had been placed on the 6 097 people
residing inside the GMA rather than focussing on the chiefdom areas as the units of benefit. Kapungwe
(2000) emphasises the need to apply the principle of “unit of production is the unit of benefit” in such
situations.
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In the Makuleke case in South Africa, a latent power struggle between the resettled Makuleke group, under
Chief Makuleke, and the Mhinga Tribal Authority under whose jurisdiction they fall has existed since their
forced removal in 1969. This rose to a head in 1997 when this administrative arrangement was translated
into a claim for the restitution of the Pafuri Triangle not to the Makuleke but to the Mhinga Tribal Authority.
When the Makuleke refused to accept this, Chief Mhinga lodged a counter claim. This delayed the
settlement of the Makuleke claim by the Land Claims Commission, who eventually rejected the Mhinga
claim recognising the Makuleke as the rightful claimants. Such situations, in which tribal authorities are
claiming to be ‘the community’ eligible for land restitution has emerged in other parts of South Africa (Kepe
and Wynberg 1999). In all cases these claims have been countered by the group whose families had been
physically removed from the restitution area, but this has not been without raising a great deal of conflict
within the broader community.
In the co-management arrangements for Chimaliro Forest Reserve in Malawi there was much discussion
and contesting views as to how the nine villages surrounding the forest should organise themselves to
manage it. Two proposals were tabled: either to manage the forest as one group comprising all villages, or
to manage it in blocks comprising three villages each. During discussions it transpired that not all villages
were comfortable working together. Those that were happy to work together tended to have historical and
ethnic ties, although all the headmen preferred the option of working as one group. Young men within the
villages wanted to manage the forest for the production of timber, charcoal, etc. for income generation, with
patches of forest allocated to individuals. On the other hand, the community elders did not want to see the
forest divided up. Even after consensus was reached (block option), there was much disparity regarding the
type of management for different sections of the forest. Most suggestions put forward had to do with
personal interests and benefits.
In Namibia there has been conflict over land and boundaries in the formation of most conservancies. The
conservancy policy expects communities to define themselves and to agree on boundaries. However, this
often causes or exacerbates conflicts over land causing significant delays in conservancy registration.
Disputes between Torra and #Khoadi//hoas conservancies over an area rich in wildlife resources required
several mediation attempts to overcome. Torra was also involved in a dispute with another emerging
conservancy. In the end Torra and the other conservancies pragmatically decided to exclude the disputed
areas from their conservancy applications pending later settlement. The process to define the community in
Sesfontein in Namibia took nearly three years. During this process one group of people geographically
separated from the rest of the community decided to form their own conservancy, despite being linked to
the broader group through a number of factors including traditional leadership. This was partly because
previous ethnic administrative borders had cut through the area that people believed encompassed one
“community”, breaking the ties between villages. In most cases the conservancies are based on social units
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of people who decide that they are a “community” because of historical ties, access to a certain areas of
land linked to chieftaincies, ethnicity and geographic proximity.
Despite the problems in Namibia, the strength of the Namibian approach is that people on the ground
decide how they will define “the community” rather than this being imposed from the outside. The main role
of the state or NGOs is to facilitate and mediate this process. Furthermore, the concept of community is
accepted as being dynamic and changeable. It is expected that conservancies will continue to shrink and
expand as communities find the appropriate social scale at which collective action is practical and effective
and the ecological scale at which wildlife management can work. It is also expected that in the north west,
conservancies may merge to manage highly mobile game such as elephants (Jones, forthcoming). Such
changes will be accommodated rather than resisted by the state.
3.8.2. Community differentiation and intra-community power struggles
In all the case studies the communities participating in the CBNRM initiatives were stratified and
differentiated along the lines of age, gender, livelihood strategies, ethnicity, political affiliations, education,
wealth, interest and/or allegiance to traditional versus modern structures. Many of the studies referred to a
community “elite” who are strong, educated and articulate with the potential to link in with the state
apparatus or private operators, and thereby control decision-making and the flow of benefits.
In the Lupande Game Management Area (GMA) in Zambia the Village Action Groups tend to be dominated
by the ‘community elite’ who are close to the chiefs and traditional leadership and trap the decision-making
process. This is a common phenomenon where communities are required to elect representatives to a
committee. They tend to choose the better-educated and more powerful individuals in the village. However,
once these elites are in power, they are said to forget and neglect the people whom they are representing.
A similar situation was reported for the Malawi case studies where members of the community made
allegations that some committee members, although elected, showed tendencies to serving their own
interests. A mechanism was thus put in place in which community members could voice such concerns with
the chief and present a case for removing the offending members from the committee. Poor representation
was also apparent in the case study areas of Chikwarakwara and Sengwe, where a common criticism of
councillors was that they tend to forget about the community as soon as they were elected.
In Namibia problems between groupings and different sectors of the community varied across
conservancies. Cattle owners are often an important community stakeholder in resisting conservancy
formation, especially in situations where land is demarcated for wildlife re-introduction, as this leads to a
loss of access to this land by graziers (Jones and Mosimane 2000). Cattle owners in Sengwe in Zimbabwe
were also a grouping that had very specific interests when CAMPFIRE proposals were being entertained
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(e.g. the alignment of cattle veterinary fences were often at odds with CAMPFIRE proposals).
In Namibia, like South Africa, population mix and distribution has been affected by forced removals and
relocations imposed by successive colonial governments. This has resulted in frequent inter-group conflict,
tenure insecurity, and leadership instability making local level organisation and action difficult to implement
(Durbin et al. 1997). In the Sesfontein conservancy residents are a mixed group consisting of Herero,
Himba, Damara and Nama people settled in a dispersed manner, which limits interaction and creates
logistical problems for collective decision making. Building cooperation and consensus between these
different ethnic groups, people living in scattered villages and between people of the same ethnic group but
under different headmen has proved difficult and has required a dedicated facilitated process. Many of the
problems have still not been resolved, delaying progress. There is also no guarantee that some of the
issues will not flare up again in the future. A similar forced relocation occurred in Chivi in Zimbabwe, but
much earlier (1950s). Thus the study site has many Ndebele households in an otherwise predominantly
Shona area. This has resulted in some weakening of NRM institutions, but more recent phenomena (e.g.
the liberation struggle) have been more important in shaping current-day NRM.
In the Kunene conservancies in Namibia conflict has begun to emerge between the youth and the
conservancy committees (Jones forthcoming, Jones 1999b). Young people have been encouraged to form
their own youth development committees by the Ministry of Youth and Sport. These committees have no
funding or power and little focus. As a result, they have been challenging the conservancy committees,
questioning their representativeness and their actions. The conservancy committees have responded to this
challenge by attempting to provide the youth with a meaningful role in conservancy activities. It is apparent
that age divisions are also present in the Chivi case in Zimbabwe, where young men in their 20s and 30s,
have expressed severe discontent with their elders, claiming that they dominate the development process
for their own ends.
In the Caprivi region in Namibia, ethnic divisions and tribal conflicts, compounded by allegiances to
opposing political parties and secessionist politics, have affected the formation of conservancies and local
level decision-making. The Kwandu conservancy in Mafwe area (supporters of the DTA) suffered a setback
when much of the committee fled with the secessionists. The emergence of minority factions opposing
conservancies also has been an issue in a number of areas and has delayed progress with conservancy
formation. In Sambala four families, driven partly by tribal and political motives, delayed the registration of
the conservancy until government at national level ruled in the favour of the majority. Ethnicity is also a big
issue in Botswana, where in some wildlife areas, the partly elected Land Boards are delaying approval of
land use plans, thus stalling CBNRM implementation. This is probably because the wildlife schemes in
those districts are the domain of minority tribes, and CBNRM implementation would see the reduction of
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free meat to the majority in the district (the majority do not necessarily live with the wildlife). Land Boards are
also easily swayed by the cattle owners in a district, and are often keen to expand the cattle grazing areas.
Once again, cattle are generally the preserve of the dominant ethnic group, so there are constant calls for
rezoning Wildlife Management Areas for commercial grazing. In the KD1 case study, the San are in the
majority and yet the local leadership is vested in the minority. One of the challenges for the Trust was to set
up a management structure that would represent all ethnic groups. The community is grouped into a
number of family groups, which are grouped into three settlement committees. Each family group selects
one female and one male to sit on the Settlement Committee. Two female and two males from each
settlement committee then sit on the Board of Trustees. Distribution of benefits (jobs and money) follows
clearly laid down procedures that allocate benefits to family groups in proportion to their size.
Communities in the Fish River study area in South Africa are highly heterogeneous entities that are
becoming increasingly more stratified along social and economic lines. Some families are well integrated
into the formal economy and receive income from fixed employment opportunities whilst others are solely
reliant on state pensions and ad hoc informal income sources. The more well off in the community can
access alternatives to local resources and therefore have little reliance on or interest in managing the
resource base. On the other hand, poorer residents immediate daily needs tend to take precedence over
the long-term interests of sustainable management. It is argued that this differentiation provides little
incentive for engagement in NRM issues and makes co-operative action almost impossible. Migrancy also
often acts as a barrier to effective NRM in this area, as senior residents are often reluctant to take decisions
on behalf of the absent, but more powerful and educated, sector of the community. This results in delays in
decision-making to a point where interest and momentum wanes and the initiative may be lost. Ainslie
(1999) believes that, for these reasons, that a CBNRM approach may not be the most appropriate route to
improved NRM in the Fish River case study area. Migrancy from the Sengwe case study area for work in
South Africa is also seen as a problem for CBNRM.
In Duru-Haitemba in Tanzania the divisions and power struggles between the so called “traditionalists” and
“elites” at village level are impacting negatively on or have the potential to disrupt forest management by
providing conflicting messages. However, some villages have successfully managed to integrate across
these two groupings through having members in both groups.
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3.8.3. Gender roles
In general women tend to take a back seat in NRM issues. Often this is because of the emphasis on
economic resources such as wildlife, livestock and timber rather than on an integrated approach that
includes the less valuable but vital resources used every day in the home.
In Malawi the role of women in forest management tends to be restricted to certain activities and forest
products (e.g. thatch and fuelwood). However, women in both study sites expressed the view that they
wanted the same opportunities as men and to have an equal say and influence in decision-making
concerning forest management and utilisation as a way of ensuring a fair share of the benefits.
Effective NRM in the Fish River area is being impeded by gender discrimination. Despite being the primary
resource users and the most knowledgeable about resource availability and condition, women are generally
not involved in decisions around NRM nor do they hold meaningful positions in local structures. This results
in a focus on livestock and range management and the neglect of other important resources.
Similarly, in Zambia the lack of adequate participation of women in NRM has prompted a suggestion that a
targeted policy should be formulated that is gender sensitive regarding the membership and composition of
local level organisations and the recruitment of village scouts. For the Makuleke case in South Africa this is
exactly what has happened following the land claim. CPA legislation promotes the role of women in CPA
executives, so women within the Makuleke community have moved from having been excluded from
community decision making by the traditional structures to at least being recognised as having a role.
Similarly in the Botswana case, female representation on the various community committees has been
assured through the constitution of the trust.
The message from Lesotho is quite positive. Here, there is increasing recognition for women, not just as
“stand-ins” for their absent husbands (working in South African mines) but as resource managers in their
own right. Grazing associations are open to women, and women cattle owners are joining these. In many
cases village committees have women holding the portfolios of vice chairperson, secretary and treasurer.
3.8.4. Role of local entrepreneurs
At a local level, individuals, often outsiders, appropriating resources for commercial purposes are placing a
serious constraint on the ability of local organisations to regulate and control the use of resources. This
applies particularly in the case of forest and woodland management. In these situations there is a fine line
between promoting strategies that enhance the value of and benefits from natural resources as an incentive
to manage them better, and the potentially negative impacts that enhanced commercialisation may bring
especially when the opportunities are recognised and exploited by more powerful groups outside the local
community.
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Entrepreneurs pose one of the greatest threats to sustainable local level NRM in Malawi. In both Chimaliro
and Mangweru study areas major conflicts exist between entrepreneurs and local communities with regard
to the utilisation of forest products. The entrepreneurs are much more sophisticated than villagers in terms
of resource acquisition (mostly illegal), processing, transportation and marketing, and therefore harvest
large quantities of resources at a time. These entrepreneurs are said to be mainly outsiders operating alone
or in small groups. Many show very little interest in managing the resource they are exploiting. Woodcarvers
have been long established in Malawi and have pursued their business relatively unchecked. There is little
understanding of the woodcraft industry and few efforts to regulate it. Many of the industry’s entrepreneurs
are economically powerful individuals with no accountability to local institutions, so they are virtually a law
unto themselves, harvesting wood where and when they want to.
Similar problems are experienced with individuals in the firewood and charcoal trade. The impact of this
trade on woodlands is substantial, particularly in the Mangweru area. Mwabumba et al. (1999) cite an
example where local VNRMC members received death threats after they attempted to challenge the right
of charcoal makers to harvest wood. The government, through the Forestry Department, tries to control
this trade through roadblocks, fines and seizure of products but with little effect.
Similarly, in Zimbabwe woodcarvers operate with little regard to traditional rules and regulations or by-laws
administered by the RDC. Often, traditional leaders themselves are involved in woodcraft and misuse their
authority to maintain a continuous supply of timber. Outsiders often gain access to timber for their work
through purchasing the wood from community members.
The issue about how to deal with these powerful commercial users is something that all countries are facing
and there are few easy solutions. Greater support by the state in local level law enforcement and greater
industry regulation at a national level could possibly help. But, at the same time the former undermines
local authority and creates a continued dependence on the state.
In the Fish River in South Africa, reserves managers have, in recent years, been issuing permits for the
harvesting of resources from within the reserves for US$3 per seasonal permit. This has resulted in
outsiders taking advantage of the permit system rather than the local community being specifically targeted.
There have been reports of entrepreneurs harvesting medicinal plants from the area. Careless and
damaging medicinal plant harvesting by urban based traders is a considerable problem in many parts of
South Africa leaving local residents feeling helpless in dealing with it. The Fish River communities are also
facing problems dealing with the invasion of livestock from large cattle owners in the neighbouring densely
populated settlement.
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In Namibia, especially in the Sesfontein conservancy, individuals within the community are beginning to
recognise opportunities for income generation through tourism, and have started campsites and traditional
villages, sometimes with the help of NGOs. This has led to some tensions between conservancies and
entrepreneurs with the latter resisting working through conservancies (Davis and Jacobson 1999). NGOs
have intervened and have encouraged a relationship with the conservancies by arguing that the land for
development is communal land and, therefore, any enclosure of it is an opportunity cost to other land users.
In this context it is fair that some fee or levy is paid to the conservancy. Tourism development plans are also
being used to resolve this important issue of collective rights and interests versus individual rights and
interests. These plans aim to ensure ecologically and socially sustainable development that is appropriate
with regional supply and demand. Conservancies in Kunene and Caprivi have decided to apply for all
“permissions to occupy” (PTOs) within their boundaries forcing individual entrepreneurs to enter into
contracts with them (Davis and Jacobson 1999).
4. Where is the new locus of devolved power and what are the
benefits of that power?
In the previous sections we have described all the organisations and stakeholders that are involved in NRM
and the roles that they play. It is apparent that devolution has resulted in contrasting outcomes in the case
studies, with different loci of power emerging amongst the range of organisations involved. Consequently,
diverse attitudes towards CBNRM among case studies and rather different kinds of benefit streams are
evident. It is these issues we turn to in this section.
4.1. Grassroots or extensions of the state: Who has received devolved authority and
control?
4.1.1. What has the stakeholder analysis revealed?
The previous sections have revealed that the transfer of authority and control for NRM from a central to a
local level has varied widely across the case studies impacting differently on community participation and
involvement in NRM. Control over wildlife, tourism and forest management has been largely devolved to
either (i) lower tiers of government (Zimbabwe), (ii) multi-stakeholder structures aligned to the wildlife
authorities and with strong representation from traditional leaders (Zambia), (iii) village based committees
(Malawi and Tanzania) or (iv) direct to communities through representative and statutory CBOs (Botswana,
South Africa, Lesotho and Namibia) (Table 2). In many cases the situation is not as clear-cut as the above
categorisation suggests, and a range of stakeholders may have overlapping roles to play (e.g. Lesotho,
Namibia, Malawi) with varying influence on the CBNRM process.
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Table 2. Summary of the level of devolved authority and control over natural resources in the case study
countries.
Country
Level of devolution
Comments
Botswana
Authority rests in the hands of a community trust with corporate status.
Accountability mechanisms are established in the Trust constitution.
Lesotho
Ultimate authority lies in the hands of the local councils and traditional leaders. Grazing Associations consisting of resource users with an elected committee help to manage the rangelands in Range Management Areas.
Other stakeholders play a more prominent role than the local community members. Legislation prevents true transfer of grazing rights to association members.
Malawi
Forestry management in communal areas (Village Forest Areas) has been devolved to elected village committees (non-statutory structures) known as Village Natural Resource Management Committees (VNRMCs).
Traditional leadership still plays a very important role in these committees.
Namibia
Conservancies (statutory structures) - formed by all communal area residents. Managed by an elected management committee.
Accountability mechanisms set out in the conservancy constitution. Property rights transferred to the community.
South Africa
In restitution cases in protected areas (e.g. the Makuleke) there has been high level of devolution to community level through transfer of land ownership to Communal Property Associations (CPAs) (statutory structures), although some authority still lies with the parks boards. In communal areas, there has been no coordinated process to address resource management and thus this responsibility still lies with the traditional authorities in most areas or with non-statutory civil society organisations. In the Fish River case study Residents Associations have attempted, unsuccessfully, to take over resource management responsibility.
CPAs consist of all rights holders and have built in accountability mechanisms. Since historical processes have eroded the power of the chiefs, open access systems apply in many areas. In the Fish River the community through the Residents Associations are in a position to manage their own resources but are not doing this for many reasons.
Tanzania
Elected village-based structures (non-statutory) are responsible for most aspects of forest management in communal areas. These are known as Village Forest Committees (VFCs). Villages have corporate status.
There is competition between traditional and the externally facilitated village organisations for forest management.
Zambia
No real devolution. Local management structures include a range of stakeholders from central government, local government, traditional authorities, and community.
Other stakeholders play a more prominent role than the local community members.
Zimbabwe
Local government - Rural District Councils.
Little accountability to the community.
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In Zambia and Zimbabwe, authority is largely concentrated at the district level. However, this power may or
may not be felt at lower levels. For instance, where high value wildlife is concerned, the Rural District
Council (RDC) makes sure that it has the sector under its control (as with CAMPFIRE). Where high value
resources are not present, such as in Chivi, the workings of the Council are all but absent, and in that case
the de facto power rests with the village traditional leaders. In Zambia there is virtually no institutional
mechanism to cater for local people at village level. Thus, the Wildlife Authorities and Sub-authorities have
no true community representation. In these situations it could be argued that devolution to district level
merely results in a shift in power from one level of government authority and control to another, and does
not represent true community empowerment or CBNRM. Most other countries have district structures that
have some NRM responsibilities, but decision making over NRM rests with village-level organisations.
Cases that have state aligned village organisations as the key loci of power are Malawi and Tanzania, while
those with community-based trusts or property associations are Botswana, Makuleke and Namibia.
In the Fish River case study it was a civic association that assumed responsibility for NRM, but since
because this is not supported by appropriate policies these structures remain relatively powerless.
4.2. How is CBNRM benefiting the community?
4.2.1. Community perceptions and attitudes towards CBNRM: Enchantment or
disenchantment?
This section attempts to summarise how local people feel about the CBNRM programmes in which they are
participants. If there is little local level support for the process, then the chances of the initiative leading to
more sustainable NRM and enhanced rural livelihoods are minimal.
The sentiments of community members towards the CAMPFIRE programme appear to be increasingly
negative. In Sengwe discontent related primarily to the lack of compensation in the face of problem
animals, the high proportion of revenue retained by the RDC, the lack of consultation by the CAMPFIRE
committee on issues such as fencing, a feeling that ‘their’ animals are being driven to other areas and
hunted with the result that other communities receive the benefits, and the lack of communication with the
private sector operator. People in Chikwarakwara were less negative having recently received a fence for
their irrigation scheme from CAMPFIRE monies and being happier with the lines of communication between
themselves and the local CAMPFIRE committee. However, damage by problem animals is still seen as a
major issue. Many felt that the large percentage of revenue retained by the RDC is not justified as almost
none of this is returned to the community in the form of development. In the Chivi case local residents were
also unhappy with their RDC, seeing little benefits from it and wanting support from it for
NRM. De facto control is at the local level but the RDC could facilitate the situation by actively supporting
local leadership (largely the traditional structure in this case).
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The Forestry Commission in Zimbabwe is unpopular with the people of Gokwe because of its enforcement
regime and policies towards the state forest. Many residents in the communal area regard the state forest
as their own making it difficult to control illegal resource use. Older people were unanimous that the forest
should be returned to community ownership and control, whilst some of the younger generation felt that it
was important for the Forestry Commission to continue to play a regulatory role. However, there was
consensus that the Forestry Commission should relax some of its rules.
In Zambia, in the Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA), community members expressed the view that
they would like the ADMADE programme to benefit them more directly by, for example, providing fertiliser
or household dividends to allow farmers to purchase such requirements. However, government officials
argue that emphasis is placed on community development projects because there is insignificant income to
make any impact at household level. Household dividends could be made more meaningful if they were
shared only by the households (6 097) residing immediately in the GMA, and not all people living under the
three chiefs whose chiefdoms overlap with the GMA. The issue of crop losses and other damage by wild
animals is again an area of discontentment. Local people are not normally compensated for crop loss.
Negative attitudes towards law enforcement agents such as village scouts and wildlife police officers
continue, despite schools and clinics being built from wildlife revenues.
In Lupande GMA, local people perceive the SLAMU programme as a donor and National Parks and Wildlife
Services initiative, rather than a community-based programme. In a survey conducted by Wainwright and
Wehrmeyer (1998) only about 10% of residents in the SLAMU claimed to have a good understanding of the
programme. This suggests that either the aims of the programme have not been well communicated or that
they have little relevance for local people. There have been clashes between wildlife officers and villagers
especially after the arrest of villagers suspected of poaching. Subsistence poaching continues in Lupande
GMA and can be interpreted as a lack of recognition of the positive links between community benefits and
wildlife conservation, possibly because significant benefits are not forthcoming. As in other community
wildlife areas, wild animals are destroying crops in Lupande.
While the cases so far discussed have elicited largely negative feelings towards CBNRM, many of the other
cases have elicited largely positive attitudes, tempered with some negative ones.
In the Botswana case, residents are highly supportive of the CBNRM programme, though it is early days to
assess success. Community members are also positive towards the forestry development in the Tanzanian
case study. There is a degree of pride in the fact that through their own efforts the forestry areas have
shown much improved forest quality in the last few years. In Namibia, recent surveys in the Kunene region
(Jones 1999a and 1999b) have demonstrated that residents are mainly positive to the conservancies and by
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implication the CBNRM process. The major area of complaint relates to the poor flow of information
between conservancy committees and members that, in turn, compromises members’ ability to participate
in decision-making. As the state takes none of the revenue generated, and has played an important
facilitatory role in a number of the conservancies, relationships between government and community are
generally good. In Caprivi, problem animal control is a major challenge and communities are dissatisfied
with government for not being more proactive in dealing with this issue. In Mayuni, Kwandu and Wuparo
conservancies, crop and livestock farmers have negative attitudes towards wildlife and are concerned that
there are no strategies in place to compensate people who have lost crops and livestock to game. In
Salambala Conservancy the employment of local people to fence the core wildlife area, the building of a
community campsite, and the translocation of game to the area has resulted in a positive attitude towards
the conservancy concept.
Regarding the Makuleke case in South Africa, research conducted by Fabricius et al. (in prep.) as part of a
broad people and parks survey indicated that Makuleke attitudes towards conservation are unusually
positive. This contrasted with earlier work when the Makuleke were still locked into hard bargaining with the
SANP. The interpretation is that regaining ownership of the land has changed attitudes to wildlife
management and conservation or, more realistically, has resulted in an acceptance of the new status quo.
Indeed, the Makuleke agreement (Box 1) does not meet many of the desires and objectives of the broader
community. The agreement imposes the conservation status of the land as non-negotiable, and subjects
ownership to significant restrictions including no direct consumptive use of resources by the community.
Acceptance of the new situation therefore does not necessarily translate into durable “positive attitudes” or
in changed behaviour on the part of the general community especially when the desire to hunt has been
strongly expressed. It can be argued that if the CPA elite were to intercept much of the benefit derived from
the land, it would leave the remainder of the community with little motivation and incentive to adhere to the
restrictions imposed regarding hunting and other direct uses.
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Box 1: The Makuleke Agreement In terms of the agreement the Makuleke regains ownership of the Pafuri Triangle (renamed ‘the Makuleke region of the KNP’). The land may, however, only be used for conservation purposes in addition to which the Makuleke are obliged to enter a 50-year contractual park agreement with the SANP, renewable after 25 years. Even should the contractual park relationship come to an end, the state will continue to have an obligation to ensure that effective conservation management takes place. This means that the Makuleke region will be declared a schedule 2b national park and is to be managed through a Joint Management Board (JMB) as an integral part of the KNP. The KNP will furthermore remain responsible for the day-to-day management of the land, but as an agent of the JMB. Decision-making in the JMB is to be by consensus with a series of deadlock breaking mechanisms. In exchange the Makuleke gain exclusive commercial rights to the area and a variety of other cultural and use rights. There would furthermore be no ‘human exclusion zones’ and the Makuleke could theoretically identify any activity in the area as ‘commercial’. The relationship between the JMB partners, for a variety of reasons, is interesting.
• First of all, it can be described as an agreement between equals. The agreement thus transcends the traditional skewed power relations between parks and people.
• Second, the state’s vested interest, namely biodiversity conservation, is made explicit and is protected through various conservation guarantees that have been built into the agreement.
• Third, clear boundaries have been imposed between the partners, making it easier to untangle SANP and Makuleke vested interest. There will, for example, be no SANP involvement in the community development or commercial aspects. Structurally the agreement leaves little scope for the desire to ‘control’ in order to achieve conservation objectives.
• Fourth, the agreement can be described as flexible, a characteristic that makes it possible to aim at the development of a meaningful long-term relationship – but one that presupposes ongoing negotiations between the two ‘partners’.
• The agreement, in other words, is structured in such a manner that ongoing negotiation between the Makuleke and the National Parks Board becomes inescapable.
The Chimaliro community in Malawi has been positive and supportive of co-management and CBNRM
arrangements in their area. For much of the community the removal of restrictions on the use of the forest
reserve and various training sessions aimed at building the capacity of community organisations signified a
huge improvement on the previous situation and a commitment by the state towards empowering local
people to manage resources. There was, however, a general dissatisfaction with delays in formally ratifying
the regulations drawn up by the community with the Forestry Department representatives. As a result the
management plan for the co-management initiative is not being fully implemented and current community
involvement is restricted to a few villages in dire need of forest resources. Most villagers fear that the good
intentions and reputation built by the Forestry Department at the beginning of the co-management efforts
are slowly being dented, and disillusionment is settling in.
In Mangweru in Malawi, the spirit of working together to manage the village forest area was evident in all
sections of the community. Since the NRM initiative originated in the community itself the role of the state
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has been minimal. The free technical and material assistance provided has been widely appreciated and
has acted to encourage and boost morale towards CBNRM. However, the community did highlight some
problems in managing and protecting their forest from theft, and felt that the Forestry Department could do
more to help address these. The deployment of two patrolmen by the Forestry Department was initially
effective but this support had become too infrequent and unreliable. This highlights the need not only to
devolve authority to a local level, but also to equip and support communities through legal mechanisms and
back-up policing to protect the resource they have become responsible for.
4.2.2. Distribution of revenues and other benefits
In Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme a large proportion of the revenue from hunting leases is retained by
the Rural District Councils (RDCs) at their discretion (Table 3). The remainder is channelled to the
community, often after inordinate delays. In Chikwarakwara the RDC retained as much as 50% of the total
revenue, 15% as a levy and 35% as a management fee. This is resented by the community who feel that
they should receive a larger proportion of the funds, especially since they must bear the costs of wildlife
damage. At community level, income is either dispersed as household dividends and/or used for community
development projects. The choice as to how the money is distributed is rarely the community’s but is usually
decided by the CAMPFIRE committee with little wider consultation. In Chikwarakwara and Sengwe,
household dividends decreased in value and then ceased altogether over the years. However, a decision to
reinstitute household dividends has recently been made. The problem with household dividends is that they
are often very low (<US$5 per annum) and the larger the community the less income is available per
household. In many instances the contribution is too small to counter the costs associated with living with
wildlife. Community projects funded varied from those that benefit the entire community, e.g. school
construction, purchase of a grinding mill and clinic upgrading, to those that are limited to a smaller sector of
the community, e.g. rehabilitation of the irrigation scheme at Chikwarakwara. Households in both areas
receive meat from hunted animals as an additional benefit.
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Table 3. Distribution of benefits in the different case studies.
Country
Who benefits
Who decides
Botswana
All members (residents) of the Community Trust.
The Board of Trustees in consultation with the community.
Lesotho
No financial returns but Grazing Association members benefit indirectly through more productive range systems. Unclear as to what happens to the fees collected by the Grazing Associations.
Malawi
State and community. In co-management arrangements a 70-30 share for government and community respectively, and for VFA a 20-80 share. In one area the VNRMC received all the revenue generated.
State and VNRMCs.
Namibia
All members (residents) of the conservancy.
The conservancy committee in consultation with conservancy members.
South Africa
Makuleke: Members of the CPA. Fish River: Few benefits other than access to resources.
CPA executive in consultation with members. In the co-management situations reserve managers.
Tanzania
Village members
Village
Zambia
In ADMADE 65% is retained by the programme and 35% accrues to the community. Under SLAMU 80% of revenue accrues to the community via Village Action Groups. The remainder is shared by local government structures (14%) and the chiefs (6%).
State sets the shares. At a local level leaders and government officials in the management structures decide on behalf of the community. Percentages of revenue accruing to different organisations decided by the state. Village Action Groups decide how to spend the money earned by the community.
Zimbabwe
RDC retains most of the revenue - up to 50%.
Decisions made mostly by RDC and CAMPFIRE committee with little consultation.
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Revenue from wildlife and tourism goes directly to the conservancy management committees in Namibia.
No portion of the revenue is required by central or local government (Christoffersen and Johnson 1997).
The residents of the conservancies decide how revenues should be distributed at conservancy AGMs,
based on a ‘benefit distribution plan’, which the committee develops in consultation with the community at
the inception of the conservancy. Usually a small portion of income is retained by the committee for running
costs (administration and personnel costs for game guards, resource monitors, etc.), although in some
conservancies this is still covered by external funding. In Botswana a similar situation prevails, with only 4%
of revenue generated having to be paid to the District Council as a Resource Royalty.
In most of the more established conservancies, substantive income has been generated. Some of this has
been through joint venture agreements with tourism companies. In most situations community members
favour the use of conservancy revenue for development projects that are identified by the community
(Jones 1999a). The #Khoadi//Hoas conservancy is allocating some income to an “elephant emergency
fund” to compensate residents for elephant damage. This is something that all the conservancies should
consider, as damage to crops by wild animals is significant. In Mayuni Conservancy 56% of respondents in
a survey indicated that they have lost more than 75% of their crops to elephants over the last three years
(Mosimane 1999a). Households in most conservancies receive meat from animals shot for trophies. The
conservancy committees in Namibia also reserve the right to decide how the conservancy wildlife quota is
used. Some wildlife may be sold as part of a smaller trophy hunting quota, but some might be reserved for
hunting by community members, while other animals could be sold live to game farms.
The situation in Zambia is less encouraging with a relatively small proportion of the overall revenue accruing
to the community. The ADMADE programme endeavours to guarantee that income generated from hunting
activities is returned to Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA) through the Wildlife Conservation
Revolving Fund (Lewis and Carter 1993; Tilly 1995). Disbursement of funds is done according to a formula
devised by the ADMADE directorate as follows: 40% of income is set aside for wildlife management; 25% is
retained for administrative costs at the ADMADE headquarters; and 35% returns to the community for
development projects. No household dividends are disbursed. Local leaders are primarily responsible to
determining how development funds are spent. Community projects that have received support include the
construction of schools, mill shelters, teacher’s houses and health centres (Hachileka et al. 1998). These
have tended to cluster around chief’s palaces leaving other villages and areas unserviced (Chilomo et al.
1995).
Restructuring of the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project into SLAMU has ensured that a
much larger proportion of revenue is distributed at a local level. Previously about 60% of revenue went to
managing the programme (Wainwright and Wehrmeyer 1998). Now 80% goes direct to Village Action
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Groups, whilst the remainder is shared by the Area Development Committees (4%), chiefs (6%) and the
Local Leaders Committee (10%). At village level the Village Action Group decides how funds will be
dispersed and which development projects will be supported. Community revenues in the Lupande GMA
have been relatively high, with US$250 000 reaching community level in 1998. Since 1996, fifty-two
community-based projects have been implemented. This approach to revenue sharing has contributed to
raising awareness of wildlife conservation, increased accountability and transparency of local institutions,
and increased democratic principles. One constraint is that management and administration costs are
carried by a donor agency, rendering the project unsustainable in the long term. At some stage, some of
the revenue earned will have to be reinvested in wildlife management.
In the Makuleke case in South Africa, all revenue generated from commercial enterprises in the Makuleke
area of Kruger National Park (KNP) will accrue to members of the Communal Property Association (CPA)
and will be managed through the CPA executive. The executive needs to ensure that it only enters into joint
venture arrangements with the private sector that guarantee a fair share of returns to the community.
Various models and opportunities are being considered. Since the process of developing the Makuleke
area is only just commencing, it still remains to be seen how successful the CPA executive will be in
including the broader community in decisions around income distribution and benefit sharing. Under the
contractual agreement with South African National Parks, KNP remains responsible for biodiversity
management (in return for the Makuleke foregoing direct use benefits). However, once the CPA begins
accruing profit from its tourism ventures a proportion of this will be invested in a conservation management
fund. This situation is in contrast to the initiatives described above in which the state automatically retains its
share of the revenue for management services.
In the Fish River case study there are few financial benefits deriving from NRM in the communal areas, and
Ainslie (1999) argues that this is one of the reasons why community-based approaches to NRM in the area
are unlikely to succeed. Indeed, the potential to generate income from the resource base is extremely
limited for a range of reasons including high levels of environmental degradation and the participation of
many members of the community in the formal economy. In terms of the relationship between local
communities and the protected areas forming the Fish River Reserve Complex, little income is currently
returned to the community. A development levy of R40 per animal shot during the hunting season was
introduced four years ago to fund development projects in the area. However, these funds have not yet
been used because of the need to set up a Section 21 company to administer them. The Eastern Cape
Tourism Board has recently provided some funding for local development projects such as fencing, schools
and a proposed craft project. This was based on recommendations made by the reserve community liaison
officers rather than on an agreement with community members.
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In Tanzania, almost all the benefits of permits to collect forest produce and fines go to the village. The
village also collects cattle and hut taxes, and of these 60% remain with the village and 40% go to the District
Council. The amounts of money raised are not high, and yet the villagers appear to be positive towards the
scheme. Thus Wily (1999), working in Tanzania, comes to a very different conclusion from that of Ainslie
(1999) working in the Fish River case study in South Africa.
In Malawi, the situation differed between cases studies. In Mangweru the VNRMC, under the supervision of
the village head, has full control of revenue derived mainly from the sales of poles, firewood and timber.
None is claimed by the state. This revenue has been used for a number of purposes including rehabilitation
of a church building, school and resident’s houses, and bridge construction. The initiative shown by the
community in Mangweru and the success they have had in protecting and managing the forest resource
has resulted in the Forestry Department maintaining a very low profile and not demanding any share of
revenue. In contrast, in Chimaliro the state takes a proportion of the benefits. Under the co-management
arrangements for Chimaliro Forest Reserve, the Forestry Department and the VNRMC agreed that 70% of
the revenue from forest products collection would go to government and 30% to the community. On
customary land this is reversed, with 80% and 20% of the revenue accruing to the community and
government respectively. The VNRMC, with approval of the village head, decides how the income should
be used, based on development needs in the community. Only when these needs are satisfied can money
can be paid out as household dividends. Another material benefit gained is access to forest products on
state land many of which, especially the non-wood products, can be gathered for free. The community
appreciates this although there is some dissatisfaction with the disproportionate share of the income
earned.
5. What are the problems to be overcome in the move to local
empowerment?
Despite commitment to more local level management of resources, the success of this has varied from
country to country and only in few cases have communities been fully empowered to take control of
decision making around land and natural resource use. In this section we draw on the case studies to
highlight some of the problems faced in the move to local empowerment, and by so doing indicate areas
that need to be tackled if empowerment at community level is to be more successful.
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5.1. National level policy and legislative issues
5.1.1. Lack of enabling policy framework that supports statutory, rights-based organisations
for CBNRM
An enabling policy framework for community-based management is essential for effective devolution. The
case studies have indicated that those countries with policies that devolve authority fully to CBOs, and more
especially transfer proprietary rights over land or resources to resource users, through the facilitation of
villages becoming corporate entities, appear to have more effective ‘on the ground’ initiatives, that are
viewed positively by community members. If lower level structures such as district councils have been
successful in obtaining power, they tend to hold onto it and are reluctant to devolve budgets and
responsibilities to lower tiers (e.g. CAMPFIRE). Murombedzi (1999) has argued that “attempts to foster
people’s participation in conservation through the distribution of revenues from resource utilisation without
devolving rights to resources to local people” will not result in improved NRM. With specific reference to
CAMPFIRE he points out that, without control over wildlife management, equity in wildlife utilisation and
opportunities to participate in the wildlife industry directly, wildlife utilisation will remain inferior to other forms
of land and resource use over which households exert a far greater degree of control.
5.1.2. The lack of commitment to devolution
In other parts of the world a lack of commitment by the state to truly release power to a local level has been
highlighted as a major factor limiting the success of CBNRM (e.g. Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Wainwright
and Wehrmeyer 1998, Jodha and Bhatia 1998, Nhira et al. 1998, Murphree 1993). For example, Jodha and
Bhatia (1998) argue that in India the legal and administrative arrangements for CBNRM (despite lip service
to the opposite) tend towards centralisation and the application of generalised and uniform solutions that do
not recognise the diversities and complexities at community level. This is supported by Datta and
Varalakshmi (1999), Anderson et al. (1998) and Hildyard et al. (1997) who believe that local organisations
under joint forest management in India are little more than a proxy for the Forest Service, with the Forest
Service still controlling key aspects such as the distribution of benefits. The same could be said to be true,
to some extent, for Malawi, Tanzania and Gokwe studies reported in this paper.
In southern Africa, Martin (1998), after working 24 years in the Zimbabwean wildlife department, notes that
the notion of the selfless civil servant is a myth – power is all important, and every bureaucrat is reluctant to
give it up (see also Murphree 1991). The command and control philosophy is thus still entrenched in much
of the legislation and work ethic. Martin (1998) argues that natural resource agencies should see
themselves as spearheading national development and only, secondly, as a regulatory body. Thus most of
their actions should be facilitative rather than prohibitive.
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Of the case studies, those in Zambia and Zimbabwe illustrate the lack of commitment to truly community-
based initiatives.
5.1.3. Multiple structures with unclear mandates
In most of southern Africa there are still on-going power struggles between the traditional authorities and the
modern structures of local government. A lack of clarity regarding the roles of these institutions in a range
of issues, including land allocation and NRM, complicates and politicises the implementation of CBNRM,
and results in competition for power, recognition and control that deflects the focus away from the real
target of CBNRM initiatives, the local community itself.
Despite the weakening of the role of traditional leaders, evidence from many African countries has indicated
that neither past colonial policies nor post-independent government policies which have favoured a
democratically elected local government have managed to destroy the institution of traditional leadership
and its legitimacy completely (see also Keulder 1998). Consequently, the traditional structures remain
important politically and administratively and should not be ignored or underestimated. In South Africa and
most colonial states, past political processes severely undermined the authority and legitimacy of traditional
leaders and caused distrust and disrespect between them and their subjects, but, nonetheless, in most rural
areas they have continued to remain the primary decision makers in communal land and NRM. But,
because their role is in question, uncertainty, confusion and the erosion of existing authority pervades. In
some areas this has resulted in the dissolution of existing institutional arrangements for NRM
and land allocation, such that open access systems and land invasions are becoming the norm (Ainslie et
al. 1998, Ainslie 1999).
A further problem being experienced in all the countries is a lack of integrated and coordinated policy
development and implementation across natural resource sectors. Many of the CBNRM initiatives are
sector specific. This can result in conflicting objectives and arrangements at a local level. Indeed, despite
effective legislative frameworks, the lack of coherent implementation strategies has led to competition and
contradictions between government departments negatively affecting CBNRM in many parts of the region.
Complex institutional arrangements with many stakeholders and overlapping roles and mandates, as is the
case in Zambia and Lesotho, has had negative effects on devolution and effective NRM. For Lesotho,
institutional tensions and power struggles are experienced both at local and national government level due
to a lack of clarity on the mandate guiding the different institutions and their relationship to one another.
Furthermore, legally it is not clear who holds ownership or control. This has contributed to undermining the
effectiveness of the range management programme.
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Ostrom (1992) stresses that institutional ambiguity, such as is currently happening regarding the role of
traditional authorities in most of southern Africa, can be an important factor in disrupting local level NRM
and can prevent revitalisation of common property systems. Indeed, conflict and power struggles between
the traditional authorities and elected local government and/or a range of CBOs are commonplace, mainly
because there is little clarity regarding their precise role in NRM issues. In South Africa traditional authorities
are protected by the constitution in their ‘cultural’ capacity, but what this means functionally is not spelt out.
Steenkamp and Urh (2000) points out that further ambiguity is created because chieftaincies and tribal
authorities are regarded as indispensable in some parts of the country but are rejected as archaic and
redundant in other parts.
This issue of local governance and the division of responsibilities and functions between the traditional
authorities, local government and new community NRM structures must be resolved if development and the
introduction of enhanced systems for land and NRM are to move ahead effectively. In Zimbabwe after the
Rural Districts Councils Act of 1988 firmly placed control in the hands of the RDC rather than the traditional
leaders, there has been a move to reverse this and new legislation is currently being considered which will
return some degree of control to the chiefs. However the new act legitimises the traditional structure without
clarifying the overlapping mandates of the VIDCO/WADCO structure and the traditional structure.
5.1.4. A history of disempowerment and undermining of local institutions
Years of disruptive political manipulation in South Africa have practically rendered CBNRM approaches
impossible in communal areas in the Fish River area (Ainslie 1999). Past state interventions such as
resettlement villages, betterment6 policies, the formation of the homelands, the undermining and
politicisation of traditional authorities and a lack of tenure security, together with the current lack of direction
concerning local government, has had a major impact on rural peoples’ interaction with their natural
resources. Furthermore, this legacy has undermined the legitimacy of local institutions, creating high levels
of institutional contestation that act as a barrier to effective CBNRM. Very similar forces have been at play in
Zimbabwe where the colonial government, and subsequently the independence regime, have
disempowered local institutions, or manipulated local institutions for their broader intentions.
In many countries the state’s usurpation of community land and resources under different pretexts and its
constant political interference in local issues were major contributing factors towards the disintegration of
6 In the late 1930s there was increasing concern about the condition of the land in homeland areas. The early Betterment Proclamations of 1939 were directed at this. Under the charge of native commissioners, residential patterns were reconstructed, pastures fenced, stock reduced, and arable land demarcated. This meant the consolidation of scattered homesteads into villages, which resulted in millions of families being forcibly removed creating huge resentment and resistance.
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traditional management systems for common property resources. In particular in South Africa and Namibia
the actions of the apartheid state contributed hugely to the erosion of local institutions and ‘social capital’ in
most of the country’s rural areas and, as a result, the re-institution of any form of collective action is very
difficult.
Another issue is that past experiences of state manipulation have made people suspicious of any efforts by
outsiders to formalise NRM systems, with some regarding these as yet another attempt at social control
from the outside (Ainslie 1999). The main source of control and power in co-management arrangements for
forests reserves in Zimbabwe remains vested in the state. In the Gokwe case study, the resource-sharing
scheme proposed by the Zimbabwe Forestry Commission was rejected in one of the villages surrounding
the State Forest, and the scheme is viewed ambiguously in other villages. This is partly due to a deep sense
of mistrust between the community and the state, a result of a long history of conflict between the people
and the Commission.
By contrast, a history that has encouraged rather than undermined local level management can facilitate
the implementation of CBNRM. Malawi has a long history of forestry sector involvement in community-
based management going back to the 1920s (Abbot 1997). The communal forest scheme established in
1926 allocated patches of woodland to village heads for local use and management. This gained
momentum in 1931 after the enaction of Village Forest Areas (VFAs) under the Forestry Ordinance of
1931. At independence in 1964 the management of trees and forests on customary land was transferred to
District Councils (Box 2). This usurped the power of village heads, placed an emphasis on revenue
generation and led to wide scale degradation reducing the number of VFAs from 5 108 in 1963 to 1 182 by
1994. However, despite this set back, the fact that there has been a history of relatively successful village
level management has facilitated the implementation of the new forest policy and legislation which amongst
other goals aims to rebuild village level control of customary forests and increase the number of effective
VFAs.
BOX 2: Decentralisation of forest management in Malawi to local government In Malawi, after independence in 1964, the control, protection and management of forestry resources on communal land was transferred from the Forestry Department, which had a policy of promoting village forestry areas (VFAs) under village heads, to district councils. Extension became the function of the agricultural extension services. Rather than this decentralisation effort having a positive effect on local forest management it resulted in the opposite, as the state’s role changed from forest conservation to revenue raising. This resulted in so much degradation of forests that management responsibility reverted back to the Department of Forestry in 1985. During this time the authority of village heads had been usurped by the politically aligned local government structures and the number of active VFAs reduced from 5 108 to 1 182.
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5.2. Local level issues and facilitating the CBNRM process
5.2.1. Low interest in natural resources by local government structures, except as an income
source
In a number of cases, the village structures forming part of the government hierarchy showed little interest
in NRM, and can be interpreted as political arms of the ruling party. This was the case with the lower level
structures in Zambia, and tends to be the case with VIDCOs in Zimbabwe. In addition, local government
structures usually have diverse goals and responsibilities and do not have the resources to devote to
resource management, other than to ensure that revenue continues. The consequence then is that local
government may favour decisions that bring in more income for local government (such as selling wood
from plantations to external vendors), rather than promoting and facilitating community use.
5.2.2. Insufficient attention paid to institutional building
Despite an enabling policy environment and considerable progress in devolution, only a few of the initiatives
described have adequately contributed to enhancing the capacity of village level organisations, local
communities and district level organisations to plan, implement and manage on their own. There has been
too much emphasis on technical rather than socio-economic and institutional aspects of CBNRM, with the
consequence that communities have realised little benefit on a sustainable and self-reliant basis. Indeed, in
many instances dependency rather than self-sufficiency has been cultivated.
5.2.3. Recognising a community and the fuelling of differentiation
For most CBNRM initiatives it is necessary to determine who is eligible as a member of the group or
‘community’ to participate in a project, or, in other words, who has rights of access to land, resources and
benefits. This is not always easy. In many cases, resources such as forests, wetlands, rivers or protected
areas may be used by a number of different communities or villages to varying degrees with different claims
to access or ownership. For example, Mandondo (2000), Lynam et al. (1998) and Nemarundwe (in prep.)
show that use boundaries for common pool resources do not match administrative boundaries, traditional
village boundaries or biophysical units (such as catchments), and that the pattern of utilisation differs from
resource to resource. Additionally, the relative strength of state and traditional structures can differ between
adjacent villages (Campbell et al. 1997) giving different meanings to ‘community’ across villages. In our
cases, many of the successful CBNRM schemes involved a process where the community itself decided on
its membership, often with facilitation by the state or NGOs.
In some policy frameworks real power is decentralised but village governance systems become little more
than a system for channelling resources from above into the hands of the local elite. This often serves to
alienate a large majority of the community by leaving little space for the involvement of socially and
economically marginalised members (Datta and Varalakshmi 1999). Questions about the lack of equity in
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power and benefits amongst community members have been raised in the Tanzanian and Zambian cases,
for example. In these cases the well-educated elite and the traditional leaders, respectively, come to play a
key role in the CBNRM systems.
Power struggles are also likely to take place within communities where local institutions or interest groups
try to take control of a community-based process to further their own interests. In any project implemented
at community level, there is ample opportunity for elite groups or individuals to dominate and control local
level structures and projects largely to their own ends, especially in situations where external agencies (in
particular private sector companies) have to deal and negotiate directly with the ‘community ’ or rights
holders. In these circumstances it is very easy for the more educated, wealthy and articulate members of
the community to ‘hijack’ a community-based process. Indeed, Dove (1993) argues that when resources
become sufficiently valuable, this value will be appropriated by elites, often from outside the community. In
many ways the CAMPFIRE process can be interpreted as having been hijacked by the district authorities,
who have used their power to ensure that the benefits of CBNRM accrue to the district council and thus to
themselves.
Common property theory proposes that successful common property NRM is more likely where
communities are small, have a homogenous social structure and hold shared views, understandings and
norms (Ostrom 1992). However, communities on the ground rarely display these qualities. Communities are
highly differentiated with multiple interests and actors, each of whom can influence processes and decision-
making in different ways. Work from Zimbabwe has shown that a single community can be made up of
separate individuals with divergent agendas, different user groups with distinct needs from their natural
resources, individuals grouped into traditional social units, other individuals rallying behind the modern
leadership structures, and traditional and political elites maintaining power over the populace (see also
Mukamuri 1995, Mukamuri et al. in prep.). Furthermore, Sithole (2000) and Mukamuri et al. (in prep) show
that these social groupings can change rapidly in relation to commercialisation, in-migration, and economic
changes.
In South Africa, most rural communities are stratified according to wealth, education, ethnicity, political
affiliations, livelihood strategies, access to land, use of resources, access to patronage, and engagement in
the formal economy (Ainslie 1999, Kepe 1999). Some are strongly divided by factionalism. This socio-
economic differentiation can result in weak incentives to contribute to NRM initiatives especially for people
with access to non land-based sources of livelihood (Shackleton et al. 1998, Ainslie 1999). It is well known
that people with little dependence on the resource base will show little interest in managing it, but, at the
same time, the very poor for whom the resource base is critical may not be able afford the costs of
restrained use in the interests of long term sustainability.
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Agrawal and Gibson (1999) argue that this community complexity rarely receives the attention or analysis it
needs from those concerned with resource use and management. The tendency is to view ‘community’ as a
unified, organic whole. Questions relating to how differences within communities affect resource use, local
politics, power relations and strategic interactions within communities are rarely addressed. Agrawal and
Gibson (1999) feel strongly that “attention to these details is critical if policy changes on behalf of
‘community’ are to lead to outcomes that are sustainable and equitable”. Other analysts question whether
‘community’ is little more than an abstract term with little relevance to the spatial and temporal dynamics of
groupings of individuals (du Toit et al. 1998). If this is the case, can we ever talk of community-based
management?
5.2.4. Insufficient benefits derived from CBNRM
For resource users to participate in resource management initiatives, the benefits of doing so should exceed
the costs (Ostrom 1992). Incentives that will encourage collective action and compliance with rules should
be associated with the change to new, sustainable resource use practices. Benefits from new approaches
must accrue to all resource users and not just certain sectors of the community or management institutions.
However, increasingly, CBNRM initiatives are demonstrating that the benefits may not justify the costs.
Recent studies have revealed that frequently too little attention is paid to enhancing the value of natural
resources for local communities or ensuring that they receive a fair share of the benefits (Fabricius 1999).
Problems often arise when the supposed benefits are not forthcoming or what is given to the community is
not what was anticipated, as in the Malawi cases. Much of this relates to a lack of community involvement in
decisions around benefit sharing and/or poor feedback from community leaders or representatives. In
community-based wildlife projects the costs carried by community members (costs of damage by wild
animals, opportunity costs of land and restrained use of certain resources, costs of participation and labour)
are rarely balanced by the benefits (Fabricius 1999). This has been illustrated in a number of cases in this
study where communities have complained bitterly about the damage caused by wild animals and the lack
of compensation for this. In some areas, the lack of significant high value resources may deter from the
achievement of community-based management as the costs of collective action will always be higher than
the benefits (e.g. Fish River).
5.2.5. Project-driven agendas
Most CBNRM in southern Africa is what has been termed “imposed” in that the process has been largely
driven from the outside by the state and /or donor agencies and NGOs. In these situations true community
empowerment may be difficult to achieve as illustrated in the following example from Zimbabwe. The style
of councillors in Chikwarakwara and Sengwe in Zimbabwe is that of a state officer in charge, rather than of
facilitator trying to understand local household aspirations. As a community member in Sengwe said: “at
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first the officials spoke softly and repeatedly told us the programme belonged to the community. Now they
have become forceful and we only obey their regulations for fear of being prosecuted.” Consequently,
villagers view the CAMPFIRE programme as an extension of the state and feel no ownership over it despite
local level CAMPFIRE committees organised under the Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) or
Ward Development Committees (WADCOs). This perspective is reinforced by the fact that the adoption of
CAMPFIRE has been largely driven from the outside by either the RDCs or national level players
(Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, and NGOs, such as Zimbabwe Trust). In many of
the other case study countries a similar situation prevails, where CBNRM initiatives are driven by project
agendas. Care needs to be paid to ensuring that community agendas drive the process, and that longer-
term sustainability issues are addressed.
6. Summary and lessons
6.1. Summary
This study has demonstrated that throughout southern African there has been a move to increase
community participation and decision-making in NRM, both in communal areas and on state owned land.
However, despite similar broad policy goals, very different approaches and institutional contexts for CBNRM
have emerged across the case studies. These, together with the influence of local level historical, political,
social and environmental factors, have impacted variably on the functioning and success of CBNRM
initiatives both within and between countries.
A multiplicity of stakeholders are involved in NRM, ranging from national departments and officials, through
to local government, traditional authorities, local resource management institutions, donors, NGOs, the
private sector and a variety of social actors and groupings from within the community. Whilst
there are a great many similarities in the composition of stakeholders between countries, their role and
relative power and influence in the CBNRM process varies considerably.
All countries were found to have some form of decentralised local government at regional or district/sub-
district level, with the traditional authority structures existing in parallel to these modern elected structures. In
some countries, e.g. Lesotho and Malawi, chiefs and other traditional leaders are co-opted onto the district
and sub-district structures, whilst in others, e.g. South Africa and Zimbabwe, these institutions are
deliberately excluded as being non-democratic and collaborators of previous regimes.
Local government structures have a variety of roles and responsibilities relating to development and
planning, and not all are directly involved in NRM. Indeed, it is only in Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent
Lesotho, that local government has a clear mandate and powers in NRM. In the other countries this function
is taken on by more local level organisations and/or district and sub-district structures sponsored by line
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ministries and departments.
In Zambia, for instance, decisions relating to wildlife management in Game Management Areas are made
by multi-stakeholder forums operating at district and sub-district level that report directly to the Department
of National Parks and Wildlife. Along with chiefs, department officials and other representatives, councillors
from the district councils sit on these bodies creating a link between local government and the district
CBNRM structures. By contrast, in Botswana, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks’ multiple-
sector Technical Committee has virtually no connection with the district councils. This has tended to
dissociate the CBNRM projects from the broader district development context.
Most of these district structures, whether local government or line department sponsored, form the upper
tier of a hierarchy of organisations that extend down to grassroots level. This tiered arrangement is,
theoretically, designed to enable community needs and priorities to filter up into district level planning
processes. The reality is often the opposite, with these structures forming a channel through which
decisions made at a higher level can trickle down.
In Zimbabwe the district councils are linked to Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and Village
Development Committees (VIDCOs). These have little direct role in wildlife management since this function
has not been delegated down by the district councils. In Zambia, only the SLAMU programme has
representation at community level in the form of Village Action Groups. This representation is severely
diluted moving up the hierarchy as more powerful stakeholders come on board, with the result that there is
no real community input at primary decision-making level. The District Councils in Zambia similarly link into
lower tier structures known as Ward Development Committees (WDCs) and Resident Development
Committees (RDCs), but, in terms of CBNRM, these are superseded by the line department structures and
are barely functional at the village level in the case study areas. In Lesotho, the lowest tier of local
government, the elected Community Councils (previously Village Development Councils), have legally
recognised control over range resources. However, because chiefs play a dominant role in these councils,
much of the authority still lies in their hands. Malawi also has its hierarchy of local government structures.
Linked to the district assembly are District Development Committees (DDC), Area Development
Committees (ADC), and Village Development Committees (VDC). These are multi-stakeholder committees
presided over by chiefs and villages heads. Whilst these structures are not directly involved in NRM, the
Village Natural Resource Management Committee (VNRMC) (facilitated by the Department of Forestry) is
accountable to the VDC. The situation is similar in Tanzania with Village Forestry Committees (VFCs),
although these are more distant from the traditional leadership.
In addition to these government-sponsored structures, in a number of countries there are also a range of
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CBNRM organisations, wh ich operate more-or-less independently of the state. In Botswana, Namibia and
Makuleke (South Africa) these are corporate entities formed by all residents or rights holders within a
designated area, often spanning several villages. These Trusts, Conservancies and Communal Property
Associations, as they are known, elect their own management committees, which may include traditional
leaders, and are governed by legally recognised constitutions. Because they have been devolved user or
proprietary rights over resources, they have the power to make rules, to approve developments, to enter
into partnership with the private sector, to receive revenues and to decide on benefit allocations. Although
these structures are facilitated by state legislation, there is very little interference by any tier of government
in their operation. Thus, in contrast to the government units described above, their foundation and legitimacy
derives from the community itself. The main role of local and central government is to approve applications
for the establishment of these organisations, to facilitate their formation, and ensure their integration into
broader district planning processes. The Range Management Associations in Lesotho are of a similar
nature, although there is considerably less clarity about their powers relative to local councils and chiefs. In
the Fish River area the primary organisations for CBNRM are civil society structures known as Residents
Associations. These have evolved and subsumed the responsibilities of tribal authorities in the former Ciskei
without any intervention from the state. Ironically though, their ability to function effectively is hampered by
the lack of state support to communal areas in South Africa. The Tanzanian case is somewhat peculiar as
well, as the local committees for NRM, the VFCs, show many similarities to the state-sponsored
organisations described above (e.g. VNRMCs from Malawi), but they differ in that Tanzanian villages have
corporate status.
The study has thus revealed a complex of different structures at a decentralised level that have some role
in NRM. It is clear that the more complicated the institutional arrangements and the greater the diversity of
state-based actors directly involved, as evident in Zambia and Lesotho, the more likely the community is
sidelined rather than empowered in the devolution process. In these cases, there is also increased
likelihood of overlapping jurisdictions and mandates, potentially leading to institutional contestation and
conflict. Neither of these situations bode well for sustainable CBNRM. On the other hand where
“appropriate authority” is devolved directly to community level, the situation is greatly simplified and there is
considerably less ambiguity regarding rights and responsibilities. The danger here, as stressed in the
Botswana study, is that these institutions come to operate in isolation of broader district level processes and,
because of their exclusivity, run the risk of alienation from the wider population. The latter could potentially
lead to decreased political support.
Based on the above understanding and the commonalities and differences between countries, the CBRNM
initiatives described in this study can be broadly classified as follows:
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(1) Cases where the empowerment process has resulted in district structures being the new locus of
power. These can be local government structures, such as district councils (Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE
case), or multi-stakeholder, district structures aligned to line ministries (Zambia cases). In the latter
cases the CBNRM agenda is driven by central state authorities, at a district level, with strong
representation from traditional leadership. In all the cases where district level
structures have been empowered, the future for CBNRM is not positive, as too few benefits reach
communities, and communities feel alienated from the NRM decision-making process.
(2) Cases where line departments sponsor organisations at lower levels, such as Village Forest
Committees in the Tanzania case, Village Natural Resource Management Committees in the
Malawi case and Resource Management Committees in the Zimbabwe Gokwe case. The more
powers such committees receive, the more likely are the successes in NRM. Thus in the Malawian
and Tanzanian examples the committees can formulate by-laws, while the Zimbabwean
committees are very weak vis-à-vis the Forestry Commission.
(3) Cases where there is very little NRM at the lower level, but what does exist is largely derived
through structures outside of the state hierarchy, e.g. traditional customs and norms in the
Zimbabwe Chivi case and Residents Associations in the Fish River case.
(4) Finally, cases that can be considered to be truly community-based, where organisations consisting
of community members themselves are the locus of power (Trusts, Property Associations, as in the
cases in Botswana, Namibia, Makuleke and perhaps Lesotho, and Villages in the case of
Tanzania). It is only this “model” that meets most of the conditions required for successful CBNRM.
Analysis of community attitudes towards CBNRM, have indicated that community members are particularly
supportive when the powerful organisation in the nexus of CBNRM stakeholders is a CBO, such as those in
the fourth category above. At the other end of the continuum are the cases where the district-based
structures assume authority (Zimbabwe and Zambia). In these, people on the ground rarely identify with the
scheme being “community-based”. Benefit distribution also differs markedly among the cases, with 96-
100% of revenues being returned to the community in the cases from Botswana and Namibia, but only 50%
in the CAMPFIRE case (most of the benefits being retained by the district council).
Having appropriate policies and institutional arrangements for CBNRM that empower CBOs to manage
resources is insufficient to guarantee success. Capacity building is essential. Given the social complexities
at a local level and the lack of experience in running of business partnerships, etc. the more successful
CBNRM schemes have been facilitated by NGOs. These organisations also play an essential role in conflict
Devolution in Natural Resource Management
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management between different community actors and institutions competing for power, and can aid in
brokering uneven power balances between community and state. Most of the CBNRM initiatives have
received donor support, without which the above facilitation would be impossible. The negative is the
creation of an unhealthy dependence on these funds and the danger of collapse when the funders
withdraw.
6.2. Lessons and some recommendations for CBNRM implementation
In addition to the institutional context discussed above, a number of other factors and issues have been
identified by the case studies that impact on the empowerment process and the success and sustainability
of CBNRM. These are summarized below.
Demand-driven CBNRM – the ideal: In all case studies, with the possible exception of one of the Malawi
cases, the Makuleke restitution claim and the NRM efforts of residents associations in the Fish River area,
the move to involve communities in wildlife and forest management has largely been driven from the
outside by state and/or donor agencies and NGOs. Because external agendas, not least biodiversity
conservation, shape the philosophies, goals, institutions and processes behind these supply-led
approaches, it could be argued that true community empowerment in these situations is an elusive ideal.
However, where effort has been made to devolve full authority and control to community level, such as in
Botswana and Namibia, a demand-driven movement is beginning to emerge. In Namibia increasingly more
communities are applying, at their own initiative, for conservancy status. A similar situation prevails in
Botswana, and the landmark Makuleke restitution case set in motion a whole series of restitution claims in
national parks and other protected areas in South Africa.
Conflicting policies – what is needed: Whilst most countries do have policies that empower local people
to manage resources, in many countries the policies may be empowering for one sector only (often wildlife)
whilst command and control policies continue to apply in other sectors (often forestry resources other than
wildlife). The principles of CBNRM need to be extended to cover all natural resources in a manner that
ensures integration with, rather than further complicates, the already multifaceted institutional set-up.
Namibia is attempting to do this by recognising conservancies as substitutes for Forest Management
Committees in areas where the latter exist.
Traditional authorities – achieving a balance: Some balance needs to be achieved regarding the role
and influence that traditional authorities have in CBNRM. In some instances, e.g. Zambia, chiefs continue to
assert a disproportionate amount of power (although there are proposals to downplay this), whilst in other
cases their exclusion from new NRM institutions has led to conflict and the stalling of progress with CBNRM
implementation. In a number of cases local people themselves have chosen to elect their chiefs and
Devolution in Natural Resource Management
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headmen onto the executive committees of the new CBNRM structures (e.g. Makuleke, some cases in
Botswana and Namibia). This is despite the questionable legitimacy of these traditional authorities. In other
cases these leaders serve in a non-executive capacity as, for example, patrons. The important point is that it
is the community who decides whether or not traditional authorities are represented. With the exception of
the Fish River study, it appears that hereditary leaders will continue to play an important role in CBNRM in
the countries studied, with traditional/indigenous systems of control still applying to lower value resources.
Indeed, the strong leadership provided by well-respected chiefs and headmen has been cited as one of the
strengths of CBNRM in Malawi and Lesotho. CBNRM programmes need to look for ways to constructively
incorporate the traditional leadership.
Entrepreneurs – more bad than good?: Entrepreneurs from both inside and outside the community have
been highlighted in a number of the studies as posing a serious threat to effective community level
management of resources. This particularly applies in the forest management cases in Malawi and
Zimbabwe. These powerful actors tend to ignore local regulations and controls, undermining the authority
of community institutions. Where CBNRM institutions have attempted to take action, they have been
threatened. In these situations, government law enforcement agencies have been relatively ineffective in
providing back-up support. More attention needs to be paid to this issue. Communities need to have strong
legal rights over resources and recourse to the law in order to protect their resources. In some cases
negotiated agreements may be required to allow access to resources to “outsiders”.
New elites: With any transfer of power there exists the danger of creating a new set of elites who use this
power for personal gain and to enhance their standing and power base. This can occur amongst local
government councillors at district level or the executive committees of community-based organizations at
community level. In the Seronga area in Botswana, the Board of Trustees of some community trusts have
begun to forge a much closer relationship with the private sector than with their community constituents. In
Malawi, community members complained of the elitist attitudes of some representatives on the VNRMCs.
Mechanisms to deal with these issues of power grabbing need to be built in the constitutions of the various
bodies.
Slow, incremental process: The process of defining and registering community-based organizations and
developing competent institutions, that are representative of the different interests amongst local actors and
sensitive to the dynamics and power relations in the community, is long, slow and arduous with time
horizons of up to five or more years. It is strongly argued in a number of the studies that any attempt to
speed up this process would condemn the CBNRM initiative from the start by ignoring the importance of the
social process. Donors and government agencies need to recognise that such processes do not happen
over-night and require long-term commitment and on-going support.
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Flexible approaches: CBNRM approaches must be flexible and adaptable to fit local contexts,
complexities and needs. As is the case in Botswana and Namibia, each CBNRM organisation should be
able to determine their own boundaries and membership, select their own management structures and
procedures, and develop their own constitutions (beyond certain prescribed provisions to ensure
accountability), by-laws, rules, sanctions and management plans.
Socio-economic differentiation: Highly stratified and differentiated communities with multiple interests
pose a particular challenge in that such situations create varying incentives and disincentives for
participating in CBNRM. Here, the role played by external facilitators is critical. All local actors, regardless of
socio-economic background, need to be brought into the CBNRM process through equitable and
collaborative negotiations. Differences and conflicts of interest need to be worked through, and collective
stakes should be strengthened through a social learning process. Some of the case studies (e.g. Namibia,
Makuleke) have demonstrated that differences of interest can be resolved through discussion, mediation,
patience and unbiased support by external players.
6.3. Conclusion
In all the countries studied there has been progress towards CBNRM and a move away from previous,
largely unsuccessful, centralised command and control approaches to natural resource management. In
some cases the move to community-based management has been more successful in empowering local
communities than in others. In most instances there is little evidence, with the possible exception of specific
case studies in Namibia and Malawi, to demonstrate that devolved authority has resulted in more
sustainable natural resource management. The assumption is that if true community control is in place then
sustainable use and management will follow, but the links between local empowerment and sustainable
NRM still require attention and further research effort.
In all the cases, the process has been complex and, at times, conflictual requiring much dedicated effort,
commitment and flexibility by all stakeholders involved. It is clear that the path to successful CBNRM is not
simple. However, the study has revealed a range of factors and conditions that may help contribute to the
success of CBNRM initiatives and the empowerment of local communities. These include a real
commitment by government to transfer power; integration across natural resource sectors; devolution to the
lowest level possible; devolution of full rights not just decision-making authority and access to benefits; legal
recognition of these rights and recourse to the law; inclusive local structures; dedicated facilitation (often by
NGOs) that builds capacity and ensures representativeness and accountability of management structures;
opportunities to generate income based on the natural resource base; a “slow but sure” process; and clarity
around the mandates of and relationships to different stakeholders such as traditional authorities, local
Devolution in Natural Resource Management
71
government and line departments.
One clear pattern that has emerged is that the chances of CBNRM succeeding appear greater in situations
where high value resources are involved, which have the potential to provide communities with an income
stream (e.g. Botswana, Namibia, etc.) and thus an incentive to participate and comply with rules and
regulations. However, where this is not the case, such as in the communal areas of South Africa, the way
forward is much less clear-cut. Here, emphasis will have to be placed on the need for more sustainable
management of resources used for everyday purposes rather on the potential to earn income from the
spins-offs of high value resources such as wildlife. Thus, many challenges for the implementation of
CBNRM still exist, and there are many lessons still to learn. Each situation is unique and influenced strongly
by a variety of contextual factors. It is therefore important that we are not too prescriptive in determining
what works and what does not. Possibly one of the most important lessons for policy makers and
practitioners (and researchers) is the need to be flexible, and to recognise CBNRM as a dynamic process in
which different issues, concerns and power plays emerge as the process unfolds and the system evolves
and adapts to accommodate new institutions and the related power shifts.
7. Acknowledgements
We thank Lini Wollenberg for her comments on a draft version of this report. The production of this report
has been possible through the collaboration and funding support of a number of different agencies and
research institutions: (i) case studies from South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho and Botswana,
and part of Sheona Shackleton’s time were funded by the USAID supported SADC NRM Project No. 690-
0251.12 through WWF- SARPO; (ii) case studies from Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and Bruce
Campbell’s input, have drawn on the project “Management of Miombo Woodland” funded by the European
Union’s Action in Favour of Tropical Forests, and facilitated by the Center for International Forestry
Research (CIFOR); (iii) the Common Property Group of the Terrestrial Ecosystems and Environmental
Management Programme (TREM), Environmentek, CSIR (Pretoria, South Africa) covered much of Sheona
Shackleton’s time to compile and edit this paper.
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