Development Policymaking and the Roles of Market, State,•Government Not Better At “Getting...
Transcript of Development Policymaking and the Roles of Market, State,•Government Not Better At “Getting...
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Chapter 11
Development
Policymaking
and the Roles of
Market, State,
and Civil Society
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Outline
1. Pendulum Swings in Theory and Practice
2. Some (Brief) Case Studies
3. Democracy and Growth
4. NGOs
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1a. Pendulum Swings Left
After World War II: Planning
• Governments Adopt 5 Year Plans for Development of Various Industries/Sectors
• Governments “Mobilize” Resources (particularly S) and Direct Allocation (I)
• Often, Large Industries are State Owned
• Often, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI): High Barriers to International Trade and Capital Flows
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The Rationale for Planning
• Soviet Union Under Lenin-Stalin Became an
Industrial Economy In One Generation
• Capitalism “Failed” During Great Depression
• Other Market Failures: Incomplete Markets,
Externalities (Private Value ≠ Social Value)
• Sometimes, Plan Required To Receive
Foreign Aid From e.g. World Bank
• England Did (Roughly) The Same Thing!
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Three Levels of Planning
1. Aggregate: How much saving is needed to finance the investment level required to reach some target level of growth? How to “mobilize” that saving?
Recall the Harrod-Domar growth model of Chapter 3:
2. Sectoral: How should investment be allocated across various sectors: steel, autos, schools, etc.?
3. Project: Which specific projects within each sector are the most desirable: Cost-Benefit Analysis
/ /g Y Y s k
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Plan Failures
• “While supposedly eliminating poverty and reducing inequality, and lowering unemployment, many LDC planning policies have in fact unwittingly contributed to their perpetuation.” p. 544
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Deficiencies In The Plans
• Grandiose Talk but Lack of Detail
• Insufficient and/or Unreliable Data – What to Produce: Steel (What kind: Rolled, Re-
bar, I-beam?), Highways, Education (What Level?), Clean Water, TP?
– How to Produce: What Technology and Mix of Capital and Labor?
– For Whom to Produce: Consumers (what do they want?), Capital Goods and Inputs to other Industries (How much of what type to which ones?)
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Plan Failures
• Institutional Weaknesses: – Incompetent And Unqualified Civil Servants
– Lack of Agency Funding e.g. Census
– Cumbersome Bureaucratic Procedures
– Inter-agency Competition
– Regional/Tribal/Family Loyalties
– Corruption
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Figure 11.2 Corruption as a Regressive
Tax: The Case of Ecuador
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Problems of Planning
• Government Not Better At “Getting Prices Right”
– Raised Formal Sector Wages Above Equilibrium
– Excessively Capital Intensive Production Methods
– Ag Prices Set Too Low
– Private Returns To Education >> Social At Tertiary Level
– Real Interest Rates Set Too Low (Little Incentive for S)
– Misallocation Between Sectors, esp. Industry v Consumer
– In USSR and Eastern Europe, enormous Pollution
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1b. Pendulum Swings Right
• 1980s: Government Failure and the Preference for Markets over Planning
• The “Washington Consensus” on the Role of the State in Development and its Limitations
• The Consensus Reflected A Free Market Approach To Development Espoused By The IMF, The World Bank, And Key Government Agencies
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Table 11.1 The Washington
Consensus and East Asia
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The Market Economy
• A Well-Functioning Market Economy Requires “Institutions”
– Clear Property Rights
– Unbiased Laws And Courts To Enforce Contracts
– Freedom To Establish Business
– Stable Currency
– Public Supervision Of Natural Monopolies
– Public Management Of Some Externalities
– Stable Monetary And Fiscal Policy
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Figure 11.3 The Association between
Rule of Law and Per Capita Income
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1c. The Pendulum Swings
• Toward a New Consensus?
– Governments Must Secure Conditions For An
Effective Market Based Economy
– Importance Of Health And Education
– A Recognition That Markets Can Fail
– New Emphasis On Government's Responsibility
Toward Poverty Alleviation (T-S)
Why Nations Fail (2012) Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
• Extractive versus Inclusive Economic
Institutions
• Extractive: Intended to Remove Wealth, e.g.
Colonial Regimes in Latin America and parts
of Africa; North Korea and Congo today
• Inclusive: Provide Incentives and
Circumstances to Create Wealth; United
States and South Korea
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Inclusive Economic Institutions
• Secure Property Rights
• Rule of Law
• Public Services (esp. Education)
• Freedom to Contract
• All Provided by “Good” Government
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2. (Quick) Case Studies
a. Central Planning v. Market
• North Korea v. South Korea
• West Germany v. East Germany
• Of course, Not just Planned but also Politically
Autocratic.
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2. (Quick) Case Studies
b. Asian Tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Thailand,
Malaysia, China, Vietnam)
– Private Property Rights and Many Private Firms
– Produce for Export (v. Import Substitution), But
– Substantial Barriers to Trade and Capital Flows
– Substantial State-Owned Industries
– Government “Targeting” of Certain Industries
– Government Investments in Health and Education
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2. (Quick) Case Studies
c. India
• 1948-92: Planning, High Trade Barriers. Huge
Corrupt Bureaucracy Develops
• Slow Growth (but Green Revolution)
• Liberalized after Exchange Rate Crisis: 1992
• Reduced Trade Barriers, Reduced Regulation
• Economy Grown Much Faster
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2. (Quick) Case Studies
• Other Countries Were “Forced” (By World
Bank, IMF, USAID) To Adopt Washington
Consensus, But Economies Continued To
Stagnate
• Eastern Europe Got Rid Of Central Planning
With Mixed Results
• Importance Of Institutions To Support
Markets
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3. Democracy and Growth
• Does Democracy promote Growth?
– Democracy => Growth
• Does Capitalism (and Growth) promote
Democracy?
– Capitalism => Democracy
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3. Democracy and Growth
• Acemoglu and Robinson:
– Inclusive Political Institutions more likely
to provide Inclusive Economic Institutions
– Autocratic Political Institutions more likely
to provide Extractive Economic
Institutions
– In other Words, Democracy more likely to
result in Economic Growth
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3. Democracy and Growth
• But There Is No Robust Relationship
Democracy => Growth
– China: Autocratic and Fast Growth
– Korea: First Autocratic, then Democratic and
Fast in both Periods
– India: Democratic, Initially Slow but Faster after
1992 Reforms
– Many: Autocratic And Slow
• It isn’t so Simple …
3.5 Capitalism and Democracy
• Milton Friedman (1962)
• Economic Freedom (Capitalism) leads to
Political Freedom (Democracy)
• Capitalism => Democracy
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3.5 Capitalism and Democracy
Evidence
• Chile:
– Capitalistic Reforms under (Dictator) Pinochet
were followed by Democratic Reforms
– But Chile was Democratic before Pinochet
• S. Korea
• Taiwan
• What will happen in China?
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3.5 Capitalism and Democracy
Evidence
• Many Countries:
– Adopted Capitalistic Reforms 1970s-90s
– Adopted Democratic Reforms in 1970s-90s
– Causality?
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Democratic Trends
Freedom House Index http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_in_the_World 11-28
“Economic Freedom” as measured
by The Fraser Institute
1. (Smaller) Size of Government
2. Legal System and Property Rights
3. Sound Money (Low and Stable Inflation)
4. Freedom to Trade Internationally
5. (Less) Regulation
Fraser Institute http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html 11-29
Trends in “Economic Freedom”
Fraser Institute http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html 11-30
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4. Nongovernmental Organizations
• Nonprofit (But Sometimes Run Businesses And
Generate Surpluses)
– Innovative Design And Implementation
– Program Flexibility
– Specialized Technical Knowledge
– Common-property Resource Management
– Representation And Advocacy
Read Case Study: BRAC
Doug’s Observations - 1
• Economic Development all Over the World
(from USA and Europe to East Asia) has
Public and Private Sector Components, in
Various Combinations
– Public: Private Property, Courts, Freedom to
Contract, Education, Public Health,
Infrastructure
– Private: Most of What, How and For Who
(Production of Goods and Services), Innovation
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Case Study:
The BRAC
Model in
Bangladesh