Detailed Analysis of Islamic State

Propaganda Video:

Although the Disbelievers Dislike It

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. - 2 -

SEGMENT ONE: ISLAMIC STATE ON THE MARCH .............................................................................. - 3 -

SEGMENT TWO: A PSEUDO-DOCUMENTARY .................................................................................... - 4 -

SEGMENT THREE: THE MASS SIMULTANEOUS BEHEADING ............................................................. - 6 -

IDENTIFYING THE EXECUTIONERS .................................................................................................... - 10 -

SEGMENT FOUR: ALLEGIANCES ....................................................................................................... - 22 -

SEGMENT FIVE: ABDUL RAHMAN (PETER) KASSIG ......................................................................... - 25 -

CONCLUDING REMARKS ................................................................................................................... - 31 -

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INTRODUCTION

Since its inception, the Islamic State (IS) propaganda machine has repeatedly demonstrated its

sophistication and complexity. IS has abandoned the often ramshackle methods of international

outreach common to its rivals (e.g. bin Laden's cassette tapes) in favour of meticulously planned, high-

quality videos. In one of its most recent releases, Although the Disbelievers Dislike It, IS attempts to

provide a graphic cinema-quality experience to its viewers, something which, at first sight, it succeeds

in achieving. However, upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that discrepancies were

overlooked in the editorial process, leading to telling anomalies.

***Please note, pages 25-30 contain screenshots from the video that some readers may find

distressing. They are present to illustrate inconsistencies within the production***

The video can be split into five sections, outlined below. Each of these will be dealt with separately in

the following pages.

1. Map Moving in Time: Displays territories in which IS has official affiliates (large or small),

followed by countries in which it suggests it plans to expand;

2. Documentary-style Narrative: An amalgamation of clips that depict the emergence of the

Islamic State over the past 11 years;

3. Parade of Knives & Execution of the 22: Twenty-two Syrian hostages are paraded by their

executioners through an olive grove, past a box of knives, and simultaneously beheaded;

4. The Bay’at (Pledges): Return to the map, highlighting (with audio) countries in which groups

pledged allegiance to Baghdadi; and

5. Abdul Rahman (Peter) Kassig’s Death Announced: An image of the executioner known as “Jihadi

John” (henceforth JJ) standing over the head of the American aid-worker Abdul Rahman (Peter)

Kassig, followed by a short clip of JJ alluding to the prophesied "final crusade" showdown in

Dabiq, Syria.

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SEGMENT ONE: ISLAMIC STATE ON THE MARCH

Screen shot of Islamic State "spreading of light" throughout the world.

The larger significance of Although the Disbelievers Dislike It is not difficult to decipher: it is an attempt

to project IS’ political influence, theological legitimacy and military prowess. If one looks through a

technical lens, there are noteworthy anomalies, changes that only become apparent with closer

examination.

SPREADING OF THE CALIPHATE

Though translations differ slightly, this video was released on the heels of Baghdadi’s audio message by

the same title, Although the Disbelievers Dislike It (November 13, 2014). The title of the video release,

produced by IS’ Mu’assassat al-Furqan, is taken from the Quran, chapter 9, verse 32:

“They want to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah refuses except to perfect His

light, although the disbelievers dislike it”.

The first 00:07:35 minutes illustrate this reference, showing the “light” of IS spreading across the world

from its origin in Iraq, south to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, west to the Iberian Peninsula and Rome,

east across Southwest Asia to China, the Koreas and Japan, and finally across the Atlantic to Mexico and

the United States. The implication is that IS intends to expand its caliphate across the world. This is not

the propagandists proposing that Islamic State is currently ready to control these territories but rather,

it is intended to inspire the audience into action and convince them there is opportunity to usher in the

global caliphate wherever they live. Their message is clear: “the caliphate is inevitable and

unstoppable."

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SEGMENT TWO: A PSEUDO-DOCUMENTARY

Screen shot at minute mark 1:40 featuring bin Laden.

HISTORY LESSON FROM THE ISLAMIC STATE - 2003 TO PRESENT

One of IS’ most recognizable nasheeds (hymn), Ummati Qad Laha Fajrat, opens the historical section

of this video. The spotlight shifts from future pursuits to past exploits through a (much-abridged)

version of IS’ history dating back to 2003, when the United States led war against Saddam Hussein’s

Iraq began. Needless to say, it is a creative interpretation of the facts; Mu’assassat al-Furqan (the

video’s production unit) gives a revisionist view of history – in reality, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the

jihadists he led had been active in Iraq at least two years prior to the war.

REWRITING THE STORY TO SUIT ISLAMIC STATE

Footage of coalition assaults from land and air is intermixed with images of the “sons of Islam preparing

themselves for battle,” a battle that is purportedly continuing to this day, now reaching Dabiq, northern

Syria. The most striking claim made in this documentary is the claim that the Iraqi jihadists of the early

2000s always intended to spread west into Syria, ultimately to stage its forces in Dabiq. This was not

the case, no matter the convenience of the story to IS' documentary; it was not until recent years that

the Syrian War created the opportunity for IS jihadists to look past the Sykes-Picot line.

Years progress through the highlight reel – the Iraqi insurgency advances and al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-

Tawhid w-al-Jihad becomes al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, which then joined the Majlis Shura al-

Mujahidin before it, in turn, subjugates itself to the Hilf al-Mutayyibin, the founding alliance that would

later form Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyya (the Islamic State of Iraq) – and, as they do, a change occurs in

the jihadists themselves.

Images of overweight civilian-dressed men toting and misfiring machine guns are followed by footage

that better resembles a conventional army, with jihadists wearing military fatigues and moving in

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convoys. This is a blatant attempt to showcase the constant efforts by the IS leadership to “progress

and advance” the global jihad, adding to its usual motto of “remaining and expanding.”

IMPROVING RELIGIO-POLITICAL STANDING IN GLOBAL JIHADI MOVEMENT

The fact that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi gave bay’ah (allegiance) to Usama bin Laden in 2004 is heavily

emphasized in this narrative. It seems a rather obvious attempt by IS to improve its religio-political

standing within the global jihadist community. IS propagandists are trying to answer detractors and

demonstrate that their group, even though it was disavowed by al-Qaeda in February 2014, is

nonetheless part of the same global movement. This theme is central to the documentary portion

of Although the Disbelievers Dislike It. Furthermore, it betrays the fact that this portion of the video is

directed at a global jihadist audience. It is an attempt to historically legitimize itself and convince

prospective adherents that it is not a “great source of sedition”, as was recently claimed by prominent

figure in Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Mu’assassat al-Furqan’s propagandists are trying to

depict IS as heirs of the mujahidin legacy and that they are cut from exactly the same cloth as al-Qaeda.

Screen shot minute mark 5:45 - 5:48 shows prisoners escaping what is presumably Camp Bucca.

SHIA ARE MAIN TARGETS

In the last few minutes of this section, the tone changes again and images of barbarities dealt out by

the Assad regime, the “Nusayri regime” are shown, before ISI’s leaders “agreed upon the necessity of

openly emerging in the Shami battlefield” and ISI became ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. It

is then implied that that, while ISIS was focusing on fighting injustice on behalf of Syrian Sunnis, the

situation was worsening in Iraq due to the Shia ascendancy and Iran’s supposed co-optation of Baghdad.

The tone changes with clips depicting the backlash against the “blackness rising over [Baghdad] day

after day” and taken from Salil al-Sawarim IV and AlaMinhaj al-Nabwa, two other productions from

Mu’assassat al-Furqan.

Here, the propagandists’ intention is to portray IS and its newly appointed “caliph” as the vanguard of

Sunni Muslims in the war against Shi’ite ascendancy and is communicated vividly.

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SEGMENT THREE: THE MASS SIMULTANEOUS BEHEADING

Click image to enlarge

FIRST OF ITS KIND

Segment three is not merely a novel approach to a terrorist execution; the beheading a total of twenty-

two prisoners simultaneously sets a new precedent for terrorist propaganda. No other non-state actor

has filmed a synchronized beheading of this size or scale before. Twenty-two SAA prisoners are paraded

by their executioners in front of the camera in several sequences before the actual execution occurs:

first, through an olive grove, then select their knives and, finally, to their final position on either side of

JJ. This procession was created on camera in multiple “takes” over no less than 4-6 hours.

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A TOTAL OF TWENTY-TWO

That the line-up changes multiple times during the sequences is not immediately noticeable due to

editorial cuts, obscuring the number of people actually present at JJ’s side such that media reports have

estimated the total number to be between twelve and eighteen.

There were in fact twenty-two executioners in total, corresponding to 22 hostages. The prisoners, who

were predominantly captured after the fall of Syrian military bases such as Tabqa and Division 17 in late

summer 2014, were relocated on two separate occasions from two different places in Syria, and at first

glance seemed to have been chosen at random. However, be that as it may, we have good reason to

believe that there was another reason to have each of these twenty-two executioners present.

THE CHOSEN FEW

It is immediately clear from the footage that these young jihadists did not get a simple “how to behead”

tutorial before being included in the film. They were already experienced in execution, at least on some

level. However, be that as it may, we have good reason to believe that there was another reason to

have each of these twenty-two executioners present. From the IS propaganda angle, the executioners

were featured much more than the prisoners and each was carefully chosen for the honour of

participating in this event. In contrast to previous IS productions, which have focused more broadly on

IS’ political program. This sequence is motivated by a different propaganda message: the novice

executioners are deliberately given a central role, almost as if this footage featured a jihadist

“homecoming”, made primarily to focus on IS’ most favoured foreign fighters.

FOLLOWING PREVIOUS FOOTPRINT AND POSSIBLE NATIONALITIES

This section of the video capitalizes on the media success of JJ’s solo executions in past videos. It

features the twenty-two executioners as jihadists who are international, proficient, and dominant,

mimicking JJ in his prior appearances. Similarly, just as speculation as to JJ’s nationality and identity

captured global attention, the same is true with this “debutant” group of jihadists. There has been the

same race to identify the executioners. However, besides the one confirmed French national, Maxime

Hauchard, the rest have been difficult to identify.

TRAC and Quilliam have good reason to believe that there is at least one more executioner of French

nationality, at least one from Kazakhstan, potentially two from near Georgia, and individuals from

Switzerland, Belgium, Australia, and the Pacific Rim area. JJ himself is believed to be British.

PLANNED FUTURE RELEASES

Unlike the preceding segment, this presentation does not merely target global jihadist, IS supporters

and potential recruits; rather, it is aimed at international security services too and, of course, the media.

Showing the executioners’ faces was a taunt, a way of emphasizing the perceived inability of the

international community to do anything to stop IS. They are now natural candidates for later

releases. At least two of the executioners have microphones but only one is briefly shown speaking,

suggesting that their interviews were cut and possibly saved for a later time. At the very least, the two

who have been miked up, presumably, will be seen in later releases. TRAC has received reports from

reliable sources that the original video might have been as long as 45 minutes, which would provide

ample footage for a second release.

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MULTIPLE TAKES

The parading line-up changes from scene to scene due to the splicing of multiple takes; guns are put

aside off camera, and small items of clothing change. Screen shots of extremely short "in-between

takes" show the executioners down the line chatting with one another, as if they are aware that they

have time to kill before the beheading begins. It also appears that the executioners cleaned

themselves between the killing and the after shots, in order to maintain a professional appearance.

Appearing at Minute Mark 10:38, this executioner was the very first shown in slow motion after execution

(note presence of microphone on right hand lapel); #19 on chart above. It is interesting to note, he is not

seen marching through the olive grove, nor, in line to get his knife. He appears briefly only one other time in

the video, next to the other masked executioner (not JJ).

Screen shots above show #1 executioner and #19 executioner side by side with microphones. Based on the

microphones, the hidden jihadists, and apparent length of filming time, it is clear that there is quite a bit

more footage than this 15:53 video.

THE EDITING MISTAKES

One of the most curious editing mistakes the Islamic State has made in the line up around JJ are three

hidden jihadi executioners. It is only in transitional sequences of less than a second that each of them

is partially visible: what TRAC and Quilliam consider mistakes in the editing process. On TRAC’s visual

model of the line-up, produced in conjunction with Quilliam, these three men appear as numbers

#18(wearing glasses), #20 (very dark skinned), and #21 (wearing a balaclava).

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Above: small screen grabs of #18, #20, and #21.

JJ’S BODY DOUBLE?

The second masked man who appears at the end of the line, never meant to be featured or exposed as being

present, raises more questions. He is roughly the same shape and size as JJ, which has led to some

speculation that he was a double. Filming for long periods of time out in the open (as well as transportation

to the location) makes JJ susceptible to drone or air strikes, making a decoy naturally advantageous.

Additionally, JJ’s role has become more than just his character; he is a figurehead of the Islamic State. The

longer he remains unknown the longer he can strike fear and awe into his audience and the longer he

remains an idol for potential recruits. He is legendary, IS’ version of Hollywood’s “Dread Pirate Roberts”, a

character whose symbolism is more important than the actual person.

No one besides this individual and JJ was allowed to cover their face in this video sequence (something most

Western foreign fighters take seriously). Hence, his significance is distinct from the rest. Furthermore, his

uniform is slightly out of sync with the rest, his boots are black (not beige) and his pack straps are army green

(unlike the others’ camouflaged packs). If he is not serving as a body double/stand-in/understudy/decoy,

then his presence is demanded for a more important reason, he may in fact have an authoritative or sensitive

position in the Islamic State. Indeed, important figures from within the IS administration regularly appear in

propaganda, just with their faces blurred out post-production. Hence, the presence of this balaclava could

well be an extension of that.

Click Image to Enlarge (This screen shot appears for less that a tenth of a second at minute mark 9:47

immediately before the mass beheading begins.)

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IDENTIFYING THE EXECUTIONERS

One of the most compelling aspects of the video is that it features nineteen bare-faced (and one

masked) executioners of various ethnicities, in addition to JJ. Other note-worthy aspects include the

effects, the apparent use of indoor “green screen” filming in part of the video, extremely high quality

cameras and editing tools, and sound effects that may be able to help identify the studio that produced

this video.

Some sources suggest ISIS may have switched from Asia to the Gulf for production in their propaganda

campaign. The parade to the knives cuts from two angles, suggesting two cameras, unless the scene

was shot twice. One of the men, officially identified as Frenchman Maxime Hauchard, aka Abu Abdullah

al-Faransi, mostly appears with his long hair tucked into his hat. However, he is shown after the

beheadings with his hair down over his shoulder and the sky is clearly stormier. Both of these changes

suggest that a significant off-camera time has elapsed and that the execution scene was shot outdoors,

as the darkness and wind coming from behind suggest.

THE VICTIMS

Not surprisingly, the video highlights the unnamed “Syrian pilots and officers” as human victims. The

three featured at right, left, and centre at the foot of JJ appear to be the youngest, the highest ranking

and the most appealing, respectively. All are in navy jumpsuits with distinctive zippers with a “D” shaped

cut-out at the bottom. They are also all barefoot, well-groomed, of healthy weight, and do not look

drugged. At least some are wearing clean, brightly-coloured civilian clothes under their uniform.

Click image to enlarge

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EXECUTIONERS FROM JJ’S RIGHT HAND, INSIDE TO OUTSIDE

#1 "ABOU OTHMAN - SOME ACCOUNTS"

Name: Unknown – (though initially reported as Mickaël Dos Santos aka Abou Othman)

Nationality: Variously reported as Australian, Palestinian, or French

Description: Light skinned male, 20s, average height, full beard, no moustache, spiral curly hair is collar

length, small mouth, bridged nose. He is one of 2 or 3 executioner with a green label hat. Like Hauchard,

he wears tan fingerless gloves, but without the black over big knuckles. Green Polka dot or

shamrocks on navy socks.

#21 "GLASSES"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Light skinned male, late 20s or 30s, below average height, short beard, and black undershirt. He is the only executioner that wears glasses.

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#2 "REDDISH BEARD"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Chechen, suspected Description: White male, late 20s, average height, full reddish beard, small bent ears, lean cheek, unpronounced nostrils. Black band watch.

#3 "PATCHY SIDEBURNS"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Light skinned male, 20s, average height, chin hairs & patchy sideburns, lean build, slight beak nose. He is one of 2 or 3 executioner with a green label hat. Black band watch.

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#4 "SQUARE BEARD"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Dark skinned male, 20s, average height, small beard cut with square bottom, lean build, full lower lip, pronounced eyelids.

#4 "ABU DUJANA AL-MUHAJIR – SOME ACCOUNTS"

Name: Unknown – (though initially reported as Abdelmajid Gharmaoui, aka Abu Dujana Al-Muhajir (28)) Nationality: Belgian Description: Light skinned male, 20s, low average height, small beard, lean build, flared nostrils, slight beak nose, close-together eyes.

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#6 "SQUARE JAW"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Light skinned male, 20s, average height, small beard mostly under chin, very broad at eyes.

#7 "FRIZZIEST HAIR"

Name: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Description: Light skinned male, 20s, average height, small beard with soul patch.

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#8 "SNEERER"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Algerian / French, suspected Description: Dark skinned male, 30s, below average height, full beard with soul patch.

#9 "GOATEE"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Khazakhastan Description: Light skinned Asian male, 20s, average height, dark hair is collar length, chin hair only, lean build. He is one of two executioners with a black undershirt (one turtleneck).

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EXECUTIONERS FROM JJ’S LEFT HAND, INSIDE TO OUTSIDE:

#10 "(NOT) NASSER MUTHANA #2"

Name: Unknown (misreported as Nasser Muthana (20)) Nationality: Unknown Description: Dark skinned male, 20s, average height, neck beard with slight mustache.

#11 "HARDLY SEEN"

Name: Unknown

Nationality: Unknown

Description: Dark skinned male, 20s, average height, small beard, wide-set eyes.

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#12 "MAYBE KHAIRUL ANUAR"

Name: Unknown - aka Khairul Anuar (name of Mayla pro archer) Nationality: Mayla or Filipino (Kurdish forces IDed his as Filipino, which fits his features) Description: Dark skinned Asian male, 20s or 30s, much below average height, no beard, and wide bridgeless nose. His hat has a unique lable with a CK, CX, or OX emblem. Source Khairul Anuar Facebook; Capital Bay

#13 "MAYBE ABU SULAYMAN GHURABA SWISSERY"

Name: Unknown, maybe Swiss national of Algerian descent aka Abu Sulayman Ghuraba Swissery (in charge of a small brigade in IS, area of Raqqa) Nationality: Unknown, Algerian-Swiss Description: Dark skinned male, 20s or early 30s, below average height, small beard and mustache, wide diamond-shaped nose. Blue carabiner on left shoulder strap.

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#14 "(NOT) NASSER MUTHANA #1"

Name: Unknown (British press mistakenly circulated a picture of this man's profile as "1st to the left of Jihad John," when in reality was much farther down the line. Muthana's father spoke to the press saying he did not think this was his son, after initially saying it looked like him) Nationality: unknown Description: Dark skinned Southwest-Asian male, 20s or early 30s, average height, short beard and moustache, dark around eyes. Red something on silver key-ring loop in left shoulder strap.

#15 "ABU ABDULLAH AL-FARANSI"

Name: Maxime Hauchard, aka Abu Abdullah Al-Faransi (22) Nationality: French Description: White male, 20s or 30s, average height, beard with slight mustache, full lips, and thin eyebrows. Like Anu Uthmar, wears tan fingerless gloves, but with black over big knuckles. Source The Guardian

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#16 "CHINSTRAP"

Name: Unknown Nationality: North African, suspected Arrived in Syria: Unknown Description: Dark skinned male, 20s, average height, beard, long face, lean cheek and build.

#17 "SUSPECTED CHECHEN"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Chechen, suspected Description: White male, late 20s or 30s, average height, soft reddish beard, nose narrow at top and wide at bottom.

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#18 "HIDDEN EXECUTIONER"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Chechen, suspected Description: Dark skinned male, 20s or early 30s, average height, moustache, low bridged nose, forehead angles back. Wears black turtleneck.

#19 "LAZY EYE"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: White male, late 20s or 30s, kinky hair, lazy right eye, pronounced brow, maybe light eyes, scar or scowl crease between eyebrows.

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#20 "BALACLAVA"

Name: Unknown Nationality: Unknown Description: Lighter skinned male, lean build. Wears a large silver watch on left wrist.

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SEGMENT FOUR: ALLEGIANCES

This segment can best be understood in the context of a TRAC article that includes a list of countries in which

groups have given a their allegiance to Baghdadi, “Islamic State (ISIS) : The Islamic Caliphate, An Invisible

Shura and A New Slate for Jihadist.” In this segment, the blue and black map from the introduction is

displayed, beginning in Rome. Arab names for various regions of the Levant, Middle East, North Africa and

the rest of the world are provided, along with audio clips of pledges of allegiance. IS mujahidin, it is implied,

are not just participants or supporters of the so-called caliphate, they are its “citizens”.

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COUNTRIES IN WHICH GROUPS HAVE DECLARED THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO ISLAMIC STATE:

33 REGIONS; OVER 60 GROUPS

IRAQ

SYRIA

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

NETHERLANDS

DENMARK

PALESTINE

GAZA

EGYPT

BAHRAIN

YEMEN

JORDAN

LEBANON

INDIA

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

BANGLADESH

GERMANY

MOROCCO

NEW ZEALAND

TURKEY

UZBEKISTAN

ALGERIA

LIBYA

NIGERIA

SOMALIA

MALI

SUDAN

TUNISIA

PHILIPPINES

INDONESIA and MALAYSIA

MALDIVES

INDIVIDUALS

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***Please note, pages 25-30 contain screenshots from the video that readers may find distressing.

They are present to illustrate inconsistencies within the production***

25

SEGMENT FIVE: ABDUL RAHMAN (PETER) KASSIG

LOWER PRODUCTION QUALITY & DIVERGES FROM POPULAR PREVIOUS "FOOT PRINTS"

The fifth and final section – one in which a picture of the disembodied head of Abdul Rahman (Peter)

Kassig appears at the feet of “Jihadi John” – is remarkably inconsistent with the rest of the video and,

indeed, all previous IS executions of Western hostages.

Unlike other segments, the lower quality of the production makes it seem disjointed, tacked on almost

as if it were an afterthought. So significant a deviation from the four previous beheadings of Foley,

Sotloff, Haines, and Henning, this image suggests the execution of Kassig did not go as planned.

FAILURE TO INTEGRATE WITH REST OF FILM

This scene fails to integrate with the message of Although the Disbelievers Dislike It, the "progress and

advance" of the global caliphate, in two ways.

First, it is a step backwards in terms of technical prowess; secondly, it is a direct communication with

the United States (the rest of the video has a clear global audience - e.g. the light spreading across

nations, the group of international executioners, global declarations of bay’at,etc).

Every single one of JJ's sentences centres around "you" and "your," challenging the United States to

face IS at Dabiq and to fulfil the prophecy of the infidels’ demise there. He does not focus on the

coalition at all, but speaks almost exclusively of the US’ role in all this, and the fact that it has always

intended to occupy Iraq and will be vanquished in doing so. Hence, the message of the overall video

and this tacked on segment are not only inconsistent, they are mismatched.

NO INITIAL STATEMENT FROM KASSIG

There are many divergences from the established pattern of previous Mu’assassat al-Furqan executions

videos featuring JJ. Most importantly, there is no initial statement from the hostage. Given the

26

circumstances, the hostages' words are undoubtedly scripted by their captors, who have used them to

communicate demands and priorities. The statements are a valuable tool that IS would not pass over

without an overriding interest. Therefore, IS either had a compelling reason to kill Kassig before

recording his message, or the opportunity was taken from them.

JJ whitewashes over the obvious omission of Kassig’s last words in saying, "his previous cell mates have

already spoken on his behalf." Indeed, in the online jihadist community, rumours abound that Kassig

again declared his faith in Allah instead of issuing the prescribed statement, something that made his

execution impermissible by Islamic law. For the Islamic State to behead someone while they are making

the shahadah would have been a publicity disaster.

MISSING BODY

Another equally plausible explanation for the absence of a statement is that Kassig died in captivity

before his time of execution was to take place. Indeed, the absence of his body is just as significant as

the fact that he made no statement. The body is nowhere to be seen. Historically (and invariably), all

jihadist executioners take great care to provide the body as evidence that the execution was not faked.

This absence is deeply important and is another example that the execution did not go to plan. Perhaps,

then, the body was absent because he was killed elsewhere or while in captivity and his body deemed

not presentable or even unobtainable, and the head simply brought to the place where it was

photographed. Even more interesting is the fact that Kassig’s head is only shown twice, each time for

a just a few seconds as the camera pans upwards from what we believe to be – with a high degree of

certainty - a still photo. Presumably, if JJ was having a “photo op” with Kassig before or after the

beheading, there would be multiple photos taken from different angles (after all, we seen in the motion

shots of JJ in same segment).”

Minute Mark 14:00 The first of the two (2) times Kassig's head is shown from exact same photo -- not part of

filming with JJ. First photo is seen from mm13:59 - mm14:02 = 4 seconds; the second time the photo is seen is

mm15:15-mm15:27= 7 seconds.

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SHADOWS ADDED TO PHOTO

Moreover, the one photo that we see only twice has odd characteristics. The shadows of both JJ and

Kassig’s head do not match the shadows created by the buildings in Dabiq seen in the back ground later

in the motion section. The second giveaway that the photo has been digitally altered is the fact that

the shadow of the head does not cross JJ’s shoe. If one places a compass on any of the shots, it is plain

to see that the shadows were added, and added poorly. Looking at JJ as a sort of sun-dial, based on

geometry, we can assume that the shots were taken at end of day. However, how the scene is lit, the

lighting is not right for dusk; it should be low and is not.

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MEDICAL REVIEW

Analysis from one of the top eye surgeons in the United States:

"... looks like an entry wound above the eye and a very unlikely way to remove a head, much easier and

more efficient a few inches [to remove a head from torso] further down the neck. Kassig appears to

be dead before head was removed... a small entry wound above the eye would likely have a large exit

wound responsible for all the blood and gore seen. I also can't visualize successful decapitation in the

manner that they present in this one photo."

Analysis from head and neck surgeon #1

"From my view of the stills the dark wound over the left eye (and resultant non-oxygenated drainage

medially) seems to be older than the beheading facial spray which was marked with oxygenated arterial

blood. The wound over the eye was marked with dark, even possibly crusted arterial or venous

blood. Thus, we concur with your opinion that this was a post facto attempt at creating a beheading

event when he was likely already deceased. I also feel that the wound above the eye appears to be

older, and the fresh blood, with the dependent drainage pattern would appear to have been added for

the purpose of the photograph.

Analysis from head and neck surgeon #2

"I can tell from this photo is that the cause of death was more than likely the gunshot wound above the

brow."

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POOR ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL WOUND

Close-up images of Kassig’s head reveal a prominent injury—probably a gunshot wound-- on the forehead.

Just above his left eye there is an apparent penetration wound with devitalized skin and dried blood

extending from it, across the forehead. The wound on Kassig’s head is inconsistent with past releases in

which hostages have always appeared groomed and without visible bruises. Based on the photo, it is

undeniable that Kassig was injured before his death, whether by IS or some event outside the control of his

captors. There does appear to be an attempt to distract from Kassig’s injury, using several layers of blood

that appear to be super-imposed across his face.

It is also debatable whether or not the photo that we see is actually a decapitated head. The photo is missing

tissue and an angular decapitation – in other words, the wound below the chin is too “clean”. This could

mean a couple of things. Either, the image of the disembodied head was photo-shopped or produced via

green screen, or a much less plausible option, the executioner took the head and "re-decapitated" it, cutting

off both muscle and tissue at a very awkward angle. In our view, it is far more likely that a photo of Kassig’s

dead body was taken separate to the video’s filming, at any point in time or place. After this, his body could

easily have been removed digitally, using something like an Avid machine, which we know IS has possession

of. Indeed, this is something eminently achievable, given what we have seen from IS propagandists in the

past.

THREE VENUES LIKELY UTILIZED

The forensic digital analyst who stripped down the Kassig section of the video for TRAC and Quilliam, strongly

believes that decapitation took place in a low-end studio hut-compound, where someone took a photo of

the head, and then photo-shopped it there. That picture was transferred to another facility where it was

built into the video. In total, our analysis suggests that three venues were utilized in total: the place of

decapitation; the studio of the executioner with green screen; and a third place that holds the “B-roll” of the

agit-prop - songs, military footage etc - where it is then integrated into the main release

Screen grab at minute mark 14:00 a split section before the scene moves from still to video of JJ speaking, note

the right hand is completely black, not in shadow but is a "cut out" on top of an image.

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NO PRESENTATION OF NEXT VICTIM

The final section missing in this execution is the presentation of the next victim. Unlike any of the other

execution videos released by IS, there is no identification or warning of the next beheading. There are a

number of possible reasons for this, broadly stemming from a handful of distinct possibilities. First, that

Islamic State is unable or unwilling at this time to behead additional Western hostages. Other reasons

include the possibility that the decision has been made that they're more valuable alive for propaganda than

dead, like Cantlie. Another possibility is that they were unable to get the next victim to the place of filming

in time for the production (e.g. the individual was not in the physical or mental condition to be presented,

there were urgent time constraints, or influential people disagree about who will be next).

The anomalies of this final segment of Although the Disbelievers Dislike can be summed up as thus: rather

than video footage, it seems that a photograph of the victim's injured head is shown. There is no body at

the beginning of a clip, nor any statement of substance, besides JJ’s polemical taunts towards the US. No

arguments are given, nor any demands made. In a sense, IS has created for itself a dead-end; an invitation

without any leverage to a nation that refuses to play into IS' eschatological aspirations.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS

Undeniably, the production effort behind Although the Disbelievers Dislike It was formidable. It is clear

that the content of the video was carefully considered and the individual (or individuals) who directed

it were obvious perfectionists. The fact that they took between four and six hours to film a single scene

using a number of different takes demonstrates this.

However, no matter how much time was spent filming or in the post-production process, mistakes were

made. Most of these were missed on account of the foreign fighter executioners and the race to identify

them that ensued. In a sense, that they appeared, bare-faced, was a red herring, designed to distract

and steer any analysis. Upon closer inspection though, looking beyond the identities of the

executioners, there are some clear inconsistencies and anomalies in the footage. In isolation of each

other, these inconsistencies are interesting. However, when aggregated together, they are illuminating.

Upon consideration of them in their totality, we can glean some important information that IS does not

want known.

In terms of the logistics of the IS media operation, our analysis of the video has betrayed the fact that

there is a substantial amount of capital (economic and human) behind the propaganda. Given the

extreme wealth of IS, the financial side aspect is not so surprising. However, the equipment that IS

attempted to keep out of shot – the cameras, in particular – demonstrates the professionalism of the

operation. Furthermore, our analysis has shed light on the fact that IS has access to, and knowledge of,

complicated post-production technology. In the video, there are a number of hallmarks for one system

in particular – Avid. This is not something that an amateur photographer can learn through trial and

error.

Based on what we know from the above, it is thus likely that the post-production side of Mu’assassat

al-Furqan, the side of the IS propaganda machine that requires the expensive machinery, software and,

most importantly, human expertise, is not based in Syria or Iraq. To have a propaganda production

centre within which was gathered all of these resources would make an easy target for airstrikes

(whether intentional or not) and, were it to be bombed, IS would be extremely damaged in the long

term. Hence, we can posit, with confidence, that post-production for this kind of IS propaganda is

carried out outside of the warzones that are now Syria or Iraq.

Furthermore, given that we know that the size of the refined footage runs into the high hundreds of

megabytes, and that there is much more raw footage that we do not see, we can make a further

hypothesis, that the location of the post-production team is regional. It is widely known that internet

download and upload speeds have been rendered slow due to the crisis in Syria and Iraq. Hence, it

would be impractical for the raw high definition footage to be uploaded through an internet

connection; this would take a huge amount of time and would fail the minute the connection dropped.

Thus, what is more likely is that the footage is transported manually, saved on hard-drives and couriered

to the post-production studio in one of the surrounding countries.

In terms of its strategic objective, this video, in particular, betrays the fact that IS is striving – and

struggling – to increase its legitimacy. The documentary section of the video, which is directed at

jihadists, emphasises the relationship with al-Qaeda that IS has, while implying that what is happening

now in Iraq and Syria is an inevitable extension of bin Laden’s jihadism. IS is trying to get in the global

jihadist community’s good books, something which it has failed at doing to date.

The simultaneous beheading is indicative of IS’ intention to garner appeal among the regional

population, as well. By this, we do not simply mean jihadists. Rather, in beheading specifically members

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of the Syrian Arab Army, IS is attempting to demonstrate that it is fighting fire with fire and, of course,

acting as the protective vanguard for the world’s Sunni Muslims.

The appearance of Kassig’s head at the feet of JJ is an obvious extension of a past motivation for

Mu’assassat al-Furqan – JJ’s mocking tone as he taunts the viewer is just another attempt to lure

intervention from the West, specifically the US. It is what is missing from this final section that matters,

far more than JJ’s polemics. Clearly, something went wrong with Abdul Rahman Kassig’s execution.

Perhaps it was not even intended to happen. It has recently come to light that tense negotiations were

being engaged in by senior IS leaders and Jordanian jihadist ideologues over the fate of Kassig,

negotiations that evidently failed. It would be unhelpful to hypothesise too much about the specifics of

what took place. Whatever the case, it was a deplorable waste of a good life.