POLS 7010 – Advanced China Studies (Prof. Chen Feng)

The persistence of Deng-Jiang modernization in the largest conservative backlash of PRC

politics after 1989

Name: LEE Kwun-leung Vincent (李冠良)Student I.D No.: 09429670Major: Master of Social Science in China Studies (History)Date: 13th October, 2009

PREFACE: JIANG’S OBLIGATION TO MAKE DENG’S

MODERNIZATION SURVIVE IN THE CONSERVATIVE

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BACKLASH

The Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989, regarded as a thorough devastation of a

predictable bourgeoisie-liberalization within the PRC Regime, marked a turning point

of Deng Xiaoping’s Opening-Up, from his forbearing approach of socio-economic

experimentation with ‘mind-emancipation’, to a more cautious line on national

modernization inherited by his successor, Jiang Zemin. Facing the resentments from

left-minded conservatives and the repressive initiative from the discontented

democratic forces being driven underground in various provinces1, Deng Xiaoping

instructed Jiang Zemin to uphold the principle of “socialism with Chinese features”.

Through a highly-centralized attempt of political reintegration, Jiang, in accordance to

Deng’s ultimate aspiration, developed PRC into a mixed regime in which different

ingredients such as traditional Mandarin rule, one-party domination, the form of

people’s party, functional factions representing different interest groups, democratic

elections and monitoring were combined2. However, though a serious reflection was

made by Jiang and the paramount leaders in terms of upgrading both the bureaucratic

efficiency and the financial capacity, the PRC Regime remained extraordinarily

intolerable to the rival behaviors of regional-based dissidents, nor to say being

unpredictably vulnerable to undergo challenges from any forms of mass democratic

campaigns. What Jiang Zemin maneuvered to implement was a revival of old

Confucian teachings as a forceful attachment of ideological value to enforce

widespread submissiveness regardless of racial and class differences. In Jiang’s

philosophical arena, as Zheng Yongnian and Lai Hongyi stated, Communitarianism3,

1 Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, “China In The 1990s”, 1st Edition in 1995, McMillian Press Limited, United Kingdom [P.31 – ‘The Decline in Ideocracy’ by Gordon White]2 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian, “The Chinese Communist Party in Reform”, 1st Edition in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada [P.206 – ‘Creating a Chinese model of democratization?’, from ‘Intra-party democracy: A revisionist perspective from below’ by He Baogang]3 Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.351 – ‘Rule by Virtue: Jiang Zemin’s Revival of the Party’s Ideology’ by Zheng Yongnian & Lai Hongyi]

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not individualism, is more suitable for China’s stable development and social

harmony.

POST-1989 CAPITALIST REFORMS WITH NO CONDONATION TO THE THREAT UPON COMMUNIST

AUTHORITY FROM THE CONSERVATIVE CADRES

Throughout the second generation of PRC leadership beyond 1989, Deng Xiaoping

remained himself as an ‘octogenarian’ decision-maker without a legitimate

presidential title. By pursuing a dichotomy between the constitutional sources of

authority and the reality of power4, Deng Xiaoping was able to reserve the

‘conservative leftists’ with a certain extent of political influence as a tactic of parallel

organization to checkmate the effectiveness of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang’s

capitalist reformation. Deng, being a wait-and-see opportunist5 and a manipulator

behind the political curtain, only let Hu and Zhao uphold the secretarial titles, but not

to transfer them all his military power. Thus, Deng remained the left-minded

conservatives, specifically Yang Shangkun, with marshal titles. If Hu and Zhao’s tasks

resulted in social disturbances and hierarchical contradictions, Deng could manipulate

the conservative force to overthrow the whole liberation path and re-introduce a more

secured plan of national modernization.

Though the Commissions for Inspecting Discipline and Central Advisory Commission

were established in 1982 for the retired Party veterans to intervene directly in current

affairs, specifically to restrain the over-rapid socio-economic re-modification initiated

4 Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, “China In The 1990s”, 1st Edition in 1995, McMillian Press Limited, United Kingdom [P.54 – ‘Leadership Politics since 1989’ by Simon Long]5 (Same as above) [P.37 – ‘China’s Political Structure’ by Tony Saich] {Elaboration: Deng Xiaoping has seemed to move between the two viewpoints, giving the green light to far-reaching change, yet at crucial moments supporting the traditional viewpoint on political issues in order to preserve his economic reforms from attack.}

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by Hu Yaobang’s camp, the two commissions were dissolved in the 14 th CCP

Congress (1992)6. It was because, after recapturing the central power from the hand of

reformative camp by assuring conservatives’ right to launch a bloodshed crackdown

on 4 June 1989, Deng Xiaoping feared that an overwhelming predominance of

conservatives’ military power would make him difficult to continue with his

economic reform. Therefore, Deng initiated Shanghai Camp, which was good at

commercial politics, to counter-balance the traditionalists.

Deng instructed Jiang to make ideological conformity be subordinated to economic

development. To continue with an aspiration of making China attain an economically

well-to-do status, Jiang moved closer to the kind of authoritarian developmental

characteristics7. The prior task Jiang had to deal with was to desalinate both the

extreme-communist and democratic thoughts by adopting the capitalism-hoisted and

introducing the new conceptual terrain of market economics to minimize the post-

1989 Chinese generation into a status of “patriotically ignorance” in the tendency of

Late Dengism. Jiang Zemin, inclining to what the conservative leftists use to think

about, regarded intellectuals’ pursuits on liberalism as an ideological contamination

from abroad8. While enabling the conservative cadres to retain a strong role in the

enterprises to stop bourgeoisie entrepreneurs deviating too much from Party policy9,

Jiang pursued a dual tactic of ‘pacification-cum-restraint’. In terms of political

consideration, Jiang reiterated the formation of ‘political nucleus’ to appease the

resented conservatives concerning their privilege loss in socio-economic influence

6 Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, “China In The 1990s”, 1st Edition in 1995, McMillian Press Limited, United Kingdom [P.44 – ‘China’s Political Structure’ by Tony Saich]7 (Same as above) [P.32 – Late Dengism]8 (Same as above) [P.31 – ‘The Decline in Ideocracy’ by Gordon White]9 (Same as above) [P.37 – ‘China’s Political Structure’ by Tony Saich] {Deng’s aspiration apart from pursuing an orthodox Leninist lines: With the decentralization of some of the decision-making powers to the work-units, they (left-minded conservatives) want the Party to retain a strong role in the enterprises to stop them (bourgeoisie entrepreneurs) deviating too much from the Party policy……… predicted a single undifferentiated mass of people to work harmoniously for the creation of socialism.}

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after the end of Maoist rule and the beginning of Deng’s Opening-Up. But, on the

same pace, Jiang eventually abstracted the authoritarian credentials from those

conservatives who un-pragmatically indulged in the persistence of ‘better Red than

Expert’10.

Jiang’s inclination to Zhu Rongji as a replacement to Li Peng

While Jiang Zemin was uplifting Zhu Rongji as his imitate follower within his

Shanghai camp, Li Peng, with his Premier title, made use of his infrastructural project

on Three Gorges Dam to seek favor from the majority of the National People’s

Congress11. As indicated by Jonathan Fenby, Li Peng’s project would result in the

unusually high proportion of one third of delegates either voting against the idea or

abstaining. Li Peng, representing the “left-minded conservatives” due to his initiation

for a military crackdown on the Tiananmen students and an outlaw of Zhao Ziyang’s

reformative fellows, was able to command other octogenarians to counteract with any

kinds of capitalist influences, or even resort to a political struggle for a restoration of

fundamental communist order. Facing the unrest from that conservative forces

throughout the 1990s, Jiang Zemin endeavored to firmly unite Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao

and Li Ruihuan, whom were ensured to understand how the capitalist and market

reforms worked in Communist China and put prior emphasis on people’s concrete

well-being. By including Qiao Shi in the economic reform camp, PLA General Liu

Huaqing was likely to go along with the majority12. That left Li Peng isolated as he

10 Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st

Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States {P.646 – Chen Yun’s camp published an article with a radically-left slogan in the People’s Daily called “Better Red Than Expert” when Zhu Rongji promoted to be the vice-premier charged with supervising industrial restructuring.}11 (Same as above) [P.649 – The New-Old Generation]12 Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st

Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.653 – The New-Old Generation] {The decline of Li Peng}

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insisted on an onslaught against the continued dynamism of advancing capitalism in

China.

For sure, like the neutral tactic of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin dared not to infuriate

the conservatives by a thorough abandonment of communist morality, or else he

would suffer from the similar political miseries of either Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang.

While reiterating his unquestioned obedience to Deng Xiaoping’s ideological legacy,

Jiang inclined to Chen Yun as a pseudo-appeasement tactic13, even though he

disfavored with Chen Yun’s extremely-leftist perceptions. Such a straddling gesture of

expediential alliance with particular conservative representatives enabled him to

reconstruct socio-economic solidarity without octogenarian hindrances.

Thereafter, Jiang Zemin moved forward his secured strategy of “confiscating Li

Peng’s bureaucratic power with a tempting cup of wine”. Beyond his action of

undermining Li’s authority from the Premier position of PRC State Council to the

figurehead title of being the Head of CCP National People’s Congress, Jiang rewarded

Li Peng’s inheritors, who were ensured of having qualifications in overseas studies, to

operate the state-run enterprises. Zhu Rongji14 was then appointed as the First Deputy

Prime Minister to strengthen the Shanghai faction against the left-conservative

personnel in Beijing. With the back-up of Jiang, Zhu Rongji acted as a vigorous anti-

corruption and reformative leader to overthrow the corrupted, inferior and brutal

cadres in the revived ‘pro-soviet traditionalist camp’. Zhu prosecuted Chen Xitong,

the PLA Military General of Zhongnanhai in Beijing City, who committed serious

13 (Same as above) [P.648 – The New-Old Generation]{Having incurred some displeasure from the Paramount Leader for leaning towards the Chen Yun camp at the start of the economic debate, Jiang Zemin swiftly trimmed his sails to gain Deng’s backing, though the patriarch brought a younger man, Hu Jintao, into the Standing Committee of the Politburo as his chosen candidate for the succession when Jiang stepped down in 2002}14 Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, “China In The 1990s”, 1st Edition in 1995, McMillian Press Limited, United Kingdom [P.54 – Zhu Rongji, the latter helicoptered up Prime Minister with just three years to ‘First Deputy Prime Minister’]

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bribery and commanded a military suppression on the student activists on 4 June

1989. Jiang Zemin noticed that, Li Peng, being the Premier of State Council beyond

1989, was incapable in undermining the predominance of corrupted conservatives,

specifically Chen Xitong. Thus, Jiang chose the alternative of deducting Li Peng’s

influence and appointed Zhu Rongji as the new Premier to plan for an attack on Chen

Xitong.

Eventual softening attitude of Yang Shangkun and Bao Tong

With regards to the emergent socio-economic downturn after the 1989 turmoil, Deng

Xiaoping couldn’t rely on conservatives to reconstruct the national economy from the

political ruins. He had to seek Jiang Zemin as an alternative cadre, who was both

loyal to the party constitution and was able to restrain the oppositional force, while

continuing with the capitalist reforms. When Deng handed the chairmanship of the

Military Affairs Commission to Jiang Zemin, he undoubtedly disappointed President

Yang Shangkun, who saw himself in the job15. Yang Shangkun’s family network

within the CCP bureaucracy was unpredictably strong, as his 72-year-old brother was

a general secretary of the Military Affairs Commission. Deng’s appointment of Jiang

Zemin from Shanghai faction, which shocked Yang and his intimate followers,

undermined the authority of left-minded conservatives to predominate the direction of

national economic modernization, as well as deducting conservatives’ significance in

terms of solely manipulating their military power to stabilize the whole nation.

Yang Shangkun noticed that, Jiang got the backing from both Chen Yun and Deng

Xiaoping; while his intimate follower, Hu Jintao, was receiving the support from an

15 Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st

Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.642 – The New-Old Generation]

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octogenarian general called Liu Huaqing. Thus, Yang’s confrontational attitude

against reformative camp became soften. When Jiang went out his way to warn

against leftism and insisted on the need to do everything to liberate productive forces,

Yang Shangkun also came out in support16. Yang finally stepped down form the

Politburo at the age of eight-five. Yang’s younger brother, due to an opposition from

the PLA members, was also dropped from the Military Affairs Commission. With no

doubt, Deng Xiaoping’s eagerness on cutting the ‘Yang Family Party” down to size17

was fulfilled once Jiang came up with the presidential title after 1989.18

When Jiang Zemin signified the business people as being recognized in playing a

politically acceptable role, Bao Tong reconciled with the economic reform camp by

stressing his forbearance to the patriotic contributions of left-minded merchants:

“If the regime held out an olive branch to ‘red-capitalists’, this did not imply the loosening of the principle of one-party rule. On the contrary, it implies that it is now time for the CCP, which controls all, to admit the unspoken truth and formally declare that it has become China’s Party for the Rich, the Noble and the Power. It is that simple, and should come as no surprise. The theory of ‘Three Represents’ will not begin a new era of democracy. Nor will those red-capitalists attracted by absolute power become the engine for political reform.”19

Bao Tong showed his unprecedented acceptance to those Chinese entrepreneurs, who

remained loyal with the PRC Regime regardless of their miserable experiences during

the forceful egalitarianism in Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Being assimilated by

16 Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st

Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.648 – The New-Old Generation]17 (Same as above) [P.651 – The New-Old Generation]18 (Same as above) [P.648 – The New-Old Generation]{Jiang Zemin decreed in response to Yang Shangkun’s resentment: “It is normal to have differences of opinion, but opposition in action is not allowed. Anybody who fails to realize this point is no Communist!”}19 Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st

Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.642 – The New-Old Generation] {Bao Tong’s statement}

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Jiang’s perceptions, Bao Tong further understood that, to recollect talents for a

prospective socio-economic modernization, ‘red experts’ could not be defined

between two extreme sides of sharp contrasts without room for ambiguity. Rather,

under the condition of selfless devotion and unbiased (faction-free) patriotism,

entrepreneurs could come to collaborative terms with the Communists. As Bao Tong

was willing to abandon his suspicions upon capitalists, Jiang could secure his strategy

of regulating a free-market economy with a facilitation of Party supervision.

Jiang strived equilibrium between traditional constituents and modern economic philosophy with his immense trust to Shanghai faction

Throughout Jiang Zemin’s endeavor of reintegrating PRC regime with economist

cadres, it was assumed that Jiang was a ‘pragmatic socialist’ who die-heartedly

inherited Deng’s ideal. He gave up communist radicalism and political romanticism20,

but to adore gradualism and realism that suited the new nationalist and patriotic goals

of contemporary Chinese civilization. To discipline the masses and ensure a

widespread unity from the civilian field, Jiang initially restored the autocratic values

from traditional Chinese cultures. Jiang manipulated the old verities within the

authoritative PRC personnel hierarchy to gradually alienate Li Peng and other left-

minded conservatives, with an ingenious adoption of ‘expediential appeasements’ and

‘alternative alliances’ to consolidate his justification to the ideological re-

modifications based on modern capitalist intelligences. In 2001, Jiang proclaimed

“Three Represents” as the ideological legacy of his cored leadership, namely

“advanced productive forces’, “advanced culture” and “the fundamental interests of

20 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian, “The Chinese Communist Party in Reform”, 1st Edition in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada [P.204 – ‘Jiang’s Pragmatic Attempts’, from ‘Intra-party democracy: A revisionist perspective from below’ by He Baogang]

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the majority”21. With a rejection to Zhao Ziyang’s ideal, a full and genuine Chinese

democracy, with multi-party system as the supplement, was forbidden to coexist with

the domination of Communist Party. In accordance to Jiang’s idea of “socialism with

Chinese features”, which undoubtedly offended the ‘red psychology’ of left-minded

conservative camp, the open-mindedness of PRC Regime was only limited to a

forbearing absorption of financial and entrepreneurial experiences from the West, for

example, the introduction of rural enterprises, agricultural banks, foreign investments

to farming activities and rural-currency reforms.

CONFUCIAN VALUES AS A LEGITIMIZATION OF JIANG’S SUPREME AUTHORITY OF “TOTALISM”

The collapse of Maoist Socialism as an ideology-based solidarity would lead to an

undermining of CCP’s authoritative control over its cadres. Such phenomenon was

reflected from the widespread abuse of power and corruption by provincial leaders.

The growing tendency for the rural officials in terms of abusing their bureaucratic

power for individual financial benefits continued to tyrannize the populace after the

Tiananmen crackdown22. Even the student protestors roared their emergent demands

for a widespread prosecution of monetary bribes, the corrupted cadres, both from the

leftist camp or from Zhao Ziyang’s camp, were still not alarmed by the administrative

crises in 1989 and continued with their financial embezzlements, injustice connivance

upon the inferior power, and illegal exploitation of people’s wealth. Meanwhile, Jiang

dared not to radically transform the PRC Regime into a democratic state with multi-

party and judiciary system as a move to outlaw the brutal cadres, as he feared of a

possible intensification of military decentralization within such a complicated

21 Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st

Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.642 – The New-Old Generation]22 (Same as above) [P.353 – Reason for Jiang to curb democracy: Re-ideologization]

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factionalized institution of the whole nation. Jiang’s introduction of old Confucian

thoughts in his ideological legacy was an applicable alternative, apart from either

Liberalism or Maoist Fundamentalism, to re-unify the Chinese populace that had

become disillusioned with socialist morality and was indulging in Western

individualism.

Rule by virtue

To strive for equilibrium between money-worship and spiritual endeavors, Jiang

Zemin introduced “Rule by Virtue” as his administrative legacy, in which the three

knowledgeable phrases were adopted from the principle of “faithful consciousness

with wholesome temperaments” (yi cheng xin zheng) from the texts of “The Virtues

of Tertiary Studies” (Da Xue):23

1. To cultivate and make oneself useful to the society (siushen)2. To look after the family and have a strong sense of family responsibilities (qijia)3. Peace and harmony under heaven (pintianxia)24

Not only did these phrases provide a code of conduct for party cadres with bad

absence of an official ideology, the spiritual affections from the behavioral

methodology, so-called “etiquette” (li), were to complement the legal system of PRC

Regime. Yet, as Law deterred people from doing evil, Jiang never denied the

significance of moral values, human feelings and family concerns to harmoniously re-

modify people’s personalities, as well as recollecting submissiveness from the

populace through educational means. With the influx of entrepreneurial utilitarianism,

23 Cai Fanglu, Shu Dagang and Guo Qi, “New Horizon, New Interpretation – Zhu Xi’s Ideology and Modern Society” (VOL.1), 1st Edition in Dec 2007, Sichuan University Publication Limited, PRC [P.208 - “The Innermost Temperaments of Zhu Xi’s Civilian-based Ideal and Humanist Values” by Tan Ping, Dean of Arts and Professor of Chengdu University] {Textual origin of ‘siushen’, ‘qijia’ and ‘pingtianxia’ 修身、齊家、平天下}24 Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.313-314 & P.350: Rule by Virtue]

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Jiang upheld the Confucian values in a modernized manner, similar to the emergence

of Neo-Liberalism25, by encouraging business people to develop individual

professional ethic codes26, or else the PRC would exert a limited degree of

interventionist policy in order to stabilize the civic economy.

Chinese understanding of ‘Party’ as a collective solidarity

Jiang reiterated the importance of “one-party rule” as enabling the PRC Regime with

a monitoring role to request people for making a consistent dedication to the

nationwide populace. Yet, the third generation of PRC leadership had a faithful

determination to improve CCP’s congress system and provincial politics, but it didn’t

imply that people could enjoy fully-pledged privileges in liberalistic and individualist

development or share political says with the bureaucrats. Yet, both Deng and Jiang did

not deny the usefulness of democracy in upgrading the socio-economic standards of

Chinese civilization, but they reserved the progress as the least prior concern,

stressing that the pluralistic democratic path should combine with Chinese values

which suited the pragmatic national conditions, such as the socio-economic needs of

vast agricultural majorities and the predictable resistance from the octogenarian

military influences within the provincial strata.

1. At a normative level, Party is a collective concept excluding private interest. Party is for the promotion of collective and public interests such as community and nation-state beyond private ones.

25 Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st

Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.654 – Neo-liberalism in economic development: a limited extent of interventionist policy in the capitalist reform]26 Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.359 – Rule by Virtue]{Jiang’s loyal scholars argued that rule by virtue cannot be understood only in the context of China’s cultural development, but also in socio-economic progress……. Jiang does not mean to go back to such an ancient virtue. It is not meant to repeat China’s traditional values but to modernize these values in modern socio-economic circumstances.}

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2. The Party is, or represents, the whole, the CCP represents all peoples in China and is equivalent to Chinese nation. Party = state = government = people. The concept of party does not contain the idea that party becomes a party.

3. Because the Party is, and represents, the whole on a collective basis, factions within the Party are denied in terms of moral principles, unity and solidarity. In real party life, factions do exist but the Party suppresses them.

4. CCP monopolizes political power in the name of providing national security, unity and social control. This is a link between one-party domination and denial of liberal democracy.

5. Dissent is an enemy of the Party; and discipline is a key to maintaining the unity of the Party.

6. The Party believes that plural parties will lead to disintegration.27

Yet, the Communist Party made an unprecedented toleration to the emancipation of

people’s intellectual thoughts and rational decision-makings, specifically the

individual hedonism of urban people’s livelihood. However, with regards to the

ancestral ideology of Maoist socialism as the legitimate pursuit of CCP Constitution,

Communists’ leadership authority, for sure, could not be institutionally offended. All

the decision-makings were not to accommodate the ever-diversifying and ever-

varying interests of particular bourgeoisie or intellectual groups in this contemporary

Chinese society, but to accommodate the universal goodness in accordance to the idea

of “collectivization”. Therefore, individualist privileges was ready to subordinate to

the national development, Party prestige and socialist commandment, and

unquestioned obedience was a vital factor to successfully uphold “totalism” (or to say,

post-totalitarianism) and ensure no hindrance to achieve national strength.

“Limited Response Model” A flexible and comparatively humanized gesture of punishing the post-Tiananmen dissidents in response to the international expectations

27 Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.341-342: Limited Response Model]

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Though Jiang Zemin noticed that the bloodshed guilty of left-minded conservatives in

June Fourth Incident could not be re-assured for the sake of preventing from another

trend of factional confrontation, he still endeavored to reconstruct a limitedly liberal

image whenever tackling with diplomatic functions. By demonstrating China with a

benevolent, compassionate, harmonious, peaceful, approachable, civilian-based,

ethical and liberal image in accordance to what Confucius expected an immortal

nation to possess; the PRC could gain more resources, tremendous applause and

greater recognition which thus benefit China in resolving unification issues with

Taiwan28.

Prospectively speaking, the PRC Regime could not always resort to “Tiananmen-

liked” suppressive measures while the civic disputes emerged. To minimize the social

implications of those fragmented protests (such as employment disputes, conflicts

between workers and provincial governments, racial conflicts or the disturbance of

China Democratic Party in the late 1990s), a “limited response” model was applied to

make the controversy milder. Realizing that the leftist ideological forces and

octogenarian revolutionary cadres eventually retreated from the political arena, Jiang

Zemin chose not to constitute too much pressure on citizens with new mentality,

rationale and civic demands. Jiang Zemin would pressure the provincial cadres to

pacify the resented people in a low-profile manner29, for example, publishing the

28 Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.322: Limited political open-mindedness of Jiang]{Take for example; China’s recent signing of two international conventions concerning human rights. And, during the United States’ President Clinton’s visit to China, live television broadcasting was permitted, during which President Clinton openly criticized the Chinese government’s handling of the June Fourth Incident. For this openness, the Chinese government received tremendous applause from abroad and, within the country, the liberalists did not take this opportunity to rise and act against the government.}29 Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.342 – Nature of “limited response” model]

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rivals in the less important newspaper columns and exiling the imprisoned dissidents

to receive medical treatments in the United States30 as a mean of minimizing the

psychological disfavor of the Hong Kong, Taiwanese and Overseas-Chinese

intellectuals.

As He Baogang commented, it is difficult for China (PRC Regime) to break her

holistic tradition (mainly in institutional and constitutional aspects) to endorse an

individualistic concept of the party31 in accordance to the Western mode of democratic

thoughts. What Jiang Zemin could do at most, as Zheng Yongnian and Lai Hongyi

indicated, was to strive for a balance between law and morality during legislation and

administration of justice, with an addition of establishing a system of moral

evaluation and moral supervision. Jiang’s occasional demonstration of flexibility in

the issues of human rights and domestic policies was appropriate to the “etiquette”

proclaimed by Confucian ethics, in which he showcased a limited extent of quasi-

citizen forbearance under his ultimate attempt of “totalism” and “post-totalitarian

authoritative rule”.

EVENTUAL PATH TO MODERN BUREAUCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

As Lance L.P. Gore commented, the institutional acceptance of capitalist

entrepreneurs, which was an inevitable alternative for PRC China to reverse its

dilemma of economic stagnation and impoverished livelihood after the 1989 Turmoil,

would accelerate enormous contradictions within the established bureaucratic

30 (Same as above) [P.342 – Nature of “limited response” model] {Liu Nianchuan, Chairman of China Democratic Party, was released and allowed to go with his family to the United States with the reason of “receiving medical treatments overseas”.}31 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian, “The Chinese Communist Party in Reform”, 1st Edition in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada [P.205 – ‘Creating a Chinese model of democratization?’, from ‘Intra-party democracy: A revisionist perspective from below’ by He Baogang]

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operations of Communist Party32. The nation-wide implementation of ‘Shareholding

Collaborative System’, ‘Ordinance on Asset Ownership’, ‘Hoisted and Publicized

Land-Speculation System’ and ‘Ordinance of Entrepreneurship’ had to be

accommodated by judiciary re-modifications and abolishment on totalitarian manner

of commercial censorship. These provided an insurant framework to maintain the

transparency of monetary creditability, autonomy of property usage, incorporative

procedures, and financial transactions on banking, trading, shares and security bonds,

while a higher degree of autonomy was granted to commercial aspirators for their

sustainable utilization of wealth on national advancements. The first thing Jiang

Zemin had to do, same as what Deng Xiaoping expected, was to continue with a

wholesome normalization of relationship between Communists and commercial

strata. Gerontocracy, which symbolized a stagnation of developmental incentives, had

to be revised to ‘slightly and repressively demonstrate’ how the new generation of

CCP leadership forbore with professionalism, as well as bridging the durational gap of

CCP bureaucratic philosophy with the universal trend of institutional etiquette for a

better presentation of national image.

Jiang Zemin defined an “Age Limit” to regulate leadership succession and personnel

reshuffling33. This helped the CCP to legitimize the admission of private entrepreneurs

and constitutionally avoided the cored leader to maneuver their “elderly

statesmanship” without mental rationale through a personal reservation of marshal

influence even after their institutional retirement. But, as Wang Gungwu and Zheng

Yongnian stated, Jiang enforced such an ideological breakthrough, which was

regarded as not in accordance to both the Maoist tradition of ‘idolatry’ and the

32 Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.30 – ‘Rethinking the Collapse of Communism: The Role of Ideology Then and Now’ by Lance L.P Gore]33 Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.15 – The establishment of “age” as an institutional factor regulating power succession]

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Confucian tradition of ‘aging ethical hierarchy’ because the CCP encountered the

crisis of recruitment due to the “brain drain” after the widespread outlaw of

bourgeoisie activists in 1989. To revive the authoritative reputation of CCP as an

aspiration of fulfilling his desire for personal glory, Jiang dared to restrain the

dissident voices of left-minded conservatives with political gestures and encountered

himself with the demands of private entrepreneurs.

Of course, Jiang Zemin knew that the younger Communist generations might be even

more experienced, civilized and open-minded in economic, managerial and global

philosophies. Thus, he re-enlightened a “limited revisionism” on the “nomenclature”

through a deepening of Cadre Personnel System. Seeing that a compromising

atmosphere was fabricated between conservative and reformative camp, Jiang

assigned Zeng Qinghong with the directorship of Central Organization Department,

rather than the Ministry of Personnel, to conduct open appointment and selection of

4th CCP cored leadership34. Jiang initially enabled democratic experiments in the

provincial levels under the ‘Public Notification System’35. With the intensification of

“household responsibility system” in agricultural provinces as a manner of

discouraging rural emigrations, peasants were allowed to vote for their village leaders

through the rural elections (e.g. Ya’an Multiple-candidate Election for Party

Secretary36) as a mechanism to foresee provincial leaders with merit-based civil

service under the popular supervision. In case of bureaucratic incompetence, peasants

could individually present their petitions to the State Council through a decent arrival

at Beijing, and cadres of central government could better solicit public feedbacks on

the performance of provincial cadres.

34 (Same as above) [P.288-289 – Deepening the Cadre Personnel System]35 (Same as above) [P.288-289 – Deepening the Cadre Personnel System]36 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian, “The Chinese Communist Party in Reform”, 1st Edition in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada [P.194 – Intra-party Democracy]

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However, Jiang Zemin’s limited release of socio-economic autonomy resulted in an

alienation of de-moralist influences without a vigorous supervision from profound

legal restrictions, in which the commercial gratification of authoritative entrepreneurs

was rewarded at the expense of privileges from weakness groups. As power

decentralization was put into effect with an immature system of social-welfare

protectionism concerning poor peasants’ secured attempts to judiciary appeals, the

provincial leaders could not be prevented from having bribing connections or the so-

called “mutual-understandings” with the authoritative entrepreneurs, who might

jointly construct latitude to disobey the indeed expectation of Beijing authorities and

drag their feet in carrying out the center’s policies. Whenever ‘land conscriptions’

were conducted for infrastructural developments that enforced a non-compensational

confiscation of peasants’ ancestral farmlands, the tortured minorities hardly made

emptive counteractions to obstruct the offending transactional procedures within the

dichotomized institutional circulations between central and provincial governments

due to the intra-bureaucracy personnel coherences.

CONCLUSION:NEO-TRADITIONAL IMAGE OF COMMUNISM UNDER JIANG TO ACCOMMODATE THE CAUTIOUS SOCIO-

ECONOMIC GROWTH

To sum up, Jiang Zemin obtained his presidential reign as he skillfully appeased the

octogenarians, as well as being unquestionably submissive with Deng Xiaoping’s

leadership, during the factional struggles between conservatives and liberalists.

However, Jiang was requested to reconstruct the post-1989 economic order based on

Deng Xiaoping’s cautious and moderate framework of PRC modernization. Thus,

while Jiang was introducing political recentralization for a better ideological

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censorship on various provinces, he still endeavored to apply Confucianism as a mean

of relaxing the rigidity of the totalitarian model in terms of positing “a rich subculture

of instrumental-personal ties’ around the formal communist institutional hierarchy37.

Under the condition of not threatening the constitutional legitimacy of Marxism,

Socialism with Chinese features and one-party dictatorship, a comparatively greater

room of liberty was eventually re-released to local entrepreneurs, bourgeoisie, traders

and other commercial aspirators by the end of 1990s, as individuals were enabled to

pursue private interests and personal advancements based on an ever-normalized

state-society relationship. But, these groups of economists were foreboded from

talking about institutional democratization. Knowing that the preoccupation of left-

minded conservatives would result in poisonous roots of “class-struggle” and

“collectivized” ideas, which hindered the wholesome socio-economic revival of PRC

Regime; Jiang thus induced the authoritative octogenarians to better influence those

who took part in Tiananmen Crackdown to surrender their supreme cadre positions.

The most famous phrase Jiang had ever adopted to criticize Li Peng and his

conservative fellows was, “To break the shackles of traditional conceptions and

subjective prejudices, and overcome our habit of following the beaten track and

rejecting new things” 38. According to Jiang’s pragmatic cherishment, the fundamental

interest of Chinese majority in the aspect of daily livelihood was more significant than

theoretical indoctrination and ideological mobilization, whereas the improvement of

socio-economic circumstances had to be done in accordance to evolutionary logics.

Though Jiang remained less open-minded in political, constitutional and judiciary

changes with regards to his concentration on nationwide stability, his prior effort in

37 Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003, Eastern University Press, Singapore [P.31 – Neo-traditional image of communism]38 Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st

Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the United States [P.651 – Jiang Zemin urged cadres to abandon their conservative thoughts]

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abandoning the Maoist model of collectivized economy deserves recognition as he, in

accordance to Deng’s ultimate expectation, pushed China towards a new millennium

of well-being nation with ‘interventionist capitalism’ as foundation.

Reference Materials

1. Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian, “Damage Control – The Chinese

Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era”, 1st Edition in 2003,

Eastern University Press, Singapore

2. Jonathan Fenby, “Modern China – The Fall and Rise of a Great

Power, 1850 to the Present”, 1st Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, the

United States

3. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian, “The Chinese Communist

Party in Reform”, 1st Edition in 2006, Routledge, USA & Canada

4. Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, “China In The 1990s”, 1st

Edition in 1995, McMillian Press Limited, United Kingdom

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5. Cai Fanglu, Shu Dagang and Guo Qi, “New Horizon, New

Interpretation – Zhu Xi’s Ideology and Modern Society” (VOL.1), 1st

Edition in Dec 2007, Sichuan University Publication Limited, PRC

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