© Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 1995, 7(2):45–74

AbstractCoordination Technologies (CT) that supportvarious aspects of organizational workingare now available in commercial markets.Still, research on their organizational use hasshown their success is mixed. I employ Ar-gyris’ organizational learning theory to findout why organizations have been less suc-cessful in exploiting CT to support organiza-tional effectiveness than their designers hadhoped. Specifically, I identify two areaswhere explanations as well as potential solu-tions can be found: (1) people in organiza-tions do not behave in the way the designersexpect and (2) the designers of CT do not be-have in the way they think they do. Drawingupon theory-based argumentation and a re-view of the literature, I argue that the benefitsof CT will not be fully realized until organiza-tions can deploy CT not only for routine com-munication and coordination but also for fos-tering on-going reflection of their workingand learning practices, and for negotiating

control over the rules and resources em-ployed in these practices. Next, I focus onhow organizations could design CT for usebeyond routine tasks. I propose using a com-bination of Issue-Based Information Systems(IBIS) and Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) as aCT platform to support organizational work-ing and learning. I evaluate this platform inlight of the theory. But organizational changetoward continuous learning and the use of CTto support working and learning are co-de-pendent and co-evolutionary. Consequently, Irecognize two intertwined conditions neededto use CT successfully: (1) an organization’sability and willingness to become aware ofcognitive and structural anomalies beforeand during the implementation of CT, and (2)the aptitude of CT in fostering and reinforc-ing this awareness. Finally, I use a case studyto illustrate these conditions.

Keywords: coordination technology, defen-sive fit, negotiated control, organizationallearning, reflection, and emory, productivereasoning, issue-based information systems,case-based reasoning.

Designing and Deploying Coordination Technologies for Fostering Organizational Working and Learning:

From vision to reality?

Timo KäköläDepartment of Computer Science and Information Systems, University of Turku

DataCity, FIN-20520 Turku, Finlandkakola@utu.fi

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1. IntroductionRapid environmental and technologicalchanges require flexible and effectiveteam-based organizations. To meet thechallenges of change, teams are now in-creasingly responsible for both thinkingand doing, i.e. work as a whole. Thisplaces new demands on the competenceof workers while at the same time mak-ing jobs more interesting and rewarding.For information systems to be useful inthis context, their designers must ac-knowledge these conditions. Cleveland(1985, p. 18) points out: “Not ‘commandand control’ but ‘conferring and net-working’ become the mandatory modesfor getting things done. … ‘Planning’cannot be done by a few leaders. …Real-life planning is the dynamic im-provisation by the many on a generalsense of direction. … More participatorydecision making implies a need for muchinformation, widely spread, and muchfeedback, seriously attended, as in bio-logical processes. … That means moreopenness, not as ideological preferencebut as a technological imperative.”

A myriad of computerized systemssuch as computer conferencing systems,multi-user editors, workflow systems,and group decision support systems havebeen designed to support various aspectsof individual, group, and organizationalworking (Bannon 1993, Ellis et al.1991). These systems are increasinglyavailable in commercial markets. In thispaper, I call these systems CoordinationTechnologies1 (CT). Their designers2

have acknowledged participation, open-ness and many other requirements posedby team-based organizations. Yet re-search on their organizational use hasshown mixed results (Grantham & Car-

asik 1988, Grudin 1988, Kling 1991,Markus 1994, Orlikowski 1992b, Or-likowski & Gash 1994, Perin 1991). I useorganizational effectiveness as the meas-ure of success. Effectiveness is a func-tion, at the very least, of both reliable, ef-ficient work routines and the ability toquestion these routines, to experimentwith new ones to create flexible interpre-tations of computer-supported work, andto enact these interpretations to inventorganizational environment (Daft &Weick 1984).

I employ Argyris’ (1990) organiza-tional learning theory to uncover why or-ganizations have been less successful inexploiting CT to increase organizationaleffectiveness than the designers of CThad hoped. This theory argues that thetraditional means of organizational chan-ge such as reorganizing work are neces-sary but not sufficient. To excel in the fu-ture, organizations must also learn to re-flect upon and possibly change their be-haviour in order to overcome defensiveroutines; they must learn how to learn.This theory has been used to interpret ex-isting approaches to information systemsdesign and implementation (Levine &Rossmoore 1994, Salaway 1987). I arguein this paper that the theory may alsoprovide a fruitful direction of organiza-tional and technological change thatwould improve the likelihood CT can besuccessfully deployed.

Organizational change toward learn-ing orientation and the use of CT to sup-port working and learning are co-de-pendent and co-evolutionary (DeSanctiset al. 1993, DeSanctis & Poole 1994,Lyytinen & Ngwenyama 1991, Markus& Robey 1988, Orlikowski 1992a, Or-likowski & Gash 1994). I regard the or-ganizational learning theory as an emer-

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gent process theory (Markus & Robey1988), according to which the maximumbenefits of CT are unlikely to be realizedunless the organization (1) learns how tolearn and (2) employs CT to reinforce or-ganizational learning in addition to usingthem to control and coordinate workprocesses. For example, Ciborra & Lan-zara state (1994, p. 64) : “... the effectiveadoption of new systems can only occurthrough processes of learning where or-ganizations become competent insmoothly turning anomalies and novel-ties into innovative patterns of behav-iour.” The reasoning that underlies thisemergent perspective is simple. Sengestates (1990, p.7): “Over the long run,superior (organizational) performancedepends on superior (organizational)learning.” Similarly, superior long-termperformance of CT depends on an organ-ization’s ability to employ CT to facili-tate and accelerate organizational learn-ing.

This paper proceeds as follows: Ibriefly present the organizational learn-ing theory in Section 2. In Section 3, Iemploy this theory to identify two do-mains that explain and possibly solve thelimited use of CT in non-routine situa-tions: (1) people in organizations do notbehave in the way designers expect themto behave and (2) designers do not be-have in the way they think they do. Onthe basis of this theoretical backing, I ar-gue that CT are unlikely to succeed untilorganizations deploy them not only forroutine coordination but also for foster-ing on-going reflection of their workingand learning practices, and for negotiat-ing control over the rules and resourcesemployed in these practices. In Section4, I focus on how organizations could de-sign CT that would be used more broad-

ly. I propose a CT platform to support or-ganizational working and learning basedon a combination of Issue-Based Infor-mation Systems (IBIS) (Section 4.1) andCase-Based Reasoning (Section 4.2). InSection 4.3, I evaluate this platform inlight of organizational learning theory. Irecognize that any technology can be(mis)used to enforce old habits, valuesand norms. Therefore, I identify two in-tertwined conditions needed if CT are tosucceed: (1) the organization’s abilityand willingness to recognize cognitiveand structural anomalies before and dur-ing the implementation of CT, and (2)CT’s ability to reinforce the develop-ment and sustenance of this awareness.Number one (1) helps determine to whatextent it is possible to accomplish (2);number two (2) enables (1). I concludesection 4 by using a case example toelaborate on the nature of these anoma-lies and inefficiencies and to depict howthe IBIS component of the CT platformcould be used to reinforce learning proc-esses necessary to overcome these ano-malies and inefficiencies. I present con-clusions and suggestions for further re-search in Section 5.

2. Theoretical BackgroundCurrent emphasis on supporting organi-zational working and learning with CTdraws significantly on a theory of man-agement called the involvement andcommitment theory (Argyris 1990, pp.125-133). The theory advises againstsubmissiveness and unilateral controland for self-management, involvement,and commitment. It has proved powerfulin helping organizations redesign theirwork and incentive systems. Moreover,

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the advocates of Participatory Design(PD) draw upon this theory. A primaryargument for PD is that through partici-pation, users become more involved andcommitted to improving their computer-supported work. However, the theory hasone major limitation: it does not explainhow it can be implemented without trig-gering embarrassment and threat (Ar-gyris 1990, p. 121). Indeed, the more em-powerment, meaningful participation,and other social innovations are encour-aged, the more potential exists for em-barrassment and threat. For instance,when work groups deploy a CT to takeon broader responsibilities and to be-come more autonomous, line manage-ment may feel threatened and enforce itsunilateral control over the deployment ofthe technology.

Argyris draws upon extensive empir-ical and theoretical work to show thatimplementation problems stem fromwhat he calls “programs” in the humanmind. These programs guide actors,3 es-pecially in embarrassing or threateningsituations where they might lose control.There are two types of programs (Ar-gyris 1990, p. 13): (1) “the set of beliefsand values people hold about how tomanage their lives” and (2) “the actualrules they use to manage their beliefs.”These programs are called, respectively,espoused theories of action and theories-in-use. Argyris emphasizes that humanaction must be studied in terms of thetheory-in-use rather than espoused theo-ry, which may not reflect actual behav-iour.

Argyris makes a critical distinctionbetween two theories-in-use called Mod-el I and Model II. Model I is dominant insociety. It provides the governing valuesthat guide actors to seek unilateral con-

trol, to win, and to suppress negativefeelings toward others. Moreover, it rec-ommends action strategies that are sell-ing, persuading, and that save face forthe actors. These governing values andaction strategies may seem normal andacceptable because people are socializedto take them for granted. Indeed, they areapplicable in handling routine situationswhere actors simply reproduce existingsocial practices (Giddens 1984). Butthey also have negative implications fororganizational long-term effectiveness.If all actors act according to these rules,everyone may lose, and the organizationmay be unable to uncover the (possiblyunjustified) beliefs underlying work rou-tines. Model I reinforces existing prac-tices by encouraging each actor to pro-tect himself against other actors’ at-tempts to dominate. Argyris calls themode of reasoning that underlies actors’protective behaviour ‘defensive reason-ing.’ Defensive reasoning occurs whenactors (1) hold premises that may not bevalid but think they are, (2) make infer-ences that may not follow from thepremises but think they do, and (3) reachconclusions that they think they havetested carefully but they have not be-cause they have framed the conclusionsin a way that prevents inquiry.

Any attempt to redraw the domainsof responsibility, autonomy, and controlin connection with the introduction anddeployment of CT is likely to threatensome actors and activate defensive rou-tines in the organization. These routinesdistort or inhibit communication, deepenmistrust, and cover up the real problems.As a result, organizations keep solvingeasy problems caused by other deeperproblems only to have the problems re-surfaced later in another form. While sin-

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gle actors may be able to work produc-tively, interdependence, and consequent-ly the working and learning of the organ-ization as a whole, suffers.

Argyris suggests a new theory-in-usecalled Model II to help actors changetheir behaviour so that the benefits prom-ised by the involvement and commit-ment theory can be fully realized even inembarrassing or threatening situations.Model II recognizes that actors, even ifcommitted to change, cannot do so un-less they learn how their behaviour andunderlying values can lead to mediocreperformance. Once they understand this,they must learn to act differently so thatModel II moves from an espoused theoryto the theory-in-use. The idea is simple:people must become proficient in actingand simultaneously reflecting on this ac-tion to learn from it. This so called dou-ble-loop learning implies the need to un-cover and criticize the governing valuesand assumptions, construct different in-terpretations based on new governingvalues, and experiment with new ways ofworking in order to enact a new realityinstead of merely solving problems inthe present environment.

The governing values of Model II arechoice based on valid information, andresponsibility to monitor the implemen-tation of the choice. These values requireactors to use two action strategies: (1)advocate their positions and encourageinquiry into or confirmation of them, and(2) minimize unilateral face saving. Thefirst strategy implies a new mode of rea-soning, i.e. productive reasoning, inwhich people clarify their premises andinferences to themselves and others. Ac-tors are open to constructive confronta-tion and evaluations. As a result, discur-sive social action (Habermas 1984) be-

comes the dominant type of interactionamong actors in non-routine situations.

Face saving occurs when people cen-sor information because they fear theywill upset their colleagues if they arecandid. Actors do not test whether this istruely the case. Rather, they cover up thatthey are hiding information and evencover up their cover-up. Thus it makessense to minimize face saving.

Combined, these strategies improvethe validity of information in severalways: Actors are encouraged to reflectthoroughly on their premises and as-sumptions so that they can be clear abouttheir positions and the reasons for advo-cating the positions. They are also en-couraged to discuss previously taboo is-sues because there is little fear that some-one will manipulate such candor to winothers over. Additionally, actors do notwaste time defending themselves anddistorting their true feelings and inten-tions.

In summary, the theory’s power isthat it concentrates on increasing organi-zations’ ability to resolve deep problems,the problems causing or magnifyingmore easily visible problems.

3. Implications for Research and Design of Coordination TechnologiesMost designers and researchers of Coor-dination Technologies espouse Model IIbecause seeking to support organization-al working and learning would make lit-tle sense under the authoritarian world ofModel I. Yet many examples in the liter-ature report how CT have been designedand deployed to reinforce unilateral con-trol of certain groups (e.g., management)over other groups (e.g., workers). For ex-

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ample, Orlikowski (1991) and Zuboff(1988) illustrate with many case exam-ples how managers deployed CT to makeorganizational processes visible in a newway, and thereby enable ideational con-trol. Workers behaved according to therules and norms embedded in the tech-nology because they realized their supe-riors or peers could see what they weredoing.

In light of Argyris’ theory, the use ofCT to establish unilateral control is un-derstandable in non-routine situations.Anderson (1991, p. 121) cites Krantz &Gilmore (1990) to clarify the point: “...bureaucracies, and their attendant struc-tures and policies, function as social andpsychological defenses. Positions androles are institutionalized to avoid theanxiety and unpleasant situations thatmight arise in less structured organiza-tions. To the extent that organizationsand their component work groups func-tion as defenses, it is likely that any com-puter systems developed and deployedwill incorporate and further these defen-sive functions.” I call this fit between de-fensive organizations and defensivetechnologies defensive fit.

A central paradigm underlying CT isthat people use CT to share their workand knowledge and to accomplish morethan any one person could achieve alone.In light of this paradigm, unilateral con-trol of some influential group(s) over theresources and rules afforded by CT is of-ten inappropriate. A move toward mutu-al control of all the involved groups isneeded. However, the Model II theory-in-use does not imply full mutual controlover the rules and resources (includingCT) deployed. If this were implied, fullyegalitarian organizations would be calledfor. But learning how to learn and inter-

nalizing Model II congruent governingvalues do presuppose that groups can ne-gotiatiate control over the rules and re-sources openly and constructively. Thisis because decisions over autonomy, pri-vacy, and control of work and the sup-porting technologies largely determinewho has the right and responsibility toknow, do, and learn in the organization.In a learning organization, these deci-sions can seldom be made unilaterally.

As a result of negotiations and on-go-ing reflection of work and managerialpractices, groups develop mutual under-standing about their resource and controlrequirements so that they can effectivelyand efficiently share knowledge and per-form, coordinate, control and transformtheir work processes. Each individual orgroup has primary control through thetechnology over the material and knowl-edge created by that individual or group,but this control can be shared or trans-ferred as a result of constructive negotia-tions (or the contracts resulting fromsuch negotiations) whenever necessary. Icall this control scheme negotiated con-trol.

The discrepancy between the para-digm underlying CT and the Model I-driven organizations is a critical factor inexplaining why CT have not been fullyexploited to foster organizational learn-ing. Another critical factor is the defen-sive fit. In the following sections, Istrengthen my argument that these fac-tors bear the blame by focusing on twoproblematic domains: (1) designers es-pouse Model II but organizational ac-tions are guided by Model I, and (2) de-signers espouse Model II but their theo-ry-in-use is Model I. These domains areconcerned with individual, organization-al, and technological issues because the

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explanations can be found from their in-teraction (Orlikowski 1992a).

3.1. Designers espouse Model II but the organizational theory-in-use is Model IResearchers have paid much attention tohelping organizations design and use CTto support effective enactment of workroutines. Theoretical approaches such asspeech-act theory (Flores et al. 1988),transaction cost theory (Ciborra 1987),and coordination theory (Malone &Crowston 1990) have been suggested toexplain how activities are coordinatedand how CT should be designed. Howev-er, none of these approaches has takeninto account the perspective of organiza-tional learning and the need for negotiat-ed control over technologies and knowl-edge resources. Many existing develop-ment methodologies, for example, thesociotechnical ETHICS method (Mum-ford 1983) and Soft Systems Methodolo-gy (Checkland & Scholes 1990), do ad-dress the need for ongoing interpretation,learning, and negotiation between vari-ous stakeholders involved in design. Butthey do not tell how to enact such socialprocesses without triggering organiza-tional defenses (Hägerfors 1994).

The earlier research does take intoaccount the discrepancy between sys-tems based on the involvement and com-mitment theory and organizational val-ues and norms based on Model I. In par-ticular, structural aspects of organiza-tions and technologies have been widelyresearched. For example, DeSanctis etal. (1993, 1994) present adaptive struc-turation theory stating that the structuralproperties of the technology must matchthe social, economic, and political struc-tures for the technology to succeed. It is

more likely, according to the theory, thatthe CT encouraging participation willsucceed if an organization has instituteda total quality management (TQM) pro-gram specifically calling for participa-tive decision making. Similarly, Or-likowski (1992b) argues that when thepremises underlying CT are incompati-ble with an organization’s culture, poli-cies, and reward systems, effective, co-operative computing is unlikely unlessthese structural properties change. Forexample, Orlikowski and Gash (1994)focus on the use of a commercially avail-able CT called Lotus Notes™ in a con-sulting company. They found that almostall the consultants hesitated to put any-thing more sensitive than routine infor-mation on the CT. Their hesitation wasprimarily the result of a mismatch be-tween the designers’ assumptions ofopenness and trust embedded in the CTand the consultants’ use of unilateralcontrol of information to reduce the pos-sibilities of embarrassment and threat.Designers perceived the climate of theorganization as open and trusting; conse-quently, they left up to users the securityand privacy issues related to Notes data-bases. Their assumptions were unjusti-fied. In fact, the consultants worked in acompetitive and uncertain career envi-ronment. They feared betraying clientconfidentiality or subjecting their infor-mation to misinterpretation or criticism,if they used Notes to share informationwithout unilateral control over their in-formation resources in Notes databases.

A good description of a mismatch be-tween Model II technologies and ModelI organizations is given by Perin (1991),who calls CT ‘electronic social fields.’She says (p. 76): “On the one hand, elec-tronic social fields subvert managers’ as-

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sumptions about conventional bureau-cratic organizations because they callinto question organizational authority,they cross functional divisions, and theycreate options for the times and places ofwork. On the other hand, ... such autono-my, cross-functional cooperation, and al-ternatives meet many of the criteria saidto be conducive to innovation and pro-ductivity in bureaucracies.” She goes onto examine the impact of this mismatchon the adoption of CT: “Managers whosee social fields as being antistructural,will be disappointed in groupware in-vestments and unlikely to sustain themover the long run.”

One alternative to avoiding the “an-tistructural” technology might be thatmanagement would enforce unilateralcontrol over its use. However, this defen-sive action would likely trigger workersto activate their own defensive routines,possibly giving up on the technology al-together. Swanson (1993) calls for com-puter-mediated communication policieson the use and information content of CTand the consequences of violating thepolicies. These policies are intended toguide actors toward using CT in a waythat is valuable to the organization as awhole. But Swanson does not acknowl-edge that such policies are difficult towrite in ways that clarify what is sanc-tioned and what is not. As a result, actorsmay stop using CT whenever a chance ofpunishment exists, and cover up that theyare doing so.

The odds are against CT as long assuperiors see them as threatening theirstatus and subordinates see them as ameans of management control. The besthope is the gradual move toward ModelII. Proper incentive structures must alsobe devised to help actors see CT as a

means to reinforce double-loop learning.The use of incentives could dramaticallyreduce resistance to using CT.

Two types of incentive structures willwork: one based on the effectiveness ofteam work (Kanter 1989), and the otherbased on the use of technology (Or-likowski 1992b). Kanter (1989) arguesthat cooperation and synergy betweenpeople and between organizational unitsremain buzzwords without real effectand meaning if incentives based on theeffectiveness of team work are not inplace. She implies that CoordinationTechnologies have scant meaning with-out incentives to foster team work. Atbest, they are used as individual produc-tivity tools, since people get paid for per-sonal excellence.

Orlikowski (1992b) states that actorsin hierarchical positions below seniormanagement cannot “afford” to use thetechnology without reward systems (in-centives and proper evaluation criteria)based on its use. Clearly, changing in-centive structures is easier when CT arenot seen as antistructural but as means toreinforce organizational learning. WhenCT are in interorganizational use, cli-ents’ demands for improved servicethrough improved coordination may alsowork as incentives.

3.2. Designers espouse Model II but their theory-in-use is Model II have emphasized the incongruity be-tween Model I-related organizationalfactors and the involvement and commit-ment theory-based systems to explainthe lackluster success of CT. This expla-nation does not imply that the design ap-proaches of CT have no role. On the con-trary, designers and researchers must fo-cus on assessing and understanding the

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true opportunities and limitations of newtechnologies at work. This is a challeng-ing task for two reasons. First, the litera-ture in the field is flooded with techno-logical utopianism amplifying the possi-bility of valued social change and under-playing the possibility of significantsocial problems (Kling 1991). Second,the functionality of CT (possibly meantto foster actors’ involvement and com-mitment) can actually trigger organiza-tional defenses, a possibility that may notbe obvious to the designers. I will focuson design issues next.

Coordination Technologies imposevarious social structures as rules for in-teraction depending on their functionsand specific features (DeSanctis & Poole1994, Lyytinen & Ngwenyama 1991).For example, they may emphasize effi-cient work processes and the task at handand discourage socialization duringwork. Many structures are incompatiblewith Model II. First, many CT providelimited support for the on-going reflec-tion that is necessary to create newknowledge and practices out of prevail-ing routines. Second, the concept of ne-gotiated control is inadequately reflectedin the structures of existing CT. This in-compatibility may stem from designers’espousal of Model II but use of Model I.Salaway (1987) studied the nature of de-signer-user interactions and found theo-ries-in-use of both designers and userswere congruent with Model I.

This defensive fit between Model Icongruent structural properties of tech-nologies and organizations seems as ap-propriate a predictor for unimpressiveorganizational exploitation of technolo-gies as the mismatch between Model IIcongruent properties of technologies andModel I-driven organizations. To elabo-

rate my contention, I will discuss sometypical features of electronic mail, work-flow management, and group supportsystems, and examine how their design-ers’ possibly unconscious Model I-driv-en thinking may have affected the struc-tural properties of technology and there-by mediated unanticipated patterns in theorganizational use of technology. I con-clude by stating two design goals of CT.

Email systems have become widelyused tools for routine communicationand coordination, and as such are clearlysuccessful. One of their main benefits isflexibility: they impose few rules for so-cial interaction, making them especiallysuited to handle ad-hoc situations and tofoster organizational learning throughsocialization. However, their controlscheme is unilateral: actors can (in atechnical sense) quickly and inexpen-sively process in any fashion the emailreceived (e.g., forward a confidentialmessage from actor X to actor Y withoutX knowing it), but cannot control whathappens to the email they send. The lackof negotiated control in the design makesit difficult for actors to discuss issuesthey perceive as threatening or embar-rassing. Instead, this design flaw mayhasten the formation of defenses becauseall the parties involved eventually noticethe (mis)use of email for unilateral con-trol, but this very cognizance is itselfnever discussed due to the defensive rou-tines (Markus 1994, Zuboff 1988). Forexample, Markus (1994) found in a casestudy that confidential messages wereforwarded, and the actors in the organi-zation were aware of it. Yet, most actorswere reluctant to devise a solution thatwould have required forwarders to re-quest permission from message senders.Markus hypothesized this solution was

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perceived as too time-consuming forroutine situations. Instead, most emailusers tried to word their confidential orsensitive messages obscurely so thatthey could be interpreted on several lev-els, at least one harmless. They also dis-guised their cover-up behaviour. Argyris(1990) calls such behaviour skilled in-competence.

Workflow management technologieshave gradually improved beyond simplyspeeding up routines to supporting or-ganizational working and learning (1) bymaking explicit which actors and workgroups are responsible for which activi-ties, documents and materials (Käkölä1995), (2) by monitoring and measuringthe enactment of work processes usingvarious qualitative and quantitative at-tributes, and providing the resultant in-formation to the responsible actors, and(3) by allowing the dynamic redesign ofthese processes as they are being enacted(Abbott & Sarin 1994, Rein et al. 1993).Unfortunately, while these CT provideextensive support for the creation andmanagement of organizational role pre-scriptions and for the assignment of var-ious system resources to actors enactingthe roles, they provide little support forreflection and negotiation about how,when, and by whom the roles and therole-connected rules and resources aredefined and controlled. This, in turn,may foster an institutionalized, con-gealed use of CT and lead CT to tightenthe normative regulation of work. Ofcourse, the designers and researchers ofworkflow management technologieshave gradually begun to acknowledgethe need of computer support for meet-ings and conferences in which perform-ance is reviewed and plans are created toredesign organizational processes to

make better use of workflow manage-ment technologies, see for instance (Ab-bott & Sarin 1994, p. 117). Yet, they donot recognize the possible need to un-cover and question the premises and val-ues on which these plans and decisionsare based. Consequently, their concep-tion of meetings and negotiations is lim-ited as far as organizational double-looplearning is concerned.

Nor have the designers of systemsspecifically designed to support meet-ings and other equivocal work domainsfully grasped the complexities of organi-zational behaviour. For example, anony-mous idea generation and evaluation arestandard features of group support sys-tems. Anonymity allows mutual controlwithin a group over sensitive and contro-versial issues and ideas, while ensuringthat only the ideas are criticized, not theirproponents. Additionally, anonymity issaid to foster open and honest discussionand to help actors confront conflicts (De-Sanctis et al. 1993, p. 13). Most peopleprobably agree with such goals. But whyis anonymity needed in the first place, ifopenness, honesty, and participation areso highly appreciated? This fundamentalquestion has received scant attention incoordination technology research. Fur-thermore, the researchers who have ad-dressed issues related to anonymity, seefor instance (Connolly et al. 1993, Jes-sup et al. 1990), have primarily concen-trated on how CT can be used to removeor reduce the effects of social dilemmas(e.g., status influence) without dealingwith the causes of these dilemmas (e.g.,status differences among team mem-bers).

Anonymity is nothing but a bypassstrategy. It fails to address the underlyingreasons why actors avoid openness, hon-

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esty, and participation when held person-ally accountable for what they say anddo. To put it more precisely, the technol-ogy bypasses the reasons. Even if a teamproduces good ideas through anonymousidea generation, many of these ideas maynever be implemented. This is becauseorganizational defenses are not reduced.Indeed, defenses may be made strongerby ideas that are threatening to somegroups.

Technologies endorsing the conceptsof Model I cannot be effectively de-ployed to reinforce Model II behaviour,unless users are knowledgeable, moti-vated, and powerful enough to substan-tially reinterpret them. In the long term,these technologies are unlikely to helporganizations solve the tough problemsrequiring double-loop learning. Howev-er, this fact is difficult to realize in theshort term since people can use the tech-nology to speed up their work. Unfortu-nately, they continue to solve wrongproblems and may disguise that they aredoing so.

In fact, these technologies may ham-per progress toward Model II by makingpeople believe that some magical fea-tures of computerized systems permitdiscussions about topics that were previ-ously taboo. Once people realize that lit-tle will change as long as real problemsare ignored, they are likely to defendthemselves vigorously again. The out-come of a well-intended technologicalintervention may end up making the bur-ied problems worse.

To overcome this defensive fit, de-signers must start surfacing their ownModel I-related values and beliefs thatgovern both their design decisions andexpectations about the usefulness of CT.Perin says (1991, p. 81): “The challenge

is to create computer support that ac-knowledges, if not incorporates, theserealities (social and cultural dynamics),rather than presume that the technologywill by itself reform or obliterate them.”However, she presents no strategies tomeet the challenge.

Organizational learning theory takesa step in the right direction by indicatingthat organizations can change their be-haviour toward Model II and establishorganizational norms and values that re-inforce the new learning orientation. CTmust become part of this new culture ifthey are to be fully exploited in Model IIorganizations. Two interrelated designgoals are needed: CT should function to(1) reinforce the effects of organizationallearning and (2) facilitate the learningprocess itself. In light of the concept ofnegotiated control, fulfilling these goalspresupposes that, as already discussed inthe panel on privacy issues in CSCW ’92(Clement 1993), CT should support notonly the completion of tasks but also re-flection and negotiation over control ofthe tasks and the resources used in thesetasks. These goals are realistic becausethey recognize that no CT can make anorganization adopt Model II. In the fol-lowing, I illustrate the realization ofthese goals in the context of one CT.

4. Supporting Organizational Learning with Issue-Based Information Systems and Case-Based ReasoningMany organizations are trapped in adoom loop: as long as coordination andcontrol of work is in disorder, resolvingthe underlying largely Model I-relatedreasons for the disorder is difficult. Part-

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ly as a result of organizations’ inabilityto look inward and resolve significantproblems, much time is spent trying toproduce order through easy but superfi-cial solutions (Argyris 1990, Senge1990). Nothing is inherently bad in chaosand disorder. Quite the contrary, they canfoster innovation and the creation of newknowledge (Nonaka 1991). However, or-ganizations need to learn to manage dis-order and chaos productively and con-structively instead of resorting to the useof power and unilateral control to estab-lish order. Thus, achieving and reinforc-ing a shift from Model I toward Model IItheory-in-use can be a fundamental andcomplex organizational challenge. Theshift may take years and its impacts per-vade the organization.

In my view, this challenge has signif-icant implications on the design and useof CT for organizational learning. To re-inforce a move in the direction of ModelII, these systems should not only fosterthe production and reproduction of so-cial order but also help organizationsdeal with the ambiguity and threat inher-ent in social change. Kling supports thisargument when he states (Kling 1991, p.86): “We cannot advance our under-standing of CSCW with discussions suchas The Coordinator,4 which focus on spe-cific kinds of conversations about tasksin organizations, and ignore conversa-tions about the processes of organizing,which might restructure patterns of au-thority, obligation, and cooperation.”

Ciborra & Lanzara (1994, pp. 82-83)go one step further than Kling by arguingfor two specific qualities for CT. First,“systems should be ‘expert,’ thoughquite a different way from current con-ceptions: In addition to supporting or re-placing knowledge-based established

routines of professionals and managers…, they should support their capabilitiesfor reflection and inquiry within the con-texts in which they are embedded, help-ing them to build up, question, and mod-ify practical knowledge according to theemergence and the shift of problematicsituations and contexts.” Second, “sys-tems should be designed as proactive,dynamic mirrors of human action, sup-porting and enhancing perpetual individ-ual and institutional self-questioning: inshort, they should play the role of ‘re-flectors,’ helping the users connect theirpractical and argumentative routines tothe established or emerging formativecontexts, rather than concealing that con-nection, as they often do.” Unfortunate-ly, Ciborra and Lanzara (1994) do notelaborate on how to build ‘expert reflec-tors’ or what they would look like.

In this section, I envision a CT plat-form that could complement systemssuch as the Coordinator to facilitate thereflexive monitoring and self-question-ing of existing actions and routines, andto ease the consequent shift toward Mod-el II. As Model II calls for discursive so-cial action (Habermas 1994), this proc-ess is best supported by the use of dis-course and argumentation-oriented tech-nology. Organizational learning alsorequires some type of organizationalmemory (Huber 1991, Walsh & Ungson1991). First, in order “to demonstrate oruse learning, that which has been learnedmust be stored in memory and thenbrought from memory” (Huber 1991, p.106). Second, organizational memory al-lows an organization to learn more (Hu-ber 1991). Issue-Based Information Sys-tems (IBIS) and Case-Based Reasoning(CBR) are two methods that can meetthese requirements.5 In the following, I

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propose that IBIS and CBR could beused to build a CT platform that wouldsupport both single-loop and double-loop learning.

This section is not intended to con-vince the reader that a new technologyalone would solve the cognitive andstructural challenges that organizationsconfront as they deploy CT. Instead, Imake two points. First, instead of by-passing the effects of Model I behaviour,and thereby reinforcing the defensive fit,CT should be (designed so that they canbe) used as interactive mirrors to makeactors aware of their skilled incompe-tence and to enable them to reflect criti-cally on their behaviour. DeSanctis et al.(1993, p. 26), though not addressingskilled incompetence, partially supportthis claim by stating that when a CT“helps the group organize its work and,perhaps more important, learn to reflecton and control its (work) processes, thegroup should be more effective.” Even ifbehavioural change is not possible, in-creased awareness alone may help buildtrust, thus improving organizationallong-term effectiveness. Second, while itis necessary and fruitful to criticize pre-vious research and existing or envi-sioned technologies, and to present ab-stract statements and prescriptions onCT design, it is not sufficient. Criticismsand prescriptions should be crystallizedinto a form solid enough to allow furtherdevelopment, testing, and criticism in or-der to foster the accumulation of knowl-edge in the CT research domain. The CTplatform envisioned below is one suchcrystallization.

4.1. Facilitating structured discourse with IBISLearning and self-questioning processesrequire actors to communicate. Argu-mentation theory (Toulmin 1958) and es-pecially the Issue-Based InformationSystems method (Rittel 1972) help tostructure discourse, thereby clarifyingthe nature of problems under discussion.The method provides three conceptualentities for structuring discourse: Issues,Positions and Arguments. The entitiesare related to each other by labelledlinks; each label describes the type of re-lationship. For example, an Argument ei-ther Supports or Objects-to Positions.Another entity called Reference repre-sents facts that support or object to theother entities. The resulting networkstructure is called an issue-net.

Issues represent controversial deci-sions to be made and problems to be re-solved through a discussion. Positionsstand for possible resolutions. These po-sitions are often contradictory and noneis necessarily the right solution. Each po-sition is supported or refuted by argu-ments. The underlying rationale is thatactors choose the solution that seemsmost plausible in light of the arguments.Validation of the cogency of the argu-ments can be carried out by subjectingthem to a process of repeated attacks anddefenses (Hashim 1993). The entitiesand the relationships of the IBIS methodare represented in Figure 1.

The primary advantage to deployingIBIS is the improved quality of the dis-course processes. The quality can be de-fined with three components: discoursecoherency, completeness and ambiguity(Auramäki et al. 1988, Brown & Yule1983). Coherency refers to how logicallythe discourse proceeds through various

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stages. A complete discourse is coherentand fulfils the conditions needed to ter-minate it (i.e., the issue has been re-solved through argumentation). Ambi-guity refers both to the ambiguity of theroles of the actors involved in the dis-course and to the clarity of the issues dis-cussed. In Section 4.4, I illustrate the useof IBIS to help organizations learn tomanage ambiguity productively. Natu-rally, these three components are inter-twined. For example, it is difficult to es-tablish conditions for completeness inembarrassing, highly ambiguous situa-tions.

IBIS improves coherency by empha-sizing the creation of new issues as pos-sible sources of new knowledge and in-vestigating these issues through argu-mentation while reducing the likelihoodthat the discourse processes devolve intoinsignificant issues. According to Chang

et al. (1993, p. 63) “it supports construc-tive discourse by focusing on the centralissue, encouraging relevant questionsand answers, and being specific aboutthe supporting or objecting evidence onany position.” IBIS also helps assess thecompleteness of discourse. For example,discourse is usually incomplete when is-sues lack positions or positions lack ar-guments (Hashim 1991). Moreover, theIBIS structuring is natural, intuitivelyappealing, and consequently easy to un-derstand. It allows for informal dialogue,and thus does not require actors to altertheir ordinary forms of discourse (Changet al. 1993). The method has been testedand used to assist civic and policy plan-ning (Rittel 1972), auditing (Chang et al.1993), collaborative learning (Rathnamet al. 1992), software design (Conklin &Begeman 1988), and scientific collabo-ration (Hashim 1991, Hämäläinen et al.1992).

FIGURE 1. The entities and the relationships between them in the IBIS-method (Hashim 1991, p. 286).

Reference

ArgumentPosition

Issue

Replaces, Questions or

Objects-to

Supports,Objects-to,Generalizes orSpecializes

Generalizes orSpecializes

Is-suggested-by

Supports

Res

pond

s-to

Generalizes orSpecializes

Que

stio

ns o

rIs

-sug

gest

ed-b

y

Que

stio

ns o

rIs

-sug

gest

ed-b

y

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The features of IBIS are well suitedto the action strategies of Model II. Byconstructing personal issue-nets, actorsare able to make their positions and argu-ments clear and recognize possible gapsand inconsistencies. Actors can alsomake their conclusions publicly testableby sharing their issue-nets and can learnproductive reasoning and conflict resolu-tion through argumentation. As a result,it is easier for actors to reflect upon theiractions and the underlying premises andvalues, and thus reach a shared under-standing of problems.

The chief limitation of many imple-mentations of IBIS is their inability toaugment individual work in the waymost decision support systems do. Forinstance, other than retrieving old dis-cussions, no memory aids are provided.Thus, enhancing the systems with amethod such as case-based reasoningwould provide an interactive workingand learning environment.

4.2. Case-Based Reasoning as an organizational memoryIn some cases, learning before doing ismore effective than learning by doing.This type of learning requires that redun-dant knowledge, i.e. potentially relevantknowledge for which actors may have noimmediate or planned use, be developedand shared with all actors for eventualapplication in new, rapidly evolving situ-ations (Nonaka 1991). One way toachieve this is to rotate people throughdifferent jobs and experiences. A supple-mentary method is to build and maintaincomputer-based organizational memo-ries or experience bases to facilitatelearning. Case-Based Reasoning is a wayto build and use such an experience base.

CBR uses reasoning from past expe-rience to interpret and explain anoma-lous situations and to propose and cri-tique solutions (Kolodner 1991). It is apowerful method of reasoning because itis consistent with people’s natural be-haviour and applied daily by all of us. Asopposed to artificial intelligence re-search, CBR emphasizes augmentingrather than automating human work.

Walsh & Ungson (1991, p. 62) statethat “interpretations about organizationaldecisions and their subsequent conse-quences constitute an organization’smemory.” In CBR, these interpretationsare represented as cases, each describingthe state of the world before action; theproblem (issue) to be solved; the solution(position) to the problem, and the conse-quences. Additionally, causal connec-tions among the initial situation, the so-lution, and the consequences should al-ways be included in a case (if these con-nections can be identified) so that thereasons for the outcome can be recalledlater. This method facilitates learning be-fore doing.

CBR supports two modes of behav-iour: problem-solving and interpretive.In the problem solving mode, cases offerold solutions as a guide for solving newproblems, and old mistakes and failuresas a way to prevent actors from repeatingthem. Past solutions are adapted to newsituations. In the interpretive mode, cas-es are used to evaluate new situationsand validate or invalidate possible solu-tions. Sometimes, solutions are fixed be-forehand and cases are needed to justifythem. Evaluation is carried out throughargumentation as explained in Section4.1. The cases are employed to generatesupporting and refuting arguments and toserve as references for the arguments. Of

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course, these two modes are intertwined.For example, a solution proposed by onecase during the problem solving modemay be found unworkable in the inter-pretation mode. Actors must then eitherreadapt the solution or search for othersby retrieving new cases.

Cases can stimulate the creation ofknowledge and organizational learningin many ways. For example, organiza-tions can resolve present contradictions(such as developing a high quality prod-uct that is cheap to make) by studyinganalogous situations from the past thatapplied to totally different products,processes, and even industries (Nonaka1991). CBR is well suited to providesuch analogies (Kolodner 1991). It hasbeen applied to planning (Hammond1989), medical diagnosis (Turner 1989),and legal reasoning (Ashley 1988).

4.3. Combining IBIS and CBR to facilitate organizational learningCombined, IBIS and CBR create a CTplatform with a strong theoretical base.CBR assists individual and organization-al learning and interpretation processesin a way that social psychologists haveproven natural and consistent with cog-nitive aspects of human behaviour (Read& Cesa 1990). IBIS allows actors toshare experiences and interpretations ina dialectical manner that encourages in-quiry into actors’ beliefs and premises(Churchman 1971) and supports con-structive negotiation to resolve conflicts(Chang 1993).

Nevertheless, in light of Argyris’ the-ory it is unlikely that this CT platformcould be fully exploited in defensive or-ganizations. The content of the experi-ence bases reflects interpretation proc-esses based on single-loop learning.

Therefore CBR produces, at best, partialsolutions to complex organizationalproblems requiring double-loop learn-ing. For example, Kanter (1983) hasfound that when organizational conflictsare resolved by consensus, winners con-veniently “forget” losers’ critique to savelosers’ face. Losers also are willing toforget for the sake of the common good.This implies that little incentive existsfor either party to memorize the processof change and its underlying reasoning.However, because these issues often can-not be discussed, the possibly detrimen-tal implications of forgetting on buildingup organizational memory remain unre-solved. The same weakness applies toIBIS. If nothing else changes, issues thatcannot be discussed before the introduc-tion of CT remain taboo after its intro-duction. For example, Arendt (1958, p.82) states: “Authority ... is incompatiblewith persuasion, which presupposesequality and works through a process ofargumentation. Where arguments areused, authority is left in abeyance.” Con-sequently, faced with threatening andembarrassing situations, actors in defen-sive organizations usually stick to theirpositions regardless of the supportingand objecting arguments. They also wantunilateral control over the pieces ofknowledge (such as the cases in the case-based part of organizational memory)and other resources that could be drawnupon during the argumentation process.As a result, discussions progress slowlyor are terminated by the most powerfulactors. Many designers neglect this factaltogether or implement features that by-pass the behavioural problems (e.g. Sec-tion 3.2).

Organizations face two alternativesin appropriating this platform: either to

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use CT only in domains where the likeli-hood of embarrassment and threat isminimal, or to deploy them additionallyto foster and reinforce organizationallearning, in cases where the prevailingdivision of work and the standard operat-ing procedures are inadequate and a fun-damental organizational redesign is es-sential. Clearly, the first alternative is vi-able and technologies are used effective-ly, for example in technical designapplications, where rational interpreta-tion process is preferable. However, fororganizations that want to reap the bene-fits of the involvement and commitmenttheory, the second alternative is the obvi-ous choice. This alternative also accordswith the two design goals presented inSection 3.2.

While the theoretical base of the CTplatform cannot explicitly address all thevirtues of Model II, the following analy-sis suggests that the platform could beapplied to support and reinforce learn-ing. As noted above, CBR reinforcesModel I behaviour because the experi-ence bases reflect interpretations basedon Model I. This process must be inter-rupted by reinterpreting the cases in lightof Model II. Facilitators are usuallyneeded to set the process in motion. Onepurpose of the process, however, is totrain actors to interpret cases themselveswithout outside help. This is the onlyway to ensure that actions as well as thecases describing the actions will reflectand reinforce Model II.

Argyris (1990) argues that the bestway of learning how to learn is throughsolving actual business problems intraining seminars that specifically ad-dress organizational learning dilemmas.In his method, each actor envisions inwriting how he or she would communi-

cate with other actors to solve a problem.A group discusses the cases to make in-dividual actors aware of the discrepancybetween intentions and actions and howthis discrepancy contributes to mediocreperformance. Finally, the actors learn toredesign their conversations so that is-sues that were previously off-limits be-come discussible. An IBIS-based systemcould be very useful in this process. Eachactor could write the case as an issue-netin which she or he would explicitly dis-tinguish between the envisioned conver-sation and information that the actorwould not communicate for whateverreason. The group could then analyzethese issue-nets to find out how the con-versation, its results, and the reasoningunderlying the results would change ifthe undiscussibles were discussed. Thecomputer-supported argumentative casemethod is likely to be a good basis forextending existing CT because severalresearchers (among them Argyris(1990), Rossmoore (1994), and Senge(1990)) have found the case method use-ful for learning how to learn. In the fol-lowing, I elaborate on how the IBIScomponent of the CT platform could beused to support and reinforce Model IIlearning processes.

4.4. Learning productive reasoning and negotiated control with IBISI sketch in this section (a) how Model I-related defensive routines and the defen-sive reasoning on which these routinesare based are evident in discussionsabout threatening and embarrassing is-sues; (b) how these discussions mustshift to reflect productive reasoning, ifdefensive routines are to be engaged, and(c) how actors can deploy IBIS to reflectupon their discourse and to learn to nego-

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FIGURE 2. Using the IBIS — structuring of a discourse to illustrate defensive reasoning in the organizational design context. I=Issue, P=Position, A=Argument

I1: (Partner 1) Should seniorpartners intervene in theproject management proc-

P1: (Manager 1, Implicit) No.

A2: (Manager 2) Partners’ ac-tions can result in a short cir-cuit of a coherent managerial

A3: (Manager 2) The projectsusually end up worse.

I2: (Consultant) Are partnersincompetent?

P2: (Managers) Partners arewrong (in suggesting partici-pating) but are not open to

A4: (Partners) We are not thatwrong nor that closed.

A5: (Partner 2) We are wor-ried that if we defer to themanagement of the project,we might lose the thing wehold dear.We feel like we need to beable to control the processlong enough to assure that it

I3: (Consultant) Do the man-agers fear that they will be mi-cro-managed by the part-

P3: (Partners) You managersfear losing control of theproject

A6: (Partner 1) I am open totrying. Hopefully, I’ll get someconfidence that the managersaren’t trying to … put me outof my field.And, they’ll get some confi-dence that I’m not trying to …

P4: (Partners, Implicit)

A1: (Manager 1) If partners in-tervene, the management ofthe firm will become distorted.

Responds-toResponds-to

Supports

Questions

Is-suggest-Supports

Generalizes

Responds-to

Responds-to

Objects-toSupports

SpecializesSpecializes

T. Käkölä 63

FIGURE 3. Using the IBIS — structuring of the redesigned discourse to illustrate productive reasoning. I=Issue, P=Position, A=Argument

I1: (Partner 1) Should seniorpartners intervene in theproject management proc-

A1: (Manager 1) I do not wishto prevent Partner 1from talk-

P4: (Partners, Implici

A2: (Manager 1) Let me illus-trate with examples some ofthe fears that I have and getyour and others’ reactions.

P2: (Manager 1) My doubt isrelated to your commitment toa managerial process. Be-cause you are beginning, it islikely that you may violate thestructure and the rules inways that are counterproduc-

I3: (Manager 1) Are my fearsunfair in your mind?

P5: (Partner 1) If I hear youcorrectly, you are concernedabout how genuinely open Iwill be about my ability to re-duce my fears of the rug’s be-ing pulled out from under me,

I5: (Partner 1) Why not picksome examples and let’s trythem out. I may find that I amnot as open as I espouse; orthat I vacillate, etc. You may

A4: (Manager 1) I realize thedangers of using a structureand rules to project manag-

A3: (Manager 1) I don’t knowhow to confront Partner 2 inways that we can learn from

A6: (Manager 1) I think I feelfree to tell you, but my auto-matic reaction is to tell youhow wrong you are and how

A5: (Manager 1) But I do notknow how to carry out my jobwithout the security of the

A7: (Manager 1) I am willingto try to design modes withwhich all of us can agree.

I4: (Partner 1, implicit) Howcan we reduce these fearsand develop a sense of trust?

P3: (Partner 1) Let’s takesome examples of your worstfears and role-play them tosee what I would say and how

P4: (Partner 1) Let us see ifwith the consultant’s help andour own, we can develop agreater sense of trust in our

I2: (Manager 1) What fears I

Responds-

Supports

Objects-to

Is-suggested-

Is-suggested-byResponds-

Responds-

Is-suggested-bySupports

Objects-to

Suppoprts

Specializes

Specializes

Is-suggested-

Responds-Responds-

Responds-

P1: (Manager 1, Implicit)

T. Käkölä 64

tiate control of their work constructively.To illustrate, I employ the IBIS methodto analyze and interpret Argyris’ (1990,pp. 111-116) case example of a discus-sion about a threatening and embarrass-ing situation related to organizational de-sign. The illustration is of special interestto coordination technology research: athorough understanding of the complexsocial processes inherent in situationswhere the prevailing social order is dis-rupted and restructured is required be-fore CT can be designed to foster on-go-ing reflection, self-questioning, and ne-gotiated control of work routines as ef-fectively as they now support theenactment of routines (Kling 1991).

4.4.1. The case example and its IBIS interpretationThe case concerns the organizational de-sign process of a small architectural andreal estate development company. Thecompany suffered from severe structuralproblems: actors’ areas of responsibilitywere unclear, tasks were poorly coordi-nated, and senior partners gave contra-dictory orders to the technical staff. Yet,the company was successful because theactors were highly committed to provid-ing excellent customer service. The com-pany had decided to expand its businesssignificantly, however, making a new or-ganizational structure crucial. The seniorpartners sought more order, stability andclarity. A new organizational structureshould redefine job responsibilities andthe relationships between variousgroups. A consultant was hired to help.

The consultant reasoned that mostactors were well aware of the existingwork roles and structure as well as thechaos embedded in them. Yet, because ofthe prevalent defensive routines, actors

had done nothing to change the structureor to employ this chaos as a source of in-novation. The consultant recommendeda two-step process in which the seniorpartners would (1) jointly develop a neworganizational design while at the sametime reducing defenses, and (2) acquirethe skills and establish the sense of trustthat enables productive reasoning, andhelps actors continue to reduce old andprevent new defenses. This recommen-dation was accepted and the design proc-ess was started. During design sessions,the need for double-loop learning quick-ly became clear, and the actors realizedthat the new design would likely fail ifthe defensive routines were not eliminat-ed.

I analyze a specific discussion duringwhich Partner 1, one of the two seniorpartners, has suggested that the partnersshould have the right to intervene in themanagement of projects. His commenthas upset the two project managers. Thetranscription of this discussion is givenin Appendix A. I use the IBIS method tointerpret and visualize causal structuresreflecting the actors’ theories-in-use(Figure 2). The interpretation makes ex-plicit the implications of defensive rea-soning. The central issue is should thesenior partners intervene in the projectmanagement? (I1). The partners arguefor intervention (P4) but hide their rea-soning and present no evidence to justifytheir argument. The managers draw con-clusions about the partners’ motivesbased on assumptions they do not reveal.Their arguments A1 and A2 (manage-ment of the company will become dis-torted if partners intervene) are assertiveand discourage inquiry. Furthermore, themanagers make a generalization, A3(project quality would suffer), an out-

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come that contradicts to the purpose ofthe organizational design process (bring-ing order to and reducing chaos in themanagement of the company) withoutgiving any evidence to support or ex-plain this generalization. The logical butmisleading interpretation is that the man-agers regard the partners as incompetent.This interpretation, if not investigated,would probably divert the discussioneven further from the real problem, i.e.both parties’ fear of losing unilateralcontrol of projects. Therefore, the con-sultant now raises two issues: I2 (are thepartners incompetent?), and I3 (do themanagers fear they will be micro-man-aged?). The managers respond by blam-ing the partners both for being wrong andblind to the fact that they are wrong (P2).But as is evident from Figure 2, the man-agers fail to support their claim. Thissuggests that they are (maybe uncon-sciously) accusing the partners of some-thing of which they are equally guilty.The partners defend themselves (A4),and then state that the managers fear los-ing control (P3). But, the partners admitat this point that they too fear losing uni-lateral control. They are willing to becandid because they know the discussionis meant to reduce, not reinforce, defens-es.

After the discussion, the consultanthelped the actors redesign their roles.Then he focused the group’s effort on re-designing their discussions by using thecase writing method outlined in Section4.3. A transcription of the redesignedconversation appears in Appendix B. Inthe following, I use the IBIS method toanalyze the conversation (Figure 3) andbriefly compare it with the earlier con-versation (Figure 2). Model II actionstrategies are evident: the actors now en-

gage in dialectical thinking and mini-mize unilateral face saving. For exam-ple, the managers present an argumentA1 (I do not wish to prevent Partner 1from talking to others) that underminestheir position P1 (Partners should not in-tervene in project management) and sup-ports the partners’ point of view. Theyalso make themselves vulnerable byopenly revealing their fears. For in-stance, the managers state they fear therestructuring program will fail becausethe partners may violate the new struc-ture and rules (P2). But instead of blam-ing others (A3, A6) the managers nowrecognize that their own behaviour mayactually cause the partners to violate therules and the structure. They also under-mine their position P2 by stating thatthey realize the dangers of using thestructure to protect themselves (A4) andthen explaining why they think they needprotection (A5). The partners proposerole-plays to let everyone see the bene-fits of discussing fears openly (P3, I5).

4.4.2. DiscussionI have illustrated the IBIS method as aresource that could be used to make ex-plicit actors’ defensive reasoning, andthereby help them reflect on their con-versations and actions. My illustrationimplies that the IBIS-component of theCT platform might facilitate and rein-force the ability of both individual actorsand groups to productively negotiatecontrol over their work, rules and re-sources. The proposed CT componentwould enhance this learning process byhelping actors visually structure and an-alyze their discussions. More important,it could be linked to other CT compo-nents such as workflow managementtechnologies, so that the IBIS-compo-

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nent could be invoked whenever an am-biguous situation involving multiple ac-tors disrupts routine workflow. The re-sulting conversations would provide thebasis for a new division of work and forthe allocation and enactment of rules andresources (including CT) to foster work-ing and learning.

Yet it would be naive to think that anykind of computerized system is a pana-cea that enables organizational learning.For example, the IBIS method is notpowerful enough to elicit the values, be-liefs, and experiences of actors nor theexpertise embedded in them. This flawlets actors simply learn the new Model IIcongruent rules of the game and produceissue-nets that illustrate productive rea-soning without having to change theirgoverning values. The IBIS method doesnot pick up on the problem. Therefore,shared understanding and productivereasoning remain difficult to accomplish.In fact, Eden (1991) states that real be-liefs and values of actors cannot be elic-ited and incorporated thoroughly intoany computerized system because actorsare often incapable of fully externalizingtheir interpretation processes. Moreover,several structural and behavioural issuesmay impede learning and cannot be ad-dressed by any technology alone.

Shared understanding, even ifachievable, will not resolve all conflicts(Gabarro 1991). Moreover, mutual trust,which is a precondition to productivereasoning and negotiated control, cannotbe established solely by making a com-mitment to understanding the points ofview of others, as Argyris seems to sug-gest. Each actor also assesses the mo-tives, discretion, and competence of oth-er actors and many other factors in decid-ing whether or not to be candid (Gabarro

1991). Gabarro (1991, p. 109) identifiesyet another barrier, which he calls “man-agerial paradox”: “while it is crucial thatmanagers be able to listen nonjudgmen-tally (to understand other points of viewand get valid information), the essence ofmanagement is to do just the opposite—to make judgments. Managers … in turn,are evaluated on how well they do this.The danger, then, is that this bias forjudging will subvert a manager’s inclina-tion to listen carefully and, in doing so,sabotage his or her ability to make accu-rate business and people judgments.” Aslong as actors seek unilateral control andare rewarded for doing so, organizationallearning is learning by the few to rein-force control over the many.

5. ConclusionsI have employed Argyris’ (1990) organi-zational learning theory to uncover rea-sons for the mediocre exploitation of Co-ordination Technologies in organiza-tions. This theory states that organiza-tions have to adopt Model II theory-in-use to benefit fully from the ideas in theinvolvement and commitment theory ofmanagement. I have noted that the bulkof CT literature does not fully acknowl-edge that deep organizational changesrequiring double-loop learning may beneeded before organizations can im-prove work performance and their em-ployment of CT to enhance organization-al coordination and learning.

I have identified three organizationalimplications of this theory: First, Coordi-nation Technologies will be underused aslong as the organizational theory-in-useis Model I. Second, the designers of CTmust make a cognitive shift toward Mod-

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el II so that CT support and reinforce on-going reflection on unquestioned rou-tines and practices as well as negotiatedcontrol over the rules and resourcesdrawn upon in these routines and practic-es. Otherwise, organizations are likely tocontinue to reinforce the defensive fitwith technological properties such as an-onymity. Third, other structural proper-ties, such as incentive schemes to fosterthe effectiveness of computer-supportedteam work, should be employed to rein-force this cognitive shift. When these im-plications are taken into account, CT willlikely be regarded as less threatening andmore useful than otherwise would be thecase.

I have presented Issue-Based Infor-mation Systems and Case-Based Rea-soning as two promising methods thatcan be deployed to design CT that fosterreflection and learning. I have also useda case example to illustrate how the IBISmethod could be employed to help actorsreflect on their defensive reasoning proc-esses and to facilitate the redesign oftheir discourse patterns to permit pro-ductive reasoning. An interesting topicfor future research is whether the envi-sioned CT platform can be combinedwith existing workflow managementtechnologies to give the transformationof chaos and ambiguity into novel andinnovative institutional arrangementsand routines equal support with routinecoordination tasks.

Researchers and practitioners cannow argue that the technologies that callfor major changes in organizational be-haviour should not be introduced (oreven developed) because their chance ofsuccess is questionable. For example,Kanter (1983) claims that successfultechnological innovations minimize the

need for organizational change. Unfortu-nately, the business value of such inno-vations is usually questionable, makingKanter’s position untenable.

At least two challenges must be over-come before the above-mentioned impli-cations can be considered in the designand deployment of CT. First, a major or-ganizational shift toward Model II isvery cost-intensive. It takes several yearsof training and mentoring at the work-place because actors tend to act defen-sively unless they are exposed to ModelII thinking and action for a long period.Second, not everybody is capable orwilling to reflect upon their defensiveroutines. Hence, the learning processmust inevitably be reinforced by firingactors who cannot or will not unlearntheir outdated behavioural patterns (Cha-ran 1991, Hedberg 1981, Tunstall 1983).The diffusion of Model II is likely to beslow even with training and discharging.If executives are to become and remainmotivated to meet these challenges, theymust see shift toward Model II as givingtheir companies a competitive edge.Moreover, the executives must them-selves learn how to learn before they canexpect their subordinates to. If execu-tives are unable or unwilling to makethemselves vulnerable despite their pow-er and formal authority, the credibility ofthe whole process is in doubt (Argyris1990).

Another approach would be to enactCT-enabled structural designs such asnetwork organizations to outperformlarge companies with a set of small, rela-tively autonomous companies operatingunder a common business strategy andtop management (Charan 1991). Theseleaner and simpler organizations withinthe network structure need less internal

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communication and coordination, thusmaking the organizations less politicaland easier to manage (Argyris 1990, Pf-effer 1992). Indeed, the potential busi-ness value of employing CT to plan, ex-ecute, and monitor contract-based trans-actions within and between network or-ganizations is huge (Charan 1991).However, if these structural designs areemployed to bypass ‘political problems,’this approach is problematic for at leasttwo reasons (Pfeffer 1992). First, “It isnot clear that by ignoring the social real-ities of power and influence we can makethem go away, or that by trying to buildsimpler, less interdependent social struc-tures we succeed in building organiza-tions that are more effective or that havegreater survival value” (Pfeffer 1992, p.30). Second, “by trying to ignore issuesof power and influence in organizations,we lose our chance to understand thesecritical social processes and to train man-agers to cope with them” (Pfeffer 1992,p. 30). This approach reinforces superfi-cial learning because the new skillsneeded to use power and negotiate con-trol constructively cannot be learned.Consequently, these structural designsshould be complemented with new skillsthat enable actors to increase their capac-ity to tolerate the ambiguity and threatinherent in social and technologicalchange without diminishing their abilityto reflect on the prevailing practices andto constructively negotiate control.

Organizational learning is such acomplex social process that the role ofCT in fostering it will remain boundedregardless of the sophistication of tech-nology. Moreover, the reliable enactmentof interdependent work practices setslimits on the level of autonomy, and mostorganizations at least seem to be doing

fine, even if the levels of autonomy andprivacy are decided unilaterally. Thesefacts imply that organizations may notneed CT to facilitate double-loop learn-ing processes. Maybe they do not. Butthe question remains: do organizationsneed CT to bypass defensive patterns?Maybe. Yet, the role of CT in bypassingthese patterns has received more thanenough attention in coordination tech-nology research.

Coordination technology researchersmust more actively create and share newknowledge about the implications for thedesign and deployment of CT of the dis-crepancy between CT that endorse thevalues of the involvement and commit-ment theory and the realities of Model I-driven organizations. Researchers mustalso recognize that achieving a fit be-tween the structural properties of CT andthe structural properties of organizationswill not guarantee successful, learning-enhancing use of CT if the fit is defen-sive. Unless these issues are adequatelyaddressed, the future CT may be careful-ly designed to support unilateral controlover all (in some way sensitive) informa-tion so that they better match the require-ments of defensive organizations. In thispaper, I have made one of the first at-tempts to address these issues.

One fundamental and extremelychallenging question for future researchis how to operationalize the organiza-tional implications identified in this pa-per and integrate them into a sound, cost-effective development and implementa-tion approach in a way that helps organi-zations (1) ensure that they are on theirway toward Model II before introducingCT, (2) identify those possibly new fea-tures of CT fostering and reinforcing or-ganizational learning, and (3) evaluate

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the success of CT using criteria that ac-knowledge the equal importance of ef-fective organizational working andlearning, and thereby help sustain thelearning effort during implementation.Conducting this research is resource-in-tensive because studying CT as media-tors for and products of human actionand organizational learning must be donein the field using many case studies andreal work situations. Moreover, it is chal-lenging to do research on a politicallyand emotionally sensitive topic that fewpeople want or are even able to discussconstructively. Providing research-basedguidance to people who may not want itis difficult. Nevertheless, the incentivesare high. Meeting this challenge will beone of the most valuable contributionsthat coordination technology researcherscan make, if the use of CT to fosterworking and learning is to move from vi-sion to reality in organizations with com-plex, unfriendly and authoritarian workrelations.

Notes1Holt (1985) coined the term ‘Coordination Tech-nology’ to depict computer support for cooperativework on heterogenous computer networks. Otherwidely used and somewhat synonymous termsinclude CSCW (Computer Supported CooperativeWork) and Groupware.2I use the word ‘designer’ to refer primarily to tech-nologists who work within an organization todevelop, tailor, and/or maintain self-developed orpurchased CT. When technologists are employedby specialized vendors of CT, teh time-space dis-juncture between the design and use of CT is oftenlarge enough to significantly limit possibilities forinteraction and learning between vendor designersand users.3I use the word ‘actor’ to refer to people in situa-tions where there is no need to focus attention onrole-related issues such as whether a person usesCT or is a manager.

4The Coordinator (Flores et al. 1988) is one of themost famous CTs. It meets well the formal, prede-fined coordination and unilateral control require-ments of the relatively stable bureaucracies(Grantham & Carasik 1988).5Naturally, there are many other suitable methods.For example, cognitive maps are structured repre-sentations of an understanding that have beenargued to support organizational learning (Bolandet al. 1992, Eden 1991). Toulmin’s (1958) argu-mentation language is another representationmethod that could be deployed for modeling dis-course inherent in working and learning. Hashim(1993) has combined IBIS and Toulmin’s argumen-tation language by using a dialogue logic approachto ensure that the validation of arguments is cap-tured. While all of these, and many others, areinteresting from the perspective of computer sci-ence, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explorethem as possible ways to foster organizationalworking and learning.

AcknowledgementMany colleagues have helped me to im-prove this paper with their ideas, sugges-tions and critical comments. I thankMark Ackerman, Inger Eriksson, KristoIvanov, Richard Mason, Hans-Erik Nis-sen, Markku Nurminen, Agneta Olerup,Lucy Suchman, Seppo Visala, AndrewWhinston, and three anonymous review-ers.

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Appendix A: Discourse reflecting defensive Model I reasoning (Argyris 1990, pp. 113-116).(Interpretation linking the statements ofthe managers and the partners is provid-ed by this author on the basis of Argyris’extensive case analysis.)

“Manager 1: I’m afraid that if Partners 1and 2 have the right to enter the process(as they just described it), they will causethe management of the firm to becomedistorted.Manager 2: Yes; their actions can resultin a short-circuit of a coherent manage-rial process. It throws the weight of deci-sion-making out of kilter, I think.It makes the management of a projectvery difficult, if not impossible. It usu-ally ends up a poorer project.”

The managers’ arguments can be inter-preted in two ways: either the partnersare incompetent, or the managers fearthey will be micro-managed by the part-ners. When the consultant intervened inthe discussion and presented these inter-pretations, the managers responded byarguing that the partners were wrong butrefused to admit it. The partners dis-missed the managers’ argument by stat-ing that they were neither that wrong northat inflexible. Encouraged by the con-sultant, the partners then revealed rea-sons behind their suggestion, reasonsthey had initially covered up becausethey assumed that revealing them wouldalienate the managers.

“Partner 2: You managers fear losingcontrol of the timing of the project; prof-itability, and billability... . Partner 1 and Iworry ... if we defer to the managementof the project, we might lose the thingthat we hold dear (the design and imple-mentation of a high quality building in aprofitable manner).Partner 1:I am open to trying. We’ll haveto have rules at the beginning. HopefullyI’ll get some confidence that the manag-ers aren’t trying to pull the rug out fromunder me, to push me out of my field.And they’ll get some confidence that I’mnot trying to run away with the projectsand do things behind their backs.”

Appendix B: Discourse reflecting productive Model II reasoning (Argyris 1990, pp. 113-116).

“Manager 1: On the one hand, Partner 1,I do not wish to prevent you from talkingto others; on the other hand, I should liketo illustrate with some examples some ofthe fears that I have and get your andothers’ reactions.Manager 1: The doubt that I have isrelated to your commitment to a manage-rial process. Because you are beginning,it is likely that you may violate the struc-ture and the rules in ways that are coun-terproductive to the program. These fearsI have may be unfair in your mind. I’mopen to discussing them.I don’t know how to confront Partner 2or you in ways that we can learn from theviolations. At best, I think I feel free totell you—but as you can see from thisconversation—my automatic reaction isto tell you how wrong you are and howwe must constrain you.Manager 1: I realize the dangers of usinga structure and rules to protect us (themanagers), but I do not know how to

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carry out my job without the security ofthe structure. I am willing to try to designmodes with which all of us can agree.Partner 1: Let’s take some examples ofyour worst fears and role-play them tosee what I would say and how you wouldreact. Let us see if with the consultant’shelp and our own, we can develop agreater sense of trust in our competenceto integrate.Partner 1: If I hear you correctly, you areconcerned about how genuinely open Iwill be about my ability to reduce myfears of the rug’s being pulled out fromunder me, etc. Why not pick some exam-ples and let’s try them out. I may findthat I am not as open as I espouse; or thatI vacillate, etc. You may find similarproblems.”