Development Policies, Institutions and the Environment in the Uplands of Southeast Asia Agnes C....

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Development Policies, Institutions and the Environment in the Uplands of Southeast Asia Agnes C. Rola and Ian Coxhead (UP Los Baños) (UW-Madison)

Transcript of Development Policies, Institutions and the Environment in the Uplands of Southeast Asia Agnes C....

Development Policies, Institutions and the

Environment in the Uplands of Southeast Asia

Agnes C. Rola and Ian Coxhead

(UP Los Baños) (UW-Madison)

Outline of Presentation Framework of Analysis Economy-environmental linkages Institutional Context of Environmental Management Decentralization and Environmental Management Decentralized Resource Management in A Philippine

MunicipalityStudy SiteEnvironmental Consequences of DevelopmentPolicies and Institutions in Transition

Towards a Win-Win Scenario in the Late Development Period

Conclusions and lessons learned

“Once upon a time, there were traditional patterns of order and balancebetween a people’s needs and the sustainability of their resources.Authority and accountability were close to the sources of need andnature. Then came a period of disorder and destruction as resourceswere redefined to meet centralized, commercial goals of distantaccountability and whimsical market forces.”

-William Burch, 1990

Prehistory/Subsistence Economy

Early Development Late Development

Economy and Resource Use

- low population growth - resource abundance - Subsistence - slash and burn, long fallow period considered “sustainable”

- high population growth, migration - increased competition of resource use - intensive agriculture - commercializing economy - shortening of fallow period

- declining population density - highly commercial economy, and intensive resource use or - declining resource use intensity (i.e. reforestation programs)

Institutional Evolution

- -Customary Law; community resource management

- state designed institutions with no practical checks - property rights not well defined, thus resulting to “land grabs”

Ideally, - central and local institutional innovations, increasedcommunity stewardship of environment - property rights well defined Alternately, - local elite gains power - incentives not compatible with benefits

Table 1. Economic Development and Institutional Evolution for Environmental Management: A Framework of Analysis.

Subsistence Economy

Early Development Late development

Environmental Quality

Customary Laws

Breakdown of Customary Lawsopen access

property rights well definedcentral and local innovations

“business as usual” attitudeno institutional innovations

Figure 1. Pathway towards environmental sustainability

Economy-environment link

Infrastructure policy- roads and telecom integrate uplands with the market economy.

Technology policy-increasing labor productivity in lowlands reduce upland migration

Industrialization and industrial policy-reduce migration to uplands

The Institutional Context

Effects of economic and policy shifts are conditioned by:

Property rights over resources

Modes of Forest management from central to

local management

“The new independent nation-states that arose following the SecondWorld War have shown little interest in revitalizing local-level systemsof authority… (they) do not relish the thought of local political forces that might challenge the legitimacy and authority of the national government.This means that natural resources have become the “property”of the national governments in acts of outright expropriation when viewed from the perspective of the residents of millions of villages.This expropriation is all the more damaging when national governments lack the rudiments of a natural resource management capability”.

-Daniel Bromley, 1991.

Table 2. Policy context for Forest Management, selected Asian countries (Sources of Basic Data: Poffenberger, 1990, 2000, Nilo, 2000, Resosudarmo, 2002)

Policy Period

Country

Cambodia Indonesia Vietnam Philippines Thailand

1970’s to 1990’s

      Military, local elite, and foreign corporations control the forests.       All forestland belong to the state

      Centralized control      Over dependence on forest resources for national income      Log ban and vertical integration of the forest industry

      Government nationalized large areas of land in 1950s and early 1960s.

      Centralized governance of natural resources      Natural resource extraction is a primary vehicle for development.  

      Cultural communities govern forest management      National Forest Policy/Land Reform Act was implemented but did not specify environmental rights & responsibilities to communities.

1990’s – onwards

  Community Involvement is encouraged in forest management.

      Community based forest management      Timber plantation management

      Private households replace state forest enterprises.

      IP rights recognized.      Decentralization of some DENR function to local government.

      National parks and sanctuaries were established      No formal legal basis for community resource management.

Table 3. Forest Cover and Deforestation in Selected Asian Developing Countries, 1980-2000.

a Minor discrepancies in rates based on the 1980 and 1990 data are due to recent revisions by the Food and Agriculture Organization to 1990 forest and estimates.

 Source: Coxhead and Jayasuriya 2003a.Source of basic data: Food and Agriculture Organization, Forest Resources Assessment 2000 and earlier issues.

Country Average Annual Change in Forest Area (%)

1980-90a 1990-2000

Indonesia -0.8 -1.2

Malaysia -2.1 -1.2

Thailand -3.1 -0.7

Lao PDR -0.9 -0.4

Cambodia -2.4 -0.6

Philippines -3.3 -1.4

Current Challenges of Decentralization

Accountability Externalities Mismatched Mandates and Authorities Capacity Constraints

a

Table 4. Decentralization Dynamics: Selected Cases in Southeast Asia 2002.Decentralization Dynamics Study

Site Actors and power Outcomes Remarks

Nghe An province, Vietnam

District forest agencies and households gain new responsibilities

Lack of genuine consultative process Technical specifications from center

Lack of accountability Mismatched mandate and authority

Ratanakiri province, Cambodia

Budgets provided by the national government from donor funds. Provincial officials provide support

Local people lack rights to defend resources from external commercial interests.

Accountability

Luang Phabang province, Laos

Villages have increased role in land use planning. Provincial officials have increased roles in regional development planning.

Local consultative process leads to collective action Line agencies lack technical expertise.

More accountability Capability constraints

Table 4. continued….

Source of data: Except for the Philippines, data were taken from Dupar and Badenoch, 2002. The Philippine case study is from Rola, et. al. 2002. Remarks column are authors’ interpretations.

Chiang Mai province (Mae Chaem watershed), Thailand

     Villages have increased voice in development decision-making through elected tambon committee.   

     Lack of clear division of labor between local government and line agencies

     Existing community-based organizations and networks strengthen decentralization process.

            Mismatched mandate and authority

Bukidnon,(Manupali Watershed) Philippines

     Local government has fiscal powers.     Community-based group has no legal support  

     Fiscal decentralization is an avenue to exploit natural resources to generate funds.

     Watershed level coordination among different communities is lacking.

         Lack of accountability        Externality problems

Study Site

Figure 2. Maagnao and Kulasihan Watersheds. .

Figure 3. Annual population growth rate, Lantapan and Philippines, 1970-2000.

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0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

4.50

1970-80 1980-1990 1990-2000

Lantapan

Philippines

Figure 4. Changes in tree cover in the Mount Kitanglad Protected Park and buffer zone. .

Figure 5. Increase and Decrease in vegetation throughout the entire watershed.

Figure 7. Specific discharge and sediment yield estimates of the Maagnao and Kulasihan River subwatersheds, 1997-99 (from Deutsch and Orprecio, 2002).

Figure 6. Average Total Suspended Solids (TSS) for Regular Sampling at Four Watersheds from September 1994 to December 2002 (mg/L).

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10

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Tugasan Maagnao Alanib Kulasihan

Institutions in TransitionGovernance Level Management Function Management Entity

(Institution)

National level

Provincial level

Municipality level

Village/Barangay Level

To maintain ecological balance

Enforcement of forestry laws diverted to community-based forestry projects 

 

water and soil resource utilization and conservation; community-based forestry projects  

 

 Monitor Poaching, Forest Fires, other peoples’ initiatives

Department of

Environment and Natural

Resources;Phil. Council for Sustainable Dev.

Provincial Environment and Natural

Resources Office

Municipal Environment and Natural

Resources Office

People’s Organizations/NGO

Multilevel Institutions

1. The Protected Area Management Board

2. The Bukidnon Watershed Protection and Development Council

3. The Lantapan Watershed Management Council

Towards a Win-win Scenario

1. Better accountability requires genuine decentralization

2. Addressing the externality problem requires watershed based institutions and policies.

3. Market-based mechanisms can support sustainable upland management, but only if the appropriate institutions are in place.

Case study conclusions

Case study results show that deforestation rates have reduced

Intensified upland agriculture in response to markets, and

Degradation occurs as policies and institutions are not catching up with the pressures of economic development.

Lessons Learned:

1. People and social structures are central to sustainability

2. Participatory Research at all levels

3. Build capacity

4. Understand institutions, and

5. Aid in the design of decision tools for environmental policy

Thank You