Devlin Yap Weir 2005 Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment Case Studies on EA...

8/10/2019 Devlin Yap Weir 2005 Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment Case Studies on EA Legislation and Practice

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DEVLIN, YAP A N D W E I R

Environmental assessment (EA) was first introduced by the National Environmental Policy ct of theUnited States in 1969 and its practice has expanded over the past 30 years. EA is now institutionalizedin more than 100 countries. Two broad normative positions have been adopted with respect to theimportance of public participation in the EA process. Technocrats argue that EA involves issues ofenvironmental and social science and should be an exercise left to experts. Populists argue that EAis a process of public policy-making and must incorporate effective public participation. The benefitsof public participation in EA have been argued since its inception and the populist vision gainedinfluence during the 1990s in step with the rise of governance as a public administration and devel-opment policy concern. Section I1 offers a review of the place of public participation in EA legisla-tion covering 27 countries and regional development banks. In most cases E legislation explicitlyincludes a requirement for some form of public participation. But the mechanisms by which public

participation has been formally incorporated into EA procedures are diverse and create a qualitativerange of participatory potential. Section 111 then addresses the question of the effectiveness of publicparticipation in actual EA processes. In the literature the effectiveness of public participation in EAhas generally been found to fall short of expectations and our analysis of 17 case studies from coun-tries reinforces these conclusions. But the experiences are mixed and the paper describes in somedetail case studies from the Philippines, Brazil, and South Africa, where public involvement in the EAprocess has contributed to the halting of major development projects. Section I introduces the basicconcepts concerning EA and the place of public participation within it.

The benefits of public participation in environmental assessment have been argued by numerousauthors over the last 20 years. Most arguments stress pragmatic and administrative benefits. Publicparticipation leads to better baseline and impact information and therefore better design of projectsand programs (World Bank 1993; IAIA 2002). The quality of project decisions is improved whenlocal knowledge and values are included and when expert knowledge is publicly examined(Parenteau 1988). Public participation enhances the credibility and legitimacy of overall processes ofenvironmental decision-making, thereby increasing a community's sense of ownership, commit-ment or support to a policy or project (IAIA 2002,9). Such credibility and sense of ownership canserve to smooth the process of implementation (Canter 1996). Some go further and argue not onlythat the public be involved but that the process go beyond legal req~ iremer~ts. n their examinationof the different outcomes of two E cases involving the U.S. Army, Shepherd and Bowler (1997)presented evidence that a proactive, substantive approach to public involvement has benefits over areactive, procedural approach (726).

Other advocates speak of the use of public participation to transcend social divisions, contro-versy, and political conflict (Tobin and Carpenter 1983; Kakonge 1998). This is a pragmatic argumentthat blends into more ethical considerations. Robert Chambers (1983, 1997) is among the best knownof those who argue that groups who have little, and who are likely to lose the most from a proposedintervention, should have influence on the decision-making process. Other writers argue that partic-

1 The literature uses both environmental assessment EA) and environmental impact assessment EIA) interchange-ably. We have adopted EA in this paper excep t in quotations and titles where EIA was o riginally used .


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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION I N ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 89

ipation is a democratic right (Brown 1998, quoted in Johnson and Wilson 2000,1893). It is deemedthe proper conduct of a democratic government (Webler et al. 1995, quoted in Cooper and Elliott2000,342). Indeed, some would dispute the validity of any EA process that does not provide for suchparticipation (Roberts 1995).

However, not everybody shares the conviction that public participation necessarily leads to betterdecisions, particularly regarding matters involving science and technology (Tobin and Carpenter1983). Jasanoff (1996) argues that increasing knowledge and increasing participation n the senseof larger numbers of voices at the table o not tell us how to act or how to make good decisions.Participation and science together often produce irreducible discord and confusion (65).

Jasanoff cites instances in which open and inclusive decision-malung appeared to produce ratherthan reduce disagreements, and made the process messy and the outcomes unpredictable. What isconsidered legitimate and desirable in one context, therefore, can be seen as unnecessarily costly,anarchical, and destabilizing in another. As argued by Webler et al.:

If public participation is to be successful, it has to do more than offer people a fair and compe-tent decision-malung process. It has to effectively cope with the tendency for people to want topursue egoistic aims before collective ones, and it has to be responsible for contributing n a posi-tive way to the democratic quality of our societies (1995, quoted in Cooper and Elliott 2000,342).

The tension between the technocrats and the populists is discussed extensively by Yap (1990). Thedebate is continuous but in legislative terms the populists appear to be gaining influence.

Two previous studies have compared the place of public participation in EA legislation across coun-tries as part of larger comparative projects on the content of EA legislation. The CEAA-IAIA(Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency-International Association for Impact Assessment)study of EA effectiveness (Sadler 1996) found that public participation was being institutionalized inEA legislation. Lee and George (2000) discovered that although there were provisions for publicparticipation, the requirements were often cast in general and vague terms. However, neither of thesestudies was based on a systematic comparison of public participation provisions. A third studycomparing EA legislation was undertaken by the present authors (CIDA 2003). This study was basedon 31 Environmental Assessment Consistency Analysis Reports (EACAs) examining the level ofcongruence between Canadian EA requirements and those in effect in Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency (CIDA) partner countries and international financial institutions IF IS .^

Thirty-one EACA Reports representing 27 developing countries and regional developmentbanks were a ~ ~ a l ~ s e d . ~ublic participation opportunities were considered in relation to the followingquestions.

2. The EACAs compared the EA legislation, regulations, and procedures of these countries with the CanadianEnvironmental ssasment ct sec tion 54[21) and the Projects Outside Canada Regulations. The analysis identifies incongruitiesbetw een the foreign legislation and Canadian EA re quirements. The purpose is to assist CIDA to address EA coheren ce issuesduring contractual negotiations with partners on the con duc t of EA, to develop contractual clauses for project agreements to

limit inconsistencies in EA execu tion, and to expand its knowledge base on EA capacity in partner countries and institutions.3. Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Chin a, Colum bia, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Honduras, India, Malaysia, Mexico,

Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestinian National Authority PNA) , Philipp ines, Poland, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania,Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, the African Dev elopm ent Bank AfD B), Asian Developm ent Bank ADB),European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD), and the Inter-American Bank for Development IABD).


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1 Are the decision criteria (i.e., project approval or rejection) made public?2. Is there a mechanism for an appeal of the decision?3 Is it a requirement that public input be solicited?4 If yes, at what stage of the project cycle is public input solicited?5. How is the public notified about the project?6 . What are the mechanisms for public involvement?7. What are the provisions for public access to project information?8 Is there a requirement that the input from the public be integrated in the EA report?

Less than half of the cases require the final decision criteria for project approval or rejection to bemade public. It is to be made public under certain conditions in some countries; for instance, in Chileit is made public only to those who participated in the consultation process; in India, if judged to be inthe public interest and requested; in South Africa and Tanzania, only on request. The situation isambiguous for Uganda and Vietnam. The case of India is particularly complex. The EA procedure isadministered across many different sector-based government agencies and the decision-makingprocess is exceedingly fragmented. As a result the lines of accountability are blurred, to say the least. InChile project activities may proceed before or without approval provided the proponent establishesenvironmental liability insurance to compensate for impacts in case of accidents.

The EA legislation and regulations of a significant number of countries and IFIs do not providemechanisms for appealing a project decision. Where an appeal is provided for, it is sometimes spec-ified that only the project proponent can appeal (e.g., Egypt, EBRD, IABD). In Brazil the right toappeal is only implied in some documentation. In the Philippines appeal is allowed for only thelower level of assessment. In Chile the appeal may be appealed.

The EACA Reports suggest that public input is allowed and solicited in the EA process of mostcountries for the highest level of assessment. The singular exception appears to be Vietnam, whereno concrete details are given on public involvement in the EA process. There is, however, signifi-cant diversity in terms of when how and, in some cases, who can participate in such high-levelassessments.

The public is to be notified early in the planning process in Columbia, Honduras, the PNA, thePhilippines, and Uganda. In Costa Rica, the PNA, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Uganda, andZimbabwe, input is required to be solicited in all stages of the project cycle, except in the monitor-inglfollow-up stage in a few cases. The public is involved at the guidelines stage in Bangladesh, Egypt,Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zambia, and by implication in the ADB and El Salvador. In other countries

and IFIs BRD, IADB, Chile, Ghana, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zambia ublic consul-tation is to start during the scoping5 process and to continue through to the review of the EA Report.Public involvement is at the discretion of authorities in Bangladesh and Honduras. The AtDB speci-fies consultation during scoping only. In many other cases the public is to be involved only after theEA Report has been prepared. This holds true for Brazil, China, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique,

4 Most EA legislations prescribe at least two levels of assessment. Th e different levels vary in term s of inten sity an dfactors examined and are designed t o reflect differencesin scale, com plexity, severity of impacts, and , frequently, level of pu blicinterest. Which level applies is generally the decision of th e relevant m inister. The lower level is known by various n ames,including screening and initial eizvironmental examination an d th e higher level is calledenvironmental assessment o r envimn-

mental impa ct assessment.Th e Canad ian federalEA process ha s four levels:screening comp rehens ive study panel review andmediation.

5 Scoping refers to the activity inEA that is followed to identify the attributes of the env ironmen t for which there isconcern (public and scientific) and a plan is provided that enables theEIA to be focussed on these attributes (Kennedy andRoss 1992,476).


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Nicaragua, and, upon public request, in Columbia. In India the public can get involved in publichearings of very speciallcontroversial projects that have aroused considerable public interest. In theADB, Mexico, and the Philippines, and presumably in the IADB, the public may continue to beinvolved in the monitoring and follow-up phase. The mechanism for public notification is not spec-

ified except in the Philippines, where public notice must be conspicuously posted in affectedcommunities, summarizing the proposed project and that EISIIEE has been submitted for re vie^. ^

In most countries and IFIs where public involvement is required, any individual or group cangive their input. India is an exception since only registered NGOs and those with legitimate inter-est can participate. Thailand is also an exception. Participation by the public in Thailand is onlythrough NGO membership in the National Environmental Board, established to review public sectorEAs, or through appointment as NGO representative to the ad hoc Committee of Experts reviewingprivate sector projects. The IADB is also an exception since consultation is only with those withlegitimate interest and informed opinion. The protocols of the AfDB, ADB, China, and El

Salvador do not specify who may participate in the EA process. In most of the EA systems wherepublic input must be solicited, the views of the public are to be integrated or considered in the finalEA Report, or at least appended, for the highest level of assessment.

In 16 of the countries and IFIs reviewed, public involvement can come in the form of writtenbriefs or interventions at public hearings. In many countries public hearings are required for high-level assessments but these assessments are at ministerial discretion. In the Philippines, Ghana, andSouth Africa intense public concern can trigger a public hearing. In Brazil a public hearing is to beheld when requested by the civil body, by the Public Ministry, or by at least 5 people and the publichearing must be in a location accessible to interested parties. In almost all cases the legislation stip-ulates the right of the public to access project information (either in summary form or complete

project documentation) with a few exceptions. In Colombia access is only granted upon request.There is no stipulation regarding access in El Salvador and China.

The mechanisms for public access to project information vary They include deposition of projectdocuments or summaries at registries, documentation centres, and public libraries, municipaloffices, on-site locations, bank offices (local and international), local and international media, andWeb sites. The exceptions are AfDB, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Mozambique, PNA, Sri Lanka,Thailand, and Zimbabwe, where no such specification is given. Funding for public access to infor-mation is rarely described. The exceptions are ADB, EBRD, and the Philippines, where project propo-nents are to pay for the information provided to the public. IADB and Chile allow user fees to becharged for access to project information.

In summary, the formal arrangements for environmental assessment vary across the countriesand IFIs reviewed. The EACA Reports suggest that while the EA process allows for some form ofpublic participation in all cases, less than half of the cases require the criteria for project approval tobe made public and only half allow appeals. With one exception public input is allowed and solicitedin the EA process for the highest level of assessment but the holding of public hearings remains adecision made by political leaders. There are wide differences in the timing and the mechanisms forpublic notification and consultation. In nearly half of the cases, public input is to be solicitedthroughout the entire project cycle, including scoping. With the rest, public involvement starts onlyafter the EA Report has been submitted. In all but three countries and institutions the participationprocess is open to individuals and groups.

6 The EIS is the Environmental Impact Statem ent and the IEE is the Initial Environmen tal Evaluation


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The review suggests that some degree of public participation appears to be possible in mostcountries. It can then be asked: When public participation is allowed by law, how effective is it inpractice? The next section considers the literature and some specific cases.

A The Quality of Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making

Several reviews of EA in different countries (Monosowski 1990; Sadler 1996; Kruger et al. 1997; Leeand George 2000; Glasson and Salvador 2000; Gibson 2002; Sinclair and Fitzpatrick 2002) suggestthat even where public participation in EA is embodied in legislation it frequently falls short in prac-t i ~ e . ~

A crucial factor that affects the quality of participation is the unequal resources available amongthe different publics in terms of time, access to information, and political power (Sinclair andDiduck 2000). Project momentum is also a major barrier. Project proponents invest considerabletime and money in preparing studies, lobbying decision-makers, and clearing regulatory hurdles.Proponents seek quick decision processes and are not likely to be interested in debating alternativeuses of a proposed site or alternative technologies (CIDA 2000). The uneven level of technicalexpertise is another factor affecting the quality of participation (Palerm 1999). In addition, attitudestoward the importance of social impacts vary significantly among project publics. Some believe thatsocial impacts are common sense and hence there is no need for public consultation about them.Others believe that social impacts cannot be measured and therefore should be ignored. Finally, thereare those who assert that the discussion of social impacts emphasizes only the costs and not thebenefits of a project and therefore tends to slow down or stop development (Evaldice, Arguelles, and

Fearnside 2000).It is clear from the literature that in practice, public participation can range along a continuum of

involvement. Full participation implies that the public is involved in the definition of the problemto be addressed or the project to be approved and in the subsequent implementation of the interven-tion approved (Arnstein 1969; Johnson and Wilson 2000; CIDA 2002), but public participation mayfall short of this ideal. The public can be consulted in a variety of ways while the decisions concern-ing the intervention are made elsewhere or the public can be invited to participate after the principaldecisions have already been made. Large-scale projects involve complex conflicts among environ-mental sustainability, financial returns, national development strategies, and the security of locallivelihoods. Effective public participation is unavoidably tempered by differences in power along

financial, organizational, and ideational dimensions. Even when public hearings are held they maynot result in significant changes in project design.

B Case Studies

In 2003, as a follow-up to our analysis of EA legislation, we reviewed secondary literature on 17cases of EA practice in the Philippines, China, Ghana, South Africa, Brazil, and Chile (CIDA

7. Indeed the Canadian EA process still excludes social imp acts, and public participation in screening rem ains discre-tionary. This is n ot trivial because screen ings constitute 99 of th e 25,000 assessments conducted un der the federal processsince the Act came into force in 1995 Sinclair and Fitzpatrick 2002 ). In comprehensive studies, public participation is onlymandatory at the poin t the comp rehensive study report is subm itted, unless a hearing is called by the minister.


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20 03 ). ~ ur review confirms the findings of the studies cited above. There were mixed outcomes interm s of com mu nity empow ermen t a nd redistribution of developme nt benefits. Because of theintervention of advocacy groups, environmental con ditions were sometimes attached to opera tingperm its an d licences. However, in mo st cases public participation in the EA was no t sufficient tolead to the rejection of projects that clearly would cause irreversible ecological and humanimpacts. Nor did it force a serious examination of alternative, less impact-intensive developm entdirections. There w ere, however, three striking examples where public pa rticipation led to theaba ndo nm ent of large projects.

1 Philippines: The Bolinao Cement ComplexIn 1993 an international con sortiu m led by a Taiwanese multinational corporation ann oun ced itsplan t o build the w orld's biggest cemen t factory in the middle of the coral reef-covered shoreline ofBolinao along the Lingayen Gulf in the north ern Philippines. The proposed ceme nt complex, to cost

US$525

million, included a qu arry, a power p lant, and a wharf. The project was attractive to thenational government. The cem ent complex was an o pportunity to develop an area with n o majorindustries an d where a m ajority of the pop ulation dep ended on small-scale fishing and farming andlived close to the po verty line. But the proposal triggered a broad-based opposition. The 200km 2coral reef complex is the most valuable asset of the coastal comm unities. One-third of its 30 villagesan d 50,000 people depend o n fishing for a living. More th an 350 species of vertebrates, invertebrates,and plants are harvested every year from the reefs. The cora l reef complex is the spaw ning ground for90% of the fish catch. Lingayen Gulf is listed as an environmentally critical arean9under the EAregulation.

The debate revolved arou nd the presum ed e conom ic benefits of the project and w hether o r not

these benefits would offset the environm ental dam age expected from the extraction of limestone, thesulphur dioxide emissions from the power plant, the carb on dioxide, and the particulate emissionsfrom the cem ent plant a nd the alkaline wastewaters. The proponen ts claimed that the com plex woulduse the most advanced, most efficient, and cleanest cement m anufacturing technologies. The 700anticipated jobs were seen as a better livelihood base tha n the rice fields, orchards, and small-scalefishing activities. The EA consultants engaged by the proponen t o rganized an EA train ing workshopto explain the EA process to the com munity and to encourage their participation in the process. Theyalso employed a com munity development specialist who conducted several scoping sessions. Afterthe EA was completed three validation sessions were held to inform the c ommu nity of the results.

The project was supported by the local municipal go vernm ent, the provincial council, teachers,and an association of Bolinao fishermen and fish dealers. The project was challenged by theMovem ent of Bolinao Concerned C itizens (MBCC ) with sup port from researchers at the MarineScience Institute of the University of the Philippines. The Movement was in effect an offshoot ofcom munity visioning, education, and the mobilization program of the Com munity-ba sed Coastal

8. From the Ph ilippines we examined th e Bicol River Basin Developmen t, the San Roqu e Multipurpo se Project, and theBolinao Cemen t Comp lex; from Brazil, the Tucurui1 Dam , the Paulinia Pipeline Link, and th e Pilar Dam; from Chile, the RioCondor Project, the Ralco Dam, the Cascada Chile Project, and the Alumysa Smelter Project; from Ghana, the LandAdm inistration Project and the Bui Hydroelectric Project; from So uth Africa, th e St. Lucia sand du ne minin g project, the

Coega Industrial Development Zone project, and th e KwaZulu-Natal Transmission Grid project; from C hina, the XiaolangdiMu ltipurpose Dam project and the L ancang-Mekong River navigation channel impro veme nt project.

9 Environmentally critical areas (ECAs) und er the Philipp ine EA legislation are areas considered enviro nmen tallysensitive. ny projects in ECAs are required t o un dergo a full Environmental Impact Assessment (Republic of the Philippines1981 .


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Resources Management Project, funded by Canada's International Development Research Centrefrom 1993 to 1998 (Talaue-McManus et al. 1998). Position letters opposing the project were sent toPresident Fidel Ramos, other government officials in the Department of Environment and NaturalResources, and the Environmental Management Bureau. A public information and mobilizationcampaign was launched ncluding protest marches in Metro Manila hat lasted nearly fouryears. Financial contributions to the cause came from Bolinaoan professionals in Metro Manila andthe United States. The MBCC also sought support from marine scientists around the world.

Overall the Philippine EA process provided for a high level of public participation. Public inputwas solicited in all stages of the project cycle and intense public concern triggered a public hearing.The most unusual and innovative feature of the Philippine EA system was the requirement that theproject proponent provide evidence of social acceptability by the site-based project stakeholders asa condition for the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (Republic of thePhilippines 1979,1981,1992,1996).

Social acceptability is defined as the result of a process that is mutually agreed upon by theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), stakeholders, and proponent to ensurethat the concerns of stakeholders, including affected communities, are fully considered andlorresolved in the decision-making process for granting or denying the issuance of an ECC (DENR1997,6 quoted in Cooper and Elliott 2000). Indicators of social acceptability may include: 1) processdocumentation reports signed by stakeholders, (2) scoping reports signed by all key parties andstakeholders' representatives, 3) detailed description of the EA process with concurrence of l l stake-holders who participated, (4) signed Memorandum of Agreement for the establishment of a multi-partite monitoring team, and (5) report of the Hearing Officer during public hearings. Consultationis recommended to be held with the following stakeholders: (1) affected citizens, (2) concerned local

government units, 3) government agencies with concerns in the project site, 4) representatives ofNGOs and peoples' organizations, (5) representatives from local institutions such as the church andschools, (6) community leaders, 7) indigenous communities present in the area, and (8) industryrepresentatives.

The Environmental Assessment Review Committee recommended against the issuance of anEnvironmental Compliance Certificate for the project. The strong and well-informed oppositionfrom local groups was taken as evidence of the lack of social acceptability in spite of the endorse-ment from the local government council. In 1996 the Department of Environment and NaturalResources denied with finality the application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate, citingthe unacceptable risks that the cement plant would pose to aquatic wildlife and coral reefs, and theconflicts that would arise with existing land and marine uses WRI 2000).

The rejection of the proposed cement complex in Bolinao, Philippines was a first in many ways.It was the first time that the information from scientists made a difference when pitted against thepolitically and financially powerful institutions. Marine scientists were instrumental in educatingthe community on the ecological costs of the proposed intervention. Because of the public educa-tion and mobilization work of scientists in support of well-organized community-based associa-tions, this town has been allowed to pursue a different development vision. Members of the MBCCmoved on and with others in the community helped develop a coastal zone development plan(Talaue-McManus et al. 1998). They have also managed to institute some rules regarding thenumber of fish pens and the use of destructive fishing technologies by the local community. Bolinaohas been placed on the ecotourism map and has become a favourite destination for local andforeign tourists. The social acceptability provisions of the Philippine EIS system provided the legalbasis for rejecting the proposal.


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2 Brazil: Pilar Da mIn the early 1990s Italy's Fiat Group and Canada's Alcan joined forces to propose the construction ofthe 170m-wide, 67m-high Pilar Dam in the state of Minas Gerais. The dam would be located 13 kmfrom Ponte Nova, a city of 60,000 people. One hundred and thirty-three families would need to berelocated. Proponents argued that the project would bring modernization and progress as theincreased power supply would attract industries and generate employment. The investors also prom-ised to provide technical assistance to affected farmers to improve their productivity, incomes, andquality of life. The proposal was submitted to the state environmental licensing authority.

The implementation framework for EA in Brazil is multi-layered with basically parallel mandatesat the federal, state, and municipal levels. The federal government allows state and municipal author-ities to develop their E policy, legislation, and guidelines, thus introducing a significant degree ofdecentralization (Governo do Brasil 1986,1987).

By 1995 the consortium was already trying to pressure local farmers to accept its compensationproposals, giving the impression that the dam construction was a fait accompli This reportedly ledsome anxious farmers to stop planting and making farm improvements. Fiat wields considerablepower in the state as a result of its huge car assembly plant in the state capital (Rothman 2001).

There were three key players in the opposition: a young agronomist, a small farmer, and a localbusinessman. The young agronomist owned a large property that would potentially be lost to thedam. He helped establish a community association of potential dam-affected families. n alumnus ofthe University of Viqosa, he contacted the university extension group in 1995. The small farmer wasthe elected president of the community association of dam-affected families. He was an eloquentspeaker who secured the support of the progressive elements of the Catholic Church and managed tomobilize kinship, friendship, and religious networks (Rothman 2001). The local businessman

provided the link to local political authorities and civil society groups. Scholars associated with theextension group at the University of Viqosa met with association members to discuss the potentialsocial and environmental impacts of the dam. They prepared the dam-affected families for theirparticipation at the public hearing. Concerns revolved around the impact on water quality; the threatto the endangered surubi catfish and other fish species; the potential for increased sewage received bythe Piranga River combined with the reduced water flow to aggravate water contamination and inci-dence of water-borne diseases in the area; the underestimation of the agricultural productivity in thearea and the role of women in food production and marketing; and the complete failure of theproponents to recognize the risk of dam failure and subsequent threat to the local population.United, the groups lobbied government officials at the state level.

At the public hearing in May 1998 critics of the dam dramatized their opposition with vigorousinterventions, poetry readings from children, and protest marches. Under public pressure, thegovernment formed a commission to evaluate the economic impacts of the dam. The commissionreported that the local government would have to expend far more on necessary infrastructure thanthe revenues they would receive in the form of royalties and potential industrial development as aresult of the dam's construction.

Fiat decided to pull out of the consortium, leaving Alcan the choice to scale down the project,seek new partners, or abandon the project. There has been no further development reported to date(Rothman 2001).

The traditional emphasis in Brazilian EA has been on how the environment affects the technicaland economic feasibility of the project, rather than how the project affects the environment. Theearly practice of E consisted mainly of studies focusing on physical and biological aspects: soil,subsoil, geology, climate, land use capacity, seismology, and limnology. Social impacts were


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frequently understated and related mainly to resettlement issues (Monosowski 1990 . Despite theseweaknesses, the active and creative collaboration between university-based scientists and farmers'groups led to stronger and more technically informed public input. The decentralization of the EAprocess and decision-making allowed local groups to have an impact leading to the effective rejectionof the Pilar Dam.

3 South Africa: The Richards Bay Mining Development inS t LuciaSt. Lucia is the largest estuarine system in Africa and the most important in KwaZulu-Natal(Heydorn 1996 . It is a string of lakes and wildlife reserves, and is the outflow of a number of therivers in Natal. It includes a variety of habitats: terrestrial, estuarine, and marine. It includes raremangrove forests, turtle breeding areas, tropical forest systems, and coral reefs. St. Lucia is locatedin a biogeographic transition zone and the levels of biodiversity are therefore unusually high. Thepark is managed by the Natal Parks Board. In 1986 the government of South Africa designated St.

Lucia Wetland Park as a Wetland of International Importance under the Ramsar Convention.Signatories to the Convention commit to promoting wise use of all wetlands and special protectionfor those wetlands of international importance.

In 1989 Richards Bay Minerals sought to bulldoze a 1400km2 section of the St. Lucia sand dunesto mine titanium and other metals. The company already had a mine and processing plant 25kmsouth of the dunes. The mining would entail the bulldozing of deep basins in the dunes, lining themwith impervious dense material such as bentonite and filling them with water. The heavy mineralswould be extracted from the surrounding dune sand by suction dredgers. The slurry would bepumped to floating concentrator pumps that separate the heavy minerals from the dune sand. Thedunes would be revegetated by reshaping the dunes and replanting with vegetation similar to the

original grass cover. The reserve was worth 5 billion rand and would net the government revenues of1 billion rand.

The mining proposal predated the legalization of EA in South Africa in 1997 but voluntary EAswere common practice since the 1970s through a process called Integrated EnvironmentalManagement.1 The EA for the Richards Bay Mining Project lasted from November 1991 to August1993, involving more than 60 scientific and non-scientific contributors and 135 Interested andAffected parties who came forward to intervene. It was the largest, most expensive, and mostcontroversial EA undertaken in South Africa. It generated 1155 media articles (Weaver et al. 1996 .

Three distinct interest coalitions were implicated in the conflict: the mining company, he envi-ronmental conservation group, and the black community that had been forcefully displaced from thearea through earlier land policy motivated by the program for establishing wildlife reserves (Preston-Whyte 1996 . The environmental lobby consisted of environmental interest groups, the provincialconservation authority, and private ranchers. The conflict revolved around several issues includinguncertainties regarding the actual effects of the disturbance of dune stratification on seepage mech-anisms and, hence, fresh water replacement of the lake system. There were uncertainties regardingthe ability of the heavily used Mfolozi River to supply the water needed for the mining (about 35,000

10. Integrated Environmental Managem ent IEM ) is the term used i n South Africa to indicate an approach tha t inte-grates environm ental considerations into all planning a nd development stages for projects, programs, p lans, and policies. SixIEM Guidelines were published in 1992 but n o procedure, m ethods , or triggers were codified in law nor were any formaladministrative mec hanism s in place at any level of gove rnme nt to review voluntaryE s done Rossouw and Wiseman 2004).

11. Interested and Affected Parties is the term used in Sou th Africa to refer to w hat elsewhere would b e called stake-holders.


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m3/day) and the implications of such heavy water demand for the downstream river ecology anddynamics and the consequences for human communities dependent on the river. The impact ofmining infrastructure (roads, traffic, power lines) on a regional tourist centre was debated. There wasalso fear that the expensive infrastructure would demand an expansion of the mining operationsbeyond the proposed boundaries for economies-of-scale. Finally, there was concern over the adversevisual impacts of a massive mining operation on an area of aesthetic and spiritual value.

The environmental lobby sought to have St. Lucia declared a World Heritage site. They foundallies with the academic community and presented a cost analysis showing that ecotourism before1994 already employed one out of every fourteen 'actively employed' South Africans (Swatuk 1996),generating 2.5 billion rand in annual revenues, and that this clearly would rise in post-apartheidSouth Africa. The mining company refuted these arguments, emphasizing that the proposed miningarea is covered by exotic pine plantations and that rehabilitation of the sand dunes would restore thepine plantation to its original indigenous vegetation cover. Mining would also offer much needed

employment for local inhabitants. In the early 1990s the company revised its job creation estimatesupward to 900 temporary and permanent jobs and 4675 jobs through multiplier effects. It claimedthat the company would annually pay 1157 million rand in taxes and earn 606 million rand in foreignexchange. It also offered to contribute million rand to social upliftment programmes.

The displaced black communities called attention to their past ownership of the land. Their mainconcern was to return to the land that they lay claim (Preston-Whyte 1996). Throughout thecontroversy the EA process was criticized for not allowing voices of these local indigenous commu-nities to be heard. It was argued that South African NGOs tended to reflect the view of the educatedand wealthy members of society. The community consultation in preparation of the EA onlyincluded employed workers, traditional tribal authority structures and one Inkatha official

(Webster and Cock 1994, quoted in Swatuk 1996). But South Africa was going through unprece-dented constitutional, social, and political changes. The Government of National Unity passed legis-lation that communities forcibly removed from the areas in the 1960s could possess title to theaffected land. In soliciting responses to the EA Report the displaced community was more effectivelyconsulted. The Interested and Affected Parties included people who were not contactable by post,whose first language was not English or who were illiterate (Weaver et al. 1996,106). The logisticsinvolved in ensuring that this wide a cross-section of the public had access to the E material repre-sented a significant challenge. In the end 331 submissions of comments totalling 1394 pages of textwere received (Weaver et al. 1996).

In 1993 the Review Panel recommended against the mining proposal. In February 1996 thegovernment of South Africa, acting on the recommendation of the Review Panel, decided againstmining on the eastern shores of St. Lucia.

The ruling against mining development in St. Lucia is considered a landmark case, setting prece-dents on several fronts. It was the largest and most transparent EA process undertaken in Africa until1997. The two-week public hearings in the last stage of the EA process marked the first opening ofopportunities for marginalized black communities to be involved in government decisions affectingtheir livelihood base. They marked the first time that alternative development visions became thestarting point of the EA process. They pitted an approach to economic development through theexploitation of a non-renewable resource against one that relies on non-exploitative use of a naturalendowment through ecotourism. The hearings also were the first demonstration of the application ofprec ution ryprinciple in EA. The project was rejected because of the perceived value of the area( the sense of place ) and because of the uncertainties of the ecological impacts and the ability tomitigate them (Kruger et al. 1997). In making its recommendation to the government, the Review


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Panel (made up of eminent lay people) made use of substantial documentation presented during theprocess and inputs from the public hearings.

The success of these three cases does not imply that EA has made a major difference to the environ-ment-development tension in any of these countries. Relatively few projects result in full EAs involv-ing public hearings. For example, in the Philippines between 1983 and 1987, of 92 majorinfrastructure projects only went through the EA system (Ross 1994). In South Africa 10 years ofdemocracy has shifted a highly centralized, white-dominated technocratic approach into a decen-tralized, highly participative and cooperative approach (Republic of South Africa 1997; 1998). Butresistance to full EAs persists. For example, the Ministry of Minerals and Energy has succeeded inexcluding mining from the EA requirements applied to other forms of industrial development

(Preston-Whyte 1996).Notwithstanding these weaknesses, high-level EAs involving public hearings do hold the poten-tial for public influence over the environmental approval process. The success of the affectedgroups in blocking the Bolinao cement complex, the Fiat-Alcan Dam in Minas Gerais, and the St.Lucia development project suggests that public participation can make a dramatic difference in theprocess of environmental a s s es~men t . ~ uch examples provide not only hope for future improve-ments in EA processes but also lessons on which advocates of public participation can draw toimprove effectiveness. Political mobilization leading to public hearings was an important elementin the three cases reported. However, numerous other projects have not been stopped despite suchmobilization. Thus more factors must be considered. The dynamic alliance of community groups

with technical experts from universities appears to have been particularly effective in challenging thedecision to proceed with projects. In all three cases, committed technical experts providing supportand solidarity with organized community groups had an impact on decision-makers. In thePhilippines and Brazil it appears that education of the community groups was equally important. Inall three cases the decentralization of the E process allowed local opposition to gain greater accessto decision-makers.

It may be that neither grassroots political mobilization against a project nor the public identifica-tion of technical problems with a project proposal will on its own lead to a satisfactory result. Whilepublic participation can bring more chairs to the table, it does not guarantee that all their occupantswill be heard and that all affected parties are equally represented. But when knowledge and action arebrought together in a local arena, project momentum can be arrested. Local public hearings providesuch arenas. It is necessary to promote the expansion of this terrain of participation while recogniz-ing and challenging the gaps that continue to exist between legal potential and actual practice.

Arnstein, S.R. (1969) A Ladder o Citizen Participation, ournal of American Institute of P lanners 35:4,216-24.

Canter, L.W. (1996) Environmental Impact Assessment nd d., Ne w York: McGraw-Hill.

12. Bloclung a project is a dramatic outcom e but not the only form of effective public participa tion. Important changesin d esign, siting, and technological choice may also be stimulated a s a result of public involvement in EA. These more subtlechanges require more detailed case studies o f EA processes and project evo lutio n and will be taken up in subsequent publica-tions.


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