Design Basis Knowledge Management

for Plant Life Management and Long Term Operation

RWM in the Design Basis Knowledge Management

New Practice of Knowledge Management in the Context of the Entry into

Force of the Federal Law No. 190-FZ of July 11, 2011 on RWM

Vienna, Austria 28 October -1 November 2013

Rakitskaya Tatiana

State atomic energy corporation “Rosatom”

IAEA

Interregional Knowledge Management Workshop

on Life Cycle Management of Design Basis Information

— Issues, Challenges, Approaches

Total RW generation in NPP

operation

Accumulated RW in structures

Total activity in discharges and

dumping

Factual RW generation in NPP

operation

Planning of RW generation in

NPP operation

License for discharges and

dumping

Standards of RW generation in

NP operation

2

Accumulation of knowledge of radioactive waste management

in NPP designing and operation

RW

ma

nag

em

en

t

NPP designing NPP construction NPP operation NPP

decommission

Verification of RW accumulation

in structures

Factual discharges and dumping

Generated amount of RW in

beyond design basis accidents

Possibility of discharges and

dumping

Estimation of RW accumulation

in structures

Preserving and accumulation of RW knowledge beyond the bounds of NPP lifecycle

Preserving and accumulation of knowledge about the basic project during all NPP lifecycle

Design

Basis

Knowledge about structural materials

Knowledge about the influence of discharges

Knowledge about radionuclide migration

Other knowledge, influencing the basic project Conversion to lifecycle logics

means working with a range of

cycles simultaneously that is with

complexes of different knowledge

and different time scales

The Federal Law No. 190-FZ of July 11, 2011 changed the concept

of radioactive waste management activities

Technological cycle of RW

Collection

Categorization Treatment

Conditioning

Packaging

Transporting

Disposal

From the moment of the entry of the Law into force organizations

operating nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities will bear

financial responsibility for all stages including disposal

Until now organizations operating nuclear and

radiation hazardous facilities bore the costs

only at the initial stages of management

1. The requirement of obligatory radioactive waste disposal was introduced

(the scale of RWM activities is significantly expanded)

3. USS RWM can be represented as an object comprising three types of cycles

. Natural cycles

Technological cycles of RWM Economic cycles

2. The Unified State System of RWM (USS RWM) is developed to organize and

provide safe and cost-effective management of radioactive waste

Knowledge management in conditions when lifetime of engineering

constructions exceed the life of the generation of specialists

4

Due to the entry into force of the Federal Law “On RW management …” № 190-FZ of 11.07.2011

in the sphere of RW management two circuits of the management system are being formed

and complex design projects and knowledge management projects are being realized

RW management is not the final stage of another cycle but a separate technological cycle of practice

RW management is the only for the time present kind of practice for which the principle of lifecycle

implementation (including RW disposal) is legislatively set

RW management cycle is the most “protracted” technological cycle and it rises in other technological

cycles of nuclear power engineering and industry. That is why it is the cycle to specify the aspect and time

scale in elaboration of the management model in lifetime management logics.

during such long life cycles as the cycle of a RW repository administrative decisions must be taken with

the participation of all stakeholders

NFC NPP

SF

RW Cycles

USS RWM

NPSS

RWR

DB

Keeping GLOBAL EXPANSION goals.

It is necessary to provide control of contributions to cover

RW management costs at full cycle into enterprise/corporation/industry economics

Maintaining EFFICIENCY level.

It is necessary to provide sufficient financial resources

for radioactive waste management at all stages of fuel cycle including disposal

Maintaining SAFETY level.

It is necessary to organize safe radioactive waste management

in full cycle sequence including disposal

(1) Formation of the first circuit of RWM governance system

in the sequence of life cycle management

5

Modeling of a multi-level corporate system

(substantive modeling)

РRADIATION SAFETY monitoring

RW

Keeping GLOBAL EXPANSION goals

Maintaining EFFICIENCY level

Maintaining SAFETY level

(2) Formation of the second circuit of RWM governance system

in the sequence of life cycle management

6

Modeling of a multifocal system of strategic management

as a system of decision making through the dialogue with stakeholders

(procedural modeling)

Monitoring RADIATION SAFETY

RW

Pu

blic

accep

tan

ce a

ssu

ran

ce

Control of contributions to cover RW management cost s to

macroeconomics

Provision of sufficient funding for radioactive waste management

7

State

Business

Society

Principles of Good Governance: Timely provision of all stakeholders with information sufficient for sound decision making. Holding public dialogues and public sessions with stakeholders.

Full cycle safe radioactive waste

management technologies

RW

(3) As a result an advanced governance system in the field of

RWM will be established (Good Governance)

ROSATOM a state governance body

in the field of RWM

ROSATOM

Com

Trm

8

ROSATOM RWM projects

(management projects and governance projects)

Management projects

(for Economic Efficiency)

Governance projects

(for Safety)

RWM

technologies

”Radwaste producers” pay for

management of their radwaste

using revenues collected from their

core business activities

(Project 5)

Ultimate responsibility of the state for

safety assurance during RWM is

restricted to the waste produced from

use of Russian-origin technologies

and goods (Project 6)

RWM services “Radwaste producers” pay for the

full cycle of RWM

(Project 3)

Information about safety during RWM

must be open

(Project 4)

RWM facilities

and asset

complexes

Safety during RWM must be

ensured by the ”producer”,

including financially (Project 1)

Radiation safety is the central priority

during RWM

(Project 2)

Capital

Investment

Disposal for RW 1 class

Disposal for RW 2 class

Disposal for RW 3 class

Disposal for …..

Com*

Trm**

* Com – communicative forms of RW Control ** Trm - transmission forms of RW Control

9

Project 1 and Project 6

Project 1 (innovation)

NFC NPP

SF

RWM cycles

USS RWM

NPSS

RWR

DB

Legacy

All

RW

New

RW

Legacy

RW

$

Project 6 (new knowledge)

$/R $/R

Continuous

improvement

10

Mechanism of RWM projects

New practice based on new knowledge

Set of

actions

Pilot

Best

practice

2-3 Plants

All plants

11

Contacts

Rakitskaya Tatiana

expert

Department for Public Policy on RWM, SNF

Management and Nuclear Decommissioning

+7 (499) 949-43-35

TGRakitskaya@rosatom.ru

www.rosatom.ru

12

Basic benefits and new capabilities of the Community of practice in the

field of nuclear and radiation safety

1. Nuclear safety culture through reproducing paradoxical knowledge - “the knowledge of ignorance” (problems)

After the Chernobyl disaster Russia has focused on nuclear and radiation safety (NRS) provision in nuclear power industry. Safety culture provides against taking actions in critical situations if you cannot predict the consequences of your actions. But it is necessary to take actions in a critical situation.

A problem situation arises when the consequences are ambiguous (two or more probably true variants of actions). The choice of a correct variant is based on involving different context knowledge and the more large-scale the consequences of actions (inactions) in problem situations are the wider context of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary knowledge and practical experience should be involved.

Conclusion: There has arisen a need to establish interdisciplinary communities of practice basing upon the international experience in ensuring global NRS.

2. Elaboration and implementation of long-term programs of nuclear power development and solution of deferred “nuclear legacy” problems is impossible without intergeneration collaboration.

New generations should be involved into the constant process of reproduction of knowledge critically important to support NRS at an adequate level. In 2008 strategic sessions were held and succession pool was set (NRS School) . The main objective of NRS School is to form a corps of experts and trainees able to recreate scientific & technical, engineering, production and management traditions which are necessary to tackle the problems of RW and SNF management and nuclear decommissioning

Conclusion: New tools to reduce long-term nuclear power development risks were worked out on the basis of cognitive maps (“Problem maps” and “Competence maps”) and Learning in Action technologies.

13

Challenges for the Community of practice

to ensure nuclear and radiation safety

How to manage risks in the field of nuclear and radiation safety?

Local safety culture enhancement to enable the further nuclear Renaissance after

Fukushima. The large scale of Russian nuclear industry requires mapping of the risks,

including those caused by human factor and organizational culture aspects. “ Risk maps”

are developed on the basis of “ Problem Maps” and “ Competence Maps”.

The area of nuclear and radiation safety assurance is regulated by the state authorities in

charge of technical regulation, environmental safety, public health, and attracts great public

interest.

Conclusion: It is necessary to take into consideration all stakeholders’ interests in

managing nuclear sector risks. “Risk mapping” is an advanced instrument of risk

management. “Risk maps” formation is one of the key objectives for the Community of

practice in the area of nuclear and radiation safety assurance.

The problem-map structure

Objectives

Problems

Subjects

Policy Economy Society Technology

Basic structure of competences

Competency

Competence

Organizational behavior

Частный пример карты рисков

Арабские цифры на карте – обозначения рисков, которые были классифицированы по четырем категориям значимости и шести категориям вероятности, причем так, чтобы каждому сочетанию вероятность/значимость был приписан один вид риска.

На этой карте рисков вероятность или частота отображается по вертикальной оси, а сила воздействия или значимость - по горизонтальной оси. В этом случае вероятность появления риска увеличивается снизу вверх при продвижении по вертикальной оси, а воздействие риска увеличивается слева направо по горизонтальной оси.

Такая классификация, размещающая каждый риск в специфическую отдельную «коробочку» не является обязательной, но упрощает процесс установки приоритетов, показывая положение каждого риска относительно других (увеличивает разрешающую способность данного метода). Жирная ломаная линия - критическая граница терпимости к риску.