Deterring Non-State Actors (Davis)
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Transcript of Deterring Non-State Actors (Davis)
NAVALPOSTGRADUATE
SCHOOLMONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
Deterring Non-state Actors: A Multi-dimensional Strategy
SO3882- Deterrence, Coercion, and Crisis ManagementProfessor Leo Blanken
September 21,2009
byMAJ Ian S. Davis
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Deterring Non-state Actors: A Multi-dimensional Strategy
The 2009 National Intelligence Strategy1 noted that the international security landscape is
rapidly changing, complex environment comprised of nation-states (states), non-state actors
(NSAs), and transnational forces (TNFs). The first mission objective in the strategy is to combat
violent extremism. To do that, U.S. national security policy must be a comprehensive plan to
address any security threat, regardless of its sponsor. In order to be effective, the policy must be
part of a multi-dimensional strategy. Before the rise of terrorism by violent extremist, states
used a variety of strategies that drove negotiation aimed at promoting parsimony and deterring
war. Although deterring violent extremists appears to be a complex problem, traditional state to
state deterrence theories are still applicable and can be adapted deter NSAs and TNFs. For the
purpose of this essay TNFs will be included a NSA. NSAs that espouse violent extremism can
be deterred by denying their capacity to conduct operations. To deny their capacity to conduct
operations, states must influence a NSA’s freedom of movement, support and legitimacy. The
factors are part of a cyclical in interdependent relationship. Although they are presented in a
sequential manner, the effects of one hinges on the effects of the others. To support the
argument, this essay will use the following structure. First, we will explore deterrence theory
and how it applies to deterring NSAs. Next, we will show how to influence freedom of
movement, support, and legitimacy to deny NSA operational capability. Finally, we will review
concepts for denying operational capacity that were presented in the essay and recommended
policy to deter NSAs that espouse violent extremism.
Deterrence Theory
1 2009 Intelligence Strategy available at www.dni.gov
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Cold War deterrence theories, such as Brody’s (1959)2 writing’s on the fear of nuclear
annihilation and Kahn’s (1965)3 escalation ladder of scaled response, were pivotal for shaping
concepts for deterrence and coercion. The same concepts of rationality and expected utility that
are used for state-state relations can be used for state-NSA relations. Jervis (1989),4 found that
although Rational Deterrence Theory (RDT) shows actors will attempt to maximize their
expected utility, but RDT did not show how actors will behave. He further found that rational
actors will seek conflict if it would yield benefits or prevent a loss in the actor’s current status
quo. Fearon’s Rationalist Explanations for War5 used RDT to show how leaders decide to go to
war by weighing the ex ante (pre-war) and ex post (after war) costs and how they apply in a
bargaining model. If a threat is not credible, then it will not affect the target’s decision cycle.
For a threat to be credible, it must be back by capacity and will to execute the threat should the
target decide to not comply with the threat. Based on the credibility of the threat, actors
calculate their expected utility of compliance or dissention and act accordingly. Rationality and
expected utility are relative to the actor’s point of view, culture, and norms. The loss of lives,
territories, and relative power in the international community generally drives the rationally of
states. Although terrorist acts, especially suicidal terrorist acts perpetrated by NSAs, may appear
to be irrational, they are actually the outcome of a rational thought process of the NSA based on
ideology, values, norms, and to achieve particular goals. Pape6 showed that terrorist acts
followed a strategy based on their timing, goals, and target selection. Although states and NSAs
2 Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," World Politics 11, no. 2 (Jan., 1959), 173-191, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009527.3 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), 308.4 Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence," World Politics 41, no. 2 (Jan., 1989), 183-207, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010407 (accessed AUgust 4, 2009).5 James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer, 1995), 379-414, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903 (accessed August 4, 2009).6 Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz, The use of Force : Military Power and International Politics, 7th ed. (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009).
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have different views on the means to achieve their goals, they both weigh the costs verses the
benefit of their actions and commit their acts based on their expected utility. Studies by Davis
and Jenkins7 and Trager and Zagorcheva8( that concludes that traditional deterrence theories
based on state-state competition can be adapted and applied to deterrence of NSAs. The
remainder of the essay is based on the findings of the two aforementioned studies. While it is
inconceivable that Osama bin Laden will ever make peace with the U.S. and stop sponsoring
terrorist acts, the international community can increase the costs of him doing business. By
influencing the environment, states can deny the NSA’s freedom of movement, support, and
legitimacy.
Freedom of Movement (FOM)t
The first goal is to influence the environment to deny NSA’s freedom of movement. FOM is
shaped by the influencing the legitimacy and support mechanisms that are necessary for NSAs to
operate. This is done internationally, nationally, and at the local level. Internationally, this can
be done by global information dominance, universal jurisdiction and cooperation, and rewards
and reprimands. The same way that NSAs leverage technology to reach a global audience, so
can states leverage technology to illuminate networks and institute a global system to monitor
indicators and warnings. Information dominance through a global network of information
exchange denied freedom of movement and is necessary to find, fix, and finish threats.
Geospatial and temporal tracking tools based on developments in network analysis are can be
used to find threats. Technology to collect and disseminated biometric data, analyze and monitor
operational patterns, and to Tag, Track, and Locate (TTL) targets enable states to fix threats.
7 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism : A Component in the War on Al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 86, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1619/.8 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It can be done," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005), 87, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=999302541&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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The refined targeting data based on a multiple sources as part of global network of information
collection and dissemination provides states more options to finish the that would otherwise slip
through the cracks of the international system. Universal jurisdiction and cooperation between
states will is a form of extended deterrence that prevent NSAs from slipping the cracks in the
international system and lends credibility to directly and indirectly..The NSA’s resulting freedom
of movement is denied by extending the applicability of appropriate authorities through
cooperation and denying the NSA the ability to hide in plain sight. Rewards and reprimands are
effective tools for rewarding those elements who deny NSAs freedom of movement and for
punishing those who support their freedom of movement. These changes in expected utility will
drive international politics and the state-state competition. Nationally (FOM) is denied by
effective coordination and synchronization, civil liberties, and prosperity. Information
dominance is also critical at the national level to deny NSAs freedom of movement. The 9/11
Commission Report found that the failure of effective coordination and synchronization of
intelligence between U.S entities charged with internal and external security was the major factor
that contributed to the failure of the U.S. to prevent the 9/11 attacks. The elimination of
bureaucracy and greater coordination within all levels of a state’s society are essential to
identify, monitor, and eliminate threats. Increased civil liberties empower the people, promote
legitimacy of the state, and help mitigate the factors that allow the NSA to gain popular support.
If the state provides a legitimate mechanism that educates and enables the people to achieve their
goals, then the people will be less likely to permit the acquiescence of the NSA. Prosperity, be it
economical or spiritual, is the manifestation of the benefits of supporting the state or the NSA. A
state fosters prosperity allowing society to create social norms and standards that frame right and
wrong by consistently punishing bad behavior and rewarding good behavior. States, NSAs, and
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citizens that operate within the boundaries established by the system are reward and allowed to
prosper that leads to an increased the expected utility for cooperation. Those that operate outside
of the established boundaries are punished and lead to a decreased expected utility for
cooperation. Actions at the national level will deny freedom of movement by indentifying and
preventing threats, removing the likelihood of the populace’s acquiescence to NSAs that espouse
extremism, and influencing the environment by diminishing the expected utility of supporting
targeted NSAs. Locally, the denial of NSA FOM is similar to counter-insurgency strategy and
relies on information, population control measures, and controlling operational assets.
Information balances FOM for the state and the NSA. The actions for denying the NSA FOM at
the local level can be viewed as the success or failure at the international and national level. The
outcome of the efforts affects the population’s susceptibility to both the state’s and the NSA’s
information campaign. The populace’s willingness to provide or protect information is driven by
their rationality based on the expected utility of cooperation with the state or the NSA. If the
benefits for cooperating with the state outweigh the cost of coopering with the NSA, the people
will give information to the state and deny FOM to the NSA. Oppositely, if the state is not
considered legitimate, or can not increase the peoples’ expected utility for cooperation with the
state, the people will passively or actively give information, safe haven, and FOM to the NSA
and deny the same to the state. Local population control measures influence the environment
and deny FOM through a system of accountability and monitoring. ID cards, checkpoints,
curfews, and entitlements are all effective methods of controlling the populace and rewarding
compliance. The directly denies FOM and operational capability by establishing a series of
control gates and indirectly denies FOM by rewarding those that participate through
entitlements. Cooperation with the measures increases benefits, while cooperation with the NSA
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decreases benefits. This denies safe haven and FOM within and through the local community.
Controlling the NSA’s operational assets at the local level by security forces and governmental
agencies is critical to deny FOM and is achieved through identification, monitoring, and
interdiction. Hardening targets and increasing operational difficulty increases requirements and
time necessary to plan and conduct operations. Interdiction of mission essential assets to execute
operations disrupts the operational cycle denies FOM and influences the NSA’s operational
cycle.
Support
Influencing a NSA’s support structure is the next method to deny operational capability.
NSAs generally have three mechanisms for support: organic, outside, and popular. According to
Cronin9 ,the majority of al Qaeda’s operations rely on a minimal amount of startup money from
the organization then it is supplemented by operatives in the field. Means of organic financial
and logistic support are illicit activities, commercial activities, and operational recovery. Money
generated by the drug trade is a major source of funding for Taliban operations in Afghanistan.
Legitimate businesses established by al-Qaeda earn profits that are subsequently diverted to fund
terrorist operations. Tighter regulations and cooperation between states will help to identify and
freeze the assets that support violent extremists. Improved physical security controls and
material management will limit pilferage of equipment. Denying the NSA the capacity to
generate resources organically will drive up the cost of doing business and force the organization
to look for outside support. As the organization looks for outside support, the organization
becomes vulnerable to observation. Outside support to NSAs comes from state sponsors, Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and private donors. These sources of outside support are
susceptible to influence by punishment for their associations with NSAs that are determined to
9 Art and Waltz, The use of Force : Military Power and International Politics, 552
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be a threat by the state or the international community. Enforcement of laws for those who
support terrorist organizations, such as criminal punishment, seizing of assets, and sanctions, will
make threats credible and dissuade active support. Popular support comes in the form of
membership, information, and acquiescence derived from propaganda. Cronin10 found that
NSAs can evolve from a terrorist group to a social movement. In the case of al-Qaeda, members
look to join the group rather than being recruited. Most of the groups in the network have loose
connections that are linked through ideology instead of command or logistical support structures.
Use of the internet and other media outlets to send propaganda is an affective tool to increase
popular support. Since these messages do not go through any vetting process, such as religious
leaders or subject matter experts, they are effective at stirring emotions in the uneducated or
disenfranchised. Since the targets of the propaganda do not have any incentive to continue with
the status quo, they begin to support the NSA either actively or passively. By influencing the
conditions that make people susceptible to the propaganda and wanting to support the NSAs,
Legitimacy
Legitimacy is the glue that holds an organization together. NSAs are not just a single
actor, but are elements of a system. All of the elements of the system are working together to
achieve a common goal. While deterrence of a NSA’s radical leadership may not be feasible, it
is easier to influence the sub-elements of the system. The NSA’s legitimacy is critical to hold
the group together. If the members do not have confidence in the leadership or the cause, the
organization will crumble. By influencing the rationality and expected utility of actors in the
system, reducing legitimacy will cause an organization to implode. Cronin’s explanations for the
decline and ending of terrorist groups in the modern era showed the importance of legitimacy to
the survival of an organization. They were: capture or killing of the leader, failure to transition
10 Ibid.
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to the next generation, achievement of the group’s aims, transition to a legitimate process,
undermining a popular support, repression, and transition from terrorism. Davis and Jenkins11
viewed NSAs as a system. By decomposing the system, they created an escalation ladder similar
to Kahn’s that facilitates targeting of the sub-elements of the system that are susceptible to
influence to set conditions for implosion stated by Cronin. The organization’s leadership,
ideology, and perception are all vulnerable to influence and can diminish its legitimacy. Inept
leadership that is viewed as criminalistic instead of heroic will diminish popular support and
cause infighting within the organization. Organizational ideology that is not attainable or is
inconsistent with the desires of the membership will decrease the appeal to its members.
Discrediting of the organizations activities by respected peers will decrease popular perception
and cause isolation and containment of the group. By influencing the environment to reduce the
NSA’s legitimacy, the states can deny the NSA’s capacity to conduct operations by diminishing
the sub-elements expected utility for remaining affiliated with the NSA, thus reducing the NSA’s
assets.
Conclusion
State-state deterrence theories are still suitable to deter NSAs with adaptation by
influencing the NSA’s operational environment to deny their operational capability to conduct
operations. To be effective, the strategy requires global cooperation and unity of effort. The
strategy is cyclic in nature, interdependent, multi-tiered, and relies on influencing the
environment through efforts at the international, national, and local levels. By influencing the
NSA’s legitimacy, support, and freedom of movement, operational capability will be denied, the
costs of conducting operations will increase, and the expected utility of executing an operation
will have a deterrent effect against NSAs. Although costs and benefits may be weighted
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differently, both states and NSAs use a rational method to weigh costs and benefits operations.
While terrorist acts, sponsored by dogmatic zealots that espouse violent extremism, are unlikely
to stop, they can be decreased by influencing the environment and denying a NSA’s operational
capability. The way ahead is for states to enact and enforce policies and regulations that: foster
international cooperation and information sharing; promote moderate views and denounce
violence; remove oppression and ignorance; and promote rights and prosperity. This may seem
like a lofty goal, but any movement forward is a step in the right direction
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Works Cited
Art, Robert J. and Kenneth Neal Waltz. The use of Force : Military Power and International Politics. 7th ed. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
Brodie, Bernard. "The Anatomy of Deterrence." World Politics 11, no. 2 (Jan., 1959): 173-191.
Davis, Paul K. and Brian Michael Jenkins. Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism : A Component in the War on Al Qaeda. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002.
Fearon, James D. "Rationalist Explanations for War." International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer, 1995): 379-414, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903 (accessed August 4, 2009).
Jervis, Robert. "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence." World Politics 41, no. 2 (Jan., 1989): 183-207, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010407 (accessed August 4, 2009).
Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. Hudson Institute Series on National Security and International Order, no. 1. New York: Praeger, 1965.
Trager, Robert F. and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva. "Deterring Terrorism: It can be done." International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005): 87.
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