Denouncing Stalin, but practising Stalinism: Two aspects of the Yugoslav Case

Srđan Grbić

Faculty of Philosophy , University of Zagreb

Abstract:

This paper examines two aspects of Stalinism that are relevant for the Yugoslav

policies in the first half of the 1950s. The first part explains the ‘rise and fall’ of Milovan

Đilas and the impact of his writings following the Sixth Congress of the LCY. His case

demonstrates and explains the limits of internal democratization of the Yugoslav system.

The impact of 'Titoism' on the political developments in Eastern Europe which

culminated with the Soviet intervention in Hunary is analyzed in the second part of this

paper. These two aspects were crucial for the long-term policies in Yugoslavia, as well as

for the Yugoslav foreign policy. They clearly defined the nature of the LCY and the

character of Tito's rule. Moreover, because of these developments Yugoslavia embarked

on a completely differnt foreign political course.

Keywords: Josip Broz Tito, Milovan Đilas, LCY, de-Stalinization, Sixth Party Congress

of the LCY, Nikita Khrushchev, Hungarian uprising 1956

1

Denouncing Stalin, but Practising Stalinism: Two Aspects of the Yugoslav Case Introduction

The term Stalinism is used to denote an entire period of world history, communist

theory and social practices. Stalinism will be remembered primarily as a form of

totalitarian dictatorship in some way removed from the workers’ paradise envisaged by

Marx. While the distance between Marx’s aims and the realities of Stalinism is evident, it

remains to be seen what Stalinism really meant and what was its main field of practice.

‘The Historical Dictionary of Marxism’ explains that the term “Stalinism” refers both to

the nature of the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin’s rule and to the interpretation of

Marxism sanctioned by Stalin and promulgated by the Soviet Union while he was in

power. Never official terms, “Stalinism” and “Stalinist” gained currency only after

Stalin’s death and, particularly, after his denunciation by Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th

Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. Both terms have tended to

be used in a derogatory way to describe a repressive, dictatorial and totalitarian regime

and a crude, dogmatic ideology1. Other authors went further and tried to unveil ‘many

faces of Stalinism’. One recent work tried to identify and divide various aspects of the

term itself. Therefore, we can speak about: Stalinism and power, Stalinism and foreign

threat, Stalinism as a civilization, Stalinism as state violence, everyday Stalinism etc2.

This paper will focus only on two aspects of Stalinism which will be analyzed within the

Yugoslav framework. These are: Stalinism as a way of conducting foreign policy and

Stalinism as a political practice.

1 David Walker and Daniel Gray, Historical dictionary of Marxism, The Scarecrow Press, 200.: p. 305. 2 ed. David Hoffmann, Stalinism – the Essential Readings, Wiley-Blackwell, 2002; For a more Marxist approach on the subjest see David McLellan, Marxism after

Marx, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998.

2

Yugoslavia was the first communist country to say no to Stalin and the Soviet

Union3 and therefore presents a specifically interesting phenomenon. With the Yugoslav-

Soviet split in 1948.4 Tito became the arch-heretic of the communist movement5.

Naturally, the Yugoslavs saw themselves as champions of anti Stalinism although they

adopted similar techniques when dealing with internal enemies. One can say that Tito’s

reckoning with pro-Stalin members of the CPY, founding of the high-security

prison/labor camp on the island of Goli Otok and the autocratic character of his

leadership made for a somewhat peculiar ‘soft’ Stalinist practice. One should also note

that liberalization and reforms that followed the split made Yugoslavia very different

from other communist countries. Although at first the split prompted the regime to

rededicate itself to the Soviet practice of socialism6 there was nothing that could compare

to Gulags in Yugoslavia, there were no full scale purges after 1949., there were serious

efforts to decentralize the apparatus, even the political commissars were removed from

the army7. These efforts proved that something new was brewing in Yugoslavia at the

beginning of 1950.

3 Most of the popular books on the subject published in communist Yugoslavia stressed

Yugoslav defiance. Some of the titles are: NO to Stalinism, Informbiro-Yugoslavia said NO etc.

4 About the split see: Ivo Banac, Sa Staljinom protiv Tita, Globus, Zagreb 1990; Vladimir Dedijer, Izgubljena bitka J. V. Staljina, Liburnija, Rijeka, 1982; Leo Mates, Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije, Nolit, Beograd 1976: pp. 102-13.; Radovan Radonjić, Sukob KPJ sa Kominformom, Političke teme, Zagreb 1975; Raymond Pearson, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998:pp. 23-44.; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, Harvard University Press, 1996: pp. 110-37.;

5 It is important to stress that ‘Tito's heresy' was the first serious affair in the world communist movement. While Trotsky's 'Forth International' was significant from a socialist point of view, only the coming of Cold War created an international setting where such events presented first-rate political issues.

6 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia As History – Twice there was a Country, Cambridge University Press, 1996: p. 246.

7 R. J. Crampton, The Balkans since the Second World War, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, 2002: p. 114.

3

Yugoslav international position in the early 1950s

The leaders of Yugoslavia found themselves in both political and economic

isolation at the beginning of 1950. The break with USSR and disputes with the US and

their western allies over the city of Trieste(also claimed by Italy) put Tito in a very

uncomfortable position. However, there were already some signs of warmer relations

with the West. In 1949 Tito closed the Yugoslav border to the Greek Communist forces

and thus contributed to their defeat8. Slowly but surely the American administration

started to think in different terms about Yugoslavia9. In 1949 Truman decided to offer

economical assistance to Yugoslavia and thus 'keep Tito afloat'10. Then in October of the

same year Yugoslavia was elected to the Security Council seat of the United Nations.

This accomplishment greatly boosted Yugoslav morale as it was meant to send a very

clear political message to Stalin11. In the next two years American military help was also

realized and the talks about establishing military ties were well underway. These moves

marked the beginning of the so-called 'wedge strategy' which was probably best defined

by the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Robert Perkins:

'What we are concernd with is containing, or driving a wedge, if you will, into

Communist totalitarianism, and in containing in particular the Stalin Breed of

Communism, or doctrine, or whatever you want to call it. We feel very strongly that it is

essential that Tito, having made the break with Stalin, will succeed in that break because

we can only break it down by driving wedges into it, and that is one of the most

important wedges that has appeared.'12

8 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War, Frontline state, 1952 – 1967,

Routledge, 2006: p. 8. 9 There was a missed chance right after the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. The american

administration looked very unfavourably on Tito and some even thought that the split is just a tactical manoeuvre to confuse the US administration.

10 Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat – The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997: p. 76-7.

11 Ibid:75.-76.; .; Tvrtko Jakovina, Američki komunistički saveznik, Profil, Zagreb 2003: pp. 287-8.

12 Lorraine M. Lees, op. cit.: p. 96.

4

The 'wedge strategy would have far-reaching consequences in the following

years.

At the same time Eastern Europe was in the middle of 'anti-Titoist' purges and

many high ranking Communists were sentenced or executed13. After discarding the

prospect of military intervention Stalin was bent on restraining 'Titoism' within the

borders of Yugoslavia. One consequence was the inauguration of a far harsher attitude

toward the Soviet Union’s East European satellites. Integral to the new approach was a

series of celebrated cases, all closely orchestrated by Stalin, against “enemies” within the

leadership of the socialist states. With the help of advisers from Moscow, a case was

fabricated against the former Hungarian Minister of Internal Affairs, Laszlo Rajk,

charging that he had headed a spy organization. Two months after Rajk’s execution,

Traicho Kostov, the former Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, was also tried

and executed. These trials were matched by analogous arrests in Poland, Romania,

Czechoslovakia, and Albania14.

With Yugoslavia and the USSR both being Communist countries one needn't have

waited to long for the escalation of conflict on the ideological battlefield.

13 See: Joseph Rotschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, Return to Diversity: A Political

History of East Central Europe since World War II, Oxford University Press, 2000: pp. 125-46.; Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe 1850-2000, Oxford Univerity Press, 2002: pp. 308-311.; Tony Judt, Post-war, WH London 2005: pp. 178-96.

14 Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold peace: Stalin and the Soviet ruling circle, 1945–1953, Oxford Univerity Press, 2004: p. 70.

5

Ideological deviations

In a tense intenational climate Tito set off to establish the basics of the ideological

frame that would dominate Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy for the next few

decades. It was obvious that he had to 'move closer to the West economically and away

from the Soviet Union ideologically'15. The atmosphere among the top ranked Yugoslav

communists was almost ebullient. It does not come as a suprise when Milovan Đilas, the

leading party ideologue, starts re-reading 'Capital' hoping that he will reveal the fallacies

of Stalin, even Lenin16. Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrič soon joined Đilas in the quest

for the origin of communism17. The three of them would come to form the Yugoslav

ideological 'troika' during the Cominform years.

Tito supported such an ideological confrontation. The process that began with

destroying millions of Stalins images culminated with a passing of the Law on the

Management of State Economic Associations by Work Collectives, popularly known as

'workers self-management'18. This was a huge step forward within the frames of

Communism. Đilas, Kidrič and Kardelj were behind this new law and Tito was delighted

with it. He supposedly even said: ' That's from Marx! Factories in the hands of the

workers'19. The 'workers self-management' law was just the first step towards a more

democratic political atmosphere.

The Sixth Congress of the CPY was held in Zagreb from 2 to 7 November 1952

and it was a milestone for the nature of Communism in Yugoslavia. Theoretical

foundations of the new course were to be 'democratization, decentralization and

15 John R. Lampe, op. cit.: p. 250. 16 Milovan Đilas, Vlast i pobuna, Europapress holding – Novi Liber, Zagreb, 2009: p.

296. 17 Vladimir Dedijer, Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas, Prosveta, Beograd, 1991: p. 331. 18 Dušan Bilandžić, Društveni razvoj socijalističke Jugoslavije, Naklada CDD, Zagreb,

1976: pp. 124-5.; John R. Lampe, op. cit.: pp. 251-3.; Sabrina P. Ramet, Tri Jugoslavije – izgradnja države i izazov legitimacije 1918. – 2005., Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2009: pp. 249-50.

19 Milovan Đilas 2009, op. cit.: p. 296.

6

debureaucratization’20. These processes were thought to lead towards the ‘withering

away of the state’ which was another concept first put forward by Marx21. The name of

the Party itself was changed from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the League of

Communists of Yugoslavia22. A liberal atmosphere that dominated the Congress23 which

was followed by a period of applied liberalization throughout the country. The main

ideological architects of the Congress were Đilas and Kardelj, although it seems that the

former had more influence. Milovan Đilas was behind all major decisions at the Congress

and some historians rightly label the Sixth Congress as the ‘Đilas Congress’24.

The education of Milovan Đilas

Born in Podbišće, Montenegro, Đilas was a leading member of the Yugoslav

Communist Party (YCP) and a minister in the communist government of Yugoslavia after

the war, becoming vice president to Tito and viewed as his likely successor. However, his

chief contribution has been as a critic of communism and in particular of Stalinism25. His

political and writing skills were also well-known26.

His staunch rhetorical attacks on Stalin and the Soviet Union made him one of the

most hated Yugoslav politicians in the USSR. His speeches and articles during the split

contained a surprising amount of hateful and vindictive remarks about the nature of

20 Dušan Bilandžić, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: glavni

procesi : 1918-1985, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1985: pp. 175-8.; Dušan Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, Golden marketing, Zagreb, 1999: pp. 321-5.;

21 Marx explains this question most thoroughly in his Critique of the ‘Gotha Programme’. (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973: p. 26.)

22 The new name was also supposed to sound more marxist alluding to the first Marxist international organization, the Communist League.

23 Milovan Djilas, Anatomy of a moral, Kessinger Publishing, 2009: p. 319. 24 Sabrina P. Ramet, op. cit.: pp. 249-52. 25 David Walker and Daniel Gray, op. cit.: pp. 92-3.; Ko je ko u Jugoslaviji 1970: pp.

241-2; Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1969: pp. vii-xi; Milovan Đilas 2009, op. cit.: pp. 427-47.; Robert Service, Comrades: Communism: A world history, Pan Books, 2007: p. 256.

26 Apart from writing five books of his memoirs, Đilas wrote several books about Marxism, novels and short stories.

7

socialism in USSR. Đilas was well known for his ‘enthusiasm’ in political matters27. In

the thirties he was one of the most radical Bolsheviks and during the war he was involved

in several executions which he himself would later write about in his memoirs28. It seems

that the conflict with Stalin softened his Bolshevik side and he was to prove himself as

the torchbearer of the ‘Yugoslav Road’. It is not an easy task to pinpoint the exact start

date of Đilas’s ‘deviation’ because his policies and articles were at the front of the new

official state policy after the 6th Congress29. He wrote a series of articles in the official

organ of the Party, Borba, in September 1951, on ‘the freedom of criticism’, ‘the duty of

communists and progressive people to learn…’, the ‘necessity of looking for new roads’,

and ‘the spiritual misery and brutality of the bureaucrats’30. After the 19th Congress of

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was held from 5 to 14 October 1952,

Đilas was quick to comment on the new theoretical developments in the USSR in his

article ‘Is Stalin moving in Circles?’31. In December 1952 and January 1953 Đilas

headed the Yugoslav delegation to India and Burma where he ’preached’ the message of

Yugoslav communism at the Congress of the Asian Socialist Parties in Rangoon32.

Leader of the British Labour Party, Clement Attlee, was also at the conference. He made

an interesting remark to the Yugoslav delegation when he said that the Yugoslavs are

here to ‘export ideas’33.

When it comes to the ideas that shaped Đilas’s way of thinking we can only

speculate. According to Vladimir Velebit, Đilas was significantly influenced by the visit

he made to the United States in 1949 during the General Assembly of the United Nations

in New York34. Some authors think that Đilas was impressed with the gradual progress

27 Some authors tend to ascribe this to his Montenegrin background. See: Vladimir

Dedijer 1991, op. cit. 28 See: Milovan Djilas, Wartime, Mariner Books, 1980. 29 See above. 30 Slobodan Draskovich, The Case of Milovan Djilas, Modern Age, Chicago, Spring

1958: p. 152. 31 Darko Bekić, Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu, Globus, Zagreb 1988: pp. 393– 4. 32 Milovan Đilas 2009, op. cit.: pp. 333–41.; Darko Bekić, op. cit.: p. 494. 33 Milovan Đilas 2009, op. cit.: pp. 335–6. 34 Tvrtko Jakovina, op. cit.: p. 363. Đilas claims that he was not impressed by the standard of living in the USA, although

8

toward socialism under a multi-party system during his first visit to Great Britain in

195135. Đilas himself states that the fateful moment occurred on the night of December

7/8 1953:

‘Although I had, as usual, fallen asleep about midnight, I woke up suddenly,

smitten within by some unfaltering, fateful realization that I would not be able to abandon

my views.’36

What we can be certain of is that the political developments in Yugoslavia prior to

December 1953 had a profound influence on Đilas. The conclusions of the Sixth

Congress stressed that the party’s primary task lay in the ideological and political

education of the masses. Based upon these principles a new Constitutional Law was

adopted in January 195337, replacement of the 1946 version which bore an

embarrassingly close resemblance to Stalin’s Constitution of 193638. This new

Constitutional Law enshrined ‘the concept of socialist direct democracy as the expression

he admits that his Marxist views were somewhat shaken when he saw a highly prosperous non-socialist state(Milovan Đilas 2009, op. cit.: p. 290.).

35 John R. Lampe, op. cit.: pp. 258. – 259. A. Bevan(1897.1960) was one of the prominent Labour politicians. During the Third

Plenum of CPY, which discussed the fate of Milovan Đilas, he was mentioned in the context of his alleged influence on Đilas. This provoked some of the Labour Party members and Tito himself wrote a letter to Bevan stating that he is certain that Bevan had no influence on Đilas whatsoever (Milovan Đilas 2009, op. cit.: p. 348.).

36 Milovan Djilas 1969, op. cit.: p. 25. 37 John R. Lampe, op. cit.: pp. 256-7.; R. J. Crampton, op. cit.: pp. 116–7. The Constitutional Law was not the complete Constitution of Yugoslavia. It abolished

and amended much of the 1946 Constitution, but did not abolish it completely. In the first part the

Constitutional Law declared the new rights of producers and working people, formulated the contents and

form of power of the working people, regulated the issue of relations between the federation and

republics. The second part refers to the organisation of authority in the federation and truly represents a

federal law. The third part includes provisions about the bodies of power of republics and bodies of power

of the autonomous province and autonomous region. (www.arhivyu.gov.rs) 38 Soviet Constitution of 1936 is available on

www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/1936toc.html

9

of the working people through self-management39. Moreover, Tito accepted the new law

because it was a good way ‘of sounding more Communist than the Soviet Union, yet

more democratic than the West’40.

The Reversal

Only a month after introducing the new Constitutional Law Yugoslavia signed the

Pact of Friendship and Collaboration with Greece and Turkey (the Balkan Pact)41. This

was one of the highpoints in Yugoslav-Western relations42 because it indirectly

associated Yugoslavia with NATO. There were even more pro-Western signals coming

from Yugoslavia in early 1953. The first five-year plan was failing miserably43 and by

the end of March the peasants were free to leave the collectives and take with them their

land and equipment44. Tito’s visit to Great Britain (16 – 21 March) was significant as it

was his first trip to the West as head of state and first trip abroad after the exhaustive

Cominform period45. However, these events were diminished by Stalin’s death on 5

March 1953. His death had far-reaching consequences for Yugoslavia. Tito was already

feeling uncomfortable being aligned with the West and dependant on their military and

economic assistance. Moreover, Tito began to look at the internal developments that

followed the Sixth Congress in a different light. The period of liberalization had caused

39 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator, C. Hurst & Co., London,

1992: p. 62. 40 Ibid: 61. – 62. 41 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, op. cit.: pp. 37–8. The Western powers wanted indirectly to associate Yugoslavia with NATO, but they would not give a blank cheque to Belgrade, allowing it to draw the whole of the West into a crisis that would only involve Belgrade’s interests. 42 The three nations will sign a defence pact (The Treaty of Alliance, Political Co-

operation and Mutual Assistance) a year later, on August 9th 1954, when the Trieste dispute was nearing its end.

43 Sabrina P. Ramet, op. cit.: pp. 255 –7. 44 R. J. Crampton, op. cit.: p. 116. 45 See Katarina Spehnjak," Josip Broz Tito’s Visit To Great Britain In 1953." in Review

Of Croatian History Vol. I, No. I, 2005: pp. 273 – 93.

10

considerable confusion among the Party members and the general public. The reduction

of interference of the Party in the Yugoslav life, elimination of ‘party bureaucracy’ and

democratization of the party were some of the main trends and Tito did not look

favorably on these developments. Therefore, on 16 and 17 June 1953 the Central

Committee of the LCY met at Brijuni to discuss these dangerous new trends. On this

meeting it was decided to put a stop to the ‘negative’ tendencies that had emerged from

the Sixth Congress. After the plenum Kardelj and Đilas went fishing. Đilas claims that he

told Kardelj that he will not be able to support the new ‘Brijuni’ line46. His ‘heretical’

behavior was slowly revealing itself.

The Fall

Đilas was convinced that the plenum was a mistake and he continued to develop

his ‘liberal’ ideas. The ideas he shaped during the theoretical confrontation with Stalin

and the USSR were further enhanced by his contribution to the ‘Yugoslav Way’ of

Communism. He was convinced that his ideas were crucial for future developments

within Yugoslavia. The ‘infamous’ series of eighteen articles in Borba were published in

the closing months of 195347. Although many analysts and scholars point to these articles

as crucial in Đilas’s fall, it was in another publication where Đilas first started to criticize

the Yugoslav system. The magazine Nova Misao (‘New Thought’) appeared in January

1953 and Đilas vaguely hoped to rally the Communist-democrats for his cause48. Even

the first articles he wrote in Nova Misao contained a surprising amount of criticism. In

‘Dvostruka filozofska uloga profesora Nedeljkovića’49 Đilas already warns about the

dangers that arise when a certain class (bureaucracy) holds a monopoly on the

development of theory50. In the same issue Đilas praises the novel Pesma by Oskar

46 Milovan Đilas 2009, op. cit.: p. 346. 47 From 11 October 1953 to 7 January 1954. 48 Milovan Djilas, Anatomy of a moral, Kessinger Publishing, 2009: pp. xii–iii. 49 ‘The ambivalent philosophical position of professor Nedeljković’, Nova misao 1,

January 1953 50 Veljko Stanić, "Milovan Đilas 1953/54 - između revolucije i slobode" in Tokovi

istorije Vol. 3-4, 2008: p. 257.

11

Davičo for his critical and somewhat revisionist portrait of the Yugoslav revolution51. All

in all, Đilas published ten articles in Nova Misao.

Further, the series of articles published in Borba had a profound influence on the

Yugoslav political scene. In the first article ‘New Contents’52 Đilas warns of a ‘new,

invisible battle’53 that is being thought out between capitalism and bourgeoisie,

bureaucratism and bureaucracy, and socialism and democracy54. He would warn about

‘favoritism and privilege’ and ‘fraudulent and undeserved assignments’55 in the article

‘Some minor electoral themes’56. His underlying concern in these articles was with the

new bureaucratic moral which was rooted in the system itself. The general public and

Tito himself looked favorably upon Đilas’s articles and the editorial board of Borba

received almost 30000 letters praising his writings57. However, articles that followed

continued to ‘unmask’ the Yugoslav reality. Đilas was openly upholding ‘public

discussions’58, free arrangement of ‘mutual relations, power relations and economic

relations’59, ‘democracy, legality, abiding by laws and courts as the principal instruments

of our socialist system’60 etc. The gradual development of his ideas and their true

implications were realized only in retrospect because Đilas was known for his complex

and turbulent style61. However, what followed was a direct attack on the LCY.

By the end of December Tito and Kardelj lost their patience with Đilas. At a

meeting held near Kranj in Slovenia Tito was furious about Đilas’s articles62. On January

51 Ibid, 258. 52 11 October 1953 53 Milovan Djilas 2009, op. cit.: p. 36. 54 Ibid 55 Milovan Djilas 2009, op. cit.: p. 45. 56 25 October 1953 57 Milovan Đilas 2009, op. cit.: pp. 354–5; Darko Bekić, op. cit.: p. 566. 58 In the article ‘New Forms’, 1 November 1953 (Milovan Djilas 2009, op. cit.: pp. 50–

1.) 59 In the article 'The Importance of Form', 8 November 1953 (Milovan Djilas 2009, op.

cit.: pp. 56–7.) 60 In the article 'Legality', 15 November 1953 (Milovan Djilas 2009, op. cit.: p. 63.) 61 Milovan Djilas 2009, op. cit.: p. x. 62 Darko Bekić, op. cit.: p. 567.

12

4 the last article was published. In it Đilas explains that the views expressed in the

previous article ‘Subjective Forces’ are his and that they are not to be associated with the

LCY63. The very next day Đilas was escorted by the security forces to Kardelj’s house.

Kardelj and Ranković conveyed Tito’s opinions to him. It proved to be a final warning to

Đilas and he thinks that the decision to convene a plenum had already ocured64. If that is

true, than the final and most widely-known article ‘Anatomy of a moral’ 65 was not the

last straw in the whole process. The essay describes the ‘massive, icy, and impenetrable

wall’ which was allegedly thrown up by Belgrade’s new social caste against a ‘beautiful,

young actress’66. The young actress was one of those ‘simple’ people that Đilas

juxtaposed against the bigoted women who symbolize all that had become hateful to

Đilas in Yugoslav society. The women scorned the actress because she had not fought in

the war and because she was connected with the stage – ‘a questionable origin for a

member of the leadership of Belgrade society’67. This article was a direct attack on the

new moral of the ruling class and it caused a huge uproar among the Party ranks.

Symbolically, the Nova Misao (‘New Thought’) magazine was shut down.

The Third Plenum was held on 16 and 17 January 195468. Its sole purpose was to

discuss the case of Milovan Đilas. Đilas was denounced and he was even rather self-

critical which he later regretted. He was expelled from the Central Committee and in

March turned in his party card. This plenum strengthened Tito’s grip over the Party and

was a further confirmation of the abandonment of the line that was created at the Sixth

Congress in 1952. However, it is important to notice that the ‘Đilas Plenum’ bore no

resemblance to the denouncements that were taking place in other Communist countries.

The plenum was broadcast over the radio, Đilas was not forced to undergo self-criticism

and he was not expelled from the Party69. ‘Titoism’ proved itself as significantly different

63 Milovan Djilas 2009, op. cit.: p. 123. 64 Milovan Đilas 2009, op. cit.: pp. 367-8. 65 Published in Nova Misao. 66 Milovan Djilas 2009, op. cit.: p. xxiv. 67 Ibid, xxv. 68 For the full minutes of the Plenum see: 'Komunist', br. 1.-2., 1954. 69 Tito intervened during the Plenum when it was proposed to expell Đilas from the Party.

He said: 'We shouldn't expell him because the western press will label as as Stalinists.'

13

from Stalinism but it was also obvious that Tito will have the upper-hand in all political

decisions in the country.

The demise of Stalin(ism)

The case of Milovan Đilas had far-reaching consequences for the future of

Yugoslav politics. However, it seems that the international repercussions of the case were

minor. The American Embassy followed the case with genuine interest, and some even

expected a classic ‘Stalinist’ showdown70. In the end, Americans took a realistic

approach to the whole process. They knew very well that Tito is extremely valuable as a

key figure in their ‘wedge-strategy’. While the US media interpreted the fall of Milovan

Đilas through a ‘democracy vs. communism’ dichotomy, the Dulles-administration knew

the real value of Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Cold War. That is why the words Dulles used

just three weeks after the third Plenum should not come as a surprise: ‘…we could

anticipate a tightening of discipline in the Yugoslav Communist Party and a check of the

recent trend toward liberalization’. Furthermore, ‘Mr. Dulles stated that the only really

disturbing factor in the current situation in Yugoslavia was the prolonged drought’71.

This way of reasoning was quite uncharacteristic of Dulles’s well-known ‘brinkmanship’

style of conducting foreign policy. Therefore, it was possible for the Americans to be in

support of Tito and of Đilas72 at the same time, although this support was manifesting

itself on different levels.

70 Tvrtko Jakovina, op. cit.: p. 365. 71 ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 183d Meeting of the National Security Council,

Washington, February 4, 1954’, p. 1370.( http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195254v08, accessed on 21 May 2010)

72 American ambassador in Belgrade George V. Allen did not think highly of Đilas. In January 1951 he described Đilas and Dedijer in a rather critical light: ‘Djilas and Vlado Dedijer, who is accompanying him as aide and translator, are both intriguers, dogmatic Marxists, and suspicious of all bourgeois governments. I regard them as among the more sinister figures of present regime, although Djilas has taken pains to try to convince me he is leading CPY toward west orientation.’ (‘The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State, London , January 31, 1951’, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1951v04p2, accessed on 21 May

14

The death of Stalin in March 1953 was the political event of the whole year. One

might argue that it came too soon and thus influenced Tito’s decision to slow down

liberalization of the regime and Yugoslav connections with NATO. However, Tito had to

be very careful during these months as he was trying to figure out who will win the

Soviet power struggle while pursuing a satisfactory settlement of the Trieste dispute.

Stalin’s death immediately launched a discussion about his legacy and of

‘Stalinism’. While thousands were mourning the death of the great leader, a new

leadership was emerging in Kremlin. It was Lavrenty Beria who wanted a radical shift in

Soviet foreign policy. While he was perceived as the Stalin’s number one executioner, his

incentives could have led to a significant improvement of East-West relations. Apart

from pushing for the unification of Germany, Beria thought that a conciliatory approach

toward Yugoslavia might help boost Soviet international prestige73. Such thoughts were

still deemed heretical and after his was arrest on 26 June Khrushchev and Molotov would

call this ploy high treason74. The fall of Beria would prove to be the last political

confrontation conducted along Stalinist lines. Of increasing concern for the new Soviet

leadership75 was the necessity of a new approach towards relations with the countries of

the Soviet bloc as well as with Yugoslavia.

The riots in East Germany, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia in May and June 1953,

shortly after Stalin’s death, proved to be the first of the major post-Stalin crisis in the

Soviet bloc. However, these outbreaks had been provoked mainly by grievances over

work conditions, monetary reforms, and food rationing; they were not a demonstration of

systemic and ideological challenges to the Stalinist structural legacy like those that were

2010)

73 When Beria was arrested the police found a letter that he was planning to send to Ranković. He even sent a secret emissary hoping that this will ultimately lead to the restoration of friendly

relations. (Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, op. cit.: pp. 158-9 Vladislav Zubok, CWIHP Working paper No. 4., Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War:: The “small” Committee of Information, 1952-53, 1992: p. 18.)

74 Vladislav Zubok, CWIHP Working paper No. 4., Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War:: The “small” Committee of Information, 1952-53, 1992: p. 18.

75 Malenkov, Molotov and Khruschev.

15

elicited in 195676. Serious challenges to Soviet authority arose only when Khrushchev

emerged as the only leader in the USSR, and when his reforms were combined with the

spectre of ‘Titoism’. The Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement was the underlying process

that set in motion events that would ultimately lead to tectonic shifts in the Soviet bloc.

Since the Soviets were unable to deal successfully with the Yugoslav ‘schism’

they had to find new solutions. The two countries re-established diplomatic ties soon after

Stalin’s death77 but true reconciliation could come only after the power-struggle in the

USSR was over. When Nikita Khrushchev finally emerged victorious in February 1955

his first major trip abroad was to Belgrade.

Khrushchev and Tito

Nikita Khruschev wanted to undertake a revolution in Soviet foreign policy. After

outmaneuvering both Beria and Malenkov, he and Molotov were in charge of conducting

foreign policy. The Yugoslavs regarded Molotov extremely unfavorably since the Tito-

Stalin split in 1948. Therefore, it was up to Khrushchev to establish better relations

between the two communist states. Khrushchev did so by writing four letters to Marshall

Tito during 1954.

The decision to write to Tito did not come easily. It seems that the struggle

between the last two contenders for supremacy in the USSR was partly decided during

the discussions about the future of relations with Yugoslavia. In February 1954 the

76 Joseph Rotschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, op.cit.: pp. 149–50. 77 After a meeting between Molotov and the Yugoslav envoy Dragoje Đurić it was

decided to resume diplomatic ties. However, Molotov was very careful while explaining this move to the central commitee: 'Since we did not succeed in settling the particular problem [of Yugoslavia] by a frontal assault, it became necessary to resort to other methods. It was decided to establish with Yugoslavia the same relations as with the other bourgeois states tied with the aggressive North Atlantic bloc.’ (Vojtech Mastny, CWIHP Working paper No. 35., NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56, 2002: p. 40.)

16

Presidium ordered Molotov to improve relations with Belgrade, but he continued to

depict the

Yugoslavs as fascists78. Khrushchev seized the initiative and wrote the first letter on 22

June. At the time Tito was concerned with the signing of the Balkan Pact and the final

agreement over Trieste. It seems that these pro-Western moves convinced even the

staunchest conservatives within the Presidium to support the ‘Khrushchev line’79. In the

first letter Khrushchev hopes that ‘not only diplomatic relations but also balanced

economic and cultural ties between our countries could be improved, based on full

equality and mutual gain’80. Furthermore, Khrushchev thought that the time was ripe ‘for

the establishment of contacts between the CC of the Communist Party of Soviet Union

and the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’81. Khrushchev tried to put the

blame for the split on Beria and Đilas. Since both of them were no longer in power it was

a convenient way to offer the Yugoslavs a quick road towards reconciliation. This was

unacceptable for Tito, since it was clear to him that Stalin and Molotov were behind

Soviet policies. Tito did not think that using Đilas82 as a scapegoat could prove itself

useful in the rapprochement. The correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev lasted

until September. Thus, first steps were made and when Khrushchev emerged as the new

Soviet leader his proposed revolution in foreign policy could start.

In March 1955, Khrushchev started a major public relations campaign designed to

undermine support for Molotov’s views83. He had the support of Marshall Zhukov and

78 William Taubman, Khrushchev, the Man and his Era, W. W. Norton & Company,

New York, 2004: p. 268. 79 CWIHP Bulletin 12/13, 2001: p. 316.(S. Rajak, New Evidence from the Former

Yugoslav Archives) 80 Ibid, 319. 81 Ibid, 320.-321. 82 Ibid, 321.

‘...as far as we are concerned, we need to say openly that an individual, for example Djilas, was not the cause of this conflict, regardless of his lack of balanced approach and his outbursts from one extreme to another.'

83 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, W. W. Norton,

17

the new Prime Minister Bulganin. High-level negotiations were initiated with the

Yugoslavs and Belgrade responded positively to the Soviet suggestion of a visit in May.

The Soviet delegation led by Khrushchev landed in Belgrade on 26 May. The Soviets

were treated to an ‘ice-cold’ reception at the airport. The Yugoslavs did not even bother

to translate Khrushchev’s remarks. He again accused Beria for the split, a statement the

Yugoslavs found unacceptable. Further adding to his problems Khrushchev got

stupefyingly dunk on several occasions and found it extremely difficult to negotiate with

Tito and Kardelj. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union signed the ‘Belgrade declaration’, but

it only established cordial relations between the two states84, not between the parties as

Khrushchev had hoped for. Nonetheless, with this meeting and the signing of the

Austrian State Treaty earlier in May the Khrushchev ‘Thaw’85 had begun in earnest.

The Spectre of Titoism

When Khrushchev gave his famous ‘Secret speech’ at the Twentieth Party

Congress in February 1956 the world stood still. The great Stalin was accused of

unimaginable crimes and his politics were heavily criticized. Khrushchev had pledged to

return the USSR to Leninism. Khrushchev still glorified Lenin, thus allowing himself to

criticize Stalin and at the same time save the sanctity of the Soviet regime. This position

was surely closer to the line propagated by the Yugoslav communists, who saw

themselves as standard bearers of Leninism after the split. Not only did Khrushchev

2006: p. 27.

84 The final declaration issued when they left a week later on June 2 was signed for the Soviet delegation not by Communist party leader Khrushchev but by the titular head of the government, Nikolai A. Bulganin, a signal that full ideological reconciliation was still beyond reach and a symbol of the Yugoslav contention that relations between two equal, sovereign states, not between a central and a peripheral party, were being mended. Tito signed for Yugoslavia in his capacity as the country’s president. (Joseph Rotschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, op.cit.: p. 148.)

85 The term Khruschew Thaw is used to describe the period after Khruschev's ascent to power until the Hungarian uprising. The Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg published a novel 'The thaw' in 1954 which then gave name to the Khrushchev Thaw.

18

denounce Stalin, but during the foreign policy86 section of the Congress a few days

earlier he stated that different roads to socialism were possible87. The importance of his

speech cannot be stressed enough. It sent shockwaves throughout Eastern Europe. A

‘liberal’ trend was set in motion and it soon blew out of proportion. Khrushchev found

out that the consequences of his speech were far greater than he imagined. He was thus

caught in a dilemma between his perceived need to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the

Communist world, his craving to dismantle political Stalinism, and the Soviet Union’s

stake in averting the destabilization and possible loss of its client states. The road from

the Secret Speech to the Hungarian Revolution lay open.

Tito made a return visit to USSR in June 1956. The reception and the atmosphere

surrounding the visit was quite different than the one that had surrounded Khrushchev’s

visit a year earlier. There was a grandiose reception for Tito in Moscow, and during their

visit to Stalingrad the masses enthusiastically surrounded the Yugoslav leader. However,

the talks between the two delegations were strained just like a year before in Belgrade.

Tito continuously rejected the unity of socialist countries, condemned the very term

socialist lager and stressed the importance of different roads to socialism88. The result of

these talks was the ‘Moscow declaration’ which established the inter-party relations

between the LCY and the CPSU, but also recognized "various roads to socialism" as

legitimate. This declaration had a profound influence in the aftermath of the Secret

Speech. Several key questions arose. What will happen in the satellite states? Are they

allowed to pursue their own roads to socialism? Where is the limit of Soviet power? All

these questions were to be answered in the next five months.

After the signing of the ‘Moscow declaration’ Khrushchev felt it necessary to

meet with the other East European leaders. At a meeting held on 22 June there was no

mention of the declaration and the Yugoslav ambassador to USSR Veljko Mićunović

86 The famous 'Secret Speech' was delivered on the last day of the Congress, February 25.

The Congress lasted from February 14 to February 15. 87 William Taubman, op.cit.: p. 271. 88 Dragan Bogetić, Podsticaji i ograničenja na putu normalizacije jugoslovensko- sovjetskih odnosa tokom 1956. in Tokovi istorije, Vol. 3-4, 2005: pp. 163-4.

19

interpreted this as a sign that the declaration is applicable to Yugoslavia only89. In almost

all the Soviet-bloc countries major changes happened between March and October 1956.

The level and intensity of the reforms varied from country to country but they all bore the

signature of Titoism.

‘Storm over Eastern Europe’

Khrushchev’s reforms improved the conditions of everyday life in the USSR and

the rest of the bloc. The real question was whether the satellites wanted reforms under the

watchful eye of the Soviets, or whether they longed to pursue independent policies.

Yugoslavia with its international prestige and its hard-earned capital from the Tito-Stalin

split presented an appealing model for the Soviet-dominated countries of the eastern bloc.

With the acknowledgement of ‘various roads to socialism’ Khrushchev had opened

Pandora’s box.

The death of the veteran Polish Stalinist party chief Boleslaw Bierut on March 12,

1956, had ambivalent consequences for Poland. On the one hand, it opened a leadership

gap; on the other hand, it spared Poland a struggle to remove him, such as was taking

place in Hungary over Mátyás Rákosi at this time. Bierut’s successor as Communist party

first secretary was Edward Ochab, who sought a stance of balance and gradualism,

further restraint of the police, easing the inordinate investments in heavy industry,

relaxing the pressure on Catholic believers, while condemning Gomulka for nationalism

and insisting on preservation of the Communists’ monopoly of power. he was deemed

acceptable by the Soviets, whose own domestic de-Stalinization and external

rapprochement with Tito would have been compromised had they intervened in Poland.

But Ochab’s position became untenable after the Poznan´ workers’ insurrection of June

28 and 29, which indicated that the previous ferment could no longer be contained within

the existing party structure90. Polish Communists became desperate and by October they

89 Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine: 1956-1958., Liber, Zagreb 1977: p. 93. 90 Joseph Rotschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, op.cit.: p. 151.; William Taubman, op.cit.:

pp. 292–3.

20

named Gomulka91 the party Secretary. Gomulka, who was accused of Titoism and

imprisoned in 1951, represented the new ‘national communist’ trend that was emerging

in the satellites.

Khrushchev approached the Polish problem quite seriously. At first he was keen

on eliminating the new leadership, but after long consultations with other members of the

Presidium Khrushchev decided to wait92 and give Gomulka some space for his reforms.

In return for Soviet tolerance, Gomulka committed himself to preserving the Communist

monopoly of power and to holding Poland to its Soviet alliance, albeit on more equal

terms93. He managed to secure substantive gains for Poland, and symbolically raised

Poland from a colony to a dominion of the Soviet Empire94.

Successful dealing with Poland boosted Khrushchev’s prestige within the Soviet

Union. He thought that he found a formula for ‘de-Stalinization’ in the satellites. Even in

Romania and Bulgaria, the bastions of Stalinism, policy changes were afoot. ‘Bulgaria’s

Little Stalin’ Vulko Chervenkov, who presided over the purges, was denounced at the

special plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party in April 1956. He was replaced by a

91 Wladyslaw Gomulka had become leader of the underground Communist resistance in

1943 after the violent elimination of two predecessors under murky circumstances. He was confirmed as secretary general of the party after the liberation, when he also became a deputy premier and the minister for the regained (ex-German) territories, in which capacity he administered the party’s extensive patronage apparatus for the distribution of these new lands to resettled Poles. Together with a small cluster of fellow “undergrounders,” he soon found himself at odds with the party’s “Muscovites” over a number of policy issues and general stances. Gomulka tended to emphasize a “Polish national road” to Socialism, to limit imitation of and dependence on the Soviet Union, to respect the patriotic traditions of the Polish Socialists, and to depreciate the collectivization of agriculture. (Joseph Rotschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, op.cit.: p. 134.)

92 Using force against Poland at this point would undermine the reconciliation with Tito on which Khrushchev was banking so heavily and would succor his own residual Stalinist rivals.

On the other hand, it seems that Mikoyan saved the Poles because Khrushchev already decided to send the Soviet troops in Poland and it was only after Mikoyan’s intervention that he decided to wait. (.; William Taubman, op.cit.: p. 294.)

93 Joseph Rotschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, op.cit.: p. 153. 94 Raymond Pearson, op.cit.: p. 53.

21

young apparatchik Todor Zhivkov95. In Romania, party boss Gheorghiu-Dej pushed for

the withdrawal of the Soviet troops since their presence was no longer needed after the

signing of the Austrian State Treaty96. However, Romania and Bulgaria remained loyal to

the Soviet Union for the time being. It was the events in Hungary that unmasked the

potential dangers of de-Stalinization.

Hungary ‘56

By early fall 1956 Khrushchev was becoming more worried about the events in

Eastern Europe. Therefore he again visited Yugoslavia to meet with Tito in September

1956. He expressed concerns that the ‘Yugoslav way’ was being exploited by hostile

forces in Eastern Europe97. His concerns were somewhat alleviated by the unfolding of

events in Poland, but a far more dangerous situation was brewing in Hungary.

In Hungary, the cult of Stalin was particularly egregious, the treatment of

‘undesirable’ social categories particularly cruel, the industrialization commitment

particularly heedless, and the circle of decision makers particularly restricted and

‘Muscovite’. The new Hungarian Prime Minister, as of 1953, Imre Nagy was a wartime

‘Muscovite’ but non-Jewish and a moderate Communist. On the other hand, the party

boss Matyas Rakosi was regarded as ‘Stalin's best Hungarian disciple’. His ruthless and

autocratic regime became increasingly burdensome for the Soviets. Rakosi was also in

95 R. J. Crampton, op.cit.: pp. 170-1. 96 Ibid, 185. - 186. Under the terms of the 1947 peace treaty Soviet troops had been garrisoned in

Romania to help guard the supply lines to Soviet bases in eastern Austria. 97 Hostile forces, I said, are trying to use the “Yugoslav way” of building socialism to

their ends. In a number of countries of the people’s democracies, such as Poland, Hungary, and others, reactionary elements are using such arguments in their hostile activity in order not to finally reveal themselves, in particular that they ought to follow the Yugoslav path, to follow Yugoslavia’s example, etc. Thus, it turns out that the reactionary elements that are fighting Communist and workers’ parties speak out under the flag of advocating the so-called “Yugoslav path.”( ‘Note from N. Krushchev to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding conversations with Yugoslav leaders in Belgrade’, www.wilsoncenter.org, accessed on 13 June 2010)

22

the forefront of anti-Titoist purges. By 1955 Nagy was out of the picture as he was

advocating a new socialist line98. During 1956 Khrushchev finally lost patience with

Rakosi and replaced him with another ‘Stalinist’ Erno Gero. Khrushchev even tried to

‘force’ reconciliation between Hungary and Yugoslavia by inviting Gero to Crimea at the

time of Tito’s visit in October. He hoped that by accepting Gero Tito would send a strong

political message to other satellite countries99.

Khrushchev was reassured by the ‘Polish October’ and tried to apply the same

model to the Hungarian situation. So far, the Hungarian revolutionary process had been

largely an internal elite process. The workers and peasants, less interested in reforming

than in abolishing the Communist system, had remained sullen and silent. The spark that

activated their mass participation was the reluctant Soviet acceptance of Gomulka’s

return to power in Poland, which the exhilarated Hungarians misinterpreted as a general

Soviet abdication in East Central Europe. On October 23, an initially peaceful but

politically militant demonstration by Budapest students precipitated the Revolution. The

next day, October 24, Soviet troops garrisoned in Hungary attempted to suppress the

Revolution but they soon halted their intervention in the provinces and by October 28 in

the capital as well. Politically, too, the Soviets were reassessing their commitments, and

on October 25 brought about the replacement of Gero˝ as party first secretary by János

Kádár100. The Soviets also endorsed Nagy as Premier and anticipated that the Nagy–

Kádár pairing would now master the situation, presumably toward an outcome

comparable to the one negotiated in Poland101.

98 The ouster of Malenkov in February 1955 eliminated that Soviet leader who was most

protective of the New Course, and Nagy fell in his wake in April—ousted from the premiership, from his parliamentary seat, from the party’s Politburo and Central Committee, and even from his residual university lectureship and membership in the Academy of Sciences. In November, he would be expelled from the party altogether.( Joseph Rotschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, op.cit.: p. 155.)

99 Dragan Bogetić, Podsticaji i ograničenja na putu normalizacije jugoslovensko- sovjetskih odnosa tokom 1956. in Tokovi istorije, Vol. 3-4, 2005: p. 169.

100 Janos Kadar was a wartime “local undergrounder,” a tortured victim of one of Rákosi’s last purges, and non-Jewish.

101 Joseph Rotschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, op.cit.: p. 158.

23

The Hungarians misinterpreted this move as a sign that Moscow was losing

political will. Therefore, Nagy made a grave miscalculation when he called for the

repudiation of Gero’s original request of October 23 for Soviet military intervention, the

reconstitution of the multiparty government coalition of 1945 and a proclamation of

Hungary’s neutrality. This was a step too far. Khrushchev was now bent on crushing the

Hungarian uprising, but he wanted to get approval from the other bloc leaders and from

Tito.

In one of the most amazing Cold War episodes, Khrushchev visited Tito on 2

November on the Adriatic island of Brijuni. He and Malenkov traveled in a two-engine

Ilyushin 14 in horrible weather. Despite the meteorological characteristics Tito gave

consent for the intervention in Hungary102. The Hungarian uprising was crushed and the

grip over Eastern Europe was once again strengthened. It would never return to the

Stalinist practices of the immediate post-war years, but the chance for true reform was

lost during the ‘Khrushchev Thaw’. In the end, Tito was too scared about the prospect of

having a non-communist, hostile country on his borders, or even with having a ‘national

communist’, non-Soviet dominated rival in the region That is why he approved of the

second Soviet intervention. The changes that took place during the ‘Thaw’ years can

perhaps best be described by the Polish leader Gomulka’s refusal to agree with the

intervention although he promised Khrushchev that he would not condemn the invasion

publicly103.

Conclusion

After the intervention Tito gave a speech in Pula on November 11, 1956 in which

he criticized some aspects of the Soviet intervention. At that time Imre Nagy was in the

Yugoslav embassy and the new leader of Hungary Janos Kadar granted him safe passage.

Nagy was arrested as he was leaving the embassy which led to a new worsening of

102 About the Brijuni meeting see: Veljko Mićunović, op.cit.: pp. 156–65. 103 Victor Sebestyen, Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,

Vintage Books, 2007, p. 231.

24

Soviet-Yugoslav relations. At the same time, events in Hungary clearly demonstrated the

limits of 'Titoism'. Milovan Đilas was finally imprisoned after the Hungarian uprising for

publishing an article 'Storm over Eastern Europe' in magazine The New Leader. He

publicly accused Yugoslav leadership for supporting the Soviet intervention. Đilas was

immediately arrested and sentenced to three years imprisonment. The next year, with the

publication of New Class, he was sentenced to another seven years. Although Yugoslav –

Soviet relations would significantly detoriorate over the next few years, Đilas was

conditionally released from prison only in 1961 and then again imprisoned the following

year after publishing Conversations with Stalin. The second Yugoslav – Soviet

rapprochement was well on its way by 1962. Đilas's fate was obviously determined more

by the current Yugoslav international position than by the potential dangerous impact his

writings might have on the general public.

These events highlighted two important aspects of the de-Stalinization campaign

and the 'Thaw' years. It became evident that only Tito's Yugoslavia was allowed 'to get

away'. It seems that the separate road to socialism was reserved only for Yugoslavia and

for Tito. Moreover, Tito overestimated the influence Yugoslavia had upon Eastern

Europe. The Soviet clampdown in Hungary clearly showed to Tito the constraints in his

'Ostblock' policy. As far as the internal situation in Yugoslavia was considered, one can

say that on this road there was no place for deviations. While Tito's rule was not

totalitarian it was overtly autocratic. Although Yugoslavia underwent its 'Thaw years' in

the early fifties this did not mean that further liberalization will be supported by Tito.

While Đilas's thoughts and articles were in line with the decisions of the sixth Congress,

he went to far with his articles. During the second 'liberalization' period in the late sixties

and early seventies Tito still found necessary to stress that he never liked the decisions of

the Sixth Congress in 1952104.

104 R. J. Crampton, op.cit.: p. 134.

25

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27

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