Derrida Interview Machine

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NIETZSCHE AND THE MACHINEAuthor(s): JACQUES DERRIDA and Richard BeardsworthSource: Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No. 7, Futures of Nietzsche: Affirmation and Aporia(Spring 1994), pp. 7-66Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717600 .

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NIETZSCHE AND THE MACHINEInterviewwith JACQUES DERRIDA byRichard Beardsworth

Ithas been an insistentointon yourpart, informinghereading trategyf each of yourengagements with Nietzsche's philosophy, that there is no one truth to Nietzsche or toNietzsche's text. Your relations toNietzsche distinguish themselves explicitly from those ofHeidegger, which are marked by a persistent, ifnot anguished, desire to contain NietzschewithinthehistoryfBeing. As youobserve inOtobiographies:VenseignementeNietzscheet lapolitique du nom propre, 'The future of theNietzsche-text is not closed'.1 I hope thatmy questions keep to the spirit of this remark, not only by remaining as open as possible, butalsobecause theyoncern hefuture(s)fNietzsche (whatNietzschehad tosayof thefutureas well as the future of Nietzsche's thought today). Iwant, nevertheless, to engage you withthe Nietzsche-text in relation to a specific historical context; that of a world emergingpolitically, conomicallynd culturally--fromutof the old War. The general rientationofmy questions s thusnot relatedtoo intentlyoquestionsof interpretationwhetherfNietzsche's text, your texts or your texts on Nietzsche); it is guided, rather, by theconsideration of the name of Nietzsche as an 'index' of a series of problems which are evermore pressing at the end of the Cold War-namely, the relations between government,technology, justice and the future. Let the name of Nietzsche be in this context a way ofopening p possibilities f approachtotheseproblems. I should iketoentitle he nterview'Nietzsche and theMachine'.

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THIRTEEN QUESTIONS TO JACQUES DERRJDA

Iwill start itha verygeneral uestion.When one considers ll thewritings hichyou have published to date, one is struck by a paradox. Since 'Force andSignification' nWriting ndDifference2 arious voicesof Nietzsche have intimatelyinhabited ourwork; andyet, comparedto the longanalysesofHusserl, Plato,Hegel, Freud, Blanchot, etc., you have written, or at least published, few piecesexplicitly on Nietzsche. Is there a particular reason for this?

Your work has often been criticised for being too 'Nietzschean'. Informing suchcriticisms is a very determined reading of Nietzsche and of yourself which argues(whateverhe ifferencesfeach critique) hat ourwork,by following ietzsche tooclosely, falls into an uncritical and irresponsible irrationalism and replaces rationalnorms fphilosophicalthinkingith the reativeplayfulness f art. Iwould liketoask you two related questions in this context. Firstly, has the jxedominantly 'literary'reception f yourwork in the nglophoneworld (andparticularlyheUnitedStates)detracted rom certainphilosophicalnecessity oyourconsiderationf theliterarytext? In this context it would appear that this necessity has been partially coveredover by the accusation, levelled against deconstruction, of 'Nietzscheanism'.

Secondly, ndmoreparticularly,ollowing hisreceptionfdeconstruction'Derrida'swork is ultimatelyrrationalnd relativist')how do you consideryour relationtoNietzsche in 'WhiteMythology'?3 In this ftenmisunderstoodssay (as youyourselfpoint out to Paul Ricoeur in 'The retrair of metaphor'4), you deconstruct any attempt-and here early Nietzsche's reduction of truth to metaphor is paradigmatic of this

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empiricist,fnotmodern,attempt-to educethefoundingoncepts fphilosophy othesensibleworld. Iwill comeback to themoves of this ssay inamoment. CanI ask you here,how thedeconstructionfWestern philosophy, f which 'White

Mythology' isone sustainedxample,differs romNietzsche's overridingeliefthattheWestern tradition eeds tobe destroyed}What are the differences etweendeconstruction and destruction?

3. Itcouldbe argued I think ere fGeoffrey ennington's ecentappraisal f the ssayin 'Derridabase'5) hat WhiteMythology'enacts n adventure f thinkingypical fdeconstruction's strategies towards, on the one hand, the discipline of philosophy,and, on the other hand, those of the human sciences. Your relation to the positionof metaphor in the philosophical text is, consequently, one forceful enactment ofdeconstruction's displacement and re-organisation of the metaphysical oppositionbetween the transcendental and the empirical. To recall themajor gesture of 'WhiteMythology': on the one hand, you show that it is impossible to dominatephilosophicalmetaphoricsfrom outside philosophy, since theattemptmeets anessential limit in the fact that the very concept of metaphor is a philosopheme basedon themetaphysical ifferenceetween he isible and the nvisible,tc.On the therhand,andforthe amereason,you arguethatphilosophy s incapable fdominatingitsmetaphorical roductions ince in itsveryattempttwould deprive tselff thatwhich sustains t. 'WhiteMythology' traces hisdouble impossibilityeaving tselfand the reader in an aporetic and uncontrollable 'position', neither inside philosophynor outside it, in another science which would wish to dominate philosophy

(linguistics,sychoanalysis, istory-the istwould include,precisely, llmodern9



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endeavours tomake thought finite).

This said, I have two questions. In what way is this ambivalent 'saving' ofphilosophy, its re-inscription,ifferent romHeidegger's wish inhisNietzschelectures of die 1930s to save Nietzsche's thought from his Nazi contemporaries'consideration f it as 'a philosophyof life'? Heidegger opposes the anticonceptualismf thesereadings yplacingNietzschewithinmetaphysics.You haveyourselfuggestednvariousoccasions(CfGrammatology,TheEnd of the ook andtheBeginningofWriting', Spurs/Eperons. es Stylesde Nietzsche, 'InterpretingSignatures.Nietzsche/Heidegger:wo Questions'6) thatHeidegger thereby loses'Nietzsche. In what ways does your double move towards the place of metaphor inthe philosophical text save and lose Nietzsche differently?

4. Iwill turn owmoreexplicitly othe thical mplicationsfNietzsche's 'destruction'of theWestern tradition. This 'destruction' always already implies a re-evaluation ofvaluesgiven that, orNietzsche, science isa reactive valuation f life. InTheWillto Power he notes,

My insight: ll the orces nd drivesbyvirtue fwhich life ndgrowthexist lie under the ban ofmorality;moralityas theinstinctodeny life. One must destroymorality ifone is toliberate life.7In a gesture which is in part the same as his reduction of truth to metaphor,Nietzsche'sGenealogyofMorals performs his estructionfmoralityby ascribingall ethical ideals to a reactive force hostile to life: what has always been understoodas morality is either immoral or uses immoral means to attain its own end. In this

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sense morality has never been, never taken place, and it is ultimately derived as a setof reactive ffects rom thewill topower. At theend of yourreadings f LeviStrauss in 'Violence of the letter: from Le'vi-Strauss to Rousseau' in OfGrammatology, having deconstructed Levi-Strauss's opposition between writing and

speech, you remark:There is no difference ithoutthepresenceof theotherbutalso, and consequently, without absence, dissimulation, detour,difference,riting.Arche-writings theorigin fmorality sof immorality. The nonethical opening of ethics. A violentopening. As in the case of the vulgar concept of writing, theethical instance of violence must be rigorously suspended inordertorepeatthegenealogy fmorals (p. 140).

Firstly, towhat extent does Nietzsche's reduction of morality to lifeprevent him fromthinkinghenecessityf law ofwhichyouhave spoken bout t lengthfor xample,'Before the Law") and, therefore, from thinking the 'prescriptive' modality of hisown text? Secondly, inwhat ways does your final call to a repetitionf thegenealogy fmorals (although he ssay is already ngaged inthis epetition)ifferfromNietzsche's enterprise,xplicitly oncerning he uestion fviolence?

5. My last two questions take me to the relations between violence and justice. ForNietzsche thefoundingf any law isnecessarily iolent. It isonlyonce the aw isinstitutedhat ormativeriteria f ustice nd injusticeome intoplay. It showeveran illusion, a reversal of cause and effect, to claim that these criteria precede andguide the institution of the law. The imperative declaration of law is rooted in force.For Nietzsche, moreover, legal conditions can never be other than exceptionalconditions ince they onstitute partialrestrictionf thewill to life,which isbentupon power, and are subordinate to its 'goal' as a means of creating greater units of

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power. A legalorder is thus oublyviolent;both in its nstitutionnd inits onstantstruggle, once instituted, with the powers of life. Heidegger's understanding of

justicein ntroductionoMetaphysics (hisreading f dike inthe econdmajor speechof the horus nAntigone) smarkedby this ccount f theuridical ndpolitical. Togo quickly: in this reading there is a singular stress on the Nietzschean 'moment'

(Augenblick)f decision inand through hich the 'Statesman' ets theworldingofthe orld (its riginaryolemos) intopoliticalform ithout overing his orldover.Althoughthis etting s, as forNietzsche, contingent,eidegger gives ita certainontological riority,newhich accordswith hispriorstress nBeing andTimeon theJuturalecstasis of temporalitynd with his recentattempts o groundnationalsocialism hilosophically.Now, giventhat hismoment fdecisionin othNietzscheandHeidegger is inscribedwithina philosophyof thewill (onewhich you havealways placed in suspicion), given also that your account of originary violence and ofthesubsequent iolenceof all laws is,however,notentirely issimilar n 'Violenceof theLetter', how does your thinkingf the relation etweenviolenceand justice'avoid'a prioritisationf themoment fpoliticaldecision? I realisethat his uestionisenormous, erhapsengagingwith all yourthinking,nd Iwill be comingback toitconstantlyifalmost inversely)n thefollowing uestion.

6. Nietzsche's genealogyofmorals is a forceful ritiqueof progressand ofmoderndemocracy: not simply because of his non-normative exposition of justice, but alsobecause democracy is considered as a reactive organisation of human beings which

increasingly akes humanity ndifferentiatednd calculable. Democracy is thepolitical realm inwhich man is delivered over to the reactive power of reason. Before

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engagingmore explicitly ith the uestionof technology,ould I askyouhowyouranalysis of originary violence situates you again in the broadest possible terms, inrelation toNietzsche's critique of democracy? Is itbecause Nietzsche fails to situatethe uestion f law in the ffractionforiginary iolence that ewrapsup soquicklythe problem of democracy? Or, is there another thinking of democracy inNietzschethatsimultaneouslyoes againsttheoverriding one fhis critique?

7. Iwould like t thisuncture ofocusveryparticularlynwhatyou sayofHeidegger'sRekoratsreden f Spirit.Heideggerand theQuestion.9 I recallthat nOf Spirit, nwhat is an extremely dense and complex passage, you criticise virulently the effectsof Heidegger's founding 'spiritualisation' of biological racism. Whereas, elsewhere(Spurs) you have recognised a certain necessity toHeidegger's philosophising gesture-at least concerning Nietzsche's empiricism-here the problems of this gesture-as onewhichspiritualises iologism~is explicitly nalysedwithin thepoliticalcontext fHeidegger's engagements with Nazism. Let me quote the passage in full:

Because one cannot demarcate oneself from biologism, fromnaturalism, from racism in its genetic form, one cannot beopposed to them except by re-inscribing pirit in anoppositional determination, y once again making it aunilateralityf subjectivity,ven if n its oluntarist orm.Thecoristraint of this program remains very strong, it reigns overthemajority fdiscourseswhich, today ndfor longtime ocome, state their opposition to racism, to totalitarianism, tonazism, to fascism, etc., and do this in the name of spirit, andevenof the reedomof thespirit note:This libertyf Spiritalwaysrunsthe iskrigorously eterminedbyHegel: that famerely formallibertynd of an abstractuniversality]n thename of an axiomatic, for example, that of democracy or'human rights' - which, directly or not, comes back to thismetaphysics f subjectivity.All thepitfalls f the trategyfestabhshing demarcations belong to this program, whateverplace one occupies in it. The only choice is the choice between

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the terrifying contaminations it assigns. Even if all the formsof complicity re not equivalent,they re irreducible. Thequestionofknowingwhich is the east raveof theseforms fcomplicity s always there- itsurgency nd its seriousnesscould not be over-stressed - but it will never dissolve theirreducibilityf thisfact. This fact (fait),of course, is notsimply a fact. First, and at least, because it is not yet doneifit), notaltogetherpas tout fait): it allsmore than ver,as for what in it remains to come after the disasters that havehappened, for absolutelyunprecedentedresponsibilities f'thought' and 'action'....In theRectorship address, this risk isnot just a risk run. If itsprogramseems diabolical, it isbecause, without there being anything fortuitous in this, itcapitalizes on the worst, that is on both evils at once: thesanctioning of nazisra, and the gesture that is still

metaphysical.10As Dominique Janicaud as noted inhisL 'Ombre e cette ensee.Heidegger et laquestion olitique11, twould be difficult o find greater ccusation fHeidegger.My question concerns, however, the so-called 'programme' of logics which you alludeto in this passage. I note that you make a similar, ifmore local, intellectual gestureinOtobiographies concerning the necessary contamination ofNietzsche's texts by Nazi

ideology. There it is a question of 'a powerful programming machine' which relates,before any human intention or will, the two contrary forces of regeneration and

degeneracy nNietzsche's earlyOn the uture ofOur EducationalEstablishments,determining in advance, before any historical eventuality, that each force reflects, and

passes into, its other. We are here, perhaps, at something like the 'heart' ofdeconstruction given its concern with what you call in 'Violence and metaphysics' 'thelesser iolence' (WritingndDifference,note21, p.313).

My question, after this necessary preamble, is short: inwhat sense have, for you, all

thoughtnd all actionup totoday een inscribed ithinthismachine?And, how do

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you understand those enigmatic words 'absolutely unprecedented responsibilities, ofthought and action? Inwhat sense, 'absolutely'?

8. This takes me tomy next two questions. From the laterNietzsche lectures onwardsHeidegger argues thatwill topower not only forms theend ofmetaphysicsbutconstitutes its accomplishment as the technicist calculation of Being as value. Willto power is the realisation of reason in the form of a willful, technological'schematisation' of theworld, which forgets Being. Following this interpretation,

Heidegger begins to conceiveof therelation etweenBeing andman in terms f anon-willful encounter between thinking and the withdrawal of Being. The supremedanger becomes that of the destiny of the essence of technology, a destiny throughwhich man's essence in itsopenness to Being risks falling from memory. Resistanceto thisdanger nd tocalculativethinkingnparticular s thought ore andmore interms of a composed 'releasement' (Gelassenheit) towards beings and of the listeningto the 'call' of Being. The earlier 'Nietzschean' moment of decision in resolutenessisthus e-appraiseds particularo metaphysicsf thewill. At thispointHeideggerhas theorised a certain renunciation of political agency. There are, of course, manyquestions here. I will remain initially with Heidegger's above interpretation ofNietzsche. Is not Heidegger's interpretation of will to power in the early 1940s asconsummatesubjectivity ven more violent thanhis earlier spiritualisationfNietzsche's physiology? For could one not argue that heproblematic fwill topower exceeds the xiomatic f subjectivitynd that life*, n thedifferencesf itsforces,precedesbothBeing and humanity? If this interpretations to a pointlegitimate, does it not suggest that Nietzsche's text allows one to think the

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'inhumanity' of technology more interestingly than the text of Heidegger, who,despite verything,emains imselfmetaphysical ivenhis belief that the ssenceoftechnologysnothing echnological' 'TheQuestionofTechnology')?

9. Iwill comeback tothe mplicationsf this ast uestion n moment.Althoughyouhave voiced cleardisagreements ithHeidegger's thinkingf technology, here saside toyourwork,more insistentince the 1980s,which is partly n accordwithHeidegger's rejectionf a philosophy f thewill. This isyour nalysisof the adicalstructuref thepromise.As youargue inOfSpirit ndMemoires orPaul deMan11,thepromiseprohibitsthe (metaphysical) athering f Being in presence,whichHeidegger's thinkingn language lso troubles.The promiseis theremainderf thenecessaryundecidabilityf thinkingnd actionuponwhich anyact of thoughtor)language philosophical, olitical, uridical, literary)ill fallupon and failtountie.

We are back here in the ontaminatingachineofOf Spirit. This remainder sanabsolutepast (itcannotbe recalledinanyact)whichgives thechanceof thefuture.Inwhat sense is this romise,which,as you say, isalwaysalready hememory f thispromise, nevertheless an affirmation of the future? What is the relation between this'double' affirmation and the single Yes-saying of Zarathustra, who affirms an

innocent reatingof the future?Does thisdouble affirmationrouble, n turn,Nietzsche'swillful fforgettingn cce Homo; namely,the ffirmationhat e is 'theanti-ass ar excellence1 'Why Iwrite such excellentbooks')? My questionsarepartlyprovokedby what you say of affirmationn 'Nombrede oui' inPsyche:inventions de Vautre1*.

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10. Iwill now link the question of temporality alluded to above concerning your phrase'absolutely unprecedented responsibilities' with the previous two questions on

technology, affirmation and the future. In your essay 'Psyche: Inventions of theOther'14 deconstruction's future is intimately related to the promoting of chance.Deconstructive inventions serve this furthering of chance not by opposing the technorational rogrammationf thealeatorybutby lettingheradicalother f calculation'arrive'. As you remark in that essay

...deconstructive inventiveness consists in opening up,unclosing and destabilising foreclosed structures, in order toleave a passage for the other', (p.60)

This radical alterity is the 'promise' of invention and is, again, a reformulation ofyour deconstructive argument that there is no beyond the undecidable, the aporeticevent; for example, there is no politics of invention to oppose tomodern politics ofinvention. Such an invention would, following your undecidable logic of the'machine', fall back into the tendency of modern politics to integrate the aleatory

within their programmatic calculations. Hence your stress in this essay on the

impossible xperience f theotheras the inventionf the impossible.Could youelaborate n this ontext hetemporal elation etweentheresponsibilitiesfwhichyou spoke in thepassage I quoted fromOf Spiritand the bsolutefuturityf thisabsolute other of invention?

11. How does a certain ffirmationf technologyelatetowhatyouhave called inTheOtherHeading: Reflections n Todays Europe 'thepromiseof democracy'15? Irecall that forNietzsche democracy is themodern reactive fate of calculative reasonand that forHeidegger (both 'early' and 'late' Heidegger) democracy is 'inadequate

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toconfronthechallenges four technological ge' (Spiegel interviewf 1966). Indistinction,nddifferently,obothNietzsche andHeidegger,yourwork canbe seento ffirmothtechnologynddemocracy.Althoughthepromiseofdemocracy snotthe ameas either hefact ofdemocracy r theregulativedea (in the antian sense)of democracy, deconstruction does 'hear' differance more in a democratic organisationof government than in any other political model; and there are no new models to beinvented. If I understand you correctly, your affirmation of democracy is, in thisrespect, a demand for the sophistication of democracy, such a refinement takingadvantage, nturn,f theincreasinglyophisticatedffectsf technology. pose theabove question, then,with thefollowing oints inmind. First of all, democraticinstitutions are becoming more and more unrepresentative in our increasinglytechnicised world-hence, in part, recent rejections of 'la classe politique\ not onlyinFrance and theUnited States; the nxietieswhich thequestionof a centralisedEuropean government raise form part of the same rejection. Then, in the secondplace, themedia are swallowingup the constitutionalmachineryof democraticinstitutions,urtheringherebyhede-politicisationf society nd thepossibility fpopulistdemagogy. Thirdly,resistance othis rocessof technicisationsat the ametime leading to virulent forms of nationalism and demagogy in the former Sovietempire, formswhich are exploitingtechnology n the domains of themedia,telecommunications and arms, whilst denying the de-localising effects of technology,culturally,nthe omainof ideology.And, finally, he ights fmanwould seemanincreasingly ineffective set of criteria to resist this process of technicisation (together

with itspossible fascisticeffects)given thisprocess's gradual effacement f thenormative and metaphysical limit between the human and the inorganic.

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12. Penultimate question: how would you react to the following proposition? The timeof technologynd thetime fphilosophy inparticular hat f deconstructionhichcan only go slowly) are becoming more and more disarticulated, disjointed, out ofjoint16. The law of our time to read is at therisk of being 'overpowered' by the lawof the time of technology, a law whose end appears to be the 'overcoming' of time.Here, theworst side of Nietzsche's prognostications for the future could come true,although itwould not be the reign of democracy thatwould have brought about thismonstrous future of indifferentiation. Either therewill be another suicidal attempt toharness technology to the ends of man (fascism in alliance with biogenetics isperhapsour worst future) and/or technology, an inhuman will to power, will overpowerhumanity. Is this proposition too oppositional, too human, too pious? Tooapocalyptic'} Or, conversely, is today another 'noontide' for decision? This decisionwould not, however, be in the 'grand style' of politics. Itwould undoubtedly doviolence to the memory of the promise of the other; but the violence would becommitted in order that the future does not risk forgetting this promise in the greatestviolence.

13. Finally. In thepreambleto this nterview suggested hat henameof Nietzschecould serve as an 'index' to a series of questions which have become all themore

pressing incethe nd of the oldWar. My final uestions, ollowingn from hosetodowith ustice,pushedrelentlesslyhe uestionof the elations etweenhisnameand the futures of this end. I am aware that you are publishing a text on Marx17.Is another ext ithwhich these uturesre tobe thoughtndactedupon that fMarx- a new Marx (with Hegel, perhaps), one 'after' Nietzsche and Heidegger, and at theend ofMarxism."

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INTERVIEW: NIETZSCHE AND THE MACHINE

InresponsetoQuestionOne-this apparent ackof sustained eflectionnNietzschecanperhapsbe explained yfollowingneof thethreadsfyour introduction. haveindeed found it difficult to bring together r stabilise,within a particularconfiguration, a 'thought' of Nietzsche. By the term 'configuration' Imean not onlya systemic coherence or consistency (no-one has seriously tried to identify a

philosophical or speculative 'system' in what is called?a proper name more

problematic and enigmatic than ever-'Nietzsche'); but also the organisation of anensemble, of a work or corpus, around a guiding meaning, a fundamental project oreven a formal feature ofwritingor speech). It is this irreducible nd singularmultiplicity,his esistance o nyform fVersammlung,ncludinghat f the nd ofmetaphysics (in the sense that Heidegger's interpretation constitutes an attempt to

'zrTtsV'-comprehendere rather than verstehen?ihe essential elements of Nietzsche's

unique thoughtithin uch n end)?it isthis rreducibilityhich ithasalwaysseemedto me more just to respect. The diversity of gestures of thought and writing, the

contradictory obility (without ossible synthesis r sublation)of the analyticalincursions, the diagnoses, excesses, intuitions, the theatre and music of the poeticophilosophical forms, themore than tragic play with masks and proper names-these'aspects' of Nietzsche's work have always appeared tome to defy, from the verybeginningnd tothe ointofmaking them ooksomewhat erisory, ll the 'surveys'and accounts of Nietzsche (philosophical, meta-philosophical, psychoanalytic or

political). As you say, severalvoices can be heard; they eturn ith an insistencewhich, I believe, will never cease, and which demands that these voices are never

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reduced to a 'monology'. In this sense, such voices already resound in their future,in the reserve with which, to use a very Nietzschean figure, they are 'pregnant'.

What willNietzsche's future e? This questionhas always leftme on thevergeofa'general repetition' of Nietzsche.

That said, I have mutatis mutandis a similar feeling for those thinkers to whom I've

apparently devoted more lengthy analyses. What I've just said about Nietzsche, Iwould also say about Plato, Hegel, Husserl, Freud, Blanchot, and so on. My writingson them remain fragmentary, oblique, elliptical, open?I hope-to surprise and to thereturn of other voices. And so, your question cannot be answered. Now, what is the

privilege fNietzsche in thisrespect? I don't know:he isperhaps, f them ll, themost mad! Two consequences are to be drawn from this: first through thismadnessthoughtsperhapsunleashedall themore violently ndwith all themore freedom;second, it is unleashed with all the more suffering. As a result, one must forbidoneself-above all, with Nietzsche-to force his name into the straitjacket of an

interpretation that is too strong to be able to account for him, in that it is claiming torecognise the identity of a meaning, of a message, of the unity of a word or of a

particular work.***

Parts one to three of Jacques Derrida's answer is an editorial reconstruction ofhis argumentdue to a technical hitch in therecording.***

First, the accusation of 'Nietzscheanism' makes no sense in itsown terms. As the lastanswer made clear, themore faithful one may claim to be toNietzsche, the less onecan make a claim on the identity of a particular 'feature' of Nietzsche's thought. The

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closer one is to 'Nietzsche', themore one is aware that there is no such thing as theNietzsche-text. This text demands interpretation in the same way that it argues thatthere is no such thing as an entity, only interpretations?active and reactive?of thatentity. 'To be Nietzschean' is a journalistic slogan which cannot cope with the namesand pseudonymsof Nietzsche; its raison d'etre is, ultimately, o conjureawayanxiety.

Second, it iswrong to argue thatNietzsche is irrational and wrong, therefore, to saythat econstructions also irrationalollowing ts assage throughietzsche. This ishopelessly implistic.There aremanymore names inthis istorical onfigurationfwhich deconstruction forms a part than that of Nietzsche. Nietzsche, yes, but alsoHeidegger and Benjamin, and so forth. The term 'irrational' fails totally to come totermswith the 'method' of genealogy. The point will come up again when we discuss

Question Four. Genealogy is an attempt, inNietzsche's eyes, to give account of the

historyf reason. Theremay be problemswith this ccount,itmay at times o tooquickly,but as such,genealogy inscribes tself n the back of reason; itcannotbeaccordingly n irrational rocedureof thinking. The method and purpose ofgenealogy precedes and exceeds such distinctions, re-organising the tradition'sidentifications of what is rational and what is irrational. To accuse either Nietzsche,or those Mnkerspartly nspired y this ccountof reasonof irrationalism,s tofallback into discursive ositionwhich genealogyexceeds.

The thirdpointconcerns he uestion f the iteraryeceptionf deconstructionntheAnglo-American world. Just one remark, here, since the

issue is extremely complex.

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If ithasbeen thecase that econstructionassed initially hroughiterature atherthanPhilosophydepartments,here is a clear reason for this. Literary theory,especially inAmerican, was more ready to listen to the arguments and strategies ofattemptsogetbehindreason'sback thannstitutionalinscriptionsfphilosophy.Thepoliticsof these epartmentsorat least omeof them;thosewhichwere receptive,precisely, to deconstruction) were, in this sense, more philosophical.

JD: Fourthly, you ask in your question what the differences are between deconstructionand destruction. You've said the essential inQuestions Two and Three, so letme addsomething else, the question of originary affirmation. To take up again the threethmkers Nietzsche, Heidegger and Benjamin, it's quite clear that something ishappening at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth forthinking towant to affirm the future. However negative, however destructive one'saccount f thehistoryf theWest mayhavebecomeat this ime, omethingscallingthoughtrom hefuture;t s this all whichmakesboth thepassagevia destruction,and an affirmation within this destruction, absolutely necessary. What do Imean bythis? Before setting up tribunals or criticising particular discourses, schools,

movements or academic tendencies, one must firstly admit that something isperhapshappening to humanity in the cross-over from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuryfor affirmation, for an affirmation of the future or of an opening onto the future, tobe markedwithina discourseof apparent estructionrmourning. Thinkof theproblemofmessianicity nBenjamin, thequestionof thefuture nNietzsche, theprivilege f thefuturalcstasis inHeidegger. These thinkersre all thinkersf thefuture....Now, why is it that any opening onto the future, both yesterday and today,

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passes through what looks like a destruction, a negative destructuration? It's notsimply these three thinkers, either. However important their thought is, they aresymptomsf, spokesmen orsomething hich is taking lace in theworld, at leastin heWest,whichcauses affirmationobe carriedthrough ya devastating pheaval,a sort of revolution which cannot proceed without destruction, without separation orinterruption,rwithoutfidelity.For these thinkersre also thinkersffidelity, frepetition?Eternal Return inNietzsche, the question of Being inHeidegger which,conveyedthroughn initial estruction,spresented y Heideggeras repetition,ndso forth. These thinkers of the future are at the same time thinkers of Eternal Return,of repetition. o,my questionis thefollowing:why is it that his e-affirmationanhave a futureonlythroughhe eismof a destruction? ut this shardly question;rather, t s theexperience fwhat is takinglace, of therevolution hichbearsusalong. One can describe thismovement as a seism, an earthquake, a maelstrom oreven a chaos, and there is a certain truth to this description. For the above arethinkersf theabyss (Abgrund), f chaos, of khaein-that is,where there s anopening, where the mouth gapes and one doesn't know what to say, there there is anexperience of chaos.

***

JD: There are twoquestions inyourQuestionThree. I'll answer them oththroughheproblematic of life. First, yes, I haven't the same approach to Nietzsche as

Heidegger's forreasonsofhistory, f generationsnd of context. I'm notwritingbetween the twoWorld Wars. My major concern is not to prise Nietzsche from Nazi

re-appropriation. My approach is different as well, because I am deeply suspiciousof this kind of manoeuvre. As Imake clear inOtobiographies, it's not by chance that

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Nietzsche could be re-appropriatedyNazism. Heidegger's history fBeing, hismetaphysics, cannot cope with this contamination. My first concern, then, is not to'save* Nietzsche, although I understand why Heidegger wanted to save Nietzsche byshowing hat is thoughtas notsimply philosophy f life.At the ame time, amaware that hequestionof life smuchmore obscure and difficult hanHeideggerclaims. Indeed, if there is one theme in Heidegger's work which makes me veryuneasy, it's the theme of life. I, like everyone, want to be a vigilant reader of the

political isksofbiologismfollowing ts articular se of the oncept f life, ndyetthequestionof life ismuchmore wily thanHeideggermakes out. Heidegger'sgesture s infact xtremelyquivocal: he cannotsaveNietzsche from hebiologismand racism in which theNazis want to enclose him exceptbymaking him ametaphysician; the last of themetaphysicians; that is, by reducing him in turn. I havetried to formalise this scene in several texts: Heidegger saves Nietzsche by losing himand loses him by saving him. I try to read Nietzsche~the thinker of the 'perhaps'(Vielleicht), as he says inBeyond Good and Evil-m a much more suspensive mannerin order to avoid these reductive gestures and affirm something else.

Regarding your second question, I cannot bring together anything whatsoever inNietzsche, whether it concern life or anything else. On the contrary, I am neitherable to, nor want to save Nietzsche. My relation in general to thinkers just doesn'tfollowthis indof logic.Deconstructionannot ose theproblem f the ropernamein terms of levels of allegiance or non-allegiance. There is no trial in this sense.

There are, for example, discursive elements inNietzsche that lend themselves toNazi

re-appropriation; one can discern a lineage from Nietzsche toNazism, and this cannot

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be ignored. At the same time, there are many other elements, sometimes the verysame elements, many other strands of thought, sometimes the same strands, which arefarfrom educible oeither he nterprisefNazism or that fHeidegger. As I'vesaid in Of Spirit19, eidegger's gestureactually capitalises on the worst?thesanctioningfNazism and themetaphysical ounter-reappropriation.t is importantin this context to takeHeidegger's Nietzsche and show that thereare otherpossibilitiesnNietzschewhicharenotprogrammedya historyfmetaphysics, hatthereremoveswhich are stronger, hichgo further hanwhatHeidegger calls thehistory f thecompletion f metaphysics;moves which actuallyput in questionHeidegger himself:his readingof Nietzsche in particular nd his philosophicalorientation in general. Briefly, there exists a reserve in Nietzsche which allows oneto read Heidegger's own thought genealogically.

Perhaps it's a little clearer now what I meant earlier when I spoke of my preferencefor texts which are open, multiple, fragmented. As for Nietzsche, there are partswhich theNazis could take, there re partswhichHeidegger could take nd partswhich resisted Heidegger, which are 'stronger' than Heidegger's thought. Theopenness of the Nietzsche-text does not prevent me at the same time-far from it-from

knowing, eelingndrecalling hat hismultiplicityas a singularityo it; that, espiteeverytJoing,t carriesthename andpseudonyms fNietzsche, that here as been anevent called, among many other names, 'Nietzsche'. I'm concerned to reflect uponthehistorico-theoreticalossibility f this ingularity,oweveropen and chaotic inthepositivesense) it has proved tobe.

***

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JD: So as not to repeat several of your arguments, letme tackle Question Four head-on.I am very unsure that when Nietzsche speaks of a destruction of morality, he isspeaking against any law whatsoever. I believe there to be a relation inNietzsche tothe law-not, obviously, what one calls 'themoral law'--which takes the form of astep ackbehind the thical n rdertoexplain t. 1would call this esturef thought'arche-ethicaT. The move can also be found in Heidegger, in his analyses, for

example, ofGewissen, Bezeugung and Schuldigsein inBeing and Time, which concerna pre-ethical, pre-moral, pre-juridical conscience. Just as Heidegger attempts toreturn to an instance or space of originality which precedes the ethical and therebygives an account of it, so Nietzsche's genealogy of morals can be seen as the effortto get behind the moral and the political. Qua 'genealogy', Nietzsche's gesturecannot fail to re-affirm or promise something which can be called arche-ethical orultra-ethical. This 'something' is of the order of the law or the call (appel); withoutitgenealogywould be impossible.The critique f the useof life s infact arriedout in its name. I'm not just referring, then, to a possible reading of Nietzsche interms of law: the law of which I speak is constinmve of Nietzsche's destruction ofmorality n thefirst lace.

When, forexample,Nietzsche speaksof theprejudicesof philosophers, hen heespies the use f life ehind achphilosopher, e has to setuphisanalysis nderthesign of truth, no longer in the sense of adequatio or aletheia, but in the sense of anopening to the law of truthor to the truth of law. This law-another name for whichis Eternal Return?is the same thing as re-affirmation. Nietzsche's so-calleddestruction ofmorality is, consequently, far from being a destruction of law. On the

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contrary,ietzsche'sgenealogy fmorality mplies naffirmationf law,with all theattendantaradoxesthatbeingbefore the aw (devant a loi) implies.Whatever theseparadoxes,there salways law (// a de la loi). The lawor this must' an, indeed,be read inall theprescriptive odalitiesofNietzsche's discourse.When he speaksof the ifferentierarchiesf force nd of differencef force, here ustalso be law.The reversal of values or their hierarchical ordering presupposes law-hence thefoolish simplicity of aligning Nietzsche's thought with relativism. To answer yourquestion fully, we would need to turn to the problematic of 'value', to Heidegger'scritiquef value in the houghtfNietzscheandofothers, utan interviewsnot theplace to do that.

RB: I'd like to insist on the relationship which you are making between the law,affirmationndpromise, inordertochart ome importantistinctionsithinwhat isoften called 'Contemporary French Thought'. For many readers of Nietzsche, withorwithout eidegger,Nietzsche reducesthe uestionof ethicsto that f life. To doso, he has to return hequestionof ethics to a history fmorality,althoughthishistoryfmorality sultimatelynderpinnedon-historicallyya hierarchyf forcesor puissances. Foucault follows the 'Nietzschean' path of historicisation, activelyforgettingheproblemof lawwhich, as a happy positivist,he cannot considermethodologically.You showedvery arlyon in 'Cogito nd theHistory fMadness'the aporias that such a path leads to. Although the essay does not concern Nietzsche's

philosophy xplicitly,your readingof Foucault's inability o reduce the logos to

history nticipates hat you've just said on the 'method'of genealogy. As for28



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Deleuze and early Lyotard-I am comparing those of you who have represented, formany, a 'corpus' of thought; the name of Nietzsche is obviously not neutral since ithas often served as one important thread which gathers you into this corpus-theyfollow the 'Nietzschean' path of force. By so doing, they certainly prove to be morephilosophicalthanFoucault, but theyseem equally to avoid, even denegate theproblematic of law. Hence their respective readings of force in terms of energy andintensity. For you, italways seemed to be more complicated: like Deleuze, you argueinyourearly essay 'Force and Signification' hatforce inNietzsche is always adifferenceetweenforces,you show that his ifferenceannotbe historicised; utyou also argue at the end of that essay--and what you've just said I believe to be aradicalisation of your earlier argument-that force and law are inextricable. Could youspeak more of this complexity in terms of what you are calling today 'the promise'?

Take as an example the passage inOn theGenealogy ofMorals where Nietzsche says,to gloss: 'Up to now philosophers have always believed-and this prejudice constitutesthem?in the logic of opposition or contradiction, that two contradictory things cannotget along with each other?hence the contradiction or dialectic which will try toreconcile these contraries. Now, however, philosophers must not only learn towelcome contradiction as such, learn to understand that contraction is not reallycontradictory; we must also come to accept a logic of 'perhaps' inwhich the so-calledcontradictions neither his orthat, utperhaps omethinglse. This logic oncernschance and the future. The future can only be of the nature of 'perhaps', so

philosophy has never been able to accept the future...'

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At this point Nietzsche announces a philosopher of the future, a philosopher of'perhaps', saying thatphilosophers have been like this or thatup to now, but that soonthere will come a new philosopher-and this is what he means by 'new'-who willtrunk the 'perhaps' dangerously ('this dangerous perhaps', he calls it). This examplethere are many others-shows thatNietzsche's demolition, his reversal of all values,hiscritique ndgenealogy realwaysmade in thenameofafuturewhich is romised.The promise doesn't come over and above the critique, as a post-face at the end. Thepromise nspires he ritique n thefirstlace. This newphilosopher s lreadythere,alreadyannouncedthroughheway inwhichNietzschepresents imself, ven inhismosthubristicndhyperbolicmoments. The presentationhows that e partakes fthepromisehimself, hat hepromise snotsomethinghat nehears rom lsewhere;like all promises, itmust be assumed. For a promise to be assumed, someone must

be there who is sensitive to the promise, who is able to say 'I am the promise, I'mthe one to promise, I'm the one who is promising, and I am promising the coming ofa new philosopher.' This means that the one who is promising is already the promiseor isalmostalreadythe romise,that he romise s imminent. his reflectionponimminence-the category of imminence together with that of 'perhaps'?is what bearsthis promise. I'm not using the term 'promise' in the sense thatHeidegger would useit, that of a god who would come to save us, but in the sense of the promise that hereI am, that hat I'm doing, I'm doinghere, in thistexthere, saying erformative^what I'm saying.

There is a promise, then, in the very move of genealogy, in itsmost destructive,

'negative' moments, and this promise has to be attended to, has to be theorisedas far

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as possible. Only in thisway can its effects be negotiated in an interesting manner.These effects are everywhere. Take, since you referred to it,Nietzsche's analysis offorce s thedifferenceetweenforces. The analysis,notably nOn theGenealogyofMorals, is always commanded by an attention to a possible reversal in the logicengagedwith. Nietzsche isfascinatedintriguednd alarmed)by theway inwhichreactivity causes the weakest to become the strongest, by the fact that the greatest

weakness becomes stronger than the greatest strength. It's the case with Platonism,Judaism nd Christianity.This law of inversion s, of course,what makes thepromise just as easily very strong as very weak, very strong in its very weakness. Assoon as there s thisreversibility,his rinciple f inversion,ietzschehimself annotprevent the most puny weakness being at the same time the most vigorous strength.Hence this logic of force bows to a law stronger than that of force. The logic offorcerevealswithin its logica law that s strongerhanthisvery logic. We arewitnessingherea virtualityhat scapeswhat isnormally ttributedo theauthorityof Nietzsche's name or Nietzsche's discourse. In other words, this discourse is alsothemostdisarmed nddisarming.When Nietzsche says that hestrong ave been

made slaves by theweak, thismeans that the strong are weak, thatNietzsche comesto the rescue of the strong because they are weaker than the weak. In a certain sense,by comingto the id of strength,ietzsche is comingto the id ofweakness, of anessential weakness. It is in this essential weakness that one can locate the place of the'arche-ethics', of the 'law' which Imentioned earlier. One must defend theweakest

who are pregnant with the future, because it is theywho are the strongest. Here theoscillating lay-one which is asmuchpoliticalandmoral as it isphilosophical~isdifficulto stop: to speak in thenameof thestrongestnNietzsche is also to speak

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in the name of theweakest. One can always argue, just as with Heidegger, that aparticular discourse of Nietzsche is and-Judaic, anti-Platonic, anti-Christian and

hyper-Judaic, hyper-Platonic, hyper-Christian. There will always be someone to say:'Yes,yourdeconstructionf theJudaic ndChristian spectstoStPaul ismade inthename of a message that s hidden inJudaism, nChristianity, n Islam, even intwentieth-century thought. You are 'hyper', you speak 'hyper' at the very momentthat you are speaking 'against'. You are in the process of developing a discourse thatis hyper-Jewish, hyper-Christian against these very instances.' And, in a sense, this

person is right.

There are many indices in Nietzsche which show the above machine of

hyperbolisationobe constantlytwork; it's thisprocess of hyperbolisationhatrestarts the machine. And the point doesn't just apply, of course, toNietzsche.

RB: To take p thewordingofQuestionFour, youonce said in f Grammatology hatnehad to suspendthe thical instance f violence inorder to repeatthegenealogyofmorals. We'll come to the problematic of violence in a moment. In the context of

your response to this question and of your more recent strategies of reading, couldone say thatthisrepetition f genealogy consists in showing that there is the'messianic' inNietzsche.

JD: Yes, so long as one follows through my re-inscription of the term. In, for example,Specters ofMarx, I distinguish hemessianicfromany formofmessianism. Themessianic concerns a notion of the future which precedes?is the very condition of-the

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future constituting messianism. The messianic is heterogeneous tomessianism in the

precisesensethat hehorizonof themessianic ismdeterminable.Messianismwillsaturatehis bsenceof horizonby turningt nto horizon. Not onlywould I wanttoshowthis hrough fairlybstractanalysis, n the asisofall thepredicates hichseem tome tomake up the concept of messiamcity-annunciation of an unpredictablefuture, relation to the other, affirmation, promise, revolution, justice, and so on--, butless abstractly, more immediately, I would want to show the difference in, forexample, the tone of Nietzsche, which is prophetic and messianic. Also SprachZarathustra is a counter-messianic book; but, of course, any counter-messianic textis at the same time messianic. Even when Nietzsche laughs at prophetic and

messianic preaching, he nevertheless assumes the same tone to laugh at it. Hepresents himself as the counter-messiah; theAntichrist ismessianic, Ecce Homo is amessianic text.

RB: Yes, but isn't this where one could say thatNietzsche remains 'Platonic'? After all,hisprophetic onecouldbe consideredmetaphysical,revealing ietzsche's inabilitytomourn the tradition in his very move against it.

JD: Yes, it's that also.

RB: Perhapswe can resituate hiscomplication-the ifference etween twokinds offuture, one an absolute futurity that allows for the future, the other a temporal horizoncalled 'the future' which actually closes off the future-when we come to Questions

Seven and Eight. Can we turn in themeantime to Question Five?

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***JD: Going straight o theend of yourquestion, I would hesitateto say that 'm not

proposing philosophy f decision. I believe that fthere s sucha things justiceor responsibility,here ustbe a decision. However, it sonly theimplicationf thedecisionwhich is irreducible.Hence I always say:The decision, ifthere s one,must interrupt causality, be revolutionary, and so on\ 1 say 'if there is one', notbecause I doubt that there is one, but because, simply, I don't know if there is one.A decision, if there s sucha thing, sneverdeterminablen terms f knowledge(savoir). One cannot determine a decision. Whenever someone says, 'A decision was

made there and then. I know this to be so, and I also know what the decision was',that person is mistaken. A decision is an event which is not subsumable under a

concept, a theoretical judgement or a determinant form of knowledge (savoir). If itcould ever be subsumed, there would no longer be the need for a decision. A

decision, if there is one, disappears in its appearance. Thus the implication or

presuppositionf the ecision isa particular ype fpresupposition.The same thingappliestoall concernscloselyrelated othe roblematic fa decision. For example,responsibility,reedomnd usticecan neverform he bjectof a determinantormofknowledge. This isnot to say thatthey reobscureor occult; they're imply othomogeneous with theoretical knowledge or determinant judgement, with what makes

somethingresent s an objector theme.

That a decision cannot become an object or a theme for knowledge is the very site ofviolence. You recallat thebeginning fQuestionFour theviolenceaccompanyingthe nstitutionf any law?thisinstitutionanbe nothing ut violentnotbecause it's

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a violence accompanying the transgression of the law, but because there is as yet nolaw. What precedes the law cannot not be violent for the law. The violent movementwhich imposes he aw is a violencewhich is bothasymmetricalndheterogeneousto every transgression that could then be identified in the name of the law. Once thisinstitution has taken place, one can of course always contest-and that's the history ofall revolutions-the imposition of the law, argue that itwas violent and unjust, seekreparation, revolt against it, and so forth. Such dispute is necessarily endless. If,however, the laws in question, whether they be general or particular, are violent forthe reason adduced above, and are deconstructible?that is, they can be considered tobe an historical artifact which is suitable for analysis and deconstruction-that in thename of which one deconstructs is not in the last instance deconstructible. I call thisureducibility 'justice'. In Specters ofMarx I oppose this concept of justice-asdisjunction, as 'being out of joint', as what is always already out of joint'?to whatHeidegger says of dike which he opposes-and, in a certain sense, rightly so?to whatone commonly alls justice. This justicehe prises from whole history f thejuridical and of juridical representation.The conceptof justicewhich I amelaborating s opposed to theHeideggerianone of dike as joining,as Fug, asbringing-together; it suggests that justice is, and must be, a discordance. As soon asjustice implies relationto another, t supposesan interruption,dis-joining,disjunction or being-out-of-joint, which is not negative; an out-of-jointness which isnotdeconstructible,hich is ustice s deconstruction,s thepossibledeconstructionof anydetermined aw (droit).

RB: You beganyourresponse othis uestion y stating irmlyhat twould bewrongnot35



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tosee yourphilosophy s a philosophy fdecision,and all you've justsaidpointstotheway inwhichyour thinkingould be seen as an endless and varied reflectionphilosophical, thical, olitical?on theirreducibilityf themoment fdecision. I amaware that oth n the ontinent nd in theAnglo-American orld this spectofyourwork causes confusion, so I would like us to stay with my question for a moment.There seem to be at least two criticisms levelled against deconstruction concerning theproblematic f decision;a problematic, hich, as you say, impliesthat f freedom,of responsibility and of justice?the stakes are consequently high. First, your workondifferances seentobe concernedwith a restlessmovement fdeferral, ith theremainder that any work on paradox implies, and that, as a result, you are littleinterested in themoment of arrest, themoment of decision. Following this sort ofargument, your philosophy cannot, given its very merits, constitute a philosophy ofdecision. This second criticism, which one hears a lot in theAnglo-American world,runs something like this: 'When it comes to the question of violence, to the crucialrole violence plays in Derrida's thought, one sees that Derrida is followingHeidegger's fidelityomiriking oclosely, that is "originaryiolence" is infactmystificationf something hatneeds tobe eitherdeveloped,or accountedfor, inhistorical nd social terms, hat his iolenceof the awbefore the law is a violencewhich is blind. Derrida's understandingforiginary iolence thus eavesus blind inturn s to thespecificityf each and every udgement'.

In theworst cases bothcriticisms an end up sayingthe same thing;namely, thatdeconstruction leaves the notion of justice undetermined, and therefore prey to themost evil re-appropriations. How would you respond?

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JD: First, I do notaccept theterm blind'. The accusationderivesultimatelyrommyargument that a decision, if there is one, cannot take place without the undecidable,it annot e resolvedthroughnowledge.Given thenature f themisunderstanding,letme sum p this oint simplynd in pedagogicalmanner.As to decisionwhichis guidedby a form fknowledge un savoir)?if I know, forexample,what thecauses and effects of what I'm doing are, what the programme is for what I'm doing,then there is no decision; it's a question, at themoment of judgement, of applying a

particular causality. When Imake a machine work, there is no decision; themachineworks, the relation is one of cause and effect. If I know what's to be done, ifmytheoretical analysis of the situation shows me what's to be done-do this to cause that,etc-then there is no moment of decision, simply the application of a body ofknowledge, of, at the very least, a rule or norm. For there to be a decision, thedecisionmustbe heterogeneousoknowledge s such. Even if1spendyears lettinga decision mature, even if I amass all possible knowledge concerning the scientific,political nd historical ield nwhich thedecision is tobe taken, hemoment f thedecisionmustbeheterogeneousothis ield, fthe ecision isnot tobe theapplicationof a rule. If there s sucha things a decision?thepointmustalwaysbe recalledthen a decision must first be expounded. Of course I'm not advocating that a decisionends up deciding anything at any moment. One must know as much as possible, one

must deliberate, reflect, let things mature. But, however long this process ofmaturing lasts, however careful one is in the theoretical preparation of the decision,the nstant f thedecision, ifthere s tobe a decision,mustbe heterogeneousothisaccumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. In this sense onlymust the person taking the decision not know everything. Even if one knows

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everything, the decision, if there is one, must advance towards a future which is notknown,which cannot e anticipated. Ifone anticipates hefutureby predeterminingthe nstant f decision, then ne closes itoff, ustas one closes itoff*f there snoanticipation, no knowledge 'prior to' the decision. At a given moment, there mustbe an excessorheterogeneityegarding hatone knows for decisiontotake lace,to constitute an event.

RB: This excess is theexperience f death?

JD: Yes, indirectly,utthe oint an'tbe followed phere, itwould take oomuchtime!Letme sticktoanswering ourprevious uestion. The preceding oesn't imply hatthedecision is blind. On the ontrary, decisionmustbe as lucid s possible. Andyet, however lucid it is, as a decision, itmust advance where it cannot see. Thisblindness snot a lackof knowledge-1repeat, it has nothing odo withwhat onecould inprinciple ome toknow-it is thevery tructurefanydecision,what relatesall decisions, immediately,o theundecidable. If there s no 'experience' f theundecidabieat themomentof decision, then thedecisionwill be nothing ut themechanical application of a rule. At a given moment, I must not know whether it isbetter odo this r that, must inthis ensebe radically ignorant' or there obe adecision. All that am sayinghere isnothing ut themodest analysis f the onceptofdecision; inotherwords, it s implied y the oncept f decision itself.Now, asImentioned earlier, as for knowing whether a decision has ever taken place, given the

very concept of decision, I can never know, in the sense that it is structurally

impossible orme tohave an objectiveknowledgeof it. It's the amething orthe

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concept of responsibility. Whoever says that he is responsible, that he has assumed'his' responsibilities has mistaken themeaning of responsibility. One can never knowif one has been responsible or not, one cannot have a good conscience: 'I took therightdecision', 'I fulfilled y responsibilities', Mydebtsarepaid', 'This iswheremy (or your) responsibility lies', and so on~all such statements are contrary to theessence of responsibility as well as to the essence of a decision. This is whyresponsibilitysmfinite. It s infiniteecauseof thefmitude f the newho 'decides'or who 'takes responsibility'.

To answeryourquestionhead-on, Iwould quite simplysay that ot only is thelanguage I am using neither anti-ethical nor anti-political, not only is ita language thatassumesthemoment f decision; it is literallyhemost ethical ndpoliticalway oftaking eriously hat is implied y the ery oncepts f decision ndofresponsibility.In this ense,what I'm proposing ould notbemore ethicalor political! Let meconclude this point by saying that those who accuse deconstruction of irresponsibility,of blindness, of arbitrary violence or of indecision or hesitation are-according to theradical structuref thedecision that have developed-enacting hevery thing f

which they are blaming the accused. To show this in detail~and following all thatI've said about the essence of a decision, this detail is crucial-would again demand

more time and care than an interview can allow.

RB: You've nevertheless made it very clear than an experience of the undecidable oraporetic (I am also dunkinghere of your essay on aporia in thevery recent ePassage des Fronrieres7*) is die passage through which a decision must pass if it is

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to come close to being a good judgement?

JD: -If it is tocomeclose tobeinga decision, ifthere s sucha things a decision. Notonlywill one neverknowwhether decision is good or bad, onewill neverknowwhether here as a decision,whether decisiontookplace as such. And this s theonly condition for there to have been a decision

RB: -To anticipatemy last uestionshere,since it'sappropriate.This experience f theaporia, which can appear to many people to be a refusal of the necessary relationbetween a decision and a particular 'moment' in time, this experience allows, in youreyes, for the future, it allows the future to arrive ay a future (and not a futurepresent), and so it allows for the future of decision (a future inwhich decisions can'take place' and decisions inwhich the future is not anticipated). I would want tostress ere thatyou are speaking f undecidabilityt amoment in timewhenmoreand more 'decisions' are closing off the future.

JD: To allow thefuture oarrive s thefuture-if,notherwords, thefuturespreciselythat.. .thefuture?is not to be understood in a passive sense. This relation to the futureis active, it s affirmative;ndyet,however ctive it s, therelation salso a passiveone. Otherwise thefuture ill notbe thefuture.As fordecisionswhich close thefuture off, are they indeed 'decisions'?

RB: Perhapswe can comeback to thiswhenwe discussagainyourunderstandingf the'promise'. Shall we turn now toQuestion Six?

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***JD: My response will be rapid and minimal. I don't believe thatNietzsche's critique of

democracy concerns democracy in general, certainly not what 1 call 'the democracyto come'. It seems tome that Nietzsche isolates several traits particular to democracyas it xisted nhis time, in therwords,he focuseson a highly etermined orm fdemocracy. What he says about this particular democracy is sometimes apposite and

just; he can touch the very springs?necessarily hypocritical and undemocratic--of whatmoves forward under the banner of democracy. But--and this takes us immediatelyback to the 'hyper-ethical' procedure of genealogy-this critique is made in the nameof what Iwould call 'a democracy to come', which is a quite different concept of

democracy from the one criticised by Nietzsche. What we were saying earlier aboutthe call and the promise opens up a notion of democracy which, whilst havingsomethingncommonwithwhatwe understandbydemocracy oday, otably n the

West, is reducible neither to the contemporary reality of 'democracy' nor to the idealof democracymforming hisreality r fact. I have highlightedhis ifference tlength in Specters ofMarx. Since, inmy eyes, Nietzsche criticises a particular formof democracy in the name of 'a democracy to come', I don't consider Nietzsche tobe an enemy of democracy in general. Those who say so are going far too fast; it is

they ho have little nderstandingf responsibility,f thecomplexityf the thicaland thepolitical; it is they ho are flatteningut thefuture.Nietzschewill alwaysget the etter f them.No, although ne cannot ubscribe oall that ietzsche sayswhen he lambasts the democracy of his day?far from it-, I believe Nietzsche to haveespied particular risks inwhat he foregrounded under the name of 'democracy', in thevarious traits of society that rallied round the principle of 'democracy'. There are at

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the same time critical and genealogicalmotifs inNietzsche which appeal to ademocracy o come. Since all of this as tobe shownthroughhetext, t'sdifficultto improvise urther. et thisbe theprotocolof an answertoyourquestion.

RB: QuestionSeven, then.

JD: First, I certainly believe that the contaminations discussed in this passage areabsolutely undeniable. I defy anyone to show a political discourse or posture todaywhich escapes this awof contamination.The onlyway todo so is in theform f(de)negationVerneinung)21,he aw of contaminationan onlybe (de)negated. Ifit is true that these contaminations are inevitable, that one cannot side-step its law

whatever one attempts to do, then responsibility cannot consist in denying or

(de)negating contamination, in trying to 'save' a line of thought or action from it. Onthecontrary, tmust consist inassumingthis aw, inrecognising tsnecessity, nworking romwithin themachine, by formalising ow contaminationorks and byattemptingoact accordingly.Our veryfirstresponsibilitys torecognisethat histerrifyingrogrammesatworkeverywherend toconfront heproblemhead-on;notto flee itbydenying tscomplexity, ut

to think tas such.

Second, thismeans thatthepoliticalgestureswhich one will make will, like allpolitical gestures, be accompanied necessarily by discourse. Discursivity takes time,it implies several sentences, it cannot be reduced to a single moment or point. Oneach occasion onewill have tomake complexgesturestoexplain that ne is acting,despite contamination, in this particular way, because one believes that it is better

to

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do this rather than that, that a particular act chosen is in such and such a situationmore likely to do such and such than another possible act. These gestures are

anything but pragmatic, they are strategic evaluations which attempt tomeasure upto the formalisation of the machine. To make such evaluations, one has to passthrough thought-there is no distinction here between thought and action, theseevaluations reactionsof thought.Whoever attemptsojustify ispoliticalchoiceorpursuea political linewithoutthought?inhesenseof a thinkinghich exceedsscience,philosophy nd technics-withouthinkinghat calls for thinkingn this

machine, this person isn't being, inmy eyes, politically responsible. Hence one needsthought, one needs to think more than ever. Thinking's task today is to tackle, to

measure itself against, everything making up this programme of contamination. Thisprogramme forms the history of metaphysics, it informs thewhole history of politicaldetermination, of politics as it was constituted in Ancient Greece, disseminatedthroughoutheWest and finallyxported othe ast andSouth. Ifthepolitical isn'tthought in this radical sense, political responsibility will disappear. Iwouldn't go sofar s to say that his hought as becomenecessary nlytoday;rather, odaymorethan ever, one must think thismachine in order to prepare for a political decision, ifthere is such a thing, within this space of contamination. Very simply, then,what I'mtrying odo is topreparefor sucha decision by tackling hemachine or law ofcontamination. For reasons that should now be clear, what I say is always going torun therisk of being taken in an unfavourablelight, it cannotfail to lead tomisunderstandings, according to the very same law of contamination. There's no

way-out.As tothe riticismsfdeconstructionbroughtp earlier, ne has indeed oassume therisk of being misunderstood, continuing to think inmodest termswhat is

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after all exceedingly ambitious, in order to prepare for these responsibilities?if theyexist.

In the assageyouquote I call these esponsibilitiesunprecedented'inedites).Whatdoes thistermmean? Inyour terms, hat is their time'? Rather thanimplyingheroicpathosoforiginality, heterm estifieso thefact that e find urselves inanunprecedented situation. After recent events?whether one gives them the name ofNietzsche, of Heidegger, of the SecondWorld War, of theHolocaust, of thedestructibilityf humanity y itsown technical esources-it is clear thatwe findourselves in an absolutely unprecedented space. For this space one needs equallyunprecedented eflectionsn responsibility,n theproblematics f decision andaction. To say this is not a piece of speculative ubris. It simply cknowledgeswhere we are. We need the unprecedented; otherwise there will be nothing, purerepetition... .The unprecedented is, of course, highly dangerous. Once on these pathsof thought,ne is liabletoget shot tby peoplewho are in hurry o interpretexts,who call you a neo-Nazi, a nihilist, a relativist, a mysticist, or whatever. But ifonedoesn't take such risks, then one does nothing, and nothing happens. What I'm

saying sverymodest:without isk, there snothing.

RB: Why didyouwrite 'absolutely nprecedented'?

JD: It was just a form of emphasis. Of course, the unprecedented is never possiblewithout epetition,here sneversomethingbsolutely nprecedented,otallyriginalor new; or rather, the new can only be new, radically new, to the extent that

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something new isproduced, that is,where there ismemory and repetition. The newcannot be invented without memory or repetition. So, two things: first, there can beno break, no experience of the break which does not presuppose a non-break, whichdoes not presuppose memory. Second, contamination follows from this iterabilitywhich isconstitutivef theunprecedented.ontaminationhappens ecause iterabilityinhabits rom thevery first hat is not yet thought.One has to confront hisparadoxical logictobe able to think he nthought.

RB: Let me take an example related towhat you've just been saying about repetition. Youhave mentioned Specters ofMarx several times inwhat you've been saying, so an

example taken from thiswork ismore than appropriate. In this combative, ironically'timely' text, you speak about our responsibility before the unprecedented. One

particularly interesting aspect of the book concerns what you call a 'newInternationar. Iwon't gather together all the threads that determine the conceptualstrategy of this term in the book. Suffice it to say that Specters ofMarx remainsfaithful to a notion of mtemationality in Marx which, you argue, Marx himselfbetrayed yontologising, mong therthings, hetemporallyndefinitetructurefrevolution and the 'supplementary' relationship between humanity and itsproductions.This new Internationalsa configurationfbonds (liens)whichare inthe rocessofforming, which go beyond citizenship, the nation-state, and national sovereignty, butwhich are neither working towards nor anticipating a cosmopolitan superstate. Thisnotion of a new International forms part of the book's strategy to prepare the groundfor a new socio-political critique of contemporary political discourses... .With Specters

ofMarx inmind,howwould you respond o thefollowing?45



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Before the inadequate structures of international law, we are at present witnessing tworepetitions.The first s that f thenation-statesfEuropewhich find themselvesconfrontednce more by regional nd ethnicdeterminationsf a people's identity.Like all repetitions,owever,there sa difference: odaysnationalisms nd fascismsare produced in, and constitute hemselves ithin, a world that s technologicallydifferento that f the 1920s and 1930s, a world that smuch smaller andmore'international' due to the accelerated processes of technicisation. The difference hasambivalentimplicationsor nyform fnationalism: herepetitionfnationalisms scertainlyated,andyetit is ll themoredangerous nd singular orbeingdated. Theother repetition is that of the nation-states which as nation-states are constitutivelyunable to think, and practice, a notion of international law. For international lawremains determined by the concept of national sovereignty, a principle which isstopping, or xample,theUnitedNations fromacting ffectivelyeyondthewishesof one or otherof itspermanentmembers. These tworepetitions,lthoughof adifferent nature, are tending to paralyse inventive moves. How, then, do youconceive the relation between this emerging new International and the presentsluggishnessf institutionsf internationalaw?

JD: The 'International' I'm interested in would indeed exceed the concepts of nation, ofstate, and of nation-state which determine the concept of 'international'. I believe thatwe are at present involved in a process which demands an accelerated transformationof international law. Every event in the contemporary world shows internationalinstitutions to be powerless, dependent, as they are, for theirmeans of enforcementon the ecisionsofparticular, owerful ation-stateshich curtail he eneralwill of

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such institutions. The reason for this is clear: the very concepts upon which themissions of international institutions are built~I especially have inmind the UnitedNations-need to be rethought, deconstructed. All these concepts belong to aWesterntraditionf thepoliticalwhich impliesthepolice, thesovereigntyf thestate,themodernconcept f thenation-state. his notion f thepoliticalisbeing completelyundermined?technically, economically and politically. International law, internationalinstitutions need to be rethought and thereby improved. The process is irifinite and

mtenninable, but it is absolutely necessary.

In this respect I have nothing against international institutions. I believe one has toaccept their history, agree to their perfectibility, and so on. That said, we are at thesame time witnessing something like an aspiration towards-1 don't dare to use the

word 'solidarity' or 'community' as these words have too much of a particularresonance-a 'bond' (lien) (the term is only suitablegiven its high level ofabstraction), a bond between-here, again, I don't want to use a term like 'citizens ofthe world' since it's a concept excessively marked by a tradition of the cosmopolitan,not 'political subjects', nor even 'human beings'-let's say, then, 'singularities', abond between singularities. There is today an aspiration towards a bond betweensingularitiesll over theworld. This bond not only extendsbeyondnations andstates, such as they are composed today or such as they are in the process ofdecomposition, but extends beyond the very concepts of nation or state. For example,if I feel insolidarity odaywith thisparticular lgerianwho iscaught etweentheF.I.S. and the Algerian state, or this particular Croat, Serbian or Bosnian, or this

particular South African, this particular Russianor Ukrainian, or whoever,~it's not

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a feeling of one citizen towards another, it's not a feeling peculiar to a citizen of dieworld, as ifwe were all potential or imaginary citizens of a great state. No, whatbindsme to thesepeople is somethingifferenthanmembership f aworld nationstate r of an internationalcommunityxtendingndefinitelyhelimits fwhat onestill calls today 'the nation-state'. What binds me to them-and this is the point; thereis a bond, but this bond cannot be contained within traditional concepts of community,obligation or responsibility-is a protest against citizenship, a protest againstmembership of a political configuration as such. This bond is, for example, a formofpolitical solidaritypposed to thepoliticalqua a politicstied todie nation-state.'The democracy to come' is a democracy whose bonds are no longer those that canbe deducedfromthe onceptofdemocracy, uchas this oncepthas beenborn anddeveloped in thehistory of theWest. The concept of democracy has always been tiedto the city, to the state,

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