The Historical Development of Law of Torts in England

National University of Advanced Legal StudiedThe Historical Development of Law of Torts in EnglandHistory of Statutory Law and Presumptions Project

SUBMITTED BY:SINDHU SAMBRANIROLL NO. 800II SEMESTERNUALS3/18/2013

Historical Development of Law of Torts in EnglandIntroduction

Torts are civil wrongs recognized by law as grounds for a lawsuit. These wrongs result in an injury or harm constituting the basis for a claim by the injured party. While some torts are also crimes punishable with imprisonment, the primary aim of tort law is to provide relief for the damages incurred and deter others from committing the same harms. The injured person may sue for an injunction to prevent the continuation of the tortious conduct or for monetary damages.[footnoteRef:2] [2: Legal Information Institute, Cornell law School, Tort, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort, Last visited on 4/3/2013]

The word tort has been derived from the Latin term tortum, which means to twist. It therefore, includes that conduct which is not straight or lawful, but on the other hand, twisted, crooked or unlawful.[footnoteRef:3] Tort is a civil,[footnoteRef:4] private[footnoteRef:5] wrong whereby the wrongdoer violates the rights of another person in society, thereby violating the wrongdoers duty to respect the rights vested in every member of the society.[footnoteRef:6] [3: R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts, (9th ed.1986), p.6] [4: ibid] [5: B.M. Gandhi, Law of Torts, (2nd ed.2002), p.3] [6: See generally: R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts, (9th ed.1986), p.6]

Originally, there was no distinction between various wrongs and there was no compartmentalisaion like crime, tort or breach of contract etc. Various writs governed the position. In the fourteenth century, under Common Law, the success of an action depended wholly on the availability of a writ. The law was Ubi remedium ibi jus (where there is a remedy there is a right) The plaintiff had to choose from a list of writs, the right writ that fits his/her cause of action. If a writ did not pertain to a particular right, the right was not recognized. The procedural system was incredibly rigid for some 500 years. In 1832 and 1833, some amendments were made, and ultimately in 1852, Common Law Procedure Act was passed whereby the writs were abolished. Judicature Act, 1873 further provided that the pleading was to contain only a statement of the summary of the facts of the case. Now the law has become Ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right there is a remedy). The creation of new torts from time to time shows the flexibility and justice of the Common Law Courts of England.[footnoteRef:7] [7: R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts, (9th ed.1986), p.1]

In this paper, you will find a brief introduction of Tort Law or Tortious liability; the paper will discuss the history and development of Tort Law in England not in general, but with specific reference to three torts- Trespass (to land), Negligence, and Defamation. The tort of Trespass has an ancient history, and was one of the first torts to be recognized. I will trace it from its origin. Under Negligence, I will be dealing with its recognized elements as of today, and how these elements developed (majorly through case laws). The tort of defamation will be divided into slander and libel, and their individual development under various courts shall be examined. All three Torts have been developed through Common Law in England, and thus have a dynamic past and a stable present.

Tort of Trespass to Land

Trespass to land means interference with the possession of land without lawful justification. In trespass, the interference with the possession is direct and through some tangible object. If the interference is not direct but consequential, the wrong may be a nuisance.[footnoteRef:8] To throw stones upon ones neighbours premises is a wrong of trespass; to allow a stone from a ruinous chimney to fall upon those premises is the wrong of nuisance. [footnoteRef:9] [8: R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts, (9th ed.1986), p.387] [9: Salmond on Torts, (14th ed.), p.72]

Trespass could be committed either by a person himself entering the land of another person or doing the same through some material object e.g., throwing of stones on another persons land driving nails into the wall, placing ladder against the wall or leaving debris upon the roof. It is however no trespass when there is no interference with the possession and the defendant has been merely deprived of certain facilities like gas and electricity.[footnoteRef:10] [10: R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts, (9th ed.1986), p.387]

Going beyond the purpose for which a person has entered certain premises or crossing the boundary where he has the authority to go, amount to trespass. Thus, if a person, who is allowed to sit in a drawing room, enters the bed room without any justification, the entry into the bed room is a trespass.Trespass is a wrong against possession rather than ownership. Therefore, a person in actual possession can bring an action even though, as against the true owner, his possession was wrongful.[footnoteRef:11] [11: Ibid. at p.388]

Originally, since most torts were also regarded as criminal actions, the defendant typically was punished by the King according to the criminal laws. In time, however, the King also began to allow individual victims of the defendant's tortious (i.e., criminal) conduct to sue for their own personal damages as well.[footnoteRef:12] The writ of trespass was developed before 1250 as a sort of civil version of the felony for this purpose. [footnoteRef:13]Actually, those actions based upon trespass were divided into several sub-categories, each with its own separate writ associated with particular types of misconduct. Trespass de bonis asportatis was used for damages to the plaintiff's goods which had been "carried away" by the defendant. Trespass quare clausum fregit was used in cases where the defendant physically intruded onto the plaintiff's land by "breaking the imaginary close" that represented the boundary line which surrounded the property ( relevant in the case of writ of trespass to land). Finally, trespass vi et armis was used for those other Tort actions whereby the plaintiff suffered injury to person or property by virtue of the defendant's direct and forceful misconduct. [12: Prof. Edward C. Martin, The English Common Law Writ System, http://netlaw.samford.edu/Martin/torts1/writhistory.htm, Last visited on 16/3/2013 ] [13: Trespass: The Origin of Everything, http://www.slesher.com/trespass.html, Last visited on 16/3/2013]

What the writs of trespass had in common was that they involved forcible, or at least intentional, action that directly resulted in injury. Lawyers tried to fit their cases into one of these writs since, if they could not, they had no case. While courts allowed some flexibility in their use, the basics had always to apply: direct harm; forcibly caused. So, when a landholder chopped down a tree and it landed on his neighbour, that could be squeezed into a trespass writ; but where the tree landed on the road and a passerby stumbled over it after dark, there was no direct injury and therefore no trespass.

To correct this problem a statute of 1285 allowed writs of trespass to be issued in consimili casu, "in similar cases." Non-specific writs of trespass could now be obtained if the fact situation were similar to those covered by traditional writs (as those had come to be interpreted by the courts) even if the injuries were not direct. A trespass in consimili casu was referred to as trespass on the case or simply case. The freedom of action allowed by actions on the case was not quickly taken advantage of and it is not until Edward IIIs reign (1327-1377) that we begin to see significant numbers of writs called trespass that cannot fit the traditional definitions.[footnoteRef:14] [14: Prof. Edward C. Martin, The English Common Law Writ System, http://netlaw.samford.edu/Martin/torts1/writhistory.htm, Last visited on 16/3/2013]

Even so, this "new" writ remained distinguishable from the original trespass writ in two very important particulars: (1) it was only available for indirect (as opposed to direct) injuries; and (2) the plaintiff was required to prove some actual harm (as opposed to merely presuming harm from the fact of the tortious invasion itself).[footnoteRef:15] [15: Writ of Trespass on the Case, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Writ+of+trespass+on+the+case, Last visited on 16/3/2013]

Even though today the common law no longer recognizes these early English writs, their impact on the individual Tort causes of action which subsequently evolved from these two early trespass writs is nonetheless quite profound. Among our modern Tort causes of action, five specific Intentional Tort actions can be traced directly back to the common law writ of trespass. Interestingly, these Torts (Assault, Battery, False Imprisonment, Trespass to Land and Trespass to Chattels) are the only Torts which still to this day do not require some type of proof of injury in order to be actionable. Moreover, they are also the only intentional Torts in which the requisite intent can be transferred from one to another. Indeed, each of these Torts can be established merely upon the most "technical" showing of an intentional act (i.e., an intent "to do the act"). Most other modern Intentional Tort causes of action require at least some kind of specific intent (i.e., intent to cause emotional distress; an intent to defame; etc), as well as proof of some actual harm to the plaintiff (as compared with merely presuming such harm). Indeed, the modern Tort of "Negligence" has derived directly from the trespass on the case writ.[footnoteRef:16] [16: Prof. Edward C. Martin, The English Common Law Writ System, http://netlaw.samford.edu/Martin/torts1/writhistory.htm, Last visited on 16/3/2013]

Tort of Negligence

Negligence may mean a mental element in tortious liability or it may mean an independent tort. In this paper, we are concerned with negligence as a tort in itself.[footnoteRef:17] [17: W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, (17th ed.2006), p.132]

The tort of negligence may be defined as a breach of duty or a failure of one party to exercise the standard of care required by law, resulting in damage to the party to whom the duty was owed. [footnoteRef:18] [18: Ibid.]

Thus we can note that the negligence of tort consists of three elements: (1) a legal duty on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff to exercise care in such conduct of the defendant as falls within the scope of the duty; (2) breach of that duty, i.e., failure to come up to the standard of care required by law; and (3) consequential damage to the plaintiff which can be attributed to the defendants conduct.[footnoteRef:19] [19: Ibid.]

The modern concept of negligence and the three elements therein were only developed after 1932, through the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson[footnoteRef:20], as the duty of care was not a concept that was recognized prior to this case. The aforementioned case shall be dealt with later on in this paper.[footnoteRef:21] [20: (1932) AC 562 H. L.] [21: Ibid at p.157]

Although the modern concept didnt exist, negligence existed in different forms in the past. Some eight hundred (800) years ago, there existed in common law very little or no concern by the state regarding individuals and their interactions.[footnoteRef:22] [22: UBC Law Students, History of the law of Torts and Negligence, www.ubclss.org/CANs/semester%202%20notes.doc, Last visited on 15/3/2013 ]

In the fourteenth century, the monarchy began to take an interest in individual interactions. The Law of Torts saw its rise with the introduction on the Tort of Trespass. However, a party wanting to bring an action for trespass had to follow strict forms- their trespass must fit a writ.In the fifteenth century, the concept of actions on the case developed in response to the narrowness of the writ system. This brought about some sense of justice as it broadened the scope of a plaintiffs claims, and later, it developed into the form of nuisance, some other torts, and negligence.

This early negligence only applied to certain cases such as apothecaries, doctors/surgeons, and other people who served the public in a professional capacity, and for whom there was a general accepted standard of appropriate conduct. They had a duty of care to the public, unlike private individuals at that time.In the latter half of the eighteenth century, negligence developed in a way that they could be indirect, as opposed to the directness required by the trespass torts. Trespass torts required the direct action of an individual to interfere with anothers ownership of their rightful property, such as in the case of Scott v. Sheppard.[footnoteRef:23] Duty was first put forward as a unifying concept in the law of tort in Bullers Nisi Prius (An Institute of the Law elative to Trials at Nisi Prius), published in 1768, in which it was suggested that:[footnoteRef:24] [23: Ibid.] [24: Negligence, http://bookshop.blackwell.co.uk/extracts/9780199211364_lunney.pdf, Last visited on 15/3/2013]

Every man ought to take reasonable care that he does not injure his neighbour; therefore, wherever a man receives hurt through the default of another, though the same were not wilful, yet if it be occasioned by negligence or folly the law gives him an action to recover for the injury so sustained. . . . However, it is proper in such cases to prove that the injury was such as would probably follow from the act done.[footnoteRef:25] [25: Ibid.]

In the 1800s, instead of focusing on causation, courts began to see fault as most important for actions on the case. With this shift in focus, it became less necessary to restrict actions to the pre-set categories. There was an attempt to develop a more general theory/principled approach to negligence. However, this century saw some cases where a plaintiffs claim against a private individual under the tort of negligence failed in court, simply because the courts seemed afraid of the repercussions of letting a third party, not a party to a contract, sue for damages.[footnoteRef:26] [26: UBC Law Students, History of the law of Torts and Negligence, www.ubclss.org/CANs/semester%202%20notes.doc, Last visited on 15/3/2013]

The question of whether a plaintiff who was not party to the initial contract of sale or supply should be able to claim the benefit of the warranty given thereunder by the manufacturer or supplier came up, and this was addressed through certain cases such as Heaven v. Pender[footnoteRef:27] and Winterbottom v. Wright .[footnoteRef:28] [27: (1883) 11 QBD 503] [28: (1842) 10 M & W 109]

The plaintiff entered into a contract with the Postmaster General to drive a mail coach. The coach had been supplied to the Postmaster General by the defendant under a contract which provided that during the term of the contract, the coach was to be kept in a fit, proper, safe and secure state. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently conducted himself, and so utterly disregarded his aforesaid contract and so wholly neglected and failed to perform him duty in this behalf, that the plaintiff was injured when the coach collapsed, throwing him off his seat.

This plaint lapsed in court. Lord Abinger C. B., in his judgement, commented saying that there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant, and if the plaintiff could sue, then any passenger, or any person on the road who was hurt by this mishap could bring a similar action. He said that unless they confined the operation of such contracts, to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which [he could] see no limit, would ensue He continues to say that there are certain classes of contracts that can be turned into torts, but only in cases where a public duty has been undertaken, or a public nuisance committed. In cases other than what is mentioned above, the actions available must be restricted to parties to a contract.[footnoteRef:29] [29: See generally: Negligence, http://bookshop.blackwell.co.uk/extracts/9780199211364_lunney.pdf, Last visited on 15/3/2013]

The notion that liability in negligence was based on the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the claimant was slow to take hold but by the early part of the nineteenth century it was said that the plaintiff had the right to compensation or damages for the negligent or wilful conduct of the party sued, in doing or omitting something contrary to the duty which the law casts on him in the particular case. This, however, still left the question, of when the law casts such a duty on the defendant, unanswered.[footnoteRef:30] [30: ibid]

The case of Donoghue v. Stevenson was instrumental in answering this question, and in the advent of duty of care as recognized in the modern context.

The facts of Donoghue v. Stevenson were as follows: Friend of Donoghue (P) purchased a dark, opaque bottle of ginger-beer and gave it to P. P drank some ginger beer, and poured some over her ice-cream, before her friend discovered a decomposed snail in the bottle. P sued the manufacturer for psychological harm (shock) and gastroenteritis (stomach flu).[footnoteRef:31] [31: MAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson: http://casebrief.me/casebriefs/malister-donoghue-v-stevenson/, Last visited on 17/3/2013]

Her claim was successful. This case established the modern law of negligence and established the neighbour test.[footnoteRef:32] [32: Donoghue v. Stevenson, http://www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Donoghue-v-Stevenson.php, Last visited on 17/3/2013]

Atkins J set up prima facie duty of care based on the neighbourhood principle. In his judgement he said:

"The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question "Who is my neighbour?" receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question" [footnoteRef:33] [33: (1932) AC 562 at p 580.]

Another important case in the development of the tort of negligence is Hedley Byrne v. Heller & Partners[footnoteRef:34] [34: (1964), AC 465 H. L.]

Hedley Byrne was an advertising company that asked its banker for a report on the financial position of one of its clients, whom it was doing work on credit for. Hedleys banker asked the clients banker (Heller) for a report. Crucially, there was no contractual relationship between Hedley Byrne and Heller.Heller provided a report that was stated to be given without responsibility to Hedleys bankers and showed the client to be in a strong financial position. Hedleys bankers sent the report to Hedley, which relied on the contents and continued to provide services on credit. The client went into liquidation and Hedley sued Heller for its negligent report. In a landmark judgment, the House of Lords held that, in the absence of the without responsibility disclaimer, Hedley would have had a successful claim. Their Lordships ruled the law imposes a duty of care on an advisor with specialist skill and knowledge who knows or ought to know that his or her special skill is being relied on, even if he or she is not in a contract with the person relying on the information.[footnoteRef:35] [35: Arthur Wardhaugh, Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (1964), http://www.supplymanagement.com/law/court-reports/2011/hedley-byrne-co-ltd-v-heller-partners-ltd-1964/, Last visited on 17/3/2013]

As one may have noticed, the duty of care is the main principle on which the tort of negligence is based, and the two aforementioned cases had an important impact in determining the situations in which this duty of care exists. The second principle, though less important, is to what extent this duty of care exists, i.e., the standard of care. This element has been elucidated in certain cases and through certain texts.Standard of care: Generally, the expected standard of care is that the reasonable person is equipped with the same skills and expertise as others in similar situation, which in essence is indifferent to each situation (Blay etc. 2008). The decision in case Cook v. Cook [1986] showed a different standard of care applied in an inexperienced person. Further, the standard of care gives way to standard of children of the relevant age and experience, which has been shown in the case Waverley Council v. Ferreira [1966] that the standard of care was that of a 12-year-old child.[footnoteRef:36] [36: See general: Negligence, http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/outlines/html/torts/torts03.htm, Last visited on 16/3/2013]

Thus one may conclude that different standards of care are expected of different people in varying circumstances, but the general rule is that of the average person, or a man on the red omnibus.Although a new tort in its current sense, the Tort of negligence has become an important tort, as it forms one of the three kinds of torts, namely, (i) intentional torts, (ii) negligence and (iii) strict liability torts, actionable in a court of law. [footnoteRef:37] [37: Types of Torts, http://torts.uslegal.com/types-of-torts/, Last visited on 16/3/2013]

Tort of Defamation

Defamation is the publication of a statement which reflects on a persons reputation and tends to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or tends to make them shun or avoid him.[footnoteRef:38] [38: W.H.V. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, (17th ed. 2002), p.515]

By 1882, it was established that even an innuendo can be defamatory. A statement could sometimes be innocent prima facie but because of some latent or secondary meaning it may be considered to be defamatory.[footnoteRef:39] In Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty and Sons,[footnoteRef:40] we saw that where there are a number of possible explanations, it is not reasonable to pick on the one that is defamatory of the claimant. Thus, a statement would be deemed defamatory through innuendo only if a reasonable person would infer that particular defamatory explanation as opposed to any other innocent explanation.[footnoteRef:41] [39: R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts, (9th ed.1986), p.195] [40: (1882) 7 A. C. p.741] [41: See general: W.V.H Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, (17th ed. 2002), p.526]

Slander and Libel:English law divides actions for defamation into Slander and Libel.[footnoteRef:42] [42: R.K. Bangia Law of Torts (9th ed.1986), p.189]

Slander:In common with most of the Germanic systems, prior to the 11th century, Anglo-Saxon law was particularly concerned with insulting words addressed by one person to another. This was an offence which it punished with severity, sometimes with the excision of the tongue. Bot and wite were due for certain terms of abuse before the Norman Conquest(1066 A.D.), and long after the Conquest local courts frequently entertained cases of insult; such jurisdiction was naturally left to the local courts, for they alone could secure amends (fines or humiliating confessions) before the same community that had witnessed the affront. [footnoteRef:43] [43: Mary Batesson, Borough Customs (Selden Society), p.78]

Gradually it becomes apparent that local courts are giving remedy for words which are not merely insults addressed to the plaintiff, but rather statements to his prejudice addressed to other persons. The remedy also takes the form of a civil action for damages rather than that of a criminal prosecution for a petty misdemeanor. There exists an interesting case in 1333 where the county court of Bedford tried an action in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant called him a false and faithless fellow, whereby he was prevented from raising a loan which was being negotiated.[footnoteRef:44] [44: Text and translation in Plucknett, The County Court, Harvard Law Review, XLII., p.668]

Up until 1275, for serious matters of slander, the church was the most practicable jurisdiction.[footnoteRef:45] The Kings Courts didnt take up matters of defamation and admitted that the Church had unfettered authority on this matter. But the King, like other lords, could not stand by while someone was saying that there is no justice in the lords court, nor could he tolerate similar statements about his principal officers. Thus, in 1275, we see the beginning of a statute called scandalum magnatum, the slander of magnates. This statute enacted that one who publishes false news or scandal tending to produce discord between the King and his people or the magnates shall be kept in prison until he produces in court the originator of the tale. This dealt particularly with political statements, and defendants were prosecuted under the Kings Court.[footnoteRef:46] [45: Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (1956), http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=2458&chapter=243142&layout=html&Itemid=27, Last visited on 14/3/2013] [46: Ibid.]

Down till the 17th century, the Common Law courts dealt only with civil remedies and awarding damages, as the ecclesiastical courts and Star Chamber, which monopolized criminal procedures, provided the Common Law courts no room for criminal proceedings. However in 1641, with the lapse of the Star Chamber, the Common Law courts deemed slander as criminally actionable in certain cases. Slanders actionable per se were originally (1) imputations of temporal crimes, but by the close of this period, (2) reflections on fitness for office, skill in trade or profession, and (3) imputations of certain diseases were added to the list.[footnoteRef:47] [47: See in general: Ibid.]

Much later, more than two centuries in the future, a fourth category was added to this list. Slander is actionable in English courts if there is an (4) imputation of unchastity or adultery to any woman or a girl, under the Slander of Women Act, 1891[footnoteRef:48] [48: R. K. Bangia, Law of Torts (9th ed.1986), p.190]

Libel: Libel is defamatory representation made in some permanent form, e.g., writing, printing, picture, effigy or statue.[footnoteRef:49] [49: Ibid. at p.189]

Libel saw its origin in the statute of scandalum magnatum, 1275 when Edward Coke was the Attorney-General of the Star Chamber. Libel, as even of today, was treated as a tort as well as a crime, while slander was merely a tort. We could see this as the Common Law courts gave a civil action for damages on scandalum magnatum, but the Star Chamber concentrated mainly on the crime, while preserving the principles and name of the statute and borrowing influences from Roman law, thus giving rise to the crime of libel.[footnoteRef:50] [50: Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (1956), http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=2458&chapter=243142&layout=html&Itemid=27, Last visited on 14/3/2013]

In the 17th century, more specifically in 1641, the Star Chamber collapsed, and consequently there was confusion for twenty years as to the remaining courts jurisdiction. Later however, it was concluded that the Court of Kings Bench succeeded to as much of the Star Chambers jurisdiction as was consistent with the then constitutional thought. Consequently the Star Chambers law of libel was henceforth to be administered by the same court as had developed the common law of slander; inevitably the two bodies of law were bound to influence each other, and tended to become more coherently combined into something approaching a systematic law of defamation.[footnoteRef:51] [51: Ibid.]

In the 16th century, once printing became cost effective and rampant across Europe, a long line of proclamations and statutes came up to deal with the new menace that came with press printing. According to one enactment, printing might constitute a statutory treason,[footnoteRef:52] and succeeding statutes settled a policy of treating printing as an overt action of treason.[footnoteRef:53] Still more numerous were the proclamations which regulated the book trade. As early as 1538 a proclamation required a licence from the Privy Council or a bishop before any English book could be printed,[footnoteRef:54] and for a century and a half there is a steady stream of proclamations directed against unlicensed printing, and heretical and seditious literature. The system of licensing plays was regulated by proclamation[footnoteRef:55] in 1661, although it was in fact a century old by this time, and many statutes from 1543 onwards punished profane interludes and plays. Statutory in its origin, the control of the stage was finally appropriated as part of the prerogative after the Restoration. A proclamation of 1668 tried to prevent the hawking of newspapers in the streets,[footnoteRef:56]and in 1688 the peddling of books was forbidden,[footnoteRef:57] after a vain attempt to license the peddlers. [52: Tanner, Tudor Constitutional Documents, p.386] [53: (1547) Edw. VI, c. 12, s. 6 ] [54: Steele, Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, p.176] [55: ibid., p.3316] [56: Steele, op. cit., p. 3516] [57: ibid., p. 3859]

Until the 20th century, Libel was known to be only in the form of things one could see, and slander dealt with defamatory actions that one could hear. However, in Youssoupoff v. M. G. M. Pictures Ltd.(1934),[footnoteRef:58] it was established that even the speech that synchronizes with the photographic part of a cinema film is also considered to be libel.[footnoteRef:59] Slesser L. J. observed: [58: (1934) 50 T. L. R., p.581] [59: R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts (9th ed.1986), p.189]

There can be no doubt that, so far as the photographic part of the exhibition is concerned, that is a permanent matter to be seen by the eye, and is the proper subject of an action for libel, if defamatory. I regard the speech which is synchronized with the photographic reproduction and forms part of one complex, common exhibition as an ancillary circumstance, part of the surroundings explaining that which is to be seen.[footnoteRef:60] [60: (1934) 50 T. L. R., p.587]

The Defamation Act, 1952 provides that broadcasting of words by means of wireless telegraphy shall be treated as publication in permanent form and thus may be a proper subject of an action for libel.[footnoteRef:61] [61: R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts, (9th ed.1986), p.189]

These are the developments of slander and libel in England till date. There is still no clear consensus on the difference between slander and libel, as some like to include permanent auditory information as libel[footnoteRef:62], while others such as Winfield still feel it is slander.[footnoteRef:63] Hopefully in the coming years, through more judgments and statutes, a uniform opinion on defamation and the two elements shall arise. [62: Salmond, Torts, (17th ed.), p.139] [63: R.K. Bangia, Law of Torts, (9th ed.1986), p.190]

ConclusionWe have seen how Tort law has evolved over more than 800 years, and what an important place it holds in our lives today. In the landscape of legal instruments, Tort Law is but a minute speck, yet, it is momentous, as without it, a lack of protection of rights would exist. Tort law protects every private individuals rights from anothers encroachment into it. Tort law acts as a security blanket in the legal context today. Although it had not been codified, Tort law is still practiced in the civil jurisdiction of most Common Law countries today. It continues to evolve, with the advent of upcoming Torts such as Tort of Cyber trespass, which shows that Common Law is not fixed, but flexible and adapts to changing times. Whether Tort Law is more important than Criminal Law or other forms of Civil Law is an indiscernible answer, but we do however know that each is required to protect individuals from various harms in society. Tort Law arose out of necessity, as necessity is the mother of all inventions, and this invention has evolved so as to almost become unrecognizable from its original form today. Yet it retains the essential, original character and principles for which it was created and valued in the first place.

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