Denouncing Stalin, but practising Stalinism: Two aspects of the Yugoslav Case

Sran Grbi

Faculty of Philosophy , University of Zagreb

Abstract:

This paper examines two aspects of Stalinism that are relevant for the Yugoslav

policies in the first half of the 1950s. The first part explains the rise and fall of Milovan

ilas and the impact of his writings following the Sixth Congress of the LCY. His case

demonstrates and explains the limits of internal democratization of the Yugoslav system.

The impact of 'Titoism' on the political developments in Eastern Europe which

culminated with the Soviet intervention in Hunary is analyzed in the second part of this

paper. These two aspects were crucial for the long-term policies in Yugoslavia, as well as

for the Yugoslav foreign policy. They clearly defined the nature of the LCY and the

character of Tito's rule. Moreover, because of these developments Yugoslavia embarked

on a completely differnt foreign political course.

Keywords: Josip Broz Tito, Milovan ilas, LCY, de-Stalinization, Sixth Party Congress

of the LCY, Nikita Khrushchev, Hungarian uprising 1956

1

Denouncing Stalin, but Practising Stalinism: Two Aspects of the Yugoslav Case Introduction

The term Stalinism is used to denote an entire period of world history, communist

theory and social practices. Stalinism will be remembered primarily as a form of

totalitarian dictatorship in some way removed from the workers paradise envisaged by

Marx. While the distance between Marxs aims and the realities of Stalinism is evident, it

remains to be seen what Stalinism really meant and what was its main field of practice.

The Historical Dictionary of Marxism explains that the term Stalinism refers both to

the nature of the Soviet Union under Josef Stalins rule and to the interpretation of

Marxism sanctioned by Stalin and promulgated by the Soviet Union while he was in

power. Never official terms, Stalinism and Stalinist gained currency only after

Stalins death and, particularly, after his denunciation by Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th

Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. Both terms have tended to

be used in a derogatory way to describe a repressive, dictatorial and totalitarian regime

and a crude, dogmatic ideology1. Other authors went further and tried to unveil many

faces of Stalinism. One recent work tried to identify and divide various aspects of the

term itself. Therefore, we can speak about: Stalinism and power, Stalinism and foreign

threat, Stalinism as a civilization, Stalinism as state violence, everyday Stalinism etc2.

This paper will focus only on two aspects of Stalinism which will be analyzed within the

Yugoslav framework. These are: Stalinism as a way of conducting foreign policy and

Stalinism as a political practice.

1 David Walker and Daniel Gray, Historical dictionary of Marxism, The Scarecrow Press, 200.: p. 305. 2 ed. David Hoffmann, Stalinism the Essential Readings, Wiley-Blackwell, 2002; For a more Marxist approach on the subjest see David McLellan, Marxism after

Marx, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998.

2

Yugoslavia was the first communist country to say no to Stalin and the Soviet

Union3 and therefore presents a specifically interesting phenomenon. With the Yugoslav-

Soviet split in 1948.4 Tito became the arch-heretic of the communist movement5.

Naturally, the Yugoslavs saw themselves as champions of anti Stalinism although they

adopted similar techniques when dealing with internal enemies. One can say that Titos

reckoning with pro-Stalin members of the CPY, founding of the high-security

prison/labor camp on the island of Goli Otok and the autocratic character of his

leadership made for a somewhat peculiar soft Stalinist practice. One should also note

that liberalization and reforms that followed the split made Yugoslavia very different

from other communist countries. Although at first the split prompted the regime to

rededicate itself to the Soviet practice of socialism6 there was nothing that could compare

to Gulags in Yugoslavia, there were no full scale purges after 1949., there were serious

efforts to decentralize the apparatus, even the political commissars were removed from

the army7. These efforts proved that something new was brewing in Yugoslavia at the

beginning of 1950.

3 Most of the popular books on the subject published in communist Yugoslavia stressed

Yugoslav defiance. Some of the titles are: NO to Stalinism, Informbiro-Yugoslavia said NO etc.

4 About the split see: Ivo Banac, Sa Staljinom protiv Tita, Globus, Zagreb 1990; Vladimir Dedijer, Izgubljena bitka J. V. Staljina, Liburnija, Rijeka, 1982; Leo Mates, Meunarodni odnosi socijalistike Jugoslavije, Nolit, Beograd 1976: pp. 102-13.; Radovan Radonji, Sukob KPJ sa Kominformom, Politike teme, Zagreb 1975; Raymond Pearson, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998:pp. 23-44.; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, Harvard University Press, 1996: pp. 110-37.;

5 It is important to stress that Tito's heresy' was the first serious affair in the world communist movement. While Trotsky's 'Forth International' was significant from a socialist point of view, only the coming of Cold War created an international setting where such events presented first-rate political issues.

6 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia As History Twice there was a Country, Cambridge University Press, 1996: p. 246.

7 R. J. Crampton, The Balkans since the Second World War, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, 2002: p. 114.

3

Yugoslav international position in the early 1950s

The leaders of Yugoslavia found themselves in both political and economic

isolation at the beginning of 1950. The break with USSR and disputes with the US and

their western allies over the city of Trieste(also claimed by Italy) put Tito in a very

uncomfortable position. However, there were already some signs of warmer relations

with the West. In 1949 Tito closed the Yugoslav border to the Greek Communist forces

and thus contributed to their defeat8. Slowly but surely the American administration

started to think in different terms about Yugoslavia9. In 1949 Truman decided to offer

economical assistance to Yugoslavia and thus 'keep Tito afloat'10. Then in October of the

same year Yugoslavia was elected to the Security Council seat of the United Nations.

This accomplishment greatly boosted Yugoslav morale as it was meant to send a very

clear political message to Stalin11. In the next two years American military help was also

realized and the talks about establishing military ties were well underway. These moves

marked the beginning of the so-called 'wedge strategy' which was probably best defined

by the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Robert Perkins:

'What we are concernd with is containing, or driving a wedge, if you will, into

Communist totalitarianism, and in containing in particular the Stalin Breed of

Communism, or doctrine, or whatever you want to call it. We feel very strongly that it is

essential that Tito, having made the break with Stalin, will succeed in that break because

we can only break it down by driving wedges into it, and that is one of the most

important wedges that has appeared.'12

8 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War, Frontline state, 1952 1967,

Routledge, 2006: p. 8. 9 There was a missed chance right after the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. The american

administration looked very unfavourably on Tito and some even thought that the split is just a tactical manoeuvre to confuse the US administration.

10 Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997: p. 76-7.

11 Ibid:75.-76.; .; Tvrtko Jakovina, Ameriki komunistiki saveznik, Profil, Zagreb 2003: pp. 287-8.

12 Lorraine M. Lees, op. cit.: p. 96.

4

The 'wedge strategy would have far-reaching consequences in the following

years.

At the same time Eastern Europe was in the middle of 'anti-Titoist' purges and

many high ranking Communists were sentenced or executed13. After discarding the

prospect of military intervention Stalin was bent on restraining 'Titoism' within the

borders of Yugoslavia. One consequence was the inauguration of a far harsher attitude

toward the Soviet Unions East European satellites. Integral to the new approach was a

series of celebrated cases, all closely orchestrated by Stalin, against enemies within the

leadership of the socialist states. With the help of advisers from Moscow, a case was

fabricated against the former Hungarian Minister of Internal Affairs, Laszlo Rajk,

charging that he had headed a spy organization. Two months after Rajks execution,

Traicho Kostov, the former Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, was also tried

and executed. These trials were matched by analogous arrests in Poland, Romania,

Czechoslovakia, and Albania14.

With Yugoslavia and the USSR both being Communist countries one needn't have

waited to long for the escalation of conflic