Development, Demography, And Climate Change

On Development, Demography and Climate Change:The End of the World as We Know it?

Tim DysonLondon School of Economics

This paper comments on the issue of global warming and climate change, in anattempt to provide fresh perspective. Essentially, five main arguments are made. First,that the process of modern economic development has been based on the burning offossil fuels, and that this will continue to apply for the foreseeable future. Second, thatin large part due to momentum in economic and demographic processes, it isinevitable that there will be a major rise in atmospheric CO2 during the presentcentury. Third, that available data on global temperatures suggest strongly that thecoming warming will be appreciably faster than anything that humanity has expe-rienced during historical times. Moreover, especially in a system that is being forced,the chance of an abrupt change in climate happening must be rated as fair. Fourth,that while it is impossible to attach precise probabilities to different scenarios, therange of plausible unpleasant climate outcomes seems at least as great as the range ofmore manageable ones. The consequences of future climate change may be con-siderable; indeed, they could be almost inconceivable—with several negativechanges occurring simultaneously and to cumulative adverse effect. There is anurgent need to improve ways of thinking about what could happen. Fifth, the paper

This paper is a personal assessment of what is occurring with respect to the subject of globalwarming and climate change. Nevertheless it is an attempt to examine the topic objectively.The paper tries to concentrate on the essentials—from both the social and the environmentalsciences—and, quite deliberately, it presents basic data on the subject for the reader’s ownconsideration. The paper’s subtitle is taken from a television program broadcast in January 2005as part of UK Channel Four’s War on Terra season. I thank Tim Forsyth, Chris Wilson, andespecially Brian O’Neill for their help and advice. However, and most certainly, the usualdisclaimer applies.

Please address correspondence to Tim Dyson, Development Studies Institute, LondonSchoolof Economics, Houghton Street, Aldwych, WC2A 2AE London, UK; e-mail: [email protected]

117Population and Environment, Vol. 27, No. 2, November 2005 � 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.

DOI: 10.1007/s11111-006-0017-2

maintains that the human response to other difficult ‘long’ threats—such as that posedby HIV/AIDS—reveals a broadly analogous sequence of social reactions (e.g. denial,avoidance, recrimination) to that which is unfolding with respect to carbon emissionsand climate change. Therefore the view expressed here is that major behavioralchange to limit world carbon emissions is unlikely in the foreseeable future, and thatthe broad sway of future events is probably now set to run its course.

KEY WORDS: climate change; economic development; population growth.

INTRODUCTION

Global warming and climate change receive a huge amount of atten-tion. Whether the world is heating up, the implications for the climate, andthe possible long run consequences for humanity, are all topics that arenever far from the newspaper headlines. It is clear that the issues involvedare uncertain, complex, and often the object of controversy. Therefore itmight be thought that little can be gained from a general social scientificconsideration of the subject—one that starts from a concern with devel-opment and demography.

The view taken here, however, is that looking at global warming andclimate change in historical perspective, examining the subject in the round(i.e. drawing on material from both the social and the environmental sci-ences), treating scientific study of it as a form of social activity, comparinghuman responses to it with those evidenced in relation to broadly analogousissues, and, above all, standing back from the subject—so as not to miss thewood for the trees—can yield fresh insights both about what is happeningand about what may happen.

Accordingly, the present paper—which in large part is commentary—isan attempt to provide fresh perspective on global warming and climatechange. It adopts an holistic approach, and essentially forwards five mainpoints. First, that since about 1800 economic development has been basedon the burning of fossil fuels, and that this will continue to apply for theforeseeable future. Although there will doubtless be increases in the use ofrenewable energy sources, and rises in the efficiency with which energy isused, there is no real alternative to the continued use of coal, oil and naturalgas for the purpose of economic development. Second, that mainly due tomomentum in economic and demographic processes, it is inevitable thatthere will be a major rise in atmospheric CO2 during the 21st century.Demographic and CO2 emissions data will be presented to help substantiate

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POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

this point. Third, that the available data suggest that the coming rise inglobal temperatures, which itself will result partly from momentum in cli-mate processes, will be appreciably faster than anything that human pop-ulations have experienced during historical times. Moreover, particularly ina system that is being forced, there must be a reasonable chance of theoccurrence of an abrupt change in climate. Fourth, that while it is impos-sible to attach precise probabilities to different scenarios, the chances of anunpleasant climate outcome occurring are at least as great as the chances ofa more manageable one. The agricultural, political, economic, demo-graphic, social and other consequences of future climate change could bevery considerable. In a more populous world of eight or nine billion people,adverse developments could well occur on several fronts simultaneously,and to cumulative adverse effect. Related to this, it will be argued here thatthere is a pressing need to improve our ways of thinking about what mayhappen—because current prognostications tend to be routine, predictableand restricted. Finally, the paper argues that humanity’s experience of an-other difficult ‘long’ threat—HIV/AIDS—reveals a broadly analogous se-quence of human reactions. In short: (i) scientific understanding advancesrapidly, but (ii) avoidance, denial, and recrimination characterize theoverall societal response, therefore (iii) there is relatively little behavioralchange, until (iv) evidence of damage becomes plain. Apropos cli-mate change, however, the opinion expressed here is that major behavioralchange to limit world carbon emissions is unlikely to happen in the fore-seeable future.

There certainly is uncertainty about what will happen. But the basicdata on trends in atmospheric CO2 and world temperature—presentedhere—are fairly easy to understand and not in serious dispute. Moreover,despite impressions to the contrary, there is a scientific consensus on thereality of human-induced climate change. It is suggested here that the broadcourse of future events is probably now set to run its course.

DEVELOPMENT, DEMOGRAPHY AND ENERGY USE

The modern processes of economic and demographic developmentboth have their origins in the European Enlightenment. It was in the secondhalf of the 18th century that the first glimmerings of the demographictransition occurred in countries like France, England, Denmark and Hol-land. And this period also saw the birth of the so-called ‘Industrial Revo-lution’ in Britain—with the associated, momentous new phenomenon of‘modern economic growth’ (Kuznets, 1966).

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Before the Industrial Revolution all economies everywhere were ex-tremely constrained in what they could produce. Borrowing a term fromWrigley (1988), pre-industrial economies were ‘organic’—in that virtuallyall of their products were ultimately dependent upon capturing solar energythrough the exploitation of wood and other vegetative matter that grew onthe land.

The Industrial Revolution transformed this situation through the massexploitation of coal, which in turn spurred a host of cumulative economicinteractions. Britain’s annual production of coal in 1800 was about 15million tons—when the combined output for the rest of Europe was probablyunder 3 million tons. Burning 15 million tons of coal provided the Britisheconomy with roughly the same amount of heat as the wood that could havebeen harvested, on a sustainable basis, from about 6 million hectares of land(Wrigley, 1988:54–55). This revolution in industrial production, however,could not be constrained to one country, and by the middle of the 19thcentury the use of coal was rising steeply elsewhere in Europe. The UnitedStates came to coal a little later—mainly because it had plentiful supplies oftimber to burn. But by the mid-1880s coal had become the main source ofenergy in the US. And, as a result of these developments, it is estimated thatthe world’s annual production of coal reached about 701 million tons in1900 and 1454 million tons by 1950 (Cipolla, 1967:55). Today the annualcoal production figure is roughly 4.1 billion tons (i.e. about 2,778 milliontons in oil equivalent) and rising (British Petroleum, 2005).

With the United States in the vanguard, the 20th century saw rapid risesin the exploitation of oil and natural gas. The US had large reserves of oil.And from early in the 20th century its oil industry expanded fast—spurredby the development of oil-burning furnaces, the spread of car ownership,the rise of aviation, and growth in the production of petrochemicals. Themass exploitation of natural gas (e.g. in electricity generation, and forhousehold heating and cooking) had to await the development of highpressure pipeline technologies in the US during the 1930s. In both Europeand Japan the diversification away from coal, towards oil and gas, occurredseveral decades later (Ponting, 1993).

The implications of these trends for world energy use are shown inTable 1. Oil has been the most important fuel since the 1960s. By 2004 oilaccounted for about 37% of global energy use, followed by coal and gas inroughly equal proportions (about 27 and 24% respectively). Nuclear andhydro each accounted for around 6%. By 2004 global use of fossil fuels wasequivalent to the burning of about 8.96 billion tons of oil each year. Noticethat growth in the world’s annual consumption of fossil fuels shows littlesign of waning. Thus during 1980–1990 the combined use of coal, oil and

120


TA

BLE

1

Worl

dEn

ergy

Supplies

,1950–2

004

Yea

r

Coal

pro

duct

ion

(mto

e)

Oil

pro

duct

ion

(mil

l.to

ns)

Nat

ura

lga

spro

duct

ion

(mto

e)Tota

lfo

ssil

fuel

s(m

toe)

Nucl

ear

ener

gyco

nsu

mpti

on

(mto

e)

Hyd

roco

nsu

mpti

on

(mto

e)Tota

l(m

toe)

1950

884

518

187

1589

––

1589

1960

1271

1049

458

2778

––

2778

1970

1359

2355

919

4633

17

269

4919

1980

1708

3088

1311

6107

161

387

6655

1990

2254

3168

1800

7222

453

494

8169

2000

2112

3604

2190

7906

584

614

9104

2004

2778

3767

2420

8965

624

634

10,2

23

Note

s:A

llfigu

res

are

inm

illi

on

tons

of

oil

equiv

alen

t(m

toe)

and

should

be

rega

rded

asonly

bro

adly

indic

ativ

e.O

ne

mil

lion

tons

of

oil

equiv

alen

teq

ual

sap

pro

xim

atel

y1.5

mil

lion

tons

ofhar

dco

al.W

orl

dnucl

ear

gener

atin

gca

pac

ity

was

insi

gnifi

cantin

1960,butth

eto

talfigu

res

give

nab

ove

for

1950

and

1960

are

slig

ht

under

esti

mat

esbec

ause

they

conta

inno

allo

wan

cefo

rhyd

ro.

Ther

ew

ere

min

or

dis

crep

anci

esbet

wee

nso

me

of

the

tim

ese

ries

use

dab

ove

,but

they

can

safe

lybe

ignore

dfo

rpre

sent

purp

ose

s.Pri

nci

pal

dat

aso

urc

es:

Coal

1950–1

980

(Kan

e,1996),

1990–2

004

(Bri

tish

Pet

role

um

,2005);

Oil

1950–1

960

(Fla

vin,

1996a)

,1970–2

004

(Bri

tish

Pet

role

um

,2005);

Nat

ura

lga

s1950–1

960

(Fla

vin,

1996b),

1970–2

004

(Bri

tish

Pet

role

um

,2005);

Nucl

ear

(Bri

tish

Pet

role

um

,2005);

Hyd

ro(B

riti

shPet

role

um

,2005).

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TIM DYSON

natural gas rose by an estimated 1115 million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe);and during 1990–2004 it rose by a further 1743 mtoe (see Table 1). Exceptfor those countries in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) thathave experienced economic decline following the collapse of communism,only a handful of countries were burning smaller quantities of fossil fuelenergy (expressed in terms of mtoe) in 2004 compared to 1994, and then byonly small amounts (British Petroleum, 2005). The overwhelming picture isone of expansion. For example, Brazil, China, India and Indonesia experi-enced rises in their use of fossil fuels of 47, 69, 63, and 62% respectivelyduring 1994–2004. And even in the world’s most advanced economies anychanges in fuel mix, or rises in energy use efficiency, were significantlyoutweighed by increased levels of fossil fuel consumption. Thus during thesame time period, fossil fuel energy use rose by 8.5, 12.0, and 5.8%respectively in the US, the European Union (as it is presently constituted,i.e. the EU24) and Japan (British Petroleum, 2005).

The huge degree to which differences in levels of per capita fossil fuelenergy consumption underpin differences in living standards in the worldtoday is shown by Figure 1. It illustrates the relationship for 63 countries forwhich recent data are available. Virtually all of the countries which lie farbelow the fitted line (e.g. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the RussianFederation) were part of the FSU, and their use of fossil fuel energy isgenerally very inefficient. The two points which lie furthest above the lineare France and Japan—both of which rely heavily on nuclear energy. Noticethat about half (n=32) of all the countries are crammed together in thebottom left hand corner of the diagram. These countries have levels of fossilfuel energy consumption of less than one metric ton per person per year.The economies of all these poor countries are severely constrained becausethey are still largely ‘organic’. The basic message is extremely clear:countries have been unable to escape from conditions of material poverty inthe absence of having access to supplies of fossil fuel energy. As the eco-nomic historian Carlo Cipolla succinctly stated:

[H]igh per capita consumption of energy not only means moreenergy for consumption, heating, lighting, household appliances,cars, etc., but [it] also means more energy for production, i.e.,more energy available per worker and therefore higher produc-tivity of labour. (Cipolla, 1967:57, emphasis in the original)

In concluding this section it is worth stressing that while the currentsize of the world’s population is certainly an important factor conditioning

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the total quantity of fossil fuels that is being burnt each year—i.e. around8.96 billion tons of oil equivalent in 2004—it is modern economic growththat has been the main engine of growth in humanity’s use of fossil fuelenergy. Thus between 1950 and 2000 the world’s population increased byroughly 140%, but the rise in fossil fuel energy consumption during thesame period was almost 400% (see Table 1).

TRENDS IN ATMOSPHERIC CO2 AND THE EARTH’S SURFACETEMPERATURE

The idea that the burning of fossil fuels might lead to a build-up of CO2

in the atmosphere, and so prevent heat escaping from the Earth, stems fromscientific work in the 19th century. It was Joseph Fourier who first saw thatthe atmosphere acts to retain heat radiation, and John Tyndall who recog-nized the important role that CO2 plays in this process (Weart, 2003:2–4).

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000

Per capita fossil fuel energy consumption (kgoe)

Per

cap

ita

GD

P (

ppp)

(cur

rent

inte

rnat

iona

l dol

lars

)

FIGURE 1. Fossil fuel energy consumption as a determinant of per capitagross domestic product around the year 2000. Notes: Data on both vari-ables were found for 63 countries, all with estimated populations in 2002 of10 million or more. The trend line shown is a simple linear regression. TheGDP data are expressed in purchasing power parity (i.e. ppp) terms, and theenergy use data are expressed in kilograms of oil equivalent (kgoe). As wellas the various factors discussed in the text, some of the scatter around thetrend line undoubtedly reflects inadequacies in the data. Principal datasource: World Resources Institute (2003:Tables 4 and 8).

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TIM DYSON

However, it was the chemist Svante Arrhenius who in 1896 published afamous piece on how the Earth’s surface temperature might be raised byincreased levels of atmospheric CO2 produced from the burning of coal. Hisinitial estimate was that a doubling of atmospheric CO2 would produce arise in temperature of about 5 degrees Celsius (deg/C). However he lateramended this to 4 deg/C—a figure that is well within the range that isestimated today with the help of much greater knowledge and moderncomputers (World Meteorological Organization, 2003:29).

For most of the 20th century the idea received little attention. Yet bythe early 1980s it was becoming apparent that the Earth was probablywarming. And concern that this might partly be due to human activities ledto the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in1988. The mandate of the IPCC—which specifically excludes making pol-icy recommendations for governments—is to assess research on climatechange and to provide relevant information to the global community. TheIPCC has now gone through three assessment rounds (e.g. see IPCC, 1990,1995, 2001a). The fourth assessment is due in 2007. Successive IPCC re-ports have concluded with growing confidence (i) that the Earth’s climate isindeed warming, and (ii) that this is mainly due to anthropogenic (i.e. hu-man-induced) causes—particularly the burning of fossil fuels which releasesCO2 into the atmosphere. It is important to stress that, contrary to popularimpressions, these key conclusions are accepted by virtually all of theworld’s climate scientists; there is no substantive disagreement on thematter (see Oreskes, 2004).

The most recent IPCC assessment, released in 2001, concluded thatduring the final two decades of the 20th century about three-quarters of theCO2 released into the atmosphere came from burning fossil fuels, with mostof the rest coming from land use changes—especially deforestation. Othergreenhouse gases (GHGs) resulting from human activities that have madesignificant, though lesser, contributions to ‘positive radiative forcing’, andhence global warming, are halocarbons such as chlorofluorocarbons(CFCs), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O). It is notable that a sizeablepart of the release of both CH4 and N2O derives from agriculture and theneed to produce food and sustain livelihoods—so, again, the current size ofthe world’s population is a pertinent consideration. Some anthropogenicinfluences have had a cooling effect—notably the release of sulfate aerosols(i.e. tiny airborne particles), many of which also emanate from fossil fuelburning. However, the net effect is very much one of positive radiativeforcing (IPCC, 2001b:7–9).

Measures of atmospheric GHG concentrations for most past periodscome from the analysis of ice core samples. The resulting time series suggest

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that levels of atmospheric CO2 started to rise from about 1800 i.e. the timeof the Industrial Revolution. Moreover, similar trends are evident for CH4

and N2O—suggesting that humanity’s influence on the global environmententered a distinctly new phase from about that time. Estimates of the world’ssurface temperature for most past periods in history are less accurate thanthose available for levels of atmospheric CO2. This is because temperatureestimates have to be imputed from the analysis of materials like tree ringsand coral reefs. Nevertheless, the available estimates suggest a slightcooling trend in the centuries before about 1910. But the temperature hasrisen sharply since. The IPCC considers that the temperature rise during the20th century was about 0.6 deg/C with a 95% confidence figure around thisestimate of ±0.2 deg/C. The rise was irregular—with comparatively rapidwarming before 1940, and again since the mid–1970s (IPCC, 2001b:3–9).Interestingly, much of the plateau in temperature between the 1940s andthe 1970s is now thought to have reflected the cooling influence of sulfateaerosols coming from the burning of fossil fuels.

Clearly, imputed estimates of past surface temperature are less satis-factory than those based on direct measurement. However, prior to the 20thcentury regular measurements of temperature were only made at a smalland unrepresentative number of geographical locations. And, prompted inpart by concern among some scientists regarding the results of the calcu-lations made by Arrhenius, systematic and direct measurement of levels ofatmospheric CO2—good enough to provide reasonably reliable estimates oftrends over time—date only from 1958 to 1959, with observations made atthe Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii.

Table 2 gives the Mauna Loa measurements. The level of CO2 in theEarth’s atmosphere has risen from about 317 parts per million (ppm) in1959–1961 to around 377 ppm in 2004 (the level prevailing before 1800 isthought to have been about 280 ppm). Figure 2 shows that although the sizeof the annual increment in CO2 fluctuates substantially, it has tended toincrease. It is notable that 2002 and 2003 were the first consecutive yearswith increments exceeding 2 ppm. However in the past some analysts haveclaimed that there has been no significant upward trend in the incrementsince 1977 (Hansen & Saito, 2001). The world’s oceans and terrestrialvegetation are major ‘sinks’ (i.e. absorbers) of CO2. And there are reasons tobelieve that, with rising levels of the gas in the atmosphere, and risingtemperatures, these sinks may have increased their absorption. According tothe IPCC (2001b:7) about half of all CO2 currently released into theatmosphere by human activity is absorbed by the oceans and vegetation.And there is evidence of increased plant growth because of the fertilizingeffect of higher levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (e.g. see Nemani

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TIM DYSON

et al., 2003). Nevertheless, according to the observations in Table 2 theaverage increment for years 1959–1976 was +0.95 ppm, whereas for 1977–2004 it was +1.61 ppm. There are certainly no signs that the size of theannual increment is diminishing. And it is certain that the concentration ofCO2 in the atmosphere will rise appreciably during the present century,although it is uncertain by how much.

TABLE 2

Global Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations and Surface TemperatureAnomaly Estimates, 1959–2004

YearCO2

(ppm)

Annualincrement

(ppm)

Temp.anomaly(deg/C) Year

CO2

(ppm)

Annualincrement

(ppm)

Temp.anomaly(deg/C)

1959 316.00 0.01 1982 341.09 1.14 0.021960 316.91 0.91 )0.03 1983 342.75 1.66 0.231961 317.63 0.72 0.02 1984 344.44 1.69 0.031962 318.46 0.83 0.01 1985 345.86 1.42 0.011963 319.02 0.56 0.04 1986 347.14 1.28 0.101964 319.52 0.50 )0.23 1987 348.99 1.85 0.251965 320.09 0.57 )0.17 1988 351.44 2.45 0.241966 321.34 1.25 )0.08 1989 352.94 1.50 0.161967 322.13 0.79 )0.09 1990 354.19 1.25 0.311968 323.11 0.98 )0.11 1991 355.62 1.43 0.251969 324.60 1.49 0.04 1992 356.36 0.74 0.121970 325.65 1.05 )0.03 1993 357.10 0.74 0.181971 326.32 0.67 )0.19 1994 358.86 1.76 0.231972 327.52 1.20 )0.04 1995 360.90 2.04 0.371973 329.61 2.09 0.09 1996 362.58 1.68 0.231974 330.29 0.68 )0.17 1997 363.84 1.26 0.411975 331.16 0.87 )0.12 1998 366.58 2.74 0.581976 332.18 1.02 )0.20 1999 368.30 1.72 0.341977 333.88 1.70 0.06 2000 369.47 1.17 0.291978 335.52 1.64 )0.04 2001 371.03 1.56 0.421979 336.89 1.37 0.07 2002 373.07 2.04 0.471980 338.67 1.78 0.10 2003 375.61 2.54 0.471981 339.95 1.28 0.13 2004 377.38 1.77 0.45

Notes: The CO2 concentrations are derived from air samples collected at the Mauna LoaObservatory. The temperature series are combined global land and marine surface tempera-tures relative to the average temperature recorded for the period 1961–1990. They are takenfrom the ‘Global average temp 1856–2005’ dataset (taveGL2v) of the Climate Research Unit atthe University of East Anglia, UK.Principal data sources: CO2 (Keeling et al., 2004; Keeling & Whorf, 2005); Temperatureanomaly data (Palutikof, 2004; Jones & Palutikof, 2005).

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Table 2 also gives corresponding annual estimates of the Earth’s surfacetemperature. The particular time series shown is that compiled by the Cli-mate Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia in the UK.However, time series produced by other bodies—such as the WorldMeteorological Organization (WMO) or the Goddard Institute for SpaceStudies (GISS)—provide a reasonably similar picture. By convention, theCRU estimates shown in Table 2 are expressed relative to the averagetemperature holding during 1961–1990. The resulting mean temperature‘anomaly’ for 1959–1961 is zero i.e. the average temperature for these3 years is equal to the average for 1961–1990. In contrast, the estimatedmean temperature anomaly for the 5-year period 2000–2004 is 0.42 deg/C,and the estimate for the year 2004 itself is 0.45 deg/C higher than thereference level (see Table 2). The 1990s were the warmest decade since areasonable quantity of direct records became available (around the middleof the 19th century). According to this time series, the ten warmest yearsglobally have been, in ascending order: 2000, 1990, 1999, 1995, 1997,2001, 2004, 2002 and 2003 (joint), and then 1998—the hottest yearrecorded, 0.58 deg/C above the average for 1961–1990.

y = -0.000298x2 + 1.207324x - 1220.602187

R2 = 0.392956

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year

CO

2 (p

pm)

FIGURE 2. Annual increments in atmospheric CO2 (ppm) as measured atthe Mauna Loa Observatory, 1959–2004. Note: Increments are expressed inparts per million (ppm). Principal data source: See the notes to Table 2.

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TIM DYSON

Clearly, and unlike the level of atmospheric CO2, the world’s surfacetemperature can fall from one year to the next because of specific events.For example, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991 led to a reduction intemperature in 1992 and 1993. And a major El Nino event—which involvessignificant oceanic warming—contributed to the record temperatures of1997 and, especially, 1998 (see Table 2). However, Figure 3 shows clearlythat the temperature trend has been firmly upwards since the mid-1970s.Notice that the moving average reveals the existence of a fairly regularfluctuation to the rise, linked in part to the El Nino/Southern Oscillation(ENSO) climate phenomenon. There is some suggestion that the next peakin the moving average might occur around the year 2010. Finally, at thetime of writing (i.e. in late 2005) it is virtually certain that 2005 will turn outto be either the second or third warmest year yet recorded according to theCRU time series (UK Meteorological Office, 2005). Indeed, there is a goodchance that 2005 will be the hottest year on record according to the GISStime series—a fact that is especially striking because it will have happenedin the absence of a large El Nino event (see Hansen, Sato, Ruedy, & Lo,2005).

As previously intimated, the causal relationships linking levels ofatmospheric CO2 and world surface temperature are extremely complex.

-0.30

-0.20

-0.10

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005

Year

Tem

pera

ture

FIGURE 3. World surface temperature anomaly estimates, 1959–2004.Notes: Temperatures are in degrees Celsius (deg/C). The trend line is a3 year moving average. Principal data source: See the notes to Table 2.

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A vast amount is unknown about how intermediary mechanisms operate.However it is known that the level of CO2 at any one moment implies ahigher temperature over the longer run—what the IPCC terms a ‘commit-ment’ to future warming. Also, while it is generally agreed that increasinglevels of atmospheric CO2 are bringing about a rise in surface temperatures,it is also agreed that in some circumstances the rise in temperature can leadto the release of CO2 i.e. the direction of causation can work both ways. Forinstance, as temperatures rise the process of ‘respiration’, whereby soils anddecaying plant matter release CO2 into the atmosphere, tends to increase.In addition, CO2 respiration can occur through forest fires and forest die-back, both of which could also become more frequent as temperatures risefurther (e.g. see Pearce, 1999; Houghton, 2004:37–42).

In concluding this section, it is worth underscoring that the data inTable 2 have the advantages of being comparatively straightforward andreliable. There is no reasonable doubt that levels of atmospheric CO2 andsurface temperatures are on a distinctly upward path. Accordingly, this is anappropriate place to present a personal interpretation of the various socialresponses that have occurred with respect to this growing body ofinformation.

SOCIAL REACTIONS TO THE EVIDENCE ON GLOBAL WARMING

That modern economic growth has raised levels of atmosphericCO2—leading to a rise in the Earth’s surface temperature and the threat ofclimate change—is patently unwelcome news. It raises difficult issues aboutthe basis of economic growth. It highlights huge—and morally awk-ward—disparities in energy use, CO2 emissions, and living standardsbetween rich and poor. It rears the prospect that some extremely difficultchanges in behavior may be required. Indeed, inasmuch as it suggests theneed for big cuts in energy consumption, it strikes at the very heart of themodern conception of ‘development’.

The view taken here is that the human response to this news has beencharacterized by a mixture of denial, avoidance and recrimination, and thatthese reactions are fairly predictable. The social response has been com-plicated because climate change is commonly seen as a phenomenonwhich—if indeed it is real—lies far off in the distant future. Most people arepreoccupied with the events of their daily lives, they are increasingly dis-trustful of official sources of information, and they tend to be relativelyunconcerned with what may happen over the very long run. Politicalleaders too have more immediate concerns to occupy their time. They

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TIM DYSON

usually avoid difficult issues, being chiefly concerned with the shortrun—often the period until the next election.

Accordingly, this section comments briefly on selected reactions to theconsensus on global warming that now exists among climate scientists. Thepoint is not to be critical of such reactions. Rather, it is to propose that theyare to be expected in the context of the dawning of unwanted news. On thepresent view, they are social phenomena that often have little direct bearingon the CO2 and temperature data to which they supposedly relate.

No one doubts that there have been significant rises in levels ofatmospheric CO2, but a small, vocal minority still question whether theworld is heating up. For example, in a paper still used in the United States topetition the government to reject the Kyoto Protocol, Robinson and othersstate:

The empirical evidence—actual measurements of Earth’s tem-perature—shows no man-made warming trend. Indeed, over thepast two decades, when CO2 levels have been at their highest,global average temperatures have actually cooled slightly.(Robinson, Baliunas, Soon, & Robinson, 1998:1)

A key part of this position—replicated by a host of internet websites—isthat the indicated recent rise in surface temperature is spurious. It is con-tended that, instead, the rise reflects urbanization. That is, it is claimed thatdirect temperature measurements are being increasingly biased upwardover time by the so-called ‘urban heat island effect’—as more and more ofthe measurements take place in urban areas, or areas close by. Alsoimportant to this position are satellite-based estimates of the temperaturesprevailing in the lower troposphere (i.e. at altitudes of about 2–4 km) whichare interpreted as suggesting that there has been little change in the Earth’stemperature.

However, both of these points have been considered and largely re-jected by climate scientists. The research teams that compile the estimatesof surface temperature—such as those at the WMO, GISS, and CRU—arewell aware of the potential bias coming from urbanization, and much workhas gone into gauging it. The conclusion is that any distortion issmall—probably no more than 0.05 deg/C for the entire period before 1990(see IPCC, 2001a:Box 2.1). Time series, such as that in Table 2, are adjusteddownwards to allow for it. The temperature estimates for the lower tropo-sphere are also open to question. Satellites do not gauge temperaturedirectly. Rather, they measure molecular microwave emissions which are

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then converted into temperatures—a process that involves making manyassumptions. Furthermore, the satellite data are only available from the late1970s—a fairly short length of time that makes trend estimation tricky.Recent work on the microwave data concludes that the temperature of thelower troposphere has probably risen by more than was previously thought.And, when the revised estimates are combined with radiosonde (i.e. bal-loon-borne) temperature measurements, differences in trend between themand the surface temperatures largely disappear (World MeteorologicalOrganization, 2003:198; see also National Research Council, 2000).In short, significant progress has been made in reconciling temperatureestimates for the surface and the lower troposphere. And in both locationsthe evidence is that the Earth is heating up.

Of course, questioning and skepticism are integral to science. But thepresent view is that statements such as that shown above border on denial.That such statements are made by a minority of non-climate scientiststends to be diminished by the media—which in the interest of providing‘balance’ strives to provide equal space to opposing views. Beyond theseconcerns lie issues of interest, on both sides. Some of the work of the IPCChas involved specialists who could have potential conflicts of interest withtheir commercial work (see Lohmann, 2001:22–23). Scientific research onclimate change is certainly affected by political and economic consider-ations (Demeritt, 2001). And the provision of advice on how to adapt to,or help mitigate, climate change is big business. On the other hand, manyindustries (e.g. in power generation, manufacturing, transport, etc) haveconsiderable commercial interest in the continuing exploitation of sourcesof fossil fuel energy. And prominent skeptics on global warming havereceived generous funding from the corporate sector (e.g. see Pearce,1997; van den Hove, Le Menestrel, & de Bettignies, 2003; Weart,2003:165–166). Furthermore, national governments—invariably with closelinks to industry—have found it extremely hard to confront the issuehead on.

This brings us to the international political response—because reduc-ing global CO2 emissions would certainly require international agreement.The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was initi-ated in 1992 to start the process towards stabilization of GHGs. But theConvention specifically avoided the issue of the level at which CO2 (andother GHGs) should be stabilized. This matter remains largely unre-solved—although a figure of 550 ppm (i.e. about twice the pre-industriallevel) is sometimes discussed. That said, other bodies, such as the GlobalCommons Institute, argue for a limit no higher than 450 ppm (Hillman,2004:119).

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Following publication of the IPCC’s second report, world leaders metin Kyoto in 1997. However in some respects the ensuing ‘Kyoto process’can itself be interpreted as one that is partly concerned with ways ofavoiding making significant reductions in CO2 emissions. At least, that is theposition that is taken here. Examples of this tendency towards avoidanceinclude the discussion of ‘carbon sequestration’ i.e. the planting of trees andother vegetation to help ‘neutralize’ CO2 emissions. It took considerabletime for the limitations of this approach to be appreciated fully—forexample, that over the long run the areas of forest required are very great,that as temperatures rise so it may prove difficult to stop the ‘respiration’ ofsome of the sequestrated carbon back into the atmosphere, that especially athigh latitudes increased forest cover may actually lead to increasedabsorption of solar radiation, and, perhaps most important, that the overallnet benefit of such sequestration efforts is likely to be small compared to theprobable scale of future human-induced CO2 emissions (e.g. see Lohmann,1999; Houghton, 2004:249–253). Another approach which can be viewedas having a sizeable element of avoidance involved—one that has occupiedarmies of negotiators, lawyers, economists, consultants, etc, the very stuff ofWeberian bureaucratization (Prins, 2003)—is the construction of ‘carbonmarkets’. By enabling ‘emissions trading’ such markets will allow somecountries (usually richer ones, with high emissions) to pay others (usuallypoorer ones, with low emissions)—essentially as a way of easing therequirement of richer countries to make greater reductions in emissionsthemselves. Carbon markets are controversial, and their ability to bringabout significant reductions in world CO2 emissions has been questionedon many grounds (e.g. see Mobbs, 2005:79–86). Moreover, Lohmann hascommented that:

None of Kyoto’s market measures ... tackle directly the physicalroot of global warming: the transfer of fossil fuels from under-ground, where they are effectively isolated from the atmosphere,to the air. (Lohmann, 2001:5)

It was noted above that in the last decade or so virtually all countrieshave continued to burn greater amounts of fossil fuel. This also applies tothose that have arguably been most prominent in supporting the Kyotoprocess—notably Canada, Japan and those of the European Union (EU).Many of these countries are unlikely to meet their CO2 reduction targetsagreed under the Kyoto treaty (which finally came into force in 2005). Thuscomparing 1990 and 2002, it is estimated that Canada’s emissions

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increased by 22% and Japan’s by 13 (see Zittel & Treber, 2003). While theCO2 emissions of the 15 countries that comprised the EU before 2004 (i.e.the EU15) remained roughly constant, this was mainly due to reductions inGermany and Britain—both of which gained fortuitously from a move awayfrom coal towards natural gas (which emits less CO2 per unit of energy). Ofthe remaining countries in the EU(15), only Sweden—which relies heavilyon hydro and nuclear—registered a fall in CO2 emissions between 1990and 2002. Of the 36 ‘Annex B’ countries of the Kyoto treaty (i.e. theindustrialized countries, including former eastern bloc nations), only 12experienced declines in emissions: the three in the EU(15), plus nine formereastern bloc nations. If one excludes these, then CO2 emissions among theremaining 24 Annex B countries rose by 13% during 1990–2002 (Zittel &Treber, 2003). Of course, the United States, the world’s largest emitter ofCO2, is not a signatory to the Kyoto treaty. And, to complete the list of socialreactions that are regarded here as fairly predictable, the ‘Kyoto pro-cess’—and the 2005 UN Climate Change Conference in Montreal—haveinvolved no shortage of recrimination between representatives of the US,the EU, and other countries.

The present view is that the prospects for an enforceable internationalagreement that will bring about a sustained and significant reduction inannual global CO2 emissions are very poor. While it may be in the interestof the world as a whole to restrict the burning of fossil fuels, it is in theinterest of individual countries to avoid making such changes (i.e. there areelements of a classic isolation paradox). Really major nations, such as theUS and China, have considerable capacity to circumvent or ignore inter-national agreements when it suits them. Moreover, the enormous com-plexities involved—many of them created and informed by matters ofinterest—will also hinder agreement. Doubtless there will be gains in en-ergy use efficiency, shifts towards less carbon intensive fuels, and greateruse of renewable energy sources (e.g. solar, biomass, wind and tidal power).But except for a massive shift towards nuclear—which has many seriousproblems attached, and would in any case take decades to bring about—-there are limits to what such changes could possibly achieve in terms ofCO2 reduction. Other technological ideas—like the extraction of CO2 fromcoal and its sequestration underground (so-called ‘carbon capture andstorage’) or, still more, the development of the so-called ‘hydrogen econ-omy’—are remote ideas as large scale and significant solutions to theproblem during the foreseeable future (Smil, 2003). Indeed, such notionscan themselves be regarded as providing some basis for avoidance inas-much as they suggest that something is being done. Understandably, poorcountries are unlikely to put great effort into constraining their CO2

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emissions—especially in the face of massive discrepancies between them-selves and the rich.

In sum, the view taken here is that for the foreseeable future the basicresponse to global warming will be one of avoidance and, at most, modestchange. That the absolute amount of CO2 emitted into the atmosphereeach year is almost certainly going to rise in the coming decades is shownby an examination of basic demographic and emissions data in the nextsection.

ILLUSTRATIVE CALCULATIONS ON FUTURE CO2 EMISSIONS

Demographic growth is a useful place to begin when consideringfuture trends in CO2 emissions. At the start of the 21st century the world’spopulation was about 6.1 billion. The United Nations projects that by 2050it will be around 9.1 billion (United Nations, 2005). This represents growthof 49% in 50 years. Although this projection is approximate, considerablefurther demographic growth is inevitable—because of population momen-tum. Moreover it is worth remarking that the UN has a good record offorecasting the world’s total population.

By itself an increase in the world’s population of roughly one half (i.e.49%) will not lead to a similar proportional rise in CO2 emissions from theburning of fossil fuels. The reason is that most of the coming demographicgrowth will occur in poor countries, which—almost by definition—burnrelatively small amounts of coal, oil and natural gas. In this context Table 3summarizes the situation at the start of the 21st century and provides a way ofexploring the future. Column (i) shows the distribution of the world’s pop-ulation in the year 2000. Columns (ii) and (iii) give the corresponding levelsof per capita and total CO2 emissions by region. Notice that in 2000 theworld’s population of 6.09 billion was releasing about 23.2 billion tons ofCO2 through the combustion of fossil fuels—implying an average annual percapita emissions figure of about 3.8 metric tons. However, the statistics incolumn (ii) also underscore the enormous variation that exists around thisaverage. Thus in North America (i.e. the United States and Canada) theaverage level of emissions was about 20.0 tons of CO2 per person per year,whereas in both sub-Saharan Africa and South-central Asia it was onlyaround 0.9 tons. Column (iii) shows that around the year 2000 the largestabsolute regional contribution to total world CO2 emissions came fromNorth America, followed closely by Europe. Together these two developedregions contained only about 17% of humanity, but at the start of this centurythey accounted for around 54% of all CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning.

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TABLE 3

Estimates of Regional and Global Emissions of CO2 Produced by theCombustion of Fossil Fuels for around the year 2000, with Illustrative

Calculations for 2050

Region

Population(millions)

Per capitaCO2

emissions(metrictons)

Total CO2emissions(millionmetrictons)

Projectedpopulation(millions)

Total CO2emissions(millionmetrictons)

2000 2000 2000 2050 2050(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)

Developing regionsSub-Saharan

Africa670 0.9 613.8 1692 1550.1

North Africa/West Asia

335 4.3 1430.8 628 2682.2

Eastern Asia 1479 3.4 5044.6 1587 5412.9South-central Asia 1485 0.9 1368.2 2495 2298.8South-eastern Asia 519 1.3 696.1 752 1008.6Central Americaand Caribbean

174 2.8 481.2 256 707.9

South America 349 2.2 771.9 527 1165.6Subtotal 5011 2.1 10,406.6 7937 14,826.2

Developed regionsEurope 729 8.4 6106.2 653 5469.6

North America 315 20.0 6294.5 438 8752.3Oceania 31 11.8 365.0 48 565.1Subtotal 1075 11.9 12,765.7 1139 14,787.0

World 6086 3.8 23,172.2 9076 29,613.2

Notes: All the figures given above are approximate—especially those relating to CO2 emissions.The per capita and total emissions statistics shown for 2000 actually pertain to 1999. Theregional groupings of countries used are those employed by the World Resources Institute, butwith Asia (excluding West Asia) being broken down according to the standard groupings of theUnited Nations. Here Sudan forms part of sub-Saharan Africa. The regions are designated aboveas either ‘developing’ or ‘developed’—perhaps the main qualifications being that Japan falls inEastern Asia, and that Melanesia is part of Oceania. The World Resources Institute provides noregional statistics on CO2 emissions for sub-Saharan Africa. In 1999, however, South Africa hadestimated per capita and total CO2 emissions of 8.1 tons and 346 million tons respectively. Toget the figures shown above for sub-Saharan Africa for the year 2000 it was arbitrarily assumedthat per capita emissions for the remainder of the region averaged 0.4 tons (about the levelsindicated for Angola and Senegal). Several modest adjustments were required to produce therelatively consistent regional and global picture given above, and therefore some of the figureson CO2 emissions differ slightly from those published by the World Resources Institute onwhich they are based. The figures in column (v) are the product of those in (ii) and (iv).Principal data sources: World Resources Institute (2003: 258–259); United Nations (2005).

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Turning to the future, column (iv) of Table 3 summarizes UN popula-tion projections for the year 2050 by region. During the period 2000–2050the population of sub-Saharan Africa is projected to rise by around 1022million, and that of South-central Asia (which includes India, Pakistan, andBangladesh) by 1010 million. Taken together, these two very poor regionsare projected to account for about two-thirds of the growth in world pop-ulation over this time period. Note too that the populations of NorthAmerica and Oceania are projected to rise by about 123 and 17 millionrespectively. Only Europe’s population is expected to decline in size.

Column (v) of Table 3 shows the total CO2 emissions that will apply in2050 if the projected regional populations in column (iv) are combined withthe corresponding per capita CO2 emission figures for 2000 given in col-umn (ii). On this simple and unrealistic assumption (i.e. that of holding percapita emissions in each region constant at the level that prevailed aroundthe year 2000), it can be seen that global CO2 emissions would rise to about29.6 billion tons i.e. by 28%. Also, the average level of per capita emissionsfor the world as a whole would fall from about 3.8 to around 3.3 metric tonsper person (i.e. 29,613/9076). The explanation for this fall is that most of thecoming demographic growth will occur in poor regions with low per capitaemissions—thereby weighting the global per capita emissions figuredownwards over time. Precisely the same consideration explains why theprojected population increase of 49% leads to a rise in global CO2 emis-sions of only 28%. Note from the sub-totals in columns (iii) and (v) that theprojected population growth in the developing regions leads to a 42% risein their total emissions (i.e. from 10.4 to 14.8 billion tons). And for thedeveloped regions too demographic growth produces a 16% rise in totalemissions (i.e. from 12.8 to 14.8 billion tons)—despite the projected declinein Europe’s population. This helps to underline the fact that in NorthAmerica, especially, immigration could play a significant role in the growthof future CO2 emissions.

The rise in annual world CO2 emissions in the next 50 years may wellbe appreciably greater than 28%. The huge differentials in current percapita emission levels shown in column (ii) of Table 3 account for this.Although, as comparative newcomers, the developing regions can expect tobenefit from rises in the efficiency with which energy is derived from fossilfuel sources, it is nevertheless virtually inevitable that most of these regionswill experience significant rises in their per capita emission levels as theydevelop economically. Consider, for example, that during 1990–1999 thelevel of per capita CO2 emissions rose appreciably in all the developingregions for which data are available. Thus for Asia (excluding West Asia) theincrease was about 19.3%; for North Africa/West Asia it was around 19.7%;

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and for South America it was about 22.5% (World Resources Institute,2003:258–259). Conservatively, these figures imply a 20% rise in per capitaemissions per decade. And, cumulated across five decades, this wouldtranslate into an increase in per capita emissions of very roughly 150%. Thatsaid, no one knows by how much these per capita emission levels willincrease. The degree of uncertainty is substantially greater than thatregarding the scale of future demographic growth.

However, the figures in column (v) of Table 3 can be adjusted in astraightforward manner to explore the broad implications of differenthypothetical trajectories in future per capita emissions. For example, ifduring 2000–2050 per capita emissions in the world’s more developedregions were to fall by 40% (which many might regard as optimistic) thenthe total volume of their emissions in 2050 would be about 8.9 billion tons(i.e. 0.6*14,787), and—assuming no change in per capita emissions for thedeveloping regions—then the total volume of world emissions in 2050would be about 23.7 billion tons (compared to the 23.2 billion that wasbeing emitted around the year 2000). This suggests that a 40% reduction inper capita emissions in the developed regions would be outweighed solelyby the effects of demographic growth elsewhere in the world. Alternatively,if per capita emissions were to double (i.e. increase by just 100%) in thedeveloping regions over the same period then their total emissions in 2050would be around 29.6 billion tons (i.e. 2.0*14,826), and—assuming noalteration in the per capita emission levels of the developed regions—thenthe total volume of global emissions in 2050 would be about 44.3 billiontons i.e. a 90% rise compared to the 23.2 billion tons being emitted aroundthe year 2000. This calculation underscores the big influence that increasedfossil fuel burning to support economic growth in the developing regions islikely to have on the volume of world CO2 emissions. Finally, consider thecase in which per capita emissions in the developed regions fall by 40%while those in the developing regions double. This combination wouldproduce global CO2 emissions in 2050 of 38.5 billion tons (i.e.8.9+29.6)—an increase of about 66% compared to the year 2000.

Several conclusions arise from these simple illustrative calculations. First,the period 2000–2050 will see substantial demographic growth—forcingtotal world CO2 emissions to rise. Because most of this growth will occur inpoor regions, the implied proportional growth in total CO2 emissions (here28%) is appreciably less than the population increase (49%). Second, theinfluence of population growth on future CO2 emissions will not be confinedto the developing world. North America, and to a lesser extent Oceania(which here effectively means Australia/New Zealand), both have very highper capita emission levels and are expected to experience significant

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demographic growth—much of it due to migration. Consider, for example,that in Table 3: the population of South-central Asia increases by 1010 millionin 50 years, which implies the emission of an additional 931 million tons ofCO2; and the population of North America rises by only 123 million, whichimplies an additional 2458 million tons of CO2. Third, even should thedeveloped regions make big cuts in their emissions, these will be more thanoffset by rises elsewhere. Thus the effect of population growth in the devel-oping regions alone would outweigh a 40% reduction in CO2 emissions in thedeveloped regions. Yet economic development will likely mean that the totalemissions of the developing regions will rise by much more than is implied justby demographic growth. Finally, as a consequence, it is virtually certain thatthere will be a significant rise in global CO2 emissions. This will happen due topopulation growth, but it will happen much more because of the fueling ofeconomic growth.

Of course, there is great uncertainty about just how big the coming risein annual world CO2 emissions will be. The IPCC, for example, hasdeveloped many different scenarios for future CO2 release (both from fossilfuel burning and changes in land use) and explored scenarios for otherGHGs and sulfur emissions. This work underscores the critical importanceof economic and technological changes for the future evolution of emis-sions. But the resulting range of variation in emissions between the differentscenarios is huge. Thus, towards the extremes, over the period 2000–2050annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use could increase only slightly orquadruple. Furthermore the IPCC is careful not to assign probabilities to anyscenario, nor does it express any preferences with regard to them (IPCC,2001c).

Particularly in relation to oil—and perhaps natural gas—it seems pos-sible that limits to the available reserves may operate to curb the expansionof their use for energy production in the coming decades (World EnergyCouncil, 2004). However, global reserves of coal are ample, and with Chinaand India investing massively in new coal-fired power stations, growth inworld coal use is currently much greater than that for either oil or naturalgas (British Petroleum, 2005). It is especially difficult to gauge the extent towhich per capita CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning will rise with theanticipated future economic expansion of Eastern Asia and South-centralAsia. And, to reiterate, there is much uncertainty regarding whether, and towhat extent, developed countries will be able to reduce their CO2 emis-sions. Even with much greater use of renewable energy sources, and greateruse of nuclear, there is little doubt that world use of fossil fuels will risesignificantly in the coming decades and that they will continue to dominatein world energy production (e.g. see Bodansky, 2001; International Energy

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Agency, 2005; Smil, 2003; World Energy Council, 2004). Given the num-bers in Table 3, and some simple assumptions, it seems reasonable tohazard that global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning could easily riseby somewhere between a quarter and two-thirds during the first half of the21st century. But we saw too that a combination of constant per capita CO2

emissions in the developed regions, and a doubling in the developing re-gions, would raise annual emissions by 90%—which would imply anaverage annual growth rate in emissions of about 1.3% during 2000–2050.In this context it is worth noting that projections made by the InternationalEnergy Agency (2005) suggest that between 2005 and 2030 energy-relatedCO2 emissions may rise by 52%—implying an annual growth rate of 1.7%.

In concluding this section the main point is surely very clear: theabsolute amount of CO2 being emitted into the atmosphere each year isalmost certainly going to rise appreciably in the coming decades.

PROSPECTS FOR THE EARTH’S TEMPERATURE AND CLIMATE

The coming major rise in CO2 emissions will occur on top of levels offossil fuel burning that have already helped to raise the level of CO2 in theatmosphere by about 33% (compared to the pre-industrial era) and con-tributed to an estimated rise in the world’s surface temperature of around0.6 deg/C. There is little doubt that these trends will continue—and that theEarth’s climate will alter significantly as a result.

Of course, the interconnections between trends in fossil fuel use, CO2

emissions, levels of atmospheric CO2, increases in the world’s temperature,and climate change, are incredibly complex. The elaborate computergeneral circulation models (GCMs), on which the IPCC draws to makestatements about possible future trends, have a lot of limitations (Houghton,2005:77–114). The GCMs find the task of simulating many of the inter-connections very challenging. This is particularly true in relation to theincorporation of feedback mechanisms—the nature and strength of whichmay change in the future in ways that cannot be readily anticipated.Moreover, the models are especially restricted in their ability to predictsudden shifts. Nevertheless, despite such limitations, in certain key re-spects—perhaps most notably in relation to global temperature changeduring recent centuries—the models do provide a reasonable fit to pasttrends. And this is the more impressive since the results from the models arenot tuned to provide a reasonable fit to the data; rather, they stem fromestablished physical principles that are incorporated into the GCMs them-selves (Burroughs, 2001:263).

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In its most recent assessment, published in 2001, the IPCC underscoredthat fossil fuel burning will probably remain the dominant influence on thelevel of atmospheric CO2 during the present century. Furthermore, it iscertain that the stock of CO2 in the Earth’s atmosphere will rise. Indeed, theIPCC projections suggest a range of atmospheric CO2 for the year 2100 ofsomewhere between 540 and 970 ppm (IPCC, 2001b:14). It was notedabove that the level in the year 2004 was about 377 ppm, and that during1977–2004 the average annual increment was +1.61 ppm (Table 2).A continuation of this increment for the rest of this century would produce alevel of 531 ppm by the year 2100. It is clear, then, that the latest IPCCprojections envisage that the size of the annual CO2 increment may wellrise significantly, compared to the general order of the increments conveyedin Table 2. This could happen partly because of the likely coming rise in thevolume of anthropogenic CO2 emissions. But it could happen too becausethere are reasons to think that the net absorptive capacity of the world’soceans, soils, and terrestrial vegetation (as ‘sinks’ for CO2) may weaken inthe future—for example, due to increased microbial activity in soils, forestdie-back and forest fires, and changes in seawater chemistry (O’Neill,Landis MacKellar, F., & Lutz, 2001:31; Hadley Centre, 2005:6–7).

The IPCC’s projections of global average temperatures incorporate anallowance for ‘commitment’ to future warming deriving from past CO2

emissions. The most recent assessment of the IPCC is that the average worldsurface temperature may rise by between 1.4 and 5.8 deg/C over the period1990–2100. In presenting this range, the IPCC notes that these projectedtemperatures are higher than those contained in its previous reports. Themain explanation for the rise in projected temperatures is that the projec-tions for future sulfate aerosol emissions—which can have a significantcooling influence—have been reduced (IPCC, 2001b:13).

In trying to assess the implications of these IPCC temperature projec-tions, it is worth recalling that the Earth’s surface temperature is thought tohave risen by about 0.6 deg/C during the 20th century. Therefore the lowestfigure of the latest IPCC range—i.e. an increase of 1.4 deg/C—implies thatduring the present century the average temperature will rise at roughlytwice the rate it did during the 20th century. A temperature increase that liesin the center of the IPCC’s range—i.e. a rise of 3.6 deg/C—means that theEarth’s temperature will increase by about six times as much as it did duringthe 20th century. Finally, a trajectory that took us to 5.8 deg/C by the year2100 would mean that the rise in temperature would be roughly nine timesas great. In contemplating these figures it should be borne in mind that therate of temperature increase experienced during the 20th century was itselfquite unprecedented in history. Those who maintain that there have been

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equally warm periods in history—such as during the medieval climaticoptimum (e.g. see Avery, 2003)—tend to base their arguments on data thatpertain to only certain parts of the world. In fact, it is not possible to deducethat the Earth’s temperature in previous historical times has been higherthan that which now prevails (see Burroughs, 2001:104).

The IPCC’s temperature projections tend to evolve in a comparativelysmooth way. However, in its various reports the IPCC has also noted thepossibility of a major, possibly abrupt, climate ‘surprise’—an unpleasantfact that has tended to be overlooked in commentaries on IPCC reports(Weart, 2003:187). But when any system is being forced the chances of asudden discontinuity occurring are likely to be raised. For example, it is atleast conceivable that at some point in the future the rise in temperaturecould lead to the cumulative, large-scale release of methane (CH4) fromunderground or undersea deposits of methane hydrate. In turn, this couldcontribute to further warming—so stimulating the release of still more CH4.Another conceivable, anticipated, ‘surprise’, albeit one that would unravelover centuries, might involve accelerated ice sheet melting—e.g. of theWest Antarctic or Greenland ice sheets—about which there is considerableuncertainty.

However, perhaps the most likely possible ‘surprise’ scenario for thepresent century is that the rise in temperature could lead to a sudden col-lapse of the thermohaline circulation system in the world’s oceans. Thiswould probably cause a rapid and major alteration of the global climate.Sudden collapses of the thermohaline system have occurred in the distantpast. It seems that a key component of such a collapse would be a shutdownof the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic. This might lead to a major coolingof northwestern Europe should it occur earlier rather than later in thepresent century (if it occurred later then the cooling effect might be offset bygeneral warming). That said, it is important to underline that the climaticramifications of such an event would almost certainly extend worldwide.Such a shutdown could be triggered by decreases in the salinity of the oceanto the east and south of Greenland—itself caused by the melting of Artic iceand increased discharge of fresh water from northern rivers. There is evi-dence of falls in salinity in these areas of ocean (Calvin, 1998; Palmer,2003) and of some slowing of water circulation in the North Atlantic(Bryden, Longworth, & Cunningham, 2005). However, most climate sci-entists believe that the thermohaline system will not collapse during thiscentury (e.g. see IPCC, 2001b:16; Osborn, 2004; Hadley Centre, 2005:-4–5)—although no one can be sure.

It is impossible to attach probabilities to the four highly stylized futuretrajectories that have been raised in this section—namely that Earth’s

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temperature in the coming century might rise at twice, six, or nine times therate that happened in the 20th century, or that there might be some sort of‘surprise’. It should also be stressed that increases of twice or nine times the20th century rate represent extremes at the ends of an envisaged range.Nevertheless it seems reasonable to conclude that the chances of humanityfacing a very difficult situation sometime during this century are consider-able—at least, that is the view taken here. A doubling of the rate oftemperature rise experienced during the 20th century might well be man-ageable. But a rise approaching six times the rate would surely be extremelydemanding. And any much greater temperature increase—in the directionof the top of the range—would doubtless be disastrous; moreover the sameprobably applies in the event of a major ‘surprise’. Therefore the range offuture temperature trajectories varies from the tractable to the disastrous.The next section considers what could happen, and makes some commentsabout conventional thinking on the subject.

THINKING ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Mainstream thought on the effects of a rise in temperature for theworld’s climate, and its people, has at one and the same time been valu-able, yet restricted. The temperature rises discussed in the previous sectionmay seem small, but their implications could be immense.

So far as the consequences for the climate are concerned, and withreference to its projected range of temperature increase for the year 2100(i.e. 1.4–5.8 deg/C), the IPCC valuably summarizes the essentials as follows:the land surface temperature rise will probably be greater than the oceansurface temperature rise; there will probably be more hot days and fewercold days, but with a reduced diurnal temperature range over most landareas; there will be increases in water vapor in the atmosphere, and rainfallwill increase in most locations; in many places there will be more intenserainfall events; in many places there will be an increased risk of drought(e.g. such as those associated with El Nino events); it is likely that there willbe increases in the frequency of extreme weather events—like thunder-storms and tornadoes; it is likely that there will be an increase in variabilityof the rainfall associated with the Asian summer monsoon; glaciers and icecaps will continue to melt; and sea levels will probably continue to rise asthe ocean expands due to thermal expansion and the melting of snow andice—a global mean sea level increase of anywhere between 9 and 88centimeters over the period 1990–2100 is projected (IPCC, 2001b:13–16).In relation to all these effects there will be variation by world region, and the

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effects will generally vary directly with the extent of the coming temperaturerise.

The task of gauging what the numerous consequences of these possiblechanges in climate might be for humanity is probably even greater than thatof determining the nature of the likely climate changes themselves. This ispartly because of the existence of both regional and socioeconomic varia-tion, and because of the multitude of dimensions both of the environmentand of human life. However, key elements of the IPCC’s assessment of theimplications and consequences of coming changes in climate for humanpopulations include: that natural systems are often limited in the extent towhich they can adapt, and that changes in such systems can sometimes beirreversible; that although adverse impacts will probably tend to predomi-nate there will also be beneficial impacts—thus, for example, while theoverall effect for world agriculture may be negative, in some locationslevels of agricultural production might be raised from some climate changes(e.g. increases in temperature and rainfall); that in most settings—whetherbetween or within countries—the adverse effects of climate change will falldisproportionately upon the poor—for example, ‘[t]he effects of climatechange are expected to be greatest in developing countries in terms of lossof life and relative effects on investment and the economy’ (IPCC, 2001d:8),and ‘squatter and other informal urban settlements with high populationdensity, poor shelter, little or no access to resources ... and low adaptivecapacity are highly vulnerable [to urban flooding]’ (IPCC, 2001d:13); thatthere will probably be appreciable increases in the geographical areas andhuman populations that are subject to water stress, to flooding and to foodinsecurity as a result of climate change; that disaster losses due to extremeweather events are likely to rise substantially; that the adverse impacts ofclimate change will be greater with more rapid warming; and, lastly, thatadaptation is a necessary strategy to complement efforts at climate changemitigation—thus, ‘[f]or each anticipated adverse health impact there is arange of social, institutional, technological, and behavioral adaptation op-tions to lessen that impact’, and ‘[a]daptation to climate change presentscomplex challenges, but also opportunities, to the [insurance and financialservices] sector’ (IPCC, 2001d:12 and 13).

Given the sheer magnitude of the task, the IPCC’s exploration of thelikely consequences of the coming change in the world’s climate is com-mendable. However it is open to criticism in several key respects. Forexample, questions arise about the vocabulary that is used. The single mostimportant theme is usually that of ways of adapting to climate change. But‘adaptation’, and similar words like ‘coping’, are not neutral. They pre-suppose changes to which it will be possible to adjust. Likewise, the

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analytical perspectives that tend to be employed—for example, that therewill be ‘winners’ as well as ‘losers’ (echoed in some of the preceding ex-tracts), can be criticized in that they presume an element of symmetry—yetit could be that on the basis of some future trajectories of temperature andclimate, conditions might deteriorate for almost everyone.

Again, and as one might expect, studies of the consequences of climatechange tend to proceed sector by sector—for example, examining thepossible implications for agriculture, industry, the service sector, health, etc.Almost inevitably this means that it is hard to do justice to the manifoldpossible interactions between different sectors. In fact, in broad terms, theIPCC’s assessment of the implications of future climate change starts from aconsideration of possible ecological changes—for example, relating towater resources, coastal zones, and marine ecosystems—and then proceedsto discuss the implications for the production of goods and services, humansettlements, energy, industry, financial services, and health. While this is areasonable direction in which to proceed, it is not the only possible one.Thus it is arguably less people-centered than, for example, the recentMillennium Ecosystem Assessment—which more specifically considersecosystems in terms of the benefits that they provide to people (e.g. in termsof timber, clean air, fibers, food, etc). Moreover, and predictably, thedominant social science perspective in these studies is that of economics.Input from, for example, sociologists or political scientists is negligible inthe published IPCC reports. Unfortunately this means that some potentiallyimportant effects of future climate change receive virtually no considerationat all—for example, as to how people’s views of the world might alter (e.g.in terms of religious beliefs) or the ways in which the behavior of nationstates in the international arena might change (e.g. towards positions thatare even more dominated by instrumentalism and national self-interest thanapplies now).

A common thread behind the issues raised in the preceding paragraphsis that study of the possible consequences of future climate change tends toshy away from contemplating circumstances that incline in the direction ofa rapid and sustained temperature increase or the occurrence of a major‘surprise’ (for exceptions see National Research Council (2002) and Stipp(2004)). It has been argued here, however, that there is a good chance thatsuch circumstances might arise. This is not the place to consider the pos-sible consequences of more rapidly warming climate scenarios or thoseinvolving a major unexpected happening, but a few observations are rele-vant by way of conclusion.

First, consider that the world’s population later in this century willprobably be around nine billion. The addition of an extra three billion

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people will mostly be those who are poor and relatively vulnerable. Second,the continuing process of urbanization will mean that extremely largenumbers of people—probably several billion—will be living in low lying,densely populated, coastal areas of the developing world, and their situa-tion is likely to be particularly exposed. Third, probably the most importantconsequence of future climate change for human populations relates toagricultural production in the world’s tropical and semi-tropical regions(IPCC, 2001d). Food production in such regions is an activity that is unlikelyto be able to adapt to a rapid rise in temperature, and it will almost certainlynot be able to cope with any abrupt change in climate. Perhaps no eco-nomic generalization is sounder than that small declines in food productioncan produce big rises in food prices—often with very significant sociopo-litical ramifications. Fourth, more thought needs to be given to circum-stances in which several adverse changes occur simultaneously and tocumulative adverse effect. This is the matter of how various potentialharmful developments might interact. For example, flooding of coastalareas, which might result partly from sea level rise and partly from increasedrainfall, could lead to the simultaneous loss of cropland and urban infra-structure, producing food price rises, large scale migration, and possiblysignificant sociopolitical disruption.

Finally, any really major or abrupt change in the world’s climate couldwell lead to a situation in which virtually everyone loses and nobody wins.This could happen, for example, through the likely severe adverse effects onagriculture everywhere. In such circumstances it would be especially naiveto believe that only poor countries would be badly affected. Indeed, it isworth considering the notion that the very interdependent complexity andhigh degree of specialization that characterize the world’s most economi-cally advanced countries could well be a potential source of significantvulnerability for some of them. A rapid rise in temperature or suddenchange in climate would have consequences that may be almost incon-ceivable to those of us who have grown up in a generally improving world,one underpinned by massive increases in the use of fossil fuel energy.

CONCLUSIONS

The view taken in this paper has been that there is a very appreciablechance of major climate change occurring at some point during the presentcentury. To have this view is not to deny that there is scope for techno-logical change to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of energy; nor is it to denythat changes in human behavior could alter the volume of global CO2

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emissions, and therefore the world’s future temperature and climate tra-jectory over the longer run. Furthermore, it is quite possible that futurechange in the world’s climate will be modest, manageable, and perhapseven beneficial for many people. That said, the chance of some sort oflarge-scale ruinous development happening—such as global warming at aquite unmanageable rate, or the occurrence of some kind of abrupt climatechange—appears to be just as great.

It is all too easy to get distracted by detail. Accordingly, as was inti-mated at the paper’s start, the approach adopted here has been to step back,look at the big picture, and try to focus on the essentials. With this in mind,the paper has brought together material on per capita CO2 emissions andpopulation projections, and it has presented data on levels of atmosphericCO2 and measures of the world’s surface temperature. The purpose of doingthis is so that, to some extent at least, the reader can make up his or her ownmind regarding past and future trends.

It can be predicted with considerable confidence that levels ofanthropogenic CO2 emissions are going to rise significantly. It is virtuallycertain that the level of CO2 in the Earth’s atmosphere will continue toincrease monotonically in the coming decades. It is very hard to envisagethat the figure will not exceed 530 ppm by the end of this century. It is likelythat the world’s surface temperature will continue to rise at a pace that isquite unprecedented during human history. Looking at the more immediateterm, it seems very likely that the first decade of the 21st century willsupplant the 1990s as the warmest decade since reasonable direct mea-surement began. There seems to be fair reason to expect that the nextsecondary peak in the temperature cycle may occur around the year 2010.Indeed, Hansen et al. (2005:4) observe in relation to 2005 that: ‘the trend ofglobal temperatures toward global warming is now so steep that in just7 years the global warming trend has taken temperatures to approximatelythe level of the abnormally warm year of 1998.’ Anyhow, the time seriespresented in this paper can be updated—since just how these measureschange during the coming years should be extremely interesting, and helpus to determine just where the world is heading.

Denial and avoidance have also been very significant themes in theopinion that has been expressed here. Understandably, people don’t like toconfront difficult issues, nor do they like to change their behavior much. Aswas intimated at the start, there is a broad parallel here with respect to HIV/AIDS. Within 5 years of its identification, all the main transmission routes ofthis disease were known, the virus was isolated, tests had been developed,and the first antiretroviral drug was available. It is perhaps worth adding thatthere was also some optimism among the scientific community about

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developing a vaccine and ‘conquering AIDS’ (Curran, 2001). Yet any suchoptimism was to see things in much too narrow, clinical-medical terms; itwas to massively underestimate the human, the social side. Denial,avoidance and recrimination were rife with respect to HIV/AIDS—they stillare—and, partly as a result, perhaps some 60 million people have eitherdied of the disease or are currently infected. There is much evidence thatpeople only really change their sexual behavior when evidence of damagebecomes plain. Similarly, the thrust of the position taken here with respectto global warming and climate change is that people will only really altertheir behavior with respect to energy use when they experience seriouseffects from these phenomena for themselves. That said, the purpose of thispiece has been to try to comment objectively on the subject, rather than totry to alter behavior.

That modern economic growth and the demographic transition bothbegan at around the same time in history is hardly coincidental. Populationgrowth, migration, and urbanization all play significant roles in the subjectof global warming and climate change. However, the most important part,by far, is that played by fossil energy—coal, oil and natural gas—in fuelingeconomic development. It is important to remember that what still locks somany people in conditions of material poverty is their reliance uponeconomies that remain overwhelmingly ‘organic’ i.e. they have no realaccess to the energy supplied by fossil fuels. If there are major changes tothe world’s climate in the coming century then the agricultural, economic,political and wider social repercussions could be so great that they impacton the future growth trajectory of the human population. While our childrenor grandchildren may not face the end of the world, they could well face theend of the world, at least as we have known it.

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Development, Demography, And Climate Change

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