Developmental Influences on the PLA

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AN ANALYSIS OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCES ON THEPEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY-NAVY AND THEIR IMPLICATION

FOR THE FUTURE

A t h e s i s p re se nt ed t o t h e F a cu l ty o f t h e U.S. ArmyCommand and General S t a f f College i n p a r t i a l

f u l f i l m e nt o f t h e r eq uire men t f o r t h edegree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

JOHN R. O'DONNELL, LCDR, USNB.A. , U n i v e rs i t y o f I l l 1 ois-Chicago, Chicago, I 1li oi s, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1995

Approved f o r p u b l i c r e le a se ; d i s t r i b u t i o n i s u n l i m i t e d



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1 2 June 1 9 9 5 I Master's The. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

An Analysis of Major Developmental Influences onthe People's Liberation Army - Navy and TheirImplications for the Future. AUTHOR^)

Lieutenant Commander John R. O'Donnell, U.S. Navy

. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND AODRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Command a nd General Staff CollegeATTN: ATZL-SWD-GDFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

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1. SUPPLEMENTARY NO TES

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.s, 2 Aug 94 - 2 Jun 9 5

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3. ABSTRACT (Maximum ZOO wordr)

This study examines the development of the navy of the People's Republic of China(PRC) and the various influences that have shaped Chinese maritime capabilities.

Since 1949, the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) has grown from a smallcollection of surface vessels to a major regional navy with significant air.su rf ac e, and subsurface capabilities. - ~hroughout its history, rh e PLAN wassubjected to developmental influences chat can be categorized as strategic,pollt ical, economic, and institutional. The effects previous influences had on thePLAN can be used as a guide to determine how current influences will affect thePLAN in the next 2 5 years. In the past 15 years, these developmental influenceson the PLAN have changed dramatically. Currently the PLAN is changing in responseto a lack of a superpower threat, China's continuing quest to recover u lo st uterritories in the South and East China Seas, the reduction of politicalinterference in military affairs, the PRC's growing economy, the growth of the

PRC's coastal regions, expanding international trade, and the P RC' s offshoreresource. evelopment. Also the PLAN has minimized its historical subordination tothe army. Together, these influences forecast a modern, capable, and independentnavy that will become a dominant presence in the waters surrounding China's islandclaims.

I I I

U 7540.01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 Re v 2-89)P l ~ l ~ D e d NSI Std. 239-18198-102

I. SUBIECT TERMS

Chi nese Navy, PLAN, People's Liberation Army-Navy

15. NUMBER OF PAGES121

16. PRICE CODE

20. LIMIT ATIO N OF ABSTRACT

Unlimited

19. SECURITY CLAS SIFICATIONOF ABSTRACTUnclassified

1 SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOF REPORT

Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASS IFICATIONOF THIS PAGE

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MASTER OF MILITARY ARTAND S C I E N C E

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name o f Cand idate: LCDR John R . O'Donnell

Thesis T i t l e : An Analy sis o f Major Developmental I nflu enc es on th ePeople's L ib er at io n Army -Navy and Their Im pl ic at io n f o r th e Future.

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chai rman

, Member

'?Ar++u .?v%p , MemberCDR Donald D . H i l l , B.S.

Accepted t h i s 2d day o f June 1995 by:

, Director,' Graduate DegreeP h i l i p J . Brookes, Ph..D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the studentauthor and do not nec ess aril y represent th e views o f the U . S . Army Commandand General S t a f f Co lle ge or any ot he r governmental agency. (Referencest o th i s s tudy should inc lude the foregoing s ta tement.

i



ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCESON THE PEOPLE'SLIBERATION ARMY-NAVY AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR THE FUTURE b . ~LCDR John R . 0 ' Donne11 , USN. 112 pages.

This study examines th e development o f t he navy o f th e People's Republico f China (PRC) and the various influences that have shaped Chinesemar i time cap ab i l i t i e s . S ince 1949, the People's Liberation Army-Navy(PLAN) has grown from a sma ll co l lec t io n o f su rface vessel s t o a majorreg iona l navy wi th s ign i f ican t air, surface, and subsurfaceca pa bi li t i es . Throughout i t s hi st or y, th e PLAN was subjected t odevelopmental inf lue nce s t h a t can catego rized a$ s t r a t e g i c , p o l i t i c a l ,

economic, and in s ti tu t io n a l. The ef fe ct s these previous influences hadon the PLAN can be used as a guide t o determine how curr en t influencesw i l l a f f e c t t h e PLAN i n t h e n e x t tw e n ty - f i v e y ea rs .

I n th e past f i f t e e n years, these developmental influences on th e PLANhave changed dra ma tic all y. Cu rre ntl y the PLAN i s changing i n responset o a l a c k o f a superpower t hr ea t, China 's cont inuin g quest t o recover" l os t " t e r r i t o r ie s i n the South and East China Seas, th e reduc t ion o fp o l i t i c a l in te r fe rence i n m i l i t a ry a f fa i r s , the PRC's g rowing economy,th e growth o f the PRC's coastal regions, expanding int er na tio na l trade,and t h e PRC's of fs ho re resou rce development. Als o t h e PLAN hasm in im iz ed i t s h i s t o r i c a l s ub or dina ti on t o t h e army. Together, thesein f luences fo recas t a modern, capable, and independent navy th a t wi 11become a dominant presence i n th e waters surrou nding China's i s la n dcla ims.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are several people who have given their valuable time and

ass is tance wi t h th i s p ro jec t . I wish t o thank my wi fe . Hare, f o r

tr an sl at io n services and providin g th e support needed t o complete t h i s

the s i s . I als o wish t o thank my the si s committee, Dr. Gary Bjorge, Mr.

Joseph G . D . Babb, and CDR Donald H i l l f o r t h e i r t i me l y, c r i t i c a l and

instrumental feedback on the ea r ly d raf ts o f th i s the sis .I ould a l so l i k e t o thank th e s t a f f a t t h e Combined Arms Research

Li br ar y (CARL) f o r t h e wide va ri et y o f ser vice s t h a t make CARLa superb

research f a c i l i t y . P a r t i cu la r ly he lp fu l were Mr. Russel 1 R af fe rt y and

Ms. Mary Nelson. Mr. Ra ff er ty 's acumen h i t h el ec tr on ic databases was

instrumen tal i n l oc at in g numerous c r i t i c a l documents needed t o complete

t h i s research. Ms. Nelsen provided cr uc ia l assistance i n tra cki ng down

several hard t o f i n d books through the in te r- l i b ra ry loan system.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pae

APPROVAL PAGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

L I S T OF F IG UR ES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i

L I S T OF TABLES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i i

L I S T OF ABBREVIATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i i i

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 . DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN THROUGH 1959. . . . . . . . . . . . 15

3 . L I N B I A O AND THE P L AN ( 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4

4 . P LA N I N T R A NS I TI O N: 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 8 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6

5 . A MODERN NAVY: THE PLAN 1 9 8 3 -1 9 9 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3

6 . REVIEW. ANALYSIS. AND CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4

APPENDIX

A. ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE CHINESE MILITARY. . . . . . . . 1 0 4

B. ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE PLA NAVY. . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 5

C . LEADERSHIP OF THE PLAN (1950-1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 6

D. PLAN FLEET DISPOSITIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 7

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 8

I N I T I A L D IS T RI BU T IO N L I S T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1 The Pacific Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 . The PRC's Offshore Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Surface Combatant Vessels

4 . China's Maritime Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 . F i e l d Army Re lat ion sh ip t o PLAN Headquarters . . . . . . .

6 . Mi l i t a r y Regions o f t h e PRC (1949) . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Naval Organization

8 . U . S . Encircle ment o f t h e PRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 . China's Offshore O i 1 Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 0 . South China Sea Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11 . Soviet Encirclement o f the PRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12 . PLAN'S South Pacific Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 . China's Offshore Defense Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .

14 . PLAN'S Long Range Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



LIST OF TABLES

Tables Page

1 Asian Surface Combatant Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2 . PRC's Gross National Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3 . PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4 . Sov ie t Sh ip Trans fe r s t o t he PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

5 . PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type (1960) . . . . . . . . . . 35



8 . S t r a t e g i c I n f l u e n c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

9 . P o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

10 . Economic Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

11 . I n s t i t u t i o n a l I n f l u e n c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

12. I m ~ o r t a n t n f luences on t he Fu tu re PLAN . . . . . . . . . 88



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

.I

ARL; '

.,

A S W

Asuw

CCP

CMC

DD

DDG

OIA

ECM

EE Z

FA

FBIS

FFG

GNP

JMSDF

LSM

LST

MR

PLA

PLAAF

Anti- a ir warfare

Repair ship- landing craf t

An ti -submarine w arfa re

Ant i -sur face warfare

Chinese Communist Party

Central Mil i ta ry Commission

Destroyer

Guided missi le destroyer

Defense Intel 1i ence Agency ( U.S.

E lectromagnetic Counter Measure

Exclusive Economic Zone

F i e l d Army

Foreign Broadcast Information ServiceGuided miss i l e f r iga te

Gross National Product

Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force

Medium landing ship

Tank landing ship

M i1i ary Region

People 's Liberat ion Army (can r e f e r t o t h e e n t i r e m i l i t a r y o rsimply the ground forces)

People ' s L iberat ion Army A i r Force

v i i i



PLAN

PLANAF

PRC

ROC

ROK

SEZ

SLOC

SS

SSB

SSBN

SSGSS N

SSM

UNCLOS

USN

People's Liberation Army-Navy

People's L ib er at io n Army-Naval A i r Force

People's Republic o f China

Republic o f China

Republic o f Korea

Speci a1 Economic Zone

Sea L in e o f Communication

Attack submarine

B a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s ubmarine ( d i es e l - e l e c t r i c )

B a l l i s t i c mis si le submarine (nuclear powered)

Guided mis si e at ta ck submarine

Attack submarine (nuclear powered)

Sur face t o su r face mis s i l e

Un ite d Nations Conference on t h e Law o f t h e Sea

United States Navy



study exami nc

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

th e development o f t he nav a1 forces o f t he

People's Republic o f China (PRC) and the various influences that have

shaped t h e form ation o f a mari time ca pa bi l i t y. The purpose i s t o

identify the major developmental influences and determine how they may

inf lue nce th e fut ur e o f th e Chinese naval forces. These forces, a

branch o f t h e Chinese army, are known as the People's Liberation Army

(Navy) or PLAN. During i t s f i r s t45 years o f ex iste nce , t h e PLAN has

grown from a co l lec t io n o f obso le scen t ships t o a modern and reasonably

cap able co as ta l navy. Th is development has been spasmodic. Only si nc e

th e 1980s has t h e PLAN been ab le t o ma int ain a per iod o f cont inuous

growth.

The primary research question i s , how have ce r ta in inf luen ces

a ff e ct e d th e development o f t h e PLAN and what do they mean f o r t h e

PLAN'S fu tu r e ? Althou gh th e PRC i s a major r egio nal power, i t s navy has

been pr imari ly a coa stal defense for ce. This coa stal navy developed i n

response t o a var ie t y o f in f luences tha t fo r ease o f ana lys is have been

ca tegor ized i n t o s t ra t eg ic , p o l i t i c a l , economic, and in s t i t u t io na l . The

fu tu re o f th e PLAN w i l l be determined by the impact o f these influ ence s.



. .

'

$.

.

.

.

S t r a t e a i c I n f luenceS

Event s, po l i c i e s , and s t ra t eg i e s occu r r ing a t t h e

i n t e r n a t i o n a l leve l tha t have affec ted the PLAN are def ined as s t ra teg ic

in flu en ces . Among these st ra te gi c infl uenc es are superpower th re at s i n

the region, Asian geopoli t ics, and Asian naval modernizat ion programs.

Fo r t h e f i r s t 40 yea rs o f t h e PLAN's h i s to ry, t h e t h re a t o f superpower

ac t ion was th e dominant s t r a t eg ic i n f lu ence on th e PLAN. Since th e f a l l

o f t h e Sov ie t Union th e i n f luence o f Asi an geop o l i t i c s and As ian nava l

modernization programs has increased.

Superpower Threat

The two superpowers, t h e Sovie t Union and t h e Uni te d Sta tes ,

were key st ra te gi c in flu ence s on t h e PLAN. The fear o f one o r both o f

these two superpowers was a si gn if ic a nt reason f o r t he PLAN's defensive

o r i en t a t io n f o r t h e f i r s t t h i r t y years o f i t s existe nce. T hi s

superpower th re a t consis ted o f a t tempts t o enc i r c l e th e PRC. As t h i s

encircle ment in vo lv ed superpower naval fo rce s, t h e PLAN was a ff ec te d.

I n t h e 1950s and 1960s, t he Unit ed States was t h e main t h re a tt o t h e PRC. The U.S. was seen as at te mp ti ng t o e n c i r c l e t h e PRC thr oug h

t h e i r support o f co un tr ie s such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan,

Ph il ip pi ne s, South Vietnam, and Thai land. Because o f t h i s nat io nal

en mi ty , t h e Un it ed Sta te s Navy (USN) was viewed as th e PLAN's most

1i ely enemy.

I n t h e 1970s and e ar ly 1980s t h i s view was reversed as an

expansi onist Sov iet Union became t he PRC's main th re at . Ad di t i on al ly ,

the Soviet Pacific Fleet expanded during the 1970s and 1980s, and became

th e new pe rceived enci r c l ing fo rc e. So vie t naval deployments and t h e

2



es tabl ishment o f a Sovie t naval base i n Vietnam were v iewed by th e

Chinese w i t h concern .

F i g u r e 1. The P a c i f i c Basin. Reprinted, by permission, from DoraAlves , Coooera tive Secur i tv i n the Pa c i f i c Bas in : The 1988 Pa c i f i cSm ~o s i um Washing ton DC: Natio nal Defense Un iv er si ty Press , 1990). X I V.

The wi thdrawal o f t h e superpowers f rom the r eg ion a l so a ff e c te d

th e PLAN. The Russian Pa c i f i c F lee t d ramat ica l ly cu t i t s opera t ing

tempo, and i s no longer a f o r c e i n t h e r eg io n. The United States

Pa c i f i c F lee t l o s t i t s ma jor r eg iona l base, Subic Bay, and has r educedi t s p re se nc e i n t h e Western P a c i f i c . T h i s r edu ced t h r e a t s h o ul d b e

re f l ec te d i n reduced naval expendi tures . That these expendi tures are

now r i s i n g i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n f l u e n c e s o th e r t h a n s t r a t e g i c ones a r e a t

3



work. The weakened superpower n aval presence i n Asia has allo wed t h e

PLAN t o shed i t s defens ive o r i en ta t i on and focus on operat ions agains t

o the r r eg iona l nav ies .

Asian Ge opo l i t i c s

Throughout i t s h is to ry , t h e PLAN has been inf luen ced by two

ge opo l i t i ca l cons ide ra t ions . These in f luences a re th e PRC's quest fo r

secure borders and the PRC's claim on what are seen as his toric Chinese

l a nd s ( i n c l u d i n g o f f s h o r e i s l a n d s ) . F i g u r e 1 shows t h e PRC's

g eo gr ap hi ca l p o s i t i o n i n t h e P a c i f i c a re a.

The i s sue o f pe rmanen t, s ecu re bo rder s i s impor tan t t o any

nat ion, and t h e PRC i s no excep tion. The PRC's eas tern b order i s a

mar i t ime one. Running f rom Korea Bay t o t he Gu lf o f Tonkin , t h i s

co as t l in e i s a lmos t 3 ,000 mile s long: To secure t h i s eas tern border,

t h e PLAN was designed t o be th e "Great Wall a t Sea." The PRC has used

i t s naval f o r c e s ( mo st ly i n t h e 1950s) t o s ec ur e t h i s e a s te r n b o rd e r.

The PRC's c l a im t o th e h i s t o r ic Chinese l ands da tes t o th e

C hin ese E mp ire i n t h e m i d t o l a t e 1 9 t h C en tu ry. T hi s " h i s t o r i c C hi na "

co ns is ts o f t h e PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong. Macao, var io us i sl an ds around

Taiwan, and numerous islands and i s l e t s i n t h e South China Sea. The

PLAN has been involve d i n thre e combat a c t io ns s inc e 1949 i n ef f o r t s t o

recover these t e r r i t o r i e s (Senkaku I s lands i n th e ea r ly 1970s , Pa racel

I s l a nd s i n 1 974. and t h e S p r a t l y I s l a nd s i n 1 98 8) .

The i s s u e o f t h e Vo ff s h o r e c l a i ms " i n t h e E as t and S outh C hina

Seas i s d rawing more a t t en t io n , as these a reas a re be l i e ved t o con ta in

la r ge o i l r e se rves . These o ff shor e c la ims inc lu de th e Spra t ly and

Paracel Is lan ds i n th e South China Sea, and Taiwan and t h e Senkaku



(Diaoyu) I s l ands i n t he East China Sea (F igure 2 ) . Pa r t s o f th e Spr a t ly

and Paracel is la nd s a re als o claimed by Taiwan, Vietnam. Malaysia, t h e

. Ph il ip pi ne s, and Brune i. The PRC's of fs ho re claims were for mali zed on

25 February 1992, when the National People's Congress passed the Law of

, t h e Te r r i t o r i a l Sea and Contiguous Zone.

F igure 2 . The PRC's Of fs ho re Claims.

5



Naval Compet it ion i n As ia

The th i r d s t ra te gi c inf luen ce on th e PLAN has been th e naval

development programs o f China's neighbors . I n t h e post-Cold War wo rl d

reg ion al navies have become more o f an in te re s t t o t h e PLAN. Japan.

South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indo nesia , I nd ia , and Singapore ar e. .

u p gr a di ng t h e i r n av al f o r c e s .

Surface Combatant Ships( F r i g a t e S i z e o r L a rg e r )

T H A I L A N D

M A L A Y S I A

Figure 3. Surfa ce Combatants o f t h e Major Asian Navies .Data from The M i l i t a r y Balance (London: Int er na ti on alI n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t ud i e s, 1990 t h r ou g h 1 99 4) .

F i g u r e 3 shows t h e s ta tus o f a s e lecte d segment o f th e major

navies i n pos t -Cold War Asia . As shown i n t h e f i gu re , on ly t h e Republ ic

o f Korea (ROK) has s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased i t s number o f major sur face



combatants since 1990. The t r e n d s e v i d e nt i n F i g u r e 3 a r e a l s o

app l ica ble t o t h e i r navies as a whole . However. F i gur e 3 does not show

t h e advance i n cap ab i l i t i e s as newer p la t fo rms r ep lace o ld e r ones .

Taiwan has leased s i x Knox c las s f r i ga te s f rom t h e U.S. , rep lac ing aging

Korean Wa era d est roy ers . The Japanese Mar it im e S e l f Defense Force

(JMSDF) i s b ui ld in g some o f th e wor l d ' s mos t tech no log ic al l y advanced

sh ip s such as t h e KONGO cl as s g uided m i s s i l e de st ro ye r.

Table 1. --Asian Surface Combatant Ships (Frigate Size or Larger)

I MALAYSIA 1 1 0 . 5 0 1 1 1 15.50 1 3 1

COUNTRY

I JAPAN 1 11.74 1 2 1 14.69 1 2 1I INDIA 1 1 3 . 1 0 1 3 1 1 5 . 6 7 1 4 1

AVERAGE AGE1990(YEARS)

I THAILAND 1 31.83 1 7 1 19.70 1 6 1

RANKING(1990)

ROK

PRC

INDONESIA

I TAIWAN 1 43.86 1 8 1 44.45 1 8 1

Data from The M i l i t a r y Balance (London: In te r na t ion a l In s t i t u t ef o r S t r a t e g i c S tu d ie s , 1990 through 1994).

AVERAGE AGE1994(YEARS)

13.18

14.68

23.00

Using age o f a sh ip a lone as an in d i ca t i on o f i t s combat

ca pa b i l i ty , th e PLAN has made s i gn i f i c an t p rogres s i n th e 1990s towards

dev elo pin g a modern combat capa ble navy. Tab le 1 shows the average age

and age r ank ing (newest t o o ld es t ) o f su r face combatant sh ips f o r th e

major Asian navie s . S ig n if ic a n tl y , t h e PLAN advanced from th e ran kin g

RANKING(1994)

4

5

6

16.15

11.69

21.08

51

7



o f f i f t h among m ajo r Asia n na vie s t o f i r s t i na span o f f i v e yea rs.

Every one o f these Asian navies was able t o minimize th e ageing o f t h e i r

surface combatant f orc e through acqu isit io ns and con stru ction .

Ad di ti on al ly , Thai land and Indonesia showed a decreasing age tr en d. The

advanced age o f t h e Taiwanese su rfa ce combatant f o rc e wi 11 de cl in e

s i gn if ic an t l y i n the next few years as Taiwan re t i re s some o f the 28

World War I 1 e ra d e st ro ye rs s t i l l i n t h e i n ve n to r y.

Po l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e s

Po l i t i c a l i n f lu e n ce s a r e as t ho se r e s u l t i n g fr om th e m i l i t a r y ' s

and spe ci f i ca l l y the PLAN'S ro le i n domestic Chinese po l i t ic s . Key t o

t h i s in f luence i s unde rs tand ing the mil i t a ry - Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) re la ti on sh ip . The CCP has always wanted t o ensure i t s co nt ro l

o ve r t h e m i l i t a r y w h i l e m in im izing t h e PLA's i n f lu e n c e i n p o l i t i c s a nd

governmental a f f a i r s . The PLA, on t h e ot he r hand, has wanted t o

m in im iz e p o l i t i c a l i n fl u e nc e i nmili tary a f f a i r s .

The CCP's influence over the mil i ta ry a n d t h e m i l i t a r y ' s

in te rven t ion i n domest ic p o l i t i c s bo th peaked du r ing the Cu l tu ra l

Revolu tion. S ince then , the po l i t i c a l in f luence on the m i l i t a ry and the

r o l e o f t h e m i l i t a r y i n l o c a l and n a ti o n a l p o l i t i c s have b oth d ec li ne d.

The d e c l in i n g r o l e o f t h e m i l i t a r y i n p o l i t i c s i s e videnced by t h e

steady decline of m i1i a r y repr ese ntat ion i n th e CCP Central Committee

Po litb ur o since th e Cu ltu ra l Revolution. Today th e Po litb ur o has only

one mil i t a ry member, L iu Huaqing. L i u was als o a former commander o ft h e PLAN (1982-1987). Conversely, t he CCP's p o l i t i c i z a t i o n o f th e

military has declined from a peak achieved du ring t he Cu ltu ral

Revolu t ion . This i s evidenced by the reduced m il i t a r y involvement i n

8



mass movements / p o l i t i c a l work and t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a de rs ' c u r r en t

emphasis on m i l i t a r y professionalism.

The second po l i t i c a l iss ue was ide ol og ic al and revolved around

t h e s tr a t eg y and d o c t ri n e o f t h e m i l i t a r y . The m i l i t a r y, e sp e c i al l y t h e

te ch ni ca ll y o rie nte d branches (PLAN and th e People's L ib er at io n Army Air

Force or PLAAF), wanted t o develop a p r of e ss i on a l m i l i t a r y as a r e s u l t

of lessons learne d i n th e Korean War. The CCP and Mao Zedong wanted t o

cont inue the doct r ine of the "People ' s War" and placed g rea t f a i t h i n

massed forces motivated by p o l i t i c a l education and ind oc tr i na tio n. Only

a ft e r Mao died. d i d th e PRC s t a r t t o move away from th e "People's War"

doc t r ine . Th is f i r s t modi f i ca t ion was ca l l ed "Peop le 's Wa under ModernConditions . " The struggle between professionalism and poli t ical ly

ra di ca li ze d mass armies continues today, a l b e i t on a smaller scale.

Economic Influences

The ef f e c t t h a t th e nature and scope o f th e PRC's n atio nal

economy had on the PLAN's development are defined as economic

inf luences . Throughout most o f i t s h istory, PLAN development wasconstrained by a weak nati onal economy. Recent PRC economic

l i b e r a l i z a t i o n has r e sul t e d i n a growing, dynamic economy that no longer

acts as a hinderance t o th e PLAN's development. Table 2 show the growth

r a te o f China's Gross National Product (GNP) dur ing se lec ted h i s to r i ca l

periods. This ta bl e shows th e dramatic differen ce i n growth re su lt in g

from economic 1i eral i a t i on. Th is grow ing economy wi 11 be bet ter able

t o support the l a rge cap i t a l cos t r equ i red o f a modern naval force. A

healthy economy can develop the infrastructure and technology required

by a navy and investment i n th e navy w i l l ai d economic development.

9



The second economic in f lue nce i s th e geographical di s tr ib ut io n

o f economic development. I n the 1980s, the PRC began designating

c er ta in coastal regions as Speci a 1 Economic Zones (SEZs) . An SEZ i s a

re gi on where fo re ig n investment and development i s encouraged. The

in cr ea si ng dependence upon these c oa st al economic zones has i n pa r t

forced a s h i f t i n t h e PRC's m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y tow ards a more forward

oriented defense. As th ese SEZs have grown i n impor tance, so has t h e

importance o f t h e PLAN.

Table 2

PRC's Gross National Product (GNP)

1 PERIOD I GROWTH RATE(PERCENT)

Source: Jonathan Spence, The Search forModern China (New York: W. W. Norton &ComDany, 19901, 670; W i l l i a mOverholt.he' Ris e o f China (New York: W. W. Norton

& Company, 1994) , 30 ; Economist Intel1i enceU n i t, Countrv Re~ot-t : China and Mona01 i

(London: Economist Intel1 gence U ni t L td . ,

1994), 23.

Another economic in flu en ce i s th e growing com petitio n f o r oceanresources. Compe tition f o r ocean resources, such as o i 1. min era ls, and

m arine l i f e w i l l f o rc e co un tr ie s t o s t r i c t l y e nfo rc e t h e i r m ar iti me



c la ims . I f t h e PRC wishes t o enforce a 200 na ut i ca l m i l e Exclus iv e

Economic Zone (EEZ), t h e PLAN would have t o expand th e number o f s hi ps

and pa t r o l a i r c r a f t . Pos s ib le o i 1 depos i ts have exacerba ted th e

t e r r i t o r i a l d i sp u te s i n t h e S ou th China Sea r e g io n .

I n s t i t u t i o n a l I n f l u e n c e s

The te r m i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f l ue n c e s i s u sed t o d e s cr i be t h e

in f lu en ce t h a t th e PRC's m i l i t a r y s t r uc tu re has had on th e PLAN. As a

subordinate or gan izat ion , th e PLAN has been s t ro ng ly inf l uen ced by th e

P e o p l e ' s L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA). PLA o f f i c e r s and so ld ie rs were used t o

man t h e f l e d g l i n g navy. This meant t h a t th e PLA's i nf l ue nc e had been

f e l t i n a l l a reas o f th e PLAN, bu t e sp ec ia l ly t he a reas o f nava l

s t r a t e g y and d o c t r i n e .

As these army personnel were t ra ns fe r r ed t o th e PLAN, t hey

b r o ug h t w i t h them in t r a - a r m y r i v a l r i e s . I n t h e f o rm a ti o n o f t h e PLAN,

most personnel came from t h e Th ir d Fi e l d Army. This was a r at he r new

army which d i d no t have t h e in f lue nce o f t he o ld e r E igh th Rou te Army o r

t h e New Fou rth Army. The PLAN lacke d t h e p o l i t i c a l in fl ue nc e because

i t s key leaders were not f rom t h e same u n i t s as th e PLA's leaders . This

in t ra- army problem diminishes , as th e Ci v i l War leade rs pass f rom t h e

scene. As these Ci v i 1 War all eg ian ce s disappe ar, new service connected

factions have emerged.

The second i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e has been t h e r o l e o f t h e

M i n i s t e r o f D efense, a key p o s i t i o n i n t h e C hinese m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e .

Bot h Peng Dehuai (1954-1959) and L i n Bia o (1959-1971) had an enormous



in fl ue nc e on t h e PLAN. Between L i n Biao and t h e ea r ly 1990s. th er e i s

l i t t l e e vid en ce o f t h e M i n i s t e r o f D ef en se 's i n f l u e n c e on t h e PLAN. I n

1992, a fo rmer commander o f t h e PLAN was app oin ted as Mi n i s t e r o f

Defense . This man, L i u Huaqing, brought ne ar ly f o r t y years o f naval

e xp e ri en ce t o t h e De fe nse M i n i s t e r p o s t .

Scooe and Limitations

T h i s s t u dy b e g in s w i t h a d i s c u s s i on o f t h e f o r m a ti o n o f t h e PLAN

and goes on t o exp la in how th e s t r a t eg ic , economic, p o l i t i c a l , and

i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e s j u s t d e s c r ib e d h av e a f f e c t e d t h e PLAN. The

f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , m is si on s, c a p a b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e s ur f a ce ,

naval av ia t io n , subsurface , and amphibious forc es wi 11 be included i n

t h i s research . Amphibious forces w i l l be v iewed f rom th e naval

per spec t ive and w i 11 n o t inv o l ve an i n dep th r ev iew o f t h e Ch inese Naval

I n f a n t r y ' s l a nd war f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s .

T h i s r e se a rc h must n e c e s s a r i l y b e l i m i t e d i n o r d e r t o f o cu s o n

th e key issues t h a t have and cont in ue t o inf l ue nc e t h e PLAN. Al though,

China has had a l o n g m a ri t im e t r a d i t i o n p r i o r t o 1 949, t h i s s tu d y w i l l

be l i m i t e d t o th e Chinese Communist Navy. The disc uss ion o f th e PLAN

w i l l b e l i m i t e d t o c o n ve n t io n a l f o r c e s o n l y as t h e i s s u e o f PLAN

s t r a t e g i c ' n uc le a r ca pab i 1 t i e s and d e t er re n ce i s t o o l e ng t hy t o i n c l u d e

i n t h i s re se arc h.

S i an i f i cance

The s tudy o f the PLAN i s e spe c ia l ly r e levan t today. The PRC i s

i m po r ta n t t o w o r l d and r e g io n a l s e c u r i t y, and i t s n avy w i l l p l a y a v i t a l

r o l e i n t h e PRC's emergence as a major power. There are fo ur bas ic



r easons why t h i s s tudy i s impor tan t . F i r s t , t h e PLAN i s n u m e r i c al l y t h e

wor ld ' s t h i r d l a rg es t navy. Tab le 3 shows th e majo r ves se l s o f th e

PLAN. Ad d i t ion a l ly, th e a ir component o f t h e PLAN co ns is ts o f over 840

a i r c ra f t . A l though no t as t ec hno log ica l ly advanced as o the r Asian

navie s , t h e PLAN i s a major naval fo rc e. I n manpower terms , t h e PLAN i s

la rg er than t h e mar i t im e force s (navy and mar ine) o f Taiwan, South

Korea. Japan, Vietnam, t h e Phi 1 pp in es , and Ma la ys ia combi ned."

Table 3.--PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type

I BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE(NUCLEAR POWERED) I

SHIP TYPE

I ATTACK SUBMARINE I 96 (NOTE 1) I

QUANTITY

I DESTROYER I 17 I

I FRIGATE I 34 II FAST ATTACK CRAFT I 799 II AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS I -35 II M I N E WARFARE SHIPS I 63 I

I REPLENISHMENT OILER I 2 I

Note: 50 "R" c las s submarines ar e bel iev ed t o be non-operat ional

Source: Bernard Pr ez el in ed. . Combat Flee ts o f th e World 1993: T he irS h i m . Ai r c r a f t . and Armament (Annapolis , MD: U.S. Naval In s t i t u t ePress. 1993). 87-105.

Secondly, t h e PLAN operates i n or near some o f t h e wor ld ' s most

v i t a l sea l i n e s o f communications (SLOCs). The PRC's disp ute s w i t h i t sne ighbors over o f f sh ore i s l a nds d i r e c t l y impact th e v i t a l SLOCs th rough

th e S t r a i t s o f Malacca and Lombok S t ra i t s . Through these s t r a i t s pas s



o i l f l o w i n g t o t h e U n it e d S t a t e s' m ajo r r e g i on a l a l l y, J a p a n .

While t h e U.S. Navy 's presence i n As ia has decl ined . t h e Uni ted

States s t i l l has many in te re s t s i n t h e area. The U.S. has major defense

t r e a t i e s a n d r e 1 a t i onshi ps w i t h Japan, South Korea, Phi 1 pp ines , and

severa l o the r Southeas t Asian coun t r i e s . I n ad d i t ion t o defense

comnitments, t h e Uni ted S ta tes has an impor t ant economic i n t e re s t i n t h e

r e g i o n . T h i r ty - s e v e n pe r c en t o f U.S. t r a d e i s w i t h A si a . T hi s t ra d e i s

nea r ly th r ee t imes U.S. t r a de w i th La t i n Amer ica and doub le th e t r ade

w i t h th e European Union.' To ensure adequate pro te ct io n o f these

in te re s t s w i t h l i m i t e d r esources , th e U.S. must under s tand th e PLAN.

A d d i t i o n a l l y, t h i s s t ud y i s i m p o rt a nt s i mp ly b ecause o f t h e

r e l a t i v e lack o f info rm at i on on t h e PLAN. Much i s known about th e

v a r i o u s f l e e t s o f t h e w o r l d b u t l i t t l e a bo ut t h e PLAN. Most s t u d i e s on

t h e PLAN were completed dur ing t h e Cold War and r e f l e c t b i - po la r

s t r a te g i c th in k in g . Th is s tudy endeavors t o expand and update th e f i e l d

o f knowledge on t h e PLAN.

Qraaniz a t i on

T hi s a n a l y si s o f t h e PLAN i s d i v i d e d by h i s t o r i c a l p e ri o d s i n

i t s development. Chapter Two covers t h e PLAN's h is to r y up throu gh th e

break w i t h th e So vi et Union. Chapter Three encompasses th e era when L i n

Biao was Min i s t e r o f Defense. Chapter Four cover s th e t r a n s i t i o n pe r iod

f ro m L i n ' s d ea th u n t i l t h e a scendancy o f L i u Huaqing t o t h e l e a d e r s h i po f th e PLAN. Chapter F iv e descr ibes developments i n t h e PLAN si nc e

1982. Chapter S ix wi 11 summarize t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e i n f l u e n c e s o n t h e

PLAN and discuss how cu rr en t in flu en ce s wi 11 af fe ct t h e PLAN's fu tu re .

14



CHAPTER TWO

THE GREAT WALL AT SEA:

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN THROUGH 1959

This chapter examines the i n i t i a l per io d o f th e PLAN'S

development th ro ug h t h e Great Leap Forward. Th is e ra was marked by

rapid naval expansion sponsored by the Soviet Union. I n a d d it io n t o

t h i s growth, t h e PLAN was occupied w i t h t h e development o f command

s t ruc tu re , in f r a s t ruc t u re , s t r a tegy, and doc t r ine . Opera t iona l ly the

PLAN was employed frequently against the Nationalist naval forces based

on Taiwan.

he Formation o f t h e PLANvents Leadino t o t

The e vo lu ti on o f t h e PLAN began a t t h e end o f World War 11. The

Sovie t Union provided the i n i t i a l impetus f o r a Communist Chinese navy,

when they tr an sf er re d several ex-Japanese gunboats t o th e PLA. I n la t e

1946 the Soviets established the Democratic Naval Academy a t Dalian,

par t of Sovie t occupied Liandong peninsula (Figure 4). This academy

p r ov id e d So vi et l e d i n s t r u c t i o n f o r f u tu r e n av al o ff i c e r s . A s i m i l a r

school for enlisted personnel was also established a t Jiamusi , c lo se t o

the Soviet-Manchurian border.=

E ff o r t s t o c o n st ru c t a Chinese Communi s t navy began i n no rthe as t

China p a r t i a l l y as a result of aid provided by the Soviets who were then

occupying Manchuria and the Liaodong Penin sula. The f i r s t Communist



naval or ga niz at io n, t h e Northeast Navy, was es tab lish ed i n November

1948. This command was not an operational headquarters, but rather an

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ce n t e r f o r t h e n av al t r a i n i n g a c t i v i t i e s i n Manchuria a nd

t h e L iaodong peninsula.

S H * " b " A l

C H I N A3 rP

6E A

Figure 4. China's Marit ime Border



I n February 1949, Na tio na lis t ships began defect ing t o th e

Communists. The most symbolic o f th e defectio ns occurred i n th e nor th

when th e f lag ship and pr ide o f the Nat iona l is t navy defected a t Huludao

i n March o f 1949. This sh ip, th e l i g h t cr ui se r Chonaainq (ex-HMS

Auro ra), was la t e r sunk a t anchor by Nationalist air planes.'

The most im porta nt de fec tion t o th e f ut ur e o f th e PLAN occurred

along th e eas t-ce ntra l coast o f China. On' 23 Ap ri l 1949, v i r t u a l l y the

e n ti r e N at io na lis t Second Coastal Defense Fleet defected t o th e

Communist side a t Nanjing (Figur e 4) ."his f l e e t o f 25 vessels

ranging i n s i ze from landing c r a f t t o des t royers , represented about 25%

o f Na t iona l i s t naval s t r eng th a t the t ime. ' A t t h e t im e o f i t sdefection, the Second Coastal Defense Fleet was on the Yangtze River.

On th e same day th e f i r s t ope ratio nall y orien ted naval un i t , t he East

China Mi l i t a r y Region Navy, established i t s headquarters i n Taizhou,

Jiangsu provin ce (F igure 4) . The re la tio ns hi p between these two events

i s unce rta in. However, Taizhou and Nanjing are only about 45 mi les

apart and both cit ies are on or connected by water t o th e Yangtze. I t

i s easy t o surmise th a t t he establishment o f th e naval headquarters was

a qui ck response by th e PLA t o manage i t s newly acq uired naval fo rc e.

Regardless o f the re la t ion ship , 23 Ap ri l 1949 i s considered the b i r t h of

the PLAN.

The f i r s t commander and p o l i t i c a l commissar o f t he East China

Mil i ta ry Region Navy was an army gen era l, Zhang Aiping . P r i o r t o

,,8 .

assuming these posts, Zhang was a deputy corps commander i n th e T hi rd

F i e l d Army.' The Third Field Army was f i g h t i n g t h e N a t io n a l i s ts i n t h e

area a t th e tim e th a t the headquarters was esta blished . To man t h i s

17



naval for ce, Th ir d F i e l d Army personnel were assigned t o th e East China

Mili tary Region Navy.' Fi gu re 5 shows t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e f i v e F i e ld

Armies a t t h e c on clus io n o f t h e C iv i l Wa and the current naval

org an iza tio n. The East China M i 1i ary Region Navy headquarters was

l a t e r rel oca ted t o Shanghai and even tua lly renamed th e East Sea F le et .8

The re1a t i onshi p between these F ie ld Armies i s key t o understanding

PLAN-PLA p o l i t i c s esp ecia l ly i n the f i r s t decades o f the PRC's h is t or y.

F igu re 5. Generalized F ie ld Army Locations i n January 1950 i n r e la ti o nt o th e PLAN'S present geographical di vi sio ns . Map reproduced, bypermission, from The In te rna t iona l In s t i t u t e fo r S t ra teg ic S tud ies , TheM i l i t a r v Balance: 1992-1993 (London: Brassey's, 1992). 149.

With the bulk o f the operational naval forces, th e East China

M i l i t a r y Region Navy took t he lead i n developinga naval strategy.

18



Zhang Ai pi ng convened a naval p la nn in g confe renc e on 9 J u l y 1949. Th is

c on f er e nc e s e t f o u r t a s k s . The f i r s t t a s k was t o o rg an i z e and r e g u l a t e

t h e f l e d g l i n g n a va l f o r c e . The second t a s k was t o c on du ct p o l i t i c a l

r eeduca t ion o f th e many former N a t i on a l i s t nava l pe r sonnel . The t h i r d

was t h e r e p a i r o f damaged o r d e t e r i o r a t i n g sh i p s and f a c i l i t i e s . The

l a s t t a s k was t o e s t a b l i s h n av al school^.^ The goals o f t h i s new navy

as defined by Zhang, were:

t o b u i l d up a s k e l e to n n a va l arm t o b e used as a b a s i s f o r t h ec r e a t i o n o f a p o we rf ul P eo pl e' s Navy o f t h e f u t u r e , i n o rd e r t odes t roy th e sea b lockade o f l ib e r a t ed Ch ina, t o suppor t th e l and anda i r f o r c e s o f t h e PLA i n d ef en se o f Ch in es e s o i 1 , and t o w ip e o u ta1 1 remnants o f t h e rea ct io nar y fo rces . l o

Organ izat io n o f t h e Communist navy i n southern China took

longer. It was n ot u n t i l 15 December 1949, t h a t t h e Guangdong M i l i t a r y

D i s t r i c t Ri v e r ine Defense Command was e s tab li shed . The de pu ty commander

o f t h e Guangdong M i 1i a r y Region , Hong Xueshi , became the R i v e r i ne

Defense Command's f i r s t commander. Personnel f o r t h i s f o r ce were drawn

f rom minor nava l commands and f l o t i l l a s i n th e r eg ion and the Four th

F i e l d Army.l1

The Beai nn i na (1950)

I n 1950, th e Chinese began t o t r ans fo rm t he r eg iona l nava l

f o rc e s and f a c i l i t i e s i n t o a n a t i o n al f o r c e . The E as t China M i l i t a r y

Region Navy, the Guangdong Mil i t a ry D i s t r i c t Ri ve ri ne Defense Command,

and th e va r ious o rgan iza t ions i n no r theast China formed th e bas i s o f th e

PLAN'S op er at ing f l e e t headquarters . A na tio na l naval headquarters wase s ta b li s he d i n B ei i n g on A p r i l 14, 1950 wi th X iao Jinguang as th e f i r s t

PLAN commander.



A long- t ime f r ie nd and p o l i t i c a l a l l y o f Mao Zedong, Xiao

Jinguang, was an army o f f i c e r w it h no naval experience p r i o r t o assuming

t h e p o s i t i on . Like Mao a n a t i v e o f Hunan pr ovi nc e, Xiao had been Mao's

f r i e n d since th e age o f seventeen. He had stud ied i n Moscow f o r fou r

years, was a ve ter an o f th e Long March o f 1934.1935, and was deputy

commander o f L in Bi ao's Fourth F ie ld Army p r i o r t o assuming the navy

po sit ion .12 Xiao was a stro ng Maoist who be lieve d i n a strong coastal

defense st ra te gy . So vie t assistance was very imp orta nt t o th e PLAN and

Xiao was selected i n pa rt f o r h is f luen cy i n Russian. Thus, Xiao had

t h e r i g h t p o l i t i c a l and i d e o lo g i ca l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h e

assignment ."

Pos t Civ i l War army t roop d is t r ibut ion affec ted the composi t ion

o f th e PLAN. Naval for ce s drew army personnel from co ll oc at ed f i e l d

armies (Fig ure 5) . Appointees t o th e East China Mil i t a ry Region Navy

came from t h e Th ir d F i e l d Army.14 Fourt h F i e l d Army pr ovid ed most o f

the personnel t o th e Northeast Flee t and the Guangdong Mi l i t a r y D i s t r i c t

R i v e r i ne Defense Command headq uarter s. Elements o f th e Fo urth F i e l d

Army als o prov ided th e o ri g in a l composition o f th e PLAN'S headquarters

i n B ei ji ng .1 5

The PLAN began w i t h a c o l l e c t i o n o f N a t i o n a l i s t s h ip s t h a t were

e it h er captur ed by the PLA or were turn ed over t o t he Communists by

t h e i r de fect ing crews. These ships and c r a f t were o f American, English,

o r Japanese o r i g i n . Ships o f t h e newly cre ated PLAN were a l l r e l a t i v e l y

small . The larg est operatio nal ship was a destroyer escort displaci ng

1.020 tons.16 I n 1950, t h e PLAN co ns ist ed o f a l i g h t c r u i s e r (non-

opera t ional 1, four destroyer escorts, seventeen gunboats, one

20



minesweeper, th re e motor gunboats, twe lve pa t ro l ve ssels, and several

t r anspor t s , a ux i l i a r ie s , and land ing c r a f t . "

The PLAN'S manpower began w it h a mixt ur e o f former Na ti o na li st

sa il or s and PLA so ld ie rs . Because o f th e techno logical sk i 11s requi red

t o maintain and operate a navy, t h e PLAN was fo rce d t o r e t a in some

former Na t io na l is t sa i lo rs . P ol i t ic a l reeducat ion was required before

they could be tr us te d. One o f Zhang Aip ing 's o r ig in a l goals was the

reeducation o f these sa ilo rs . As discussed e ar li er , t he Th ird and

Four th F i e ld Armies provided personnel fo r th e ea rl y PLAN. These

personnel require d substa ntia l tr a in in g before they could become

competent mariners .I n 1950 several major naval schools were opened t o t r a i n these .

people. On August 24t h, t h e Naval Fast Atta ck C r a f t School and t h e

Naval Arti l lery School opened i n Qingdao. The a r t i l l e r y school was

founded i n pa r t by members o f an a r t i l l e r y d iv i s i on o f the Four th F i e l d

Army. On 31 October 1950, th e F i r s t Naval Av ia ti on School was formed i n

Qingdao. I t i s l a t e r combined wi th a second avi ati on school t o become

the Naval Aviation School . l a

The PLAN pursued an aggr essive p o l i c y o f rec ove ring and

res to r ing i t s naval cap ab i l i t i e s wi t h l im i te d resources . With Sovie t

a id t he Dal ian- Por t Arth ur complex was enl arg ed w it h more capable pie rs ,

new warehouses. expanded anchorage areas , inc reas ed stor ag e fa c i 1 i i es ,

and refu rbis hed machine shops and dry dock f a c i l i t i e s . I n Qingdao, th e

f a c i l i t i e s l e f t by th e U.S. Navy were augmented by new con stru ctio n.

Repair f a c i l i t i e s i n Jiangnan as we1 1 as a torpedo factory and naval

arsenal were made o~erational l9



The PLAN at tempted the re pa i r o r mod i f ic a t i on o f vesse ls wi t h

var yin g degrees o f success. The cr ui se r Chonaainq was re fl oa te d i n

1951, b ut was never f u l l y r es to re d and was scrapped i n t he m i d - 1 9 5 0 ~ . ~ ~

An ex-Canadian and two e x- Br i t i s h corve t te s p rev ious ly conver ted t o

merchant vessels were rearmed and refurbished as combatants by the

PLAN." The re pa i r sh ip T a b S h a (ex-USS Ac hi ll es (ARL-41)) which had

burned and grounded i n 1949 was rest ored t o opera t ional sta tu s.

Sovie t naval ass ista nce expanded i n 1950. The So vi et Naval

Advisory Miss ion was es tab l i shed e ar ly i n 1950 . I n i t i a l l y th e group o f

Soviet naval advisors numbered around 500 with 100 remaining at the

PLAN'S headquarters and the rest being dist ributed among the fleet

u n i t s . 2 2 I n J u l y, t h e f i r s t S o v i et s hip ment s o f re placem en t p a r t s f o r

ships i n he ri t e d from th e Guomindang ar ri ve d. The Soviets a lso provided

assi s tance i n t h e e f f o r t t o r es to re t h e C h ~ n a o i n q . ~ ~hree years

1a t e r, t h e Sov ie t Naval Advis ory Mi ssi on numbered between 1,500 and

2,0 00 and had a p re se nc e i n v i r t u a l l y e ve ry s h i p and t a c t i c a l u n i t i n

the PLAN.24

Desp it e t h e u rgen t need t o conso l ida t e , o rgan ize , and t r a i n , t h e

PLAN was th rown i n t o i n i t i a l e ff o r t s t o secu re t h e PRC's ea s t e rn

mari t ime border. Ear l y amphibious opera t ions t o conso l ida te t he coas ta l

isl an ds under Communi s t con tr ol revealed serious de fi cie nc ies . I n March

o f 1950, t h e PLA conducted an amphibious assa ul t on t h e i sl a n d o f

Ha inan . Hainan i s on ly 15 mi l e s f rom th e ma in land a t i t s c lo ses t po in t .

Over 500 s ol di er s drowned when r a f t s bei ng towed by motorized junks

c ap si ze d d u r i n g t r a n s i t ." The early amphibious operations were

conducted more l i k e r i v e r c ross ings and c l e ar l y demonst ra ted th e need



100 mile wide Taiwan Strait.

Preparations for such an invasion were well advanced by June

1950. The Th ir d F ie ld Army had b u i l t up supply and tr an sp or ta ti on

assets t o sus ta in a crossing of the Taiwan Strait.26 Army un i ts were

being tr ai ne d i n amphibious warfare by naval of fi ce rs ." The 25 June

invasio n o f South Korea and the subsequent po sit ion in g o f t he United

Sta tes ' Seventh F leet i n th e Taiwan S tr a it s ended these invasion plans.

Ear lv Stra teav

The PRC's predominant st ra te gi c concern ea rly i n i t s hi st or y was

t o defend th e na tio n and i t s Communist rev ol ut io n from att ac k. The PLAN

was important for i t was t o secure China's ma ritim e border and extend

Communist cont ro l t o th e o ff -s hor e is lands . I n a September 21, 1949

speech t o the Chinese People's P o l i t i c a l Co nsu ltat ive Conference, Mao

Zedong had declared:

,. Our na t ional defense w i l l be consol ida ted , and no imp er ia l is t w i l l,i

,be allowed t o invade our t e r r i t o r y again. Our people 's armed forcesmust be preserved and developed with the heroic and tested People'sL ib er a ti on Army as i t foundation. We w i l l no t on ly have a powerfularmy but a lso a powerful air force and a powerful navy.'"

I n January o f 1950, Mao also described h is view on th e importance o f t he

PLAN: "We must b u i l da navy. This navy must be able t o secure our

coastal defense and effectively protect us against possible aggression

by. the imp er ia l i s t s . ""

Cons t ra in ing th i s des i re fo ra

strong navy was the devastationo f th e Chinese economy. The mo de rn iza tio n o f th e PLA and t h e PLAN was

no t a h igh p r i o r i t y o f the Chinese l eade rsh ip immed ia te ly a f te r t a k ing

power i n 1949. The PRC leadership's main concerns were establishing a



.! . . . workable adminis t ra t ive organiza t ion , curb ing inf la t ion , and rebui ld ing

domestic industry 30 Even befo re the o f f i c ia1 dec la ra t ion e s tab l i sh ing

th e PRC, i t s leaders were looking t o demobil ize the PLA t o concentra te

on rebui l d ing the na t ion .

I n a d d i ti o n t o t h e e f f o r t s t o g ain c o n tr o l o f t h e c o as ta l

is la nd s and Taiwan, t h e PRC began an ea r ly campaign t o re cove r i sl an ds

fu rt he r o ut i n th e East and South China Seas. Only two years a f t e r the

founding o f th e ir country, the PRC s tar te d t o lay c l a im t o t h e v ar io us

i s le t s and . reef s o f the Spra t ly I s lands . I n th e 1951 peace t r ea ty

between Japan and the United States, Japan renounced a l l c la im s t o t h e

is la nd s o f th e South China Sea. The peace t r e a t y d i d not mention who i n

fact owned these islands and on 15 August 1951, the PRC claimed th e

Spra t ly Is lands , the Parace l Is lands . and o ther reefs and i s l e t s o f th e

South China Sea as an h i s t o r i c pa r t o f China . 3 a Without t h e means t o

enforce these claims, the PRC nonetheless had established an important

lega l foo tho ld i n these i s lands . S ince then , these is la nd claims have

continued t o inf lu enc e th e PLAN.

Develo~mentsDurins th e Korean Wa

The PLAN d id not s i g ni f i ca nt ly p ar t i c i pa te i n the KoreanWa but

was busy developing i t s org aniza tion. On 13 October 1951, th e Cen tral

Mil i ta ry Comiss ion c l a r i f i e d the re la t ion ship between each of t he

regional navies, the Mil i ta ry Regions with naval forces, and the Navy

Headq uarters. The M i l i t a r y Region was given combat command o f th eregional navies, w hi le t he Navy Headquarters i n Bei j i n g had pri m ar ily an

"organiza t ional leadersh ip re la t ionship ."" This cemented the PLAN'S

r o l e as a suppor t ing fo rce t o the army.

24



I n December 1951, Xiao Jinguang out li ne d h is "Three Pi l l a r s " on

which t o develop th e PLAN. These p i l l a r s were, " t o b u i l d p o l i t i c a l l y

and i d e o l o g i c a l ly, t o b u i l d o rga n iz a ti o na l ly, t o b u i l d

techno log ica l ly. "3 4 I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t Xiao p la ce d p o l i t i c a l and

id e ol og ic a l growth ahead o f tec hno log ica l advancement. Xiao was a

strong be1 i ver i n p o l i t i c a l orthodoxy over techn ical competence, which

prob ably e xpl ain ed why he sur vive d as th e PLAN'S commander f o r t h i r t y

years.

Also during the Korean War, th e People's Li be ra ti on Army-Naval

A i r Force (PLANAF) was formed i n Ap r i l o f 1952 w i t h Dun Xingyun as i t s

f i r s t commander. The 1 s t Di vi si o n o f th e PLANAF wasa c ti v at e d i n

Shanghai on 27 June 1952. The u n i t was formed w i t h personnel from t h e

f i r s t c lasses from th e Naval Avia tion School along w it h a regiment from

t h e army and one from the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).35

Early planes were a l l propel le r dr iven and i t was not u n t i l 1955 th a t

t h e PLANAF re ce iv ed i t s f i r s t j e t a i r c r a f t .

Inf luence o f t he Korean War

Although not a major p a r t i c ipa n t i n the Korean War, t h e PLAN was

s ig n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d b y i t . By causing the delay and eventually the

ca nc ell at ion o f th e planned invasion o f Taiwan, th e Korean Wa allowed

the Na t io na l is t forces on Taiwan t o recover from th e ir recent defea t on

th e mainland. Taiwan rece ived massive U . S . a id and r e b u i l t i t s navy,

thereby becoming a s ig n i f ica n t t h re a t t o Ch ina' s eas te rn bo rde r. I n1953, Mao sta te d, " I n th e past, when im p er ia li st s invaded our country,

i n most cases th ey came from th e sea. Even now, the Pa ci f i c Ocean i s



not a t a l l Pa ci f i c . We ought t o have a st ro ng navy."3"ao al so

c a l l e d f o r t u r n i n g th e c o as t l in e i n t o a "Great W a l l on the Sea."37

The Korean Wa also reduced th e resources ava ilab le f o r

expanding and modernizing t he PLAN. On 14 February 1952, Mao and Xiao

Jinguang agreed t o s h i f t funds from ship construc tion t o th e PLAAF t o

help bui ld more a i rc ra f t fo r use i n Korea.3s Only wi th Soviet

assistance was th e PLAN able t o grow durin g t h i s per iod (Table 4) . It

was not u n t i l a f t er th e war tha t the PRC could restore naval development

programs.

The Korean war al so demonstrated t o t h e PRC leadership the value

o f sea power. Merchant shipping, escorte d by naval force s, prov ided t h e

l o g is t i c support t o the United Nations land and air fo rces . A irc ra f t

ca rr ie rs o f f th e Korean coast launched air s t r i k e s a t w i l l a ga in st t h e

Communist fo rc es . Also, U . S . amphibious capabi l i t y , as demonstrated a t

Inchon showed th e Chinese th e u t i l i t y o f a modern, trained amphibious

force. A statement a tt ri bu te d t o Mao surfaced i n 1954: "Our f a il u r e t o

win a dec is ive v i c to ry i n Korea i s a t t r i b u ted t o our poor naval

force. "39

Era o f Pro fess iona lism and Sov iet Inf lue nce (1953-1959)

The period following the Korean Wa was t he peak o f S ino-Sov iet

naval cooperation. This cooperation consisted pr im ar il y o f ma ter ial,

technological , and ide olo gic al tr an sf er s. These tr an sf er s were

inst rum enta l i n t h e ea rl y development o f th e PLAN. The post-Korean Wale ad er o f th e PLA, Peng Dehuai , envisioned a Chinese military based upon

th e Soviet model .



The Sovie ts provid ed th e PLAN a va ri et y o f surfa ce combatants

and submarines. The ma jo ri ty o f these vessels were t r an sf er re d between

1953 and 1959. Table 4 l i s t s t he major Sov ie t nava l t r a ns f e r s t o t h e

PLAN. A f t e r 1955, Sov ie t ass ist anc e was aimed a t develop ing t h e PRC's

s h i p c o n s t r u ct i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s

TABLE 4. -MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL TRANSFERS TO THE PLAN

MIKE SUBMARINE 11

MIKE V SUBMARINE I:GORDY DESTROYER I:P-4 MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT 150

T 43 MINESWEEPER 1 2

DATE RECEIVED

MAY, 1954JUNE, 1955

JULY, 1953

OCTOBER, 1954JUNE, 1955

OCTOBER, 1954JUNE. 1955

OCTOBER, 1954

Source: David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power, 28-32.

With Sovie t a i d , th e PRC developed a sh ip bu ild in g in du st ry . The

s hi p bu i l d ing program emphasized con st ru ct io n o f sm all and medium u n i t s

as we ll as submarines." The Sovie ts als o ass ist ed i n t h e development

o f sh ip rep a i r f a c i l i t i e s and submarine cons t ruc t ion t echnology. I n

1956, Chinese yards began assembling "W" c l a s s d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c

submari nes from Sovi et made pa rt s. With So vie t ass istan ce, t h e Chinese

began cons t ruc t ion i n t he l a t e 1950s o f one "G" c l a s s d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c.

s b a l l i s t i c m i s s i le s ~ b m a r i n e . ~ ~.



The tra n sf er o f Soviet naval thought t o th e PLAN was j u s t as

important as ma ter ial and technology tra ns fe rs t o th e PLAN'S*~?. development. During th e mid t o l a t e 1950s th e Soviet Navy sh if te d th e i r:f :... emphasis away from a b ig sh ip S ta l i n is t navy t o one th a t emphasized fa s t

&; a t tack c r a f t , submar ines, guided miss i l e s , and a i rc ra f t t o de ter

blockade o f the homeland. This doc trin e o f thought was c a ll ed th e

"Young Scho ol." The "Young School" naval d oc tr in e had a ls o been po pul ar

i n th e 1920s and 1930s when Xiao Jinguang st ud ie d i n Moscow. I f he was

exposed t o any naval d octr ine dur ing h is t ra in in g i t was most probably

t h i s "Young School . " Also the PLAN's l im it e d naval exp ertise and th e

presence o f Soviet naval advisors a t a l l levels of the PLAN, i t i s no

su rp ris e th a t t h e PLAN adopted th i s "Young School" t ype o f naval

doctr in e . I n 1958. th e CCP Central Mili tary Commission approved " A

Resolution on Building the Navy." Thi s r e s o lu t i o n s t a t e d t h a t :

The Navy take s th e development o f submarines as i t s f oc al po in t,w i t h a corresponding development o f necessary surfa ce ships . Nomatte r whether t h e development i s f o r submarines or surfa ce ship s,i t should es pe ci al ly emphasize th e use o f new tech nolog ies, such asguided m i ss i le s and atomic p r o p ~ l s i o n . ~ ~

Th is emphasis on submarine development para1 e l s t h e "Young sc ho ol "

doctrine and would be a primary pa tte rn i n th e PLAN's development f o r

the next two decades.

Defense Reorganization and Peng Dehuai,.. As le ad er o f th e PLA, Peng Dehuai had a l a rg e r in f luence on the

pr of es sio na lis m o f th e PLAN tha n Xiao Jinguang. I n 1954 Peng became th eF i r s t Vice-Chai rman o f th e CCP Central Committee's M i1 t a r y Commission.

This pos i t io n i s i n pr ac t ic e th e head o f the PLA. Previously, Peng had

l e d the Chinese troops i n Korea and was convinced o f t he need f o r

28



modernizat ion . Peng s t ro ve f o r a profe ss iona l no t a rev olut ion ary army

and used the Soviets as a model . He s t ar te d reforms which were l a t t e r

known as t h e "Four Gre at Systems." These systems were: t h e Compulsory

M i l i t a r y System, th e System o f M i l i t a r y Ranks, th e Sa la ry System, and

t h e Order o f Me r i t System."

Peng's reform e f f o r t s were implemented i n 1955. A co ns cr ip t io n

law was enacted i n February o f th a t yea r. Th i s ensu red a st eady f lo w o f

new sa i lo rs and a l lowed th e PLAN t o keep them fo r f i v e years (opposed t o

th re e and fou r yea r s f o r th e PLA and PLAAF respe c t ive ly ) i s f i v e

yea r commitment helped t h e PLAN main tain a pro fes sion al t ra in e d for ce .

That same month, a rank system as we ll as a sa la ry system was

a d ~ p t e d . ' ~By October o f 1955 t h e l a s t o f th e "Four Great Systems,"

t h e Order o f M er it System, had been enacted.

Peng h ad a keen i n t e r e s t i n n av al a f f a i r s . I n 1955. h e l e d t h e

m i l i t a r y ' s f i r s t succes s fu l combined arms amphibious as sau l t . Th i s

amphibious opera t ion was d i r ec ted aga ins t Na t io na l i s t t roops i n th e

i s land s o f f th e coas t o f Zhe j iang prov ince. " Peng wan ted th e PLAN t o

deve lop method ica l ly and w i th in Chinese ca pa b i l i t i e s . I n a s ta temen t

t h a t r e f l e c t e d C hinese c a p a b i l i t i e s and t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e S o v i et

Young School he sa id , "The process o f bu i l d i ng th e Navy should be ' F i r s t

boa t s , then sh ips . ' First , we should develop torpedo boats , submarines,

e t c e t e r a.

F i r s t F i v e Year P la nThe pe r iod o f 1953-1957, o f f i c ia1 l y d es ig na te d " t r a n s i t i o n t o

soc ia l ism, " corresponded t o th e PRC's F i r s t F ive Year P lan . The goal o f

t h e F i r s t F iv e Year P lan emphasized th e development o f heavy

29



i n d u s t r y 4 g This emphasis on heavy industry helped the PLAN especially

i n the development o f sh ip r epa i r and cons t ruc t ion f a c i l i t i e s . Although

a t th e end o f th e f i r s t F ive Year Plan, th e leadership was genera l ly

s a t i s f ie d w it h what had been achieved, Mao and l e f t i s t r ad ic al s thought

more could be accomplished i f th e populat ion was id eo lo gi ca l ly aroused

and i f domestic resources were used t o sim ultan eous ly develop

ag ri cu lt ur e and indu str y.5 0 Mao ca rr ie d th e day and pull ed China in t o

the Great Leap Forward which had dire effects on the PLAN'S

mo dern izat ion programs. The f a i u r e o f t h e Great Leap forwa rd combined

w i t h the withdrawal o f Sov iet a ssi s tance l e d t o a two year shipbui ld ing

Figure 6 . Mil i t a ry Regions o f t h e PRC, 1949. Re pri nte d, bypermission', Jonathan D. Spence. The Search f o r Modern China (New York:W. W. Norton & Co., 1990), 523.

30



P o l i t i c a l S t r u g g l e s

Throughout t h e ea rl y 1950s. th e PLA had been organized i n t o s i x

separate mi l i tary regions (Figure 6 ) . Each o f these regions had fou r

main posts: a government ch ai man , a .party secretary, a m i l i t a r y

commander, and a PLA p o l i t i c a l commissar. Some men, such as Gao Gang

and Rao Shushi, he ld more tha n one pos t and were develo ping str on g

reg ion al power bases.= I n 1954 these two st ro ng regi on al lead ers were

purged and the mil i tary and administrat ive organizations were

cen t r a l i zed .

The PLAN di d not escape t h i s c en tr al iz at io n o f power i n Bei in g.

I n 1955. th e PLAN began th e form atio n o f a th re e f l e e t system. The East

China M i l i t a r y Region Navy became th e East Sea Fl ee t wi th i t s

headquarters i n Shanghai (Fi gur e 4 ) . The Navy o f th e South Centr al China

M i l i t a r y Region was renamed th e South Sea Fl ee t and estab lis hed i t s

headquarters i n Zhangjiang. The naval ac t i v i t i e s i n north China were

n o t org aniz ed i n t o a f l e e t s t r u ct u r e a t t h i s t im e .

Previously, the PLAN had avoided the heavy poli t ical inf luence

that the ground forces had experienced. I t was o nly i n 1957, t h at t he

PLAN establ ished the o f f i c e o f F i r s t P o l i t i c a l Commissar, wi th Su

Zhenhua as i t s f i r s t l eader. P r i o r t o 1957, the navy' s sen io r Po l i t i ca l

Commissar and head o f t h e navy's P o l i t i c a l Department was e n ti tl e d ,

Deputy P o l i t i c a l Commissar. Su Zhenhua held t h i s po st a t t h e ti m e o f

h i s p romotion t o F i r s t Po l i t i ca l Commissar, a move which merely

fo rmal ized h i s con t ro l o f the navy' s po l i t i c a l s t ruc tu re . The min imal

p o l i t i c a l in f luenc e i n nava l a ff a i r s was ev iden t i n Su' s 1957 address t o

the Congress o f Naval A ct iv is ts i n which s tandard p o l i t i c a l rh eto r ic was



decidedly absent. I n t h i s speech he charged th e navy t o pra cti ce

economy, ra is e th e qu a li ty o f the armed forces, develop ta ct ic a l

expe r t i se , con tinue t o s treng then China 's defense o f t e r r i t o r i a l wa ter s,

escort merchant convoys, and protect the f ishing fleet 5 z

Taiwan Stra i ts Cr is is

I n 1958. th e PR C th rea tened t o comple te th e task th a t th e Korean

Wa had stopped. The most ext en sive ser ies o f naval action s between t h e

PLAN and ROC occurred durin g th e blockade o f th e islan ds o f Jinmen and

Mazu i n 1958. I n attempts t o int er ce pt resupply convoys t o Jinmen, th e

PLAN lost four torpedo boats. Only U.S. in te rve n t ion wi th fou r ca r r ie r

ta sk forces p revented Jinmen f rom fa l l i n g t o the Co mm ~n is t s .~ ~his

c r i s i s aga in showed the a b i l i t y o f sea p w er t o in f luence events and

also prompted th e PRC t o ex tend i t s t e r r i t o r i a l seas f rom 3 t o 12

nau t ica l mi le s .

S p l i t w i t h t h e So vi et U nion

The Si no-S oviet r i f t th a t emerged i n th e la t e 1950s dramat ica l ly

af fe ct ed t h e PLAN. This r i f t was basically a divergence i n paths

between the two socia l is t s ta tes coupled with under ly ing d is t rus t

between Mao and the Soviet leader Khrushchev .s"i s t t he s p l i t

delayed th e PLAN's mod erniza tion plans . This break als o caused t h e PLAN

t o reeva lua te i t s s t r a tegy. No longer d i d i t have a benevolent Soviet

U nion t o t h e n o r th .

The ide olo gica l and p o l i t i c a l s p l i t between th e Soviet Union and

t h e PRC delayed t h e PLAN's growth. I n 1959 So viet naval ass istanc e was

d ra m at ic a ll y reduced and by August 1960 t h e So vie t Union had removed t h e



last 150 naval advisors (down from a peak o f 2,000). The ef fe ct on th e

PLAN was dramatic, virtuallya l l sh ip construc t ion was ha l ted , h a lf

completed sh ips and submari nes s at i d l e w h il e naval leader s determined

pr io r i t i e s . Add i t iona l ly, t he supp ly o f spa re pa r t s fo r the Sov ie t made

equipment stopped, causing more un it s t o remain in po r t 5 5 This

d ramat ic c u t o f f d rove the PLAN t o s e l f - su ff i c ie ncy ,a t r a i t t h a t

remains ing ra ined i n Chinese m i l i t a ry th ink ing .

Th is i n i t i a l pe r iod o f the PLAN'S h i s to r y ended i n 1959. I n

th a t year a1 1 o f t he inf luences previously descr ibed were dramat ica l ly

changed. St ra te gi ca ll y, 1959 marked th e end o f Soviet assistance t o th e

PLAN. Economically, t he ef fe ct s o f th e f a i l e d Great Leap Forward were.

b eg in ni ng t o be f e l t . P o l i t i c a l l y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , t h e replacement

o f Peng Dehuai as Min is te r o f Natio nal Defense w it h L in Biao hada

s ignif icant inf luence on the PLAN.



CHAPTER THREE

LIN BIAOAND THE PLAN (1960-1971)

The new lea de r o f t he Chinese mili tary, Lin Biao, r

a si gn if ic an t fa ct or i n th e development o f the PLAN. This second era o f

t h e PLAN's h is t o r y was a perio d o f growth and modernization th at

occurred despi te nat ional economic disasters and poli t ical instabi l i ty.

Most o f t h i s expansion can be at tr ib ut e d t o one man, L i n Bi ao. During

t h i s per iod , L in had a larger influence on naval force structure and

st ra te gy than th e PLAN's commander. L i n Bi ao 's vehement a n ti -

Americanism l e d t o t h e expansion o f t he PLAN as a counter t o t he U.S.

Navy.

The PLAN i n 1960 was s ig n if ic an tl y d if fe re nt from the f orce

created only a decade be fo re . The number, va r ie ty , and cap ab i l i ty o f

i t s ships had increased (Table 5). The ship s o f th e PLAN now had more

o f a So vie t appearance as a res u l t o f Sovie t naval ass is tance i n the

1950s. As shown i n Tab le 5, t he PLAN now had t h e nucleus o f a coastal

defense force wi th i t s lar ge numbers o f f as t a ttack c r a f t , submarines,

and patrol vessels.

The personnel compos ition o f t h e PLAN had als o changed.

Although the o f f i c e r corps was s t i l l composed almost e nt ir el y o f formerPLA of f i c e r s , t h e PLAN had begun developing i t s own of f i c e r co rps.

Instead of volunteers, the majority of the PLAN's sailors were now

conscripts serving a f i v e year term of service .

34



Table 5. - - P L A N ' S ~ o m ~ o s i t i ' o ny Sh ip TYPE (19 60)

SHIP CLASS

ATTACKSUBMARINE

I FRIGATE I 16 I INCLUDES 4 RIGA CLASS BUILT INSHANGHAI

QUANTITY

DESTROYER

I FLEET I 10 1ALL SOVIET 1-13 CLASSMINESWEEPER

NOTES

26

4 I ALL EX-SOVIET GORDY CLASS

I PATROL VESSEL I 27 I EX-SOVIET AND BRITISH CRAFT

ALL EX-SOVIET. THE MOST CAPABLEARE THE 12 "W" CLASS

TORPEDO BOAT

I REPAIR SHIP I 1 1 EX-USS ACHILLES(ARL-41)

AMPHIBIOUSSHIPS

Source: Raymond V . B . Blackman, ed. , Jan e's Fi a h ti n a Ships 1960-1961(New York: McGraw-Hi 11 Book Company I n c . . 196 0). 117-1 21.

APPROX. 150

As a r e s u l t o f changes i n th e 1950s, t h e PLAN was developing

a long th e l i ne s o f a p ro fes s iona l nava l fo rc e mode led on th e Sov ie t

navy. Not onl y were th e PLAN's sh ips o f Sovie t des ign , so were i t s

50 SOVIET P-6 CLASS AND SEVERALSOVIET P-4 CLASS

25

s t ra te gy , rank s t ru ct ur e , and uniforms . I n t h e previous decade th e PLAN

had adopted t h e Sovie t "Young School" o f naval tho ught t h a t advocated an

i n s h o re de fe ns e w i t h l i g h t s u r f ac e c r a f t o ve r a h i g h seas f l e e t w i t h

la rg e r sh ips . ' Th i s s t r a teg y was t o con t inue th roughou t th e decade

w i t h some p o l i t i c a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s .

By 1960, th e PLAN's org ani zat ion had evolved t o resemble i t s

c u r r e n t s t r u c t u r e ( F i g u r e 7 ) . The na va l a c t i v i t i e s i n n or t h e a s t China

MOSTLY EX-U.S. SHIPS

were now con soli dat ed under t h e North Sea F le et headquartered i n

35



Qingdao. The PLAN'S t o p lea de rs hi p, Xiao Jinguang and Su Zhenhua,

remained the same. However, Zhang Aipi ng, th e founder o f t h e East China

M il i ta r y Region Navy i n1949 had previ ousl y reverted back t o t he PLA.

Figure 7. Naval O rg an iza tio n. Re pr int ed from Godwi n

The Chinese Communist Armed Forces (Maxwell A i r ForceBase, AL: Air University Press, l988) , 123.

36



.

i'., Strateaic Out look.

Throughout th e 1960s, th e Chinese continued t o v iew th e U.S.

Navy as the primary mari t ime threat . The U.S. Navy was seen as pa r t o f

an e f fo r t t o enc i r c l e China, as dep ic ted i n F igure 8.

Figure 8. U.S. Enc ircl eme nt o f t h e PRC. Drawing from Pekina Review,re pr in te d i n Washinaton Post , 27 February 1966, E 3 .

The PLAN did not view the Soviet navy a s a major th re at . The

p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e o f the day had many references about th e U.S. Navy,

but none about the Soviet Navy. St ra teg ic al ly , th e Soviet Pac i f i c Fleet

was not much o f a t h r e a t i n t h e 1960s. I t lagged behind the other three

Soviet f l ee t s i n the number and qu a l i ty o f i t s sh ips. Throughout the

1960s, Soviet operations i n the Pa ci f ic were co nsi s te nt l y l a s t among th e



(

,

four major operat ing areas ( '~edi ter ranean. A tl a n ti c , Ind ian Ocean, and..: , P a c i f i c Ocean) i n term s o f a nnual sh i p d a y s . V t was n o t u n t i l l a t e i n

.. th e decade t h a t China began t o perce ive a S o v ie t na val t h r e a t i n t h e

. P a c i f i c .

N a v a l Strateqy

The PRC's naval stra tegy changed very l i t t l e i n th e 1960s. The

s t r a t egy t ha t came t o the fo re dur ing t h i s pe r iod was an o ff shoo t o f

Mao's "Great W a l l a t Sea." This st ra te gy came t o be known as th e

"People's Wa a t Sea." The "People' s War a t Sea" was a combination o f

Mao's coastal defense strategy and the Soviet "Young School" doctrine.

I n th e wor ld s trug gle , L in Biao saw t h a t N orth America and

Western Europe cons t i tu t ed th e "c i t i e s o f the wor ld" and the r es t o f the

contine nts made up th e "r ur al areas o f the world . "' He saw proletarian

upr is in gs beginning I n these " ru ra l" areas. Using t h i s same analogy,

th e oceans could a ls o be par t o f the ru ra l area. The "People's War a t

Sea" was s imply an extension o f "r ur al " g u er i l la war onto th e oceans.

I n f a c t , t o win a t sea one must embrace Mao's th ou gh t, r e l y on t h e

masses o f people, make use o f cover and concealment, and " br in g i n t o

f u l l p l a y t h e s t r at e g y and t a c t i c s o f t h e p eo pl e' s w ar." "

Pe ri od o f Retrenchment (1960-1961)

The end o f Sovie t assistance and the f a i l u r e o f the Great Leap

Forward had gr ea t im pacts upon t h e PLAN'S growth. These two fa c to r s

combined t o e ff e c t i v el y h a l t any new shi p development or c ons truc tion

for the PLAN until 196Z.5 O f these two factors , the end o f Soviet

assis tance a ffe ct ed th e PLAN t o a gr ea te r degree. The end o f So vi et



assistance a ffec ted th e PLAN so deeply th at th e is sue o f outs ide

tec hni cal dependence affects th e PLAN t o t h i s day.

The wit hdr awa l of So vi et a ssi stan ce stopped t h e PLAN'S growth

by removing Soviet technic ians, ha l t in g th e supply o f spare pa rts , and

r e s t r i c t i n g t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f f u e l . I n 1960. f ou r" W " c lass

submarines were i n various stages o f constru ctio n. A ft er th e Sino-

Sov iet s p l i t , work ceased on these submarines fo r over a year.6

Add i t i ona l ly , the PLAN had not s tock pi led quant i t ies o f spare par ts fo r

i t s S ovie t designed ships and submarines. By early 1961 and through

1962 many ships and submarines were un able t o ope rate due t o la ck o f

replacement p a r ts and te chn ic al assis tan ce .' By 1960, t h e PRC wasimpor t ing one-hal f of i t s o i l requirements from th e Soviets . A f t e r t h e

s p l i t these imports were reduced by 40 percent . The re su lt in g o i l

shortage caused th e PLAN t o reduce usage by r e s t r i c t i n g underway

t r a i n i n g . s

Along wi th t he end o f Soviet a id , the economic res t ru ctu r in g

after the Great Leap Forward caused a r educ t ion i n sh ip cons t ruc t ion .

To repair a severe agricultural production slump, the Central Committee

i n 1961 s h i ft e d emphasis away from heavy in du st ry and towards

a g r i c u l t u r e a n d l i g h t i n d u s t r y 9 This was re af fi rm ed i n 1962. when

Zhou E nl ai c a l l e d f o r t h e na ti o n t o pu t i t s f i r s t p r i o r i t y i n

agr ic ul tur e , l i g h t indus t ry over heavy indust ry, and the reduct ion o f

s t a t e investment i n the cons t ruc tion o f i dus t r ia1 enterprises ."hi s

change i n emphasis res ult ed i n dramatic reductions o f naval rel ate d

in du st ri es . For example, th e production o f merchant ships dropped from

54,300 metr ic tons displacement i n 1959 t o 13,500 me tr i c tons i n 1962 ( a



75 percent redu ction). Finished ste el production decline d from 11,300

t on s i n 1960 t o 6,000 o ns i n 1962 ( a 47 percent drop) .ll This

r e d u c t i o n o f i n d u s t r ia1 prod uction combined wi th th e absence o f sk i 1 e d

Sovie t te chnicia ns cr ip p le d th e PLAN'S development plans f o r two years.

Expansion and Politics (1962-1966)

Durin g t h i s p er io d th e PLAN expanded dr am at ic al ly . Between

1962 and 1966, expenditures on naval construction rose about 600

perce nt. The naval budget not on ly increased i n absolute terms bu t als o

as a percentage o f th e growing non-s t ra teg ic mi l i t a r y forces budget. I n

1958, he PLAN expenditures constituted 25 percen t o f t he non-s t rateg ic

forces budget; by 1966 t h i s had inc reased t o 29 percent .1 2

During this period the PLAN used the increased budget

appropr ia t ions t o upgrade th e force . I n 1962. th ey resumed work on th e

fou r "W" cla ss submarines and sta rt ed work on i t s successor, t he "R "

submarine. The PLAN began co nst ruc ti on o f a b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e capable

submarine, the "G" c la s s i n m id 1962. They a l so re f i t t e d the "W" class

with new sonars while a t the same time decommissioned older submarines.

The PLAN also took t h e f i r s t steps towards a modern coastal defense navy

wi t h th e bu i ld in g o f the Komar c la ss mis s i l e a t t ack boats i n 1963 and

th e Osa c lass mis s i l e a t tack boats i n 1964. These were equipped with

Styx miss i les which f or th e f i r s t t ime gave the PLANa capable anti-

sur fac e ca p a b il it y . The PLAN was a ls o developing la rg e numbers o f gun

. equipped coast al pa tr ol boats and torpedo boats. I n1963,

work began on,

+ .- th e Jiagnan class f r ig a te , th e f i r s t surface combatant designed and'

~:;/ .

'.:x . b u i l t i n China. The f i r s t an t i submarine type vesse l , t he Hainan c lass

submarine chaser, was launched i n 1964.l'

40



I n add i t ion t o t h i s s ign i f ica n t expansion o f the number o f

vessels and a i rcraft , several personnel issues were addressed i n t h i s

pe rio d. L i Zuopeng, a f e ll o w Fourth F i e l d Army alumni, was appointed

Xiao' s deputy i n 1962. L i was a close associate o f Li n Biao having

previously served as a corp s commander i n h i s arw. Manning and

t r a i n i n g a te ch ni ca ll y based force l i k e the PLAN became easier i n 1965,

when th e term o f se rvice f o r ship based sa il or consc ripts was increased

from 5 t o 6 yea rs .

I n 1965, p o l i t i c s reversed th e PLA's tu r n toward th e Soviet

professional mili tary model that began a t th e end o f t he Korean War. On

May 24 o f t h a t y ea r, a l l o f Peng Dehuai's 1955 reforms were repealed .Two days later, the mili tary uniform was standardized. This elim ina ted

th e most v i s ib l e di st in ct io n between the services and between of fi ce rs

and co ns cr ip ts . The PLAN would i n t h e fu tu r e wear th e same uni for m as

t h e army. I n June , the Min is t r y o f Nat ional Defense pr ohi b i te d the use

o f mil i ta ry t i t l e s . Hencefor th , o ff ic er s were t o be ca l le d by th e ir

f u l l name o r s im ply " ~ o m r a d e . " ~ ~hese measures were intended t o

reverse the t r end towards th e Sov ie t iza t i on o f the mil i ta ry model and t o

fo rce a re tu rn t o equa l i ty th a t the rank s t ruc t u re had e limina ted .

P ro of o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e " Pe op le 's War a t Sea" doctrine and

small naval combatant employment came i n August 1965. I n a b r i e f b a t t l e

e leven torpedo boats , four fas t a t tack craf t , and one gunboat engaged a

Nationalist large subchaser and a small subchaser. The b a t t l e res ult ed

i n a PLAN v ic t o r y . Zhou Enlai commended t h e p a r ti c ip a ti n g un it s by

saying "Th is naval b a t t l e e nt ai le d clo se combat, ni g ht combat, and mass

combat. It was a ba t t l e i n which sma ll c r a f t fough t l a rge vesse ls . " 1 5

41



C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n (1966-1969)

The Cul tura l Revolution had three main influences on the PLAN.

F i r s t . i t removed some se ni or naval of f i c e r s . Second, i t f o r c e d t h e

n av y t o c o n t i n u e w i t h a c o a s t al d ef en se s t r a t e g y. T h i r d , t h e C u l t u r a l

Rev01 u t ion p re ci p i ta te d a s t ru gg le among t h e PLAN's t op 1eadership.

A l though these in f luence s a re s i gn i f i c an t , they were minimal compared t o

t h e changes t he Cu l tu r a l Revo lu tion b rough t t o th e PLA.

Many sen io r nava l o f f i ce r s were purged dur in g th e Cu l t u ra l

Revolut ion . h o n g those purged were t h e PLAN's P o l i t i c a l Commissar, t h e

navy 's c h ie f operat ions o f f i c e r , t h e Eas t Sea F l ee t commander, two

deputy commanders, a n d t w o F l e e t P o l i t i c a l Commi ssars . A1 to ge th er 12 0

sen ior naval o ff ic e rs and thousands o f - lower rankin g personnel were

purged.16

The C u l t u r a l R e v o l u ti o n f o r ce d t h e PLAN t o c o n t i n u e w i t h i t s

coas ta l de fense nava l s t r a tegy. The p o l i t i c a l rh e t o r ic e spousing men

over weapons became do ctr in e . A skirmis h w i t h t h e Na t i on al is t navy was

desc r ibed as "a sea b a t t l e th a t r e fu ted th e bourgeo is and r ev i s io n i s t

the ory t h a t weapons, ru le s , and reg ula t io ns and 'exper ts ' a re

omnipotent. "17 The f e a r o f p o l i t i c a l r e p r i s a l made c h a l le n g i n g t h e

cur ren t s t r a tegy ve ry hazardous .

The Cu l tu ra l Revo lu t ion a l s o p r ec ip i t a ted a s t r ugg le between

t h e PLAN's commander, X iao Jinguang, and h i s deputy, L i Zuopeng. L i had

been i n h i s p o s i t i o n s i nc e 18 June 1962.18 On 9 June 1967, he replaced

Su Zhenhua, as F i r s t Po l i t i c a l Commissar o f t h e PLAN." As a r e s u l t o f

h i s t i e s w i t h L in B iao , L i Zuopeng e f f e c t iv e l y became th e PLAN's c h i e f .

Xiao J inguang became a mere f igure head and was r e l a t i v e l y s i l e n t



th roughout t he C ul tura l Revolu t ion . The pro of o f L i ' s power was

demonstrated i n 1969, when he, ra th er than Xiao, was app ointed t o th e

pol it bur^.^^

Even w i th t h e c o n ti n uin g p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g le , b o th c i v i l i a n and

m i l i t a r y s h ip b u i l d in g i nc re as ed d u rin g t h i s p e r io d . Despite the8

,' 're je ct io n o f th e Sovie t model, th e PLAN followed t he same ship

. ,.1. i,' p r i o r i t i e s developed by Peng Dehuai i n th e 1950s. I n 1969, Zhou Enlai

,I.

:r e s t a t e d t h e s e s h ip b u i l d in g p r i o r i t i e s :

,

Submarines, fa s t a t tack c r a f t , development o f t h is k ind o f vesse ls( s i c ) i s what we should accelerate. We are hopeful th a t a nuclearpowered submarine can ent er t h e water i n 1970. . . . The Navyshould enhance i t s air bor ne and surface defense systems.=

Shipbui ld ing sk i l ls had increased by the la te 1960s . In 1968,

China designed and b u i l t i t s f i r s t 10,000 ton c lass merchant sh ip .22

The PLAN received th e f i r s t "R " d iese l - e le c t r i c c la s s submarine b u i l t

en t i r e ly wi t h domes tic ma te r ia l s i n 1969.23

Soviet Border Incident (1969)

Re lat ions w i th Soviet s con tinued t o de te r io ra te du r ing the

1960s. Beginning i n 1966 and co nt inu ing through 1968, t h e Chinese grew

wary o f increased Soviet troo p le ve ls along th e border. I n March 1969,

Chinese and Soviet tr oops clashed i n th e dispute d Wusuli Jiang (Ussun

River) border area ." A f te r t h i s i n c id e n t , t h e So v i e t Pa c i f i c F l e e t

began t o be perceived as a th re a t. The Sovie ts were viewed as

"f r a n t i ca l l y expanding i t s navy and bu i ld ing upa

f lee t wi th combata b i l i t y i n far oceans"25 ha t would be used i n conjun ction wi t h th e

U.S. t o blockade th e PRC.



The th re at t o th e PLAN was s ta rt in g t o change i n the ea rly

1970s. Ins tea d o f one major th r e a t, th er e were now two. The Chinese

argued th a t i n th e face o f two "mari time ty ran ts" th a t they should bu i l d

a powerful navy and a str ong merchant marine. They also suggested t h a t

China should b u i l d " ra i l r oad s on the sea" th a t would f a c i l i t a t e na t ional

defense. the l ib er a t io n o f Taiwan, and the provid in g of support t o world

rev01u t ion. 26

The re gio na l navies were no t viewed as majo r t h r e a ts . However,

t h e r e b i r t h and growth o f Japan's naval force s was noted w it h some

concern. The Japanese government and t h e Japanese Ma rit ime Se lf-D efe nse

Force (JMSDF) was c r i t i c i z e d he avily i n 1970 and 1971 ju st p r i o r t o th e

re tur n o f the Ryukyu Is lands ( inc lu ding the PRC claime d Senkakus) t o

Japan by the U.S. Also, th e r aid s from Taiwan had diminished i n th e

1960s as t h e PLAN and PLA so l i d i f i e d i t s coa stal defenses i n th e Taiwan

S t r a i t . "

The F a l l o f L in Biao (1971)

Af te r an abor t ive coup, Li n Biao was k i l l e d i n an a i rp lane

cra sh on 13 September 1971. Af te rw ards , a l l o f L in ' s suppor ters were

removed from o f f i c e i n what has been ca ll ed t he "most extensive purge o f

t h e PLA h igh command since t h e Chinese Communists came t o power. " 2 B

Although, th e PLAN i n general was not associated w it h t he coup attem pt,

t h e PLAN's p o l i t i c a l commissar, L i Zuopeng, was deeply invo lve d. L i was

a key associate of Lin Biao and the officer who allegedly allowed Lin 's

escape p lane t o t ake o f f desp i te e xp l i c i t o rde rs t o the con t ra ry from

Zhou Enlai 2 9 L i was removed as t h e PLAN's p o l i t i c a l commissar and a l l

other posts on 24 September 1971.'"

44



Li n d id not l i v e t o see the type of navy he helped develop. I n

December of 1971, th e f i r s t guided m is si le destroyer designed and b u i l t

i n t h e PRC was turn ed over t o t h e PLAN by Da lia n Shipyard ." Duri ng

Li n' s tenure as Min is te r o f Defense th e PLAN fare d w e ll . L i n was.

c ru c ia l t o the cons t ruc t ion o f 7 Luda c lass des t royers , 2 guided missi le

fr ig at es , 7 fr i ga te s, 95 Surface t o Surface M is si le (SSM) equipped

patrol craf t . 430 patrol craf t (gun), and over 430 torpedo equipped

p a tr o l c r a f t .'"



CHAPTER FOUR

PLAN I N TRANSITION: 1972 TO 1982

By 1972, the PLAN had become a capable coastal defense force.

I t s sub stan tial submarine fo rce and la rge numbers o f small f a s t a t t a c k

c r a f t , some equipped w it h sur face t o surfac e missi es (SSM). were a

po te nt th re a t t o advers aries (Table 6). The PLANAF had al so grown i n

t h e previo us decade and was now estimated t o have 100 I L- 28 l i g h t

bombers and around 350 fighters (mostly MiG-15,17, and 19 ty pe s) . The

PLAN also constructed a s e r ie s o f c oa s ta l s u r v e i l l a n c e s i t e s t h a t

provided coverage of th e en t i re coas t l ine out t o 50 miles . ' This was

th e coas ta l defense fo rce i n i t i a t e d by Li n Biao .

The CCP's rea cti on t o L in 's coup attempt was t o reduce the

p o l i t i c a l r o l e o f t h e m i l i t a r y . PLA r ep r es e nt a ti on i n t h e 25 man

Politburo dropped from a high o f 52 percent i n 1969 t o 28 percent i n

1973 and i n t h e same ti m e frame PLA membership i n t h e Ce nt ra l Committee

dropped from 45.6 percent t o 31 .3 percent .' The PLAN lo s t i t s f i r s t

ever P oli tbu ro represe ntative, L i Zuopeng. because o f hi s asso ciation

w it h L in Biao and his involvement i n Li n 's coup attempt.

L in Biao 's death tem por arily ha lte d naval expansion. I n 1972

military spending dropped 20 percent and rose only1

percent per yearf o r th e re st o f th e decade. These budget con str ain ts c ut and slowed

procurement o f th e Luda de str oy er and t h e Han nucle ar submarine

co ns tr uc ti on programs. However, con st ru ct io n o f Young School ty pe ships

46



con t inued , wi th p roduc t ion o f seve ra l "R " class submarines, fast a t tack

c r a f t , and th e development o f th e Ming cla ss submarine. '

Ta bl e 6.- PLAN'S Com posit ion by Sh ip TYPE (1972)

NOTESHIP CLASS

BALLISTICMISSILESUBMARINE

OUANTITY

ATTACKSUBMARINE

1

DESTROYER

"G " CLASS

I I

35

FRIGATE

FLEET I 20 1 SOVIET 7-43 CLASSMINESWEEPER

ALL SOVIET DESIGN

5

MISSILE BOAT

FAST GUNBOATS I - . 315 . 1 37MM GUNS

4 GORDY DESTROYERS1 LUDA GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER

18 5 JIANGNAN CLASS4 R I G A CLASS

17

AMPHIBIOUS I 25 1 MOSTLY EX-U.S. SHIPSSHIPS

OSA AND KOMAR CLASS

PATROL VESSEL

TORPEDOBOAT

Sources: Raymond V . B. Blackman ed.. Jane's F ia h ti n a S h i m 1972-1973(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1960). 64-68, and DavidG .

Muller, China as a Maritime Power (Boulder Co: Westview Press, 1983),89-110.

20

220

REPAIR SHIP

Economic Influ ences i n th e E arl v 19705

The PLAN be ne f i t t ed f rom China 's increased in te re s t i n mari t ime

economic a f f a i r s i n th e 1970s. The primary economic in fl ue nc e was th e

EX-SOVIET AND BRITISHCRAFT

SOVIET P-4 AND P-6 CLASS

1 I EX-USS ACHILLES(ARL-41)



growing importance o f of fsh or e o i l f ie l d s . The second economic fa ct or

was expansion o f for ei gn tr ad e and th e f o ll o w on development o f a l a rg e

merchant f l e e t , expanded ship bu i di ng capacit y, and growth i n m a r i ime

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .

O i l became a major concern f o r China as w el l as t he re st o f th e

wor ld i n the ea r ly 1970s. I n the ea r ly 1970s, su rvey ing e ffo r t s

determined th a t lar ge o i l deposits were possib ly lo cated under th e East

China and Yello w Seas. I n 1974 South Korea and Japan es ta bl is he d a

j o i n t development zone f o r fi nd in g o i l under th e East China Sea

cont in enta l sh e lf (Figure 9) . This was seen i n Bei j i n g as a f l a g r a n t

infringement of China 's sovereignty. Th e o ff i c ia1 Chinese position asstat ed by the M in is tr y o f Foreign Aff ai rs was: "The East China Sea

con t inen ta l she l f i s the na tu ra l extens ion o f the Chinese con t inen ta l

t e r r i t o r y . The People' s Republ ic o f China has inv io la b l e sovere ignty

over the East China Sea continental shelf."+

Early i n th e 1970s th e PLAN was involve d i n p ro te cti ng China's

con tine nta l sh e lf from o i 1 explo rat ion by for eig n nations and companies.

Previously, two PLAN Komar class missile boats shadowed a G u l f o i 1

company exp lo ra ti on s hi p th a t was cond ucting surveys n or th o f Taiwan

approximately 40 t o 50 miles from th e Chinese mainland. Due t o th i s

naval presence, th e U.S. pressured th e company t o withdraw i t s ship. '

Between February and June 1973, PLAN Komar cla ss m is s i l e boats appeared

i n t e r m i t t e n t ly w i t h i na m i l e o f G ul f o i l d r i l l i n g r i g , GlomarI V , i n a

Korean concession area o f t h e East China Sea. This presence combined

w it h American reluctan ce t o press th e concession claim. forced Gu lf O i l

t o abandon e f fo r t s t o d r i l l i n the a rea .6 These two even ts aqa in



demonst ra ted t o t he Chinese th e b ene f i t s o f even a minimal naval

presence.

F i g u r e 9. China 's Offshore O i l Regions. Reprinted,by perm iss ion , from Kim Woodard, "China and Of fs ho reEnergy" i n Problems o f Communism Vol. X X X ,Nov-Dec1981, 39 .



In addition protecting China's offshore petroleum resources,

th e PLAN was used t o ass is t st at e o i l e nter prise s. This assistance

included providing th e o i 1 r ig s w ith meteorological data , coordinat ing

th e prep arat ion o f expl orat ory work, and safeguarding personnel working

on th e r ig s . The PLANAF also fl ew so rt ie s t o ascert ain concentrations

o f o i l r e s o ~ rc e s . ~hus the navy played a key ro le i n t he development

o f China's offs hore oi 1 resources.

The growing s iz e o f t h e Chinese merchant marine and

shi pbu ild ing in du st rie s focused government a t t e n t i on on maritime

a f f a i rs . To help s t a r t an in te rn at io na lly competitive merchant marine,

t he Chinese began w i t h for ei gn ship purchases. The PRC purchased 250fre igh te rs , tankers , and bu lk ca r r i e rs t o t a l in g 2.5 mi l l io n gross tons

between 1970 and 1976. There was a lso a dramatic increase i n

shipbuilding output . Between 1970 and 1976, t h e PRC constru cted 94

fr ei gh te r, tankers, and bulk car ri er s amounting t o over 1 m i 11 on gross

tons ."hip produc tion was acce lerate d. For example, J i angnan

shipyard i n Shanghai b u i l t 5 ships i n 1974, whereas i n the 1960s the

shipyard took f i v e years t o bu i l d a single ship.9

The PRC also began upgrading i t s mariti me in fr as tr uc tu re .

Besides ships, th e most important it em a maritime nation required was

f a c i l i t i e s t o t ra ns hi p p roducts e f f i c i e n t l y . Such fac i l i t ie s inc luded

deep draft berths, wide and deep channels, and modern freight handling

equipment. This improvement i n maritime inf ra st ru ct ur e had th e

advantage that i t could also be used by the PLAN.



Law o f t h e Sea Debate

The PRC's admission i n t o th e Un ited N ations i n 1971 began a

decade long involvement i n int er na tio na l marit ime discussions rev01 v i ng

around th e development o f th e Law o f th e Sea Tre aty . The PRC's

p ar ti ci p at io n i n the United Nations Conference on t he Law o f th e Sea

(UNCLOS) hi gh lig ht ed maritim e af f a i r s and the need f o ra stron g navy t o

protect China 's offshore resources.

The UNCLOS mee tings were imp or ta nt t o t h e Chinese. The

conferences provided a forum t o denounce t h e two superpowers a s

"marit ime hegemonists" , and t o cu rr y p o l i t i c a l favor among Thir d World

coastal states who wanted a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) . For t h e Chinese th e issu e was bo th economic and s tr a t e g ic . The

Chinese press accused th e U.S. and th e Sovie t Union o f plun de ring th e

re so urce s o f s m al le r c o u n t ri e s, u s in g t e r r i t o r i a l w ate rs t o c o l l e c t

m i l i t a ry in fo rma t ion , and as a base t o launch invasions.1°

A ft er ni ne years t h e Law o f th e Sea Tr eaty was signed on 10

December 1982. Although n ot pleas ed w i t h th e pro vi si on s on deep sea

min ing and t rans i t o f fo re ign warsh ips th rough te r r i to r ia l wa te r s , the

Chinese signed th e tr e a ty . The vic e chairman o f th e Chinese deleg ation

t o the UNCLOS said a ft e r t he signing , th a t co untrie s should make e f f o r t s

t o defend the p r inc ip le s o f the convent ion and th e i r l ega l r ig h t s and

int er es ts . " This debate over th e Law o f th e Sea hig hli gh ted th e need

f o r a comprehensive maritime strategy that would protect Chinese rights

and in te re s ts i n the waters o f East Asia .



Paracel Is1ands

Durin g t h e same per io d th a t t h e Law o f t h e Sea was bei ng

d eb at ed , t h e C hin es e q ue st t o r e c a p tu r e " l o s t t e r r i t o r i e s " m a ni f es t e d

i t s e l f i n t h e So uth C hina Sea. A d ispu te began over th e Spr a t l y I s l ands

(F igure 1 0 ) i n l a t e 1973, as a r e s u l t o f So ut h Vie tn am 's l e a s i n g o f o i l

concess ions and inc orp ora t ion o f a p o r t io n o f th e Spra t ly (Nansha)

Is land s i n t o t h e i r Phuoc Tuy province. '"

Fi gu re 10. South China Sea Isl an ds

52



A1 though the di sp ut e between China and South Vietnam rev01 ved

around the Spratly Islands, c o n f li c t between th e two m i li t a ri e s began i n

the Paracel (Xisha) Is lands. Pr ior t o the c o n f l ic t both s ides had

forces i n the Paracels. The PRC occupied the northeast port ion o f the

is la nds known as th e Amph it ri te Group, and th e South Vietnamese occupied

th e Crescent Group i n t h e southwest (F igu re 10 ). On 19-20 January 1974,

t h e PLAN captured t h e Crescent Group o f t h e Paracel Isla nds w it h a task

forc e o f fa st attack c ra ft and about 500 troops.

The act ion i n th e Paracels was th e PLAN'S f i r s t amphibious

oper atio n sinc e 1955. Although i t appeared t o be a modern combined arms

amphibious assa ult, the re was l i t t l e coor dinat ion between th e PLAbranches. Int ern ati ona l condemnation along wi th an i n a b i l i t y t o pr oj ec t

power further south prevented the PLAN from securing the Spratly

I s l a n d ~ . ~ ~

Sov ie t Hegemoni sm Replaces U.S. Imperi a1 i m

Another important s t r a te gic fac tor aff ect ing t he PLAN i n t h i s

period was t he s h i f t i n China 's pr imary thr eat f rom the United States t o

the Sovie t Union. I n th i s per iod S i no-American relations improved,

wh il e th e Sino-Soviet dis pute expanded t o the oceans. The Soviet

P a c i f ic Fl ee t became t he p rimary adversary o f th e PLAN because o f i t s

expansion, the p a t te rn o f opera tions i n As ia , and the h os t i le po l i t ic a l

re la t io ns between China and t he U.S.S.R. Second, t he Sov iet ac t i v i t i e s

i n Asia were seen as an attempt t o en ci rc le th e PRC. Having a new

adversary t o replace th e U . S . meant th a t th e PLAN co uld con tinue t o

request increased expenditures on naval forces.



GROWING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE EAST

Figure 11. Soviet Encirc lement o f t h e PRC. Repr in ted ,by permiss ion , B e i . i i n ~ eview, March23, 1981, 21.

Sov ie t nava l expansion i n th e P ac i f i c was watched c lo se ly byth e PRC. By t h e ea r l y 1980s, t h e Sovie t P ac if ic -F le et had a lmos t

doubled th e number o f p r i nc ip a l su r face combatants t o 90, increased i t s

naval av ia ti on by 50 percen t t o 440 a i r c r a f t , and added many newer

54



class es o f nu cle ar powered submarines. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e S o v ie t navy had

s t a t i o n e d i t s l a rg e s t c o n t in g e nt o f n av al i n f a n t r y (8 .00 0 men) i n

V l adi vostock ." The wo rl d wide So vie t naval e xer cise . "Okean 75,"

demonstrated th e Sovie t t hr ea t t o t h e Chinese . The Chinese a ls o had

no ted th e inc reased Sov ie t nava l a c t i v i t y nea r th e PRC's coas t l ine .

A t t h i s t ime t he Chinese came t o v iew the Sov ie ts as

"hegemonists" who wanted t o dominate Asia (Fi gu re 11) and e n c i r c l e t h e

PRC. The Sovie ts use o f Vietnamese p o r t fa c i l i t i e s beginning i n 1979

was majo r p ro of o f t h i s i n t en t i on . The Chinese saw th e goa l s o f t h i s

Sovie t expans ion as fou rfo ld : th e removal o f t h e U.S . f rom th e Western

P a c i f i c , t h e e nc i r cl em en t and i s o l a t i o n o f C hina, t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o n o f

Japan, and t h e gradual co nt ro l of Southeast Asian co un tr ie s .15

Return o f Pro fess ional ism and Modernizat ion

By th e mid-1970s, pro fes sion alis m and modernizat ion had begun

i t s r e t u r n t o t h e m i l i t a r y . I n May 1974 t h e PLAN r e i n s t i t u t e d a u n if o r m

t h a t was s i m i l a r t o t h e ones o f t h e p r o fe s si on a l e ra o f t h e l a t e 1950s.

The PLAN'S f i r s t nu cle ar power submarine, H a , was launched i n 1974.

A l s o i n 1974, J i an ah u, t h e l e a d s h i p o f a new c l a s s o f f r i g a t e s was l a i d

down. I n January 1975, Zhou Enla i f or ma ll y announced t h e PRC's dec is io n

t o begin th e "comprehens ive modernizat ion o f na t ion al defense . "16

M i l i t a r y sc ho ol c u r r i c u l u m once a g a in c on c en t ra te d on m i l i t a r y v i c e

~ o l i t i c a l t u d ie s .

The D e cl in e o f t h e P o l i t i c a l I n f l ue n c e fr om t h e L e f t

A m aj or p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g t h e PLAN was t h e r e d u c t i o n

o f t h e p o l i t i c a l i n fl u en c e of t h e l e f t i s t s . Symbolico f t he p o l i t i c a l



dec lin e o f t he l e f t i s t s was the f a l l o f t he "Gang o f Four."

which included Mao's wife, opposed naval professionalism and

sidetracked a PLAN modernization proposal that envisioned an

navy as well as a strong coastal defense.17 A member o f t h i s

Zhang Chunqiao, st at ed th a t a navy was ir re le va nt i n the age

This group,

had i n 1975

ocean going

group,

o f shore-

based guided miss i les .="After t h e f a l l o f th e "Gang o f Four," th e

naval modernizers responded with:

The introduction of guided missiles cannot replace a navy ordiminish i t s rol e. The navy has a m u l ti - fa c e te d r o l e t o p la y : t odestroy enemy naval power, t o blockade v i t a l sea areas, t o prot ectsea communications and trans por t, t o coordinate wi th th e army i nnaval actions, and t o pro tec t f is hi ng and shipping i n peacetime."

This r ebu tta l defines many o f th e missions o f a modern navy, such as seacontrol, sea denial , and power projection. It appears t h a t t h e PLAN was

already focusing on new roles and missions a t t h i s s ta ge i n 1977. Once

the "Gang o f Four" was removed from power t he PLAN began t o di st ance

i t s e l f from o l d s t ra tegy and doc t r ine .

Develooment o f a New Naval Doctrine

After Mao's death. the PRC leadership sought out a new mil i t a ry

doctrine that would encompass the new strategic and technological

re al i t ie s . To avoid repudiat ing Maoist doctr ine , t h i s new m il i t ar y

doc tri ne was li nk ed t o t h e past and was labe led "People's War Under

Modern Co nd it ions . The military strategy that accompanied this new

do ct ri ne was again a mod ifica tion of Mao's ideas. Later labeled "Active

Defense Under New Historical Conditions, " t h i s s t ra tegy placed more

emphasi s on forw ard defense and modernizatio n. The new m i 1 t a ry

doctrine and strategy were the essential ingredients for the development



of a new naval strategy. This naval s t ra teg y was f i na l iz ed i n the 1980s

and wi 11 be addressed i n t h e next chapter.

The s h i f t away from a "Young School" coastal defense strategy

was evidenced by th e co ns tru cti on i n 1977 o f an underway replenishment

ship. This typ e o f ship , th e Fuqing clas s, was th e f i r s t underway

replenishment s hip i n th e PLAN. The f i r s t one became oper ation al i n

1979 and th e PLAN cu rr en tl y has two o f these ships.21 The ca p a b il it y

t o r ef ue l a t sea gave th e PLAN added range, f l e x i b i l i t y , and th e a b i l i t y

t o remain on s ta t io n longer.

During t h e l a t e 1970s th e PLAN began t o co ncen trate on combined

arms naval warfare. A t t h e T hi rd Plenum o f t h e 11th CCP Cen tralCommittee (18 t o 22 December 1978), Deng Xiaoping dir ec te d th e m i l i t a r y

t o "Pay special at te nt io n t o combined combat tr ai n in g. "2 2 This

combined combat t r a i n i n g meant t h a t su rfa ce, subsurface, and air

e lements o f th e navy were t o coordinate t h e i r a c t iv i t ie s t o mass combat

power on the enemy. I t was dur ing t h i s pe rio d t h a t t h e PLAN developed

th e Reclulations on t he Coordinated T rai nincl o f S hi m and A ir c r a ft which

in s t i t u t e d b e t t e r p la n ning and a broadening o f coordina ted s h ip-a i r c r a f t

t r a i n i n g . 2 3

To accomodate these changes t o d oc tr in e and stra te gy , t h e PLAN

upgraded i t s tra in in g program. The tr a in in g concentrated on improving

th e standards o f th e "Five Combat Ca pa bi lit ie s. " These combat

capabi 1i i s were:

1. Coordinated combat capabi 1i y

2. Quick reac t ion capabi l i ty

3. Electromagnetic Counter Measure (ECM) c a p a b i l i t y



4 . Guaranteed l o g i s t i c a l capabi 1 t y

5. Fi el d sur vival capabi l i ty 2.

These combat capabi 1 i i e s provide an in si gh t i n t o the PLAN'S

emphasis f o r development. They wanted t o develop a c a p a b i l i t y t o

conduct coordinated surface, air, and subsurface attacks on the enemy.

The PLAN was t o be f le x ib l e and a gi le i n order t o qu ick ly respond t o any

threat and would use ECM t o negate th e el ect ron ic advantage o f a more

advanced navy. Ad di ti on al ly , th e PLAN would ensure s u f f ic ie n t l o g i s t i c

support and upgrade t h e i r sh ips ' damage con tr ol capabi 1 t i e s .

Economic Influences (1976-1982)

Along wi th the dec l ine o f l e f t i s t p o l i t ic a l extremism came an

economic program known as th e "Four Mode rniza tions ." This program

ca lle d fo r modernizat ion o f ind ustr y, agric ul tur e , science/technology,

and national defense i n th at order o f p r i o r i t y . The PRC leadership

be l ieved tha t a strong economy was a basis for a strong nat ional

defense. The PRC's pres s echoed t h i s theme by s t a t ing : "Only with the

fa st er growth o f economic cons truc tion can ther e be greater progress i n

d e f e n c e { s i c ) c o n s t r ~ c t i o n . " ~ ~n a 1981 address t o t h e PLA, Deng

Xiaoping ca l le d f o r the mili tary t o b u i l d a powerful armed for ce , t o

improve t he army's weaponr-y, and t o ac ce ler ate th e modern izat ion of

nat ion al defense on th e basis o f a continually expanding economy.26

Thus, economic modernization can be seen as a precursor o f mili tary

modernization.

With increased foreign trade came the growth of a large

merchant marine f l e e t and shi p b ui ld in g ca pa b il it y. Between 1970 and

1980, the PRC's merchant fleet expanded from 70 ships with a total

58



displacement (empty) o f 750,000 tons t o 431 s hi ps w i t h a t o t a l

displacement (empty o f 7,920,000 tons ." This expansion was

accomplished by purchasing ships abroad and through national ship

c o n s t r u c t i o n . By th e end o f th e 1970s. t h e PRC was b u i l d i n g merchant

s h i p s f o r e x p o r t .

Te st i na t h e New Mode rnizat ions

Towards t h e end o f th e 1970s th e PLAN began a ser ie s o f o ut o f

area operat ions t o t e s t new ships , technologies , and techniques . I n

1977, a PLAN submar ine conducted a f i r s t ever t r a in in g c ru i s e i n the

Western Paci f i c . 8 The PLAN exe rc ise d nava l combi ned arms i n l9 79 ,

when 4 submarines, 22 surface ships, 4 reconnaissance and 8 f ighter

a i r c r a f t combined t o i n t e r c e p t a s imula ted enemy task fo rc e i n th e

Ye1 lo w Sea and E as t China Sea.29

The most d i s t an t o f these ou t o f a rea opera t ions occur red i n

May o f 1980. I n t h i s opera t ion , an e igh teen sh ip PLAN tas k fo r ce

deployed 4 ,000 mi les t o th e Sou th Pa c i f i c i n suppor t o f a Dong Feng V

i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s si e t e s t co nd ucte d on 1 8 May (F igure 12 ) .

I n th i s t a sk fo rc e were t he two rec en t ly comple ted Fuq ing c las s underway

repleni shmen t sh ips which .were v i t a l i n su ppor t ing th e 35 day opera t ion .

T h i s f o r c e d e mo ns tr at ed t h e PLAN'S a b i l i t y t o s u s t a i n a n av al f o r c e i n

d i s t a n t w a t e r s . l o

The PLAN cont inued w it h these exper iments and t r i a l s . I n a

t e s t o f lo ng range mar i t ime su rve i l la nce , two PLANAFB-6 bombers

conducted t h e f i r s t p a t r o l o f t h e S p r a t l y I sl an ds on 8 November 1980.31

I n t h e sp ri ng o f 1981, a PLAN naval fo rc e conducted a naval presence

o p e r a t io n i n w hi ch t h e y o p e ra t ed o f f s o u th e rn J apan, i n t h e Phi l i p p i n e

59



Sea, th e South China Sea. and Gu lf of T ~ n k i n . ~ =n October 1982, th e

PLAN conducted i t s f i r s t successful submerged launch o f a b a l l i s t i c

m i s s i l e . 3 3 Even w it h these improvements i n various t a c t i c s ,

techniques, and procedures, th e PLAN s t i l l lacked a leader who could

env ision t he navy as more than j u s t an adjunct o f th e army.

Fi gu re 12. PLAN's South P a c i f i c Deployment. Re prin ted, bypermission, from Bei.iina Review, 23, No. 21, 26 May 1980, 5.

New PLAN Leadership

As t he moderniza t ion progressed i n the l a t e W O s, i t became

cl ea r than th e PLAN's old er leader ship would have t o be replaced. Xiao

J i nguang, who had headed t h e navy sinc e 1950, was inc apab le o f changin g

th e organiz ation and bureaucracy th a t he had in st i t ut e d. I n 1978, he

was promoted and th e PLAN was e f f e c t i v e l y under the c on tr ol o f Xiao' s

deputy and an experienced naval of f i c e r , L iu Da~s hen g. '~The command



s i t ua t io n was c l a r i f i e d two years la te r when on 11 January 1980. Ye Fei

was a ppointe d Commander o f th e PLAN bypass ing L i u D a o ~ h e n g . ~ ~

Ye Fei was another r e l a t iv e l y o l d army o ff ic e r wi th l i mi te d

naval experience. He was born i n F uj i an province i n 1914. Li ke most

o f f i c e r s , Ye Fe i was not educated outs id e China . He was a member o f t h e

Fourth F ie ld Army du ring th e l a s t pa rt o f the C i v i l War. He had served

tou rs as commander o f th e Fu jian M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t and commander o f th e

Fuzhou Mil i ta ry Region. Only i n the year p r i o r t o h i s appoin tmen t d id

Ye Fei have any con nec tion wi t h th e PLAN (he was made 1s t P o l i t i c a l

Commissar i n 1979) .36

Ye Fei proved uns uita ble f o r th e assignment, due p ri m a ri ly t opoor hea l th . He repor ted ly had two hea r t a t t acks i n h i s f i r s t yea r o f

o f f i c e . I n December o f 1980, L i u Daosheng headed a de lega t ion t o

Pakistan where he was i d e n t ~ f i e d s "Act ing Commander" o f t h e navy."

Even a f t e r he recovered, Ye was unable t o provid e stro ng di re ct io n t o

th e PLAN i n these c r i t i c a l years o f development.

On 28 August 1982, t h e Cen tr al M i1 t a r y Commission (CMC)

r e t i ed Ye Fei . Again L i u Daosheng was bypassed, t h i s ti me i n fa vor o f

L iu H ~ a q i n g . ~ ~i u was t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t naval

experience t o head th e PLAN. The nominatio n o f a career naval off icer

t o th e PLAN'S to p leadership p os it io n was a s i g n i f i c a n t t u r n i n g p o i n t i n

i t s h is to ry.

Li u was born i n Hubei province i n 1916. During th e la t t e r pa r t

o f the Chinese rev olu tio n he was deputy p o l i t i c a l commissar o f th e 10th

Army o f t h e Second F i e l d Army, where he became fr ie n d s w i t h Deng

Xiaoping . Af te r the founding o f thePRC, Li u t r a n s fe r r e d t o t h e navy.



L i u Huaq ing 's i i t ia1 assignment i n th e fo rmi ng PLAN was as de puty

p o l i t i c a l commissar o f t he Number 1 Navy Col lege i n Dal ian .

From 1954 t o 1958 L i u s tud ie d a t t he Sov ie t Un ion ' s Vorosh ilov

Naval War Co lle ge and t h e Frunze Naval Academy i n Le r~ in gr ad . ' ~During

L i u ' s s t u d i e s , t h e So v ie t Navy was s t r u g g l i n g t o j u s t i f y i t s e xi st en c e

i n t h e f a ce o f c r i t i c i s m fr om t h e dominant S o v i e t gro und f or c e s. L i u

was a l s o i n th e Sov ie t Union when th e Sov ie t ' s l ead in g proponen t o f a

bl ue wat er fo rc e, Admiral Gorshkov, assumed t h e command o f th e Sov ie t

Navy. This was an ex ci t i ng pe r io d i n t h e development o f Sovie t naval

s t r a t e g y. I t i s pos s ib le t ha t L iu Huaq ing was in f lue nced by these naval

pol c y s t ru ggl es and Sovie t b lu e water expans ion p lans .

Upon h i s r e tu r n i n 1958 , L iu was as signed as th e as s i s t a n t

coman der o f t h e No rth Sea F le e t and commander o f th e Lushun naval base.

L i u moved s te a d i ly upward throu gh vario us assignments . He spent several

years inv ol ve d w i t h research and development." It would be Liu

Huaqing who would le ad t h e PLAN throu gh i t s nex t developmental phase.



CHAPTER FIVE

A MODERN NAVY: THE PLAN 1983-1995

By 1983 t h e PLAN was a f i r s t c lass coasta l defense navy th at

was ju s t beg inning t o operate fu rt h er from shore. This navy was the,

apex o f a "Young School" typ e fo rc e, w i t h l ar ge numbers o f submarines

and fast a t tack craf t (Table 7 ) . The navy was incre asin g i t s tec hnic al

ca pa bi li t i es and was beginning t o develop a naval strategy and doctrine

t h a t were not t i e d d i re c t ly t o th e ground forces. The PLAN's surface

combatant forc es were we1 1 equipped w it h surf ace t o surf ace m iss i es ,

but lacked surface t o ai r miss iles f or s e l f or area defense. Due t o

t h e i r large numbers, th e coasta l fa s t a t tack cr a f t provided a formidable

coas tal defense for ce . Construc tion o f new ships had added t o the

PLAN's amphibious l i f t ca pa b il it y and the recent expansion o f th e PLAN

marine corps had completed the requirements necessary for a 1 m i ed

amphibious assault. Fle et lo g is t ic s continued t o be backward, although

the PLAN now had the two Fuqing class replenishment ships.

I n 1983, t h e PLANAF con si st ed o f some 200 bomber and a n t i - sh ip

s t r ik e a i r c r a f t , 550 f i gh te r a ir c r a f t (most ly MiG-19 Farmers), and about

a dozen French made Super Frel on he li co pt er s. The Super Frelo n i s

p r i m a r i l y a shore based he l icop te r . The PLANAF's ASW ca pa bi l i t y was

s i g n i f i c a n t l y l i m i t e d f o r i t was entirely shore based.' I t would not

be until the early 1990s that the PLAN began deploying helicopters on

surface combatant ships.

63



Table 7. --PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type (1983)

S H I P CLASS

BALLISTICMISSILE

SUBMARINE

I I

QUANTITY

ATTACKSUBMARINE

NOTES

2

DESTROYER

MISSILE BOAT I

1 XIA CLASS1 "G " CLASS

109

FRIGATE

-

215 I MOSTLY OSA AND KOMAR VARIANTS

6 HAN CLASS SSN2 MING CLASS85 "R " CLASS16 "W" CLASS

18

FLEET I 23 1 SOVIET 7 4 3 CLASSMINESWEEPER

4 GORDY CLASS14 LUDA CLASSDDG

40

FAST GUNBOATS I 402 I MOSTLY SHANGHAI CLASS

14 JIANGHU CLASS3 JIANGDONG CLASS5 JIANGNAN CLASS

4 R I G A CLASS

PATROL VESSEL I 20 I EX-SOVIET AND BRITISH CRAFTI

TORPEDO BOAT I 260 I MOSTLY HUCHUAN CLASS

AMPHIBIOUS

I5 YUKAN CLASS LST

SHIPS 37 1 2 YULING CLASSI S M

REPLENISHMENTSHIPS

1 3 FUQING CLASS AOR

Source: John Moore ed. , Jane's F iah ti na Ships 1983.1994 (New York:Jan e's P ub li sh in g Company Lt d. , 1983), 91-107.

REPAIR S H I P

As t h e PLAN had grown, so had the Soviet Pac i f i c Fle et . By

1983, the Soviet Pacific Fleet had become a major t hr ea t t o the PLAN.

This f l e e t consi sted o f 110 submarines ( in cl ud in g 28 nuclear powered

1

- -EX-USS ACHILLES(ARL-41)



b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e subm arine s), 1 a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r. 88 p r i n c ip a l s ur fa ce

combatants, 225 minor combatants, 20 amphibious sh ips (and t h e bul k o f

Soviet marines), and 330 combat ai r c r a ft . = Although smaller i n sheer

numbers tha n th e PLAN, t h e Sov iet P a c i fi c F le et enjoyed an advantage i n

combat power and capabi 1 i i es .

By th e e ar ly 1980s the Chinese m i l i t a r y do ctr ine was evolving

i n t o the "Peop le 's Wa Under Modern Conditions" and the mili tary

str ate gy was s h i f t i n g towards "A cti ve Defense Under New H is to ri ca l

Con ditio ns." Both th e do ct ri ne and str ate gy were pre dica ted on China

remaining on th e st ra te gi c defense. To support th e nation al str ateg y

and doctrine, the PLAN's overall defensive strategy now included ana c t iv e war o f a t t r i t i o n a t sea. This stra tegy res ted on thr ee

p r i n c i p l e s . F i r s t , th e PLAN was t o avoid e ar ly de cis ive engagement wi t h

the Sovie t Pac if ic Flee t and conserve s t rength for a protrac te d war.

Second, t h e PLAN would di v id e i n t o small groups o f h ig h ly maneuverable

fa s t a t tack c r a f t t o des t roy the Sovie ts piecemeal. Third , the PLAN

would r e l y on coastal minelaying, land based miss i les and ar t i l l e r y , and

th e PLANAF t o i n t e r d i c t Soviet sea li n e s o f communications and prevent a

Soviet amphibious assault l

Economic I n f1uences

Throughout the period 1983 - 1994 the "Four Modernizations"

economic ref orm program continued t o i nf lu en ce t h e PLAN. M i li a r y

mo der niza tion was sub ord inat ed t o economic moderni z a t i on. The PLANleadership concurred with placing economics f i s t . The PLAN's deputy

commander, Zhang Xusan, s ta te d i n 1992 t h a t , "Economic development



serves as the coun try 's primary

i n support ing and pa r t i c ip a t i ng

task , and the navy w i l l spare no e f f o r t

i n t h e p ro ce ss . " "

These economic re forms broug ht advanced tech nology t o th e PLAN.

As one o f th e more tech ni ca lly orie nted branches o f th e m i l i t a r y , t h e

PLAN gr ea tl y be ne fit ed from China's e f f o r t s t o modernize her science and

technology. I n th e p revious decade th e PLAN and th e s hip bu ild ing

in du st ry had learne d how t o b u i l d ships. Now the y faced a more

d i f f i c u l t challenge o f b ui ld in g th e advanced weapons systems, th e

command and co nt ro l systems, and th e i nf r a st ru ct u re which a re req uire d

o f a modern naval power.

F i r s t th e PLAN had t o es ta b l ish th e organiza t ion t h a t woulddetermine te chn olo gic al req ui rements, procur e them, t e s t them, and then

incorpora te the new technology i n the f le e t . The tes t i ng por t io n came

f i r s t . w i th the e s tabl ishment o f the Naval Tes t ing & Evaluation Center

on 9 March 1983. Later that year, the navy established three new

committees, the Military Studies Research Committee, the Science and

Techno1 ogy Committee, and th e S c i e n t i f i c C ul tu ra l Education Research

C ~ m m it te e .~ ogether these new committee coordinated th e oth er

func tions o f techn ological development i n th e PLAN.

New technology provided the PLAN with advanced systems.

I n i t i a l emphasis was on purchas ing advanced technology from t h e West.

However, t h e f ea r o f dependence on ou ts id e powers le ar ne d as a r e s u l t o f

th e Sov ie t p u l l ou t i n the l a te 1950s fo rced th e PLAN t o be se le c t ive on

which technologies t o purchase. As a result, the massive Chinese

purchases o f Western technology expected by th e West never ma te ri al iz ed .

The PLAN on ly bought sele cted m i l i t a r y items, us ua lly i n small numbers.



>,.

, This emphasis on research and development directly affected

, PLAN performance. The r e l i a b i l i t y o f shipboard equipment was improved.1. ..

During th e Seventh F iv e Year Plan, t h e navy developed "1,500 kin ds o f.. sc ie n t i f i c and techno log ica l achievements i n i t s r e l i ab ili y

research. "" Through t he use o f science and technology, th e tim e and

c o s t o f r e p a i r i n g a destroyer dropped 30 percent. The PLAN also

developed a fa s t a t t ack c r a f t ma in engine th a t l a s ted twice as long . I n

1983, a small po r t io n o f these sc ie n t i f ic and technologica l achievements

were estim ated t o save th e PLAN 150 m i l l i o n yuan (appr oximate ly 18

m i l l i o n U.S. dollar^).^

Coasta l Devel opme~ntStrategy

Coas tal economic development was p a r t o f economic moderni z a t i on

and al so had an o ve r a ll p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on t h e PLAN. The economic needs

o f th e coas tal Special Economic Zones (SEZs) l e d t o increa sed

development o f China 's marit ime in fr as tr uc tu re . The s ix t h Five Year

Plan (1981-19851 included plans t o b u i l d 132 deep water berths for 15

coastal po rts t h a t would increase cargo handling capacity by 46 percent

t o 317 mi l l io n tons by 1985 .8

Coastal development also had adverse side effects on the PLAN.

F i r s t , economic development sometimes for ce d PLAN u n i t s t o re lo ca te . An

example o f t h i s occur red i n L ianyungang, Ji ngsu Province, where 1arger

ber ths were required t o increase lo ca l coa l export^.^ This also

occurred i nQ i

nghuangdao, J i u j iang, X i

amen. Guangzhou. Zhoushan. andTanggu .

Secondly, th e use o f PLAN u n it s t o suppo rt coa stal economic

development hu rt navy t r a in in g . The PLAN was used t o re h a b il it a t e olde r

67



:. s hips f o r c o as ta l t r a n s p o r t, a s s i s t i n t h e co n st r uc t io n o f f a c i l i t i e s ,

conduct naviga tion al surveys o f the coast, repai r merchant vessels, and

he lp i n an t i - smuggling e ff o r t s.I0 These activit ies detracted from

t r a i n i n g a professional naval force.

A t h i r d problem arose out o f th e PLAN being colloc ated wi th t he

booming SEZs and li v i n g i n these areas o f growing aff lue nc e. The

r e l a t iv e pros pe rit y of th e coastal people compared t o th e PLAN's

a u st e r it y caused many navy personnel t o concent rate on t h e i r own

rnateri a1 wealth vi ce t h e i r assignment. The sa i lo r s saw an ever-widening

gap between th e mi l i t a r y and loc al people and morale suff ere d. As a

B e ij in g r ad io commentator noted i n 1988, "Some cadres and fi g h te r s areeager t o t ake o f f t he i r uni fo rms and want t o be t r ans fe r re d t o do

c iv i l i a n work i n va rio us l o c a l i t i e s so as t o ca rv e o u t a new career as

soon as po ss ib le ." ll The PLAN sought t o counte r the se economic

inf luences through educat ion of the s t ra teg ic importance of the ir

rnission.12

Ocean ResourcesThe quest t o e xp lo it ocean resources continued t o in flue nce th e

PLAN's st ra te gy . The navy's deputy commander i n c h i e f , General Zhang

Xusan, sta ted th a t th e PRC ought t o in cr ea se i t s e f f o r t s a t e x p lo i t i n g

marine resources t o employ more la bo r and f a ci 1i a t e t h e c o un t ry ' s

growth i n th e next century.13 I n 1983, an East China Sea ex pl or at or y

we l l y ie lded the f i r s t commerc ia lly s ig n i f ica n t amounts o f o i l.14

Pro tect ion o f these maritim e resources, such as o i l , was one o f th e

reasons the CMC c i te d i n a 1986 ca l l fo r a modern navy.lS



Conscripts

The growing Chinese economy made i t m o r e d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e

m i l i t a r y t o a t t r a c t pe rs on ne l. A lth ou gh t h e PRC had a conscript system,

re gi st ra ti o n had been volunt ary. This volunt ary system had su ff ic ed t o

t h i s po in t because the m il i t a r y offered Chinese youth an oppor tuni ty fo r

upward mo bi l i t y. The m il i t a r y was espec ia l ly appeal ing t o ru ra l youth.

who made up the m ajo r i t y o f th e mi l i ta r y. For them, t h e PLA pr ov ide d an

o p p or tun i ty t o l e a r n a sk i l l , so tha t upon comple t ion o f ob l iga ted

se rv ice they cou ld l i v e i n the c i t i e s . Previous ly, the re had always

been more reg is t ran ts than open b i l le ts and the loca l se lec t ion

committees co uld weed out th e undesi ra ble . Slowly bu t sur el y, improvingeconomic conditions were changing this si tuation.

The ag r ic u l t ur a l reforms o f th e "Four Modernizations" made

mil i ta ry ser vice les s at t ra ct iv e . More young people were simply no t

re gi st er in g f o r c on sc rip ti on. The Chinese press began a media campaign

i n th e mid-1980s t o encourage thesepeop le t o r eg i s te r. , Also , the

Chinese government enacted the Conscriot Work Requl a t i on^ on 24 October

1985. This act authorized lo ca l governments t o f o r c e p eo ple t o f u l f i l l

t h e i r mil i t a ry ob lig at ion s according t o law.16 I n one example, t he

Be iji ng Municipal People's Congress requi red mandatory re gi st ra ti on , and

in s t i t u t e d a system o f f i ne s and punishment fo r those who di d not. The

p u l l o f the fr ee market economy was so grea t, th a t one o f th e possible

fines was loss of a l l business licenses for one year."

The second economic i nf lu en ce was t h e problem o f o per atin g

incr eas ing technology w it h re la t iv e ly backward con scr ipts . The PLAN

adopted thr ee approaches t o solv e t h i s problem. F i r s t , s p e c i a l i s t s a n d



sent t o research in st i t u t es and manufactur ing plant s t o s tudy. Third ,

key technicians were sent abroad for advanced training.'"

Merchant MarineThe r ap id growth o f th e Chinese merchant f l e e t was importan t t o

th e PLAN. The merchant f l e e t allowed ex-PLAN s a il o r s t o keep t h e i r

sk i 11s curren t and reduced unemployment among ex-serv icemen. I n 1992,

nearly 50 perc ent o f t he merchant f l e e t crew members were ex-PLAN

s ai lo rs . This merchant f l e e t could become a pa rt o f t he PLAN i n the

event o f emergency."

Merchant sh ip c on st ru ct io n was impor tant t o th e PLAN as i t

sustained naval shipyards, improved ship b ui ld in g techniques through

practice, and provided hard currency as a re su lt o f merchant ship sales

abroad. I n t h i s per iod, sales o f Chinese b u i l t merchant ships expanded.

According t o one survey. "t he f l e e t has reaped more than 50 mi l l io n yuan

o f p r of i t s {s ic ) , and t h is has made up fo r the insuf f ic ien cy o f the

m il it a r y expenses t o a certain degree. "'o I t i s unclear from th e above

statement whether fore ign ship sale rece ipts go di r e c t ly t o th e PLAN or

t o th e PRC's treasury . Regardless, sh ipb uil din g has been a p o s i t i v e

influence for the PLAN and the country as a whole.

New M i l i t a r y and Naval Strateay

The prev iou sly described post-Mao ev olu tio n i n m i l i t a r y

str ate gy and doc tri ne had, by the mid-1980s. res ult ed i n an almost

complete rev ersa l o f Mao's "People's War" doc tri ne. According t o Zhang

Zhen, the n commandant o f t h e Na tio nal Defense University, the Central



Mili tary Commiss ion (CMC) o f t he Cen t ra l Committee o f t he Chinese

Communist Par ty d i r ec te d a b ol d course change i n th e s pr ing o f 1985.

The CMC be l iev ed t h a t th e two superpowers had achieved pa r i t y and th a t a

m aj or war was u n l i k e l y f o r t h e r emain de r o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y.

Accord ing ly, the CMC d i r e c t e d t h e PLA t o s h i f t t h e i r s t r a te g y and

t r a i n i n g t o what t h e th ey f e l t was t h e most l i k e l y f orm o f c o n f l i c t i n

t h e near fu t ur e , lo ca l l i m i t e d war ( jubuzhangzheng) on th e PRC's

borders 21

T h i s change i n m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e a nd s t r a t e g y c o i n c i de d w i t h

and in flu en ce d t h e development o f a new naval s tr at eg y. The naval

st ra te g y' s name remained t h e same, "Offsh ore Ac ti ve Defense." However,

t h i s s t r a t egy was qu i t e d i ff e r en t f rom th e p rev ious one. The p r imary

changes w ere i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f o f f s h o r e a nd i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f new

m i l i t a r y doc t r i ne and s t r a te gy t o nava l war fa re . A l though th e PRC or

th e PLAN had no t p re c i s e ly de f ined th e t e rm "o ff shore" , s evera l o f f i c i a l

have g iv e n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . L i u Huaqing i s r e p o rt e d t o have s a i d

t h a t t h e PLAN must m a in t ai n e f f e c t i v e s ea c o n t r o l w i t h i n t h e f i r s t

i s l a n d c h ai n a nd t h a t t h e t e rm o f f s h o r e r e l a t e s t o t h e h i g h s eas and

means th e wa ter s w i t h in t he s econd i s l an d cha in (F igure 13 ) .22 I n

Apr i 1 1987, L iu Huaqi ng co nf i rmed t h a t ac t i ve off sh or e defense remained

t h e fundamental s t r a t eg y o f Chinese naval f 0rc es . ~3

The PLAN acquired an enhanced r o l e i n th e new m i l i t a r y do ct r in e

and s t r a te gy. Ac t i ve defense under new h i s t o r ic a l co nd i t ion s ca l l ed f o r

a defense o f key areas such as th e prosper i ng coas ta l regions . To do

t h i s , th e s t r a t egy in tended t o ex tended Ch ina ' s s t r a te g ic depth seaward

w hi ch wo ul d t r a n s f or m t h e c o as t f r om a d e f en s iv e f r o n t l i n e t o a



s t r a t e g i c r e a r a re a. A ls o, t h e s h i f t i n fo cu s t o l o c a l wars meant t h a t

naval warf are would become a more impor tant area i n China 's m i l i t a r y

s t r a t e g y.

Fig ur e 13. The PLAN'S Off sho re Defense. Rep rin ted , by permis sionfro m Alexa nder Chieh-chen g Huang. "The Chinese Navy's Of fs ho reAct ive Defense S tra tegy, " Naval War Col le ae Review, V o lXLVII, No.3(Summer 1994) : 21.



:

,.

i

?:

Force Restructuring, .

,$

"

I n l i n e w it h the new doctr in e and s t ra teg y and the primacy o f.

, .

: economic growth, China reduced i t s m i l i t a r y manpower. I n 1985, Deng:.,.:

Xiaoping formulated a plan t o shr ink th e PLA by 1 m il l i o n men i n two. years." On 1 August 1985, th e CCP's journa l sta ted "th e stre ng th o f

an army i s not determined by the number o f troops , but by th e q ua li ty oft

; i t s commanders and f ig ht er s , the qu al i t y o f i t s a rms, and the degree o f.

ra t i o na l i ty o f i t s systems and founda tions. "15 The PLAN d i d no t escape

t h i s r ed uc ti on i n f o rc e. Between 1983 and 1993, t h e PLAN'S manning

le ve l was reduced from 360,000 t o 260.000.26 Thi s 28 per cen t decrease

was rough ly th e same as th e red ucti on i n th e ground fo rces . I n a d di ti onth e m i l i t a r y ' s s ha re o f t h e n a t i o n al budget f e l l fro m 13 .7 p er ce nt i n

1983 t o 9.4 percent i n 1986." Following th e completion o f these

red uctio n i n 1986, t h e m i l i t a r y planned t o focus on weapons improvements

and o f f i c e r training.l"his was a bold reversal from Mao's doctrine

o f a "People's War" and again the emphasis was on professionalism vice

p o l i t i c a l c o r r e c tn e s s .

Zhana L ianzhonq

I n August 1987, L i u Huaqing was promoted t o Vice Chairman o f

t h e CMC and Zhang Lianzhong re placed him as commander o f th e PLAN. L ik e

L i u , Zhang was als o an experienced naval o f f i c e r . He was re l a t i v e l y

young. having been born i n 1931 i n th e Liaodong Peninsula. During th e

C i v i l War, he was member o f t h e T hi rd F i e l d Army and hence i s b el ie ve d! t o owe some all eg ia nc e t o Zhang Aip ing , th e founder o f th e PLAN.29 He,

8

! remained an i nf an tr y o ff ic e r u n t i l t he mid 1960s when he t ran sfer red t o



t h e PLAN. A subma riner, he held various submarine and shore commands

p r i o r t o h i s assignment as deputy navy commander i n 1985. The cho ice o f

Zhang su rp ri se d many Western m i l i t a r y a naly sts who expected othe r more8

,no table PLAN leade rs t o ge t the a ~ s ig n m e n t . ~ ~e l ac ke d t h e p o l i t i c a l

i

:inf lue nc e o f L i u Huaqing as he i s on ly an a lte rn at e member o f th e

Centra l' Commi t t e e .

Po l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e s

The b igges t p o l i t i c a l in f luence on the PLAN dur ing th i s per iod

was th e continued r i s e i n power o f L i u Huaqing. I n 1985, he became a

member o f th e CCP's Cen tral Committee. While th e PLAN'S p o l i t i c a l

inf lue nce i n the person of Li u Huaqing was growing, the p o l i t i c a l

r ep re se nt at io n o f t h e m i l i t a r y as a whole was de cl in in g. I n 1985, only

13 pe rce nt o f th e CCP's C en tr al Committee were mil i t a ry (as opposed t o

45 percent i n 1969 a t the he ight o f the Cu l tu ra l Revo lu t ion ) . The

downward tr e n d o f m i 1 t a r y rep resen tat ion i n th e Po l i tbu ro con tinued .

I n 1986, th e mil i ta ry made up only 13.6 percent o f th e Po litb uro .

A d d i t i o n a l l y, t h e mil i t a ry was no longer a s i g n i fi c a n t f o rc e i n l o ca l

c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c s ."

Spratlv Islands (1988)

The Sp ra tl y Islan ds di spu te heated up again i n 1988 between the

two most ac ti ve par ti ci pa nt s i n th e stru gg le: th e PRC and Vietnam. I n

January o f 1988, th e PLAN landed troo ps on two o f th e i s l e t s and then

occupied four additional ones. I n March, t h e PLAN and th e Vietnamese

Navy clashed over the i sla nd s. This b a t t l e resu lte d i n damage t o a t

le as t two Vietnamese boats and th e PRC maintained con tr ol o f t he isl an ds

74



t h e y had o cc up ie d. T h i s a c t i v i t y i n t h e S p r a t l y I s l a nd s has f o rc e d t h e

PLAN t o rna in ta i n pa t r o l s o f these r eg ions .

Professional Trends

By 1989, t h e PLAN had become a pro fe ss io na l, s k i l l e d fo rc ecapab le o f conduc t ing extended ou t o f area opera t ions. To t e s t i t s

sus ta i nabi 1 i y and readiness i n d i s t an t waters , t h e PLAN conducted

numerous p o r t v i s i t s and conducted r ou ti ne exerc ises away from th e PRC.

As shown i n Fig ur e 14, t h e PLAN had ope rat ed as f a r away as Hawaii and

Karachi, Pakis t an. The events o f Ti ananmen Square te mp or ar ily brought

t he se p o r t v i s i t s t o an end.

Fi g u r e 14. The PLAN'S Long Range Deployments. Re pr in te d,by pe rm is sio n Tai Ming Cheung, Growth o f Chinese Naval Power:P r io r i t i e s . Goa ls . Miss ions . and Rea iona l Imp l ica t ion sS ingapore : I n s t i t u t e o f Sou theast Asian S tud ies , 1990, 13.

75



Post Soviet Union

The f a l l o f th e Sovie t Union meant th a t the land threa t f rom

t h e no rth was diminished. This caused a reevaluation of defense

pr ior i t ies away f rom a land b ias . This was s i gn if ie d by th e grea ter

in te re s t i n coas ta l defense, " land and coas ta l defenses a re o f equal

importance. There i s no problem o f which should be given grea ter

emphasis than the other. . . . There i s no reason f o r us t o again f o l l ow

th e p a s t gu id e li n e o f 1ay i ng one- side d emphasis on bor der defense

cons t ruc t ion . "32 This new emphasis on coa sta l defense be n ef it te d t h e

PLAN.The PLAN also benefitted from the f a l l o f t he Sovie t Union

through th e purchase o f Soviet arms t o upgrade i t s equipment. Most

s i gn i f i ca n t fo r th e PLAN was the 1995 de l ive ry o f the f i r s t o f fou r"K "

(K il o) clas s dies el - e le ct r ic submarines from th e Soviet Union. These

modern submarines w i 11 g ive t h e PLAN added ASW capab i l i ty, a s a

submari ne i s considered th e b est weapon aga inst oth er submarines . The

"K " i s qu ie ter and has a bet te r an t-sh ip torpedo than the "R " submarine

i t i s r ep la ci ng .

Under Modern Conditions

In th e ea rly 1990s, th e concept o f th e "People's War" i n naval

war fa re was f i n a l ly e l imina ted . I n th e po st-De sert Storm era much

Chinese military literature discussed modern and combined arms warfare.

The purpose o f a 10 -s hip naval e xer cise i n t h e East China Sea was " t o

study and exp lore ways f o r coo rdin atin g various forces and ra is in g th e

comprehensive naval de fe ns ib il it y under condit ion s o f modern

76



warfare."33 I n March o f 1993. th e North Sea Fl eet conducted i t s f i r s t

ever Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) exercise using PLAN ships and

& :. submarines. The press a r t i c l e declared th e importance o f such

exercises :A

The counterattack between missile destroyers and submarines withhig h speed underwater man euv era bil ity i s an im por tan t mode offu tu re nava l ba t t l e s . I f China does no t venture in t o t h i sexc lus ion area {area o f PLAN ne gle ct } i t w i l l come t o g r i e f i n afut ure war. -"

Emphasis on Territorial Claims

I n the 1990s, th e PRC has con tinued i t s ins i s t ence on i t s

o ff shore t e r r i t o r i a l c l a ims , esp ec ia l ly i n the South China Sea. On 25

February 1992, the PRC's National People's Congress passed the Law of

t h e Te r r i t o r i a l Sea and Contiguous Zone. Th is l aw fo rm al iz ed t h e PRC's

cla im s t o Taiwan, Ma cc le sfi el d Bank (Zhongsha) , the Senkaku (Diaoyu) ,

Pescadores (Penghu). Pra tas (Dongsha), P aracel (Xi sha ), and S pr at ly

(Nansha) archipelagos ( Figure 2 ) . About thre e months l a t e r , the PRC

announced that i t had licensed a U.'S. firm t o exp lo re fo r o i l and gas i n

the disputed areas.

There has been rece nt evidence o f a PRC mili tary b ui ld up i n t h e

South China Sea. A book pub l ish edb y the China P ubl ic Secu r i ty M in is t ry

revealed th a t the PRC i s c o ns tr uc ti ng a m i l i t a r y air base i n the Paracel

Is lands. This air base i n the Parace ls p laces Chinese mi l i t a r y a i r c ra f t

190 mi les c los er t o the Spra t ly I s lands and a l lows Chinese a i r c r a f t the

abi 1i y t o provide increased coverage o f the Sprat ly I s1 ands re gi on tha n

a i r c r a f t based i n the previous bases i n Hainan." I f t h i s base i s

capable o f prov iding air support fo r poss ib le ac t ions i n the Spra t lys ,

The Chinese requirement fo r an a i r c r a f t ca r r i e r would be reduced.

77



Asian Naval Moderni z a t i ons,.',' :,

,;Naval modernization Southeast Asian navies began i n th e l a t e

'I.,.I. 1980s. Responding t o var ying in te rn al and exte rna l influ enc es, Taiwan,<:,r. . South Korea, Ma1 ays i a . Singapore, Thai 1and, and Indonesia each began

:programs t o upgrade t h e i r naval forces. Although ther e was l i t t l e

:

. d ir e c t Chinese re ac tio n t o these modernizations programs, th e Chinese

..

d id attempt t o por tra y th e ir own naval expenditures as non-threatening

and o f a defensive nature.

I f t h e PRC showed l i t t l e in t er es t i n Southeas t Asian navies ,

the reve rse was t r ue 'o f th e i r a t t e n t ion t o the Ind ian navy. I n a 1993

report by the PLA's General Logistic Department, General Zhao Nanqi

declared th a t Ind ia ' s development o f a la rg e navy was n ot acce ptable t o

th e Chinese and th a t t h e PRC was not going t o l e t In di a dominate th e

In dia n Ocean. He then proposed t o in cre ase t h e PLAN'S presence i n th e

Indian Ocean by conducting increased po rt c a ll s i n the region.36

General Zhao i s considered a possible successor as the PLA's second most

s en io r o f f i c e r , and i n t h a t p o s i t i o n co ul d w i e l d g r ea t i n f l ~ e n c e . ~ '



CHAPTER SIX

DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCES:

REVIEW, ANALYSIS. AND CONCLUSIONS

The previous chapters have de ta i l ed t h e development o f t h e

PLAN as a f u n c t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c , p o l i t i c a l , economic, and i n s t i t u t i o n a l

in f lue nces . These in f luen ces a ff ec te d th e PLAN's s t r a teg y, d oc t r ine .

and fo rc e s tr uc tu re . This chapt er wi 11 summarize pas t developmental

inf l uen ces , analyze t h e cu rr en t inf luences , and determine how cu rr en t

i n f lu e n c e s w i l l p o s s i b l y a f f e c t t h e PLAN i n t h e n e xt t we n ty f i v e y ea rs .

A tw en ty -f iv e year t i me pe r i od was chosen as t h i s roughly corresponds t o

t h e u s e f u l l i f e span o f a f r o n t l i n e n av al combat s h i p . T h is r e v i e w and

a n a l y s i s b e g in s w i t h t h e most o v er a r ch i ng o f t h e f o u r i n f l u e n c e s .

S t r a t e s i c I n f l u e n c e s

O f t h e fo ur developmental in flu en ce s on t h e PLAN, t h e

s t r a te g i c in f luenc es have been th e mos t cons i s ten t th roughou t i t s

h i s t o r y. These s t r a t e g i c i nf l ue n c es a re l i s t e d b y h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d i n

Table 8 . Two s t r a te g i c in f luence s have remained r e la t i ve ly cons tan t

throughout th e PLAN's h i s t or y. It i s t h e se tw o e nd u ri ng i n f l u e n c e s t h a t

have had the g rea tes t s t r a teg ic e ff ec t on the PLAN

The f i r s t o f th e s e k ey s t r a t e g i c i nf lu e nc es i s t h e PRC's f e a r

o f superpower enci r c lement and t h e assoc iat ed superpower naval th r e a t.

F or t h e m a j o r i t y o f i t s h i s t o r y, t h e PLAN has b een f ac e d w i t h an

79



en c i r c l i ng superpower th re a t , e i th e r U.S. o r Sov ie t . For t h e f i r s t two

and a h a l f decades th e U.S. was China ' s pr imary thr ea t . I n th e 1970s ,

t h e Sovie t Union supplanted t h e U.S . as China 's major perceived th re at .

The S o v ie t t h r e a t r e t a i ne d i t s p rim ac y u n t i l t h e m id t o l a t e 1980s and

t h e t h r e a t was a bo ut e l i m i n a t e d w i t h t h e f a l l o f t h e S o vi e t U nio n. The

presence o f these superpower t hr ea ts helped b u i l d consensus f o r

increased naval spending. Around 1986, th e PRC s h if t e d i t s m i l i t a r y

focus f rom defense again s t superpower aggress ion t o th e conduct o f lo ca l

l i m i t e d wars around th e PRC's b orders .

Table 8 . - - S t ra te gic Inf lue nces on th e PLAN

SPECIFIC COMPONENT I

TO 1959

1 1972-1982 - SOVIET NAVY BECOMES PRIMARY THREATI - CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

- U.S. NAVY I S PRIMARY THREAT- FEAR OF U.S. ENCIRCLEMENT- SOVIET ASSISTANCE- CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

1960-1971 - U. S. NAVY I S PRIMARY THREAT- FEAR OF U.S. ENCIRCLEMENT- NO SOVIET ASSISTANCE- CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

Since 1992 the PLAN has been without a major superpower

adver sa ry. The Sov ie t Pa c i f i c F le e t has a t roph ied i n V ladi vostock whi 1e

th e U.S. Pa c i f i c F l ee t has r educed i t s Western Pac i f i c p resence .

P rev ious ly, th e PLAN be ne f i t t ed f rom th e ex i s tence o f an ex te rna l

80

1983- 1995 - SOVIET NAVY I S PRIMARY THREAT (TO 1986)- FEAR OF SOVIET ENCIRCLEMENT (TO 1986)- CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS



superpower naval th r e a t . Ad d it io na ll y, th e PLAN needed a t h re a t t o

overcome a con t in ent a l b i as among th e leadersh ip . This t r a d i t io n a l PRC

la n d focu s has now changed, as many CCP and na ti o n a l le ad er s now see t h e

i mp or ta nc e o f m ar i t i me a f f a i r s .

The second const ant s t ra te gi c in fl ue nc e has been t h e PRC's

t e r r i t o r i a l c la im s i n t h e waters o f As ia . Beg inn ing w i th th e 1950s

captu re o f several near shore is land s i n th e Eas t China Sea and th e

Taiwan S t r a i t t h e Ch ine se h ave s t r i v e n t o r e g a i n h i s t o r i c C hine se

m a ri t im e t e r r i t o r i e s . I n t h e 1960s, t h e PRC c o nt in u ed t o st r e s s i t s

c la ims t o t e r r i t o r i e s i n th e Eas t Ch ina Sea. Sou th Ch ina Sea, and th e

Ta iwan S t r a i t bu t was t o o absorbed i n in te rn a l upheava l t o do any th ing

about them. I n 1974, t h e PRC to ok advantage o f a weakened South Vietnam

and a di s i n t er es te d U.S. by ous t i ng th e South Vietnamese f rom th e

Paracel Is la nd s. Fourteen years l a t e r i n 1988, PLAN ships sank th re e

Vietnamese s h ip s w h i l e o cc up yi ng s i x p o s i t i o n s i n t h e S p r a t l y I s l a n d s.

I n January, 1995, th e PLAN occupied Misc hie f Reef i n t h e Spra t ly

I s land s wh ich was a l so c la imed by t he Repub l ic o f t he Ph i1 ipp ines . l

Th is 45 y ea r t r e n d towards t e r r i t o r i a l a c q u i s i t i o n a lo ng

China's eastern marit ime border has been an opportunis t ic campaign aimed

a g a i n s t weak o r i s o l a t e d o p p o s i t i o n . A l l t h e m i l i t a r y moves t o occupy

is l an ds have been taken agai ns t co unt r ies w i t h weak o r no n-exis tent

naval f or ce s. The Chinese cla ims over Taiwan, Pescadores Is 1 ands , and

Senkaku Is1ands have not been s trenuous ly e xerci sed as they would b r in g

t h e PRC i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h c o u n t ri e s w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t n av al power

(Taiwan and Japan).



A lt ho u gh n o t a c o nt in u ou s s t r a t e g i c i n f l u e n c e , t h e e f f e c t o f

t h e 1950s Sov ie t a s s i s tance on the PLAN i s s ig n i f i ca n t enough t o warran t

d iscuss ion . This naval a i d s i g n if ic a n t l y helped t h e PLAN become a

respectable coas t a l defense navy through Soviet sh i p , info rma t io n , and

t ec h no lo g y t r a n s f e r s . The p r im a r y s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s S o v i et na va l

ass is tance was not hardware , b ut ra the r t h e expor t o f the Sov ie t "Young

School " naval do ctr in e t h a t wi th mod if ic a t i ons became t h e PLAN'S

doc t r in e and d rove PLAN fo rc e s t ru c tu re f o r a lmos t t h i r t y yea r s .

Add i t i on a l l y, th e ab rup t end o f Sov ie t a s s i s t ance t augh t th e PLAN th e

v al ue o f s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y. A f t e r t h e end o f So vi et m i l i t a r y a ss is ta nc e,

t h e PRC was determined t o develop i t s e l f w i t h domes tic resources . The

PLAN r e t a i n s t h i s t r a i t , 36 y ea rs a f t e r t h e s p l i t w i t h t h e S o vi et U nion.

The Ch inese w i l l buy se lec ted m i l i t a r y ha rdware t o he lp develop ideas

bu t w i l l no t make mass m i l i t a r y purchases as tha t wou ld ind ic a t e fo r e ign

dependence.

P o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e s

P o l i t i c a l inf l uen ces on th e PLAN have had t h e most recen t

impact on th e deve lopment o f the navy. These po l i t i c a l in f luenc es a re

shown, by pe r iod i n Table 9. Throughout i t s h is t o ry t h e PLAN as an

i n s t i t u t i o n has been su b je ct e d t o l e s s o f t h e CCP's p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e

and man ipu lat ion tha n China's ground fo rc es . The PLAN has been ab le t o

s t r e s s p r o f e s si o n a l is m o ve r p o l i t i c s t o a g r e a t e r d eg re e t h a n t h e army.

O f a l l th e branches o f th e PLA, t he navy su ffe red th e l e as t

in t er fe re nc e f rom th e CCP. The reasons f o r t h i s are not c l ea r.

However, t h e CCP seemed con ten t t o keep th e PLAN ou t o f p o l i t i c s and t h e

PLAN was c o n te n t t o b u i l d a f ac ad e o f p o l i t i c a l o rt ho do xy t o s a t i s f y t h e

82



.''X

CCP. H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e PLAN lagged behind t h e army i n t h e development

o f p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . The P o l i t i c a l Commissar system

was in he r i te d from t h e PLA and in s t i t u t e d immediate ly by naval shore, .?

based commands, but i t was no t u n t i l t he ea r l y 1960s t h a t most sh ips

began r ec e iv i ng p o l i t i c a l o f f i ce r s . The Cu l t u ra l Revo lu t ion ' s emphasis

on s t r i c t obed ience t o Maoism and Ma0 m i l i t a r y though t , fo re s t a l l e d th e

navy 's a t tempts t o develop a separate naval s t r a t eg y and do ct r in e .

Throughou t t he Cu l t u ra l Revo lu tion , th e PLAN con t inued t o b u i l d

submarines, f a s t a t t a c k c r a f t and a i r c r a f t . These we re t h e l i g h t f o rc e s

o f th e "Young School" and conformed w it h Mao 's s t ra te gy o f na t ion al

defense and th e navy 's r o l e as a coas ta l defense forc e .

Table 9. - - P o l i t i c a l In f luences on the PLAN

I TO 1959 - PLAN HAS NO POLITBURO REPRESENTATIVEI - EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONALISM

PERIOD

1 1960-1971 - CULTURAL REVOLUTION

I - NATIONAL EMPHASIS ON POLITICS

SPECIFIC COMPONENT

1 1983-1995 - MILITARY'S REDUCED POLITICAL ROLEI - EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONALISM

1972-1982

The PLAN's p o l i t i c a l in fl ue nc e i n t h e CCP has been extremely

l i m i t e d . Wit h t h e n o t a b l e e x ce p t io n o f L i Zuopeng's i nv ol ve me nt i n L i n

Biao ' s coup a t t empt, t h e PLAN d is tanced i t s e l f from domest ic p o l i t i c a l

s t rug g les . L i was th e PLAN's f i r s t r ep re sen ta t ive i n th e CCP Cen t ra l

83

- DEATH OF MA0 ZEDONG- REMOVAL OF GANG OF FOUR- RETURN OF DENG XIAOPING- MILITARY'S REDUCED POLITICAL ROLE



Committee Po lit bu ro (1969-1971). The PLAN d i d not pa r ti c ip a te i n

success ion p o l i t i c s fo l low ing Mao's dea th i n 1976. Since the r is e o f

th e modernists, p o l i t i c s i n the PLAN has become even l ess impo rtant . A

PLAN of f ic e r was not admitted t o th e P oli tb ur o again u n t i l 1992, when

L iu Huaqi ng was appoi nt ed .

For the past 15 years, the CCP fac t ion favor ing moderniza t ion

o f th e m il i t a r y le d by Deng Xiaoping has dominated over th e p o l i t ic a l

p u r i s t s . By consent , the m i l i t a r y ' s p o l i t i c a l ro le has been reduced and

th e mil i t a ry has been allowed t o conc entra te on modernization . The r i s e

o f t he modernists over t he Maoists allowed th e m i l i t a r y and the PLAN t o

modify Maoist mil i t a ry doctr in e . The m i l i t a r y has been able t o again

emphasize professionalism through th e re sto ra tio n o f a rank structure.

separate uniforms f o r t h e servic es, and increased emphasis on s k i l l and

mil i t a ry p ro fi ci en cy . The PLAN's naval st ra te gy evolved from an army

suppor t r o l e i n the "Ac t ive Defense" s t ra tegy t o a p rima ry r o l e i n

extending China's defensive perimeter seaward under the "Offshore Active

Defense" st ra te gy . The s h i f t away from Mao's "People's War" do ct ri ne

has helped the technically oriented PLAN by encouraging the employment

o f advanced technologies i n modern warf are.

Economic Influences

Economic influences have played a major r o l e i n th e development

o f th e PLAN. These influence s are l is t e d , by perio d i n Table 10. The

predominant economic in flue nce i n the e ar ly perio d o f th e PLAN's hi st or ywas t h e backward Chinese economy. Th is economy pla ced co n st ra in ts t h a t

i n h ib i t ed t h e i n i i a1 development o f t h e PLAN. These con s tr a in ts were



the l ack o f funds t o b u i ld and main ta in a navy, and the emphasis on

agr icu l t u re and l i g h t indu s t ry ove r heavy indus t ry.

With th e r i s e o f the Four Modernizations, came ad ditio nal

economic influences . Thi s i c l uded an expandi ng economy, development o f

offshore resources, coastal development, and expansion of foreign trade.

A l l o f these inf luences had a positive impact on the PLAN. A growing

economy could support an expanding navy. I n 1984, Deng X iaoping stated,

"Quadrupling China 's gross i nd us tr ia l and ag ri cu lt ur al product means

th a t by the end o f th i s cen tu ry, improving our m i l i t a r y equipment w i l l

be an easy job ."' The in fl ue nc es o f co as ta l development and expanding

fo re ign t rad e a l so bene f i t t ed the navy i nd i r ec t l y by focus ing theChinese leadership on maritime issues rather than interior development.

Table 10. --Economic In flu en ce s on t h e PLAN

1 1960-1971 - ECONOMIC SCARCITYI - EARLY FOCUS ON MARITIME RESOURCES

PERIOD

TO 1959

SPECIFIC COMPONENT

- DEVASTATED ECONOMY

1972-1982

I n s t i t u t i o n a l I n f l u e n c e s

The in s t i t u t io na l in f luences remained re la t iv e l y cons tan t fo r

th e f i r s t 30 years o f th e PLAN but have changed si g n if ic a n tl y since

- FOUR MODERNIZATIONS- M A R I T I M E RESOURCES- COASTAL DEVELOPMENT

1983-1995 - EXPANDING ECONOMY- MARITIME RESOURCES- COASTAL DEVELOPMENT



.".,

:;:

;;:i.

1983. These in s t i t u t i on a l in f luences a re l i s t e d i n Tab le 11. Dominant., among these influences was the army's control over the PLAN. This army:.

:,>... dominance was reduced i n t h e 1980s.,. .

Table 11. - - In s t i t u t i on al Inf luences on th e PLAN

PERIOD SPECIFIC COMPONENT

TO 1959

- ARMY CONTROL OF PLANI - "PEOPLE'S WAR UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS" DOCTRINE

- ARMY CONTROL OF PLAN- ROLE OF PENG DEHUAI- R I S E OF PROFESSIONALISM (1953-1959)

1960-1971 - ARMY CONTROL OF PLAN- ROLE OF LIN BIAO- "PEOPLE'S WAR DOCTRINE"

Army dom inatio n o f t h e PLAN began a t the format ion o f the navy.

Transferred army of f i ce r s formed the co re o f th e PLAN'S i n i t i a lleade rship. Xiao Jinguang, a former army o f f i c e r , commanded t h e PLAN

f o r i t s f i r s t 31 year s. The army was al so dominant among th e PLA's

service branches because i t was the oldest and most respected. I t was

the a rmy tha t was v ic to r ious i n the C iv i l War, not the navy or the air

fo rc e. Th ird, army dominance force d th e other branches in t o a

suppor t ing ro le . The navy 's ea r ly s t ra t egy and doctr in e were t i e d t o

the land based "People's War" doc t r ine .

In st i t u ti o n a ll y , army dominance o f th e navy began t o wane i n

the late 1970s as mil i tary leaders saw ser ious weaknesses i n th e

1983-1995 - ROLE OF LIU HUAQING- PLAN DIVERGES FROMARMY- BEGINNING OFA SEPARATE NAVAL DOCTRINE



Wa Under Modern Con di ti ons ." The army dominance o f th e PLAN was

seve rely weakened by th e appointment o f L iu Huaqing as the PLAN's

comander i n 1982. L i u Huaqing and h is successor Zhang L ianzhong were

th e f i r s t nava l o ff i ce r s t o head the PLAN. During the ir tenure the navy

accelerated the trend toward becoming an independent force.

The second major insti tutional in fl ue nc e on t h e PLAN was r o l e

o f th e Min is te r o f Defense. Th is in f luence was pa r t i cu la r ly s t rong i n

th e f i r s t two Min ist ers o f Defense. The f i r s t , Peng Dehuai, emphasized

a pro fess iona l fo rce developed along Sovi et lin e s. The second, L i n

B ia o, s tr es se d t h e p o l i t i c a l r o l e o f t h e mil i t a ry. These two mili taryleaders, ac t ing i n opposite d i re c t ion s . had a big impact on the PLAN's

s t ra tegy, doctr ine , and force s t ruc ture . Since Li n ' s f a l l from power,

no Mi n is te r o f Defense has accumulated enough power t o pr ovi de th e ki nd

o f impact t h a t Peng and L in had on th e mil i t a ry.

Conclusions

Using previous and cur re nt influence s t o determine the PLAN's

fu tu re can be ri sk y. Unpredictable events have and w i l l occur t h a t

could e l iminate , a l t e r , o r rep lace o ld inf luences a lmost overn ight . An

example o f t h i s was L i n Biao' s death and hi s subsequent re pud iatio n.

This se ct io n w i l l assume away any dramatic unforeseen events and w i l l

review t h e developmental inf lue nce s t o determine how they may a f f e c t th e

PLAN i n t o th e year 2020. Important developmental influ ence s t o t he PLAN

o f t he fu tu re are summarized i n Table 12.



S t r a t e g i c a l l y, t h e PLAN i s a d j u s t i n g t o a w or ld i n which the r e

i s n o superpower t h r e a t t o C hin a. I n t h e mi d t o l a t e 1980s, t h e Chine se

m i l i t a r y began t o change i t s focus from a defense o f China from

superpower invas ion t o t he conduct o f r eg iona l , 1 m i e d wars a long th e

ex te r i o r o f Ch ina 's bo rder. Th i s emphasis on ex te rna l v ice in t e r na l

war, means t h a t t h e PLAN wi 11 become a more impo rtan t p a r t o f t h e

Chinese mi l i t a ry . Thus, th e absence o f a superpower th re a t w i l l no t

cause a dramatic curt ail men t o f t h e PLAN'S modernization. On t h e

c o n t r a r y, t h e l a c k o f a seaborne i n va s i o n t h r e a t w i l l a l l o w t h e f u t u r e

PLAN t o shed i t s de fens ive o r ie n ta t ion .

Tab le 12 I mp or ta nt I n f lu e nc e s on t h e Fu t ur e PLAN

I CATEGORY I SPECIFIC COMPONENT

I STRATEGIC I - NO SUPERPOWER NAVAL THREAT- CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

POLITICAL

I INSTITUTIONAL I - LIU HUAQING- INCREASED SPECIALIZATION

- MILITARY'S ROLE IN CHOOSING DENG'SSUCCESSOR

- EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONALISM

ECONOMIC

The second s t r a t eg ic inf lue nce on th e f u t ur e PLAN i s t h e PRC's

c o n t i n u i n g qu es t t o r ec ov er l o s t t e r r i t o r i e s and r e v e rs e t h e "Unequal

Trea t i e s " fo rced on China l a t e i n the European co l on i a l e r a .

S p e c i f i c al l y, t h e PRC w i l l s o l i d i f y i t s c o nt r o l o f t h e Sp r a t ly and

- EXPANDING ECONOMY- MARITIME RESOURCES- COASTAL DEVELOPMENT- INTERNATIONAL TRADE



Paracel Is lands as th e countr ies d ir ec t l y i n opposi t ion t o the PRC's

dr ive t o acqu ire i s l and te r r i t o r ie s a re d iv ided on how t o counter

Chinese diplomatic and mil i t a ry moves i n th e South China Sea. Malays ia

has recent ly dis tanced i t s e l f from a mu lt i - la te ra l approach t o so lv ing

the Sprat ly I s land dispute . The PRC w i l l consolidate i t s posi t ions i n

th e Spra tly Islands by ex pl oi ti ng th e weakness o f the other claimants.

This consolidation may also be accomplished by political agreement,

because as Mao once sa id , " P o l i t i c a l power grows ou t th e end o f a gun

ba r re l . " The PLAN wi 11 have become that gun barrel.

T e r r i t o r i a l claims on Taiwan and th e Senkaku Islands w i l l not

be pressed, as i t would br ing t he PR C i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h two o f A s ia 'sst rong es t m i l i t a r y and economic powers. The PRC - Taiwan issue w i l l be

a1 lowed t o slo wly evolve towards interdependence. Also, th e PR C

leadership w i l l be sa t i sf ie d with t he s ta tus quo over th e Senkaku

Islan ds. Therefore, PRC claims i n these two areas w i l l not infl uen ce

the PLAN.

How wi 11 these c ur re nt and lon g running s t ra te g ic inf lue nce s

af fe c t the PLAN i n the fu tu re? This fo rce w i l l be capab le o f p ro jec t ing

and main taini ng power w it h in t he area bounded by i t s is la nd claims.

However, t her e i s no st ra te gi c imperative f o r t he PLAN t o acquire an

a i r c r a f t ca rr ie r. The PLANAF w i l l have s uf fi ci en t ground basedair

cover t o defend i t s i s lan d c la ims . The recen t purchases o f Sov iet

a i r c r a f t i s t h e f i r s t s te p i n developing a i r c r a f t w i t h s u f f i c i e n t range

t o accomplish t h i s mission. Add it iona l ly, a Chinese a i r c r a f t ca r r ie r

would have many p o l i t i c a l drawbacks as many Asian c ou nt ri es and t h e

United States would become alarmed by t h i s prospe ct. Recently, th e



PRC's Foreign Min ist er c it e d th e PLAN's lack o f an ai r c r a f t ca rr ie r as

an example o f China's peaceful i nt en ti on s .The f u tu re p o l i t i c a l inf lue nc es on th e PLAN wi 11 be determined

by th e scope o f th e PLAN's involvement i n succession po l i t i c s a f t e r Deng

X iaoping. The m i l i t a r y as a un if yi ng forc e i n China wi 11 have a l a rge

voice i n th e select ion o f the PRC's next leader. The m il i t ar y ' s

ob je ct io n t o Deng's f i r s t h e i r apparent, Hu Yaobang, was among th e

causes f o r h i s dismissal as th e CCP's secret ary-gener al i n January

1987: The PLAN, as an emerging forc e, w i l l have d if f e r e n t po l i t i c a l

goals from th e ground forc es. The p o l i t i c a l divergence between th e army

and th e navy w i l l for ce t he navy t o assume an expanded p o l i t i c a l ro le .This w i l l be unfamiliar ground for a m il i t a r y b ranch tha t has

t r ad i t io na l l y escaped the re a l i t ie s o f Chinese po l i t i c s under the

protect ion of the army.

The second po l i t i c a l in fluen ce on the f ut ur e o f the PLAN i s a

continued emphasis on mili tary profession alism. The perpetual st rug gle

between p o l i t i c a l orthodoxy and mi l i t a r y professionalism appears t o have

ended; w it h professionalism th e cle ar winner. No fu tu re leader o f the

PRC w i l l attempt t o draw back from th e subs tant ial gains made by th e

navy i n favor o f rees tab l ish ing po l i t i c a l p rimacy.

Dominating both stra teg ic and p o l i t i c a l influ ences, economic

in f luen ces w i l l have th e great est impact on the fu tu re o f t he PLAN. A

heal thy, v ibra nt economy i s v i t a l t o th e continued expansion o f t he

Chinese navy. Economic growth i s th e CCP's prime concern and h i s t o r y

has demonstrated t h a t i n the event o f an economic cr i s i s , mil i t a ry

expenditures wi 11 be fro zen or even reduced. Ensuring th e contin ued

90



expansion o f th e Chinese economy i s becomi ng an inc rea sin gly d i f f i c u l t

task. China i s ju st beginning t o confront the problem o f s imultaneously

encouraging and managing economic growth , co n t ro l 1 i g in f l a t ion , an d

reducing unempl oyment . Another 1arge problem f o r t h e Chinese economy i s

improving efficiency and ending government subsidies . An estimated 50

percent o f China's 108,000 st a te ente rpr ise s are lo s in g money. As these

s ta te en ter pri se s account f o r about 55 percent o f China's Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) , t h i s problem must be resolved t o fac i l i t a t e continued

economic expansion 5

The second economic inf lu en ce on th e f ut ur e o f t h e PLAN i s th e

quest f o r marit ime resources such as o i l and f i s h . The PLAN hascommitted i t s e l f t o ass i s t ing i n the development o f th e na t iona l

economy. H is t o r ic a ll y , t he PLAN has done t h i s by aidi ng fishermen i n

d is t ress and i n the cons t ruc t ion o f o i l in f ras t ruc t ure . S ta te owned

shipyards have a lso b u i l t o ffshore o i 1 plat forms i n support o f o i l

exp lor ati on and ex tr ac ti on e f f o r t s . The PLAN wi 11 continue th i s

assistance i n th e quest fo r mari time resources.

The PRC has become a more mari t ime oriented nat ion part ia l ly as

a re s u lt o f i t s increased overseas commerce. Coastal economic

development i s re la t ed t o th i s in ter nat io nal t rade and both are

important t o China's continued economic expansion. As th e f i r s t l i n e o f

defense o f these i mpo rtan t coast al regions, th e PLAN w i l l emerge as a

more powerful branch o f th e m il i t ar y.

I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y, t h e t r en d towards m i l i t a r y s p e c i a li z a ti o n w i l l

continue. I f cu rr en t trend s co ntinu e, t he PLAN w i l l become a separate

f or ce i n a l l but name. The navy w i l l continue t o develop and re fi ne i t s



own ma rit ime st ra te gy and do ct ri ne . The navy wi 11 most l i k e l y remain a

par t o f the PLA struc ture , but i t w i l l no longer be influenced by a

overpowering ground force component.

Possible Imp1i at i onsThe net resul t of a l l these inf luences, i s th at the PLAN i n th e

year 2020 wi 11 have slow ly evolved i n t o a navy second t o none i n Asia.

The PRC's goal, I el ieve, i s t o develop a s trong naval force without

antagonizing or a l ie nat ing i t s neighbors. The PLAN wi 11 have not

acquired an aircraft carrier unless Japan or a unified Korea has one.

The reason f o r t h i s i s twofo ld , a PLAN aircraft carrier would unduly

cause concern among Asia c ou nt ri es and the Chinese wish t o avo id th e

Soviet mistake of placing mili tary growth over economic growth. It i s

no coincidence th at th e Soviet Union' f i r s t conventional a ir c r a f t

ca r r i e r was i n cons t ruc t ion a t the t ime o f the count ry 's co l lapse.

By 2020, th e PLAN wi 11 have achieved a rough te chno logica l

p a ri t y w it h other modern navies. I t s submarine force w i l l be a mixture

o f nuclear powered submarines based on t he navy's experience w it h t he

Han and Xia cl as s submarines and di es el - e l e c t r i c powered submarines

developed from the Soviet " K " class submarines f i r s t del ivered i n 1995.

En ter ing se rv ic e i n th e e ar ly 1980s and possessing improved endurance,

weapons, and reduced s e l f noise, t he " K " i s a signif icant upgrade for

th e PLAN submarine for ce c ons ist ing la rg el y o f obsolete " R" submarines.

China's growing technological sophistication along with reverse

engineer ing o f S ovi et a i r c r a f t wi 11 have made t h e PLANAF a modern

ai rf or ce capable o f defending any o f th e PRC's of fsh ore claims. The

PLAN surf ace ship s by 2020, w i l l have modern surf ace t o a i r miss i les fo r

92



s e l f and area defense and w i l l have l and s t r i k e ca pab i l i t y s im i la r t o

t h e U.S. Navy's c u r r e nt Tomahawk Mi s s i l e . The PLAN w i l l have a modern

c m a n d and co nt ro l system capable o f support ing lo ng range operat ions.

Op er at io nal ly , th e PLAN i n 2020 wi 11 have dr am at ic al ly

increased i t s v i s i b i l i t y i n Asia. I t wi 11 conduct more p or t v i s i t s and

est abl ish more m i l i t a r y t o mi l i t a r y contacts . The PLAN wi 11 conduct

more out o f area opera tions . By 2020, t h e sea area w i t h i n China's

i s la nd c la ims and especi a l l y around th e Sprat ly and Paracel I s lands w i l l

be considered a l oc al operat ing area and wi 11 be th e s i t e o f increased

and near cont inuous PLAN presence. The PLAN wi 11 become a fami l i a r , bu t

not an overshadowing presence i n th e waters o f th e Western P ac if ic . East

China Sea, Ye1 low Sea, and South China Sea.



'David G . Mu1 1Westview Press. 1983)

e r , Cb, 44.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER ONE

na as a Ma rit im e Power (Boulde r , CO :

' I n te r n a t io n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S tu d ie s , Jhe M i l i t a r vBalance 1994-1995 (London: Bra sse y's , 1994 ), 164-193.

3Charles R . Larson, Commander i n Chi ef, Un ited States P a ci fi cCommand's t es tim on y b e fo re Senate Armed Services Committee, Postu reHearinas, 103rd Congress 2nd Session, 2 March 1994.

CHAPTER TWO

'Muller, 12.

3Bruce Swanson, Eiaht h Vovaae o f th e D ra ~o n: H is to rv o fChina's Ouest for Seapower (Annapolis. MD: U.S. Naval In s t i t u te Press ,1982). 181-182.

'Gene Z . Hanrahan, "Report on Red China's New Navy," U.S. NavalI n s t i t u t e Proceedi nas 79 (August 1953) : 847.

Tlichael D. Swaine. The Militarv & Po l i t i ca l Success ion i n Ch ina(Santa Monica. CA: RAND Corporation. 1992). 39.

'W i 1 i a m W . Whi tson . Or aan izat ion al PersDectives and Decisio n-Makina i n t h e Chinese Communist Hiah Command (Santa Monica, CA : RANDCo rpo rat i on, 1971) , 42.

==China Today Edi t o r ia1 Board. Danadai Zhonaauo Hai u n (ThePeo ole's Navv Todav) (Bei i n g : China Soc ial Sciences Press, l9 87 ), 683-



684 and Whitson, 42.

12Muller, 15.

=5wanson, 194.

14Whi son , 42.. ..

...:i..,

"China Today, 684.

l"aymond V . 6. Blackman ed. , Ja ne's F ia h ti n o Ships 1950-1951(New York: McGraw-Hi 11 Book Company, 19501, 150-158.

17B1ackman, 150-158.

="hi na Today, 684-686.

19Swanson, 194-195.

mMuller, 29.

21Raymond V . 6. Blackman, ed. , Jane ' s Fiah t i na Ships 1955-1956(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19551, 152.

2 ~ u l l e r . 8.

"Ibid, 28-29.

26Jiefang Ribao (L ibe ra tio n D ai ly ), 13 Feb 1950 i n JonW .

Huebner, "The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan." The China Ou ar te rl v 110:265.

"Jie fan g Ribao, 4 Feb 1950 i n Huebner: 265.

'"Michael Y . M . Kau, e d. . The W ri ti nas o f Mao Zedona: 1949-1976.Volume 1 (Armonk, NY: M. E . Sharpe, 19861. 6.

'"Jonathan D. Spence, The Search For Modern China (New York: W.W . Norton & Company, 19901, 525.

"Harlan W . Jencks, F r m Muskets t o Miss i les : P o l i t i cs andPro fes sion alis m i n t h e Chinese Armv. 1945-1981 (Boulder, CO: WestviewPress, 19821, 46.

"Mul ler, 78



"China Today, 686

"Ibid, 580

'China Today, 687.

"Takahiko Sena, "Submarines o f Communist China." Ships o f t h eWorld December 1969 trans. U. S. Defense In te ll ig e n ce Agency ( D I A ) .t r an s l a t io n LN 809-70. 2 : i n Muller , 20.

mMuller, 29.

"Sena, 3 i n Mu1 l e r 50.

"Paul H. 8. Godwin. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces (MaxwellAir Force Base, AL: A i r U ni ve rs it y Press. 1988), 115.

china Today, 694.

"Jurgen Domes, Pena Te-Huai : The Man and t h e Imaa? (Sta nfo rd ,CA: Stan ford U ni ve rs it y Press, 1985). 66-67.

45Conscription Law o f t he People's R epublic o f China, 7 February1955, i n Theodore H . E . Chen, The Chinese Communist Reaime: Documents andCommentary (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967). 311-319.

4 7 D ~ e s ,6.

'China Today, 689.

"Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada, and Ronald E. Dolaned., China: A Countrv Study (Washington, DC: Lib ra ry o f Congress -Federal Research Division, 1988). 41.

'"bid. 43.

51Spence, 522-524.



CHAPTER THREE

lMul le r, 111.

'Michael MccGwi r e , Ken Booth, and John McDonnel 1,

ed. , S o v i e tNaval Pol c v : 0b .ie cti ves and C on st ra in ts (New York: Praeger Pub1 i hers ,1975), 377-379.

'L in Biao, "Long Liv e the V ictor y o f the People 'sWar," i nIrrmanuel C . Y. Hsu Readi nas i n Modern Chinese H is t o r v (New York: Oxf ordU ni ve rs it y Press, 19711, 629.

4Chang Y i -Mi n, "B ui ld in g the World's Stronges t People's Navy"Bei.iina Review 11 No. 1: 42.

'Muller, 89-90.

"bid, 90.

' I b i d .

81bid.

'Peter S . H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China: TheDwnestic Scene 1949-1967 (South Orange NJ: Seton Hall University Press,1967). 400.

Ibid , 405.

11Harold C. Hinton, ed., The People's Republic o f China: AHandbook (Boulder. CO: Westview Press, 1979), 423-424.

14Tang and Maloney, 433-434.

"China Today, 701.

W u l e r . 134-135.

laChina Today, 697.

I9 Ib id , 703.

'"uller, 136.



.;,;e .... ., .glk.!, . v :v,.,:

%;;;;>?&.!, 5. .:y > . .,d..'$p "China Today, 704.

i< J.,. . :.

. . .22Yen Wei - hui , "China Bui lds i t s F i r s t Ocean-Going Freighter i n

, th e 10,000-Ton Clas s," P e k i n ~ eview 11 No.3: 15.

"China Today, 704

"Worden, Savada, and Dolan, 49.25Mul ler, 114.

26Menno T. Kamminga, "Bui ld ing 'Rai 1 oads on th e Sea' : China'sAttitude Towards Maritime Law" China Ouarterlv 59 (July-September 1974):547.

"Mul l e r , 113-114

2 8 E l i s Jof fe , "The Chinese Army Af te r t he Cu l tu ral Revolut ion:The Ef fec ts o f Int er ve nti on " China Oua rter lv 55 (July-September 1973):469.

"Muller 105-106.

'China Today. 704.

)'Bruce Swanson, "The Navy o f t h e People' s R epubl ic o f China ,"i n Guide t o Far Eastern Navies , ed. Barry M . Blechman and Robert P.Berman. ( Ann apo lis , MD: U.S. Naval I n s t i t u t e Press. 1 978), 92-94.

CHAPTER FOUR

=Mullet-, 108

'Parr is Chang, "China's M i l i t a r y " Cur ren t H i s to rv 67 (September1974): 105.

'Mu1 l e r , 151-152

4PRC M in is tr y o f Foreign A ff a i r s statement. Bei.iina Review 20,No. 25 (17 June 1977) : 17.

'Selig S. Harr ison, China. O i l . and Asia: Conflict Ahead? (NewYork: Columbia U ni ve rs it y Press, 1977). 1-7.

"bid, 130.

'China Today, 628.

"wanson, "The Navy o f t h e People's Republic o f China." 145.

98



gBei .iinc l Review 18, No. 24 (13 June 1975): 30.

l% ei .i in a Review 17, No. 25 (21 June 1974): 5.

"Xinhua, 2 May 1982 i n FBIS-CHI, 3 May 1982,A - 1

"Gerald Segal . Defendi na China (London: Oxfor d Un iv er s it y

Press, 19851, 198.

laKenneth G. Weiss. The Sea i s Red: The Si no- Sov iet R iv al r v andi t s Naval Dimension (Alexa ndria , VA: C enter f o r Naval Analyses, 1984).17.

15Jiang Yuanchun. "So vie t S tr ate gy f o r East Asia . " B e i i i n qReview 24. No. 12 (23 March 1981): 20.

17 El li s Jo ff e. "People's War Under Modern Cond itions : A Do ct ri nef o r Modern War" China Ouar te rl v 112 (December 1987) : 569.

l Wu l le r , 173.

l9Jiefanaun Bao (20 Ap r il 1977): 3. i n Mul ler , 173.

%obert S. Wang, "China's Evolvi ng St ra te gi c Do ctr ine ,"

Survey X X I V, No. 10 (October 1984): 1048.

"John Moore, ed ., Jan e's Fic lht inc l Ship s 1992-1993 (New York:McGraw-Hi 11 Book Company. 1992). 131.

"China Today, 472

2v'Speed Up th e Modernization o f Natio nal Defence ( s i c ) " Bei,i i nqReview 20, No. 32 ( 5 August 1977) : 17.

'"eng Xiaoping, The Se le ct ed Works o f Dena XiaoDina Volume 2(Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1984). 373.

"Renmin R i b a ~ , 0 J ul y 1981, 7.

'China Today. 707.



"China Today, 710

successful Launching o f C ar ri er Rocket" Bei in a Review 25,No. 43 (25 October 1982) : 5.

"Mu1 1er, 206.'Xhina Today, 709.

3hPeopl 's Liberation Army. Zhunaauo Renmi n Jie fana ,iu n J i ana X i J

Mina L iu (Chinese P e o ~ le ' s ib era t ion Armv - Lis t o f F l a a O ff i c e r s ,Volume 1 2nd ed. (Bei i n g : PLA Press. 1987). 58.

"Mu1 1e r , 206.

'Thins Today, 712.

"" Br ie f Biography o f Li u Huaqing," Bei. iina Review 32. No. 47(20 November 1989). 22.

'OPeople's L ib e r a t io n Army, Zhunaauo Renmin Jiefana .iun Ji an a XiuMina Liu (Chinese Peo~le 's iberation Armv - L i s t o f F la a Of f ic e rs ,Volume 2 2nd ed. ( B e i j in g : PLA Press. 1987). 58.

CHAPTER FIVE

=Mu ller, 166-167.

2 In te rna tiona l In s t i t u t e fo r S t ra teg ic S tudies . The M i i t a r vBalance 1983-1984 (London: Int ern ati on al I n s t i t u t e f o r Stra teg icStudies. 1983). 18.

'Alexander Chi eh-cheng Huang, "The Chinese Navy's O ff sh or eActive Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications" Naval WarColleae Review XLVII, No. 3 (Summer 1994) : 17.

'Gao Anming, "Navy t o P a r t ic ip a t e i n Economic Reform Dr iv e"China Da il v 6 A p r il 1992 i n FBIS-CHI-92-072, 14 A p r il 1992, 43.

Xhina Today, 712-713.

5 h i Changxue and Wang He l in , "Navy Has Made Marked Improvementsi n I t s A b i l i t y t o Maintain, Repair Equipment by Means o f Technology"Renmin Ribao 6 Ju ly 1991 i n FBIS-CH-91-135, 15 July 1991. 56.

' Ib id .

%e i. ii na Review 26, No. 5 (3 1 January 1983): 19.



g"More Seaports, A ir p o r ts Opened" B e i i in a Review 27, No. 48 (26November 1984) : 9.

. . . l"Huang Caihong, "Navy Supports Coastal Development With,

". Resources" Xinhua Domestic Ser vic e 7 J u ly 1992 i n FBIS-CHI-92-132, 9.

July 1992, 29.

==BeisinsDomestic Ser vic e 2 June 1988 i n FBIS-CHI-88-108. 6June 1988, 29.

13Gao Anmi ng, 44 .

14Bei.iina Review 26, No. 28(6 Ju ly 1983): 7

"Honaai (Red Flaa) 16 January 1986, 17-21 .

16 "Co nsc rip tion Work R eg ula tio ns" Xinhua Domestic Ser vic e 29October 1985 i n FBIS-PRC, 30 October 1985, K18-K-27.

17 "Be ijin g Men Get Set t o J oi n t h e PLA" China D a il v 23 October1993 i n FBIS-CHI-93-024, 25 October 1993, 39.

18Liu Shendong and Si Yanwen, "High , New Technology Ap pli ed i nNavy C ons tru ctio n" Jiefan q.iun Baa 30 September 1991 i n FBIS-CHI-91-211,43.

19Hu Chunhua , "Navy's E f f o r t t o Develop Marit ime ShippingSe rvic e Has Broad Prospe cts" Ji ef an qj un Bao 2 June 1992 i n FBIS-CHI-92-121. 38.

21Paul H . B . Godwin, "Force and Diplomacy: Chinese SecurityPo l icy i n th e Pos t-Co ld war E r a " China and th e World: Chinese Fo reiqnRela t ions i n th e Post-Cold war E r a 3rd ed ., Samuel S . K i m ed. (Boulder,CO : Westview Press, l994), 172.

2"lexander Chi eh-cheng Huang, 19.

"China Dailv 11 A p r i l 1987 i n FBIS-PRC, 16 Ap ri 1 1987, K-23

24ChongK . Yoon, "Problems o f Mode rnizing t h e PLA: DomesticConstraints" China 's M i i t a r v Moderniza tion : In te rn a t iona l Imp l ica t ions

Lar ryM.

Wortzel ed. (New York: Greenwood Press. 1988) . 2-3 .25Honaai (Red Flaa) 1 August 1985 i n FBIS-CHI-153, 8 August

1985. K-4.

261n te rnat iona l In s t i tu te fo r S t ra teg ic S tud ies , The M i l i t a ryBalance 1983.1984 (London: In te rn at ion al I n s t i t u t e f o r St ra te gic

101



,.

Stud ies , 1983). 84; In te rn a t iona l In s t i t u te fo r S t ra teg ic S tud ies , l3.eM i li t a r v Balance 1993-1994 (London: In tern a t iona l I n s t i t u t e fo rSt ra teg ic Studies, 1993), 152.

z8Bei.iinclReview 29, No. 16 (14 A p r i l 8 6): 5-6.

29MichaelD. Swaine. The Militarv & Po l i t i ca l Success ion i nChina: leaders hi^. I s t i tu t ions . Be l ie f s (San ta Monica , CA: RANDCorporation, 1992). 74.

' o T ~Kuncr Pao 3 February 1988, 1 i n FBIS-CHI-88-022. 3 February1988, 9.

"Harry Harding, Chin a's Second Re volutio n: Reform A f t e r Mao(Washington, DC : The Brooking Insti tution, 1987), 217.

"Mao Zhenfa, "Form th e Concept o f Defense That Lays an EqualEmphasis On Both Coasta l and Land Defenses" Jiefancl.iun B ~ Q February1990 i n FBIS-CHI-90-042-S, 2 March 1990. 23.

"Wu Senhui and Zhang Ha ntin g, "Eas t Sea F le e t Combined ForcesManeuvers Ends" Xinhua Domestic Ser vic e 3 June 1992 i n FBIS-CHI-92-109,5 June 1992. 29.

34HuangCaihong "Army-People Projects Benefit Coastal Areas"Xinhua Domestic Serv ice 9 A p r i l 1993 i n FBIS-CHI-93-074, 20 Ap r i l 1993,22.

35"China Builds Air Base Near Sp ra tly s and Taiwan i s Fo llow ingS u it " Asian Defence Jour nal 23, No. 8 (August 1993): 98.

'"'Bei j i n g S aid t o B u i l d Three Large Naval Bases"1<Ynda 11January 1993 i n FBIS-CHI-93-006, 11 January 1993, 22-23.

37Easter n Exoress 4 May 1994, 8 i n FBIS-CHI-94-086, 4 May 1994,28-29.

CHAPTER S I X

'Nayan Chanda , R igoberto Ti g lao. and John McBeth, "T er ri t o r i a1Imperative" Far Eastern Economic Review 158, No. 8 (23 February 1995):15 .

~Chong-PinLi n, "Red Fi s t : China 's Army i n Tra nsit ion "International Defense Review 28 (February 19951, 31.

'Joris Janssen Lok and Robert Karniol , "Spain Offers Carr ie rDesigns t o Chinese" Ja ne's Defense Weeklv 23 (18 Februa ry 1995): 8.



Chong-Pin Lin, 31.

sNayan Chanda, "The End i s Near" Far Ea stern Economic Review158, No. 8 ( 2 3 February 1995): 48-50.



APPENDIX A

Organisational Chart of theChinese People's Liberation Army

Source: J aw s's Infor mati on Group Ltd. china i n Cr is is : The Role o f t h eM i l i t a r y (London: Jane's Defense D a t a , 19891, 91.

104



APPENDIX B

Organisational Chart of the PLA Navy

I I II

lonh China Sc r Earl ChinaFleet Sea Flrct

Military lnftilvler Units vndcr dirrck Schaolr. conlrol or ,he Nsr

smliatcd lo ,heNary

Boat Unit s v n e y Un i

Q ShipBoat Uni,

Source: Janes ' s Infor mat io n Group Ltd . China i n Cr is is : The Role o f t h eM i l i t a r y (London: Jane's Defense Data, 19891, 90.

105



PLAN COMMANDERS

X I A O J NGUANG

YE F E I

L I U H UA QING

ZHANG LIANZHONG

1 ST POL I T I CAL COE b l I SSAR

SU ZHENHUA

L I ZUOPENG

SU ZHENHUA

Y E F E I

L I YAOWEN

WE1 JINSHAN

APPENDIX C

LEADERSHIP OF THE PLAN

J A N 1 9 5 0 - J A N 1 9 8 0

J A N 1 9 8 0 - AUG 1 9 8 2

AUG 1982 - NOV 1987

NOV 1987 - PRESENT

F E B 1 9 5 7 - J U N 1 9 6 7

J U N 1 9 6 7 - S E P 1 9 7 1

MAY 1972 - F E B 1 9 7 9

F E B 1 9 7 9 - J A N 1 9 8 0

J A N 1 9 8 1 - OCT 1 9 9 3

OCT 1 9 9 3 - PRESENT



APPENDIX D

PLAN'S MAJOR NAVAL BASES AND OPERATING AREAS

Source: Tai Ming Cheung. Growth o f Chinese Naval Power: P r i o r i t i e s .Goa ls . Miss ions. and Rea iona l I m ~ l i c a t i o n S ingapo re : I n s t i t u t e o fSoutheast Asian Studies. 1990), 33.



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CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: O 8 / O5 / 95

2. Thesis Author: wDR John O'Wnne1l

3. Thesis Title: An Analysis of Yajor Developmental Influences on the

People's Liberation Army-Navy and Their Implication for the Future

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Developmental Influences on the PLA

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