Demokratizacija Arapskog Svijeta OK

8/13/2019 Demokratizacija Arapskog Svijeta OK

1/19

This article was downloaded by: [193.198.214.132]On: 19 April 2012, At: 03:05Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Democracy and SecurityPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdas20

States Do Not Just Fail and Collapse:

Rethinking States in the Middle EastRolf Schwarz

a& Miguel de Corral

a

aMiddle East Faculty, NATO Defense College, Italy

Available online: 18 Aug 2011

To cite this article:Rolf Schwarz & Miguel de Corral (2011): States Do Not Just Fail and Collapse:Rethinking States in the Middle East, Democracy and Security, 7:3, 209-226

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2011.600581

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditionsof use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representationthat the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of anyinstructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary

sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditionshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2011.600581http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2011.600581http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditionshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2011.600581http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdas20


2/19

Democracy and Security, 7: 209226, 2011

Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1741-9166 print/1555-5860 online

DOI: 10.1080/174 19166.2011.600581

States Do Not Just Failand Collapse: RethinkingStates in the Middle East

Rolf Schwarz and Miguel de Corral

Middle East Faculty, NATO Defense College, Italy

The Arab Spring reinforces the argument that there is a need for a more comprehensiveclassification of states. The events that took place in early 2011 serve to show why cer-tain states have developed as they have. Much of Western scholarship has failed toconceptualize this aspect of statehood and has taken Max Webers ideal-typical state asthe holder of the monopoly of violence, seen as legitimate by all its people as a given.The debates have been limited to two ideal types: the strong, legitimate, and demo-cratic state (in Western Europe and North America), and the failed and authoritarian

state (in the Third World, mainly in Africa) plagued by insecurities and instability.States that fit neither characterization, like most Middle Eastern states, have not beenadequately treated in the debate. These are neither failed states, nor are they fullydemocratic. Middle Eastern states are both strong in the area of security and coercionand weak in the area of democratic representation and legitimacy, and hence fill a mid-dle ground. But as the Arab Spring shows, this is not a permanent or viable situation,and changes can be expected. By using a more nuanced model for states, we can furtherunderstand current developments in the Middle East and infer possible trajectory ofstate transformation.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Democracy, Middle East, State Failure, State Formation

A previous version of this article was presented at the 6th Pan-European Conferenceon International Relations, ECPR Standing Group on International Relations, Section21, The Place of the Middle East in International Relations: Making Sense of GlobalInterconnection and Local Dynamics in Middle East Politics (Turin, September 1215,2007). Many thanks to Martin Beck, Oliver Jtersonke, Philipp Stucki, and ChrisSchnaubelt for comments and suggestions.The views expressed by the authors in this article are their own and do not necessarilyreflect the official position of the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization.

Address correspondence to Rolf Schwarz, Middle East Faculty, NATO Defense College,Via Giorgio Pelosi 1, 00144 Rome, Italy. E-mail: [email protected];[email protected]


3/19

210 R. Schwarz and M. de Corral

INTRODUCTIONToday, the sovereign equality of states seems a far cry from the reality of

international relations. World politics is witnessing new forms of governance

structures that reflect a range of de facto holders of sovereign powers within

states (warlords, local gangs and militias, private military companies, and

so on), as well as substantial asymmetries of power among sovereign states.

Sovereignty seems today no longer as inherently territorial, nor as exclu-

sively in the hands of states. Practice shows that for centuries sovereignty

has been divided among a variety of actors and shared by them in constella-

tions that often transcended territorial boundaries, and that has been violated

in theory and practice.1 De facto sovereign control can also be held by var-

ious actors and not only by states, as witnessed in several Middle Eastern

countries; most prominently Iraq2 but also Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and

Libya. Globalization has weakened the state and led to weak states in the

Middle East,3 failed and fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa,4 and interme-

diary states in Latin America and Southeast Asia.5 Given this global trend

one may speak of the emergence of persistent state weakness in todays

world.6 But despite this, many countries limp along chronically weak and frag-

ile, but do not fully collapse.7 The recent Arab Spring shows that while state

institutions have displayed their frailty and regimes have been violently con-tested, most states, with the exception of Libya, have not yet collapsed. Yemen

and Syria are extremely fragile, as civil war is looming, and might slip into

collapse.

Max Weber famously defined the state as a human community that suc-

cessfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a

given territory,8 but he never took for granted that all states were in real-

ity strong and controlling their territory; rather it was legitimacy that set

states apart from other forms of coercion and violence. Hence Webers focus

remained on the difference between legitimate domination (Herrschaft) and

coercive power (Macht) in the exercise of sovereign state functions.9 This dis-tinction has however remained outside of much Western scholarship, which

has conceptualized and measured variations in states in distance to the ideal

type, and which has remained bound by a normative model of what the state

and its relations to society should be rather than what it is.10

Empirically, tremendous variations exist among states concerning actual

state control of society, the distribution of resources, and the exercise of polit-

ical power within states (democratic or authoritarian). Terms such as weak,11

quasi,12 fragile,13 and failed14 states were introduced into the academic usage

in order to account for the phenomena that many real states fell short of the

Weberian standard and were meant to help bridge the gap between realityand the ideal. These debates have largely been limited to two ideal types:

the strong, legitimate, and democratic state in Western Europe and North


4/19

Rethinking States in the Middle East 211

America,15 and the weak and authoritarian state in the developing world,

mainly in Africa. States that fit neither characterization, like most Middle

Eastern states, have not been treated in the debate. These are neither failed

states, nor are they fully democratic. Most Middle Eastern states are both

strong (in the area of security) and weak (in the area of representation and

political legitimacy). In some cases (Tunisia and Egypt), we have seen moves

toward more representation, but outcomes are still uncertain. In other cases

(Libya and Yemen) we have seen the likely emergence of a failed state, indicat-

ing the severe fragility of state institutions. These remain exceptions. Most

Middle Eastern states are in a middle ground and as such perhaps not so

exceptional in a global context. Weak and fragile states are common phe-nomena and perhaps should be seen as the norm.16 They do not necessarily

monopolize legitimate violence but rather broker an elite consensus in which

armed groups tolerate domestic peace in exchange for rights to extract rents.17

If this consensus breaks downs on account of political or economic grievances,

instability will reign. This could either lead to a renegotiation of the social con-

tract, as in Egypt and Tunisia, or to failure and outright violent confrontation,

as in Libya and Yemen, and possibly also Syria. Failed states can be found in

the Middle East, as latest developments show. However, they remain rare as

weak/fragile states (such as Syria, Mauritania, or Lebanon) have not yet fully

collapsed, as did Iraq in 2003, Lebanon in 1975, or Libya in 2011.Much has been written about the exceptionalism of the Middle East, and

many authors have claimed that Islamic culture and Islamic political thought

are seen as the prime reason why Middle Eastern states differ from Western

states. Indeed, there are solid theoretical reasons for this, as Islam does not

separate state and religion, and no distinction between public and private

spheres exists.18 Islamic principles demand a concrete role of the state in shap-

ing society and in the conduct of public lifethe principle of commanding right

and forbidding wrongand thus put an emphasis on divine, rather than popu-

lar, sovereignty.19 Nevertheless, political behavior and attitudes are to a large

extent adaptive to social settings and shaped by political context, and seeing

Middle Eastern states only through a culturalist perspective misses important

aspects.

Therefore we concentrate on a functional reading of the state, focusing on

the states capacity to provide public goods to its population. Viewed through

this angle, there is a wide variance concerning the future of Middle Eastern

states. Arab states, for the most part, stand apart from the strong and demo-

cratic states in Europe and North America but also from the collapsed states in

Africa. As seen by events in the Arab Spring, some states have moved toward

democratization but will inevitably face difficulties due to their weak institu-tional structures. Others will remain resilient, yet authoritarian, while some

will remain weak and fragile, yet will avoid immediate collapse.


5/19


MAKING STATES WORKThis analysis suggests that a more nuanced understanding of statehood based

on the form and the performance of the state is necessary. Statehood should

be seen as a continuum ranging from an ideal-type strong state on the one

hand (as found in the Euro-Atlantic area), to a patrimonial failed state (such

as those found in Africa, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, and

Yemen) that lacks state infrastructure and who may be violently contested

by various non-state actors. In between lie various types of states that differ

qualitatively from these two extremes.

The form of the state (failed, weak/fragile, rentier, reformed, or strong)

is linked to the performance of the state in three functions, namely in its

security,20 welfare,21 and representation22 function.23 The distinction is rem-

iniscent of earlier classifications, such as that of Barnett,24 who lists three

objectives of the state, namely war preparation, economic development, and

political stability, or that of Czempiel,25 who offers three policy domains in

which the state operates: security, economic well-being, and system of rule

(Herrschaft). More recently a typology of four dimensions of statehood, includ-

ing economic, security, social, and political, was proposed.26 While there is

considerable overlap between these classifications, minor differences exist as

to the various elements.Furthermore, the legitimacy of states is judged by their citizens in terms

of the performance of core functions. If the state fails to fulfill oneor in some

rare cases allof its functions it will equally lose its legitimacy. This allows

differentiating between cases of functional state failure and institutional state

collapse: state institutions can persist even while the state fails to fulfill its key

attributed functions. The genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994 was not

enabled or produced by the Rwandan state disintegrating or ceasing to exist,

as is often assumed. On the contrary, the genocide was produced by highly

disciplined agents of the state who pursued the task of murdering many of

its people with hideous efficiency.27 There was hence no state collapse, butstate failure, when the Rwandan state, run by Habyarimanas successor, was

defeated and displaced in mid-1994 by the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

This focus on the performance of statesso far only crudely captured in

International Relations (IR) theory as state strength and state weakness

points toward a typology of statehood used by some authors. 28

The resulting taxonomy can replace the simple North-South bifurcation

between strong and weak states, as illustrated in Table 1.29

State re-formation in Table 1 denotes the process through which a recon-

ceptualizing of state functions occurs: it describes changes in the public

conception of what it means for the state to fulfil its core functions. States areconsistently attempting to modernize and thus change their respective degree

of statehood. For example, this could see a shift from the modern Weberian


6/19


Table 1: Degrees of statehood.

Degree of statehood

FunctionsStrongstate

Reformedstate

Rentierstate

Weak/Fragile state

Failedstate

Security X X X X Welfare X X Representation X X

State Formation State Re-formation State Failure

Note. Adapted from Rolf Schwarz, The Political Economy of State-Formation in the ArabMiddle East: Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization, Review of International

Political Economy15 (2008): 603.

strong state to a reformed state. This occurred in many European states in

the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, when the state

withdrew from its welfare function and citizens were asked to take on more

private responsibility in that domain. Tunisia and Egypt, prior to their respec-

tive revolutions, were also considered reformed states. Now, in their process of

democratization, the two states are attempting to further legitimize their rep-

resentative institutions. Reconceptualizing of state functions can also occur

if, for example, rentier states that are initially able to fully distribute wel-

fare benefits to its citizens have to, through a fiscal crisis, reduce their welfarefunctions. Thus, they would either become a reformed state or a weak/fragile

state. Most Arab states in the late 1980s fit that pattern of a rentier state

in fiscal crisis. They had to readjust their welfare functions, renegotiate the

classic formula of no taxation, no representation, and ultimately widen their

political legitimacy, thereby affecting the representation function of the state.

Some succeeded, but opened space to non-state groups, mainly Islamist groups,

which filled the gap and gained legitimacy by providing socioeconomic ser-

vices the state no longer could provide. In the long term this strengthened

representation but weakened security.

Focusing on a new functional understanding of statehood allows to high-

light where most Arab states are strong (security function and, in times of

oil booms, welfare function) and where they are weak (representation func-

tion and, in times of fiscal crises, welfare function). The shift from one form to

the other and the renegotiation of statesociety relations risks bringing about

violent transitions. Reform and political change can be expected in times of

declining resources or in times of fiscal crises. This was the case during the

revolutions in both Tunisia and Egypt. As global food prices increased, people

could no longer accept the inefficiency of their government to provide basic

necessities. This simple fact, compounded by the lack of democratic repre-sentation, led to the uprisings that saw the removal of President Ben Ali, in

Tunisia, and President Mubarak, in Egypt, from power. While political change

has indeed occurred, this might be unsustainable, as the accompanying fiscal


7/19


base of the state has not been expanded. Simply changing the head of state

does not ensure that the state will become a genuine democracy.

Regarding the three categorizations that lie between the extremes of the

strong state and the failed state, the examples of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and

Yemen can best illustrate why such taxonomy is essential in IR scholarship.

Furthermore, they can demonstrate the argument that Middle East states are

indeed different and do not fit in the Weberian classifications of states.

Egypt is the prime example of a reformed state. On a security level,

the North African state is extremely strong, being the tenth largest mili-

tary in the world.30 It has 468,000 active personnel, 479,000 reserves, and

397,000 paramilitary forces.31

Over the last 30 years, the United States hasgiven Egypt $1.3 billion per year in military aid.32 The large military and

paramilitary forces have kept the country stable, especially since the 1979

Peace Treaty with Israel. Egypt is not a wealthy state by any means, and it

has no vast amounts of natural resources, differentiating its governance to

that of rentier states in the Gulf. Due to the lack of resources, the Egyptian

government has had to tax its population, and thus the people have gained

some modest form of representation in parliament and government. However,

the Egyptian state under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak insufficiently provided

welfare to its citizens. Rapid urbanization in Cairo brought about the devel-

opment of slums, and of course, a remarkable amount of poverty. Around 25percent of the population under 25 is unemployed in Egypt and has grim

prospects for employment.33 Government inefficiency to address the rampant

poverty and the welfare services demanded by the population, such as basic

food and water, sanitation, health clinics, and educational facilities, led to

the development of significant non-state actors in the country. The most rec-

ognized, the Muslim Brotherhood, is incredibly popular not only due to its

doctrine of Islam as the Solution, but also due to it providing basic ser-

vices to the population.34 The lack of welfare provisions was one of the main

forces driving the Egyptian Revolution, as food prices rose and the government

could not placate an already poverty stricken population. Also, the unbal-

anced taxationrepresentation social contract, encapsulated by a corrupt and

authoritarian regime, which many in the population did not feel represented

their interests, was a major reason of the Egyptian Revolution.

Gulf States exemplify the rentier state paradigm; due to the resources

available to the state, there is no inherent need to tax the population. Saudi

Arabia, which has a large military comprised of 233,500 active personnel35

that fully protects the sovereignty of the state, fulfils the security functions

in the Weberian definition of statehood. Also, the state has the capacity to

provide welfare to the population. As noted previously, there is no need forthe state to tax the population, and thus in the past, the social contract of

taxation for representation was completely nonexistent. However, due to the

demands of the population, there is a glimpse of a shift from the traditional


8/19


no taxation, no representation social contract, as there will be, once again,

municipal elections in the country. Saudi Arabia, even after protests in early

2011, is still viewed as a strong monarchy in the Gulf region, which looks as

though it will continue its authoritarian rule unchallenged.

Yemen is the best illustration for a weak/fragile state that has recently

slipped into state failure. Tribes and non-state actors are strong and place lim-

its on the reach of state authority. Legitimacy and public trust in the armed

forces is low, and thus the public relies on tribes and extended family to provide

for security, especially in remote areas. The reach of the states armed forces

does not extend far beyond the capital Sanaa. And while 80 percent of the

armed forces are located in urban areas throughout Yemen, only 25 percent ofthe total population lives there, leaving a majority of the population outside

of the states reach. This means that the authority of the central government

is limited to the capital and the major cities and does not extend across the

whole country. Thus, while plagued by a general political legitimacy deficit,

Yemen has recently been subject to three converging security challenges that

have weakened state authority further and opened questions about coming

state failure.36 In the North of Yemen, the Houti rebellion has waged since

2004 and has recently brought instability that has spilled over into neighbor-

ing Saudi Arabia. In the South, calls for secession have been heard, awakening

remembrance of the civil war that had plagued Yemen in 1994. In addition tothis, Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula has made Yemen its central area of

operations, and terrorism has struck the country on several occasions, includ-

ing through the bombing of foreign embassies and the kidnapping of Western

tourists. This triple challenge has strained the already weak institutions and

has highlighted the dangers of a political system that builds on security,

surveillance, and tribal connections without developing the proper accountable

institutions. While providing faint security, Yemen has failed. Recent events in

the country highlight this, as there have been bloody protests demanding the

removal of President Saleh from power, and even an attack on President Saleh

that left him severely wounded and forced him to leave Yemen and seek med-

ical treatment in Saudi Arabia. Despite months of divide, Yemen has not yet

collapsed. The ongoing political crisis and the looming civil war might lead to

collapse in the near future.

EXPLAINING MIDDLE EASTERN STATES

There are a variety of reasons as to why Middle Eastern states are, for the most

part, in that middle ground between the two extremes of a strong state and a

failed state. Major factors include the emergence of non-state actors, who areespecially prevalent throughout the region due to many governments inability

to provide basic functions to their populations. These actors have replaced the

state in many ways, but this has not necessarily meant state collapse.


9/19


Many states in the developing world have seen parallel developments, as

in the Arab World recently, that all differ markedly from the historic path of

state formation in Europe.37 These states have not been able to create the state

capacity that would allow them to fulfill state functions such as taxation and

the provision of public goods. While much of this weakness went unnoticed

as long as they possessed enough external revenues, states became vulnerable

when they ran out of resources and when they had to adjust to cutbacks in pub-

lic services and welfare provisions. As pressures for integration in a globalized

world have risen, so have economic activities become detached from sovereign

states. As a consequence, many a states ability or willingness to tax its popu-

lation has waned. The void left behind by the retreat of the state in deliveringpublic services has been filled in many instances by private actorsnon-

state groups, civil-society networks, warlords, and others. Not only have these

groups started to tax their constituents, but they also provide basic state func-

tions such as health care and education. Actors such as Hezbollah, the Muslim

Brotherhood, and Hamas, although in the West seen as extremist Islamist

groups, are viewed in their country as groups that readily provide the pop-

ulation with basic necessities and who give the underrepresented population a

voice.38

New governance patterns seem to be emerging as a reaction to the with-

drawal of the state and the emergence of non-state actors.39 This has beencalled the new Middle Ages,40 as the rise of private statelets that coexist in

a delicate, often symbiotic relationship with a larger state: In the cities of the

developing world, groups ranging from criminal gangs to Islamist civil-society

networks have assumed many of the functions that states have abandoned,

funding their operations through informal taxes as well as proceeds from the

drug trade, human trafficking, and money laundering.41

In Lebanon, a chronically weak state, different armed groups and militias

exist, and despite the end of the civil war (19751991), still put a limit on

the reach of the Lebanese armed forces. In the South, Hezbollah has created

a state within a state, and provides many state-like functions in the area

of social services, health care, and of course security, and in the Palestinian

camps, groups like Fatah al-Islam control large parts of the security sector and

have engaged in the past in violent combat with the Lebanese armed forces.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgencies waged over the past decade have

underlined the weakness of state authority and the difficult task of recon-

structing a state and capable armed forces in a postconflict society.

And despite these enormous challenges, most Middle Eastern stateswith

the exceptions of Yemen and Libyahave not succumbed to state failure and

state collapse. Middle Eastern states may be weak and undemocratic, but theyare surviving. They must be set apart from the strong and democratic states

that emerged in early modern Europe and North America, but they must

also be distinguished from the failed and collapsed states in Africa. Despite

expectations of full-blown upcoming collapse, even weak/fragile states like


10/19


Syria and Yemen have not yet succumbed to outright state collapse,42 and

Lebanon, despite its many power centers, has lingered on as a state. What

accounts for this? Why have states not just collapsed in view of their appar-

ent weakness? Is this stability of weak states an ephemeral phenomenon and

are the states of the region prepared for large governance crises, such as those

currently taking place?

To answer these questions, a look at European history helps. The rise of

the modern state in early modern Europe was accompanied by the power to

tax people and to extract financial and human resources from society. Through

this it became necessary for absolutist monarchs to extend rights of repre-

sentation in government to those capable of paying the taxes necessary tofinance wars they wished to fight. The expansion of political rights to the

gentry, the bourgeoisie, and later the working class thereby became associ-

ated with states whose relative legitimacy permitted them to raise more taxes

and build greater military capabilities. The much larger and technologically

sophisticated armies sponsored by these states also required more developed

and effective administrative structures to extract resources. The use of these

enhanced capabilities to execute successful wars then led to even greater

administrative and political capacities to tax and extract other resources.

Thus, for centuries, wars, conflicts, and armed violence were the driving

force in building viable, legitimate, and democratic states on the Europeancontinent.43

The logic that drove state formation in Europe, namely the interplay

between war and state making, was not able to unfold fully in the Middle East

and other world regions due to the high degree of outside penetration. The

effects of military competition had required European states to organize them-

selves effectively internally and hence contributed to the emergence of a few

centrally organized state bureaucracies. The highly asymmetrical competition

between Middle Eastern states and outside great powers effectively hindered

the same effect.

When the ferocious men and women who built Britain, the United States,

Germany Italy, France and Russia used advantages over their neighbors for ter-

ritorial aggrandizement and the construction of great national states, there was

no external club of preexisting great powers able to penetrate their continents

and enforce paralyzing fragmented status quo on behalf of civilized norms of

interstate behavior.44

Several other factors blocked the war makes states process and produced

a mixture of strong and weak states in the Middle East. Firstly, excess

oil revenue in the hand of the state reduced the state necessity to extractresources (taxation) from its own population. Second, rentier states had the

privilege to distribute and allocate excess oil revenues according to political

considerations and without reference to economic consideration. Third, a high

level of rentierism had a negative effect on the human, social, and economic


11/19


development of a country. While the economic benefits from oil revenues were

only short-lived, the long-term consequences were market distortions, corrup-

tion, unproductive economic sectors, and the absence of autonomous social

groups. All three aspects underline that rentier states differ drastically from

states whose role is to collect taxes. The process through which war-makers

are civilianized due to their need to forge a symbiosis with nascent civilian

state-makers never materializes. Rather, rentierism leads to the emergence of

weak states in two ways: economically and politically.

Economically, rent-based state formation leads to particular institutional

structures within rentier states. The allocation of rents follows political crite-

ria (loyalty, proximity to rulers, family relationships) and thereby leads to areinforcement of traditional loyalties and a lack of bureaucratic state capac-

ity. It is not position but proximity that determines access to resources and

privileges and hence the welfare of citizens. While most development theories

focus on formal institutions within countries (parliaments, the judiciary, polit-

ical parties, trade unions), the bulk of transactions occur in rentier states in

the informal realm. In the Arab world, the informal nature of politics, the pat-

rimonial nature of social interactions, and the role of informal institutions is

central. Social interaction and decision making in all fields of politics are deter-

mined by highly elaborate networks of patrons and clients, by rent-seeking,

by informal group structures, and neopatrimonialism. Particularly importantin this context is the notion of wasta, the Arabic term for intercession, or

mediation, which is the social mechanism that determines allocation deci-

sions in society, economy, and politics. Rather than labor, personal capacity,

or merit, it is the personal contact to political decision makers that deter-

mines and facilitates how resources are allocated and thus how the material

well-being of the individual, the family, the clan, etc., is secured. Material

well-being thereby does not only imply the successful pursuit of material ben-

efits, but also embraces nonmaterial enhancements (jobs, positions, licenses,

access to information). The result is a reversal of the genuinely capitalist rela-

tions between labor, productivity, and profit.45 Wasta is an economic activity,

which involves investments in personal relations and gains in terms of allo-

cation of resources. Allocation networks build on existing cultural context but

function along modern channels. Rent allocation preserves these, but does not

create them. The preservation of tradition occurs within the vicinities of mod-

ern state institutions. The use of tradition within a formally modern system

creates additional transaction costsfor besides investing in personal rela-

tionships, entrepreneurs have also to invest in the formal regulationand

hinders the implementation of economic reforms. Societal norms and lack of

economic development are clearly linked.Politically, a rentier political bargain is stable only as long as sufficient

resources are available. In times of abundance (oil booms) it hinders the

emergence of independent political interests demanding democratization and

strengthens the autonomy of the state toward society.46 A vibrant civil society


12/19


is unlikely to emerge, and nongovernmental interests are usually organized

around the states allocation system. A high level of rentierism positively

affects the function of the modern state in providing welfare and wealth to

its citizens. The high level of wealth and welfare allocation in rentier states

has led to an implicit social contract that substitutes political rights for state-

provided welfare, as well as to the co-optation of strategic social groups. The

expenditure side of rentier states displays a state-building agenda of creating

societal peace and legitimacy through welfare allocations. While this informal

social contract may only be sustainable as long as there are enough resources

to be allocated both for the state bureaucracy and for the whole of society,

the chances for political change increase if the state fails to fulfill its part ofthe social contract and thereby fails to fulfill its welfare function. In order to

avoid state failure, the state has to react to societal demands and broaden its

representative function, which includes changes in its foreign policy.

In the Middle East, the consolidation of states saw a reconfiguration when

economic resources were no longer forthcoming. This gave rise to the retreat of

the state from its core functions and imposed a renegotiation of statesociety

relations. Where the state lacked revenues to allocate welfare benefits to soci-

ety at large, or where it withdrew from its welfare commitments, non-state

actors filled the gap. In many cases, they provided alternative avenues for

political protest, such as Islamist movements.47 Such is the case in Egyptwith the Muslim Brotherhood, which is immensely popular among many of

due the fact they provide basic services that the government seems unwill-

ing or incapable to provide.48 In some cases non-state actors even challenged

the states monopoly of violence; this was the case in Algeria, where the

Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) took over many social services abandoned

by the state and challenged the state violently.49 This was also the case in

Yemen, where a withdrawal from state-provided welfare lead to the civil war

in 1994 and became of the underlying causes of the Houti rebellion in the

north.

The linkage between welfare and representation has to be constantly rene-

gotiated. The prime considerations in this context become budget security,50

the acquisition of new revenues, and the maintenance of the states alloca-

tion power in the face of weak infrastructural power. Institutions of statehood

exist but serve the purpose of allocation, patronage, and distribution of wel-

fare. They are informal in nature and describe tacit social rules that structure

social, economic, and political interactions. Informal does not make a judg-

ment on the legal and nonlegal nature of the rules. But it highlights that while

seemingly similar, institutions function differently. In all this, many Middle

Eastern states differ from the ideal-typical strong and democratic Westernstate as well as from the collapsed states in Africa. When states in the Middle

East have failed, as in Yemen and Libya, they have lacked legitimate political

representation and welfare, and have tried to cling to oppressive security as a

form of governance.


13/19


DANGER OR HOPE AHEAD?NEW AUTHORITARIANISMOR PROSPECT FOR DEMOCRATIZATION?

The events that swept through the Middle East and North Africa during the

first few months of 2011 put on display the possible future of state transforma-

tion in the region. Egypt and Tunisia, while being reformed states, are moving

toward becoming strong states. Of course, this will take time and there are too

many variables at the moment to predict if such a shift in state transformation

will occur. Nevertheless, the revolutions spoke to the demands of the people for

more legitimate representation and for basic welfare services to be given to the

population.In the Gulf, Libya, and Syria, people have demanded more representation,

yet the protests, for the most part, have been met with repressive tactics by

the state. However, the West, and especially the United States, has pushed

states to consider the legitimate demands of the population and move toward

providing a more equitable state of representation; such is the case of Bahrain.

In Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council has seen the imminent danger of

the country collapsing. Thus, they extended a political deal in order to save

the failed state from civil war and hence stove off state collapse from the Gulf

region. A complete collapse of the state would see non-state actors, such as Al

Qaeda, possibly gain more prominence and influence, perhaps resembling thesituation of al-Shabab in Somalia.

Libya is currently embroiled in a violent conflict that resembles a civil

war where opposing factions control territory. The country has collapsed alto-

gether. Before the conflict in Libya erupted, it could be argued that Qaddafi

maintained a shadow state through his networks of patronage and oppressive

security. No institutions exist or existed previously,51 and thus no welfare or

representation systems were put in place. Security was scantily maintained

by poorly trained military and paramilitary forces, but oppressively applied.

As the country has now collapsed and is in essence divided, there is no stable

security force governing the entirety of the country. Libya, after Qaddafi, willeither see state formation or a drawn-out state collapse.

Looking at the historic process of state formation in the Middle East can

help our understanding of state collapse, its likelihood and nature. It can

also offer more general and theoretical insights into IR theory about how

states adjust their external behavior in order to assure their survival and

avoid the emergence of alternative forms of governance inside their state terri-

tory. The close connection in rentier states between the economic and political

foundation of the state leads to a twin phenomenon of state failure (in the

representation function of the state) and life support for weak and frag-

ile states. Were it not for the availability of external rents many weak and

fragile states would probably have succumbed to institutional state collapse,

even while maintaining all along a legal faade of statehood.52 Understanding


14/19


potential for state failure must hence start with an understanding of how the

three state functions interplay in a given state.

Rentier states are an interesting case. They display a particular connec-

tion between them: abundant external revenues allow the provision of welfare

and the acquisition of security to the detriment of representation. In times of

fiscal crisis the state has to withdraw its welfare function and renegotiate a

new equilibrium. This can take on an external strategy (revenue acquisition

through foreign policy and/or war-making) or an internal strategy (economic

reform and/or democratization). Both scenarios bear dangers for state fail-

ure as war-making may lead to the unmaking of the state and as economic

reform might increase societal conflicts. The heritage of a rentier economy, i.e.,the informal nature of revenue distribution within a rentier state, bears the

potential of the emergence of shadow states.

Shadow states are those states that are characterized by a commercial-

ization of politics in which a system of patronage and oppressive security

maintains a minimum level of order. Foreign aid and other forms of external

rents have offered state rulers wealth to distribute to loyal persons and finan-

cial resources to create a coercive state apparatus to marginalize and control

political opponents. This state apparatus has been maintained as long as rev-

enues and rents were forthcoming. In times of fiscal crisis it challenged the

foundations of many states: international pressures to enact economic reformand privatization measures, and cut-off patronage networks left the state

apparatus weakened and some privileged private entrepreneurs strengthened,

and in some cases exceeded a particular states capacity to enact reforms, thus

undermining its capacity even further and encouraging neopatrimonialism to

become even more rampant.53

In such a situation of economic restructuring, some state elites provoked

insecurities54 and societal tensions, sold private protection in turn, and con-

tributed in the long term to the emergence of societies that are prone to

settle disputes by recourse to violence. Viewed from this angle, the operation

of shadow states comprise already all the ingredients of state failure. State

failurewhere it occurredwas essentially a collapse of the patronage sys-

tem, which had maintained a minimum level of order and a selective form of

economic welfare (for those clients of the rulers). Even where internationally

mandated economic reforms have reduced the economic resources available to

shadow states, financial funds are often channeled through other means, such

as non-state organizations. There is an inherent importance of maintaining

the distribution of welfare benefits (even at a low level) for the continuing func-

tioning of the security of the state. Where both fall apart, as in post-2003 Iraq,

the state collapses; insecurities abound and the reimposition of the monopolyon the legitimate use of violence (the first step in process of state formation)

becomes the highest priority in the reconstruction of the state, but is often very

difficult to achieve.


15/19


Gradual reform and transformation of post-rentier states is hence the key

to transforming an allocation state into a taxation state and of transforming

weak states into legitimate, democratic states. Effective central control of the

state is a prerequisite for this.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, when attempting to understand Middle Eastern states, the

Weberian model is insufficient. Not all states fit into the simplistic charac-

terization of strong and failed states. We must recognize that varying degreesof statehood exist, and Middle Eastern states, in particular, exemplify the need

for a more advanced classification.

Most states in the region fall into the categories of reformed, rentier,

or weak/fragile. Although there exist the rare cases of failed states, this is

unusual; most states will avoid falling into either extreme of the classification.

States such as Egypt and Tunisia are working to improve state institutions

and functions and thus become a more strengthened reformed state. Rentier

states in the Gulf will most likely persist in their modes of authoritarian gov-

ernance, but will perhaps give small glimpses of political reform. Weak/fragile

states such as Syria and Yemen are in the limbo stage in which they could falleither into state collapse or push ahead as they havefrail but maintaining a

monopoly of security over the entirety of their territory but without resolving

the underlying governance problems.

Currently, the Middle East is going through a period of tremendous change.

States have transformed and will continue to transform. Arab states have the

possibility to democratize following the revolutions, but they will face consid-

erable challenges due to their institutional weakness. However, most states

will have to reform their economic and political policies in order to appease the

populations legitimate demands for a more representative government and a

more efficient welfare distribution system. Although many states may remain

weak and authoritarian, they will most likely not fully collapse. Even some

of the weakest states in the region, like Lebanon and Syria, seem to be able

to resist multiple security challenges while maintaining some form of rudi-

mentary statehood. Yemen has failed and might slide into complete collapse

if the political deadlock remains and widespread violence becomes the norm.

The situation in Libya is extremely complex, and the outcome of the current

power struggle is unclear. The prospects for Libya are either a stalemate in

which the country is divided or a post-Qaddafi scenario that either will lead

toward reform at the hands of a more legitimate regime, or an even grimmerand prolonged state collapse.

The events that shook the region in the early months of 2011 serve to show

why a new conceptualization of statehood is necessary. While the states in the


16/19


region are not like the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area, they are neither

similar to states like Afghanistan and Somalia. Evidently, this demands that

the middle ground be recognized and defined in order to better understand how

states develop.

NOTES

1. Stephan D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1999).

2. Rolf Schwarz and Oliver Jtersonke, Divisible Sovereignty and StateReconstruction in Iraq,Third World Quarterly26 (2005): 643659.

3. Kristian Ulrichsen, The Durability of Weak States in the Middle East, inPersistent State Weakness in the Global Age, ed. Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 8396; Rolf Schwarz, Introduction. Resistance toGlobalization in the Arab Middle East, Review of International Political Economy15(2008): 59098.

4. Stein Sundstl Erikson, State Formation and the Politics of Regime Survival:Zimbabwe in Theoretical Perspective, Journal of Historical Sociology 23 (2010):31640; Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authorityand Control(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Robert Rotberg, ed.,WhenStates Fail. Causes and Consequences(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

5. Miguel Angel Centeno,Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America

(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Richard F. Doner et al.,Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast andSoutheast Asia in Comparative Perspective, International Organization 59 (2005):32761.

6. Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, eds.,Persistent State Weaknessin the Global Age(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).

7. Neil A. Englehart, Governments Against States: The Logic of Self-DestructiveDespotism,International Political Science Review28 (2007): 13353.

8. Max Weber, Politik als Beruf [Politics as a Vocation], in Gesammelte PolitischeSchriften, ed. May Weber (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1919), 506.

9. Max Weber, Staatssoziologie [Essays in Sociology], in Grundriss der

Sozialkonomie, Vol. III, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Max Weber (Tbingen: MohrSiebeck, 1922), 822.

10. Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transformand Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001);Leonard Seabrooke, Bringing Legitimacy Back in to Neo-Weberian State Theory andInternational Relations (Canberra: Australian National University, Department ofInternational Relations, 2002).

11. Weak states lack infrastructural power and are unable to perform core state func-tions throughout their territories. Weak states are disconnected from societal demandsand often do not rely on domestic taxation.

12. See Robert H. Jackson,Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the

Third World(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).13. Fragile states are states that have weak structures and lack performance capacityin core state tasks; they are thus similar to weak states and only differ in the degree of


17/19


their weakness. Fragile states may be on the verge of becoming failed states but mayalso recover from state weakness and gain in capacity to perform; Stephan D. Krasnerand Carlos Pascual, Addressing State Failure, Foreign Affairs84 (2005): 15363.

14. A failed state can be defined as a polity that is no longer able or willing to per-form the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world despite maintaininginternational legal recognition; Rotberg,When States Fail, 6

15. Strong states are defined by possessing infrastructural power, namely the capac-ity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement logistically politicaldecisions throughout the realm; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 2(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 55.

16. Douglas North et al.,Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework forInterpreting Recorded Human History(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

17. Jack Snyder, The State and Violence. A Discussion of Violence and Social Orders:A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Perspectives onPolitics8 (2010): 28789.

18. Abdulaziz Sachedine, The Role of Islam in the Public Square: Guidance orGovernance?(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

19. Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

20. Security has both internal and external dimensions. More importantly, recentdebates have moved from a traditional understanding of state security to one in whichthe individual is the referent object of attention. It is this human security focus that we

follow in this article.21. Welfare refers to the improvement of the economic and social well-being of individ-uals. Nuanced disagreement exists as to whether the state should provide for welfareentitlements directly or just provide the framework under which individuals can striveto attain these.

22. Representation is most commonly associated with liberal democracies, but clas-sical social contract theories teach us that representation must not be exclusivelyassociated with them. Representation, hence, is encapsulated in the states relation-ship with its citizens through the selection of a sovereign who acts in the name of thecommonwealth and who is bound by the will of the represented.

23. Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, State Failure, State Collapse, and State

Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies,Development and Change33 (2002):75374; Rolf Schwarz, Post-Conflict Peace-Building: The Challenges of Security,Welfare and Representation,Security Dialogue36 (2005): 42946.

24. Michael N. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, andSociety in Egypt and Israel(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 6.

25. Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Internationale Politik: Ein Konfliktmodell [InternationalPolitics: A Model for Conflict] (Paderborn: Schningh/UTB, 1981).

26. Jack A. Goldstone,Deteriorating Fragile States: How to Recognize Them, How toHelp Them?(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008).

27. Christopher Clapham, The Challenge of the State in a Globalized World,Development and Change33 (2002): 776.

28. Christopher Clapham, Degrees of Statehood,Review of International Studies24(1998): 14357; Roland Dannreuther, War and Insecurity: Legacies of Northern andSouthern State Formation,Review of International Studies33 (2007): 30726; StaffanLindberg, Forms of States, Governance, and Regimes: Reconceptualizing the Prospects


18/19


for Democratic Consolidation in Africa, International Political Science Review 22(2001): 17399.

29. In rare cases there exists the possibility of state collapse. State collapse is thebreakdown of state institutions and the emergence of a situation that resembles an allout war. Its symptoms are anarchy, lawlessness, and widespread violence that threatensurrounding states and regions. This was the case in Lebanon in 1975, Iraq post-2003,and, most recently, Libya in 2011. State failure is different, as it entails poor governanceand inadequate, incompetent, or abusive national authority structures, but not neces-sarily the complete breakdown of institutions; Rolf Schwarz, NATO and Preventionof State Failure: An Idea Whose Time Will Come?, Contemporary Security Policy31(2010): 33962.

30. IISS,The Military Balance 2010(London: The International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 2010).31. Ibid.

32. US Department of State, Background Note: Egypt [2010], http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm (accessed May 23, 2011).

33. Schumpeter, Young, Jobless, and Looking for Trouble, The Economist, February3, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/02/youth_unemployment(accessed May 21, 2011).

34. Miguel de Corral, Dont Ignore the Muslim Brotherhood, The Jerusalem Post,March 1, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=210399 (accessed May 23, 2011).

35. IISS,Military Balance 2010.36. Christopher Boucek, Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral, CarnegiePapers, September 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2009/09/10/yemen-avoiding-downward-spiral/29j (accessed May 18, 2011); Ginny Hill, Yemen: Fearof Failure, Chatham House, 2008, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/bp1108yemen.pdf (accessed May 18, 2011).

37. Keith Krause, Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: TheMiddle Eastern Case, European Journal of International Relations 2 (1996): 31954;Rolf Schwarz, Rule, Revenue and Representation. Oil and State Formation in theMiddle East and North Africa(Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies,2007); Georg Srensen, War and State MakingWhy Doesnt It Work in the ThirdWorld?,Security Dialogue32 (2001): 34154; Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, Tilly

Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World, InternationalStudies Review10 (2008): 2756.

38. de Corral, Dont Ignore the Muslim Brotherhood.

39. Philip G. Cerny, Neomedievalism, Civil War and the New Security Dilemma:Globalisation as Durable Disorder,Civil Wars1 (1998): 3644; Batrice Pouligny, CivilSociety and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes

Aimed at Building New Societies, Security Dialogue36 (2005): 42946.

40. John Rapley, The New Middle Ages,Foreign Affairs85 (2006): 96.

41. Ibid., 102.

42. David Hughes, Yemens Problems are the Regions Problems, NATO Review

4 (2010), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Yemen/Yemen_region_problems/EN(accessed May 18, 2011).

43. Charles Tilly,Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 9901990(Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1990).


19/19


44. Ian Lustick, The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: PoliticalBackwardness in Historical Perspective, International Organization51 (1997): 675.

45. Eva Bellin,Stalled Democracy. Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-SponsoredDevelopment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Oliver Schlumberger, ArabPolitical Economy and the European Unions Mediterranean Policy: What Prospectsfor Development?,New Political Economy5 (2000): 24768.

46. Michael Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?,World Politics53 (2001): 32561.

47. Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed.,Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory Approach(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

48. de Corral, Dont Ignore the Muslim Brotherhood.

49. Pradeep K. Chhibber, State Policy, Rent Seeking, and the Electoral Success of aReligious Party in Algeria, Journal of Politics58 (1996): 12648.

50. Laurie Brand, In Search of Budget Security: A Reexamination of JordanianForeign Policy, in Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations ofRegional and Outside Powers, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 13958.

51. Daniel L. Byman, Qaddafis Legacy, Brookings Institution, February 24,2011, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0224_libya_byman.aspx (accessed May20, 2011).

52. Jackson,Quasi-States; Rotberg,When States Fail.

53. Jean-Francois Bayart et al., The Criminalisation of the State in Africa (Oxford:James Currey, 1999); Neil Cooper, Picking Out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces:

Representation of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy, SecurityDialogue 36 (2005): 46378; Beatrice Hibou, From Privatising the Economy toPrivatising the State: An Analysis of the Continual Formation of the State, inPrivatising the State, ed. Beatrice Hibou (London: Hurst & Co., 2004), 147.

54. William Reno, The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States,Development andChange33 (2002): 83758.

Demokratizacija Arapskog Svijeta OK

Documents

Transcript of Demokratizacija Arapskog Svijeta OK